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Beyond absolutism andrelativism in transpersonal

evolutionary theoryJorge N. Ferrer

a

aCalifornia Institute of Integral Studies , 9 Peter

Yorke Way, San Francisco, CA, 94109, USA Phone:

(510) 5950408, (415) 6745500x125 Fax: (510)

5950408, (415) 6745500x125 E-mail:Published online: 04 Jun 2010.

To cite this article:Jorge N. Ferrer (1998) Beyond absolutism and relativism in

transpersonal evolutionary theory, World Futures: The Journal of New Paradigm

Research, 52:3-4, 239-280

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Beyond AbsolutismandRelativismin

Transpersonal Evolutionary Theory

JORGEN FERRER

California InstituteofIntegral S tudies,9Peter Yorke W ay,SanFrancisco,

CA 94109 US A.

Tel.:

510) 595-0408,

415)

674-5500x125;

Fax:

415)

674-5555,

E-mail:

JorgeNF@ aol.com

(Received Decem ber10, 1997;acceptedJanuary 6, 1998)

This paper critically examines

Ken

Wilber's transpersonal evolutionary

theoryin thecontextof thephilosophical discourseofpostm odernity.The

critique focusesonWilber's refutation ofnon-absolutistandnon-universal-

ist approachesto rationality, truth,andm orality suchascultural relativ-

ism, pluralism, constructivism

or

perspectivismunder

the

charges

of

being epistemologically self-refuting

and

morally pernicious. First,

it is

suggested that Wilber offers

a

faulty dichotomy between

his

absolutist-

universalist metanarrativeand a self-contradictory and pernicious vulgar

relativism. Second,

it is

shown that Wilber's argum ents

for the

self-refuting

and pernicious nature of other non-absolutist approaches are bothfal-

lacious

and

distorting. Finally,

the

problematic consequences

of

absolutist

discourse

for

academic

and

cross-cultural dialogue

are

pinpointed. Taking

Wilber's treatment

of

Nagarjuna's thinking

as a

paradigm atic example,

it is

suggested that absolutist thinking both usually leads

to

"bad" hermeneutics,

and potentially hinders genuine dialogue among people and traditions

holding different world views.

KEYWORDS: absolutism, relativism, evolution, transpe rson al, d ialogue ,

Wilber

The last two decades of Western philosophical debates have been

increasingly dominated by an implacable assault on the principles

of modernity, or the so-called fundamental Enlightenment para-

digm. Although there is not a unified postmodern theory, virtually

all postmodern thinkers have developed the following two inter-

related lines of attack against the legacy of modernity (see, e.g., Best

and Kellner, 1991; Docherty, 1993; Rosenau, 1992): (1) the rejection

of any form of absolute and universal standards of rationality, truth,

WorldFutures,1998, Vol.

52, pp.

239-280

1998

OPA (Overseas Publishers Association)

N.V.

Reprints available directly from

the

publisher Published

by

license u nder

Photocopying permittedbylicense only theGordonandBreach Publishers imprint.

PrintedinIndia.

239

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240 JORG E N FERRER

and value; and (2) the critique of any privileged picture, metanar-

rative or "Big Story" about human beings and their place in history

and the cosmos.

1

As Lyotard (1974) put it in his often quoted

dictum, postmodernity can be characterized by an "incredulity

toward metanarratives." According to many contempo rary thinkers ,

metanarratives have historically not only claimed universal status,

bu t also functioned as legitimization devices of ethical and epistemic

judgments and practices. The absolutist character of metanarratives

has been fiercely criticized for being totalizing, imperialistic, and

logocentric. Postmodernism emerged as a reaction against these

totalizing meta-frameworks, and due to the failure of the funda-

mental Enlightenment project to find untouchable or absolute

foundations for human knowledge and morality. This lack of ulti-

mate foundations has been often portrayed as potentially leading to

a situation of utter perplexity, enervating anxiety, meaningless rela-

tivism, and even banalized nihilism (e.g., Bernstein, 1983; Crook,

1991;

Carr, 1992).

2

If there are no transhistorical and transcultural

foundations for our knowledge and morality, the enemies of post-

modernism argue, then the only route open to us is one leading to

both a self-refuting epistemological relativism an d a pernicious moral

anarchy. This is, paraphrasing Habermas (1987, p. 300), the di-

lemma of the postm odern era: How to navigate between the Scylla of

a totalitarian and unattainable absolutism and the Charybdis of a

self-contradictory and morally repugnant relativism.

Interestingly enough, this postmodern predicament finds strik-

ing parallels in the history of evolutionary philosophical thinking.

Ever since the rise of Darwinism, many of the debates on biological

and human evolution have orbited around the conflict between

defenders of an uni-linear, universal, and frequently pre-given evolu-

tionary process (Hegel, Teilhard de Chardin, etc.) and proponents

of multiple, undeterministic, and often purposeless evolutionary

pathways (Spencer, Morgan, Bergson, Monod, etc.) (Bowler, 1989).

In the same vein, the perpetual quarrels between scientists and

religious partisans of various sorts (creationists, finalists, etc.) about

the nature and purpose of evolution usually derived from similar

points of divergence (e.g., Barlow, 1995). However, it was in the

discipline of cultural anthropology where the dichotomy between

absolutist and relativism in the context of evolutionary thinking

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ABSO LUTISM AND RELATIVISM 241

emerged at its best. Since the critique of the classic evolutionary

standpoint by Franz Boas and his pupils, but especially after the

publication of Peter W inch's seminal

The Idea of aSocial Scienceand

its Relation toPhilosophy

(1958), philosophers and anthropologists

have arduously disputed both the universality and evolutionary

superiority of the mode of rationality characteristic of the West

(absolutist/universalist thesis), and the illegitimacy of making such

transcultural comparative jud gm en ts due to the relativity and in-

comm ensurability existing among multiple "rationalities" and "forms

of life" (relativist/pluralist thesis) (see Wilson, 1970; Finnegan and

Horton , 1973; Hollis and Lukes, 1982). In the eyes of their respective

antagonists, of course, the universalists appeared "imperialistic"

and "ethnocentric," and the relativists look "irrational," "nihilistic,"

and "amoral." It soon became evident, however, that both extreme

positionsradical universalism and radical relativismentailed

unb earab le implications for ou r m odern ideals of justice, democ-

racy, and equality among human beings. On the one hand, the

commitment to radical universalism traps us in the conceptual

straitjacket of dogmatic superiority and intolerance towards other's

values and ways of life, so painfully evident in the historical

justification of colonialism and imperialism. O n the other hand , the

acceptance of radical relativism builds unbridgable gaps among

cultures tha t now "live in different worlds," not only positing

apriori

obstacles to cross-cultural communication, but also preventing the

critique of any historically o r culturally accepted form of life (includ-

ing organized slavery, systematic genocide, ritualistic cannibalism,

or institutionalized torture). In the light of these difficulties, it

should not be surprising that an increasing number of anthropo-

logists, philosophers, and social scientists are today intentionally

seeking a middle way between these excesses that honors their

insights while avoiding their dangers (e.g., Bernstein, 1983; Tam biah,

1990;

Fay, 1996). As in contemporary philosophy, then , the agenda

of modern anthropology and evolutionary philosophical thinking

is to transcend these pernicious dualisms and move beyond

absolutism and relativism.

It is in this context that I want to discuss here the most recent

work in transpersonal evolutionary theory as proposed by Ken

Wilber (1995a) in his massive Sex, Ecology, Spirituality. The Spirit of

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242 JORGE N FERRER

Evolution.

3

One m ann er to read W ilber's (1995a)

Sex, Ecology,

Spirituality (SES

thereafter) is as a response to the relativist threat

seemingly inherent in the postmodern critique of modernity. In

the introduction of

SES,

Wilber presents this work as the first part

of a trilogy

(TheKosmos Trilogy)

aimed at the bold and colossal

task of identifying and systematizing the general evolutionary pat-

terns embedded in the various branches of human knowledgethe

"patterns of existence" (p. 32)with the Maimonidean purpose of

providing us with an "orienting map of the place of men and

women in relation to Universe, Life, and Spirit" (p. ix). Specifically,

Wilber (1995a) offers his trilogy as an example of how this type of

integrative work can be done in our fragmented postmodern era.

