fenrich v. the blake school and minnesota tort law: a road

Mitchell Hamline Law Review Mitchell Hamline Law Review

Volume 45 Issue 5 Sua Sponte Article 3

2019

Fenrich v. The Blake School and Minnesota Tort Law: A Road Map Fenrich v. The Blake School and Minnesota Tort Law: A Road Map

Through Special Relationships, Misfeasance/Nonfeasance, and Through Special Relationships, Misfeasance/Nonfeasance, and

Duty Duty

Mike K. Steenson Mitchell Hamline School of Law, [email protected]

Follow this and additional works at: https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr

Part of the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation Recommended Citation Steenson, Mike K. (2019) "Fenrich v. The Blake School and Minnesota Tort Law: A Road Map Through Special Relationships, Misfeasance/Nonfeasance, and Duty," Mitchell Hamline Law Review: Vol. 45 : Iss. 5 , Article 3. Available at: https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol45/iss5/3

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Steenson:ARoadMapThroughSpecialRelationships,Misfeasance/Nonfeasance,andDuty

78

FENRICHV.THEBLAKESCHOOLANDMINNESOTATORTLAW:AROADMAPTHROUGHSPECIALRELATIONSHIPS,

MISFEASANCE/NONFEASANCE,ANDDUTY

MikeSteenson†

I. THE FACTS ............................................................................................ 79 II. DUTY AND SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS .................................................. 80

A.SpecialRelationships ............................................................... 81 B.SpecialRelationshipsandFenrich .......................................... 89

1.InLocoParentis ................................................................ 91 2.CommonCarrier ............................................................... 93

III. DUTY AND FORESEEABLE RISKS ....................................................... 94 A.AssumptionofSupervisionandControlandthe

Misfeasance/NonfeasanceIssue .......................................... 94 IV. DUTY AND FORESEEABILITY ............................................................. 98

A.TheRecentCases ...................................................................... 99 B.ForeseeabilityinFenrich ....................................................... 101

V. THE TRIAL ......................................................................................... 102 A.Foreseeability ......................................................................... 103

VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 110 TheMinnesotaSupremeCourt’srecentdecisioninFenrichv.The

BlakeSchoolisashortcourseonMinnesotatortlaw.1Arisingoutofanaccidentinvolvingastudent-drivencaronthewaytoapost-seasonathletic event, the case required the court to considerwhether theschool owed a duty to the two passengers in the other car, one ofwhomdiedintheaccident.2Therewerethreeinterrelateddutyissuesin the case.3 First the court assessedwhether the school was in a †MikeSteenson,BellDistinguishedProfessorofLaw,MitchellHamlineSchoolofLaw.TheauthorwishestothankMichelleGibbonsforherexcellentre-searchassistanceinpreparationofthisarticle. 1. 920N.W.2d195(Minn.2018). 2. Id.at200–01. 3. Id.at201–06.


2019] MITCHELLHAMLINELAWREVIEWSUASPONTE 79

specialrelationshipwiththestudent,sufficienttotriggeradutytotheFenrichs.4Thecourtheldthattherewasnospecialrelationshipbe-tweentheschoolandstudentthatwouldextendtoathirdpartyin-jured by the student’s negligence.5 Second, the court determinedwhethertheschool’sroleasthefacilitatorinsendingstudentstothemeetconstitutedmisfeasanceornonfeasance.6Thecourtheldthattheissuehadtoberesolvedattrial.7Finally,thecourtassessedwhethertheaccidentwasforeseeable.8Thecourtheldthattheforeseeabilityissuepresenteda closecase thathad tobe resolvedby the trieroffact.9Thecourt’sremandraisesimportantquestionsconcerningtherelationshipofjudgeandjuryintheresolutionofthekeyissuesinthecase.10

The special relationship issue,misfeasance/nonfeasance issue,andforeseeabilityissuesrecurinMinnesotatortlaw.Thepurposeofthisarticleistoputtheissuesinabroadercontextandevaluatethesupremecourt’streatmentoftheminFenrich.Followingashortstate-mentoffacts,thisarticleconsidersthedutyissuesinorder.

I.THEFACTS

Thecasearoseoutofanaccident that resulted in thedeathofGaryFenrichandseriousinjuriestohiswife,JeanAnnFenrich.T.M.,asixteen-year-old student from the Blake School, who were drivingwithavolunteercoachandtwoteammatestoanout-of-seasonNikecross-countrymeet.TheMinnesotaStateHighSchoolLeagueseasonhad ended, and coaches were not permitted to participate in themeet.11However,theheadandassistantcoachesassistedthestudentsinpreparingforthemeet.12Afterexchangingemailswiththecoaches,

4. Id.at202–03. 5. Id. 6. Id.at203. 7. Id.at215n.4(holdingthatthedistinctionbetween“misfeasance[and]non-feasanceisaquestionoflaw”and“whentherearegenuineissuesaboutwhatthede-fendantdidortheresponsibilitiesitassumed,acourtmaynotbeabletodecidethequestionbysummaryjudgmentonapaperrecord”). 8. Id. 9. Id.at206–07. 10. Id.at205. 11. Id. 12. Id.


80 MITCHELLHAMLINELAWREVIEWSUASPONTE [Vol.45:5

T.M.’s parents agreed to let their son drive.13 The student’s carcrossedthecenterlineandhittheFenrichs’car.14

Fenrich, individually and as her husband’s trustee, sued theschool,headcoach,assistantcoach,andvolunteercoach.15Followingthedistrictcourt’sgrantofsummaryjudgmentforthedefendants,theMinnesota Court of Appeals affirmed—although on differentgrounds—and theMinnesotaSupremeCourtgrantedreview.16Thesupremecourtagreedwiththedistrictcourtandcourtofappealscon-cluding,“thattheschoolwentbeyondpassiveinactionbyassumingsupervisionandcontroloveritsathleticteam’striptoSiouxFalls.”17

Thedistrictcourtconcludedtheschooldidnotoweadutytothegeneralpublic tocontrol theconductof itsstudents.18Thecourtofappealsaffirmedonthebasisthattherewasinsufficientevidencetoestablishthatinjurytothirdpartieswasforeseeable.19Thesupremecourtreversed,holdingthatforeseeabilitywasaclosecaseandoneforthetrieroffacttoresolve.20Togettothatissue,thecourtfirstcon-sideredwhethertherewasaspecialrelationshipthatwouldimposeon the school an affirmativeduty to act.21The court next assessedwhethertheschoolaffirmativelycreatedariskofinjury.22Andfinally,thecourtdeterminedwhethertheschool’sconductcreatedaforesee-ableriskofinjury.23

II.DUTYANDSPECIALRELATIONSHIPS

Thecourtfirstfocusedonwhethertherewasadutybasedonaspecialrelationshipbetweentheschoolandplaintiff.24

Thecourtbegan itsanalysisbynoting that there isnogeneraldutytocontroltheconductofathirdpersonunlessthereisaspecialrelationshipbetweenthedefendantandtheplaintiff,andtheharmthe 13. Id.at199. 14. Id.at198. 15. Id.at200. 16. Id.at200–01. 17. Id.at203. 18. Id.at200. 19. Id.at201. 20. Id.at205–07. 21. Id.at202–03. 22. Id.at203–05. 23. Id.at205–07. 24. Id.at202–03.Whilethecourtbeganitsanalysiswiththespecialrelationshipissue,thatproblemwouldhavebeenavoidedhadthecourtfirstconsideredwhethertheschoolaffirmativelycreatedariskofinjurytothirdpersons.Seeid.



plaintiffsuffersisforeseeable,25orwhere“thedefendant’sowncon-ductcreatesaforeseeableriskofinjurytoaforeseeableplaintiff.”26

Theissueofmisfeasance/nonfeasanceiskeytodeterminingifaduty is owed. If there is nonfeasance, there is no duty to the thirdparty,absentaruletriggeringadutytoact.Aspecialrelationshipbe-tweenthedefendantandplaintiff27orthedefendantandthepersonwhocausestheinjury28actsasatrigger.

