figurational thinking and first image theorizing in ir · figurational thinking and first image...

Figurational thinking and first image theorizing in IR

Paper for presentation at the ECPR Joint Sessions 2011

Workshop 14 'Bringing the Individual Back In' – International Relations and the First Image

First draft - Please do not quote

Abstract

The problem of theorizing the individual actor is strongly tied to the agency-structure problem. I propose that none of the major theoretical solutions to this problem have successfully conceptualized agency, due to the ontological assumptions of the initial problem formulation. If we examine scientific realist accounts, we find that they are based on a Cartesian subject. Here a core of agency escapes socialization, irreconcilably separating agency from structure. If we examine structuration theory, we find that the concept of 'knowledgeability' is rooted in a bodily and unconscious search for ontological security at an individual level. Both schools of thought remain trapped in an agency-structure dichotomy, and thereby squander the opportunity to fruitfully theorize agency and the role of individuals in shaping social reality. Post-structuralist perspectives, although they theorize the individual in non-essentialist terms are not particularly well suited to underscore the importance of individual action in IR either, as they focus on discourse broadly understood. I consequently suggest to side-step the unproductive agency-structure debate by taking a processual-relational approach that places 'figurations' at the center of inquiry. The proposed shift implies that political scientists move beyond thinking about how the (conceptually) isolated individual shapes international relations. Hence, the model of agential individuals, developed in this paper, suggests to think about actors in terms of figurationally embedded individuals (themselves understood as ongoing processes). This conceptual shift has implications for the way we think about first and second image theorizing, because a figurational logic blurs the boundary between part and whole underlying this categorization.

Bernd Bucher Rosenbergstrasse 51 9000 St. Gallen bernd.bucher 'at' unisg.ch 0041712242602


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1. Introduction - the lack of acting persons in social constructivist thinking

Social constructivists have had a difficult time in incorporating first image theorizing.1 But

while the eclipse of agency has been widely documented (Checkel, 1998; Palan, 2000;

Shannon, 2000; Jacobsen, 2003), the theoretical preconditions of the difficulties of

incorporating agency in social constructivist scholarship have not received extended

attention. I will argue in the following that social constructivists have not yet formulated a

model agency to successfully underscore the importance of acting persons in International

Relations (IR). This is so because both scientific realist and structurationist approaches

(although they strongly differ in general outlook) take a substantialist starting point in the

agency-structure dichotomy. Such a starting point encourages the introduction of a pre-

social (essentialist) subject at some point in the theory building process. This, on my

reading, is problematic from a social constructivist perspective. Unfortunately post-

structuralist approaches do not provide the sought-after theoretical concepts either. I will

consequently focus on an alternative approach that promises to be able to more strongly

focus on the actions of individuals in IR. In short, I propose to pay tribute to the

importance of actually acting persons by modeling persons as processes within a

figurational approach. In order to spell this notion out, I will draw upon the sociology of

Norbert Elias, especially the shift from homo clausus to homines aperti.

Figurational approaches consider the individual and society to be two aspects of one and

the same process. Neither persons, nor the situations in which they act can be entirely

separated from each other. Although processual-relational / figurational approaches focus

on constitutive interdependencies, they are also able to conceptually grasp what persons do

when they act. The individual in this sense does not entirely disappear from analysis. Quite

to the contrary, figurational thinking is able to account for the importance of individauls in

world politics without essentializing them. In order to formulate a heuristic with which to

grasp what agents do when they act, I will very briefly introduce a slightly modified version

of Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann Mische's concept of agency. The argumentation of this paper

has implications for the notion of (first, second, third) image theorizing in IR (see Waltz,

1959; Singer, 1961), because it blurs the boundaries of the image logical underlying the

analytic distinction between first and second image thinking. As such, figurational thinking

can incorporate the importance of individuals because they are not conceptualized as a

counterpart to structure. Scholars do not have to decide between first or second image

theorizing, because both levels are intimately connected.

I will develop my general argument in four major steps. Because the argument is based on

the premise that social constructivism needs to formulate a non-essentialist notion of

1 Parts of this paper have been presented at the 52nd annual ISA Conference in Montreal, 2011.


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agency, I will in a first step explicate this statement. I will keep these remarks to a

minimum in order to create space in which to engage the more pressing questions

regarding the importance of individuals in IR.

In a second step I will outline why scientific realist and structurationist approaches

(formulated in the agency-structure debate) conceptually tend to posit pre-social and

essentialized agents.2 Both approaches are faced with choosing between the primacy of first

or second image theorizing (Singer, 1961). In both instances agency and structure are

closely related. I will therefore briefly comment on their respective understandings of

structure, before more narrowly focusing on their conceptualizations of agency. Before

moving on, I will discuss post-structural thinking in regard to agency. I will do so in

passing, not because post-structuralist thinking does not have a concept of agency worth

considering, but rather because the practical focus on discourse makes post-structural

approaches an unlikely candidate to more strongly focus on the importance of individuals

in IR.

Following this discussion I will (in the third section of this paper) outline how the

importance of acting persons can be taken seriously in social constructivist IR theory. In

short, I propose to utilize a figurational approach developed by Norbert Elias. This shift in

perspective enables scholars to incorporate the actions of persons in a non-essentialist

fashion. Such a move, at the same time, suggests that the dichotomy between first and

second image theorizing in IR is not as stark as is usually assumed.

While figurationally embedded persons (in the plural), understood as processes, lie at the

heart of the theoretical outline of this paper, it is also important to be able to grasp

individual actions. Building on a figurational approach, I suggest to make the acts of

persons visible through employing the concept of agency developed by Emirbayer and

Mische (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998), in the fourth step of this analysis. In closing this

paper, I briefly summarize my argument and reflect on its implications for the question at

hand.

2. A very brief sketch of a non-essentialist reading of social constructivist thinking

Although the importance of first image theorizing is deeply rooted in the notion that agents

are involved in the ongoing construction of social reality, it has not been possible to

remedy the lack of agential theorizing identified in the late 1990's (see Checkel, 1998). The

inability of social constructivist approaches to broadly account for the role of individuals in

2 A logic of appropriateness approach amounts to a structural explanation of agency, and as such "it is untenable as a theory of individual action" (Sending, 2002: 443; see Checkel, 2001: 559; Goldmann, 2005, for a dissenting view see Mueller, 2004). I omit the analysis of the logic of appropriateness from the present analysis.


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the ongoing development of international relations is especially troubling because the

importance of agency is an outflow of basic ontological assumptions (see for instance:

Ashley, 1986; Guzzini, 2000; Kratochwil, 1989; Kratochwil, 2008; Kratochwil and Friedrichs,

2009, Onuf, 1989; Wendt, 1987; Wendt, 1992). The practice of privileging structure over

agency, and often eclipsing the latter altogether (see Jacobsen, 2003; Checkel, 1998; Risse,

2007; Shannon, 2000), has deprived social constructivist theorizing of the ability to

understand the ongoing development of the social world, because the "agents who help

create and change [social settings] in the first place" (Checkel, 1998: 325) drop out of the

picture. The importance of underscoring the role of individuals and their actions is indeed a

pressing and important issue for social constructivists (see for instance Checkel, 1998: 340;

Shannon, 2000: 311). But clearly not any account of agency will do. Quite clearly, any

formulation of agency must be compatible with the basic underlying (ontological)

assumptions of the research approach. This, on my reading, implies that agency must be

conceptualized in a non-essentialist way, because positing the self as a self-evident or

secure foundation of knowledge production reproduces the problems associated with

rationalist philosophy.3 Following the linguistic turn, I maintain that the plausibility of taking

the individual as a secure foundation from which to start thinking about the social world,

has steadily decreased. From a social constructivist perspective language, practice and

"agency [matter] in social life" (Kratochwil, 2008: 86), for both the construction of

meanings/knowledge and social reality (Guzzini, 2000: 149). As such it is not possible to

burden the mind-independent world with adjudicating scholarly disputes. To be concise,

the social world and hence international relations, is a 'world entirely of our (unintentional)

making' (see Onuf, 1989). This leaves no room for 'naturalized' starting points of inquiry.

Social constructivism should therefore be understood in non-essentialist terms. This finding,

in practice, creates problems for the attempt to move individuals closer to the center-stage

of social constructivist theorizing. This is so because the main alternative conceptualizations

of agency rely on a pre-social and essentialized agent in theorizing the relationship

between agency and structure.

In the following I will discuss to what degree the most prominent attempts to take agency

seriously in social constructivist research fail to serve as a model with which to underscore

the importance of individuals in IR. I will begin with a discussion of a scientific realist

account, before turning to an analysis of agency in structuration theory. In a final step I will

briefly comment on post-structuralist understandings of agency and outline why this line of

thinking is not optimally suited to tackle the problem at hand.

