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Evaluating the Fight against the Islamic State

This paper analyzes the U.S. response to the world wide insurgency and terror organization known as

the Islamic State (IS), ISIS, ISIL, and Daesh. i This paper analyzes the history and nature of the Islamic

State and the geopolitics surrounding it. It explores the strategies and tactics that the U.S. is currently

conducting, and recommends that these strategies and tactics continue. The paper’s recommendations

for changes are largely political. The paper recommends that the U.S. become the advocate for Sunni

welfare and autonomy in Syria and Iraq.

It is very important to conduct a thorough evaluation of a government’s response to insurgency and

terrorism. What a government does or neglects to do and how it performs has a direct bearing on the

strategies and forms of warfare insurgents and terrorists choose, and the nature and extent of

challenges insurgents must cope with as they seek to accomplish their aims. The more government

responses are informed, prudent, relevant, determined, and disciplined, the greater the burden on the

insurgents. A key to a government’s response to insurgency and terrorism is the recognition that

insurgency and terrorism is a political and military phenomenon. The primary question is which

dimension is most significant and what to do about it. ii

History of the Islamic State

The jihadist group Islamic State (IS) burst on to the international scene in 2014 when it seized large

swathes of territory in Syria and Iraq. It has become notorious for its brutality, including mass killings,

abductions and beheadings. The group though has attracted support elsewhere in the Muslim world -

and a US-led coalition has vowed to destroy it. In June 2014, the group formally declared the

establishment of a "caliphate" - a state governed in accordance with Islamic law, or Sharia, by God's

deputy on Earth, or caliph. It has demanded that Muslims across the world swear allegiance to its leader

- Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al-Badri al-Samarrai, better known as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi - and migrate to

territory under its control. IS has also told other jihadist groups worldwide that they must accept its

supreme authority. Many already have, among them several offshoots of the rival al-Qaeda network. IS

seeks to eradicate obstacles to restoring God's rule on Earth and to defend the Muslim community, or

umma, against infidels and apostates. The group has welcomed the prospect of direct confrontation

with the US-led coalition, viewing it as a harbinger of an end-of-times showdown between Muslims and

their enemies described in Islamic apocalyptic prophecies. iii

IS can trace its roots back to the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian. In 2004, a year after the US-led

invasion of Iraq, Zarqawi pledged allegiance to Osama Bin Laden and formed al -Qaeda in Iraq (AQI),

which became a major force in the insurgency. After Zarqawi's death in 2006, AQI created an umbrella

organisation, Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). ISI was steadily weakened by the US troop surge and the creation

of Sahwa (Awakening) councils by Sunni Arab tribesmen who rejected its brutality. Baghdadi, a former

US detainee, became leader in 2010 and began rebuilding ISI's capabilities. By 2013, it was once agai n

carrying out dozens of attacks a month in Iraq. It had also joined the rebellion against President Bashar

al-Assad in Syria, setting up the al-Nusra Front. In April 2013, Baghdadi announced the merger of his

forces in Iraq and Syria and the creation of "Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant" (Isis). The leaders of al -

Nusra and al-Qaeda rejected the move, but fighters loyal to Baghdadi split from al -Nusra and helped Isis

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remain in Syria. At the end of December 2013, Isis shifted its focus back to Iraq and e xploited a political

stand-off between the Shia-led government and the minority Sunni Arab community. Aided by

tribesmen and former Saddam Hussein loyalists, Isis took control of the central city of Falluja. In June

2014, Isis overran the northern city of Mosul, and then advanced southwards towards Baghdad,

massacring its adversaries and threatening to eradicate the country's many ethnic and religious

minorities. At the end of the month, after consolidating its hold over dozens of cities and towns, Isis

declared the creation of a caliphate and changed its name to "Islamic State". iv

The Nature of the Islamic State

In order to devise a strategy to defeat IS, we must first determine its nature. Insurgency may be defined

as a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the non-ruling group

consciously uses political resources and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of

legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics. v IS meets this definition because it is using political

resources and violence to establish a caliphate. The caliphate would be an enormous Islamic state that

encompasses all Muslims worldwide. However, the sectarian forces of IS aren't counting Shia Muslims in

that equation, only Sunnis. IS’ desire and apparent strategy is to overthrow the existing governments of

unstable, heavily Muslim nations and establish their own theocratic state in its place. vi

Bard O’neill has identified seven major elements of insurgencies that must be identified and studied:

Their Nature, Strategy, Environment, Popular Support, Organization and Unity, External Support, and

Government Response. vii While this paper will focus on analyzing the Government Response, I will

outline the first six elements of the IS insurgency to help give this response context.