A.SpecialRelationships

Afindingthataspecialrelationshipexistsisnotconclusiveontheduty issue,however.Rather, thedutyrequirement isaspecialrela-tionshipplus.JusticeSimonettexplainedthisinEricksonv.CurtisIn-vestmentCo.29Thecourt inErickson stated, “Whetheraduty is im-poseddepends,therefore,ontherelationshipofthepartiesandtheforeseeableriskinvolved.Ultimately,thequestionisoneofpolicy.”30Thespecialrelationshipinquiryiscompoundnotsingular.

Thecourt’s listofspecialrelationships includes thosebetweenparentsandtheirchildren,mastersandservants,possessorsofland

25. Id.(quotingDoe169v.Brandon,845N.W.2d174,178(Minn.2014));seealsoLundgrenv.Fultz,354N.W.2d25,27(Minn.1984);Delgadov.Lohmar,289N.W.2d479,483(Minn.1979).Adutymayalsoarisewherethedefendantandpersoncausingthe injury are in a special relationship.RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OFTORTS:LIABILITY FORPHYSICALANDEMOTIONALHARM§41(AM.LAWINST.2010). 26. Domagalav.Rolland,805N.W.2d14,23(Minn.2011).The“foreseeableriskofinjurytoaforeseeableplaintiff”appearsforthefirsttimeintheDomagalacase.Seeid. 27. SeeDelgado,289N.W.2dat483. 28. SeeLundgren,354N.W.2dat27. 29. 447N.W.2d165,168–69(Minn.1989). 30. Id.InErickson,thecourtconsideredtheissueofwhethertheownerandop-eratorofaparkingrampwasliabletoarampcustomerwhowascriminallyassaultedintheramp.Id.at168;seealsoFunchessv.CecilNewmanCorp.,632N.W.2d666,673(Minn.2001)(discussingthataspecialrelationshipbetweenlandlordandtenantisnotrecognized).InFunchess,thecourtreiteratedthepolicyconsiderationsnotedinErickson:

[C]rime prevention is essentially a government function, not a privateduty; criminals are unpredictable and bent on defeating securitymeasures;andbecausetheissueariseswhereexistingsecurityprecau-tionshave failed, thequestionwill alwaysbewhether further securitymeasureswererequiredandapropertyownerwillhavelittleideawhatisexpectedofhimorher.

Id.at673n.4(citingErickson,447N.W.2dat169).



whoholdtheirpropertyopentothepublic,andcommoncarriersandtheircustomers.31

InBjerkev.Johnson,thesupremecourtsawspecialrelationshipsasexisting“underanyoneofthreedistinctscenarios.”32Thefirstsce-nario isbasedonthestatusof theparties.33Thesecond iswhereaperson,“whethervoluntarilyorasrequiredbylaw,”takescustodyofanotherundercircumstanceswheretheotherperson“isdeprivedofnormal opportunities of self-protection.”34 And the third involvescaseswhereapersonassumesresponsibilityforadutythatisowedbyonepersontoathirdparty.Inthosecases,adutyariseswhenthepersondoesthefollowing:

“[U]ndertakes,gratuitouslyor forconsideration, torenderservicestoanotherwhichheshouldrecognizeasnecessaryfortheprotectionofathirdpersonorhisthings,”andliabil-itywillbeimposedif(1)hisfailuretoactincreasestheriskofharm;(2)heundertookadutyowedbytheothertothethirdparty;or(3)theharmissufferedbecausetheotherorthethirdpersonreliedontheundertaking.35WhileBjerkeisastandardstatementoftherecognizedspecialre-

lationshipsinMinnesota,thelistisnotexclusive.Thesupremecourt’sfinal“specialrelationship,”theundertakingofaduty,isreallyasepa-ratedutytriggerthatisdistinctfromtheotherspecialrelationshipsrecognizedbythecourt.Thedutydoesnotdependontherelationshipoftheparties,asdotheotherspecialrelationships;but,rather,onanagreementtoassumeadutythatworkstothebenefitoftheplaintiff.

TheRestatement(Third)ofTorts:LiabilityforPhysicalandEmo-tionalHarmprovidesausefulparallellistfororganizingspecialrela-tionships.TheRestatementbreaksspecialrelationshipsintotwocat-egories,withsomeoverlap.Section40liststhespecialrelationships

31. SeeH.B.v.Whittemore,552N.W.2d705,708(Minn.1996)(citationomit-ted);Donaldsonv.YoungWomen’sChristianAss’nofDuluth,539N.W.2d789,792(Minn.1995);Harperv.Herman,499N.W.2d472,474(Minn.1993). 32. 742N.W.2d660,665(Minn.2007).Bjerkeinvolvedacustodialrelationshipassumedbythedefendantoftheteenageplaintiff,whowassubjecttosexualadvancesbythedefendant’slive-inmalefriend.Seeid. 33. Id. (quoting Delgado v. Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479, 483–84 (Minn. 1979);RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS§§314,315(AM.LAWINST.1965))(“The firstarisesfromthestatusoftheparties,suchas‘parentsandchildren,mastersandservants,possessorsoflandandlicensees,[and]commoncarriersandtheircustomers.’”). 34. Id.at665(quotingHarper,499N.W.2dat474). 35. Id.(quotingWalshv.PagraAirTaxi,Inc.,282N.W.2d567,571(Minn.1979);RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS§324A(AM.LAWINST.1965)).



betweenthedefendantandthevictimthatwillcreateaduty.36Section41liststherelationshipsbetweenthedefendantandthepersonwhocausestheinjurythatwillimposeadutyonthedefendant.37

Section40’slistofnon-exclusive38specialrelationshipsincludes:(1) acommoncarrierwithitspassengers,(2) aninnkeeperwithitsguests,(3) abusinessorotherpossessoroflandthatholdsitsprem-

isesopentothepublicwiththosewhoarelawfullyonthepremises,

(4) anemployerwithitsemployeeswho,whileatworkare:(a)inimminentdanger;or(b)injuredorillandtherebyrenderedhelpless,

(5) aschoolwithitsstudents,(6) alandlordwithitstenants,and(7) acustodianwiththoseinitscustody,if:

(a)thecustodianisrequiredbylawtotakecustodyorvol-untarilytakescustodyoftheother;and(b)the custodian has a superior ability to protect theother.39

TheRestatementtakesthepositionthatthedefendantwhoisinaspecialrelationshipwiththeplaintiffowesadutyofreasonablecareastorisksarisingwithinthescopeofthatrelationship.40

The Third Restatement expands on the special relationshipslistedinthemorefamiliarsection314AoftheSecondRestatementofTorts,41 which recognized the first, second, third, and seventh 36. Restatement(Third)ofTorts:LiabilityforPhysicalandEmotionalHarm§40(Am.LawInst.2010). 37. Id.§41. 38. Id.§40cmt.o. 39. Id.§40(b).Thelistisnotintendedtobeexclusive.Thecommentsnote,forexample,thatfamilyrelationshipsarelikelytobecategorizedasaspecialrelation-ship.Id.§40cmt.o. 40. Id.§40(a). 41. Restatement(Second)ofTorts§314A(Am.LawInst.1965).Section314Astates:

(1) Acommoncarrierisunderadutytoitspassengerstotakereasonableaction(a)toprotectthemagainstunreasonableriskofphysicalharm,and

(b)togivethemfirstaidafteritknowsorhasreasontoknowthattheyareillorinjured,andtocareforthemuntiltheycanbecaredforbyothers.



relationshipsonthelist,andinsection314BoftheSecondRestate-mentofTorts42whichrecognized thespecial relationshipbetweenemployerandemployee.Section40alsoreplacessection344,whichoverlappedwithsection314Aandimposedadutyofreasonablecareonapossessoroflandwhohelditopentothepublictoavoidinjuriestoentrantscausedbytheconductofthirdpersons.43

