FERNANDBRAUDELTHEMEDITERRANEANANDTHE MEDITERRANEANWORLDINTHEAGEOFPHILIPIIVOLUME TWOTRANSLATED FROM THEFRENCH BYSIAN REYNOLDSContentsPart TwoCOLLECTIVEDESTINIESANDGENERALTRENDS(continued)IV. EMPIRESI. TheOrigin of EmpiresTurkish ascendancy: from Asia Minor to the BalkansThe Turks in Syria and EgyptThe Turkish Empire seen from withinSpanish unity:the Catholic KingsCharles VPhilip II's EmpireAccident and political explanation., 2. The State:Resources and WeaknessesThe 'civil servant"Reversion and sale of officeLocal autonomy: some examplesFinance and credit in the service of the State1600-1610: the comeback of the smaller state?V. SOCIETIES1. NobleReactionLandlords and peasantsIn Castile: Grandes and Titulos versus the KingHidalgos and regidores in CastileOther nobilitiesThe successive aristocracies of TurkeyThe Ciftliks2. The Defection of the BourgeoisieBourgeoisies of the MediterraneanThe defection of the bourgeoisieNobility for saleHostility to the new nobles3. Poverty and BanditryUnfinished revolutionsClass struggle?Against vagrants and vagabondsBrigands everywhereBanditry and the stateBandits andnoblesThe increase in banditrySlavesPossible conclusionspage 657661661667669669672675678681681687691693701704705706709715716718724725726729731733734.735738739743745749752754755650ContentsVI. CIVILIZATIONSI. Mobility and Stability of CivilizationsThe significance of anecdoteHow cultural exports travelledCultural diffusion and resistanceGreek civilization: did it survive1Survivals and cultural frontiers ,An example of asecondary cultural frontier: IfriqiyaThe slow pace of change and transfer2. Overlapping CivilizationsThe Turks in the eastern Balkan plainsIslam in Spain: the MoriscosMorisco problemsA geography of Morisco SpainThe drama of GranadaAftermath of GranadaThe supremacy of the West3. One CivilizationAgainst the Rest: The Destiny of theJewsAn unquestionable civilizationThe ubiquity of Jewish communitiesJudaism and capitalismJews and the general economic situationUnderstanding Spain4. The spread of CivilizationThe stages of the BaroqueBegging the questionRome:centre for the diffusion of Mediterranean cultureAnother centre of cultural diffusion: SpainThe supposed decline of theMediterraneanYD. THEFORMSOF WARI.Formal War:Naval Squadrons and Fortified FrontiersWar and technologyWar and statesWar and civilizationsDefensive frontiersin the BalkansThe Venetian limesOn the DanubeThe centralMediterranean: along the coasts of Naples and SicilyThe defence of the coasts of Italy and SpainThe coasts of North AfricaThe presidios:only asecond bestFor andagainst raidsDefensive psychology2. Piracy:ASubstitute forDeclared WarPiracy: anancient and widespreadindustryPrivateering sponsored by citiesThe prizesThe chronology of privateering:-:.:-:.:.:.:.:.:.::.:.:.:.:.;.:.;.;.:.;.;.:.;.;.;.;.;.; y " 757757758760763769770771773776,776780781785790792798802804811814820823826827829829833835836836838840842844845847849853854859862864865866869972872ContentsChristian privateersChristian piracy in the LevantThe first brilliant age of AlgiersThe second brilliant age of AlgiersConclusion?Ransoming prisonersOne war replaces anothervm. BYWAYOPCONCLUSION: CONJUNCTUREANDCONJUNCTURESA word of warningThe secular trendIntermediate-term fluctuationsThe bankruptcies of the Spanish Crown and economic fluctuationsWar at home and abroadConjuncture and historyShort-term crisesPartThreeEVENTS. POLITICS ANDPEOPLEI. 1550-1559: WARANDPEACEINEUROPEI. TheOrigins of theWar. , 1545-1550: peace in the MediterraneanThe Africa affairMiihlbetg and afterz. War in the Mediterranean and outside the MediterraneanThe fall of Tripoli:14th August, 15511552: the flames of warCorsica becomes French and England SpanishThe several abdications of Charles V:1554-15563. TheReturn of War:Initiative Still Comes fromthe NorthThe Truce of Vaucelles is brokenSaint-QuentinThe treaty of Cateau-CambresisPhilip II's return to Spain4. Spain in Mid-CenturyThe Protestant scarePolitical discontentFinancial difficulties,1I. THELASTSIXYEARS OFTURKISHSUPREMACY: 1559-1565I. War Against the Turk: ASpanish Folly?The breakdown of Turcp-Spanish negotiationsThe naval supremacy of the TurksThe Djerba expeditionz. Spain's RecoveryThe years1561to 1564A double enemy: the corsairs and the winter seas, 1561-1564The Corsican uprisingPeace in Europe65187387788088288688789089289289389689789789990090490490490791191891992392693193793794094594995495495796096796796797097398798799210011004ContentsA few figures on the maritime recovery of SpainDon Garcia de Toledo3. Malta:ATrial of Strength (l8th May-Bth September, 1565)Was it asurprise?The resistance of the KnightsThe relief of MaltaThe role of Spain and Philip IIm. ORIGINSOFTHEHOLYLEAGUE: 1566-1570I. Netherlands or Mediterranean?The election of Pius VThe Turks in Hungary and in the AdriaticWar breaks out again in HungaryThe Netherlands in 15661567-1568: the Mediterranean eclipsed by the Netherlands2. TheWar of Granada: ATurning-PointThe rising tide of warThe beginning of the war of GranadaOne consequence of Granada: Euldj'All takes TunisGranada andthe war of CyprusThe early stages of the war of CyprusThe relief of Cyprus IV. LEPANTO1. The Battle of 7thOctober, 1571Adelayed startFrance: an unknown diplomatic factorWill Don John and the fleet arrive in time?The Turksbefore LepantoThe battle of 7th OctoberA victory that led nowhere?2.1572: ADramaticYearThe French crisis up to the St. Bartholomew Massacre, 24th August,1572Don John's orders and counter-orders, June-July, 1572The Morea expeditions3. Venice's 'Betrayal' and the TwoCaptures of Tunis 1573-1574Venice's caseThe capture of Tunisby DonJohn of Austria: another victorythatled nowhereThe loss of Tunis:13th September, 1574Peace at last in the Mediterranean.V. TURCO-SPANISHPEACETREATIES: 1577-15841. Margliani's Peace Mission, 1578-1581Back to the beginning: Philip II's firstpeace movesNegotiations in Don John's timeMartin de Acuna:the outsider who succeededGiovanni MarglianiThe1581agreement100710121014101410171017102010271027 '102710301035103810441055105510601066106810731082108810881089109210961098llOO110311061106111411181125112511271133113911431144114411461150115211611230123112321234123812451245124612501253125812581259126112611261,1265126512731276131713576531165116611681174'117611781182118411861188118911951196120412051216121912221223August-Contents2. War Leaves the Centre of the MediterraneanTurkey and PersiaThe war against PersiaThe Turks in the Indian OceanThe invasion of Portugal: turning-point of the centuryAlcazarquivir1580: the CoupSpain leaves the MediterraneanINDEXOFPROPERNAMESGENERALINDEXSOURCESI. Unpublished SourcesThe Spanish ArchivesThe French ArchivesThe Italian ArchivesThe Vatican ArchivesThe Ragusa ArchivesEuropean Archives outside the Mediterranean and France2. Cartographical SourcesModern reference worksOriginal sources3. Printed SourcesMajor collections of published documentsEssential worksBibliography: Published works in alphabetical orderCONCLUSIONVI. OUTOFTHELIMELIGHT: THEMEDITERRANEANAFTER1580I. Problems and Difficulties for the TurksMter 1589: rebellion in North Mrica and in IslamThe Turkish financial crisis1593-1606: theresumption of major offensives on the Hungarianfront2. From the FrenchCivilWars toOpenWar with Spain: 1589-1598The wars of religion in Mediterranean FranceThe Franco-Spanish war:1595-1598The peace of Vervins3. The End of Naval War., False alarm in 1591Gian Andrea Doria refuses to fight the Turkish fleet:September, 15961597-1600False alarm or missoo opportunity in 1601 ?The death of Philip II, 13th September, 1598List ofIllustrations1. Galleys in a storm, in harbour and inbattle2. Barbarossa3. Philip II4. In sight of Tunis (1535) Photo A.C.L., Brussels5. The Battle of Lepanto,artist's impression, PhotoMas, Barulona6. The siege of a fortin Africa PhotoMas, Barcelona7. Don John of Austria Photo Giraudon, Paris8. Sixtus V Photo Alinari-Giraudon, Paris9. Charles V Photo Giraudbn, Paris10. Philip II (circa 1555) Photo Giraudon, ParisList ofFigures55. Thepopulationof theBalkanpeninsulaat thebeginning of thesix-teenthcentury 66256. State finance and the general price situation 68057. State budgets andthe generalprice situation: 1. The case of Venice;2. The case of France 68458. State budgets andthe general price situation: 3. The case of Spain 68659. The asientos and economic live in Castile 69460. The Luoghi of the Casa di San Giorgio1509-1625 70061.Moriscos and Christians in Valencia in 1609 78262. Population changes in Valencia between 1565 and1609 78463. The Duke of Alva moves troops to Flanders, April-August, 1567 83864. The privateers of Tuscany 87665. Christian prisoners on their way to Constantinople 89066. LoansobtainedbyCharlesV andPhilipIIfromAntwerp financiers,1515-1556 94267. Philip II at work, 20th January,1569 122668. Philip II at work, 23rd October,1576 1227. ,VOLUME TWOPart Two(continued)CHAPTERIVEmpiresWe must go far back in time, to the beginning of a long process of politicalevolution, before wecanachievea validperspectiveon thesixteenthcentury.At the end of the fourteenth century, the Mediterranean belonged to itstowns, to the city-states scattered around its shores. There were of coursealready, hereandthere, a fewterritorial states, fairlyhomogeneous incharacter and comparatively large, bordering the sea itself: the Kingdomof Naples -'il Reame' - the outstanding example; the Byzantine Empire;QI the possessions united under the Crown of Aragon. But in many cases,these states were merelythe extensions of powerful cities: Aragon in thebroadsense 'was a by-product ofthe dynamicrise ofBarcelona; theByzantine Empire consisted almost entirely of the extended suburbs of twocities, Constantinople and Salonica.By the fifteenth century, the city-state was already losing ground; firstsigns oft h ~ crisis could be detected in Italy during the early years of thecentury. In fifty years,the map of the Peninsula was entirely redrawn, tothe advantage of some cities andthedetrimentof others. It wasonly apartial eclipse. The upheaval failed to achievewhat may have beenat issue- thoughI doubt it - theunificationof theItalianPeninsula.Naples, Venice and Milan in turn proved unequal to the task. The attemptwouldinanycasehavebeenpremature: toomanyparticularinterestswere at stake, too many cities eager foran individualexistence stood inthe way of this difficult birth. So it is only partly true that there was a de-cline in the power of the city-state. The Peace of Lodi, in 1454, confirmedboth abalance of power andadeadlock: thepolitical mapof Italy, al-though simplified, was still a patchwork.Meanwhile, a similar crisis was becoming apparent throughout the restof the Mediterranean. Everywhere the city-state, precarious and narrow-based, stoodrevealed inadequate to performthe political and financial tasksnow facing it. It represented a fragile form of government, doomed to ex-tinction, as was strikingly demonstrated by the capture ofConstantinople in1453, the fall of Barcelona in 1472 and the collapse of Granada in 1492.1It was becoming clear that only the rival of the city-state, the territorialstate.2rich in land andmanpower, wouldinfuturebeableto meet the1 See above, Vol.I.p. 339.2 I have deliberately avoided the term