3 This understanding of social constructivism is one among many alternatives. Other conceptualizations are not only possible, but even highly welcome (for a survey of constructivist thinking see: Ruggie, 1998; Adler, 2002, Guzzini, 2000; Hopf, 1998).


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3. Agency in scientific realism, structuration theory and post-structuralist thinking

a) Agency in Colin Wight's scientific realism

Colin Wight (Wight, 2006) has recently provided an impressive conceptualization of agency.

Although I consider this contribution to be very valuable, I argue nonetheless that Wight's

understanding of agency is deeply problematic from a non-essentialist perspective, because

it rests on a particular version of the Cartesian cogito. As such, Wight's agency model is not

uncritically suited to serve as an underlying framework to emphasize the importance of

individuals in IR. In order to substantiate this claim I will first briefly comment on Wight's

conceptualization of structure, before discussing his notion of agency in more detail. This is

an important preliminary step in that it makes visible how agency and structure are

conceptually connected in the first place.

Structures in this view are conceptualized as 'unobservables' (Wight, 2006: 121), which are

only discernable through their independent causal effects. Structures are ontologically

accounted for through (material) effects which are independent from agential instantiation

or interpretation (see Wight, 2006: 159). In a nutshell, they are independent from agency.

As such, there is "an ontological hiatus between society and people" (Bhaskar, 1979: 44)

that requires us to distinguish between the "genesis of human actions, lying in the reasons,

intentions and plans of people, on the one hand, and the structures governing the

reproduction and transformation of social activities, on the other" (Bhaskar, 1979: 45).4 But

this ontological distinctness does not imply that agency and structure are entirely unrelated.

Quite to the contrary, scientific realists conceptualize the simultaneous separateness and

connectedness of agency and structure in terms of emergent properties.5 A more

comprehensive discussion would certainly have to take aim at this conceptual link. But as

the argumentation at hand aims to pin-point problematic aspects in the articulation of

agency, it has to suffice here to have hinted at the concept of emergence connecting

distinct ontological levels. Returning to the conceptualization of structure, and making

things short, structure is understood as "causal factors in the social world independent of

agential understanding" (Wight, 2006: 154). In Wight's view, actors' understandings do not

figure prominently into the notion of structure. Actors' interpretations are of secondary

importance, as the (given) materiality of the social world places limits on the interpretations

persons can reasonably and successfully entertain about the world. On this account material

4 This (ontological) separateness is decisive, because it serves as the condition of possibility to theorize the causal relationship between agency and structure.

5 "Emergence means that although the more complex levels of reality, for example societies, presuppose the more basic or less complex levels, for example, people, explanations of them are not reducible to the other" (Wight, 2006: 37).


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referent(s) tie "differential meanings into a complex whole" (Wight, 2006: 159).6 Wight's

perspective stresses the centrality of actual relations in contrast to 'mere' interpretations In

short, Wight underscores the existence of objective social conditions which are grounded in

the materiality of the social world.7 The understanding of structure outlined above

emphasizes that structure and agency are two ontologically distinct things which stand apart

from each other. Given this contextualizing outline of structure, I will now turn to a critical

discussion of Wight's model of agency.

In a nutshell, Wight differentiates between three levels of agency (agency1/2/3), and I will in

the following briefly outline what these different levels signal. I will primarily focus on

agency1 not only because it is central to the theoretical enterprise under scrutiny, but also

because it is the most problematic level of agency in the narrative.8 Concisely put, agency1

refers to the things that people are capable (or incapable) of doing qua being human (see

Archer, 1995: 255). It is, at base, conceptualized as "the 'self' which [stands] in relationship

to the world by which it is [continually being] constructed" (Wight, 2006: 210). Agency1, in

this sense, is a logical prerequisite for socialization, not an empirically discernable aspect of

agency. Wight here refers to the physical constitution of human beings as a condition of

possibility for human actions and sociability. In the final analysis agency1 (understood in

terms of 'species being') is grounded in the materiality of the human body and serves to

'earth social life' (see Bhaskar, 1993: 164).9

Wight at the same time stresses that the ability to act into the social world depends on one's

social position (Wight, 2006: 212). The capacity to act 'is a function' both of specie's

attributes and social positioning. The second level of agency (agency2) then "refers to the

way in which agency1 becomes an agent of the socio-cultural system" (Wight, 2006: 213).

Agency2, thus understood, refers to how an agent can be an 'agent of something' (see

Archer, 1995: 257). Agency3 finally refers to the different positions within social structures

that can be occupied by agents1. These 'positioned-practice places' (such as peasant or

party candidate) exist apart from the specific persons occupying them (see Wight, 2006:

6 This argument implies that in order to be able to reasonably speak about differing interpretations (of something), these differing interpretations must indeed refer to the same referent (for a critique see Hollis and Smith, 1991: 407).

7 To be fair, Wight does not reduce structure to materiality, but rather attempts to "incorporate the important dialectic between material and ideational factors" (Wight, 2006: 174). Wight further disaggregates material and ideational factors into four interrelated planes of activity. Roughly: material transactions with nature, inter-intra-subjective actions, social relations like class, group identity, or production, the subjectivity of the agent.

8 The concept of agency presented by Wight predominantly draws on Margaret Archer's "stratified model of people" (Archer, 1995). 9 Wight defines agency1 as "embodied, intentional causality, or praxis" (Bhaskar, 1994: 100).


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213). Positioned practices provide specific possibilities to actualize potentialities. "Agency3

[then] refers to those 'roles' that agents1 play for agency2" (Wight, 2006: 213).

Within this account, Wight presents agents as structured entities. At the same time, the

agent is based on monadic center (see Wight, 2006: 206), which serves "as an a prioristic

anchorage" (Archer, 1995: 281). From the social constructivist perspective sketched-out

earlier, this is a problematic theoretical conceptualization, because the pre-social,

essentialized, human being "remains the alpha and omega" (Archer, 1995: 281) of Wight's

model of agency. In other words, Wight's social actor is conceptually dependent on a type

of pre-social Cartesian self.10 Wight stresses that despite the importance of socialization,

classification and signification, these processes "all-too-obvious[ly] […] still presuppose

someone" (Wight, 2006: 207).

But this argument is has its difficulties, if only, because signification does not presuppose a

specific ontology of the signified.11 Phrased differently, signification here is equated with

subjectivation and this equivocation is not prima facie necessary, arguably not even

plausible. To be precise, Wight does not negate socialization. He stresses that the person 'as

a social agent' is structured by language and embedded in culture (agency2/3). Wight freely

admits that agents are not simply autonomous subjects but that they "navigate [their] social

field through a set of structural formations and a network of heterogeneous discourses,

which are not of [their] own creation" (Wight, 1999: 131/32). But the same is not also true

in the case of agency1. Wight, expanding on the statement quoted above, continues to

argue:

Yet, still, I think to myself, who is it who is cognizant of this? Is this belief in my constructed status itself a constructed effect? And is the belief that I should question the constructed certainty of my constructed status itself a constructed effect. I am now trapped in a viscous regress. In order to think the impossibility of my subjectivity I must presume the possibility of my subjectivity. In effect, there is a 'self' who is thinking about the relationship between the discourse and that same fragmented 'subject' (Wight, 1999: 131/32, emphasis added).

Wight's entire conception rests on the possibility of subjectivity that is prior to language and

culture. As such, he continually underscores that all social processes which involve agents

are conditioned on the logical prerequisite of an 'I' that is prior to these processes (see

Wight, 2006: 209). Conversely, the social world is outside of the 'I' - not empirically, but

10 The Cartesian ego is a claim to secure and trans-historic knowledge, and as such it functions in analogy to Wight's agency1. But, to be fair, there are important differences at the same time. The Cartesian ego is not an embodied 'I'. Wight therefore does not commit to a distinction between res cogitans and res extensa. Wight hence does not opt for a dualistic position argued by Descartes.

11 The signification of Santa Clause, for instance, does not presuppose the materiality of the signified (see Kratochwil, 2007; see also Michel, 2009).


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conceptually.12 The 'I' at the center of Wight's account then supposedly escapes social

construction.13 Such a move opens the door for a foundationalist account of the social

world. But the "claim, as in the Cartesian cogito, that the 'I' resists radical doubt because it is

present to itself in the act of thinking or doubting is [an] appeal to presence" (Culler, 1983:

94). As such Wight's account of agency is subject to post-structuralist critiques of rationalist

philosophy. At a general level, Wight tends to neglect the insights of contemporary

language philosophy. This is visible in his equivocation of grammatical habits and

ontological necessity.14 Such a theoretical move presupposes that language is a neutral

descriptive instrument which correctly depicts the world. But to the degree that social

constructivists do not accept the language independence of knowledge, and take the

performative dimension of language seriously, his argument does not hold. Once language

becomes the object of critical reflection, the certainty with which the 'I' is postulated in this

account begins to dissolve (also see Jackson, 2011). Additionally, Wight also disregards

Meads insight that the self can alternatively be understood as continually arising social

emergents (Mead, 2002: 135-222). To be concise, in Meads view, the self emerges out of a

conversation of specific gestures termed 'significant symbols'.15 In such an exchange

(conversation) he or she can take the role of the other. Consequently one is able to look

back at oneself, and respond to oneself, from the point of view of the other. Or to put it

differently, one can 'become an object to oneself' (see Morris, 1966: xxiv).16 As such,

symbolic interactionists view the self as continually arising out of a relational

communicative process. They consequently do not posit a pre-social self which serves as a

condition of possibility of socialization.