Thespecialrelationshipsimposeadutyonthedefendanttousereasonablecarewithrespecttotherisksthatarisewithinthescopeofthatrelationship.Thatdutyincludesthedutytoguardagainsttheconductofthirdpersons.44

Section41coverscaseswheretheactorisinaspecialrelation-shipwith the personwho causes harm to the injured person. The“[s]pecialrelationshipsgivingrisetotheduty...include:(1)aparentwithdependentchildren,(2)acustodianwiththoseinitscustody,(3)an employer with employees when the employment facilitates theemployee’scausingharmtothirdparties,and(4)amental-healthpro-fessionalwithpatients.”45

Thespecial relationshipsnoted in theThirdRestatementalignwiththespecialrelationshipsrecognizedbytheMinnesotaSupremeCourt.Thecourthasrecognizedallofthespecialrelationshipsnotedinsections40and41oftheThirdRestatement,withtheexceptionof

(2) Aninnkeeperisunderasimilardutytohisguests.(3) Apossessoroflandwhoholdsitopentothepublicisunderasimilar

dutytomembersofthepublicwhoenterinresponsetohisinvitation.(4) Onewhoisrequiredbylawtotakeorwhovoluntarilytakesthecustody

ofanotherundercircumstancessuchastodeprivetheotherofhisnor-malopportunitiesforprotectionisunderasimilardutytotheother.

Id. 42. Id.§314B. 43. RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OFTORTS:LIABILITYFORPHYSICALANDEMOTIONALHARM§40CMT.A(AM.LAWINST.2010). 44. Id.§40cmt.g. 45. Id.§41.Aswithsection40,thecommentsnotethelistisnotintendedtobeexclusive.Id.§41cmt.i.Section41replacesseveralsectionsoftheRestatement(Sec-ond)ofTorts,includingsection315(a)(nodutytocontrolconductofathirdpersonabsentaspecialrelationship);section316(dutyofparenttocontrolconductofchild);section317(dutyofmastertocontrolconductofservant);andsection319(dutyofthoseinchargeofpersonshavingdangerouspropensities).Id.§41cmt.a.However,itaddsanewprovisioncoveringmentalhealthprofessionalsandtheirpatients toreflectrecentdevelopmentsincaselaw.Seeid.



the landlord-tenant relationship in section 40(b)(6).46 Fenrich in-volvedthestudent-schoolrelationship.47 46. Thisfootnoteexplainsinslightlymoredetailthesupremecourt’sstandardlistofrecognizedspecialrelationships.Thecourthasrecognizedthatdefendantsowedutiestoinjuredpersonsindifferentsettings,althoughthecourtdidnotspecificallylabelthoserelationshipsas“special”relationships.Thelabelisunimportant;theim-positionofadutyis.Fororganizationalpurposes,thisfootnotefollowstheThirdRe-statement’sspecialrelationshiplist.

(1) acommoncarrierwithitspassengers The supreme court has been consistent in holding that common carriershaveadutytoexercisetheutmostorhighestdegreeofcarefortheirpassengers.See,e.g.,Georgev.EstateofBaker,724N.W.2d1,9–10(Minn.2006);Lindstromv.YellowTaxiCo.ofMinneapolis,298Minn.224,226,214N.W.2d672,674–75(1974);Fordv.Stevens,280Minn.16,19,157N.W.2d510,513(1968);Fievev.Emmeck,248Minn.122,126–28,78N.W.2d343,346–48(1956);McKellarv.YellowCabCo.,148Minn.247,250,181N.W.348,349(1921).

(2) aninnkeeperwithitsguests InAlholmv.Wilt,394N.W.2d488,490(Minn.1986),thecourtrecognizedthat“[t]avernownersinMinnesotahavethedutytoexercisereasonablecareunderthecircumstancestoprotecttheirpatronsfrominjury.”Thesupremecourtapprovedthetrialcourt’sjuryinstructionsthatrequiredashowingthattheproprietorwasonnotice of the offending party’s vicious or dangerous propensities by some act orthreat,thattheproprietorhadanadequateopportunitytoactfortheprotectionofthepatronwhowasinjured,failedtoactreasonablytoprotectthepatron,andfinally,thattheinjurywasforeseeable.Id.at489n.3.Asthelawevolved,ajuryinstructionthatwasapprovedinrecognitionofthelatitudedistrictcourtshaveinframingin-structionsseemedtohardenintoelements.SeeBoonev.Martinez,567N.W.2d508,510(Minn.1997)(citingAlholm,394N.W.2dat489n.3). InHensonv.UptownDrink,LLC.,922N.W.2d185(Minn.2019),thecourtsug-gesteda lessrestrictivestandard forresolving innkeeper liabilitycases.Thecourtnotedthat“whenthetotalityofthefactsandcircumstancesputtheinnkeeperonno-tice,”ithas“heldthatthere[is]adutybasedonforeseeability,”and,atleastinthatcase,theforeseeabilitywasaquestionforthetrieroffact.Id.at192.Thecourt’sref-erencetoKlingbeilv.Truesdell,256Minn.360,363,98N.W.2d134,138(1959),inwhichthecourtheldthat“thereisampleevidenceintherecordfromwhichthejurycouldfindthat[thepatrons]wereintoxicatedtothepointwheretheproprietororhisservantshouldhavebeenawareofthefactthattheirconductwouldleadtotrouble,”andMettlingv.Mulligan, 303Minn.8,11n.3,225N.W.2d825,828n.3 (1975), inwhichthecourtnotedthatithas“foundliabilityintavernownerspredicateduponintoxicationoftheoffendingpatron,”frametheinnkeeper’sdutymorebroadlythanBoone’sAlholm-basedformulation.SeeHenson,922N.W.2dat192.

(3) abusinessorotherpossessoroflandthatholdsitspremisesopentothepublicwiththosewhoarelawfullyonthepremises

TheMinnesotacourtshaveconsistentlyrecognizedthisasaspecialrelation-ship.Thecourts’decisionsrelyonsection314A(3)oftheSecondRestatement.See,e.g.,Bjerkev. Johnson,742N.W.2d660,665(Minn.2007).Section40(b)(3)of theThirdRestatementreplacessection314A(3).RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OFTORTS:LIABILITY



FORPHYSICALANDEMOTIONALHARM§40cmt.a(AM.LAWINST.2010).Itisimportanttounderstandthereachofsection40(b)(3).It“imposesanaffirmativedutyonasubsetoflandpossessorsforcertainrisksthatdonotarisefromconditionsoractivitiesontheland.”Id.§40cmt.j.Itapplies,forexample,incaseswhereacustomer’sincapac-itationisnotrelatedtoaconditionontheland.Id.§40illus.4.TheMinnesotaSupremeCourthasrecognizedthedistinction.InLouisv.Louis,636N.W.2d314(Minn.2001),acaseinvolvingaswimming-pool-slide-accident,thesu-premecourtdrewacleardistinctionbetweenpremises-liabilitycasesandcasesin-volvingpossessors’dutiesarisingoutofaspecialrelationship.Thedefendantsoughttotieitsdutytowarnofthedangersinvolvedinusingthepoolslidetoaspecialrela-tionship,arguingthatbecausetherewasnospecialrelationship,therewasnodutytotheplaintiff.Id.at317,320.Thecourt,however,rejectedtheargument.Id.Incasesinvolvingpremisesliability,thereisnoneedtoestablishaspecialrelationship.Id.at320–21.Thecourtemphasizedthatithas“consistentlyrecognizedthatadutybasedonaspecialrelationshiptheoryisseparateanddistinctfromadutybasedonaprem-isesliabilitytheory.”Id.at320.