nation-state.658 CollectiveDestiniesexpense of modern warfare; it could maintain paid armies and afford costlyartillery; it wassoontoindulgeintheaddedextravagance of full-scalenaval wars. And its advance was longtobeirreversible. Examplesofthenew pattern emerging atthe end ofthe fifteenthcentury are Aragonunder John II; LouisXl's expansion beyondthe Pyrenees; Turkey underMubammad II, the conqueror ofConstantinople; later France underCharles VIII with his Italian ambitions and Spain in the age of the CatholicKings. Without exception, these states all hadtheir beginnings farinland,many miles from the Mediterranean coast,3 usually in poor regions wherethere were fewer cities to pose obstacles.In Italy by contrast,the wealthand very densityofthe cities maintained weaknesses and divisions as modemstructuresemergedonlywithdifficultyfromthegripofthepast, par-ticularly when that past had been a glorious one and much of its brillianceremained. Past glory could mean present weakness, as was revealed by thefirst Turco-Venetian war,from1463 to1479, inthecourseof which theSignoria, inadequatelyprotectedbyher small territory, was eventuallyobliged, despite her technical superiority, to abandon the struggle; it wasdemonstratedonce more during the tragic occupation of Otrantoby theTurks in 14805and appeared even more strikingly in the beginnings of thestormunleashedbyCharlesVIII'sinvasionof Italyin1494. Wasthereever a more extraordinary militarydisplay than that swift march onNaples, when, accordingtoMachiavelli, theinvaderhadmerelytosendhis billeting officers ahead to mark with chalk the housesselectedfor histroops' lodgings? Once the alarm was over, it was easy to make light of it,even to taunt the French ambassador Philippe de Commynes, asFilippoTron, a Venetian patrician, did at the end of July, 1495. He added that he'was not deceived by the intentions attuouted to the kingof France, 'de-siring togotothe Holy Landwhen he really wantedtobecomeno lessthan signore di tutta l'Italia'.6Such bravado was all very well, but the event marked the beginning of atrain of disasters forthe Peninsula,the logicalpenalty for its wealth, itsposition attheepicentre of Europeanpolitics and, undoubtedly thekeyfactor, the fragility of its sophisticated political structures, of the intricatemechanisms which wenttomake upthe'Italian equilibrium'. Itwasnoaccident if from now on Italian thinkers, schooled by disaster and the dailylesson of events, were to meditate above all upon politics and the destinyof thestate, fromMachiavelli andGuicciardini inthe earlypart of thecentury to Paruta, Giovanni Botero or Ammirato at the end.Italy: that extraordinary laboratory for statesmen. The entire nation waspreoccupied with politics, every man to his own passion, fromthe porterin the market-place to the barber inhis shop or the artisans in the3 A. Siegfried, op. cit., p. 184.4 H. Kretschmayr,op. cit., II,p. 382.5 See studies by Enrico Perito, E. Carusi and Pietro Egidi (nos. 2625, 2630 and 2626in Sanchezbibliography).G Modena, Venezia VIII, Aldobrandino Guidoni to the Duke, Venice,31st July, 1495.Empires659taverns;7 forraggionedi stato, raisond'etat,San Italian rediscovery,wasthe result not of isolated reflection but of collective experience. Similarly,the frequent cruelty in political affairs, the betrayals and renewed flames ofpersonal vendettas are so many symptoms of an age when the old govern-mental structureswerebreakingupand aseries of new onesappearinginrapidsuccession, accordingtocircumstancesbeyondman's control.These were days when justice was frequently an absent figure and govern-ments were too new and too insecure to dispense with force and emergencymeasures. Terror was a means of governinent. The Prince taught the art ofday-to-day survival.9But even in the fifteenthcentury and certainly by the sixteenth,afor-midable newcomer confronted the mere territorial or nation-state. Larger,monsterstateswerenowappearing, throughaccumulation, inheritance,federationorcoalitionof existingstates: what byaconvenient thoughanachronistic term one could call empires inthemodern sense -for howelse is one to describe these giants? In 1494, the threat to Italy frombe-yond the Alps came not merely from the kingdom of France but fromaFrenchEmpire, asyet hypothetical it istrue. Itsfirst objectivewastocapture Naples; then, without becoming immobilized at the centre of theMediterranean, to speed to the East, there to defend the Christian causein reply to the repeated appeals of the Knights of Rhodes, and to deliverthe Holy Land. Suchwasthe complex policy of Charles VIII, whateverFilippoTronmayhavethought: it was acrusading policy, designedtospan theMediterranean in one grand sweep. For no empire could existwithout somemystique andinwesternEurope, thismystiquewaspro-videdbythecrusade, part spiritual, part temporal, astheexampleofCharles V was soon to prove.And indeed Spain under Ferdinand and Isabella, was no 'mere nation-state': it was alreadyanassociationofkingdoms, states andpeoplesunited in the persons of the sovereigns. The sultans too ruled over a com-bination of conquered peoples and loyal subjects, populations which hadeither beensubjugatedor associated with their fortunes. Meanwhile,maritime exploration was creating, for the greater benefit of Portugal andCastile, the firstmodem colonial empires, the importance of whichwasnot fully grasped at first by even the most perspicacious observers..Machiavelli himself stood too close to the troubled politics of Italy to see'beyond them - a major weakness in a commentator otherwise so lucid.10,M. &eidlmayer,OPt cit., p.342. Itsfirst useisusuallyattributedtoCardinal Giovanni DellaCasa, OrazionediMesserGiovanni dellaCasa, scritta aCarloQuinto intorno alla restitutione dellacittddi Piacenza,published in theGalateo by the same author, Florence, 1561, p. 61. Fora full treatment of the topic of raison d'etat, see F. Meinecke, Die Idee der Staatsriisonin der neuerenGeschichte. Munich, 1925(published in English asMachiavellism. Thedoctrineof raisond'etat and itsplaceinmodernhistory, trans!. byDouglasScott,London, 1957).P PierreMesnard, L'cssor de la philosophie po/itique au XVI' siecle.to A. Renaudet, Machiavel, p. 236.660 Collective DestiniesThe story of theMediterranean inthesixteenthcentury isinthe firstplace astory of dramatic political growth,withthe leviathans taking uptheir positions. France's imperial career, as we know, misfired almost im-mediately, for several reasons: external circumstances in part, a stillbackwardeconomyandperhapsalsotemperamental factors, prudence,a characteristicpreferencefor safeinvestments anda distastefor thegrandiose. What had failed to occur was by no means an impossibility. Itis not entirely fanciful to imagine a French Empire supported by Florencein the same way that the Spanish Empire (though not at first it is true) wassupportedbyGenoa. Andtheimperial careerofPortugal, a Mediter-ranean country only by courtesy in any case, developed (apart from a fewMoroccan possessions) outside the Mediterranean region.Sothe rise of empiresintheMediterraneanmeansessentially that ofthe Ottoman Empire in the East and that of the Habsburg Empire in theWest. As Leopold von Ranke long ago remarked, the emergence of thesetwin powers constitutes asingle chapter inhistory and before going anyfurther let us stress that accident and circumstance did not preside aloneat the birth ofthese simultaneous additions to the great powers ofhistory. Icannot accept that Sulaiman the Magnificent and Charles V were merely'accidents' (asevenHenri Pirennehas argued) - their persons, byallmeans, butnot theirempires. Nor doI believe inthepreponderantin-fluence of Wolsey,llthe inventor of the English policy of the Balance ofPower who, by supporting Charles V in1521(against his own principles)when the latter was already ruler of the Netherlands and GermanY, that isbysupportingthestrongerpowerinstead of Fran90isI, theweaker, issaid to have been responsible for Charles's rapid victory at Pavia and the'subsequent surrender of ItalytoSpanishdominationfor twohundredyears.For without wishing tobelittle the role played by individuals andcir-cumstances, Iam convincedthattheperiod of economic growthduringthe fifteenth and sixteenth centuries created a situation consistentlyfavourabletothelargeandverylargestate, tothe'super-states' whichtoday are once again seen as the pattern of the future as they seemed to bebriefly at thebeginning of theeighteenth century, whenRussiawasex-panding under Peter the Great and when a dynastic union at least was pro-jected between LouisXIV'sFrance and Spain under Philip VP Mutatismutandis, the same pattern was repeated in the East. In 1516, the sultan ofEgypt laid siege to the free city of Aden and captured it, in accordance withthe laws of logical expansion. Whereupon in obedience to the very samelaws, the Turkish sultan in 1517 seized the whole of Egypt.13Smallstatescould always expect to be snapped up by a larger predator.The course of historyisbyturnsfavourableorunfavourabletovast11 G. M. Trevelyan, op. cit., p. 293.12 BaudriIlart(Mgr.), PhilippeVet faCour de France, 1889-1901,4 vols.,lntrodUC-tion,p. 1.13 See below, p. 667 If.Empires 661political hegemonies. It prepares their birth andprosperity and ultimatelytheir decline and fall. It is wrong to suppose that their political evolution isfixed once for all, that some states are irremediably doomed to extinctionand others destined to achieve greatness come what may, as if marked byfate 'to devour territory and prey upon their neighbours'.14Two empires in the sixteenth century gave evidence of their formidablemight. But between 1550 and 1600, advance signs can already be glimpsedof what wasintheseventeenthcenturytobetheir equallyinexorabledecline.I. THEORIGINOFEMPIRESAword of warning:when discussing the rise and fall of empires,itis aswell tomarkcloselytheir rateofgrowth, avoidingthetemptationtotelescope time and discover too early signs of greatness in a state which weknow will one day be great, or to predict too early the collapse of an em-pirewhichweknowwill onedayceasetobe. Thelife-span of empirescannot be plotted by events,only by'careful diagnosis and auscultation -and as in medicine there is always room for error.