12 This is a necessary outflow of the notion that agency and structure stand in a causal relationship.

13 Wight argues against the social construction of the subject 'all the way down', also see Wendt's 'rump materialism' (Wendt, 1999).

14 Friedrich Nietzsche's criticism in 1886 already pointed to the central role of grammar and its implications for conceptualizing the social world, in arguing: "that [contrary to Cartesian philosophy] a thought comes when 'it' wants, and not when 'I' want. It is, therefore, a falsification of the facts to say that the subject 'I' is the condition of the predicate 'think.' It thinks: but to say the 'it' is just the famous old 'I' - well that is just an assumption or opinion, to put it mildly, and by no means an 'immediate certainty.' In fact, there is already too much packed into the 'it thinks': even the 'it' contains an interpretation of the process, and does not belong to the process itself. People are following grammatical habits here in drawing conclusions, reasoning that 'thinking is an activity, behind every activity something is active, therefore -.'Following the same basic scheme, the older atomism looked behind every 'force' that produces effects for that little lump of matter in which the force resides, and out of which the effects are produced, which is to say: the atom" (Nietzsche, 2007: 17-18).

15 Significant symbols are symbols which an individual not only sends, but also responds to respectively. 16 This is taken to be the defining characteristic of the 'self'.


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To make things short, both language philosophy and symbolic interactionism strongly draw

the persuasiveness of Wight's account into doubt. It, in the final analysis, centers on an

essentialist notion of agency and is therefore not easily compatible with non-essentialist

social constructivism. It thus can hardly function as a model of agency to highlight the

importance of acting individuals in social constructivist thinking.

b) Agency in Anthony Giddens structuration theory

Having now very briefly discussed the major difficulties of Wight's account of agency, I turn

to Anthony Giddens' structuration theory in which he pictures agency and structure as two

sides of the same coin (mutual constitution). I will proceed by explicating the relationship

between systems and structures, before examining the stratification model of agency in

more detail. In a final step, I will critically reflect upon the approach and argue that

structuration theory also has problems that warrant a search for other conceptions.

Social Systems are thought of as "the stable patterns that give […] order to interactions"

(Calhoun, Gerteis and Moody, 2007: 221). They are simply visible interaction patterns, or

institutionalized features (see Giddens, 1984: 24, see also Bryant and Jary, 1991: 7). In this

sense, social systems (which display structural properties) are external to the agent and

(possibly) confront agents as objective states of affairs.17 Giddens' notion of social system is

therefore not unlike classical understandings of social structure.18 Structures, clearly in

contrast to Wight's account, are conceptualized as internal to the agent.

Conceived of as rules and resources, they serve as common interpretive schemes within

specific societies. Structures therefore "exist only as memory traces [which are] instantiated

in action" (Giddens, 1984: 377), and have no independent ontological status apart from

agents and their practices (see Giddens, 1984: 26).19 To the degree then that structures are

internal to agents, one can reasonably speak of their 'virtual existence' (Giddens, 1984: 25).

Structure in this sense cannot be said to condition action. If this were the case, structure

would have to be external to the agent to start with. This is decisively not the case. Rather

agency and structure are inseparably tied together in that "agency is given meaningful form

only through the 'generative schemes' of structure" (Calhoun, Gerteis and Moody, 2007:

17 Structural properties include political, economic, and legal (symbolic) orders, the most basic of which give a society its characteristic form. 18 Some critics consequently have stressed that the difficulties encountered in conceptualizing agency and structure are not overcome in Giddens account, but simply deferred to the relationship between agency and system (see Hay, 1995).

19 Memory traces are in this conception constitutive of the knowledgeability of agents, although memory traces do not entirely saturate the constitution of agents.


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221).20 Although structures are internal to agents, this does not imply that agents live in

virtual worlds. The social world in this theoretical construction is not reducible to the

'knowledgeability' of agents. For one, structural properties of systems (symbolic orders in

their political, economic, and legal dimensions) confront the individual in constraining and

enabling ways as quasi-objective facts.21 At the same time these structural properties are

continually dependent on the actions of persons. The structural properties one finds in

social systems are consequently both the "medium and the outcome" (Giddens, 1984: 25) of

practices. Agents are the 'moving parts' in structuration theory. The term structuration, in a

nutshell, attempts to capture the "modes in which […] social systems are produced and

reproduced in interaction" (Giddens, 1984: 25).22 Having outlined the central concepts of

social systems and structures in Giddens account, I now turn to a discussion of agency in

structuration theory.

Agency, generally, refers to the capacity to act (not merely to have intentions of doing

something). Giddens' shorthand for agency, namely that persons "could at any phase in a

given sequence of conduct, have acted differently" (Giddens, 1984: 9), is not separable from

structure. It does not intend to signal a voluntarist agent that stands free of structure.

Structures as rules and resources are internal to agents in that they exist as memory traces

and are instantiated in action. Agency and social acts are (at the most basic level) situated

within "the temporality of day-to-day conduct" (Giddens, 1979). Agency, thus situated,

becomes manifest, through interventions, into a "potentially malleable object-world"

(Giddens, 1979). Giddens disaggregates agency into three dimensions, namely practical

knowledge, discursive knowledge and unconscious motivation and I will briefly examine

these dimensions of agency in the following.

Giddens views the acts performed by persons to be primarily based on their practical

knowledge of day-to-day situations (knowing 'how to go on', see Kaesler, 2003: 320).

"Routinized practices are the prime expression of the duality of structure in respect to the

continuity of social life" (Giddens, 1984: 282). This view allocates discursive knowledge to a

position of secondary importance within structuration theory. How to go on in day-to-day

life is not primarily based on the ability to verbally account for what one is doing. While

20 Consequently, structure cannot be thought of as a constraining normative order. Instead of thinking of structures as internalized norms and values, structures are conceptualized as generative schemes (rules) and material resources that function as the condition of possibility of (knowledgeable) action.

21 This is so because structural properties of institutions (potentially) hold "in suspension reflexively monitored conduct" (Kilminster, 1991: 96). 22 "To enquire into the structuration of social practices is to seek to explain how it comes about that structures are constituted through action, and reciprocally how action is constituted structurally" (Giddens, 1976: 161).


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most actors will be able to give reasons for what they are doing most of the time (Giddens,

1984: 6), the need to explicate actions arises primarily in situations that are at odds with

normal expectations. The second dimension of agency, namely discursive consciousness

(knowing that) and the ability to verbalize one's actions are in this sense most important in

situations which problematize day-to-day activity. Clearly the distinction between practical

and discoursive knowledge is an analytical one, but one that underscores continuity and

routine, rather than novelty and creativity.23 But more importantly, Giddens also

differentiates between practical knowledge and unconscious motivation. Here Giddens

(metaphorically) assumes a 'bar' that separates the conscious and the unconscious. The

latter enters into the knowledgeability of the agent only as modes of recall "to which the

agent does not have direct access" (Giddens, 1984: 49).24 The status of the unconscious is

important and problematic for Giddens' stratification model of agency and I will, in the

following attempt to pin-point why this is the case. Concisely put, a dominant role of the

unconscious would jeopardize the conception of agency. Giddens cannot allow for a strong

role of the unconscious, because to the degree that unconscious motivation would explain

action, agents would become structurally determined. Since agents and structures are

mutually constitutive of each other, actors would be reduced to 'structural dopes' if the

unconscious actually structured conscious life (Boyne, 1991: 69). This is a conclusion which

needs to be avoided in order to stabilize Giddens' ambitious theoretical construction.

Giddens is hence moved to reject any conceptualization of the unconscious "that would

have the effect of reproducing the primacy of social structure in the very constitution of the

social agent" (Boyne, 1991: 53).