(4) anemployerwithitsemployees Section 40(b)(4) replaces section 314B of the Second Restatement.RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OFTORTS:LIABILITYFORPHYSICALANDEMOTIONALHARM§40cmt.k(AM.LAWINST.2010).Liabilityinthesecasesrequiresashowingthattheemployeeisin “imminent danger” or is “injured or ill and thereby rendered helpless.” Id. §40(b)(4).TheMinnesotaCourtofAppealscommentedonsection314BinSchmitzv.U.S.SteelCorp.andnotedthataspecialrelationshipbetweenemployerandemployeeexistsonlyincaseswhere“anemployee,‘actingwithinthescopeofhisemployment,comes intoapositionof imminentdangerofseriousharm.’”831N.W.2d656,679(Minn.Ct.App.2013),aff’dinpartandrev’dinpart,852N.W.2d669(Minn.2014)(quotingRESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS§314B(AM.LAWINST.1965)).However,thetheorywillhavelimitedreachbecauseworkers’compensationwillreachmostcasesinvolvingoccupationalinjuries.TheRestatementcommentsnotetheselimitations:

ThecircumstancesinwhichtheaffirmativedutyimposedinthisSubsec-tionmightapplyhavebeenlargelylimitedtotherisktoanemployeeofacriminalattackbyathirdpartythatoccursattheplaceofemployment,anillnessorinjurysufferedbyanemployeewhileatwork(butnotresultingfrom employment) that renders the employee helpless and in need ofemergencycareorassistance,andtheoccasionalcasethatfallsthroughthecracksofworkers’-compensationcoverageandimplicatesanaffirma-tivedutyasopposedtotheordinarydutyimposedby§7.Thecasesthatfallthroughthecracksarequitevariedbecauseofthevariationsthatexistindifferentstates’workers’-compensationstatutes.

RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OFTORTS:LIABILITYFORPHYSICALANDEMOTIONALHARM§40cmt.k(AM.LAWINST.2010).

(5) aschoolwithitsstudents Seeinfranotes63–76andaccompanyingtext.

(6) alandlordwithitstenants Klinev.1500Mass.Av.ApartmentCorp. is thekeycaseconcerninga land-lord’s duty to its tenants and tenants’ guests.See439F.2d477, 487–88 (D.C. Cir.1970) (holding a landlord liable for the assault and robbery of tenant when the



landlordknewofsimilarincidentsofcrimeincommonareasinthepastduetofaultyornonexistentsecurity,renderingsuchcrimeforeseeable).Itstartedanationaltrendtoward recognition of the landlord-tenant relationship as a special relationship.RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OFTORTS:LIABILITYFORPHYSICALANDEMOTIONALHARM§40cmt.m(AM.LAWINST.2010).NotwithstandingKline,Minnesotalawhasneverrecognizedaspecialrelationshipbetweenalandlordandtenantthatgivesrisetoalandlord’sdutytoprotectatenantfromthirdparties.InFunchessv.CecilNewmanCorp.,632N.W.2d666,668(Minn.2001),alandlordwasaccusedofbreachingsuchadutywhenintrud-ersgainedaccesstoatenant’sapartmentthroughanunsecuredexteriordoorandmurderedthetenant.Thecourtacknowledgedthepossibilitythatthelandlordcouldbeheldliableforundertakingadutyundersection323oftheSecondRestatementofTortsbyinstallingasecuritysysteminthebuildingbutthecourtheldthatthefactsdidnotsupportthistheory.Funchess,632N.W.2dat674–75.(7)acustodianwiththoseinitscustody,if:a)thecustodianisrequiredbylawtotakecustodyorvoluntarilytakescustodyoftheother;andb)thecustodianhasasuperiorabilitytoprotecttheother. Section40(b)(7)replacessection314A(4)oftheSecondRestatement,whichhasbeenfrequentlycitedbythesupremecourtasoneof thespecialrelationshipsrecognizedinMinnesotalaw.See,e.g.,H.B.v.Whittemore,552N.W.2d705,708(Minn.1996);Donaldsonv.YoungWomen’sChristianAss’nofDuluth,539N.W.2d789,792(Minn.1995);Harperv.Herman,499N.W.2d472,474(Minn.1993).Thecourt, inBjerke v. Johnson, 742N.W.2d660, 665–67 (Minn. 2007), applied section314A inholdingthatacustodialrelationshipwasestablishedbetweenplaintiff,aminoratthetime,andthehorsefarmownershestayedwithwhenshewassexuallyabusedbyanotheradultresidentatthefarm. Adutymayalsobebasedonthedefendant’srelationshipwiththepersoncausingharm.Section41oftheThirdRestatementcoverscaseswheretheactorisinaspecialrelationshipwiththepersonwhocausesharmtotheinjuredperson.The“[s]pecialrelationshipsgivingrisetotheduty...include:(1)aparentwithdependentchildren,(2)acustodianwiththoseinitscustody,(3)anemployerwithemployeeswhentheemploymentfacilitatestheemployee’scausingharmtothirdparties,and(4) a mental-health professional with patients.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:LIABILITYFORPHYSICALANDEMOTIONALHARM§41(AM.LAWINST.2010).

(1) parentwithdependentchildren Section316oftheRestatement(Second)ofTorts,providesthatparentsareunderadutytousereasonablecaretocontroltheirminorchildrentopreventthemfromcausingharmtoothers,intentionallyornegligently,incaseswhere(a)thepar-entsknoworhavereasontoknowtheyhavetheabilitytocontroltheirchildren,and(b)knoworshouldknowoftheneedandopportunitytocontrolthem.RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS§316(AM.LAWINST.1965).Section41oftheRestatement(Third)ofTorts,whichsupersedessection316,providesthat“[a]nactorinaspecialrelation-shipwithanotherowesadutyofreasonablecaretothirdpartieswithregardtorisksposedbytheotherthatarisewithinthescopeoftherelationship,”andidentifiesoneof those special relationships as “a parentwith dependent children.”RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OFTORTS:LIABILITYFORPHYSICALANDEMOTIONALHARM§41(AM.LAWINST.2010). TheMinnesotaCourtofAppealshasrecognizedthespecialrelationshipbe-tweenparentandchildasarelationshipthatwillimposeadutyonparentstoprevent



certaininjuriescausedbytheirchildren.See,e.g.,Jaramillov.Weaver,No.A06-2343,2007WL4303775,at*5(Minn.Ct.App.Dec.11,2007)(holdingfactsinsufficienttoestablishspecialrelationshipbetweenparentsandadultchild);Sarauv.Oliver,No.C1-00-223,2000WL1052143,at*2(Minn.Ct.App.Aug.1,2000)(refusingtoapplysection316toparentoftwenty-year-oldson);Kohnv.Ross,No.C0-97-198,1997WL423579,at*4(Minn.Ct.App.July29,1997)(recognizingparent-childspecialrela-tionshipbutconcludingthatinjurytoplaintiffatpartyhostedbyfifteen-year-oldsonwasunforeseeable);Hansenv.C.H.,No.C2-91-1808,1992WL67513,at*2(Minn.Ct.App.Apr.7,1992)(applyingsection316butholdingthatparentsdidnothavesuffi-cient knowledge of their children’s dangerous propensities); Silberstein v. Cordie,474N.W.2d850,855–56(Minn.Ct.App.1991)(applyingsection316toparentswhofailedtopreventinjurycausedbymentallyilltwenty-seven-year-oldson).