- .Turkish ascendancy:15 fromAsia Minortothe Balkans. Behind the rise ofTurkeytogreatnesslaythreecenturiesof repeatedeffort, of prolongedconflict and of miracles. It was on the 'miraculous' aspect of the OttomanEmpire that western historians of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenthcenturies tended to dwell. It is after all an extraordinary story, the emer-gence of the Ottoman dynasty fromthe fortunes of war onthetroubledfrontiers of Asia Minor, a rendezvous for adventurers and fanatics.16ForAsiaMinor wasaregion of unparalleledmysticalenthusiasm: herewarand religion marched hand in hand, militant confraternities abounded andthe janissaries were of course attached to such powerful sects as the Ahisand later the Bektas,.his. These beginnings gave the Ottoman state its style,its foundations among the people and its original exaltation.The miracleisthat such atiny state should have survivedthe accidentsand disturb-ances inherent in its geographical position.But survive it did, and put to advantage the slow transformation of theAnatoliancountryside. TheOttomansuccesswas intimatelyconnected, with the waves of invasion, often silent invasion, which drove the peoplesof Turkestan westwards. It was brought about by the internal transforma-tion of Asia Minor17 from Greek and Orthodox in the thirteenth centuryto Turkish and Moslem, following successive waves of infiltration and in-deed of total social disruption; and also by the extraordinary propagandaJC Gaston Roupnel, Histoire et destin, p. ;30.15 On the greatness of Turkey, see R. de Lusinge, De la naissance, duree et chute dejEtats, 1588,206 p. Ars. 8 H17337, quoted by G. Atkinson, op. cit., p. 184-185, andan unpublished diplomatic report on Turkey (1576), Simancas Eo 1147.16 Femand Grenard, Decadence de l'Asie, p. 48.nSee above, Vol. I, p. 178.Empires 663of theMoslemorders, someof whichwererevolutionary, 'communist,like the Babais, AIDs and Abdala.n; others more mystical and pacifist, forexample the Mawlawis of Konya. Following G. Huart,Kopriiliizade hasrecentlydrawn attention to their proselytism' .18 Their poetry- theirpropaganda - marked the dawn of western Turkish literature.Beyond the straits, the Turkish conquest waslargelyfavouredby cir-cumstances. The Balkan Peninsula was far from poor, indeed in the four-teenthandfifteenthcenturiesit wascomparativelywealthy. But it wasdivided: Byzantine$, Serbs, Bulgars, Albanians, Venetians, andGenoesefought amongst themselves. There was religious conflict between theOrthodox andthe RomanChurches;and socially the Balkan world wasextremely fragile - amerehouse of cards. So it should not be forgottenthat the Turkish conquest of the Balkans was assisted by an extraordinarysocial revolution. Aseignorial society, exploitingthepeasants, was sur-prised by the impact and collapsed of its own accord. The conquest, whichmeant theendofthegreat landowners, absoluterulers ontheir ownestates, wasin itsway 'a liberationof the oppressed'.19AsiaMinor hadbeen conqueredpatiently and slowly after centuries of effort;the BalkanPeninsulaseemsnot tohaveofferedanyresistancetothe invader. In. .Bulgaria, where the Turks made such rapid progress, the countryside hadalready ~ n unsettled, well before their arrival, byviolent rural dis-turbances.2oEven in Greece there had been a social revolution. In Serbia,the native aristocracy was wiped out and some of the Serbian villages wereincorporated into the wakf (possessions of the mosques) or distributed tothe sipiihis.21And the sipiihis, soldiers whose titles were held only for life,(Opposite)Fig. 55:The population of the Balkan Peninsula at thebeginning of the sixteenth centuryMissingfromthismap, compiledbyOrnerLutfi BarkanfromOttomanpopulationcounts, are the figuresfor Istanbul, which do not appear to have survived. The Turkscontrolledtheiracquisitionsfromfrontier postsandaboveall fromthekey towns.Note the large implantation of Yiinik nomads in the plains, but also in the highlands,in the Rhodope for example and in the mountains to the east ofthe Struma and Vardar.Aline running roughlyfromtheisland of ThasosthroughSofiadividesapredomi-nantly Christian zone, onlypartially colonizedbytheTurks, fromazone of strongMoslemimplantationinThraceandthroughtoBulgaria. Subsequent researchbyOmer Lutfi Barkan and his pupils has now analysed virtually all the sixteenth centurycensuses, revealinga large population increase andconfirmingwhat was alreadythought: that Moslemspredominatedinthepopulationof Anatolia. Everysymbolon the map represents 250 families, that is over1000 people. Note the density of theMoslem population in Bosnia and the large 1ewish colony in Salonica.II Annuaire du monde musulman, 1923,p. 323.19 An expression used by Mr. B. Truhelka, archivist at Dubrovnik, during our manydiscussions on this subject.20 Cf. in particularChristoPeyefr, Agrarverfassungund Agrarpolitik, Berlin, 1927,p. 69; I. Sakazov, op. cit., p. 19; R. Busch-Zantner, op. cit., p. 64 fr. However, accord-ingtoanarticlebyD. Anguelov, (Bulgarian) Historical ReView, IX, 4,p. 374-398,Bulgarian resistance to the Turks was stronger than I have suggested.2110s. Zontar, 'Hauptprobleme der jugoslavischen Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte'inVierteljahrschr. fUrSozial-undWirtscha/tsgeschichte, 1934, p. 368.664 Collective Destiniesat first asked for rents in money, not in kind. It was some time before thecondition of the peasants once again became intolerable. And in Bosnia,around Sarajevo, there were mass con\'Cl"Sions, due in part to the flourish-ingBogomilianheresy.22ThesituationwasevenmorecomplicatedinAlbania.23Here the landowners were able to take refuge in the Venetianpresidios;Durazzo for example, which remainedinVenetian possessionuntil 1501.When these fortresses fell, the Albanian nobility fled to ItaIy,where some of their descendants remain to the present day. The Musachifamily did not survive; its last member died in Naples in 1600. It left be-hind however the Histariadella CosoMusachi, publishedin1510byGiovanni Musachi, avaluablerecord of thefamilyfortuneswhichteIlsus much about the country and its ruling caste. The name of this ancientfamily is preserved in the Muzekie region of Albania24where it once hadimmense holdings.25The story of these exiles and their wanderings is anastonishing one. The same path was not trodden by alI nobles and land-owners in the Balkans. But whatever their fate, even when they succeededin maintaining themselves for a while, by abjuring or otherwise, the generalpattern was the same; before the Turkish advance an entire society feIl intoruins, partlyofits ownaccord, seemingtoconfirmyet againAlbertGrenier'sopinionthat'tobe conquered, apeople must have acquiescedin its own defeat.'Social conditions in the Balkans help to explain the invader's success andthe ravages it brought. The Turkish cavalry, ranging rapidly far and wide,blocking roads,ruining cropsanddisruptingeconomic life, went aheadof the main army andprepared the ground for an easy victory.. Only themountainousregionswerefor awhileprotectedfromtherelentlessin- ,vasion. Bowing tothe geography of the Balkans, the Turks took controlfirst of the principal highways, along the river valleys leading down to theDanube; the Maritsa, the Vardar, the Drin and the Morava. In 1371, theytriumphed at Chernomen on the Maritsa; in1389 they won the battIe ofKossovoPolje, 'theField of Blackbirds', fromwhichflowtheVardar,Maritsa and Morava. In 1459, this time north of the Iron Gates, the Turkwas victorious at Smederevo 'at the very point where theMorava meetsthe Danube and which as much as Belgrade commands the approaches tothe Hungarian plains'.24 .Conquest wasrapidtoointhewidespaces of the eastern plains.21In1365, the Turk settled his capital at Adrianople, by 1386 all Bulgaria hadbeen subdued, to be followedby Thessaly.28 Victory came more slowly inthe mountainous west and was often more apparent than real. In Greece,Athenswas occupied in 1456, the Morea in 1460, Bosnia in1462-1466,21>221. W. Zinkeisen, op. cit., II, p. 143; R. Busch-Zantner, op. cit., p. SO.23 R. Busch-Zantner, op. cit., p. 65. U Ibid., p. 5525 Ibid., p. 65 and references to studies by K. Iireeek and Sufilay.21 Ibid., p. 23.21 W. Heyd, op. cit., II,p. 258. 21 Ibid., II,p. 270.29 Ann. dumonde musulman, 1923, p. 228.:.:.:.z.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.z.:.:.:.zo:-::-::-:.-.:-::.z.;.;.z.:.;.:-;.;-))o:.;-)..; . ~ -;.;.-..., J' " J' o'of.------' .-. -..-.- .-..... ;"". ..Empires665Herzegovina in1481,30 despitetheresistance of some 'mountainkings',Venice herself was unable for long to prevent the Turk from reaching theAdriatic: Scutari wascapturedin1479andDurazzoin1501. Militaryvictory was followed by another, more leisurely conquest: the constructionof roads and fortified posts, the organization of camel trains, the setting inmotionof all the supply andtransportconvoys(oftenhandledbyBul-garian carriers)andfinally, most importantof all, that conquestwhichoperated through those towns which the Turks had subdued, fortified orbuilt. These nowbecamemajorcentres of diffusionof Turkishciviliza-tion: theycalmed, domesticatedandtamedat least theconqueredre-gions, whereit must not beimaginedthat anatmosphereof constantviolence reigned.In the earlydays, theTurkish conquesttookaheavytoll of the sub-jugated peoples:after thebattle of Kossovo, thousandsupon thousandsof Serbs were sold as slaves as far away as the markets of Christendom31or recruited as mercenaries; but the conqueror was not deficient inpolitical wisdom, as canbe seenfromMubammadII'sconcessionstotheGreekssummoned toConstantinopleafter 1453. EventuallyTurkeycreated, throughoutthe Balkans, structures within whichthepeoples ofthe Peninsula gradually foundaplace, collaborating with the conquerorandhereandtherecuriouslyre-creatingthepatterns oftheByzantineEmpire. This conquest brought a new order, a pax turcica. Let us take thewordof theanonymousFrenchman whowrotein1528: 'the country issafe and there are no reports ofbrigands orhighwaymen, . '0TheEm-perordoesnot toleratehighwaymen orrobbers.'31Could asmuchhavebeen said of Catalonia or calabria at the same period? There must havebeensome truth in this optimistic picture, since for manyyears theTurkishEmpire remained toChristian eyes an extraordinary, incompre-hensibleanddisconcertingexampleof orderliness; itsarmyastonishedwesterners by its disciplineandsilence as muchas by itscourage, abun-dant munitions and the high quality and sobriety of its soldiers. Not thattheirastonishment preventedtheChristiansfromhatingtheseInfidels,'far worse than dogs in all their works'as one writer put it in1526.33Gradually however, westerners came to take a more balanced view of theTurks. They were of course ascourge sent by the Lord:Pierre Viret, theProtestant reformerof FrenchSwitzerland, wroteof themin1560: 'we'must not be amazed if God is now punishing the Christians through theTurks as he once punished the Jews whentheyforsooktheirfaith ... forthe Turks are today the Assyrians and Babylonians of the Christians andthe rod and scourge and fUry of God'oM But from, mid-century on, others30 H. Hochholzer, art.cit., p. 57.31 J. Zontar, inVierteljahrschr./Ur Sozial- und Wirtscha/tsggeschichte, 1934, p. 369,:l2 Quoted by G. Atkinson, op. cit.,p. 179.33 Ibid., p.211.34 Ibid., p. 397.The same idea is expressedin1544 by JeromeMaurand, Itinerairede .d'Antibes aConstantinople(1544), publishedbyLeonDurez, 1901, p. 69, thevictories of the Turks are apunishment forthe sins of the Christians.666 Collective Destinieslike Pierre Belon were to recognize the virtues of the Turks;andin lateryears this strange and contrary land was to exercise great fascination overEuropeans, for whom it was a convenient place to escape to in imaginationfromthe restrictions of western society.It was atleastanadvance torecognizethat Turkishactionscouldbeexplained by the faults and weaknesses of Europe.35 A Ragusan citizen saidas muchtoMaximilianI :36 whilethewesternnationsaredivided, 'allsupreme authority in the TurkishEmpirerestsin asingle man, allobeythe sultan, he alone rules; he receives all revenues, in a word he ismasterandall other menarehisslaves'. Insubstance, this waswhat wasex-plained to Ferdinand's ambassadors in 1533 by Aloysius Gritti; a singularcharacter, the son of aVenetian and aslave-girl, and formany yearsthefavourite of the GrandVizier, Ibrahim Pasha. Charles V should not riskhisstrengthagainst thatof Sulaiman: VerumesseCarolumCesarem po-tentem sedcui non omnes obediant, exemplo esse Germaniam et lutheranorumpervicaciam.37It is certainlytr,ue that Turkishstrength was drawn, asif by amecha-nical process, intothecomplexof Europeanweaknesses. Thebitterin-ternal dissensions of Europe permitted and even encouraged the Turkishinvasion of Hungary. 