In order to escape this view, Giddens argues that "the unconscious is, effectively, produced

and maintained by [the] social actors themselves" (Boyne, 1991: 69). This in turn implies

that unconscious motivation of agents must largely be subject to agents' capacities. As a

solution to the looming difficulties of theory construction, these are conceptualized as

organically rooted capacities. The (theory immanent) need to minimize the role of the

unconscious is, in the final analysis, achieved by introducing "a primitive level of

management of tensions rooted in organic needs" (Giddens, 1976: 117). This capacity to

maintain ontological security, can only be understood in terms of an "ongoing

accomplishment" (Giddens, 1976: 117) of agents which is not intertwined with structure.25

The maintenance of ontological security, which plays a decisive part in the routinized

23 This focus makes Giddens' model less suited for IR where discursive knowledge is in high demand.

24 For an in depth perspective on the role of the unconscious see Boyne, 1991: 69-73. 25 It is therefore necessary that this capacity to maintain ontological security is fully present and active even in new-born children.


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character of day-to-day activities, is thus rooted in a socially skilled agent whose agential

capacities are pre-social. This amounts to the introduction of a skilled agent that is prior to,

and apart from, structure. Giddens hence attributes agential capacities to the 'it', in arguing

the need of a "theory of the subject (a theory of the processes through which the 'I' rises)

[while also claiming] that even before the arrival of the 'I', there is still an 'it' that thinks,

which is to say that there is still agency" (Boyne, 1991: 71). In short Giddens introduces an

anemic but nonetheless substantial theory of the pre-social subject 'through the back-door'.

His conception of agency consequently also carries with it a residuum of the Cartesian ego

(see Boyne, 1991). Giddens conceptualization of unconscious motivation and the notion of

ontological security posit an 'original' agency that escapes structuration. Such a notion of

'structure independent' agency violates Giddens' own notion of duality of structure/mutual

constitution, and it is problematic from a non-essentialist social constructivist perspective.

As such structuration theory, akin to scientific realist approaches, cannot be used to

strengthen first-image theorizing in social constructivism.

I maintain that the inability to completely resolve the tension between agency, structure and

system is not to be found in Giddens', or Wight's lack of ingenuity. Rather it is to be found

in the insolvability of the problem itself. The problem of the agent 'behind' the agent, of

having to reconcile two separate social entities arises from a substantialist perspective (see

Dewey and Bentley , 1949).26 Something is required that is socialized, something is required

that stands apart from structure in order to avoid structural determination. It is not possible

to imagine that the 'I' can be socialized if the 'I' is not already given, consequently it must

be there prior to socialization. The agent must in some way stand free of structure in order

not to be reducible to structure. The part must be separated from the whole in an apodictic

fashion. This starting point of inquiry tends to reproduce the necessity of an essentialized

agent. As such the agency-structure dichotomy itself seems to be a stumbling block in the

attempt to theoretically formulate a non-essentialist concept of agency with which to

emphasize the role of individuals in IR.

c) A few remarks on agency in Roxanne Doty's post-structuralist approach

But starting with the agency-structure dichotomy does not make the conceptualization of a

non-essentialist agent entirely impossible. Roxanne Doty, for example, offers an alternative

account of the agency-structure problem that emphasizes practice (Doty, 1997: 375), and

does not require an essentialized agent. Practices in a post-structuralist view are always

embedded in discourses that make meanings possible. But the signification of practice is

26 For a discussion of mutual constitution and similar associated problems see Jackson and Nexon, 1999: 295.


13

never unambiguous. Practices, like meanings, are indeterminate. Doty in effect argues for a

decentering of practice and thereby eschewes "attempts to locate the source and meaning of

practices in some determinable center, e.g. an unproblematically given subject or generative

structural principles" (Doty, 1997: 376). Meanings, although open in principle, have to be

continually arrested. These determinations of meanings are never absolute, but rather

converge around a center that itself is structured. The center then is an effect of ongoing

practice and it becomes decisive to investigate how the "structuring of structure(s), the

effecting of a center, takes place" (Doty, 1997: 378). Post-structuralist research consequently

focuses on the discursive practices "that work to exclude the potentially infinite chain of

meanings and thereby move from excess to [temporarily] 'closed' structure" (Doty, 1997:

379).27 Likewise, agency is "contingent, unstable and discourse specific" (Doty, 1997: 379). I

agree with Doty, that this view is part of a social constructivist agenda, but is not taken

seriously enough by most social constructivists, who fall back on a pre-discursive subject.

The need to reserve a space for making choices and reflecting upon discourse as the

criteria for agency in these accounts originates from the view that practices, as well as

structures are fixed or closed (see Wight, 2006). If agents were fully constituted by

practices, we would be left with a fully structured subject. "Subjects would be mere dupes

acting according to what particular sets of practices dictated" (Doty, 1997: 380). The

necessity to open space for agency and escape structural determinism, in Doty's view, is a

function of the notion of 'closed structure'. If structures are conceptualized as "fully

constituted objective wholes" (Torfing, 1999:148), one either thinks subjects as the mere

effects of structure, or makes room for them to somehow escape or resist structure on the

basis of pre-discursive qualities.

Doty in her conception of indeterminate practices offers an alternative by opening space in

analogy to the play of meaning found in Derrida's conception of language. "Agency is not

understood as an inherent quality of individual human beings […], but rather as a

positioning of subjects that occurs through practices, practices which are inherently

discursive and ultimately undecidable" (Doty, 1997: 383-84). Drawing on Laclau and Mouffe

(Laclau and Mouffe, 1989: 111), she introduces the notion of subject-positions, which are

created within discourse. The idea is that subjects are defined as a position within a

discourse. It almost goes without saying that subject positions are "accorded varying

degrees of agency" (Doty, 1997: 384). Agency in this perspective does not originate in a

pre-discursive subject. Rather "agency results from a complex weaving together of the

27 The construction of meanings, in this view, involves the silencing of alternatives. In the enactement of one (malleable) center, other possible centers are excluded. This moves the question of power relations to the fore.


14

subject-positions and meanings that are available within multiple and overlapping

discourses" (Davies and Harré, 1990: 59).

But one could go one step further here and follow Ernesto Laclau who argues that the

'playfulness of structure' does not alone account for the impossibility of full determination.

What might be added to Doty's approach is the notion of 'dislocation'. "Dislocation refers to

the emergence of an event, or a set of events, that cannot be represented, symbolized, or in

other ways domesticated by the discursive structure - which is therefore disrupted" (Torfing,

1999: 148). In Laclau's account dislocation prevents that structure is ever entirely

determined. At the same time the subject cannot have an identity that is entirely structured

by structure. But it is to some degree. It therefore becomes possible to speak of a "failed

structural identity" (Laclau, 1990: 44). "The incompleteness of the structural identity

constitutes the subject as the locus of a decision about how to establish itself as a concrete

subjectivity with a fully achieved identity" (Torfing, 1999: 149). Identity then can never be

fully achieved on the grounds of the undecidability of structure. The subject in this sense

cannot be reduced to a signifier that would signify it completely. There cannot, in other

words, be a relationship of identity between subject and signifier. The, 'subject before

subjectivation' is consequently not understood as a positive presence, but as a constitutive

lack (see Laclau and Mouffe, 1989; Torfing 1999: 52). The process of becoming somebody is

an ongoing attempt to fill the ever present and necessary lack of complete identification.

"The subject of the signifier is a retroactive effect of the failure of its own representation"

(Žižek, 1989: 175).

The subject or the agents in the approaches criticized by post-structuralists run the risk of

postulating a positive center, or positive presence of agency. Doty, along with Laclau and

Mouffe, attempts to conceptualize agency (as well as structure) on decisively non-

essentialist terms. While conceptualizing the subject as a lack is an intriguing theoretical

move, it suggests a focus on discourse, broadly conceived, when empirically engaging

societies (which of course always also means society of states here). Individuals are placed

within discourses and there is no objection to analyzing them in principle (see Gordon,

1999; Bevir, 1999). But the tendency has been to eclipse actors and the highly contingent

unintended consequences of human agents acting into the world. The tendency to

obnubliate the subject is the outflow of the need to avoid any 'original presence' in the

form of an autonomous subject. The same must also be true for any notion of structure,

which will not do as an original presence either (as the post-structuralist abandonment of

Saussure's understanding of meaning exemplifies). The turn then to shifting discourses is

highly plausible. At the same time, post-structuralist approaches seem to be less suited to

focus on the importance of individuals in IR. Fortunately the subject, understood as a


15

constitutive lack, is not the only possibility to conceptualize the subject in non-essentialist

terms.28

While I consider the difficulties discussed so far to be intimately linked to taking the

agency-structure dichotomy as a starting-point of theorizing, I will not expand on this

aspect of the argumentation in any length. Suffice it to say that many of the difficulties

associated with scientific realist, structurationist and post-structuralist accounts largely

disappear if we think of persons (in the plural) in terms of relational-processes themselves

(not just as being involved in process). In the following I would like to move to a

discussion of figurational sociology, which conceptualizes persons in societies without

taking refuge in the agency-structure dichotomy in the first place.29 From a figurational

perspective, it is possible to view acting persons (instead of abstract agency) and their

(broadly understood) social ties (rather than structure) as two dimensions of a single

overarching process, rather than two distinct entities.30 In doing so, it permeates the

boundaries between first and second image theorizing. The parts-whole dichotomy is

thereby replaced by a figurational model in which persons are constitutively interdependent

with each other. Bellow, I will outline such a figurational perspective in order to

substantiate this claim (the irony notwithstanding).31

4. The importance of acting persons in figurational sociology Taking a figurational perspective makes an especially important difference in regard to

understanding agency in the social world. In sharp contrast to (substantive) notions of 'core

of agency', processual-relational thinking views persons as one type of processes among

others. There is in this sense no 'I' apart from doing, not even in self-experience. The self is

not understood as a unified (given) thing, a substratum underlying agency. The self is seen

28 Indeed post-structuralism embraces an aporia (Doty, 1997) between agency and structure that could also be avoided by taking a different point of departure.