IS’ nature is a traditionalist insurgency mixed with apocalyptic-utopian insurgency elements. A

traditionalist insurgency is one that seeks to restore a political system from the recent or distant past. viii

IS’ traditionalist sentiments can be seen in its desire to recreate a caliphate that was destroyed when

the Ottoman Empire was dissolved. The Ottoman Empire caliphate was drastically different that the one

that IS envisions. ix Unlike the Ottoman Empire, the IS caliphate follows takfiri doctrine, which proclaims

people to be apostates because of their sins. The IS is committed to purifying the world by killing vast

numbers of people. The lack of objective reporting from its territory makes the true extent of the

slaughter unknowable, but social-media posts from the region suggest that individual executions

happen more or less continually, and mass executions every few weeks. Muslim “apostates” are the

most common victims. Exempted from automatic execution, i t appears, are Christians who do not resist

their new government. Baghdadi permits them to live, as long as they pay a special tax, known as the

jizya, and acknowledge their subjugation. IS can also be categorized as a somewhat apocalyptic-utopian

insurgency because its followers believe that a battle between IS and the forces of “Rome” will usher in

the apocalypse.x

The Islamic State’s Strategy

IS strategy can be summarized as a military-focus one, with global ambitions but an immediate

concentration on Iraq and Syria. A military-focus strategy gives primacy to military action and

subordinates political action. Proponents of the military focus believe that popular support either is

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already sufficient or will be a by-product of military victories. The Cuban revolution led by Fidel Castro

exemplifies a military-focus insurgent strategy. xi This IS strategy was an amazing success until the U.S.

decided to start military action against IS. With its efforts to gain territory in Syria and Iraq being stymied

by U.S., Iraqi, and Kurd efforts, it appears that IS is expanding its strategic efforts through worldwide

terrorist attacks. ISIS claimed responsibility for the Paris attacks on November 13, 2015, an IS affiliate

claiming credit for the downing of a Russian passenger plane over Egypt on October 31, 2015, and a

bombing in Lebanon that killed more than 40 people on November 12, 2015. xii This shift in strategy may

be caused by the increased difficulty in fighting in Syria and Iraq, or it may just be the way that IS is

trying to entice countries to invade so that it can fight the apocalyptic battle that it envisions.

Although the media portray the Islamic State as a religion-based political movement, which it is, the

more fundamental basis for understanding IS is their perceptual and aspirational geographic endgame of

a caliphate. Their narrative involves historical geographic and culturally relevant regions, including

Khorasan, an area spanning parts of Iran, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan. xiii

Figure 1: IS geographic goal for territorial control by 2020.xiv

The Islamic State’s Environment

The Institute for the Study of War map of ISIS (September 15, 2015) shows that IS support and control

zones encompass central and eastern Syria, as well as western and central Iraq. xv This area includes the

large portions of the Euphrates and Tigris river valleys in both Syria and Iraq. In Syria and Iraq, ISIS has

already taken control of oil fields, water and agricultural areas. In spite of their massive virtual recruiting

efforts and religious-political characterization, much of the ISIS campaign is centered on human and

physical geography.xvi In spite of their tenuous control, ISIS has divided their area of administration in