(2) Acustodianwiththoseinitscustody Thisisalong-standingbutlimitedspecialrelationship.TheThirdRestate-mentnotesthat“[t]heclassiccustodianunderthisSectionisajailerofadangerouscriminal,”andthat“[o]therwell-establishedcustodialrelationshipsincludehospitalsforthementallyillandforthosewithcontagiousdiseases.”RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OFTORTS:LIABILITYFORPHYSICALANDEMOTIONALHARM§41cmt.f(AM.LAWINST.2010).Min-nesotacourtshaveconsideredthistheory,includingundersection319oftheSecondRestatementofTorts,whichwasreplacedbysection41.See Johnsonv.State,553N.W.2d40,49–50(Minn.1996)(acknowledgingsection319,butfindingthehalfwayhouseowednodutytoplaintiffsforparoleeathalfwayhousewhocommittedrapeandmurderofathirdperson);RumRiverLumberCo.v.State,282N.W.2d882,886(Minn.1979)(holdingtherewasadutyimposedonAnokaStateHospitalforpropertydamagecausedbyescapedpatient);Sylvesterv.Nw.Hosp.ofMinneapolis,236Minn.384,387–88,53N.W.2d17,19–20(1952)(holdingthereisadutyimposedonthehospital to other patients when it accepts patients with mental disorders);Stuedemanv.Nose,713N.W.2d79,84(Minn.Ct.App.2009)(holdingthegroupfosterhomehadadutywithrespecttooneofitsviolentresidents).

(3) Employer-employee TheMinnesota SupremeCourt has analyzednegligent supervision claimsbothunderRestatement(Second)ofAgency§213(Am.LawInst.1958)andRestate-ment(Second)ofTorts§317(Am.LawInst.1965).SeeSemradv.EdinaRealty,Inc.,493N.W.2d528,533–34(Minn.1992). Thecourtadopted the tortofnegligenthiring inPonticasv.K.M.S. Invest-ments,331N.W.2d907,910–11(Minn.1983),relyingonRestatement(Second)ofAgency§213.Liabilityisbasedontheemployer’snegligence“inplacingapersonwithknownpropensities,orpropensitieswhichshouldhavebeendiscoveredbyreasona-bleinvestigation,inanemploymentpositioninwhich,becauseofthecircumstancesoftheemployment,itshouldhavebeenforeseeablethatthehiredindividualposedathreatofinjurytoothers.”Ponticas,331N.W.2dat911. NegligentretentionwasfirstrecognizedinDeanv.St.PaulUnionDepotCo.,41Minn.360,362–63,43N.W.54,54(1889).Anemployer’sliabilityforretaininganemployeewithapropensitytocauseharmtoothersisbasedontheemployer’s“per-sonalfaultinexposingotherstounreasonableriskofinjuryinviolationofthe[em-ployer’s]dutytoexerciseduecarefortheirprotection.”Porterv.GrennanBakeries,219Minn.14,22,16N.W.2d906,910(1944).Ingeneral,“[a]nemployerhastheduty



B.SpecialRelationshipsandFenrich

InFenrichv.BlakeSchool,theschoolurgedthecourttoadoptacategoricalrulethat“aschoolneverowesadutyofcaretonon-stu-dentthirdpartiesforinjuriesresultingfromstudentconduct.”48Thecourtdeclined.49Whilerecognizingtheimportanceofschoolsinaciv-ilizedsociety,whichasamatterofpolicymightsuggestamorere-strictiveliabilityrule,thelackofprecedentfortheno-dutyproposi-tionarguedbytheschoolpromptedthecourttoconcludethatthereisno justification forexemptingschools frombasic tort lawprinci-ples.50‘to refrain from retaining employees with known dangerous proclivities.’” J.M. v.Minn.Dist.CouncilofAssembliesofGod,658N.W.2d589,597(Minn.Ct.App.2003)(quotingYunkerv.Honeywell,Inc.,496N.W.2d419,423(Minn.Ct.App.1993),rev.denied(Minn.Apr.20,1993));seealsoOlsonv.FirstChurchofNazarene,661N.W.2d254,264(Minn.Ct.App.2003)(quotingYunker,496N.W.2dat423). Minnesota,however,doesnotrecognizetheclaimofnegligenttraining.See,e.g.,Sotov.Shealey,331F.Supp.3d879,884n.1(D.Minn.2018)(citationomitted);Petersonv.BankersLifeandCas.Co.,734N.W.2d275,277(Minn.Ct.App.2007)(ci-tationomitted);M.L.v.Magnuson,531N.W.2d849,856(Minn.Ct.App.1995)(cita-tionomitted).

(4) Mentalhealthprofessionalswiththeirpatients Tarasoffv.RegentsofUniv.ofCal.,551P.2d334(Cal.1976),istheseminalcaseinwhichtheCaliforniaSupremeCourtimposedadutyonapsychotherapisttowarnathirdpersonofdeaththreatsmadetowardthethirdpersonbythepsycho-therapist’spatient.Id.at340.Minnesotacourtshaveconsideredtheroleofamentalhealthprofessionaltoactfortheprotectionofthirdpersonsinahandfulofcases.Forexample, inLundgren v. Fultz, the court recognized that a special relationshipbe-tweenapsychiatristandpatientcouldbethebasisforalimiteddutygivingrisetothepsychiatrist’sallegednegligenceinaidingthepatienttogetaccesstoagun,whichthepatientusedtokillathirdperson.354N.W.2d25,27–28(Minn.1984).ThecourtinLundgrenemphasizedthatanyduty towarnpotentialvictimswouldbe limitedtocaseswherethepatienthasmade“specificthreatsagainstidentifiablepersons.”Id.at29(citingCairlv.State,323N.W.2d20,25–26(Minn.1982)). Section148.975ofthe2018MinnesotaStatutesimposesadutyonthelim-itedcategoryof“licensee[s],”definedinsubdivision1(d)toinclude“practicumpsy-chologystudents,predoctoralpsychologyinterns,andindividualswhohaveearnedadoctoraldegreeinpsychologyandareintheprocessofcompletingtheirpostdoctoralsupervisedpsychologicalemploymentinordertoqualifyforlicensure,”tomake“rea-sonableefforts”towarnpotentialvictimsofspecificthreatstothatvictim.Subdivi-sion2requires“aspecific,seriousthreatofphysicalviolenceagainstaspecific,clearlyidentifiedoridentifiablepotentialvictim.”MINN.STAT.§148.975,subdiv.2(2018). 47. Fenrichv.BlakeSch.,920N.W.2d195,201–02(Minn.2018). 48. Id.at202. 49. Id. 50. Id.



The school’s argumentwas based onGylten v. Swalboski,51 anEighth Circuit case applyingMinnesota law. In that case, a studentfootballplayeronacooperativefootballteamsponsoredbytwosep-arateschooldistrictscausedanaccidentwhiledrivingfromhisschool,Climax,totheotherschool,Fisher,whichwaswherepracticewastobe held that day.52 Pursuant to the cooperative agreement, eachschoolwasresponsible for the transportationof its students to theotherschool forpractices.53Theschoolsusedbusesfortransporta-tion,butbecauseofamix-upastowhichschoolwassupposedtobehostingthepracticeonthedayoftheaccident,TimothySwalboski,Jr.,ajunior,drovehimselfandanotherteammatetopracticeattheotherschool,withtheknowledgeofhiscoach.54Theplaintiffsarguedthatthe school districts “negligently breached their duty of supervisionandcontrolofthestudentswhileintransporttofootballpractice.”55

Thedefendantschooldistrictsmovedforsummaryjudgment,ar-guingthattheydidnotoweadutytonon-studentswhomightbein-juredby thenegligenceofastudentwhowasdriving toanactivitysponsoredbytheschools.56TheEighthCircuitconcludedthattherewasnospecialrelationshipbetweentheschoolandtheplaintiffs,andthattheschoolcouldnot,underthefacts,anticipatethattheywouldbeinjured.57Therewasnoindicationthattheschoolhadknowledgethattherewouldbeariskofinjurytothethirdpartiesunderthesecircumstances,promptingthecourtto“believethattheMinnesotaSu-preme Court would likely reach the conclusion of not extending aschool district’s liability to non-student third partieswho lack anyconnectiontotheschool.”58

TheMinnesotaSupremeCourt, inFenrichv.BlakeSchool, readGyltenasconsideringonly the issueofwhether therewasaspecialrelationshipbetweentheschoolandthegeneralpublicthatwouldim-pose a duty on the school.59 According to the supreme court, the

51. 246F.3d1139(8thCir.2001). 52. Id.at1141. 53. Id.at1140. 54. Id.at1140–41. 55. Id.at1141. 56. Id. 57. Id.at1142,1144. 58. Id.at1144. 59. 920N.W.2d195,202(Minn.2018)(citingGylten,246F.3dat1143).