'It was the capture of Belgrade [29th August, 1521],'Busbecqquiterightlysays,38'which loosedthat multitudeof evilsunderwhose weight we continue to groan. This threwopen the flood-gatesthroughwhichthebarbariansenteredtodevastateHungary, it broughtabout the death of KingLouis, the loss of Buda andthe enslavement ofT.ransylvania. If the Turks had not capturedBelgrade, theywouldneverhaveenteredHungary, onceoneofthe most flourishing kingdoms of ' .Europe and now adesolate and ravaged land.'Infact 1521, theyear of Belgrade, alsosawthe beginningof the longstrugglebetween F r a n ~ o i s I andCharles V. Oneconsequencewas thebattle of Mohacs in 1526; anotherthe siege of Vienna in1529. BandelIo,whowrote his Novelle not longafter this event,39 paints a pictureofChristendom preparing for the worst, 'reduced to a canton of Europe, as aresult of the discordswhich appear every day more profound between theChristianPrinces'. Unless, that is, Europe40 was less concerned with barringthewaytothe Turkthanwithother, brighterprospectsintheAtlanticand elsewhere in the world, as some historianshave suggested.41The timehas surely come to turn on its head that hoary and misleading explanation,35 F. Babinger, Suleiman der Priichtige (Meister der Pa/itik), 1923, p. 446-447.3CI J. W. Zinkeisen, op. cit., III, p. '19.37 Quoted by J. W. Zinkeisen, ap. cit., III, p. 20, n. I, following Anton von Gevay,Urkunden und Actenstucke zur Geschichte der Verhiiltnisse zwischen ()sterreich,Ungarnund der Plorte im XVI. und XVII. Jahrhundert, 1840-1842, p. 31.38 Busbecq, Lettres ., p. 42; cf. TheTurkish Letters, p. 14.39 Op. cit., VIII, p. 305.40 F. Grenard, op. cit., p.86.41 Emile Bourgeois, Manuel historique de po/itique etrangere, Vol. I, 1892, Introduc-tion,p. 2 If. -Empires 667still sometimes encountered, that it was the Turkishconquest whichstimulated the great discoveries, whereas the reverse in fact occurred, forthe great discoveries robbedthe Levantof much of its appeal, enablingtheTurkstoextendtheir influenceandsettletherewithout toomuchdifficulty. After all, the Turkish occupation of Egypt in January, 1517 didnot occur until twenty years after VascocIa Gama had sailed round theCape of Good Hope.The Turks in Syria and Egypt. And surely the major event in the rise of theOttomanEmpire, moresignificant eventhanthecaptureofConstan-tinople (a mere 'episode' as Richard Busch-Zanter rather deflatingly callsit42) was indeed the conquest first of Syria in 1516, then of Egypt in 1517,both achieved in a single thrust. This wasthe firstglimpse of the futuregreatness of the Ottoman state.43 In itself, the conquest was not particu-larlyremarkable andposedfewdifficulties. Thedisputedfrontiers ofnorthern Syria and in particular an attempt by the MamlUk sultan to actas mediator between Turks and Persians served as a pretext when the rightmOment came. The MamlUks, whoconsidered artillery adishonourabley.reapon, could not withstand the fire of SeUm's cannon on 24th August,1516, outsideAleppo. Syriafell overnight intothehands ofthecon-queror who" entered Damascus on 26th September. When the new Mamhlkruler refused to recognize Turkish sovereignty, Selim's army advanced intoEgypt. The MamlUk forceswere again shattered by Turkish cannon44 inJanuary, 1517outsideCairo. Artilleryhadoncemorecreatedamajorpoliticalpower, asithad alreadydoneinFrance, inMUSCOvy4SandatGranada in 1492.46Egypt succumbed with hardly a struggle, and with a minimal disturbanceof the establishedorder. The MamlUks, whoretainedtheirvast estates,very quickly regained effective power: Bonaparte, arriving in Egypt threecenturies later, foundthemthere still.The Baron de Tott wasno doubtcorrect when he wrote: 'In examining the canons or code of Sultan SeUm,one would imagine that this Prince capitulated with the Mamliiks, ratherthan conquered Egypt. It is evident, in fact, that by suffering the twenty-four Beys tosubsist, who governedthat kingdom, he onlyaimedatballancing[sic]their authority, bythat of aPasha, whomhe constituted, Governor General andPresident oftheCouncil ..".47Weshouldbewarned by such comments not to over-dramatize the conquest of 1517.All the same, it was a landmark in Ottoman history. From the Egyptians,Selim gained much of value. In the first place, the annual tribute, originallymodest,48 grew steadily. Through Egypt, the Ottoman Empire was able to42' eine Episode, keinErcignis', p. 22. 43 V. Hassel, op. cit., p. 22-23.44 F. Grenard, op. cit.,p. 79. 45 See above, Vol. I, p. 180.46 J. Dieulafoy, Isabelle la Cat/zolique, Reinede Castille, 1920; FernandBraudel,'Les Espagnols .... in RevueAfricaine, 1928, p. 216,n. 2.47 ToU, Memoirs .. on theTurks and theTartars, London, 1785, Vol.II, p. 29.48 Brockelmann, History ofthe Islamic Peoples (tr. Carmichael and Perlmann),London, 1959,p. 289.668 Collective DestiniesparticipateinthetrafficinAfricangoldwhichpassedthroughEthiopiaandthe Sudan andin the spicetradewithChristian countries. Mentionhas already been made of the gold traffic and of the revived importance oftheRedSearouteinLevantinetrade. BythetimetheTurksoccupiedEgypt and Syria, long after Vasco da Gama's voyage of discovery, thesetwocountries were nolonger exclusive gateways totheFar East butneverthelessremainedimportant. The Turkishbarrier betweenChristen-dom and the Indian Ocean49was now completed and consolidated, whileat the same time a link was established between the hungry metropolis ofConstantinople and an extensive wheat, beanandrice-producingregion.Onmany subsequent occasions, "Egyptwas tobe acrucial factorinthefortunesof the Turkish Empire and one might even say asource of cor-ruption. It has been claimed with some plausibility that it was from Egyptthat there spread to the far comers of the Ottoman Empire that venalityof ofIice50which has so frequently undermined apolitical order.But Selim derived fromhisvictory something else quite asprecious asgold. Even before becoming ruler of the Nile, he had had prayers said in hisname and fulfilledthe role of Caliph,51 Commander of the Faithful. NowEgypt provided consecration for this role.Legend had it - that it was nomore than a legend seemed notto matter - that the last of the Abbiisids,having taken refuge in Egypt with theMamliiks, ceded to Selim the cali-phate over alltrueMoslembelievers. Legend or not,the sultan returnedfromEgyptradiating anaura of immenseprestige. InAugust, 1517, hereceived from the son of the Shaikh of Mecca the key to the Ka'ab itself.52It was fromthis date that the elite corps of horseguards was "granted the 'privilege of carrying thegreenbanner of theProphet.53 There can be nodoubt that throughout Islam, the elevation of SeIim to the dignity oCCom-mander of the Faithful in1517 was as resounding an event as the famouselection, two years later, of Charles of Spain as Emperor was in Christen-dom. Thisdateat the dawnof thesixteenthcenturymarkedthearrivalof the Ottomans asaworldpower andperhapsinevitably, of awave ofreligious intolerance.54SeIim died shortly after his victories, in 1520, on the road to Adrianople.HissonSulaimansucceededhimunchallenged. ToSulaimanwasto fallthe honour of consolidating the might of the Ottoman Empire, despite thepessimistic forecastsvoiced concerninghisperson. Inthe event the manproved equal tothe task. He arrived at an opportune moment, it is true.491.Mazzei, op. cit.,p. 41.50 Annuaire dumonde musulman, p. 21.51 The sultan did not officiaIly assume this title until the eighteenth century, Stanford1. Shaw, 'The Ottoman view of the Balkans'inThe Balkans in transition, ed. C. and B.lelavich, 1963, p. 63.521. W. Zinkeisen,op. cit., III, p. 15.53 Brockelmann, op. cit., p. 302.54 Stanford 1. Shaw, art. cit., p. 66,remarksupontheroleplayedby thefanaticaulemaclass inthenewlyconquered Arabprovinces andtheOttomanreactiontoincreased Franciscan missionary activity in the Balkans (supportedby the HabsburgsandVenetians).Empires 669In 1521, he seized Belgrade, the gateway to Hungary; in July, 1522, he laidsiege to Rhodes, which fell in December of the same year:once the for-midableandinfluential fortressoftheKnightsofSt. Johnhadfallen,the entire eastern Mediterranean lay open to his youthful ambition. Therewasnownoreasonwhythemasterof somanyMediterraneanshoresshould not build a fleet. His subjects and the Greeks, includingthose whoinhabited Venetian islands,55 were to provide him with the indispensablemanpower. Wouldthereignof Sulaiman, usheredinbythesebrilliantvictories, have been so illustrious had it not been for his father's conquestof Egypt and Syria?The Turkish Empire seen fromwithin. As western historians, we have seenonlytheouter faceof theTurkishEmpireanditis as outsiders, onlypartially aware of its true workings, that we have tried to explain it. Thisnarrowview. isgraduallybeingchangedbyutilizingtheextremelyricharchives of Istanbul andthe rest of Turkey. In order tounderstandthestrengths and also, for they soon became apparent, the weaknesses56 andirregularities of this immense machine, it must be viewed from the inside.It will mean reconsidering a style of government which was also a way of'life, a composite and complex heritage, a religious order as well as a socialorder and several different economic periods. The imperial career of theOttomans covers centuries of history andthereforeaseries of different,sometimes contradictory experiences. Itwasa'feudal' regime which ex-panded fromAsiaMinor intotheBalkans(1360), afewyearsafterthebattle of Poitiers, during the early stages of what we know as the HundredYears' War; andit wasafeudal system(basedonbeneficesandfiefs)whichtheOttomans introducedtotheconqueredregions ofEurope,creating a landed aristocracy controlled only with varying success by thesultans, and against which they were later towage an untiringandeven-tually effective campaign. But that dominant class in Ottoman society, theslaves of the sultan, was constantly being recruited from new sources. Itsstruggle for power punctuated the internal rhythm of theimperial story,as we shall see.Spanish unity: theCatholic Kings. In the East the Ottomans; in the WesttheHabsburgs. Beforethe rise ofthe latter, the Catholic Kings, the'original authors ofSpanishunity, playedas vital a part inimperialhistory as the sultans of Bursa and Adrianople had in the genesisof theOttomanEmpire- ifnot more. Their achievement was furtheredandassisted by the general temper of the fifteenth century after the HundredYears' War. We should not take literally everything written about Ferdi-nand and Isabella by the historiographers. The achievement of the CatholicKings, whichI havenointentionofbelittling, hadthetimes andthe"See above, Vol. I,p. 115 and note 43.56 Stanford I. Shaw, 