29 For an outline of the substantialism and processualism see Dewey and Bentley, 1949; Rescher, 1996; Rescher, 2000; Jackson and Nexon, 1999; Bucher, 2011). 30 It is potentially problematic to view the social world in terms of agency and structure understood as entities. To be very clear in this regard: I am not making an ontological statement here. The problematic status of substantialism is not considered to be an outflow of lacking correspondence to a mind-external world. The problematic 'nature' of substantialism arises solemly in regard to specific questions being ask and the lack of utility such an approach provides in answering these questions. In short, I consider processual-relational approaches to be scientific ontologies (see Jackson, 2011). 31 Processual-relational thinking has been introduced by Patrick T. Jackson and Daniel Nexon (Jackson and Nexon, 1999) in IRT, and a number of processual-relational thinkers can be found in sociology (see for instance Abbott, 2001; Elias, 1978; Emirbayer, 1997; Kilminster, 1998; Mennel, 1992; van Krieken, 2007).


16

as a "unity of functioning" (Rescher, 2000: 16). Rather than searching for an operator, as in

Descartes cogito, figurational thinking emphasizes operations (Rescher, 2000). The self in

this view is conceptualized as a continuously integrated process. What is being disputed by

processists is the view of persons as entities which exist in separation from their actions and

activities in the form of some substratum of core agency. In short, the 'self' is

conceptualized as a "unified manifold of actual and potential processes – of action and

capacities, tendencies, and dispositions to action" (Rescher, 2000: 15). The focus of

theorizing is thus shifted from a "unity of hardware, of physical machinery, to a processual

unity of software" (Rescher, 1996: 108). The question of what agency actually 'is', is

consequently replaced by the question of what persons/agents 'do' (see Emirbayer and

Mische, 1998), and I will spell this out after discussing figurational thinking more closely.

Keeping the processual character of persons in mind, it is important to also underscore the

relational dimensions of persons in order to articulate the importance of acting persons in

social constructivist narratives of international relations in a non-essentialist fashion.

In the following, I will briefly outline Norbert Elias' central concept of figuration, which

underscores the basic relatedness and the constitutive ties of (interdependent) acting

persons (Elias, 1969; Elias, 1978; Elias, 1991; Elias, 2000; Elias and Scotson, 1990).32 From a

sociological perspective, the concept of figuration aims to replace the concepts of agency

and structure. In doing so it promises to be able to emphasize the importance of acting

persons.

In short, figurations are defined as dynamic social networks of constitutively interdependent

persons. Figurations aim "to grasp the processual link between actors and society in a way

that renders 'the individual' and 'society' 'two different but inseparable levels of the human

world'" (Bauman, 1989: 39). Persons in this conception are (constitutively) connected to

other persons by social ties.33 Individuals from this perspective, are not understood as

secluded, as given independently (homo clausus), but as fundamentally interdependent

beings (homines aperti). Consequently, individuals are what they are only in light of the

interdependencies in which they (as processes) are continuously developing.34 'Society' is in

turn understood as the ongoing medium and outcome of social practices. Rather than

starting with agents and their environment, figurations signal that agents are always

constituted in environments which are (largely) characterized by the functional

interdependencies among persons. The relations that bond individuals together in a

32 For a discussion of Elias' sociology in IRT see Linklater, 2002; Linklater 2007. 33 It is possible to apply this reasoning to states, as well as to human beings (see Jackson and Nexon, 1999; Bucher, 2011).

34 It is possible to draw on the insights of symbolic interactionists, hinted at above, to underpin this relational view of persons (see Morris, 1966: XIV).


17

'continuum of changes', in this conception, are "as real as the 'individuals' themselves"

(Mennell, 1992: 256). As such it is unnecessary to resort to a pre-social agent that stands

free of structure. The importance of individual action is central to this theoretical

perspective. But the individual itself is not a monadic entity. Rather any individual is

constitutively embedded in relational interdependencies.

In order to further illustrate what the concept of figuration entails, I will briefly draw on a

hypothetical and a historical example. Imagine that two persons (say Emile and Max, or for

the sake of simplicity A and B) live secluded and without outside contacts. In such a

setting, almost all communication will take place between these two persons. At a practical

level, it is likely that they will be highly dependent on each other. At the same time, A and

B will not only be interrelated at a practical and material level. Rather A and B need to be

understood as constitutively interdependent as persons. The claim of figurational sociology

is simply that if we want to say anything (sociologically) interesting about A, we need to

take into account A's relationship with B. Given the setting of this hypothetical example, it

would be surprising if the relation(s) between these two actors could be left unmentioned

in studying either of them. The claim here is indeed that neither A nor B are given prior to

their relation. What either of these two persons can do and, in a sense, 'what they are

continually becoming' can only be determined on the basis of their relations toward each

other. This is not to argue that the selves/identities of A or B are entirely 'saturated' by this

specific relation. They can also be related towards abstract concepts, or other meaningful

signs.35 Ontologically speaking, A and B 'are' what they are (in the singular, as well as in

the plural) only within figurations understood as a (constitutive) functional nexus.

Emphasizing the processual character of this approach, it is important to underscore that

the relatedness of A and B is not of a static kind. Rather, it is characterized by a dynamic

interplay through which these two persons continually renegotiate themselves (see also

Mead, 1966: 135-227).

The processual-relational character of persons (and societies) is also intuitively graspable

from a long-term historical perspective. Taking comparatively small associations of Homo

sapiens of the Upper Paleolithic, for an example, it is possible to identify short chains of

interdependence and close ties among the individuals and the group as a whole (see

Kaufmann, 2002). These associations were small in the sense that persons could have

personal relations with all the other members of their society (see Elias, 1978: 137). People

living in the Upper Paleolithic would have had very bad chances to survive (or strive) in

35 Persons, more generally, might be joined in functional nexuses through a (common) reference to mythological ancestors or shared deities. They might be joined (or separated) by a teleological narrative giving meaning to the future, or some notion of 'the good life'. Non-personal or non-immediate 'ties' among persons are often made visible through the use of symbols such as flags, statues, monuments or specific historical narratives (see Elias, 1978: 137).


18

isolation of the specific group into which they were born. By and large persons depend on

others they either know, or to whom they are related through kinship. The 'chains of

interdependencies' found in these societies, in other words, can be said to be rather short.

Persons living in small societies or small social arrangements usually have an understanding

of the role they play in their group.36

Given these conditions, it makes sense to ask how the actions of the different group

members generate reasons for what the other persons of the group (can) do. Indeed it

would be fruitful to study how actions generate intended and unintended outcomes for

other persons, and how social practices stabilize specific social orders.

The picture of a secluded, pre-social, individual faced with structure does not give us any

theoretical leverage in this case. The picture of a "free, up-by-one's-own-bootstraps"

(Collins, 1992: 81) kind of person to be reconciled with structure loses its argumentative

force in the light of the immediate interdependencies characterizing small societies.

The dichotomy of agency and structure appears more plausible when we look at larger and

more complex societies. As the chains of interdependence (which connect persons)

lengthen, social networks are proliferated and the control over social processes is reduced,

the agency-structure dichotomy and with it the notion of pre-social agency, gain intuitive

plausibility. This is a complex and possibly counter-intuitive claim, and I will in the

following attempt to spell out what it entails.