EighthCircuitdidnotconsiderthe“ownconduct”exceptionanditdidnotcreateacategoricalexclusionforschoolsfromtortliability.60

TheplaintiffinFenricharguedthattherewasaspecialrelation-shipbetweentheFenrichsandschoolunderinloco-parentisandcom-mon-carrier theories.61 The supreme court rejected both argu-ments.62

1.InLocoParentis

As the Third Restatement notes, the relationship between aschoolandstudentisbasedontheschool’sstatusasapossessoroflandthathasopeneditspremisestoasubstantialportionofthepublicpopulation,asacustodianofitsstudents,andbecauseitactspartiallyintheplaceofthestudents’parents.63Thedutiesareoverlapping.

Thesupremecourt,inFenrich,rejectedtheargumentthatthereis a special relationship based on an in loco-parentis theory.64 Thecourtexplainedthatithas“neverheldthataschoolgenerallystandsinlocoparentiswithitsstudents”anddeclinedtodosoinFenrich.65However,Minnesotacasesmaynotmakeitquitethatclear.Thereareacknowledgementsoftheinloco-parentistheoryintheschoolsetting,and, in somecases,whispersof the conceptwithout theuseof theterm.66

60. Id. 61. Id. 62. Id. 63. RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OFTORTS§40CMT.L(AM.LAWINST.2010). 64. 920N.W.2dat202–03. 65. Id. (citingHollingsworthv. State,No.A14-1874,2015WL4877725,at *4(Minn.Ct.App.Aug.17,2015))(“Hollingsworthconcedesthatschoolsgenerallydonotoweadutyofcareinlocoparentistoprotectstudents.”).Thecourt,citingLondonGuarantee&Acc.Co.v.Smith,242Minn.211,64N.W.2d781,784(1954),notedthat“[i]nlocoparentis...‘referstoapersonwhohasputhimselfinthesituationofalawfulparentbyassumingtheobligations incidenttotheparentalrelationwithoutgoingthroughtheformalitiesnecessarytolegaladoption.’”Fenrich,920N.W.2dat202. 66. Anotherunpublishedcourt-of-appealsopinion,Vistadv.Board.ofRegentsofthe University of Minnesota, acknowledges the concept. No. A04-2161, 2005 WL1514633,at*2n.1(Minn.Ct.App.June28,2005)(“Becauseaschooldistrictordinar-ilyisinlocoparentiswithitsminorstudents,itsdutyisgreaterthanthatofauniver-sitytoitsadultstudents.”).TheMinnesotaSupremeCourthasacknowledgedtherule,althoughitdidnotusetheterm“inlocoparentis.”See,e.g.,Verhelv.Indep.Sch.Dist.No.709,359N.W.2d579,593(Minn.1984)(Simonett,J.,dissentinginpart)(citationsomitted)(“Ordinarily,aschooldistrict’sdutytosuperviseisbasedonthefactthatparentshaverelinquishedcustodyoftheirchildrentotheschoolforschoolactivities



Sheehanv.St.Peter’sCatholicSchool67isakeycaseinthedevel-opmentofaschool’sobligationtoprotectitsstudents.68InSheehan,aneighthgraderlostthesightinherrighteyeasaresultofathree-to-four-minute pebble-throwing incident during recess.69 At theteacher’sdirection,shewassittingwithagroupoftwentygirlsonthesideofanathleticfieldbeingusedbyeighth-gradeboyswhothrewpebblesatthegirls.Thetrialcourtinstructedthejurythat:

Itisthedutyofaschooltouseordinarycareandtoprotectitsstudentsfrominjuryresultingfromtheconductofotherstudents under circumstanceswhere such conductwouldreasonably have been foreseen and could have been pre-ventedbytheuseofordinarycare.Thereisnorequirementofconstantsupervisionofallthemovementsofpupilsatalltimes.70Thejuryfoundfortheplaintiffandawardedher$50,000indam-

ages.71Thesupremecourtaffirmed.72Aftersurveyingdecisionsfromseveralotherjurisdictions,73the

courtdistilledthefollowingstandard:

and,consequently,theschoolischargedwiththedutyofprotectingthechildrenwhileinitscharge.”). 67. 291Minn.1,188N.W.2d868(1971). 68. SeeS.W.v.SpringLakeParkSch.Dist.No.16,592N.W.2d870,874(Minn.1999) (callingSheehan v. St. Peter’s Catholic School, 291Minn. 1, 188N.W.2d868(1971),“theseminalschooldutycase”). 69. Sheehan,291Minn.at3,188N.W.2dat870. 70. Id. 71. Id.at869. 72. Id.at871. 73. The defendant, in Sheehan, relied onWoodsmall v. Mount Diablo UnifiedSchoolDistrict,10Cal.Rptr.447(Cal.Ct.App.1961);Wilberv.CityofBinghamton,66N.Y.S.2d250(N.Y.App.Div.1946),aff’d,73N.E.2d263(N.Y.1947);Ohmanv.Board.ofEducation,90N.E.2d474(N.Y.1949);andNestorv.CityofNewYork,211N.Y.S.2d975(N.Y.Sup.Ct.1961).291Minn.at3,188N.W.2dat870.TheMinnesotaSupremeCourt distinguished those cases because “the injurieswere inflicted suddenly andwithoutwarningand insuchamannerthecourts feltsupervisionwouldnothavepreventedthem.”Id.ThecourtalsocontrastedChristofidesv.HellenicEasternOrtho-doxChristianChurch,227N.Y.S.2d946(N.Y.Mun.Ct.1962),whereliabilitywasim-posedwhenstudentwasstabbedbyanotherstudentinaclassroomthatwasunsu-pervisedfortwenty-fiveminutes,withNashv.RapidesParishSchoolBoard.,188So.2d508(La.Ct.App.1966),wherenoliabilityattachedwhenteachercouldnothavean-ticipatedorpreventedonechildstrikinganotherintheeye.Sheehan,291Minn.at5,188N.W.2dat871.However,thecourtstatedthatitsubscribedtothepositiontakenbytheCaliforniaCourtofAppealsinZieglerv.SantaCruzCityHighSchoolDistrict.,335P.2d709(Cal.Ct.App.1959),“whichheldthat inordertorecoverdamagesa



Weareoftheopinionthatthebetterreasonedcasespermitrecovery if there isevidence fromwhicha jurycould findthat supervisionwouldprobablyhaveprevented theacci-dent.Weneednotdecidewhethertheremayberecoveryforlackofsupervisionwhereachildisinjuredbysudden,un-anticipatedactionofafellowstudent.Thisisnotsuchacase.Here,thepebblethrowingcontinuedfor3or4minutesbe-foreplaintiffwasinjured.Undersuchcircumstances,ajurycouldproperly findthathadtheteacherbeenpresentshewould have put a stop to this dangerous activity beforeplaintiffwasstruck.74Thecourtalsoheldthataplaintiffisonlyrequiredtoprovethat

“ageneraldangerwasforeseeableandthatsupervisionwouldhavepreventedtheaccident”thatoccurred.75Proofthattheparticularac-cidentwasforeseeableisunnecessary.76

Thetakeawayfromthecourt’sdecisionsisthataspecialrelation-shipexistsbetweenaschoolanditsstudentsthatjustifiesimposingliabilityontheschoolforinadequatesupervisionthatresultsininjurytoanotherstudent.Thatdutydoesnotextendtothirdpersons.