'The Ottoman view of the Balkans' in The Balkans in transition,cd. Ielavich,p. 56-80.Collective Destiniesdesires of men in its favour. It was a development desired, demanded even,bytheurbanbourgeoisie, wearyof civil war ~ d anxiousfor domesticstability, forthe peaceful renewal of trade and for security. The originalHermandad was an urban phenomenon: its alarum bells rang out from cityto city, proclaiming anew age. The cities, with their astonishing reservesof democratic tradition, ensured the triumph of Ferdinand and Isabella.So let us not exaggerate the part, admittedly an important one, playedby the principal actors in this drama. Somehistorians have even suggestedthat theunionbetweenCastileandAragon, whichbecameapowerfulreality through the marriage of 1469, could well have been replaced by aunionbetween Castile and Portugal.57 Isabella hadthe choice between aPortuguese husband andan Aragonese, betweenthe AtlanticandtheMediterranean. Infact theunificationof theIberianPeninsulawasal-ready in the air, alogical development of the times. It was aquestion ofchoosing aPortuguese or an Aragonese formula, neither being necessarilysuperiortotheother andbothwithineasyreach. Thedecisionfinallyreached in 1469 signalled the re-orientation of Castile towards the Mediter-ranean, an undertaking full of challenge and not without risk, in view ofthe traditional policies and interests of the kingdom, but which was never-theless accomplished in the space of a generation. Ferdinand and Isabellawere married in 1469; Isabella succeeded to the Crown of Castile in 1474and Ferdinandto that of Aragonin1479; thePortuguesethreat wasfinally eliminated in 1483; the conquest of Granada was accomplished in1492; the acquisition of Spanish Navarre in 1512. It is not p o ~ i b l e evenfor a moment to compare this rapid unification with the slow and painfulcreation of France from its cradle in the region between the Loire and the'Seine. The difference was not one of country but of century.It would be surprising if this rapid unification of Spain had not createdthe necessity for a mystique of empire. Ximenez' Spain, at the height of thereligious revival at the end of the fifteenth century, was still living in theage of crusades; hence the unquestionable importance of the conquest ofGranada and the first steps, taken a few years later, towards expansion inNorthAfrica. Notonlydidtheoccupation of southernSpain completethe reconquest of Iberian soil; not only did it present the Catholic Kingswitha richagricultural region, a regionofrichfarminglandandin-dustrious and populous towns: it also liberated for foreign adventures theenergies of Castile, solong engagedin an endless combat with the rem-nantsof SpanishIslamwhichrefusedtodie - andthesewereyouthfulenergies.58Almostimmediately however, Spain wasdistracted fromAfrican con-quest. In1492, ChristopherColumbusdiscoveredAmerica. Threeyearslater. Ferdinand was engrossed in the complicated affairs of Italy. Ferdi-nand, the over-cunning Aragonese, hasbeen bitterly criticized, by CarlosPereyra,59 forbeing thus diverted towardstheMediterraneanandsone-51 Angel Ganivet, Jdeariumespanol, ed. Espasa, 1948, p. 62 fr.58 Pierre Vilar, LaCatalogne .., I, p. 509 fr. 59 Imperioespanol,p. 43.Empires 671glecting the true futureof Spain which layoutside Europe, in the barrendeserts of Africa and in America too, an unknown world abandonedbySpain's rulers to the worst kind of adventurer. And yet it wasthishandingover of the Ultramar to private enterprise which made possible the astonish-ing feats of the Conquistadores. I earlier criticized Machiavelli for failing torecognizethepotentialimportance of themaritimediscoveries; evenaslate as the seventeenth century, the Count Duke Olivares, the not alwaysunsuccessful rival of Richelieu and very nearly a great man, had still notgrasped the significance of the Indies.60In the circumstances, nothingcould have been more natural thanAragonesepolicy, withtheweight of traditionbehindit. Aragonwasdrawntowards theMediterraneanbyher past andbyher experience,intimately acquainted with its waters through her seaboard, her shippingand her possessions (the Balearics, Sardinia and Sicily) and not un-naturallyattracted, liketherest of EuropeandtheMediterranean, bytherichlands ofItaly. Whenhiscommander Gonzalvo de Cordobacaptured Naples in 1503, Ferdinand the Catholic became master of a vitalpositionandawealthykingdom, hisvictory markingatriumph for theAragonesc.fteet and, under the Great Captain, the creation, no less, of the-Spanish tercio, an event which can rank in world history on a level with thecreation of theMacedonianphalanx ortheRomanlegion.61Tounder-stand the attraction of theMediterranean for Spain wemustnot let ourimage of Naples at the beginning of the sixteenth century be coloured bywhat it hadbecome by the end - acountry strugglingto survive, hope-lessly in debt. By then the possession of Naples had become a burden. Butin1503, in1530even,Cl2theReameof Naplesaffordedboth avaluablestrategic position and a substantial source of revenue.The final point to note about the Aragonese policy to which Spain be-came committed, is its opposition to the advance of Islam: the Spaniardspreceded the Turks in North Mrica; in Sicily and Naples, Spain stood ononeof theforemost rampartsof Christendom. LouisXII might boast:'I am the Moor against whom the Catholic King is taking up arms',63 butthat didnotpreventthe Catholic King, by the mere location of theter-ritorieshepossessed, fromcomingmoreandmoretofulfil theroleofCrusader and defender of the faith with all the dutiesaswell as thepri-vileges that implied. Under Ferdinand, thecrusadingardour ofSpain, moved outof thePeninsula, not toplunge intothebarren continentofto R. Konetzke, op. cit., p. 245; ErichHassinger, 'DieweltgeschichtlicheStellungdes XVI. lahrhunderts" inGeschichte inWissenschaftundUnterricht. 1951, refers tothebookby JacquesSignot,1Adivisiondumonde , 1st ed. 1539(othereditionsfollowed:5th ed. 1599) which makes no mention of America.61 Welldescribed by Angel Ganivet in [dearium espano/, 1948,p. 44-45.62 Naples had run into deficit by at least1532, E. Alberi, op. cit., I,1, p. 37. Fromthe time of Charles V, ordinary expenditure in his states, not counting the cost of war,exceeded his revenueby twomillion ducats. GuillaumeduVair, Actions oratoiresettraites, 1606, p. So-S8.63 Ch. Monchicourt, 'La Tunisie et l'Europe. Quelques documents relatifs auxXVI-, XVII- et XVIII- siecles' in Revue Tunisienne, 1905, off-print, p. 18.672 Collective DestiRiesAfrica on the opposite shore, nor to lose itself in the New World, but tomake up a position inthe sight of the whole world, at the very heart of whatwas then Christendom, the threatened citadel of Italy: a traditionalpolicy, but a glorious one.CharlesV. Charles V succeeded Ferdinand in Spain. As Charles of Ghent,he became Charles I in 1516. With his coming, western politics took on newand more complicated dimensions, a development comparable to what washappening at theother end of thesea under Sulaimin theMagnificent.Spain now found herself little more than a background for the spectacularreignof theEmperor. Charles of Ghentbecame CharlesV in1519;hehardlyhadtimetobe Charles of Spain. Or, rather curiously, notuntilmuchlater, at theendof hislife, forreasonsof sentimentandhealth.Spainwasnot prominent inthe career of CharlesV, thoughshe con-tributed handsomely to his greatness.It would certainly be unjust to overlook the contribution made by Spainto the imperial career. The Catholic Kings had after all carefully preparedthe inheritance of their grandson. Had they not been active on every pos-siblefrontwhich mightprove useful, in England, Portugal, Austria andtheNetherlands, stakedthrow afterthrowonthe lottery of royalmar-riages? The notion of surrounding France, of neutralizing this dangerousneighbour, prefiguredthelateranomalousshapeof theHabsburgEm-pire, with a gaping hole at its centre. Thepossibility of Charles Vsreignwas a calculatedgambleonthepart of Spain. Anaccident might ofcourse have changedthe course of history. Spain might have refused to, .recognize Charles as long as his mother, Joanna the Mad, was still alive(and she did not die, at Tordesillas, until 1555); or the preference mighthavegonetohisbrotherFerdinand, whohadbeenbrought upinthePeninsula. For that matter, Charles might not havewontheimperialelection in 1519. But for all that, Europe might not have escaped the greatimperial experience. France, which hadbegunmoving inthat directionin1494, might very well have begun again and succeeded. And it shouldalsoberememberedthat behindthefortunes of CharlesVforalongtime lay the economic power of the Netherlands, already associated withthenewAtlantic world, the crossroads ofEurope, anindustrial andcommercial centrerequiringmarkets andoutletsfor itstradeandthepolitical security which a disorganized German Empire would havethreatened.Since Europe was moving of its own accord towards the construction ofavast state, the imperialdrama, would havebeenplayedout sooner orlater: only the dramatis personae would have been different had Charles'fortunestakenanotherturn. The electorsof Frankfurtcould hardly, in1519, havepronouncedinfavourof anational candidate. AsGermanhistorians have pointed out,Germany could not havebornetheweightof suchacandidacy: it wouldhave meant takingonsingle-handedthetwo other candidates, F r a n ~ o i s I and Charles. By electing- Charles,Empires 673Germany chosethelesser of twoevilsandnotmerely, althoughthisissometimes suggested, the manwho held Viennaand thereforeprotectedherthreatenedeasternfrontier. In1519, it shouldberemembered, Bel-grade wasstillaChristian possession and between Belgrade and Viennalay the protective barrier of the kingdom of Hungary. Not until 1526 wasthe Hungarian frontier violated. Then - and only then - the situation wastotallyaltered. Thethreads of theHabsburg and Ottoman destinies aretangled enough in reality without confusing them any further. The follow-ing popular rhyme about the Emperor would not have been heard in 1519:Das hat er als getaneAllein fiir VaterlandAuf das die rornische KroneNit komm in Turkenhand.In fact Charles never used Germany as abase of operations. By 1521,Luther was launched on his career. And soon after his coronation at Aix-la-Chapelle, in September, 1520, the Emperor renounced, in favour of hisbrother Ferdinand, his own marriage to the Hungarian princess Anna: inBrusselson7thFebruary, 1522, hesecretlycededthe Erb/andto hisbrother.64By so doing he was abdicating frompersonal interventionon. any large scale in Germany.Nor was it possible in the nature of things for Charles to make Spain hisheadquarters.Too far from the centre of Europe, Spain did not yet offerthe compensating advantage ofriches-from the New World: not until 1535was this tobe amajor consideration. In his struggle against France, thechief occupation of his life after 1521, Charles V was obliged to rely uponItaly and the Netherlands. Along this central axis of Europe, the Emperorconcentrated his effort. Gattinara, the Grand Chancellor, advised Charleswhatever else he did to hold on to Italy. MeanwhileintheNetherlands,inpeacetimeat least, Charles Vbenefitedfromsubstantial revenues,thepossibilityofloans, as