Pushing post-modern ja rg on to its limits, we could say that what

Wilber is proposing is a meta-metanarrative: A privileged meta-

frmework able to adequately situate or correct the rest of metanar-

ratives about human existence and its place in the cosmossuch as

the Christian, Darwinian, M arxist, Buddhist, Jung ian , e tc.

4

Further-

more, as is the case with all metanarratives, this "Big Story" is not

presented as one more perspective of cosmic and human evolution,

but as an all-embracing framework possessing privileged status over

all local and rival stories. As Wilber points out, the problem with

contemporary holistic paradigms is that they are not holistic

enoug h, and the purpo se of hisTrilogyis to show the bigger picture

(in Schwartz, 1995, p. 41).

Two other intertwined objectives are pursued by Wilber in

SES:

The first is to carry forward what he considers to be the true task

of postmodernity, i.e., the integration of the Big Three (We, I, and it;

or the Good, the Beautiful, and the True), whose differentiation

defined the m odern perio d, and whose presen t state of dissociation

is, for Wilber, lurking behind most of the maladies besetting the

twentieth-century, such as the ecological crisis, ethnocentric imperi-

alism, or egocentric narcissism (see Wilber, 1995a, pp. 148-149;

390-394; 1996, p. 337). The second is to fight the "flatland,"

Wilber's term for the currently prevalent Western world view char-

acterized by a lack of qualitative distinctions, interiority, and spiri-

tuality. This world view must be challenged, Wilber (1996) writes,

not only because "Only by rejecting flatland can the Good and the

True and the Beautiful be integrated" (pp. 336-337), but also

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ABSOLUTISM AND RELATIVISM 243

in order to dispel the "aperspectival madness" (nothing is better

than anything else) which Wilber attributes to every non-absolutist

and non-universalist account of rationality, truth, and valuesuch

as cultural relativism, pluralism, perspectivism, multiculturalism,

constructivism, post-structuralism, deconstructionism, and contex-

tualism.

5

It is not my purpose in this paper to argue against or in favor

of the specific vision of reality that Wilber presents in his book.

6

My purpose is merely to show that the arguments he offers for the

rejection of non-absolutist approaches do not stand serious scrutiny,

and that certain non-absolutist positions should therefore be re-

garded as viable alternatives to his absolutist-universalist scheme

in both transpersonal theory and evolutionary thinking.

7

In addi-

tion, I want to suggest what I believe are certain problematic con-

sequences of absolutist thinking for the practice of genuine and

undistorted dialogue among different peoples and traditions.

To this end, I will first elucidate the philosophical stance espoused

by Ken Wilber in

SES.

Second, I will claim that the arguments he pres-

ents against non-absolutist approaches have important and insur-

mountable shortcomings. On the one hand, I will argue that Wilber

offers a "faulty dichotomy" between his absolutist-universalist scheme

and a self-contradictory and pernicious vulgar relativism. On the

other hand, I will show that Wilber's arguments for the self-refuting

and pernicious nature of every non-absolutist approach are both

fallacious and distorting. In

brief,

I will give an account of how

non-absolutist views can be posited without falling in self-contradictory

aporias or "aperspectival madness." Finally, I will explore the poten-

tially hazardous consequences of absolutist positions for academic

dialogue and cross-cultural understanding. Taking Wilber's treatment

of the Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna as a paradigmatic example, I

will suggest that absolutist thinking frequently hinders genuine dia-

logue between people and traditions holding different world views.

I . ABSOLUTISM IN AN AGE OF POSTMODERNISM

As mentioned above, the overall goal of

Sex,Ecology, Spirituality

(SES)

is to offer an o rienting m ap of the place of men and women

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244 JORGE N FERRER

in the universe. In this section, I want to show how this map is laid

out from the absolutist position known as the pe rennial philosophy.

Before proceeding further, however, it may be necessary to

say some words here about my use of the term "absolutism," instead

of the more in vogue "objectivism," to refer to Wilber's position

throughout this paper. As is well known, absolutism has been a

term in disuse in Western philosophy for the last decades. Recently,

for example, Bernstein (1983) encouraged the substitution of

objectivism for absolutism in the classic dichotomy "absolutism-

relativism." Bernstein (1983) argued that, since all human knowl-

edge is today accepted to be fallible, conjectural, and app rox imate,

absolutism is "no longer a live option" (p. 12). Therefore, he pro-

posed to use objectivism to refer to all forms of foundationalist

philosophy standing in opposition to relativist, contextualist or

skeptical views of reason , know ledge, and value. However, a lthough

both absolutism and objectivism have been applied in contrast to

relativist doctrines, these two terms should not be used as inter-

changeable. In short, while objectivism claims that our knowledge

of the world, even if imperfect and app roxim ate, is warranted by the

existence of a pre-given reality that exists "out th ere " independen tly

of human subjectivity and intersubjectivity, absolutism maintains the

existence of ultimate, transcendental or eternal truths and values

embedded in human nature, the universe, or both.

The reason I am emphasizing this distinction here is because

I believe that, in the context of transpersonal theory, to use the

term objectivism is profoundly confusing and misleading for at

least the following two reasons: First, to accuse an absolutist

transpersonal theoristsuch as Wilberof being objectivist is

inaccurate because he or she may be defending the identity

between human deepest subjectivity and the ultimate nature of

objective reality. After all, this is the central claim of the perennial

philosophy, according to which: "At the highest levels, world

andself,outer reality and inner reality, coincide as the 'ground' of

all that is" (Rothberg, 1986, p. 3). Or, in Wilber's (1993b) own

words: "The core insight of the psychologia perennis is that our

'innermost' consciousness is identical to the absolute and ultimate

reality of the universe" (p . 22). Second, we should also remem ber that

one of the most basic tenets of transpersonal theory is precisely

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that self-identity can expand to include other aspects of life and

cosmos

(Grof,

1985, 1988; Walsh and Vaughan, 1993a). But then,

in transpe rsona l studies it is not clear how to coherently dem arcate

between what is objective and what is subjective because what once

were "objects" of knowledge can become, temporarily or perma-

nently, part of an individual's "subjectivity". As I see it, this dis-

mantlement of the subject-object organization of phenomena

strongly suggests that Cartesian epistemic categories such as objec-

tivism or subjectivism do not have either explanatory descriptive

power to account for transpersonal events.

The critical issue in transpersonal epistemology, then, is not the

"objectivity" of transpersonal knowledge claims, but their ontologi-

cal and epistemic status in relation to rival proposals (e.g., does

the archetypal-astrological paradigm have epistemic privilege over

Wilber's evolutionary model? Can indigenous forms of spirituality

be legitimately subordinated to the hierarchical framework of the

perennial philosophy? Or are all these approaches different but

equally valid ways in which spirituality can be cultivated and lived?).

We will briefly return to these crucial questions at the end of this

article; here I am merely pointing out that, since the nature of

transpersonal phenomena renders objectivism meaningless, we

need to recover the term absolutism to refer to any transpersonal

theory claiming to be paradigmatic for the rest and/or to depict

"how things really are ."

8

1 . The Perennial Philosophy

There is no doubt that the idea of a perennial philosophy

philosophia

perennis)has been differently articulated thro ug hout

the history of Western ph ilosophy. Th e search for an universal, per-

manent, and all-encompassing philosophy can be traced to the

Neoplatonism of Philo of Alexandria or the Platonic-Christian

synthesis of St. Augustine. However, it is not until the Renaissance

that we find the term "perennial philosophy" explicitly used

in philosophical circles (Loemker, 1973). More precisely, it was

Agostino Steuco (1497-1546), bishop of Kisamos and librarian of

the Vatican, who coined this term to refer to the

prisca theologia

or

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246 JORGE N FERRER

philosophia priscorium of Marsilio Ficino, a unifying philosophical

system based on a synthesis of Platonic principles and Christian

doctrines. Thus, the modern notion of a perennial philosophy

should be regarded as a product of the ecumenical interest of the

Neoplatonic tradition in the Renaissance (Marsilio Ficino, Giovanni

Pico della Mirndola, Nicolas de Cusa, Agostino Steuco, etc.) in

finding unity and harmony amidst the multiplicity of conflicting

world views (Schmitt, 1966).