2.CommonCarrier

Thecommoncarrier theory inFenrichwasbasedon theargu-mentthatT.M.’scarwas,ineffect,a“schoolbus,”whichmadeitacom-moncarrier.77However, thestatutorydefinitionof“schoolbus”ex-cludesmotorvehiclesofthetypeT.M.wasdriving;78thecourtquicklydisposedoftheclaimonstatutorygrounds.79

studentneedonlyprovethatageneraldangerwasforeseeableandthatsupervisionwouldhavepreventedtheaccident”andthat“[i]twasnotnecessarytoprovethattheparticularaccidentwhichoccurredwasforeseeable.”Sheehan,291Minn.at4–5,188N.W.2dat871. 74. Id.at871. 75. Id. 76. Id. 77. 920N.W.2dat203(Minn.2018). 78. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 169.011, subdiv. 71(a) (2016)) (explaining that“schoolbus”excluded“avehicle...qualifyingasatypeIIIvehicleunderparagraph(h),”andthusexcludedpassengercarsofthetypeT.M.wasdriving). 79. Id.



III.DUTYANDFORESEEABLERISKS

Theremayalsobeadutywhere“thedefendant’sownconductcreatesa foreseeableriskof injury toa foreseeableplaintiff.”80Thesupremecourtagreedwiththedistrictcourtandthecourtofappealsin concluding that “the schoolwentbeyondpassive inactionbyas-sumingsupervisionandcontroloveritsathleticteam’striptoSiouxFalls.”81 The first step in the supreme court’s determination ofwhethertheschoolowedadutytotheFenrichswasfindingthattheschoolassumedsupervisionandcontroloverthetrip.82Thesecondstepturnedontheforeseeabilityofrisk.83

A.AssumptionofSupervisionandControlandtheMisfeasance/NonfeasanceIssue

Theissueofsupervisionandcontrolinthecasewaslinkedtotheissueofwhethertheschool’sactionconstitutedmisfeasancesufficienttoimposeadutytousereasonablecareontheschool.Tobetterun-derstandthecourt’sapproachtotheprobleminFenrich,itishelpfultofirsttakeabroaderlookatthemisfeasance/nonfeasanceissue.

Intortlaw,thereisordinarilynodutytoactunlessthedefendanthascreatedariskof injury.84RecentMinnesotadecisionsholdthatthereisadutyifthedefendantcreatesaforeseeableriskofinjurytoa foreseeableplaintiff.85There isnoduty if thedefendantdoesnotcreateariskof injury,86unlesstheplaintiffcanestablishoneofthe

80. Id.at202(quotingDomagalav.Rolland,805N.W.2d14,23(Minn.2011)).The“foreseeableriskofinjurytoaforeseeableplaintiff”appearedforthefirsttimeintheDomagalacase.805N.W.2dat23.UnderDomagala,dutyturnsonthecreationofaforeseeableriskofinjury.Seeid. 81. Id.at203. 82. Seeid.at203–05. 83. Seeid.at205–07. 84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OFTORTS:LIABILITY FORPHYSICAL ANDEMOTIONALHARM§7(a)(AM.LAWINST.2010)(“Anactorordinarilyhasadutytoexercisereasonablecarewhentheactor’sconductcreatesariskofphysicalharm.”).Thereare,however,limi-tationsonduty.Section7alsostatesthat“[i]nexceptionalcases,whenanarticulatedcountervailingprincipleorpolicywarrantsdenyingorlimitingliabilityinaparticularclassofcases,acourtmaydecidethatthedefendanthasnodutyorthattheordinarydutyofreasonablecarerequiresmodification.”Id.§7(b). 85. See,e.g.,Doe169v.Brandon,845N.W.2d174,178(Minn.2014);Domagala,805N.W.2dat23. 86. Restatement(Third)ofTorts:LiabilityforPhysicalandEmotionalHarm§37(Am.LawInst.2010).



exceptions to thegeneral rule that there isnoduty innonfeasancecases.

Thelinebetweenmisfeasanceandnonfeasancemayseemclear.Ifthedefendantdoesn’tact(nonfeasance)thereisnoduty.Ifthede-fendantdoesact and creates a (foreseeable) riskof injury (misfea-sance), there isaduty toact.The line isn’tsobright inapplication,however,andfocusingjustonwhetherthereismisfeasanceornon-feasancecanbemisleading.Theissueisnotwhether

reasonablecareentailsthecommissionoromissionofaspe-cificact....Forexample,afailuretoemployanautomobile’sbrakesora failure towarnabouta latentdanger inone’sproductisnotacaseofnonfeasancegovernedbytherulesinthisChapter,becauseinthesecasestheentiretyoftheac-tor’s conduct (drivinganautomobileor sellingaproduct)createdariskofharm.This issoeventhoughthespecificconductallegedtobeabreachofthedutyofreasonablecarewasitselfanomission.87Thesupremecourt’sdecisioninHarperv.Herman88isagoodex-

ampleoftheimpactofanarrowfocusononlythefailuretoact.Theplaintiff in thecasewas injuredwhenhedoveoffaboatownedbyHermanintoshallowwateroffalakeisland.89Harperwasunawarethatthewaterwasshallow,butHerman,anexperiencedboater,knewthatitwas.90Harperwasoneoffourguestsontheboat.91Hewasin-vitedbyanotherguest,butnotbyHerman.92ThedistrictcourtheldthatHermanowednodutytowarnHarperthatthewaterwasshal-low.93Thecourtofappealsreversed,holdingthatHerman“voluntar-ilyassumedadutytoexercisereasonablecarewhenheallowed[Har-per]toembarkonhisboat,”andthathe“owedadutyofcaretowarn[Harper]not todive fromtheboatbecauseheknewthewaterwasdangerouslyshallow.”94

TheMinnesotaSupremeCourtreversed.95Thecourtframedtheissueas“whetheraboatownerwhoisasocialhostowesadutyofcare towarn a guest on the boat that thewater is too shallow for 87. Id.§37cmt.c. 88. 499N.W.2d472(Minn.1993). 89. Id.at474. 90. Id.at473. 91. Id. 92. Id. 93. Id.at474. 94. Harperv.Herman,487N.W.2d908,910(Minn.Ct.App.1992). 95. Herman,499N.W.2dat475.



diving.”96HarperarguedthatHermanowedhimadutytowarnthatthewaterwasshallowbecauseofHarper’sinexperienceasaswim-meranddiverandHerman’sasaveteranboater.97Harperarguedthatunderthosecircumstances,HermanshouldhaveknownthatHarperneededhisprotection.98

The supremecourtbeganwith theassumption that thiswasanonfeasancecaseandthattheonlywaytoimposeadutyonHermanwastoestablishaspecialrelationshipbetweenHermanandHarper.99ThecourtheldthattherewasnorecognizedspecialrelationshipandthatHerman,therefore,didnotoweadutytowarnHarper.100Her-man’sknowledgeofthedangerousconditionalonewasinsufficienttoestablishliability.101

Thecourt’sfocusonthefailure-to-warnissueimmediatelyfore-closedanyanalysisofthesurroundingcircumstances.102HermandidnotwarnHarper of the danger of diving at the spotwhere he hadmooredtheboat.103Hadhebeenoneoftheotherpassengers,itseemsclearthathewouldnothaveowedaduty,buthewasanexperiencedboaterandhemooredtheboatinanareawherethewaterwasshal-low.104Viewingthefactsintheirentirety,itisarguablethatHermancreatedariskofinjurywhenheputtheboatinthatpositionandknewthatHarperwouldbeswimmingthere.Inthatview,hefacilitatedtheinjuryratherthansimplyfailingtopreventit.105

Focusingonthefactsintheirentiretyprovidesaclearerwayofviewingtheissue.ThesupremecourtdidthatinFenrich,usingVerhel