in1529, anda budget surplus. It was fre-quentlysaidduringhisreignthat theNetherlandspaidall hisbills, anopinion even more widely voiced after 1552. For now the same fate befellthe Netherlands which had already befallen Sicily, Naples and even Milan:althoughwealthystates, all of themhadseen their budget surplusespractically wiped out.Thisdevelopment may havebeen hastenedby the. fact that both Charles and Philip II concentrated their military efforts on, the Netherlands, thusdamagingitstrade. Large sums of money were ofcourseimportedfromSpain, especiallyduringPhilip'sreign. But com-plaints were stillbeing voiced in1560.The Netherlands claimed tohavesuffered more than Spain; 'for the latter remained freefromall materialharmand hadcontinued to trade with France under cover ofsafe-conducts'.65 So she could not complain over much of her sufferings duringthiswar, which, sheadmitted, hadonlybeenwaged so that theking ofMGustav Turba, GeschichtedesThronfolgerechtes inallenhabsburgischen Liindern_" 1903, p. 153 If.6S Granvelle toPhilip II, Brussels, 6th October, 1560, Papiers d'etat, VI, p.179.674Collective DestiniesSpaincould'haveafootholdinItaly' .tiel It wasasterile debate, butonewhichturnedtothe disadvantageofFlanders. PhilipII tookupresi-dence inSpain andin1567 one of the aims of the Duke of Alva wastomaketherebel provincesdisgorge their wealth. Areliable history of thefinancesof theNetherlandswouldthereforebeveryusefuI.el7 TheVene-tians, in 1559, described it as a rich and populous country but one where thecost of living was staggeringly high:'what costs two in Italy and three inGermany costs four or five in Flanders'.CiS Was it the price rise, followingthe influx of American bullion and then the war, which finally dislocatedthe fiscal machinery of the Netherlands? Soriano in his Re/azione of 1559writes:'these lands are the treasuries of the King of Spain, his mines andhis Indies, they have financedthe enterprises of the Emperor for so manyyearsinthewarsofFrance, Italy and Germany ... '.6!I But even ashewrote, this had ceased to be true.Italy and theNetherlandsthen, providedthe vitaldouble formulaforCharles V's policy, with fromtime totime contributions fromSpain andGermany. Tothehistorianofthereignof PhilipII, Charles's Empireappearscosmopolitanincharacter, opentoItalians, FlemingsandBur-gundians whomight, naturally, findthemselvesrubbingshoulderswithSpaniards in the Emperor's entourage. The age of Charles V, coming as itdoes between the Spain of the Catholic Kings and the Spain of PhilipII,carriessomethingof auniversal temper. Theideaof crusadeitself wasmodified,70 losing its purely Iberian character and moving away fromtheidealsof theReconquista. Mterhiselectionin1519, CharlesV'spolicytook flight and was carried away in dreams of Universal Monarchy. 'Sire', ,wrote Gattinara tothe Emperor shortly after his election, 'now that GodinHisprodigiousgracehas elevated YourMajesty aboveallKings andPrinces of Christendom, to apinnacle of power occupiedbefore by noneexcept your mightypredecessor Charlemagne, youare ontheroadto-wards Universal Monarchyand on the point of unitingChristendomunderasingleshepherd.'71Thisnotion of Universal Monarchywas thecontinuous inspiration of Charles'spolicy, which alsohad affinitieswiththe great humanist movement of the age. AGerman writer, GeorgSauermann, who happenedtobeinSpainin1520, dedicatedto the Em-peror's secretary, PedroRuizdela Mota, hisHispaniae Conso/a/io, inwhich he tried to convert Spain herself to the idea of apacific UniversalMonarchy, unitingall Christendomagainst theTurk. Marcel Bataillon66 Granvelle toPhilip II, Brussels, 6th October, 1-560, Popiers d'etat, VI, p. 179.67 See F. Braudel, 'Les emprunts de Charles-Quint sur la place d' Anvers' in Charles-Quint et son temps, Paris, 1959, graph, p. f96. .68 E. Alberi, II,op. cit., III, p. 357 (1559).1I9 Ibid.70 For avaluable discussion of thispoint see R. Menendez Pidal,Ideaimperial deCarlos V, Madrid, 1940; for a comprehensive reviewof the questions involved,RicardoDelargoYgaray, LAideade imperioen10 politicoy10 literatura espaiiolas,Madrid,1944.71 Quoted by E. Hering,op. cit., p. 156.Empires 675has shown how dear this notion of Christian unity was to Erasmus and hisfriendsand disciples.72In1527, afterthe sack of Rome, Viveswrote toErasmus in extremely revealing terms: 'Christ has granted an extra-ordinary opportunity to the men of our age to realize this ideal, thanks tothegreatvictoryof theEmperorandthecaptivityofthePope,'73 - asentence whichilluminatesthetruecoloursof theideologicalmist, thevision in which the policy of the emperor was surrounded and the frequentsource of motives for his actions. This is by no means the least fascinatingaspect of what was the major political drama of the century.PhilipII's Empire. The workofCharles Vwas continuedduringthesecondhalf of thesixteenthcenturybythat of PhilipII, rulerover anempire too, but avery differentone. Emerging fromthe heritage of thegreat emperor duringthe crucial years 1558-1559, this later empire waseven IIlore vast, coherent and solid than that of Charles V, less committedto Europe, moreexclusivelyconcentratedonSpainandthusdrawnto-wards the Atlantic. It had the substance, the extent, the disparate resourcesand the wealth of an empire, but its sovereign ruler lacked the coveted titleof Emperor which would have united and, as it were, crowned the otherC"Ountless titleshe held. CharlesV'ssonhadbeen excluded, aftermuchhesitation, from the imperial succession which had in theory, but in theoryonly, been reserved for him at Augsburg in 1551.74And he sorely missed theprestige this title would have conferred on him, if only in the minorbutirritating war of precedence with the French ambassadors at Rome, thatvitalstage onwhichall eyeswerefixed. Soin1562, thePrudent Kingthought of seeking an Imperial crown. In January, 1563 it was rumouredthat he would be declared Emperor of the Indies.7s A similar rumour cir-culatedinApril, 156376totheeffect that Philipwouldbeproclaimed'King of theIndiesandof theNew World'. The rumourspersistedthefollowing year, in January, 1564, when once again the title of Emperor oftheIndieswas mentioned.71About twentyyearslater, in1583, it waswhispered at Venice that Philip II once more aspired to the highest title.'Sire', wrote the French ambassador to Henri III, 'I have learnt from theseLords that Cardinal Granvelle is coming to Rome in September this yearto have the title of emperor conferred upon,his master.'78Perhaps this was no more than Venetian gossip. Even so it is interesting.'The same causes were toproduce the same effects when Philip ill in histurnwaiJ a candidate for the empire. It was not merely a question of vanity.12 Op. cit., see all of Chapter VIII, p.395 fr.'73 According to R. Konetzke, op. cit., p.152. 7' See below, p. 913."G. Micheli to the Doge, 30th January, 1563, G. Turba, op. cit., I, 3, p. 217."Ibid., p. 217, n. 3.'17 13th January, 1564, Saint-Sulpice, EoCabi6, op. cit., p. 217, that isif Cabi6isright about the date.7. H. de Maisse to the King, Venice, 6th June, 1583, A. E. Venice 81, f028v". Philip IIwas apparently thinking of applying for the Imperial Vicariate in Italy,12th February.1584, Longlee, Depiches dip/omatiques "p. 19.676 Collective DestiniesIn a century preoccupied with prestige, governed byappearances, amercilesswar of precedence waswagedbetween the ambassadors of theMost ChristianKingof FranceandHisCatholicMajesty of Spain. In1560, inorder toput anendtothis irritatingandunresolvedconflict,Philip IIproposedtothe Emperor that they should appoint a joint am-bassador to the Council !;)f Trent. By not being emperor, Philip II was de-prived, at thehonorarylevel of appearances, of thefront rankwhichshouldhavebeenhisamongChristianpowersandwhichnoonehadbeenabletodisputeCharles Vor hisrepresentativesduringhis entire'lifetime.The fundamental characteristic of Philip II's empire was its Spanishness- or rather Castilianism - a fact which did not escape the contemporariesof the Prudent King, whether friend or foe: they saw him as a spider sittingmotionlessat thecentreof hisweb. Butif Philip, afterreturningfromFlanders in September, 1559, never again left the Peninsula, was it simplyfrominclination, froma pronounced personal preference for thingsSpanish? Or might it not also have been largely dictated by necessity? Wehave seen how the states of Charles V, one after another, silently refused tosupport the expense of his campaigns. Their deficits made Sicily, Naples,Milan and later the Netherlands, burdens on the empire, dependent placeswhere itwas no longer possible for the Emperor to reside. Philip II hadhad personal experience of this in the Netherlands where, during his staybetween 1555 and 1559, he had relied exclusively on moneyimported fromSpain or on the hope of its arrival. And it was now becoming difficult fortherulertoobtainsuchassistancewithout beinginpersonclosetoits,original source. Philip Irs withdrawal to Spain was a tactical withdrawaltowards American silver. His mistake, if anything, was not to go as far aspossible to meet the flow of silver, to the Atlantic coast, to Seville or evenlater toLisbon.'" Was it theattraction of Europe, the needtobebetterand more quickly informed of what was happening in that buzzing hive,whichkept thekingat thegeometrical centre of thePeninsula, inhisCastilian retreat, to which personal inclination in any case drew him?That the centre of the web lay in Spain bred many consequences; in thefirst place the growing, blind affection of the mass of Spanish people for theking who had chosen to live among them. Philip II was as much beloved ofthe people of Castile as his father hadbeen by the good folk of the LowCountries: A further consequence was the logical predominance ofPeninsular appointments, interests and prejudices during Philip's reign; ofthose harsh haughty men, the intransigent nobles of Castile whom Philipemployedon foreignmissions, while forthe conduct of everyday affairsand bureaucratic routine he showed a marked preference for commoners.Charles V was forcedto be ahomelesstraveller in his scattered empire:all his life he had had to negotiate the obstacle of an unfriendly France, inorder tobring tohisdominions oneby one thewarmth of hispersonalpresence. Philip II's refusal to move encouraged the growth of a sedentary'79 As suggestedby JulesGounon Loubens, see above, Vol. I, p.351, note 402.Empires677administration whose bags need no longer be kept light for travelling. Theweight of paper became greater than ever.The other parts of the empireslippedimperceptiblyintotheroleofsatellites andCastile intothat ofthe metropolitan power: aprocesscleartoseeintheItalianprovinces.Hatred of the Spaniard began to smoulder everywhere, a sign of the timesand a warning of storms ahead.That Philip II was not fully aware of these changes,thatheconsideredhimself to be continuing the policy initiated by Charles V, his father's dis-ciple as well as successor,is certainly true; the disciple was if anything alittle too mindful of the lessons he had learnt, over-conscious of precedentinhis dealings andencouragedinthis byhis immediateadvisers, theDuke of Alva or Cardinal Granvelle, the walking legend and livingd o s