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Syria and Iraq into provinces with leadership by regional government to control the people and

resources within those provinces. xvii

Figure 2: Institute for the Study of War, ISIS Sanctuary, September 15, 2015

IS is fighting a ground war inside Iraq and Syria on three types of terrain: deserts, cities, and suburban

areas. IS favors maneuver warfare in open deserts, allowing IS to attack cities immediately adjacent to

deserts from multiple directions, which Iraqi news sources often term “attacks from multiple axes.” ISIS

also specializes in insidious urban operations, whereby ISIS infiltrates enemy defenses within large cities,

attacks security forces with guerilla tactics, and terrorizes populations to challenge the state’s ability to

provide security. An additional signature that emerged in AQI’s 2006 campaign was a “Belt” offensive,

whereby ISIS designed a way to maneuver around large cities and infiltrate them by establishing sectors

of responsibility in the surrounding suburban terrain and establishing staging areas there. The physical

terrain in Iraq and Syria dictates how well IS can apply its various warfare techniques to each objective

(see Figure 3 below).xviii

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Figure 3: ISIS’s Hybridized Warfarexix

The political geography of Syria and Iraq is a very permissive environment for IS to thrive. Sunni

disenfranchisement in both Iraq and Syria created a vacuum that the IS has exploited. In Iraq, a Sunni

minority was sidelined from national politics after the United States ousted Saddam Hussein, a Sunni, in

2003. In Syria, a civil war erupted in 2011 pitting the ruling minority Alawis, a Shia offshoot, against the

primarily Sunni opposition, spawning sectarian violence. However, after rapid expansion through Iraq in

much of 2014, IS seemed to run up against its limits as it pushed up against majority Kurdish and Shia

Arab regions, where it faced greater resistance from Iraqi forces and local populations along with U.S.-

led air strikes. Its militants have failed to advance on Baghdad or the Kurdish capital, Erbil. xx

The Islamic State’s Popular Support

Twitter is crowded with people who support and sympathize with IS and who are interested in following

it. It’s a phenomenon we’ve seen nothing like since al -Qaeda attacks. When a woman tries to sneak

from Saudi Arabia to Yemen along with her kids in order to go to Syria and work with the jihadists, then

such an act represents IS’ capability to mobilize support. It also means that IS has agents that recruit

members for it. When the number of Western Muslims who joined the fighting in Syria reaches the

hundreds, then we are practically talking about the success of ISIS, the global organization and not just a

group enthusiastic to the Syrian cause.xxi However enthusiastic these active IS supporters are, they

appear to be a small portion of the population of Muslim and Western countries. In a recent poll, IS had

found the most support in the African country of Nigeria at 14% of the respondents. Even there though

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had 66% of respondents who had an unfavorable opinion of IS. xxii The people who responded favorably

to IS in this poll may have only been the active supporters of IS however. There may be a vast greater

amount that passively support IS. These passive supporters do necessarily not act on their feelings, but

they want IS to succeed. Viewers of Al Jazeera Arabic were asked in an anonymous poll 'Do you support

ISIS victories in Iraq and Syria?' The poll attracted more than 36,000 votes, with a staggering 81% in

support of the ISIS and only 19% rejecting the group. Most of Al Jazeera Arabic's audience comes from

the Sunni Muslim world, with high viewership in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Michael Weiss and Hassan

Hassan explain the strange allure of ISIS to many Sunni Muslims, “Those who say they are adherents of

ISIS as a strictly political project make up a weighty percentage of its lower cadres and support base. For

people in this category, ISIS is the only option on offer for Sunni Muslims who have been dealt a dismal

hand in the past decade — first losing control of Iraq and now suffering nationwide atrocities, which

many equate to genocide, in Syria. They view the struggle in the Middle East as one between Sunnis and

an Iranian-led coalition, and they justify ultraviolence as a necessary tool to counterbalance or deter

Shia hegemony. This category often includes the highly educated.” xxiii

This public support for ISIS extends into Western countries as well. In a survey done by ICM research in

2014 (before the Paris attacks), found that nearly 16% of French citizens had a favorable view of ISIS.

That 16% is even higher than the 13% in Gaza who were found to view ISIS favorably, in a similar poll.