Throughout the history of philosophy, the term "perennial phi-

losophy"

philosophia perennis)

has also been used as a synonym

for Scholasticism and Thomism; as the final goal of philosophy

by Leibniz; as the regulative ideal of philosophical practice by

Jaspers; and as a world philosophy, synthesis of East and West, by

Radhakrishnan (Collins, 1962; Loemker, 1973). Common to all

these conceptions, however, is the idea that a philosophical curre nt

exists that has endured through centuries, and that is able to

harmoniously integrate all traditions in terms of a "single Truth"

which underlies the ap pa ren t plurality of world views. According to

the defenders of the perennial philosophy, this unity in human

knowledge stems from the existence of a single ultimate reality

which can be directly accessed by the human mind under certain

special conditions.

As is well known, the idea of a pe renn ial philosophy was popu lar-

ized in the twentieth century by Aldous Huxley (1945), who in his

book by the same title defined it as "the metaphysics that recognizes

a divine Reality substantial to the world of things and lives and

minds; the psychology that finds in the soul something similar to,

or even identical with, divine Reality; the ethic that places man's

final end in the knowledge of the immanent and transcendent

Ground of all being" (p. vii). What characterized Huxley's peren-

nialism, as well as the one of the so-called traditionalists such as

Ren Guenon, Ananda K. Coomaraswamy or Frithjof Schuon (see

Borella, 1995; Quinn, 1997), was the conviction that the "single

Tru th" of the peren nial philosophy can be found at the heart of the

mystical teachings of the world contemplative traditions. Although

with different emphases, all these authors claimed that while the

exoteric beliefs of the religious traditions may be assorted and

occasionally even incom patible, their esoteric or mystical dimension

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reveals an essential unity that transcends all doctrinal pluralisms.

9

And this is so, the traditionalists argued, because mystics of all ages

and places are individuals who are able to transcend the different

conceptual schemes provided by their cultures, languages, and doc-

trines,

and consequently have access to a direct, unm edia ted ap pre -

hension of reality(gnosis).

10

In sum, the traditionalists maintained not only the existence of a

contemplative consensus about the ultimate natu re of reality, but also

the absolute truth of such a vision, i.e., that it depicts "the way things

really are" once divested from individual and cultural projections. In

its general form, then, the perennialist thesis includes two different

knowledge claims: A descriptive claim, that affirms the homogeneity

of the message of the contemplative traditions; and a normative or

epistemological claim, that maintains the absolute truth of that

message (cf., Griffiths, 1991). Although I cannot develop this poin t

here, it is important to note that the evaluation of these two claims

may require different testing procedures. The examination of the

former claim, for example, may involve hermeneutic comparative

analyses of the different mystical texts, as well as interviews and dia-

logues among representatives of the living traditions. In con trast, th e

assessment of the latter may entail epistemological analyses of the

cognitive value of mysticism, and, in my opinion, personal involve-

ment in certain forms of spiritual inquiry (see, e.g., Rothberg, 1994).

But, what is the "single Truth " about which all contemplative trad i-

tions supposedly agree? According to the modern defenders of the

mystical version of the perenn ial philosophy, such as Huston Smith

(1976, 1987, 1989), Frithjof Schuon (1984), and Seyyed Hossein

Nasr (1989, 1993), the doctrinal core of the perennial phi-

losophy is the belief that Spirit, Pure Consciousness or th e U niversal

Mind is the fundamental essence of both human nature and the

totality of reality. In the perennialist view, that is, Spirit is the

ontologically primary foundation of the cosmos.

Briefly, the other major principles derived from this primor-

dial Truth are involutionary cosmology, hierarchical ontology and

axiology, and hierarchical epistemology (see, e.g., Rothberg, 1986;

Smith, 1976, 1989; Nasr, 1989, 1993; W ilber, 1977, 1990, 1993a;

Quinn, 1997): (1)Involutionary cosmology, or the postulate that the

physical universe is the result of a process of emanation, restriction

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248 JORGE N. FERRER

or involution of Spirit. In o ther words, Spirit is prior to ma tter, and

matter has evolved from It. (2)

Hierarchical ontology and axiology,

o r

the vision of reality as composed of different layers or levels of

being that are hierarchically organized (e.g., matter, mind and

spirit)the so-called Great Chain of Being. In this hierarchy, the

higher levels are those closer to Spirit, and are regarded as more

real, more causally effective, and more valuable than the lower.

That is, Spirit is more real and better than mind and matter. And

(3)hierarchical

epistemology,

or the theory of knowledge according to

which knowledge of the higher realms of the hierarchical ontology

is more essential, reveals more about reality, and is therefore

authoritative upo n knowledge of the lower ones. Tha t is, knowledge

of Spirit (contemplation, gnosis)is m ore true and valuable than

knowledge of the m ental an d physical levels (rational and empirical

know ledge, respectively).

To sum up, the perennial vision maintains that reality is orig-

inated by, and ontologically the same as, a simultaneously imma-

nent and transcending Spiritidentical in essence to human

innermost consciousnessthat constitutes the ultimate referent for

what can be regarded as real, true, and valuable.

2.

Ken Wilber's Evolutionary Perennialism

Through his many works, Ken Wilber has identified himself as

a modern translator and defender of the perennial philosophy,

championing untiringly the perennial doctrines in the transpersonal

arena during the last two decades (1977, 1980, 1983, 1990, 1993a).

11

His latest work is not an exception. As Wilber (1997) has recently

stressed, however, there is a fundamental difference between his

"neoperennialism" and the traditional versions of the perennial phi-

losophy. In contrast to the merely involutionary accounts of most

traditions, Wilber (1997) claims that a more adequate description

of the perennial Truth today should necessarily incorporate the

notion of evolution. As Walsh (1995) rightly pointed out, the aim of

Wilber's recent work "is to trace evolutionphysical, biological,

and humanand to set it within the context of the perennial phi-

losophy" (p. 18). Following thinkers like Hegel, Aurobindo, or

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ABSOLU TISM AND RELATIVISM 249

Teilhard de Chardin, then, Wilber (1997) proposes an evolutionary

perennialism

that holds that:

(...) there is still That One, or the timeless and absolute Spirit of

which the entire universe is but a manifestation, but that world of

manifestation is not now devolving away from Spirit, it is evolving

toward Spirit. God does not lie in our collective past, God lies in our

collective future; the Garden of Eden is tomorrow, not yesterday; the

Golden Age lies down the road, not up it. (p. 63)

What Wilber is claiming is that the involutionary cosmology of the

traditional perennial philosophy should be complemented with a

special type of

teleological

evolutionism. Teleological evolutionism is

the view that cosmological, phylogenetic, and ontogenetic processes

are ultimately directed towards a prede term ined goal. In the classic

evolutionary perennialist view, this pre-given goal is generally

equated with Spirit

itself.

For traditional evolutionary perennialists

like Te ilhard de C hard in or Aurobind o, that is, Spirit is not only th e

beginning, but also the end-point of evolution. Spirit is both the

Alpha and the Omega of all cosmological and evolutionary pro-

cesses. It is important to note here that, in contrast to these phi-

losophers, Wilber (1995a, 1997) does not believe that this Omega

point (Spirit) towards which the evolutionary process is directed will

ever be reached in the world of time and space and form. Since

Spirit is timeless and formless, Wilber (1997) convincingly argues,

It will never be reached at any point in time, but can only be

realized "by stepping off the cycle of time and evolution altogether"

(p .

280). Still, it should be noted here that Wilber (1995a) regards

Spirit as the final cause, pull, and telos of the entire cosmic and

human evolutionary process.

It is certainly one of Wilber's great accomplishments to have given

the perennial vision higher contemporary finesse and explanatory

power than any other traditional or modern account. In my opinion,

this is due not only to the incorporation of the notion of evolu-

tion, but also to the adoption of two conceptual frameworks: One

modern, structuralism, and the other postmodern, constructivism.

Against an evolutionary background, these two frameworks allow

Wilber to accommodate, somewhat artificially I believe, both the

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250 JORG E N FERRER

plurality of human forms, and some modern epistemological

insights within the universalist vision of the perennial philosophy.