s i ~ rrespectively of thedefunct imperialpolicy. Itistruethat Philip notin-frequentlyfoundhimself insituationsanalogousat least inappearanceto those experienced by the Emperor his father. As ruler of the Netherlandswhy should he not, like Charles V, seek peace with England, whose good-will was vitaltothe security of the commercial centre of the North? Orsince,like his father, he hadseveralstates onhis hands, why should henot pursuethesameprudent anddelayingtactics, his object beingtoccmtrol from adistance the not always harmonious concert of his far-offpossessions?But circumstances were to dictate radical changes. Only the trappings ofempire survived. The grandiose ambitions of Charles V were doomedbythe beginning of Philip's reign, even before the treaty of 1559, and brutallyliquidated by the financial disaster of 1557. The machinery of empire hadto be overhauled and repaired before it coulo be started again. Charles Vhadneverinhisheadlongcareerbeenforcedtobrakesosharply: thedrastic return to peace in the early years of Philip's reign was the sign oflatter-day weakness. Grand designs were not reviveduntil later and thenless as the result of the personal desires of the sovereign than through forceof circumstance. Little by little, the powerful movementtowards Catholicreform, misleadinglyknownasthe Counter-Reformation, wasgatheringstrength and becoming established. Born of a lengthy series of efforts andpreparations, alreadyby1560 aforcestrongenough toswaythepolicyof the Prudent King, it exploded violently in opposition to the ProtestantNorthinthe15808. It wasthismovement whichpushedSpain into thegreatstrugglesof theend of Philip'sreignandturnedtheSpanishkinginto the champion of Catholicism, the defender of the faith. Religious pas-sions rali higher in this struggle than in the crusade against the Turks, a warentereduponalmost unwillinglyandinwhichLepantoseems tohavebeen an episode without sequel.And there was another compelling factor: after the 1580s, shipments ofbullion from the New World reached an unprecedented volume. The timewas now ripe for Granvelle to return to the Spanish court. But it wouldbewrongtothinkthat theimperialismwhichappearedat theendof thereign was solely the result of hispresence.The great war which began in678 Collective Destiniesthe 15805 was fundamentally astruggle for control of the Atlantic Ocean.the new centre of gravity of the world. Its outcome would decide whetherthe Atlantic was in future to be ruled by Catholics or Protestants, northern-ersorIberians, for theAtlanticwasnowtheprizecovetedbyall. ThemightySpanish Empire with its silver,its armaments, ships, cargoes andpolitical conceptions, now turned towards that immense battlefield. At thesamemoment intime, theOttomans turnedtheir backs firmlyontheMediterraneantoplungeintoconflict on theAsian border. ThisshQuldremindus,if a reminder is needed, that the twogreat MediterraneanEmpires beat withthe samerhythmandthat at least duringthelasttwentyyears of the century, theMediterraneanitself wasnolonger thefocus oftheir ambitions anddesires. Didthedeclineof empiresoundearlier in the Mediterranean than elsewhere?Accident andpolitical explanation. That a historian should today combinepoliticsandeconomicsinhisarguments will not seemremarkable. Somuch of what we have to discuss - though not of course everything - wasdictatedbythepopulationincrease, bythepronouncedacceleration oftrade and later by economic recession. It is my contention that a correla-tion can be established between the reversal of the secular trend andtheseries ofdifficulties which confrontedthegiant political combinationspuiltupbytheOttomansandtheHabsburgs. To makethisconnectionclearer, Ihave deliberately excluded explanations advanced by historianswho have concentrated on the outstanding personalities and events of thetime, explanationswhichcansometimesbea distortingprismthroughwhich to view reality. I have also neglected what is rather more interestingtous, thelong-termpolitical explanation: politicsandinstitutionscanthemselves contribute to the understanding of politics and institutions.The controversy is rather curiously taken up again in a brief paragraphin the last book by the great economist Josef A. SchumpeterSO whose viewsare in part the opposite of those expressed above.Schumpeter recognizesonly one unbroken line of development, one constant:the rise of capital-ism. Everything else inpolitics or economicsismerely amatter of acci-dent, circumstance, chance or detail. It was an accident 'that the conquestof South America produced atorrent of precious metals', without whichthetriumph of the Habsburgs would havebeen inconceivable. It was anaccident that the'price revolution' occurred tomake social and politicaltensions moreexplosive; andyet another accident that theexpandingstates(and empires too of course) found the way clear before them in thesixteenth century. How an accident? Because the great political powers ofthe past collapsed of their own accord, the German Holy Roman Empirewith the death of Frederick II in1250; the Papacy about the same time,for its triumphwas but a Pyrrhicvictory. Andwell before 1453, theByzantine Empire had fallen into decline.Sucha viewofhistory(althoughthepassageinSchumpeter isvery10 History 0/ Economic Analysis, London, 1954,p. 144 fr.Empires679short) should in fairness be discussed point by point rather than dismissedabruptly by the historian. To be brief however, I would only say this, thatthe natural collapse of the Papacy and the Empire in the thirteenth centurywas no accident, nor was it the result of a blind pursuit of self-destruction.Economic growth in the thirteenth century made possible certain politicaldevelopments just as it did in the sixteenth and prepared the way for large-scale political change. It was followed by a period of recession, the effectsof which were universally felt. The series of collapses during the followingcentury can be attributed to an economic depression of long duration:the'waning of theMiddle Ages' during which all rottentrees weremarkedout for destruction, from the Byzantine Empire to the Kingdom of GranadaincludingtheHolyRomanEmpire itself. From starttofinishthiswasaslow and natural process.With the recovery which became apparent from roughly halfway throughthefifteenthcentury, afurther roundof destruction, innovationandre-newal couldbeexpected. ThePapacywasnot seriouslydamageduntilafter the Lutheran revolt and the setback of the Diet of Augsburg(1530).It wouldhavebeenpossibleforRometopursueadifferent policy, onemore resolutely eirenicaland conciliatory. Letit be rememberedthoughinat the Papacy nevertheless remained a great power, even in the politicalarenathroughout thesixteenth centuryandindeeduptotheTreatyofWestphalia (1648).To return to the other points': the price revolution -as Schumpeter him-self observes81 - preceded the massiveinflux of preciousmetalsfromtheNew World. Similarly the expansion of the territorial states (of Louis XI,HenryVIIof Lancaster, Johnof Aragon, Muhammad II)precededthediscovery of America. And finally, if the mines of the New World did be-come a crucial factor, it was only because Europe possessed 'the means ofexploiting them, for the operation of the mines was in itself costly. Castile,it has been said, won America in a lottery; only in a manner of speaking,for Castile haa afterwards to turn her acquisition to account and this wasfrequently a mundane matter of balancing input and output. Furthermore,if the NewWorldhadnotofferedeasy access togoldandsilvermines,western Europe's need for expansion would have foundother outlets andbrought home other spoils. In a recently published study, Louis Dermigny82~ u g g e s t s that theWest, bychoosingtheNewWorld, where almost allfacilities hadto becreated by the Old, maypossiblyhave neglectedanother option.,.. that of the Far East wheresomanyfacilities alreadyexisted, where wealth was more accessible, and perhaps other options too:the gold of Africa, the silver of central Europe, assets momentarilygraspedbutsoonabandoned. Thesingledecisivefactorwastherestlessenergy of the West.Inshort, Schumpeter's thesis ismerelyarestatement of thekindofII Op. cit., p. 144.ULaChine et /'Occident. Le commerce Ii Canton auXVIII" siec/e (1719-1833),4vols., 1964, Vol. I, p. 429 if.300km-.Franca ~~ Milan VeniceS,voy .' %'Burgundy ~ f"':',"Monf.""oSjJain~ ot Chrlsti.n rulmduri"ll the fir,t quorterof Ill.fift...1Il "aluryFig.56: State financeand the general price situationThese rathercuriousVenetianestimates(Biland generali, Vol. I, Bk. I, Veni!=e, 1912,p. 98-99) arecertainlynot stricllyaccurate, but theygiveanideaof theuniversaldecrease in thefinancial resources ofthe Europeanstates between 1410and 1423(1410 level representedby shadedcircle, 1423level byblackcircle). English revenuesfell from2millionducatsto700,000; Frenchfrom2millionto I million; Spanishfrom3millionto800,000; Venetian from1,100,000to800,000, etc. Evenifthesefigureswereaccurateonewouldstill havetocalculaterealincomeasonedoesrealwages. In general, the state seems always to have lagged a little behind changes in theeconomic situation, both during upward and downward trends, that is to sayitsresources declined less quickly than others duringa depression- andthis was anadvantage- androseless quicklyduringperiodsofgrowth. Unfortunatelysuchatheory cannot beverifiedeitherfromthedocument inquestionhere, orfromolherscited below. One thing is cerlain:the resources of the state fluctuated according to theprevailing economic conditions,Empires 681argwnent frequentlyheardinthe days when accident was much invogue as atheory among historians. It ignores or underestimates the importance of thestate -and yet the state, quite as much as capitalism, was the product of acomplexevolutionary process. The historical conjuncture, in the verywidest sense of the term,carries within itthe foundations of all politicalpower; it breatheslifeor deathintothem. Yesterday's losers maybetoday's winners, for fortune rarely comes twice in succession.2. THBSTATE: RESOURCESANDWEAKNESSESOf that rise of state and'empire' witnessed by the sixteenth century,theeffects are a great deal more visible than the causes. The modem state hadadifficuhbirth. One of the more obvious of thenewphenomena whichaccompaniedit wasthemultiplication of theinstrumentsandagents ofstate power: one problem among many.The 'civil servant'.8J The corridors of political history are suddenly throngedwiththe longprocessionofthosemenwhomwemayconveniently ifanachronistically, call 'civil servants'. Their arrival maries a political revo-lution coupled with a social revolution.. Once summoned to power, the government official quickly appropriatedfor himself a share in public authority. In the sixteenth century at least, hewasinvariably of humbleorigin. InTurkeyheoftenhadtheadditionalhandicapofbeingbornaChristian, amember of a conquered race, ornolessoftenaJew. AccordingtoH. Gelzer,84 of theforty-eight grandviziers between 1453 and 1623, five were of 'Turkish'birth, including oneCircassian; ten were of unknown origin; and thirty-three were renegades,includingsixGreeks, elevenAlbaniansorYugoslavs, oneItalian, oneArmenianandoneGeorgian. Thenumberof Christianswhothussuc-ceeded in reaching