Even more alarming is that more than a quarter (27%) of French citizens between the ages of 18 and 24

were found to sympathize with ISIS.xxiv

Organization and Unity

IS has quietly built an effective management structure of mostly middle-aged Iraqis overseeing

departments of finance, arms, local governance, military operations and recruitment. At the top the

organization is the self-declared leader of all Muslims, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a radical chief executive

officer of sorts, who handpicked many of his deputies from among the men he met while a prisoner in

American custody at the Camp Bucca detention center a decade ago. He had a preference for military

men, and so his leadership team includes many officers from Saddam Hussein’s long-disbanded army.

They include former Iraqi officers like Fadel al-Hayali, the top deputy for Iraq, who once served Mr.

Hussein as a lieutenant colonel, and Adnan al-Sweidawi, a former lieutenant colonel who now heads the

group’s military council. Mr. Baghdadi’s deputies include 12 walis, or local rulers; a three -man war

cabinet; and eight others who manage portfolios like finance, prisoners and recruitment. xxv IS appears to

be quite unified because there are relatively few news reports of defectors from this large

organization.xxvi

External Support

IS does not appear to have official support from external countries. Saudi Arabia has denied accusations

that it is supporting IS and has provided a base to train moderate rebel forces. However, wealthy Saudis

have sent donations to the group and some 2,500 Saudi men have travelled to Syria to fight. xxvii The

most important external support that IS receives is in the form of fighters travelling to Syria and Iraq to

fight for it. The largest total number (according to the International Centre for the Study of

Radicalization and Political Violence) Is from Saudi Arabia. Belgium has the highest number of fighters

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per capita of any Western nation. Abdelhamid Abaaoud, a Belgian-born senior Islamic State operative,

was suspected to be the key mastermind behind the coordinated attacks on Paris in November. He was

killed in a raid at an apartment building in a Paris suburb six days following the attacks. France is the

biggest source of fighters in Europe, contributing 1,200. Government figures have put the number of

fighters closer to 1,600. The U.S. is very low on this list with only about 100 fighters have come from the

U.S. An estimated 1,700 fighters have come from Russia. Most of these are thought to be from

Chechnya and Dagestan, according to Russia’s Federal Security Service. xxviii

U.S. Efforts against the Islamic State

On September 10, 2014 President Obama announced his strategy to defeat IS: “we will degrade, and

ultimately destroy, ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained counter-terrorism strategy.” This

strategy entails four elements: A systematic campaign of airstrikes, increased support to Iraq and

Kurdish forces, as well as support to Syrian opposition to IS, counterterrorism efforts to prevent terrorist

attacks, and humanitarian efforts to support those displaced by IS. xxix

In September 2014, the then director of the US National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), Matthew

Olsen, said IS controlled much of the Tigris-Euphrates river basin - an area similar in size to the United

Kingdom, or about 81,000 square miles. A year later, the US defense department declared that IS

frontlines in much of northern and central Iraq and northern Syria had been pushed back significantly by

US-led coalition air strikes and ground operations. IS could no longer operate freely in roughly 20-25% of

populated areas in Iraq and Syria where it once could, it said. The defense department estimated that IS

had lost approximately 5,790-7,720 square miles of territory in Iraq, or about 30-37% of what it

controlled in August 2014, and 770-1,540 square miles in Syria, or about 5-10%. Despite this, IS has been

able to capture new territory of strategic value over the same period, including the ci ty of Ramadi in

Iraq's Anbar province and Palmyra in Syria's Homs province. xxx So you could say that the airstrikes have

been somewhat successful in degrading IS ability to gain and hold territory.

In February 2015, US Director for National Intelligence James Clapper said IS could muster "somewhere

in the range between 20,000 and 32,000 fighters" in Iraq and Syria.xxxi The U.S. Air Force has fired off

more than 20,000 missiles and bombs since the U.S. bombing campaign against ISIS began, according to

the Air Force, leading to depleted munitions stockpiles and calls to ramp up funding and weapons

production.xxxii This would seem to support the U.S. contention that there had been "substantial

attrition" in IS ranks since US-led coalition air strikes began in August 2014. In June 2015, US Deputy

Secretary of State Antony Blinken said more than 10,000 IS fighters had been killed. xxxiii