On the one hand, the adoption

o

structuralismpermits him to house

cultural differences within a universalist view of consciousness and

reality. For example, defending a perennialist view of spirituality,

Wilber (1995a) proposes that the diversity of experiences, symbolic

expressions, and cultural forms found in the various contemplative

traditions stems from the existence of surface structures, culturally

and historically situated manifestations of an underlying universal

sequence of deep structures which ultimately constitute one path

and one goal for human spiritual evolution: "Common deep struc-

tures with culturally situated surface structures seem to me to steer

a course between 'no similarities at all' and 'mostly or only one

common core'" (1995a, p. 604, note. 16).

Accordingly, Wilber (1995a) plots the transpersonal territory into

four types of hierarchically laddered realms or dee p structures. The

psychic (or nature mysticism: the realm of OBEs, vibrations, Kun-

dalini, chakras, etc.); the subtle (or deity mysticism: the realm of

luminosity and archetypal forms, of God, etc.); the causal (or

formless mysticism: the realm of pure consciousness, emptiness,

nothingness, the Void, etc.); and, finally, the nondual (nondual

mysticism: beyond being and non-being, where "emptiness is form,

and form is emptiness," the world as expression of Spirit, etc.).

According to Wilber (1995a), these four types of mysticism "can

most definitely be found cross-culturally. Nobody is denying that

a Buddhist will interpret the luminosity as the Sambhogakaya, the

Christian will interpret it perhaps as an angel or Christ himself,

a Jungian will interpret it as an archetypal emergence, and so on"

(p .

621, note. 58). In other words, although very specific arche-

typal visions and deities (different surface structures) can be ob-

served in different traditions, all of them belong to the same level

of spiritual development, i.e., the subtle level, the realm of the

archetypal manifestations (the same deep structure). In sum, hu m an

spirituality is ultimately universal, as constituted by an evolutionary

hierarchy of deep structures. Contextual factors only shape and

determine the situated manifestations and interpretation of these

deep structures and the level of spiritual evolution attainable in

each tradition.

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On the other hand, Wilber (1995a) adds to the perennial vision

severalconstrudivist principles inspired in Vrela, Thompson, and

Rosch's (1991) enactive paradigm, such as the rejection of the

representation paradigm, the emancipation from the constraints of

a pre-given reality, or the idea of "enacted worldspaces" (intersub-

jectively shared worlds of referents that are disclosed in the process

of the mutually codetermined evolution of consciousness and the

world). Wilber should certainly be c redited for having extend ed the

scope of the enactive paradigm from its original confinement in

the monological sensoriomotor world to dialogical mental and

translogical spiritual realms. I should point out here, however, that

Wilber's inclusion of these modern epistemological insights occurs

under the shadow of an absolutist-universalist scheme that sab-

otages the enactive paradigm. According to Wilber (1995a), al-

though the different worldspaces are not pre-given but enacted,

their unfolding follows a still pre-given evolutionary pattern gov-

erned by a spiritual telos: "The deep structures are given, but the

surface are not." (Wilber, 1996, p. 212). Of course, the unnecessary

subordination of the enactive paradigm to a uni-linear sequence of

pre-given evolutionary stages (or deep structures) betrays the very

raison

d tre

of this paradigm , which was not only devised to p rovide

a "middle way or entre-deux between the extremes of absolutism

and nihilism" (Vrela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991, p. 238), but

also developed in the context of a view of "evolution by natural

drift" that is undeterministic and inimical to any pre-given evolu-

tionary path.

In sum, Wilber should be credited for having 'softened' and

actualized the perennial vision, there by allowing for much more

diversity, variety, and creative novelty than any traditional account.

However, by retaining an absolutist/universalist core in his notion

of deep structure, Wilber still runs the risk of falling prey to the

several dangers intrinsic to absolutist thinking. In the next two

sections, we will examine in more detail the nature of these pitfalls.

Here, what should be clear is that, for Wilber, underlying all app arent

contextual diversity and undeterminism, the re exists a pre-given and

universal evolutionary process that determines the deep structure of

world views, social structures, and human psychospiritual develop-

ment. This evolutionary process is driven by a dynamic telos-Spirit

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252 JORGE

N

FERRER

that, although never reachable

in the

world

of

form,

is the

ultimate

origin,

end, and

ground

of all

that exists.

II . FIGHTINGTH FLATLAND

In this section,

I

want

to

explore

the

arguments Wilber offers

throughout

the

entireSESagainst non-absolutist accounts

of

knowl-

edgeandvalue.In short, I will argue that Wilber's strategycom-

prises

the

following

two

moves:

(1) to

create

a

faulty dichotomy

between his absolutist-universalist vision and a vulgar relativism;

and

(2) to

depict

all the

alternatives

to his

absolutist vision

as

both

self-refuting,

i.e.,

they canno t

be

stated w ithout falling

in

contradic-

tions; and pernicious, i.e., they inevitably lead to a "flatland" in

which

no

qualitative contrasts

can

consistently

be

made

(a

situation

of "aperspectival madness"). This section discusses

in

detail

the

fallacious nature

of

these

two

moves.

1 . TheFallacyof theFaulty Dichotomy

W ilber's first move against non-absolutist appro aches

is to

create

a faulty dichotomy between

his

absolutist scheme

and a self-

contradictory and pernicious relativism. Central to Wilber's argu-

ment

is the

conflation

of all

non-absolutist approaches into

an

artificially constructed "vulgar relativism," so that the reader gets

the impression that

one has to

choose between eitheradopting

absolute/universal standards or falling into

the

clutches

of a self-

refuting and nihilistic relativism inwhichno knowledge claimsor

qualitative distinctions

can

coherently

be

made.

The nature

of

this move

is

more evident than ever

in his

discussion

of the

types

of

constructivism. Wilber (1996) claims that,

"Faced with this discovery o f'n o t pregiven ,'atheoristcanthen take

one

of two

routes through this

new and

confusing postmodern

landscape, where nothing is foundational" (p. 61, hisemphasis).

The first route

is one

leading

to a

self-contradictory extreme

con-

structivism, which holds that

all

world views

are

arbitrary,

all

truth

relative,and no universal truths exist, whileat once defending the

universal validity

of its own

approach. Wilber pinpoints, rightly

I

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believe, that this form of constructivism is jus t a form of nihilism

rooted in egocentric narcissism. The second route is a moderate

constructivism, which Wilber (1996) identifies with his own approach ,

and that "simplyinvestigates the actualhistory and unfolding of these

world views, not as a series of merely arbitrary flailings-around, but

rather as an evolutionary o r developmental pattern , governed in pa rt

by the currents of evolution it se lf (p. 63 , his emphasis). As we have

seen, for Wilber, the deep structures of this evolutionary pattern are

still pre-given, that is, they follow a pre-determined sequence that

inversely recaptures the steps of involution.

The crucial flaw in this argumentation is that a non self-

contradictory constructivism does not need to be subordinated to

any pre-given evolutionary schemeand this is, I believe, the

crux of Vrela, Thompson, and Rosch's (1991) enactive paradigm.

However, Wilber's naked dichotomization renders possible only

two options: Either pre-given evolutionary world views or totally

arbitrary ones; either universalism ornihilistic "aperspectival mad-

ness;" either absolutism

or

self-contradictory relativism. There is

nothing new about this move. For example, in spite of the numer-

ous studies clarifying the different varieties of relativism,

12

abso-

lutist philosophersout of either ignorance or malicehave sys-

tematically employed this argument to attack any non-absolutist

account of truth and value. The purpose behind positing dichot-

omies that do not exhaust the possibilities is well known by phi-

losophers and logicians. In their classic study on fallacies, for

example, Fearnside and Holther (1959) pointed out that: "The as-

sumption that there is no middle ground is a favorite weapon of

persons desiring to force others to take sides in black-white terms

even though the problem is not simple and though its fair solution

requires an evaluation of several possibilities" (p. 30).

To conclude this section, it appears that Wilber suffers from, and

helps to spread, the philosophical affliction that Bernstein (1992)

called the "Cartesian Anxiety," that is, "the anxiety that unless we

can specify a firm foundation for our knowledge claims, unless we

can appeal to clear determinate ahistorical criteria for deciding

what is true and false, correct and incorrect, then the only alterna-

tive is to fall into the abyss of a self-refuting relativism where

'anything goes'" (p. 309).