From the perspective of contemporary social arrangements, the small number of

interdependent people forming Paleolithic societies indeed seems far removed. In the time

of international institutions and globalizing markets, persons find themselves integrated in

inextricably complex chains of interdependencies that span the globe (see Mennell, 1992:

95). Persons which have no way of knowing each other are often highly interdependent. At

the same time, contemporary individuals are embedded in a multitude of different social

networks. Or put differently, an increasing number of social networks intersect in

contemporary persons. Under such conditions, it becomes possible to analytically separate

an individual from any single one of these functional networks (social relations). The

possibility of being able to do so creates the impression that persons, at a basic level, are

given apart from all social relations. As such it can appear that they are given prior to social

relations in principle. In turn, it seems as if there remained a substance, an essence, or a

core of personhood (see Dewey and Bentley, 1949: 130) which is entirely apart from the

interdependencies which are constitutive of persons. This is what Elias called the notion of

'homo clausus' - the secluded individual. The agent here is pictured as someone/thing

which stands alone. Relations (sociality) are something which is subsequently added. Not

only do 'lengthening chains of interdependence' and the proliferation of social network in

36 In such a setting the number of functional networks remains relatively low (in comparison).


19

which persons are integrated, plausibilize the notion of homo clausus. Additionally the

notion of structure as something which (objectively) confronts the individual also gains

intuitive force. This is so because the ability to control social processes is reduced as the

number of participants (simultaneously playing games) increase and power asymmetries

even out. I will in the following attempt to argue that experienceability does not make for

good ontology.

Returning to the two person case, we can reconsider the constitutive relationship between

A and B. Let us assume that the mutual (inter)dependence of our hypothetical protagonists

are asymmetrical. Asymmetrical relations are abundant in social networks, and we can

quickly think of a number of examples (employer/employee, landlord/tenant, or the

patron/broker/client nexus, see Nexon, 2009: 40-41). If we also include examples of a less

extreme character, we find that power asymmetries are 'the rule' in functional social

nexuses (see: Benthem van den Bergh, 1971: 19).37 Let us further assume that A is strongly

favored in the distribution of power. Ceteris paribus, the more one-sided the power relation

is, the more control A exerts over the course of events. If conversely, A and B are equally

powerful (or to put it differently, are equally strong players), neither of them can decisively

command the unfolding of events. If we now add the persons C, D, and E to the

interaction, the ability to control the course of events further decreases. Put differently,

given conditions of relative power equality, the capacity to translate intentions into

outcomes decreases. In such a setting all players are confronted with a highly complex

situation in which none of them can individually steer the course of events. The (social)

game can seem to acquire a life of its own. This impression can become starkly magnified

because "people's knowledge of the figurations in which they are caught up is virtually

always imperfect, incomplete and inaccurate" (Mennell, 1992: 258). There is a cognitive and

practical limit to the capacity to understand the interdependencies in which one is located,

and one can only formulate limited strategies in acting into figurations (see Elias, 1978: 85).

Again, as the ability to comprehend complex networks of interdependent persons

decreases, the perception that 'the social environment' acquires a 'life of its own' becomes

increasingly plausible. If we even further increase the number of participants, the force of

this logic is magnified. If we take modern day societies, we find a breath-taking number of

interdependent persons, institutions and states involved in long, even globe-spanning

chains of interdependence. Although power differentials are far from evened-out, none of

the participants has the ability to completely control the course of events. In fact not even

powerful states are able to shape many important aspects of the social conditions which

most strongly affect their citizens. To further complicate matters, in many contemporary

37 Even within brotherhoods / sisterhoods there is usually an older brother or sister (I would like to thank Martin Beckstein for pointing this out to me).


20

societies not even all the participating 'players' will be known. This too will restrict the

ability of participants to navigate societal complexities. As if this was not yet enough,

persons will simultaneously play a number of different games, because being located at the

intersection of many functional nexuses implies that one action will (possibly) have effects

in more than one of these nexuses.38 Actions in such a setting can still be purposeful, but

the capacity to act should not at all be equated with of turning intentions into outcomes,

especially on a grand scale. As the size and number of functional nexuses increase, it

becomes more difficult to know the implications of one's actions, and it consequently

becomes increasingly difficult to ascribe outcomes to specific actions. One final addition of

complexity can still be added here, because functional nexuses need to be understood as

fragmented. This term is meant to signal that persons are not part of all figurations to the

same degree. While "all players remain interdependent, […] they no longer all play directly

with each other" (Elias, 1978: 86). But not being an active part of a specific figuration does

not imply that one cannot be affected by the actions of the persons directly involved in the

figuration. Quite to the contrary, the decisions and actions taken by unknown persons or

institutions can be experienced as independently given causal influences.

Using a games metaphor can help to illustrate the relation between actions and the

development of events. In a card-game, players continually make their moves in

accordance with a mutually understood set of rules. This results in a specific pattern which

becomes visible over time, and it is even possible to describe this process as the

development, or movement, of the game. Clearly the development of the game cannot be

discerned independently of the moves of the cards-players. Ontologically speaking, the

game does not move by itself. The game, as such, has "no existence independently of the

players" (Elias 1978: 130). But the game is not simply an abstraction or a superficial additive

(see van Krieken, 2007: 58) either. "The 'game' is no more an abstraction than the 'players'"

(Elias, 1978: 130). Assuming that none of the players can dominate the others, the course of

the game is quite independent of the actions of any single player. While card games are

often played by a very limited number of persons at a time, and this results in the ability of

the most skilled players to come out on top more often than not, more complex games

reduce control over the course of events. In many complex societal settings, "none of the

participants, however knowledgeable, can [usually] change [a] 'figurational logic'" (Bauman,

1989: 41).

Social processes are generally characterized by a low degree of individual control. The less

a process resembles the implementation of an individual plan, the more it resembles a

social process (see Elias, 1978: 82). But while persons may not be able to individually steer

38 This later finding is reflected in the insight that "we can never do merely one thing" (Jervis, 1997: 10-12).


21

social developments, they can only act within (and across) these figurations. Persons can

only purposefully act in relation to rules of the game, and their position within such games.

Given such a finding, agency should not be conceptualized in terms of an abstract capacity.

What agents can or cannot do is not to be determined in an a priori fashion. Quite to the

contrary, agency and therefore the importance of individuals and their actions are an

empirical question. A focus on figurations makes it possible to take into account the varying

degrees in which individuals need to be considered in our understanding of IR. A

figurational perspective can do so in a non-essentialist fashion because it understands

persons as "an aggregation of processes" (Jackson and Nexon, 1999: 304) which are given

through their social relations.39

From this perspective, IR should not attempt to stress the importance of the individual (in

the singular), but rather it should focus on individuals in the plural ('homines aperti' – open

persons). In doing so it should take the dynamic (inter)relatedness of persons seriously. It

becomes visible here, that the first-image from a figurational perspective is problematic if it

refers to secluded individuals (the abstract individual) in the singular. It seems to me that in

order to more fully appreciate the importance of individuals and their actions in IR, it is

important to shift the perspective towards individuals in the plural. But this implies that

figurational thinking blurs the boundary between the part and the whole, because neither

persons nor society are given independently of each other. The notion of first and second

image is thereby problematized to a certain degree. This being said, it will still be important

to focus on individual persons as actors in empirical research, because 'individuals' (their

processual-relational ontology notwithstanding) and their characteristics can oftentimes play

an important role in international relations. Any attempt to emphasize the role of

individuals should therefore be able to formulate a vocabulary with which to grasp what

persons do when they act.

As such, it is desirable to move beyond the description of behavior and attempt to more

thoroughly grasp what persons do as agents. In looking for suitable tools in this regard, it is

important to keep in mind that they need to be ontologically compatible with the

figurational logic spelled out above. In order to provide a vocabulary with which to make

visible that individuals are involved in shaping the world they inhabit, I will draw on the

work of Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann Mische (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998), and give it a

small, but important theoretical twist. While I adopt the dimensions of agency which these

two authors formulate, I do not understand the outlined dimensions to signal what agency

(actually) is. Rather I understand these dimensions as a heuristic with which to grasp what

39 Figurations replace reified agents and structures with a picture in which dynamic and shifting relations are central to understanding persons in society. It thereby offers a simple tool with which we can avoid thinking of 'the individual' and 'society' [as if they were] antagonistic" (Elias, 1978: 130).


22

agents do in acting.40 I will, in other words, reframe their attempt to understand 'what

agency is' and rather ask the question: 'what do agents do'. The following categories, serve

to analytically disaggregate a complex process of action, in order to arrive at a better

understanding of social action at an individual level.41

5. Making visible what agents do

At a very basic level these two authors understand agency in terms of a temporally

"embedded process of social engagement" (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998: 963).42 This

engagement is characterized by an interplay between three temporal orientations, namely

the past, the future and the present. Importantly, the relationship between these temporal

dimensions is contextually variable. They define agency as,

the temporally constructed engagement by actors of different structural environments [...] which, through the interplay of habit [iteration], imagination [projectivity], and judgment [practical evaluation], both reproduce and transform those structures in interactive response to the problems posed by changing historical situations (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998: 970).

This definition can be referred to as the chordal triad of agency.