While evidence supports the contention that U.S. airstrikes have had some success in degrading IS, some

feel that they are not effective because the U.S. has wanted to avoid collateral damage. There is also an

element of miscommunication that's limiting an advance by Iraqi troops. Shiite fighters with the Popular

Mobilization Committee in Tikrit in April said they never knew when or where the airstrikes would fall,

which prevented them from moving into new territory to fight ISIS. General Joe Dunford, chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said a new plan will aim to fix that. If U.S. Special Forces are on the front line,

they could not only call in airstrikes, but pass on intelligence to soldiers on the ground, closing the

communication gap. But more than anything, analysts say, the embedding of U.S. troops on the front

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line could improve the accuracy of airstrikes, which could make a significant difference in combating

ISIS. "We have needed better targeting in Iraq for quite some time, that is clear," Daniel Serwer, an

expert on Iraq and Syria at the Middle East Institute said. "This plan would not only improve the

accuracy of American bombing, but it would enable it." The U.S. is planning to have a limited amount of

special operation forces and military advisers embed with Iraqi forces on the front line to ensure the

logistics there are effective, intelligence is accurate and arms are delivered to the Sunni tribes efficiently,

Dunford said. According to his briefing, the plan will make fighting on the front line more efficient, a

boost the Iraqi soldiers have needed since the rapid expansion of ISIS in 2014. xxxiv

But the introduction of U.S. troops on the front line could anger the Shiite forces that are largely backed

by Iran, a country that is currently countering the U.S. fight in neighboring Syria by propping up

President Bashar Assad. "I have seen some signs that there are a few battalions [in the Popular

Mobilization Committee] that are opposed to the plan," said Alireza Nader, an expert on Iranian

relations in the Middle East at RAND Corporation, a global think tank. xxxv

The U.S has struggled to find reliable partners against the Islamic State on the ground in Syria other than

the Kurds and an array of Arab-dominated groups the CIA has armed to fight Bashar al-Assad. In early

October 2015, the Obama administration announced that a $500 million Pentagon program to train

anti-IS Syrian rebels had largely failed and was being restructured. The White House's approach now

seems to be to support the Kurds and nationalist Arabs in the north as intensely as possible. It

announced on October 30, 2015 that the U.S. would deploy dozens of special operations forces to

northern Syria to coordinate airstrikes and arms supply. This strategy has some risks because Turkey is

nervous that the success of the Syrian Kurds will inspire Kurds in Turkey to try and carve out their own

mini states, and it pointed to the Euphrates as a red line when announcing its recent attacks on the

Syrian Kurds. Ankara fears Syrian Kurdish forces will connect the areas they control in northeast Syria to

their third region, or canton, in the northwest, thereby creating a powerful Kurdish corridor along the

Turkey-Syria border.xxxvi

There is a great deal of criticism concerning the current U.S. counterterrorism policy. Captain Robert

Newson, a Navy SEAL who served as director of the Joint Interagency Task Force -Counter Terrorism, told

an interviewer at West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center that “drone strikes, manned airstrikes, and

special operations raids … buy space and time. But by themselves they are only a delaying action, and

everywhere I have been, in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, every military person up and down the chain of

command acknowledges this. This ‘CT concept’ — the solution that some people champion where the

main or whole effort is drone strikes and special operations raids — is a fantasy.” A Stimson Center

commission on U.S. drone policy with retired Gen. John Abizaid concluded in June 2014 that “the Obama

administration’s heavy reliance on targeted killings as a pillar of US counterterrorism strategy rests on

questionable assumptions, and risks increasing instability and escalating conflicts. While tactical strikes

may have helped keep the homeland free of major terrorist attacks, existing evidence indicates that

both Sunni and Shia Islamic extremist groups have grown in scope, lethality and influence in the broader

area of operations in the Middle East, Africa and South Asia.” xxxvii

This report finds that the defeat of ISIS must address two Centers of Gravity. The first is a classical

military center of gravity that ISIS uses to wrest physical control from modern states and hold w hat it

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has gained. The second ISIS center of gravity is a political capacity to provide essential state functions

within the territory that ISIS controls. ISIS strength emanates from the ability to translate military

control into political control, and thereby to claim that the Caliphate is manifest. A strategy to defeat

ISIS must break this synergy among the military and political operations of ISIS and its layered

leadership. The U.S. must consider ways to accomplish this in order to propel the strategic defeat of ISIS.