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254 JORGE N. FERRER

2. Refuting the Argum ent for Self-Refutation

Once the false dichotomy between absolutism and vulgar relativ-

ism is artificially constructed, the second move logically follows: A

sustained attack of the "wrong" pole under the charges of

self-

refutation and "aperspectival madness." In this section, I will con-

sider the legitimacy of the charge of self-refutation with which

Wilber (1995a, 1996) attempts to dismiss all non-absolutist ap-

proaches, such as cultural relativism, constructivism, pluralism,

and other contextualist accounts of truth and morality. The next

section will deal with the second charge, that of "aperspectival

madness."

The core of Wilber's attack against non-absolutist approaches

rests in the argument for self-reflexivity or self-refutation. When

considering cultural relativism, for example, Wilber (1995a) claims

that its adherents "maintain that all diverse cultural values are

equally valid, and that no universalvalue jud gm en ts are possible.

But that judgm en t is itself a universal jud gm en t. It claims to be

universally true that no jud gm en ts a re universally true" (p . 29, his

emphasis). Therefore, h e continues, "this type of obscurantism (...)

is profoundly self-contradictory" (p. 29; see also pp. 526-528,

note. 26). Wilber (1995a) applies the same line of argumentation

adnauseumto critique non -hierarchical app roaches (p. 25), plural-

ism (p. 28; p. 574, note. 26), perspectivism and post-structuralism

(p.188), multiculturalism (pp . 199-204), constructivism (pp .599-601,

note. 16), and deconstructivism (p. 721, note. 4).

As is well know n, the charge of self-refutation is the classic

argument against relativism used by virtually all absolutist philoso-

phers even since Plato's quarrels with the Sophists.

13

In its general

form, the argument runs as follows: Relativism (or constructivism,

contextualism, etc.) is self-refuting because it cannot be stated con-

sistently without becoming some form of absolutism (or objectiv-

ism, universalism, etc.). That is, to say that all views are relative

(or constructed, contextual, etc.) renders the relativist thesis either

relative itself or claiming to be an exception to its own logic. If the

relativist thesis does not have absolute and universal value, the

absolutist philosopher argues, then ther e is no reason to consider it

more valid than any oth er view. Conversely, if the relativist thesis is

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claimed to have absolute value, it either contradicts itself or falls

into what Mandelbaum (1982) called the "self-excepting fallacy."

Before proceeding to show the fallacious na ture of this argumen-

tation, I should add an important point here to avoid serious

misund erstand ings of my position in this article. I totally agree with

Wilber, Taylor, and many others, in that a vulgar relativism main-

taining that "everything is the same as everything else, and that no

distinctions can be therefore made between what is good or bad,

righ t or wrong, true or false" is bo th blatantly self-contradictory and

morally repulsive. And it is probable that some of Wilber's targets

are guilty of these charges and well deserve the harsh reprimand

they receive at his hands.

1 4

Furthermore, I also agree with these

authors on the significance and inevitability of making qualitative

distinctions in human lifeand, in the next section, I will be giving

a brief account of how these contrasts can be made without falling

into the extremes of absolutism and vulgar relativism.

T he p roblem with Wilber's p resen tation , however, is that it forces

the reader to mistakenly believe that one can only "take one of two

routes:" Absolutism/universalism or a self-contradictory vulgar rela-

tivism. In other words, Wilber consistently omits to mention that

many alternatives to absolutism, such as certain types of pluralism,

perspectivism, pragmatism, and moderated forms of relativism and

constructivism, are not necessarily inconsistent.

15

What all these

approaches have in common is not to be self-refuting, but to

challenge absolutist, universalist, and objectivist beliefs in the exis-

tence of transcultural and transhistorical standards of rationality,

truth, and morality. As Adorno (1979) already warned, to inter-

pret this denial as a self-refuting positive theory is both fallacious

and question-begging. In short, what I am suggesting here is that

the self-refuting nature of m ost non-ab solutist appro aches only emerges

when they are either believed to ha ve absolutist purpo ses or judged from

standards (notions ofabsolutetruth, rationality, etc.) only appro priate in an

absolutist domain of

discourse. In other words, these approaches are

self-refuting onlywhen they are supposed to have an absolutist

agenda, i.e., to make absolutist claims.

16

The imputation of purposes alien to non-absolutist approaches is

a com mon strategy employed , with more o r less awareness, by most

absolutist philosophers. The neo-pragmatist Rorty (1989), for

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256 JORG E N FERRER

example, after rejecting self-refuting forms of vulgar relativism

("every belief is as good as every other"), challenged the assump-

tion that philosophy is a search for the Truth, and that human

inquiry is aimed at the discovery of "underlying structures,"

"culturally invariant factors," or "biologically determined patterns."

(p.

36). And when the absolutist philosoph er depicts his position as

self-contradictory, he Responded tha t this ph ilosopher is "projecting

his own habits of thought up on the pragm atist when he charges with

[vulgar, self-refuting] relativism" (p. 44). Because, Rorty (1989)

argued, the absolutist philosopher "thinks that the whole point of

philosophical thought is to detach oneself from any particular com-

munity and look down at it from a m ore universal standpoint. When

he hears the pragmatist repud iating th e desire for such a stand poin t

he cannot quite believe it. He thinks that everyone, deep down

inside,

must

want such d etachm ent" (p. 44, his em phasis).

The persuasiveness of the argum ent for the self-refuting na ture

of non-absolutist approaches, then, rests on the acceptance of an

absolutist domain of

discourse. However, human discourse can have

different purposes apart from arguing for the absolute truth or

falsehood of knowledge claims, viewpoints, or paradigms. For ex-

ample, when Meiland (1980) considered the claim that if rela-

tivism is

only

relatively true, then we have no reason for taking it

seriously, he pointed out that this statement presumes that only

that which is purely absolute or objective is worth expressing. By

bringing evidence contra universals and absolutes, relativists may

be attempting to rationally persuade the non-relativist of the rela-

tivity of

all

conceptual frameworks,

including

the relativist one. This

appears to be, for example, the path taken by Goodman (1978),

who emphasized the local (versus universal) validity of relativist

knowledge claims. Stated in this way, then, the relativist thesis,

far from being self-refuting, is rather "self-exemplifying" (Smith,

1993).

Alternatively, Meiland (1980) continued, relativists may be

merely presenting their position because they have a psychological

need to express the way they see the world. Furthermore, I should

add, they may be appealing to the reasonableness, appropriateness,

and even 'truthness' of the relativist thesis without operating in the

domain of a bivalent theory of truthaccording to which a state-

ment is either true or false (not-true), instead of having different

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degrees of 'truthness' (Negoita, 1985). In all these cases, relativism

is not self-refuting and worth expressing. N eedless to say, analogous

arguments can be made,

mutatis mutandis,

in defense of the rest

of non-absolutist approaches that Wilber attempts to dismiss under

the charge of self-refutationsuch as pluralism , perspectivism, o r

constructivism.

The idea of different domains of discourse has been further

developed by Patel (1994). In his interesting attempt to solve the

pa rado x of self-refutation in Nagarjuna's thin king, Patel (1994)

distinguished between two different universes of discourse: Argu-

mentative/systematic and dialogical/conversational.

17

In the

argu-

mentative universe of discourse, the function of statements is to assert

propositions that have a truth-falsehood value. In adialogicaluni-

verseof discourse, in contrast, propositions are not advanced as true

or false, bu t expressed with a different purpo se, such as therapeu tic,

soteriological, showing a state of affairs, or simply continuing the

philosophical conversation. According to Patel (1994), the prob lem

of the contradictory nature of self-referential statementssuch as

Nagarjuna's famous claim that hisMulamadhyamakarikascontains no

thesisappears

only

when considered in an argumentative universe

of discourse. Following Patel, one might argue that when relativists

deny the existence of absolutes, they are primarily developing an

alternative mode of dialogical discourse. However, absolutist phi-

losophers have interpreted them as positing absolutist positive

theories in an argumentative universe of discourse.