In the following, I will briefly discuss the three temporal orientations present in the actions

of persons, in order to arrive at a useful heuristic with which to grasp the actions of

individual persons in a non-essentialist fashion. I will first discuss iteration, then projectivity

and only in a final step will I discuss practical evaluation. The discussion will therefore not

be linear, because both the temporal orientation towards the past, as well as the temporal

orientation towards the future enter into any decision regarding the resolution of challenges

contemporarily facing persons.

40 Emirbayer and Mische's model is thoroughly processual, but it lacks relationality despite their claim to the contrary. Their relational model merely refers to the disaggregating/splitting of the singular agent into a relational/dialogical conversation, without sufficiently taking the self as a social emergent into consideration.

41 There is no trans-historical claim to the analytical distinction presented here in that even the concept of time underlying the plausibility of the analytical distinction can be historicized. I consider this to be one possible theoretically compatible alternative, the usefulness of which is still subject to empirical testing. 42 As I do not here attempt to fully outline Emirbayer's and Mische's conceptualization of agency, but rather appropriate it for studying the acts of individual persons in IR, I will be very selective in presenting their theory on agency.


23

a) Iteration

The iterational element of agency (associated with the past) "refers to the selective

reactivation by actors of past patterns of thought and action, as routinely incorporated in

practical activity, thereby giving stability and order to social universes and helping to

sustain identities, interactions, and institutions over time" (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998: 971,

emphasis added). It is not easy to see agency in iteration right away, because 'the past' is

commonly associated with stasis and stability. It is therefore especially worthwhile to

underscore that iteration is an important dimension of agency (see Emirbayer and Mische,

1998: 976). The term 'iteration' attempts to signal that even processes of a highly

reproductive type are not automatic, but always involve the effort of agents.43 Emirbayer

and Mische explain by arguing that "the primary locus of agency for the iterational

dimension [...] lies in [their] schematization of social experience" (Emirbayer and Mische,

1998: 975, emphasis in original).44 It involves recalling, appropriating and selecting schemas

that inform action on the basis of past interactions (see Emirbayer and Mische, 1998: 975).

That iteration can be understood in active terms is most accessible if we focus on selective

reactivation of 'past patterns'. The act of selecting is difficult to conceive in purely automatic

terms. It seems to involve a minimum amount of effort.

Continuing the analytical disaggregation of the iterational dimension of agency, it is

possible to dissect the concept of selective recall/reactivation from past experience, into

three elements, namely selective attention, recognition of types (typification) and categorical

location (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998: 979). Firstly, the concept of selective attention signals

that action is closely intertwined with the perceptual focus on some events, rather than

others. Secondly, processes/events need to be identified as 'cases of something'. Here

typification, that is the recognition of "the 'sameness,' 'likeness,' or analogy' of an emerging

experience with those of the past" (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998: 980), renders common

sense notions of agency compatible with the iterational dimension of agency. Thirdly, it is

important to point out that typification does not take place in an ideational or social

vacuum. Rather, persons continually (even involuntarily) position specific experiences or

situations within a wider web of social experiences (categorical location), thus giving and

adding meaning to these events. Taken together, selective attention, recognition of types

43 The need to underscore the agential dimension of agency explains why Emirbayer and Mische did not opt for the terms habit or routines, which both seem to suggest a high degree of automaticity, which can be understood as the absence of agency.

44 Even the most reproductive engagement with ones surroundings are non-automatic, and can have transformative potential. Institutional procedures which partly constitute the state, need to be continually re-enacted.


24

and categorical location provide concepts with which to grasp even habitual actions in

agential terms. Because agency is understood as a chordal triad, all three temporal

orientations are intertwined with each other. They all make visible 'what persons

(predominantly) do in acting in a re-productive fashion. The iterational dimension of

agency is therefore conceptually linked to the temporal orientations towards the future and

the present.

Iteration is linked with the temporal orientation towards the future via the concept of

'expectation maintenance'. Akin to Giddens' notion of ontological security, Emirbayer and

Mische assume that the iterational element of agency can often serve to uphold a basic trust

in the way we consider things to be. But in stark contrast, the concept of 'expectation

maintenance' here is understood as a heuristic tool to grasp the acts of persons, and not as

a biological capacity that predates socialization. The concept of 'expectation maintenance'

therefore does not reintroduce the difficulties which are associated with the concept of

ontological security.

The link with practical evaluation (present) is accounted for through the concept of

'maneuvers among repertoires'. In order to appropriately act in shifting social contexts,

agents need to be able to switch back and forth between different social repertoires. The

degree of conscious engagement (maneuvering) will not be strongly related to specific

situational contexts. While deeply taken for granted situations will most likely only call for a

low degree of maneuvreability, more ambiguous situations might call for a more conscious

form of maneuvering. As such, especially this later element nicely establishes a conceptual

link between iteration and practical evaluation.

To reiterate, the iterational dimension of agency (which points to the reproduction of social

conditions) can be conceptually grasped through the active schematization of social

experience. This includes selective attention, the recognition of types and categorical

location. The concept of 'expectancy maintenance' ties future states-of-affairs to past

experience.45 Finally, at the intersection between past and present we encounter the

possibility of maneuvers among repertoires (shifting along with social contexts). Thus

understood even the most habitual and reproductive deeds can be grasped in terms of

'actions'.

45 The past is itself a dynamic 'point of reference', because the past is continually reconstructed in our personal accounts in the light of present challenges and future expectations (see Mead, 2002: pp. 35; Abbott, 2001: 225).


25

b) Projectivity

The projective dimension of agency refers to the "imaginative generation [...] of possible

future trajectories of action, in which received structures of thought and action may be

creatively reconfigured in relation to actors' hopes, fears, and desires for the future"

(Emirbayer and Mische, 1998: 971).46 At a minimum this involves the active reorganization

of schemes through imagining different responses to challenges facing the agent. This

dimension of agency can also be disaggregated into three sub-chords. In this case it is

possible to distinguish between narrative construction, symbolic recomposition and

hypothetical resolution.

Narrative construction refers to agents locating possible future events/states of the world

within an ongoing process of unfolding history. This includes the formulation of narratives

that relate agents towards other agents. Additionally such narrative constructions also relate

the agent to itself, that is it relates agent X at (time) t1 to agent X' at t2. Narrative

construction can thereby serve as 'maps of action' (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998: 989). Such

maps of action are especially valuable under conditions of uncertainty, as they provide the

means for agents to formulate a (more or less) coherent sense of personal, historical or

institutional development. The second sub-chord, namely symbolic recomposition refers to

agential disaggregating, re-arranging, or re-contextualizing of symbols. Persons can generate

novel combinations and new meanings by way of symbolic recomposition. This dimension

of projectivity accounts for the ability of agents to creatively or imaginatively engage

problems. Agents can also (and this is the third sub-chord) hypothetically resolve the

challenges facing them in order to evaluate which solution will presumably have the

desired effects on a number of different dimensions.

As above, the temporal orientation of agency towards the future is also intertwined with the

remaining temporal orientations through two 'transmission belts'. Projectivity is connected

to the past through the "retrospective-prospective process of identification" (Emirbayer and

Mische, 1998: 988, emphasis in original). This concept refers to the notion that the

anticipation of future events takes place through a "retrospective engagement with one's

prior 'stock of knowledge' as stored in typification, repertoires, and social narratives"

(Emirbayer and Mische, 1998: 989). When actors imagine the future, they arguably draw on

the identification of experiences made in the past and the selective movement between

these experiences. As such, memory, in an important sense, relates 'the future' to the

actions and experiences of the past. Moving on, the temporal orientation towards the future

is connected to the temporal orientation of the present through experimental enactment. 46 The notion of reconfiguration is decisive. The projective orientation does not signal that actors create something ex nihilo. Creativity is always embedded within historical experience and immediate contexts of action.


26

This 'transmission belt' refers to the possibility of agents experimenting with different

solutions to challenges facing them, although without fully committing themselves to the

consequences of the envisioned solutions. One can, for example, imagine that solutions are

first enacted in a low risk environment before being applied on a larger scale.47

c) Practical evaluation

In a final step I will outline the practical-evaluative dimension of agency which refers to

actors making "practical and normative judgments among alternative possible trajectories of

action, in response to the emerging demands, dilemmas, and ambiguities of presently

evolving situations" (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998: 971).48 Continually drawing on Emirbayer

and Mische, the internal structure of practical evaluation can be disaggregated into

'problematization', 'decision', and 'execution'.