Destroying its Critical Capabilities, denying its Critical Opportunities and Critical Requirements, and

exploiting its Critical Vulnerabilities are additional component effects that must be synchronized in order

to achieve this strategic effect.

Knowing that it would take tens of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands of troops to defeat IS and

hold its terrain for an indeterminate amount of time, I agree with Graeme Wood of the Atlantic that

“given everything we know about the Islamic State, continuing to slowly bleed it appears the best of bad

military options.”xxxviii I concur with President Obama’s statement that "ISIL is not going to pose an

existential threat to us, they are a dangerous organization like al Qaeda was, but we have hardened our

defenses, our homeland has never been more protected by more effective intelligence and law

enforcement professionals at every level than they are now. The coordination is much better than it is

now. If you look at the number of successful terrorist attacks that have occurred, you know, we have

disrupted a lot of them, but the dangers are still there and so we just have to keep things in

perspective"xxxix That being said, I also agree that more can be done short of an invasion of Syria and Iraq

of tens of thousands of U.S. troops. I agree with the Institute for the Study of War findings that a

strategy whereby ISIS remains in control of Mosul, Raqqa, and other urban centers in Iraq and Syria will

fall short of the desired outcome. Settling for lesser aims or resolving to do nothing are equal. The threat

of ISIS is real and expanding, but ISIS is also vulnerable at its present political formation stage. xl

The only way to defeat IS is to guarantee a ground force that will occupy, secure, and rebuild Syria, and

Iraq to a lesser extent. More limited solutions are insufficient to shape ground conditions that promote

stability and reduce the opportunity for groups like IS to remain. The difficulty in accomplishing this is in

the details however. The U.S. must continue to work with local forces in Syria and Iraq to accomplish this

goal because the U.S. is not a suitable unilateral occupying force because anti -U.S. sentiment in these

countries has risen to staggering levels. Iran is also not suitable or capable, as demonstrated by its

inability to help the Assad regime win its war in Syria, its tactical inability to clear ISIS from Tikrit in Iraq,

its state sponsorship of terrorism, and its strategic objectives to destroy other states in the region. The

Arab coalition currently fighting the Houthis in Yemen is likewise unsuitable, given the likelihood that it

would also condone persecution of minority Shi’a populations. The Arab coalition is also risky because it

treats Iraq and Syria as battle grounds for a sectarian war against Iran instead of unified state -building

missions that are necessary to defeat IS.xli

I agree with the Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton when she said that "We need to lay

the foundation for a second Sunni awakening," in her November 19 Council on Foreign Relations speech.

"We need to put sustained pressure on the government in Baghdad to get its political house in order,

move forward with national reconciliation, and finally stand up a national guard. Baghdad needs to

accept, even embrace, arming Sunni and Kurdish forces in the war against [IS]. But if Baghdad won’t do

that, the coalition should do so directly."xlii I think that a very public direct arming of Sunnis and Kurds

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would place us on the side of the majority of the Islamic world. It might place a wedge between many

Jihadist intellectuals, who will likely support IS regardless of our actions, and the vast majority of Sunni

Islam who passively support IS. The U.S. should articulate a policy that Sunnis would receive protection

and autonomy (if not independence) in any post-Assad regime in Syria and Iraq in conjunction with this

supply of armaments. If the U.S. can be seen as the champion of Sunni rights, this could significantly

reduce the appeal that IS has to potential Sunni recruits.

i Irshaid, F. (2012, December 2). Isis, Isil, IS or Daesh? One group, many names. BBC Monitoring. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27994277.

ii Oneill, Bard E. (2005). Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, Inc.

iii What is ‘Islamic State’? (2012, December 2). In BBC News Retrieved December 5, 2015, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29052144. iv What is ‘Islamic State’? (2012, December 2). In BBC News Retrieved December 5, 2015, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29052144.