In addition, discourse (both argumentative and dialogical)

may not be necessarily the ultimate context for the discussion of

knowledge claimsand especially transpersonal ones. In this vein,

Rothberg (1994) pointed out that once the epistemological claims

of the spiritual traditions are taken seriously into account, to assume

"discourse as theuniversal horizon of knowledge" (p. 9, his em -

phasis) could be deeply misleading. Furthermore, Rothberg (1994)

continued, arguments for self-contradiction such as Habermas'

"performative paradox" (to question discourse is self-refuting

because it assumes discourse) are only legitimate if one presumes

the impossibility of going beyond the structures of communicative

rationalityand this assumption is precisely what most spiritual

traditions challenge Ro thberg (1994) suggested that a possible

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258 JORG E N FERRER

complementary model to discourse could be found in Kremer's

notion of "concourse" (1992a,b, 1994, 1996). In contrast to the

Habermasian-like discourse, where the different validity claims

(comprehensibility, propositional truth, truthfulness, and right-

ness) are redeemed through the suspension of action, and engage-

ment in linguistic elucidation and argumentation, Kremer coined

the term "concourse" to refer to a more holistic, embodied, and

egalitarian mode of knowledge-sharing and resolution-making in

which not only rational argumentation, but also ritual, silence,

story-telling, humor, theater, dance and other arts are taken into

consideration in the search for consensus. According to Kremer

(1994),

"While it is tru e tha t we are always cha lleng ed to reflect ou r

resolutions in language, this does not mean that language is the

sole arbiter of truth" (p. 33). On the contrary, he added: "The

knowing of the body, the knowing of the heart, the knowing which

comes from states of shifted awareness are all valuable processes.

Even thou gh every consensus will have to withstand the challenges

posed in verbal, rational discourse, the words of resolution will

have to withstand the challenges from all other human dimen-

sions of experiencesomatic, sexual, emotional, and spiritual"

(1994, p. 33).

In sum, there aretw oparadigm s of hum an comm unication aimed

at the resolution of validity claims: Discourseargumentative and

dialogicaland concourse. Since the practice of dialogue incorpo-

rates extra-linguistic elements such as attention to the silences be-

tween words, to the language's rhythm, and to the timbre and tone

of voice (Bhm, 1990), I suggest that the dialogical mode of dis-

course should be considered a bridge between argumentative dis-

course and "concourse ." In o the r words, I believe tha t the shift from

an argum entative to a dialogical mo de of discourse in contem porary

philosophy (Bernstein, 1983) is paving the way for the recognition

of "concourse" as a necessary corrective for the limitations of

linguistic modes of rationality and resolution-making.

To conclude this section, although vulgar relativism is obviously

self-contradictory, the validity of this charge against most non-

absolutist approaches assumes an absolutist universe of argumenta-

tive discourse. However, both the existence of absolutist standards

(of reason, truth, and value), and the exclusive or privileged

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legitimacy of an argumentative universe of discourse, is pre-

cisely what is denied or put into question by these approaches.

Furthermore, the contradictory problems seemingly implicit in

self-referential propositions do not necessarily emerge in either a

dialogical universe of discourse or in a model of "concourse." But

the n, the arg um ent for self-refutation agains t relativism is well-

founded onlyif relativism, the view that it is trying to discredit is

mistaken (that is, if there really exist absolute standards of reason,

knowledge, and value). Once it is revealed that the hid den premises

of the self-refutation charge against non-absolutist appro ache s p re -

suppose its conclusion, this reasoning becomes what logicians call a

syllogistic fallacy. This is why a non-absolutist philosopher such as

Fuchs (1992) can tranquilly point out that "The methodological

horror of relativism and its paradoxes scares and occupies only

those who still search for safe epistemic foundations" (p. 30).

3. Abso lutism or Aperspectival Madness ?

The second charge made by Wilber against the different varieties

of non-absolutism is that they lead to what he calls "aperspectival

madness," i.e., a situation in which no qualitative distinctions can

consistently be made because no perspective can be regarded as

having advantage over any other (e.g., see 1995a, pp. 721-722,

note. 4; 1996, pp. 192-193). Wilber illustrates the potentially

pernicious nature of non-absolutist stances by mentioning, for

exam ple, that Paul de M anan early Am erican deconstructionist

had been a Nazi sympathizer (1995a, p. 722, note. 4).

Again, I believe that what is lurking behind this reasoning is the

belief that the rejection of absolute standards ineluctably leads to

moral nihilism and anarchy. However, it cannot be repeated too

often that the absence of absolute or universal standards does not

m ean that there are no standards at all, or that any value jud gm en t

is arbitrary. Non-absolutists philosophers are well aware of the

dangers of falling in what Sm ith (1988) called the Egalitarian Fallacy,

i.e., to assert "that, unless one jud gm en t can be said or shown to be

[objectively, absolutely] more 'valid' than another, then all judgments

must be 'equal' or 'equally valid'" (p. 98). In the same line, modern

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260 JORG E N FERRER

cultural anthropologists have warned us against this faulty reason ing.

According to Robbins (1993), for example, the flight from ethno-

centrism should not lead anthropologists into the "relativistic fallacy,"

the morally intolerable "idea that it is impossible to make moral

judgm ents about the beliefs and behaviors of others" (p. 9). Actually,

I do not know of any serious contemporary philosopher who holds

the view that any belief or practice should be regarded as good as any

other so I fail to discern who are the real targets of Wilber's critique

of the view that "It's all relative, so there is no better and worse, and

no stance is better than another" (Wilber, 1996, p. 193).

On occasions, Wilber (1995a) appears to accept the possibility of

relative value judg m en ts. For exam ple, in discussing multicultural-

ism, he states that: ".. .sliding contexts do not in any way prevent

some contexts from be ing still

relatively better

than less encompassing

contexts. Thus, that everything is relative does not mean nothing is.

better; it means some things are, indeed, relatively better than

others, all the time" (pp. 202-203, his emphasis). However, it

should be noted here that these statements are m ade in the context

of an absolutist-universalist framework in which what is

moreencom-

passing

and holistic is judg ed to be absolutely m ore valuable than

what is mo re simple. For Wilber, tha t is,relatively bettercontexts are

necessarily moreencompassing contexts. In fact, Wilber (1995a) con-

tinues his discussion on multiculturalism: "By failing to see the

definiteness

of

relative

judgm ents and thus being totally disoriented

and lost in aperspectival spacethey miss the

integral

pa rt, the

universal-integral

pa rt, of their own stance, and thus they all too

often regress into a riot of idiosyncratic differences tha t destroys the

integrity of their own position" (p. 203; his emphasis). Once again,

Wilber's inability to envision non self-refuting alternatives to univer-

salism is conspicuous: Contextual and relative value jud gm en ts are

accepted, but only when subordinated to his absolutist-universalist

schem e. Otherwise, there is no escape from self-contradictory

aporias and "aperspectival madness."

However, a world without moral absolutes or universals is not

necessarily a "flatland" in which "nothing can be said to be deeper

or higher or better in any meaningful sense" (Wilber, 1995a, p . 24).

This line of argumentation, apart from falling into the several

fallacies mentioned above, blatantly ignores the possibility of

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historically em bedded hum an values. Jud gm en ts about what is

better or worse can be legitimately made either on pragmatic/

contextual grounds such as local adequacy, applicability, etc. or

resolved in a situation of "concourse" where we not only rationally

consider abstract moral postulates, but also openly listen to the

voice of our bodies, our emotions, and our spirits (Kremer, 1992b,

1994).

For example, Rorty (1989) argued that qualitative distinctions

can be justified, not from an absolute or transhistorical standpoin t,

but on the grounds of the practical advantages of a certain posi-

tion or way of being. These qualitative preferences, Rorty (1989)

stressed, a re "not built into us by hum an na ture. It is jus t the way

welive now " (p. 44 , his em phasis). And con tra cultural solipsisms,

Bernstein (1991) pointed out that, although each tradition has its

own standards of rationality, cross-cultural qualitative jud gm en ts are

possible because we can exam ine bo th how a tradition fulfills its own

standards of rationality, and how successful it is in m eeting the chal-

lenges of rival traditions. Therefore, "The rational superiority of a

tradition can be vindicated without (falsely) presu pposing that the re

are universally ne utra l, ahistorical standards of rationality. T he re is

not 'rationality as such'" (p. 91). A similar point has been made by

Hoy (1994) in his critique of Habermas' universalism: "To criticize

one comm unity or set of social practices, we do no t need to im agine

some ideal standpoint that is independent of any contingent con-

crete stand point. M ore substantively, we may ju dge that community,

not from outside our own standpoint (since there is no such out-

side),

but from the standpoint of other communities, or otherself-

unders tand ings, that we know to be, or to have been, viable" (p. 203).