the peak of the Turkish hierarchy indicates the scale onwhichtheyhadpenetrated the ranks oftheservants oftheOttomanEmpire. Andif ultimatelythelatter wastoresembletheByzantine Em-pire, rather than say aMongol Empire,85 it was because of this large-scalerecruiting of civil servants.In Spain, where we are better acquainted with the government employee,.he would typically come from the urban lower classes, or even of peasant'stock, which did not prevent him (far from it) from claiming descent froma hidalgo family (as who did not in Spain1). At any rate the social advance-ment ofsuch men escaped no one's attention, least of all that ofone of theirdeclared enemies, the diplomat and soldier Diego Hurtado deMendoza,representative of the high military aristocracy, who notes in his history of8J This title is obviously an anachronism - I use it purely for convenience as a termtocover theofficiersof France, /etradosof Spainandsoon. JulioCaroBaroja,op. cit., p. 148 if uses 'bureaucracy', but that too is an anachronism._ 14 Geislliches und We/tUchesGUS dem griecnisch-twkisthen Orient, p. 179, quoted byBrockelmann, op. cit., p.316.IS F. Lot, op. cit., II, p. 126.682. Collective Destiniesthe War of Granada :86 'The Catholic Kings put the management of justiceand public affairs in the hands of the letrados, men of middling condition,neitherhighnorverylowborn, offendingneithertheonenortheotherand whose profession was the study of the law', 'cuya profesi6n eran letraslegales'. The letrados were brothers beneath the skin of the dottori in leggementionedinItaliandocumentsandthesixteenthcenturyFrenchlaw-yers, graduates of the University of Toulouse or elsewhere, whose notionsof Roman law contributed so much to the absolutism of the Valois. Withclear-sightedhatred, HurtadodeMendozaenumerates theentiretribe, ,the ofdores of civil cases, alcaldes of criminal cases, presidentes, membersof the Audiencias (similar to the French parlements) and crowning. all, thesupremecourt of the ConsejoReal. Accordingtothesementheircom-petence extends to all matters, being no more nor less than the 'ciencia de10 que es justo y injusto'. Jealous of other men'soffices, they. are alwaysready to encroach on the competence of the military authorities(in otherwords the great aristocratic families). And this scourge is not confined toSpain: 'this manner of governing has spread throughout Christendom andstands today at the pinnacle of its power and authority'.87 In this respect,Hurtado de Mendoza was not mistaken. As well as those letrados who hadalready reached positions of authority, we must also imagine the army ofthose preparing to embark upon a government career who flocked in ever-growing numbers to the universities of Spain (and before long to those ofthe New World):70,000 students at least, as is calculated at the beginningof the nextcenturyby anirritated RodrigoVivero, Marquispel Valle,R8anothernoblemanand aCreole fromNew Spain;amongthesemenarethe sons of shoemakers andploughmen!Andwho is responsible forthis' .state of affairsif notthe Church and state,which by offering offices andlivings draws more students to the universities than ever did the thirst forknowledge. For the most part these letrados had graduated from Alcala deHenares or Salamanca. Be that as it may and even if one remembers thatthe figure of 70,000, whichseemed so enormoustoRodrigoVivero, wasmodest in relation to the total population of Spain, there can be no doubtof the immensepolitical significance of the rise of anew social categorybeginning inthe age of construction under Ferdinand and Isabella.Eventhen there were appearing those 'royal clerks' of extremely modest origin,such as Palacios Rubios,611 the lawyer who drafted the Leyes de Indios andwasnot eventheson of ahidalgo!Or later, underCharlesV, the secre-tary Gonzalo Perez, a commoner whispered to have been of Jewishorigin.90Or again,in the reign of Philip II, there was Cardinal Espinosa,86 De/a guerradeGranada comentarios por don Diego HurtadodeMendoza, editedby Manuel Gomez Moreno, Madrid, 1948, p. 12.81 Ibid. II a.M.Add. 18287.19 Eloy HulIon, Uncolaborador de los ReyesCat6licos:el doctor Palacios Rubios ysus obras, Madrid, 1927.IlO R.Konetzke, op. cit., p. 173, Gregorio Maranon, Antonio Perez, 2 vols., 2nd ed.,Madrid, 1948, I, p. 14 If. Angel Gonzalez Palencia, Gonza/oPerez secretarjodeFelipe II, 2 vols., Madrid, 1946, does not mention this. -Empires 683who when he died of apoplexy in 1572, combined in his person a wealth oftitles, honoursandfunctions, and left his housepiled high withdossiersand papers which he had never had time to examine and which had lainthere sometimes for years. Gonzalo Perez was acleric, like Espinosa andlike Don Diego de Covarrubias de Leyva, details of whose career we knowfrom the fairly long memoir written by a relative, Sebastian de Covarrubiasde Leyva, in1594:91we are told that Don Diego wasborn at Toledo ofnoble parents, originally fromViscaya, that he studied first at Sala-manca, went on to become a professor at the College of Oviedo, was latermagistrate at the Audiencia of Granada, next bishop of Ciudad Rodrigo,then archbishop of Santo Domingo 'en las Indias' and finally President ofthe Court of Castile and presented with the bishopric of Cuenca (in facthe died at Madrid on 27th September, 1577, at the age of sixty-seven, be-fore he could take possession of it). If proof were needed, his story provesthatit waspossibletocombineacareerintheChurchwithacareerinstate service. And theChurch, particularly in Spain, offered many open-ings to the sons of poor men.In Turkey, the reign of Sulaiman was at thesametime anage of vic-torious warfare, of widespread construction and of substantiallegislativeaCtivity. Sulaimanbore the title of Kanani, or law-maker, indicative of arevival of law studies andthe existence of aspecial class of jurists in thestates under his rule and above all at Constantinople. His legal code so suc-cessfully regulated the judicial machinery that it was said that Henry VIIIof England sent a legal mission to Constantinople to study its workings.92HisKanan-nameistothe East whatthe JustinianCode is tothe West93and the Recopilacion de las Leyes to Spain. All the legal machinery estab-lishedbySulaimaninHungary wasthework of the jurist Abu'I-Su'iid;such a major achievement of legislation was it on the question of propertythat many of itsdetailedprovisionsremaininforcetothepresent day.ADdthe jurist IbrahimAI-Halabi, author of ahandbookonlegal pro-cedures, the multaka,94 can be ranked alongside the most eminentwesternjurists of the sixteenth century.The more one thinksaboutit, the more convincedonebecomes of thestriking similarities, transcending words, terminology and political appear-ances, betweenEast andWest, worldsverydifferent it is true, but not,alwaysdivergent. ExpertsinRomanlawandlearnedinterpreters of theKoran formedasingle vast army, working in the East asinthe West toenhance the prerogative of princes. It would be both rash and inaccuratetoattribute the progress made bymonarchyentirelytothe z ~ I , cal-culations anddevotionsofthesemen. All monarchiesremainedcharis-matic. Andtherewasalways theeconomy. Nevertheless, this armyoflawyers, whether eminent or modest, was fighting on the side of the large91 Cuenca, 13thMay, 1594, Copy, B.Com. Palermo, QqG24, fO 250.92 P. Achard, op. cit., p. 183 fr.93 Franz Babinger, Suleiman der Priichtige(Meister der Politik), 1923,p. 461.1'4 F. Babinger,op. cit.Or----------------------------.,

'.'.o ..0/Venetian revenues(VeDice +the Temlfelma)-/lundred. of thou,and.III ducati correnli

/ Hundreds of thous od..' of .. I..... ..- t(;f'-1f--+-1--1-+-1-I- t,,.,.yf\V/ .....'1IJ Tens of tons of silver ""'/164 59 69 7882 81S4 160209 21 333138411423 6469 SO 15001. Thecase 0/ Venicesoo700500io rowes loumoi.in goldIndex 100 = 1498300100 14986760 10 Il82. Thecase 0/ FranceEmpires 685state. It detested and strovetodestroy allthatstood in the way of stateexpansion. Even in America, where civil servants from Spain or Portugaloften abusedtheiroffice, theservices renderedbythese humble men de-votedtothe princecannot begainsaid. Turkey, nowbecomingpartlyagainst her own will a modern state, appointed totheconqueredeasternprovinces of Asia, increasing numbers of half-pay tax-farmers, who livedoff the revenues they collected but transmitted the bulk of it to Istanbul; shealso appointed increasing numbers of paid civil servants who, in exchangeforspecific service, preferablyinthetownseasiest toadminister, wouldreceive a salaryfromthe imperial treasury. More andmore of theseofficialstendedtobe renegadeChristians, whothusgraduallyinfiltratedthe ruling class of the Ottoman Empire.They were recruited through thedewshirme, asort of 'tributewhichconsistedof takingawayfromtheirhomes intheBalkans a certainnumber ofChristianchildren, usuallyunder the age of five'.95 Andthe worddewslzirme designated both a poli-ticalandasocial category.These new agents of the Ottoman state wereto reduce almost to ruin thetimarli of the Balkans(the holders of timiirsor fiefs) andfor many years to sustain the renewed might of the empire.96Without alwaysexplicitlyseekingtodoso, sixteenthcenturystatesmovedtheir 'civil servants' about,97uprootingthemtosuit their con-venience. Thegreaterthestate, themorelikelywasthistobethecase.Onerootless wanderer was Cardinal Granvelle, a sonoftheFranche-Comte who claimed to have no homeland. One might be inclined to dis-misshimas anexception. but thereis noshortageofsimilar cases inSpain- the licenciado Polomares for example, first employed at theAudienciaof the Grand Canary Island and ending his career in theAudiencia of Valladolid.98Evenmorethancivilians, militaryofficersinthe king's service travelledabroad, withor without the army. FromNantes where, at the end of the century, he was an efficient servant of the(Opposite) Fig. 57: State budgets and the general price situationVenice's revenues came fromthree sources: theCity, the mainland(Terra/erma)andthe empire. The empire hasbeenomitted fromthis graphsince the figuresareoftenunsubstantiated. Graph constructedbyMile Gemma Miani, chiefly fromtheBilandgenera/i. The three curves correspond to the total receipts of Venice and the Terra/erma:nominal figures (inducat; correnti); the figures in gold(expressedin sequins)andinsilver(intens of tons of silver). The figuresforFrance(compiled byF. C.Spooner)are unfortunately far from complete(nominal figuresinlivres tournois and figuresingold). Despitetheir lacunae, thesecurvesshowthat fluctuations instaterevenuescorrespo[lded to fluctuations in the price sector.PS R. Mantran, op. cit., p. 107, note 2.Il6 See the excellent exposition by Stanford J. Shaw, art. cit., p. 67 if, 'Decline of theTimar System and Triumph of theDevshirme Class'.P7 Manyexamplescanbefoundinthelife-histories of patricians, engineers andsoldiers in the service of theVenetian republic - or of Turkish agents who, we know,moved about in a similar manner.PI His dossier is inEo137 at Simancas. This oddfigurewas the author of the longreporttoPhilip II(Valladolid, October, 1559,Eo137) referredtobelow, p. 958.1&00 1510 1580 1570 1560 155010:.,...A- ...-"'--no..a../\.

_._.-100-':.--804 --- ,...--_.-----e---.._.--J....2-13. The case of SpainFi