v Oneill, Bard E. (2005). Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, Inc.

vi Tognotti, Chris (2014, September 2) What Does ISIS Want, Exactly? The Terrorists' Stated Goal Has Been Made. Bustle, Retrieved from http://www.bustle.com/articles/38192-what-does-isis-want-exactly-the-terrorists-stated-goal-has-been-made-clear

vii Oneill, Bard E. (2005). Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, Inc.

viii Oneill, Bard E. (2005). Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, Inc.

ix Tognotti, Chris (2014, September 2) What Does ISIS Want, Exactly? The Terrorists' Stated Goal Has Been Made. Bustle, Retrieved from http://www.bustle.com/articles/38192-what-does-isis-want-exactly-the-terrorists-stated-goal-has-been-made-clear x Wood, Graeme ( 2015, March) What ISIS Really Wants. The Atlantic, Retrieved from http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/

xi Oneill, Bard E. (2005). Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, Inc.

xii What is ‘Islamic State’? (2012, December 2). In BBC News Retrieved December 5, 2015, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29052144.

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xiii Medina, Richard M. and Hepner, George F. (2015) A Note on the State of Geography and Geospatial Intelligence. Retrieved on December 5, 2015 from https://www.nga.mil/MediaRoom/News/Pages/StateofGeographyandGEOINT.aspx xiv Burman, Jake (2015, September 14) ISIS WARNING: Horrifying map of target countries it wants to dominate in Europe by 2020. Sunday Express Retrieved from http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/597254/ISIS-Map-Europe-Terror-Organisation-Andrew-Hosken-Caliphate-Abu-Musab-al-Zarqawi xv ISIS SANCTUARY MAP: SEPTEMBER 15, 2015 (2015, September 15) Institute for the Study of War. Retrieved from http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isis-sanctuary-map-september-15-2015 xvi Medina, Richard M. and Hepner, George F. (2015) A Note on the State of Geography and Geospatial Intelligence, NGA. Retrieved on December 5, 2015 from https://www.nga.mil/MediaRoom/News/Pages/StateofGeographyandGEOINT.aspx xvii Medina, Richard M. and Hepner, George F. (2015) A Note on the State of Geography and Geospatial Intelligence, NGA. Retrieved on December 5, 2015 from https://www.nga.mil/MediaRoom/News/Pages/StateofGeographyandGEOINT.aspx xviii Mcfate, Jessica Lewis (2015) MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 27, THE ISIS DEFENSE IN IRAQ AND SYRIA: COUNTERING AN ADAPTIVE ENEMY. Institute for the Study of War, Retrieved from http://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISIS%20Defense%20in%20Iraq%20and%20Syria%20--%20Standard.pdf xix Mcfate, Jessica Lewis (2015) MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 27, THE ISIS DEFENSE IN IRAQ AND SYRIA: COUNTERING AN ADAPTIVE ENEMY. Institute for the Study of War, Retrieved from http://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISIS%20Defense%20in%20Iraq%20and%20Syria%20--%20Standard.pdf xx Laub, Zachary, and Masters, Jonathan, (2015, November 16) The Islamic State. Council on Foreign Relations, Retrieved from http://www.cfr.org/iraq/islamic-state/p14811 xxi al-Rashed, Abdulrahman (2014, June 23) How much support does ISIS enjoy? Al Arabiya News – Middle East. Retrieved from http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2014/06/23/How-much-support-does-ISIS-enjoy-.html xxii Poushter, Jacob (2015, November 17) In nations with significant Muslim populations, much disdain for ISIS. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/17/in-nations-with-significant-muslim-populations-much-disdain-for-isis/ xxiii Al Jazeera poll shows alarming levels of support for ISIS (2015, May 26) In The Interpreter. Retrieved December 6, 2015 from http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/05/26/Al -Jazeera-poll-shows-alarming-levels-of-support-for-ISIS.aspx xxiv Joseph, Dan (2014, August 27) 27% of French Youth Support ISIS. Cnsnews.com Retrieved December 6, 2015 http://www.cnsnews.com/mrctv-blog/dan-joseph/27-french-youth-support-isis