The concept of problematization refers to the notion that agents sometimes become aware

that specific elements of situations do not prescribe a clear course of action. Under specific

conditions, agents are faced with the question of what to do, given that rules and schemes

cannot simply be applied to objectively given states of affairs. Although one can argue that

rules can never simply be applied in a clear-cut fashion (see Kratochwil and Friedrichs,

2009), the degree to which the problematic nature of rule application enters the

consciousness of actors can be expected to vary. The problematization of a situation is

closely tied to a characterization of a situation, and the characterization of possible schemes

which might be employed. In order to resolve a problematized situation, agents are called

upon to come to a decision (second sub-chord). Although one might assume that decisions

are easy to identify, this might not always be the case. Whether or not decisions are clearly

discernible is an empirical matter. This is so because decisions are continually made in the

process of practical evaluation. Decisions should therefore not be reduced to 'one shot

games'.49 This, in practice, can make it difficult to untangle decision and execution. To

make things short, the term execution refers to the course of action which an agent follows

in the attempt to bring about some desired result.

47 Projectivity can be expected to be most important in situations in which standard protocols are not sufficient to stake out a course of action. 48 The dimension of practical evaluation generally underscores the importance of 'political decision making processes' under conditions of uncertainty.

49 Sometimes decisions will be clear-cut, especially in cases in which a decision commits an actor to a course of action that cannot easily be revered (On fuzzy boarders see Davis, 2005). But this specific type of decision should not entirely eclipse that decisions are continually made within a process of practical evaluation. Decisions should therefore not be reduced to outcomes of practical evaluation.


27

As with the other temporal orientations, two 'transmission belts' serve to connect practical

evaluation to the other temporal orientations. The connection to the temporal orientation of

the past is accounted for through practices of characterization. Problematization, decision

(and execution) are conceptually based on characterization of something as a case of

something. Past and present are consequently connected through the schemes and

categories operative in a decision-making process, which can be found in memory and past

experience. The process of practical evaluation is additionally connected to 'hypothetical

futures' through the concept of deliberation. Acts of deliberation examine different

alternative choices, in order to discern the expected effects of these choices relate to the

aims and values involved in a decision. Deliberation therefore involves 'playing through'

alternative ways in which to resolve actual situations.

d) Summary

This overview of the temporal orientations and related dimensions of agency presents

agency as a disaggregated process. But this is simply an analytic move used to arrive at a

more fine grained vocabulary. Agency can and should be viewed as a unified process

composed of sub-processes. All three temporal orientations can be expected to be present

in agency, although their relative importance will vary across time, situation and agent

involved.50 Actions can therefore be understood as a "concrete synthesis, shaped and

conditioned, on the one hand, by the temporal-relational contexts of action and, on the

other, by the dynamic element of agency itself" (Emirbayer and Mische 1998: 1004,

emphasis in original).

The chordal triad of agency is only used as a heuristic device in this approach. To be clear,

this is not to be understood as an ontological argument. The disaggregation of agency into

temporal orientations can help to provide a vocabulary with which to make agency visible

in social encounters ranging from habitualized rule-following to highly creative or

subversive disruptions of social situations. It serves as a toolkit with which to grasp what

figurationally embedded persons do in their actions. This heuristic will probably be most

useful in the analysis of small group settings, and especially in cases where information is

abundantly available. It is reasonable to assume that the application of this heuristic will be

demanding. At the same time, it enables researchers to speak of the actions of individuals

in a fashion that is compatible with the underlying figurational framework.

50 Future research should attempt to theorize the relationship between sociogenesis and characteristics of temporal orientations in broader societal groups.


28

Figure 1: The chordal triad of agency (see Emirbayer and Mische, 1998)

Dominant temporal orientations / dimension of agency

past / iteration

future / projectivity

present / goal-seeking

Main concepts

- selective attention

- recognition of types

- categorical location

- narrative construction

- symbolic recomposition

- hypothetical resolution

- problematization

- decision

- execution

'Transmission belts'

present:

maneuver among repertoire

future:

expectation maintenance

past:

retrospective-prospective process of identification

present:

experimental enactment

past:

characterization

future:

deliberation

5) Concluding remarks - re-integrating the importance of acting persons

This paper attempted to introduce figurational thinking in order to provide a theoretical

concept with which to underscore the importance of individuals in IR. This theoretical

apparatus is important because existing theoretical frameworks (in social constructivism)

either introduce a pre-social agent, or divert the attention of inquiry away from the actions

of specific persons. The figurational model which was outlined takes the importance of

individuals in IR seriously, and it does so on the basis of a non-essentialist understanding of

actors. The decisive move away from the notion of homo clausus towards an understanding

of persons as homines aperti opens space in which individuals and their actions can be

moved to the center of inquiry. Most importantly, this does not signal that that 'structural

elements' are thereby neglected. The contrary is the case insofar as persons and their social

ties are not analytically separated in the first place. Persons are always conceptualized in

constitutively interdependent terms. As such a study of IR, from a figurational perspective,

will underscore how the actions of persons and the unintended outcomes of their doings

continually produce and reproduce the social ties which give rise to the possibility of these


29

actions, and which in part constitute what actors are in the first place. Persons therefore are

at every point of the inquiry central to this theoretical undertaking. The focus on persons in

the plural does not imply that studying individual actions would be illegitimate. Keeping

the ontological interrelatedness of persons in mind, it is possible, without reservation, to

focus on the actions of specific persons, their individual psychological make-up, personal

dispositions or habits. It is in fact possible to study what persons do in their actions. In

order to be able to describe acts of persons I draw on the work of Emirbayer and Mische

who formulated a sophisticated notion of agency. But rather than following them in their

assessment that these dimensions describe 'what agency is', I take the concepts outlined

above to be valuable in describing the actions of persons in detail. The practical value of

these categories is yet to be put to the test, and it may well be that it will not always be

possible to apply them even where this would be highly valuable due to practical research

constraints. But formulating such an elaborate vocabulary of agential doings, attempts to

(theoretically) grasp actions at a basic level in order to be able to, convincingly, argue the

case of individuals in IR.

The theoretical shift towards figurations has an important implication in regard to the levels

of analysis question which is closely tied to the status of individuals in IR. In the levels of

analysis framework we find a parts-whole (unit-system) dichotomy (Singer, 1961) which is

analytically helpful in many cases, but potentially problematic from a figurational

perspective.51 The levels of analysis perspective posits the existence of parts and wholes

and usually reduces the choice between images to one of utility (see Singer, 1961: 77). In

doing so it reduces the levels of analysis question to a methodological choice. "What always

starts as an ontological discussion becomes methodological" (Onuf, 1995: 41). But such a

move takes the ontological distinctness of the levels for granted. A figurational approach

suggests that social reality does not have to be studied from a units or a systems

perspective, because individuals and society are two dimensions of one overarching

process. It is therefore not necessary to "focus [either] upon the parts or upon the whole,

upon the components or upon the system" (Singer, 1961: 77).52 From a figurational

perspective, society and individuals are located at a quasi meso-level. It is not a meso-level

proper, as the categorization of 'in-between' presupposes both micro and macro levels.

51

On the usefulness of thinking in terms of levels in regard to disciplinary boundaries see Onuf, 1995: 52. On levels of analysis see also: Waltz, 1959; Hollis and Smith, 1990; Buzan et al., 1993

52 On a side note: The distinction between individual, state and system found in Waltz (Waltz, 1959) can easily be accounted for from a figurational perspective. The state, as a distinct level of analysis, can also be studied in terms of figurations themselves. But off course this does not provide for a fruitful way of stressing the importance of individuals.


30

'Meso' in this sense is used in an illustrative sense only. Here neither individuals nor the

social setting in which persons act, are given independently of each other. While specific

research questions might warrant the (purely) methodological exclusion of either

individuals or their societal context, it has to be kept in mind that, ontologically speaking,

they are two elements of a complex process. As such, discussions of levels of analysis

should not disregard underlying 'levels of being' (Onuf, 1995: 44), at least in terms of

scientific ontologies (Jackson, 2011). I do not claim that the micro-macro distinction is

entirely without warrant. This way of approaching IR has indeed led to many very helpful

insights. But I argue that the distinction is not helpful when we attempt to underscore the

importance of individuals in the social sciences. The conceptualization of agency as 'free of

structure', is associated with the particular, the incalculable and as such something which

cannot be exhaustively (scientifically) accounted for. This makes a focus on individuals

problematic for scientific inquiries that are geared towards the production of 'general

knowledge' above and beyond historical contingencies. As the framing of social reality in

terms of agency and structure and part and whole is detrimental to the attempt to

underscore the importance of individuals in IR, I attempted to shift basic ontological

assumptions. The proposed remedy attempts to dissolve the bi-polar view of agency and

structure and part and whole, by placing individuals in a thoroughly intersubjective realm.

The problem of the role of individuals in IR is therefore not framed within a continuum

between methodological individualism and collectivism /structuralism (see Singer, 1961;

Onuf, 1995) A figurational approach accounts for both the importance of the social

conditions of actions, as well as for the plausible view that individuals, their personal

dispositions and their actions cannot be written out of any meaningful IR narrative.


31

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