In other words, the rejection of universal standards does not

necessarily snares us in either the idiotic endorsement of all forms

of life ("aperspectival madness") or the ethnocentric hubris and

provinciality of thinking that our standards are to be preferred to

all others. All of us are already participating in diverse planetary

communities, and this participation allows us to criticize not only

other's standards, but also our own. By stepping outside our own

particular community and looking at our context from other con-

texts, we can practice self-criticism and open ourselves to learn and

be transformed by oth er perspectives. In this way, ethnocen trism is

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262 JORGE N FERRER

avoided while conserving grounds for cross-cultural criticism. What

is really ethnocentric, says Hoy (1994), "is the assumption that we

have become less and less context-bound, and more and more

universal. Th is Whiggish view entails tha t others will have to becom e

more like us, and is thus ethnocentric" (p. 205).

The positions of these au thors not only challenge Wilber's univer-

salist claims about a unique mode of rationality (based on Piaget's

"formal operational cognition") (e.g., see 1995a, p. 174), but also

his conviction that the absence of absolute standards leads inevi-

tably to a situation of "aperspectival madness." On the contrary, con-

tempora ry ph ilosoph ers a rgue, the lack of absolute founda tions may

lead to a pluralistic reconstruction of a philosophy embodied in

everyday practices and grounded on an open-ended dialogical

communication among human beings. Non-absolutist philosophers

simply do not find it necessary to appeal to any form of abstract

absolute or universal principles, and less to factual ones such as

W ilber's "holistic capacity," in o rder to make such evaluations. Th e

Enlightenment assumption that without absolute or universal stan-

dards,

rational criticism of others and ourselves is not possible is a

myth that must be laid to rest.

Furthermore, one might even contend that nihilism is parasitic,

no t upo n relativism, bu t up on absolutism. Nihilism results from the

failure to find absolute foundations. Although I cannot adequately

defend this thesis here, I believe that the craving for absolute and

universal standards is ultimately rooted in fears of moral anarchy,

the fear that, as Dostoyevsky put it, "If God does not exist, then

everything is permitted." This tendency can be traced to Plato,

whose doctrine of the eternal and transcendental Ideas was in

part a reaction against the individualism and vulgar relativism

dominating Greek government and commerce after the rise of

democracy. However, if one is no t involved in the self-defeating

enterprise of searching for absolutes, nihilism does not need to

em erge. This is why, I believe, some con templative traditions, such

as Madhyamaka Buddhism, regarded the grasping for absolute

foundations not only as an egoic tendency contributing to exis-

tential alienation, but also as the major obstacle for spiritual lib-

erationmore about Wilber and Madhyamaka thinking in the next

section.

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To conclude this section, it may be necessary to say some words

regarding Wilber's claim (1995a) about the inevitability of a hier-

archical ontology and axiology g rou nded in the p rinciple of "holis-

tic capacity." In

brief,

Wilber (1995a) insists that reality is not

composed of things or processes, but of holons, that is, who le/parts,

"wholes that a re simultaneously pa rts of othe r wholes" (p. 35), which

are thereby hierarchically organized. Wilber (1995a) offers two

different arguments for the inevitability of hierarchies. The first is

formal: The rejection of hierarchies is self-defeating because it

involves an implicit hierarchical ranking of non-hierarchies upon

hierarchies. To deny hierarchies, then, "is self-contradictory: it is a

hierarchy that denies hierarchy" (p. 25). The second argument is

descriptive or naturalistic: As in all domains of naturethe physio-

sphere (matter), the biosphere (life) and the noosphere (mind)

wholes emerge with more and new qualitative properties than their

parts,

and as these wholes cannot, by definition, be at th e same level

as their parts (otherwise they will be merely another part), Wilber

(1995a) maintains that hierarchies, or "ranking of eventsaccording

to their holistic

capacity

(p. 17, his emphasis), are embedded in

reality. In this hierarchical world view, he proceeds, holons (whole/

parts) with more integrative and holistic capacity are higher, deeper, and

more valuable.

As we have seen , th e first argum ent is plainly fallacious. Assuming

an absolutist argumentative universe of discourse, it turns a nega-

tion into a positive statement, and then accuses it of being self-

contradictory. As for the second argum ent, I agree with Wilber that

there are different degrees of order, complexity, and organization

in the physical and biological world, and I believe that to speak

about these differences in terms of "higher" and "lower" is a

semantic option as valid as any other. However, the adequacy of

hierarchical accounts in cognitive and moral development (the

noosphere) is currently a highly controversial and debated issue

see, e.g., Alexander and Langer (1990) for several descriptions of

non-hierarchical m odels of cognitive developm ent; Flanagan (1991)

for a critique of universal stage developmental theories of moral-

ity; and Burman (1994) for an account of some of the serious

ideological problems inherent in Piaget's cognitive developmental

model.

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264 JORGE N FERRER

Finally, about the validity of grounding qualitative distinctions in

a hierarchical ontology, it must be said that it is highly problematic

to leap without further exp lana tion from a factual level of discourse

(e.g., about what is more complex, organized and holistic) to an

axiological one (about what is more valuable). This "jump" is what

in the philosophy of ethics is known as the

naturalistic fallacy,

according to which no conclusions expressed in evaluative language

(value judgm ents ) can b e legitimately drawn from prem ises ex-

pressed in descriptive language (factual judgments). And even in

the case that it were valid to say, as I believe it is, that "values and

facts are no longer automatically divorced" (Wilber, 1995a, p. 31),

Wilber offers no non-circular argum entation for the value jud gm en t

that more holistic organizations must be regarded as absolutely

more valuable than simpler ones.

III. PRIVILEGED FRAMEWORKS, HERMENEUTICS, AND

DIALOGUE

One of die most critical issues in contemporary transpersonal

dieory is the existence of a privileged framework or paradigm able

to harmoniously unify the different competing theories that have

risen in the field during the last decades. Of course, most transper-

sonal thinkers believe that th e frameworks they hold are either m ore

encompassing or epistemically privileged upon the rest. Arguably,

the condition of modern transpersonal studies can be dien character-

ized as a "batde for the ultimate framework," i.e., the search for an

all-embracing meta-framework able to bestow their advocates with a

privileged symbolic interpretation that allows them to hierarchically

subordinate the rest of transpersonal models and theories.

Whether a consensus about an ultimate framework for transper-

sonal theory, or for human knowledge in general, will ever be

reached is obviously unknown to me. For all I know, it is quite

possible that the very idea of an single, complete, and privileged

symbolic interpretation of reality is no more than mere fiction. In

any event, what is most discouraging about this situation is the

circularity of the arguments transpersonal au thors generally employ

to refute or discredit dieir opponents. I believe that transpersonalists

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ABSOLUTISM ANDRELATIVISM 265

wouldbewisein remembering at leasttwo of the harshest lessons

philosophers

of

science learned more than twenty years

ago:

First,

that

the

persuasive power

of an

argument

is in

large part provided

by

the

conceptual framework within which

it is

made.

And

second,

that logically incompatible conceptual frameworks

can fit the

very

same evidence.

Or, put in

philosophical jarg on , that

all

evidence

is

in large part "theory-laden" (Hanson, Kuhn),

and

that

all

theories

are

"underdetermined"

by

evidence (Quine).

For

example, Wilber's

(1995a) support

of the

more advanced nature

of

Eastern

and

W estern

mysticism over shamanism

(pp.

572-57 3, note.

26), his

claim about

the non-spiritual nature

of

most Jun gian arche types

(pp.

247-249),

andhisportrayalof aplethoraofthinkersBerman, Roszak, Tarnas,

Washburn, etc.as retro-romantics

(see pp. 670-691 ,

note.

32;

p.

684, pp.751-761,

note.