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xxv Hubbard, Ben and Shmitt, Eric (2014, August 27) Military Skill and Terrorist Technique Fuel Success of ISIS, The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/28/world/middleeast/army-know-how-seen-as-factor-in-isis-successes.html xxvi Tasch, Barbara (2015, September 25) Dozens of ISIS defectors explained why they left the terror army. Business Insider. Retrieved from http://www.businessinsider.com/dozens-of-isis-defectors-explained-why-they-left-the-terror-army-2015-9 xxvii Islamic State: Where key countries stand (2015, December 3) In BBC News Retrieved December 5, 2015, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29074514 xxviii Shaw, Jessica Marmor (2015, December 5) The countries where ISIS finds support, in two charts. Market Watch. Retrieved from http://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-countries-where-isis-finds-support-in-two-charts-2015-12-05 xxixWatch Obama’s ISIS Speech and Read the Full Transcript (2014, September 10). In Heavy Retrieved December 5, 2015, from http://heavy.com/news/2014/09/obama-isis-speech-transcript-video-september-10-2014/ xxx What is ‘Islamic State’? (2015, December 2). In BBC News Retrieved December 5, 2015, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29052144. xxxi What is ‘Islamic State’? (2015, December 2). In BBC News Retrieved December 5, 2015, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29052144. xxxii Diamond, Jeremy and Starr, Barbara (2015, December 4) The U.S. is running out of bombs to drop on ISIS. CNN. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/04/politics/air-force-20000-bombs-missiles-isis/ xxxiii Diamond, Jeremy and Starr, Barbara (2015, December 4) The U.S. is running out of bombs to drop on ISIS. CNN. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/04/politics/air-force-20000-bombs-missiles-isis/ xxxivBanco, Erin (2015, October 28) US To Send Military To Frontline In Anbar Province, Iraq, To Support Iraqi Troops In Fight Against ISIS. International Business Times. Retrieved from http://www.ibtimes.com/us-send-military-frontline-anbar-province-iraq-support-iraqi-troops-fight-against-2159293 xxxvBanco, Erin (2015, October 28) US To Send Military To Frontline In Anbar Province, Iraq, To Support Iraqi Troops In Fight Against ISIS. International Business Times. Retrieved from http://www.ibtimes.com/us-send-military-frontline-anbar-province-iraq-support-iraqi-troops-fight-against-2159293 xxxvi Jones, Sophia and Ahmed, Akbar Shahid (2015, November 6) Here's The Latest Potentially Fatal Flaw In Obama's ISIS Strategy Washington's increasing coziness with the Syrian Kurds has made Turkey nervous. The World Post. Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/american-airstrikes-from-turkey-help-kurds_563ba049e4b0307f2cac7267

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xxxvii Brooks, Rosa (2015, June 24) U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy Is the Definition of Insanity. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/24/u-s-counterterrorism-strategy-is-the-definition-of-insanity/

xxxviii Wood, Graeme ( 2015, March) What ISIS Really Wants. The Atlantic, Retrieved from http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/ xxxix President Obama defends his strategy against ISIS (2015, December 3) CBS News. Retrieved on December 6, 2015 from http://www.cbsnews.com/news/president-obama-isis-threat-paris-style-terror-attack-us/ xl Lewis, Jessica D. (2014) The Islamic State: A Counter-Strategy for a Counter-State. Institute for the Study of War Retrieved on December 6, 2015 from http://www.understandingwar.org/report/islamic-state-counter-strategy-counter-state xli xli Mcfate, Jessica Lewis (2015) MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 27, THE ISIS DEFENSE IN IRAQ AND SYRIA: COUNTERING AN ADAPTIVE ENEMY. Institute for the Study of War, Retrieved from http://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISIS%20Defense%20in%20Iraq%20and%20Syria%20--%20Standard.pdf xlii Pecquet, Julian (2015, December 1) US threatens to bypass Baghdad, arm Sunnis against IS. Al-Monitor. Retrieved from http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/12/us-threat-bypass-baghdad-arm-sunnis-fight-isis.html#