17),

only make sense

and are

compelling

if both

the

pre-trans fallacy,

and his

unilinear

and

universal evol-

utionary scheme

are

accepted. However,

the

pre-trans fallacy

in its

strong form

and the

idea

of

unilinear evolution

are

precisely some

of the notions questioned by many transpersonal thinkers (e.g.,

Armstrong,

1984, 1985;

W ashburn,

1990, 1995, 1996;

Hunt,

1995;

Grof, 1996;

Kremer, 1996a). Needless

to say,

when

the

basic

premises

of a

framework

are

challenged, retorts assuming their

validity

are

blatantly question-begging.

Although

I

cannot

go

further into this discussion here,

I

would

like

to

conclude this pape r

by

briefly pointing

out

certain potential

pitfalls

of

believing

to

have attained ultimate

or

absolute frame-

works

for

academic

and

cross-cultural dialogue.

In brief, the

first

dangeris toignore, dismissasincoherent,or simply regardasfalse

any conflicting evidence

the

absolutist philosophe r encoun ters when

confronted with other viewpoints, alien traditions

or

competing

paradigms.

The

second

is to

regard this evidence

as

partial,

or,

what

is even m ore distorting,

to

translate

it in

terms

of the

"master" code

of

the

totalizing framework.

As

it

should

be

obvious, both dangers build serious obstacles

to the

practice

of

authentic dialogue, which requires

not

only

the

willingness

and ability

to

actively listen

and

understand others,

but

also

the

openness to be challenged and transformed by their viewpoints.

Of course,

the

problem with absolutist stances

in

this regard

is

that

once

one

believes

to

have

a

more

or

less accurate picture

of how

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266 JORG E N FERRER

things really are," dialogue with people maintaining conflicting

viewpoints cannot but become an uninteresting and sterile mono-

logue. At its worst, the conflicting viewpoints are regarded as less

evolved, incoherent, or simply false. At its best, the challenges

presented are assimilated within the all-encompassing framework

defended by the absolutist philosopher. In both cases the absolutist

philosopher appears to not even

listen

to what other people are

saying, because all new or conflicting information is screened, pro-

cessed, and assimilated in terms of his or her own framework.

Therefore, a genuine or symmetrical encounter with the other in

which opposing viewpoints are regarded as real options is rendered

unlikely.

Considering Wilber's work in this context, several authors have

commented on the obstacles that his argumentative style of dis-

course raise for academic and philosophical dialogue (Kremer,

1996b; Rothberg, 1996; Zimmerm an, 1996; McDermott, 1997), and

even pointed out that "his main adaptive strategy in relation to the

challenges has been, in Piagetian terms, that of

assimilation

(Kelly

and Rothberg, 1996; their emphasis). Rather than repeating what

others have already po inted out with eloquence, I will focus here on

how some absolutist tendencies of Wilber's discourse may hinder

cross-cultural dialogue and hermeneutic understanding. To this

end, I will present Wilber's treatment of the celebrated Buddhist

philosopher Nagarjuna as a paradigmatic example of the distor-

tions commonly resulting from the process of assimilating other

traditions to an absolutist metanarrative.

18

The Absolutization of Emptiness sunyata)

In short, the interpretation that Wilber offers of Madhyamaka's

thinking relies exclusively on Murti's

TheCentral Philosophy of Bud-

dhism (1955). Wilber (1995a) justifies the selection of this source by

saying that, "although not without its difficulties and occasional

inaccuracies, is nonetheless a classic in the field" (p. 692, note. 1),

and "is generally regarded as the finest treatment of Nagarjuna in

English" (p. 630, note. 2). Then, he proceeds by equating emptiness

sunyata)

with pure Consciousness (p. 539, note. 2); with Absolute

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reality (pp . 69 3-6 94 , note. 1); with th e Suchness of all Forms (p. 693 ,

note. 1); with p ure Presence (p. 696 , note. 1); and even suggests that,

once the Madhyamaka via negativa is relaxed, N agarjuna's emptiness

can be metaphorically matched with the Hindu Brahman (p. 698,

note. 1). Furthermore, Wilber (1995a) adds, the Buddhist no-self

doctrine cannot be literally applied to the Absolute, because both self

and non-self "are equally manifestations of the Primordial State,self-

cognizing Emptiness and spontaneous luminosity" (p. 706, note. 1).

Several objections can be raised about Wilber's account of empti-

ness

(sunyata):

First, Wilber omits to m ention that M urti's work

(1955), together with Stcherbatsky's writings (1962, 1968) are

unanimously regarded by m od ern Buddh ist scholars and historians

as the "absolutist" interpretation of Nagarjuna. This absolutist

interpretation, strongly influenced by nineteenth-century German

idealism (Schelling, Hegel, Kant, etc.), emerged as a reaction to the

nihilistic readings of emptiness fruit of the first Western intellectual

enco unte r with Buddh ism (e.g., Max Mller) (Tuck, 1990). M odern

commentators concur in that in order to establish convincing par-

allels between these traditions (Madhyamaka and German idealism),

Murti had to transform Nagarjuna's thinking into a version of

Advaita Vedanta philosophy that does not stand any serious analysis

of the textual and historical evidence (Tuck, 1990; Hayes, 1994).

As Huntington (1989) pointed out, for example, Murti's "Vedantic/

Kantian spectacles distort the Madhyamika's message in a much

more subtle and persuasive fashion than any nihilistic interpreta-

tion ever could, and for that reason have unfortunately done a g reat

deal to prevent us from deepening our understanding of these

texts"

(p. 27). Actually, no modern scholar of Madhyamaka philos-

ophy would quote Murti's work except to point out the inadequacy

of his interpretations, or as an historical example of the projection

of Western philosophical notions on Eastern thinking (see e.g.,

Streng, 1967, p . 76, p . 148, no te. 15; Hu ntinchon, 1989, p p . 26 -3 0 ;

Tuck, 1990, pp.4 7 - 5 3 ; Hayes, 1994, pp. 333-338).

Second, modern interpreters of Nagarjuna find any form of

absolutist account of emptiness sunyata) completely unacceptable,

and in no way grou nd ed on textua l evidence. According to Richards

(1978), for example, "It is a mistake to subsume the Madhyamika

philosophy of Nagarjuna in Advaita Vedanta a nd thereby to change

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268 JORG E N FERRER

a dialectical philosophy into an ontology. Equally it would be a

mistake to translate sunyatainto a transcendental absolute such

as Tathagata (p. 259). The point here is that emptiness(sunyata)

was explicitly devised to be a via media between absolutism and

nihilism, and the reification of any of these extremes is the worst

service one can offer to Nagarjuna's intentions. It is in the middle

way, between absolutism and nihilism, where the soteriological and

transformative power of emptiness sunyata) resides: Suffering re-

sults from the reifying tendencies of the mind towards positions and

beliefs, and liberation is attained by the avoidance of all views,

including the transformation of emptiness (sunyata)into another

theory or view of reality. In Nagarjuna's own words:

The Victorious Ones have announced that emptiness is the relinquish-

ing of all views. Those who are possessed of the view of emptiness are

said to be incorrigible.

Mulamadhyamakarihas

13: 8; in Kalupahana,

1986, p. 223)

Commenting on this passage, Candrakirti (in Sprung, 1979)

described emptiness

sunyata)

as a medicine given by a doctor (the

Buddha) for the malady of dogmatically clinging to views: "in this

sense, Kasyapa, the absence of being sunyata) is the exhaustion of

all dogmatic views. But the one for whom the absence of being itself

becomes a fixed

belief,

I call incurable" (Prasannapada, 249; in

Sprung, 1979, p. 151).

Finally, it is noteworthy, and I do not think accidental, that

Nagarjuna's opponents attempted to refute emptiness(sunyata)

with the same fallacious argument that Wilber uses against all

non-absolutist approaches, i.e., the argument for inconsistency due

to self-referentiality. In the Vigrahavyayartani (Averting the argu-

ments), Nagarjuna's opponents stated that:

1. If self-existence (svabhava) does not exist anywhere in any existing

thing,

Your statement, (itself) being without self-existence, is not able to dis-

card self-existence.

{Vigrahavyayartani,

I: 1-2; in Streng, 1967, p. 222)

Nagarjuna's response is well known: Emptiness sunyata) cannot

be regarded as another viewpoint simply

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