96. Id.at474. 97. Id. 98. Id. 99. Id. 100. Id. 101. Id.at475. 102. Seeid. 103. Id.at474. 104. Id. 105. Thisisarecurringproblem.Thetake-homeasbestoscasesaregoodexam-plesofhowtheissueshouldberesolved.Inthosecases,aworkerbringshomecloth-ingembeddedwithasbestosfibers.Anothermemberofthehouseholdcontractsas-bestosisormesotheliomabecauseofexposuretotheasbestos.Theissueiswhetherthecompanyemployingtheworkerhasadutytowarnfamilymembersofthedanger.Failuretodosoisnonfeasance,orsotheargumentgoes,butthecompanyhasaffirm-ativelycreatedariskofinjuryinexposingthefamilymemberstotheasbestos.SeeFlintv.LangerTransp.Corp.,762F.Supp.2d735(D.N.J.2011);Satterfieldv.BreedingInsulationCo.,266S.W.3d347(Tenn.2008).



v.IndependentSchoolDist.No.709106asitstemplatefortheanalysisof the supervision issue.107 The plaintiff in Verhel, a Denfeld HighSchoolcheerleader,wasinjuredinamotorvehicleaccidentwhilerid-inginavanwithseveralothercheerleadersthatwasdrivenbyoneofthe cheerleaders.108 At the time of the accident, one week beforeschoolstarted,thecheerleaderswereputtingupbannersintheearlymorninghoursonhomesoftheschool’sfootballplayersinanticipa-tion of the first game of the season.109 Verhel sued another cheer-leaderwhowasdrivingavaninwhichVerhelandseveralothercheer-leaderswerepassengers.110

Thekeyissueinthecasewaswhethertheschooldistricthadas-sumedsupervisionandcontrolovercheerleadingatthehighschool,whichwouldthenrequireittoprovideregulationsandsupervisionformembersofthecheerleadingsquadwhiletheywereengagedincheerleadingactivities.111Followingajuryverdictfortheplaintiff,thecourtheldonappealthatthefactsweresufficienttojustifythever-dict.112

ThecourtinFenrichsawthefactsinVerhelas“strikinglysimilar”totheFenrichfacts,concludingthat“viewedinalightmostfavorable

106. 359N.W.2d579(Minn.1984). 107. Fenrich,920N.W.2dat203.ThecourtinVerhelinturnusedRaleighv.Inde-pendentSchoolDistrictNo.625,275N.W.2d572(Minn.1978),asitstemplate.Verhel,359N.W.2dat589–90.TheminorplaintiffinRaleigh,astudentatCentralHighSchoolinSt.Paul,wasslashedbyanotherstudentafteranoff-campusshowingofthefilm“KING,AFilmedRecord,MontgomerytoMemphis,”duringBlackHistoryMonthandatatimeofracialtensionattheschool.Raleigh,275N.W.2dat573.Ajuryfoundtheschooldistrict liablefornegligentlysupervisingandorganizingthestudents.Inaf-firming,thesupremecourtconcludedthat“althoughtheschooldistrictmightnotbeliableforsudden,unanticipatedmisconductoffellowstudents,itisliableforsudden,foreseeablemisconductwhichprobablycouldhavebeenpreventedbytheexerciseofordinarycare.”Id.at576.Thecourtthoughtthatthefactsofthecasemadeit“ex-tremelyclose,”butthattheevidenceshowingtheschooldistrict’sawarenessoftheracialtensionattheschoolandthelackofsupervisionandorganizationofthestu-dents,thecourtdecidedthatitcouldnotholdasamatteroflawthatthejurywasnotjustifiedinfindingabreachofdutyandinfindingcausation.Id.Hadtherebeenrea-sonablesupervision,thesuddeninjuriesmighthavebeenpreventedbyeitherinter-ruptingitordeterringitfromhappeningatall.Id. 108. Verhel,359N.W.2dat583. 109. Id. 110. Id. 111. Id.at586–87. 112. Id.at588–90.



to Fenrich, a reasonable fact-finder could find that they constitutemisfeasance.”113

Inanalyzingtheissueofwhethertherewasmisfeasancebytheschool,thecourtfocusedonalistofspecificfactsinthecasethatsug-gestedaffirmativeactionbytheschool:

Theheadcoachstronglyencouragedtheentireteamtopar-ticipateintheNikemeetand14teammembersregistered.The assistant coach paid the bulk registration fee. Thecoacheswereactiveinpreparationforthemeet, includingthe assistant coach attending one of thepractices and re-cruitingavolunteercoachtorunthem.The assistant coach also took active responsibility forcoordinating transportation to, and lodging at, the Nikemeet.Asheput it, “weall drovedownas a team.”Heex-presslyapprovedtheplantohaveT.M.—andnotT.M.’sfa-theroranotheradult—driveteammembersandthevolun-teercoachmorethan200milestoSiouxFalls.Theassistantcoachdecidedthat thevolunteercoach,a teenager,wouldridewithT.M.Buthedidnotgivethevolunteercoachanysafety instructions—suchastosit inthefrontseat, topayattention(ratherthanbedistractedbyelectronicdevices),andtomakesurethatT.M.droveresponsibly.NordidtheassistantcoachgiveanyinstructionstoT.M.,except,duringabreak,to“keepitsafeandkeeprolling.”114TheFenrichcourtborrowedVerhel’sconclusionthatthissortof

driving“behavior,ormisbehavior,byunsupervisedstudentsistobeexpectedandispreciselytheharmtobeguardedagainstbytheexer-ciseoftheschooldistrict’ssupervision,”andrejectedthedissent’sar-gumentthattheschool’sdutyshouldbelimitedonlytoitsownstu-dents.115 The court concluded that, on those facts, “a reasonablefactfindercouldconcludethattheschool’sownconductwasmisfea-sant.”116

IV.DUTYANDFORESEEABILITY

Misfeasance—creatingariskofinjury—providespartoftheba-sis forthedutydeterminationunderMinnesota law,buttheriskof

113. Fenrich,920N.W.2dat204. 114. Id.at199–200. 115. Id.at205. 116. Id.at204.



injury has to be foreseeable. The foreseeability issue, includingwhetherthejudgeorjurydecidesit,iscriticaltothatdetermination.

A.TheRecentCases

Montemayorv.SebrightProducts,Inc.,117andSenoglesv.Carl-son,118arekeyrecentcasesaddressingthatissue,andtheyarefoun-dationalforthecourt’sconsiderationoftheissueinFenrich.Ineachcase,oneinvolvingtheforeseeabilityissueinaproductsliabilitycaseandtheotheracaseinvolvingalandowner’sduty,thesupremecourtconcludedthat,viewingtheevidenceandinferencestobedrawnfromitinfavorofthenon-movingparties,summaryjudgmentbasedontheconclusionthattheinjurieswerenotforeseeableasamatteroflawwasinappropriate.119

It seems clear that the court isnot establishinganew rule forsummary judgment cases involving the foreseeability issue,120 but 117. 898N.W.2d623(Minn.2017). 118. 902N.W.2d38(Minn.2017).ForananalysisofMontemayorandSenoglesandtheforeseeabilityissue,seeMikeSteenson,Duty,Foreseeability,andMontemayorv.SebrightProductsInc.,39MITCHELLHAMLINEL.J.PUB.POL’Y&PRAC.31,44–47(2018).InWarrenv.Dinter,No.A17-0555,2019WL1646469(Minn.Apr.17,2019),amedicalnegligencecasethesupremecourtheld,inacaseoffirstimpression,thattheallegeddecisionofahospitalisttodenyadmissionofapatienttoahospitalcouldconstituteprofessional negligence, even absent a physician-patient relationship between thehospitalist and theperson forwhomanurse-practitioner in adifferent clinicwasseekingadmission.Thecourtnotedthatithas“neverheldthatsucharelationshipisnecessarytomaintainamalpracticeactionunderMinnesotalaw,”andthat“[t]othecontrary:whenthereisnoexpressphysician-patientrelationship,wehaveturnedtothetraditionalinquiryofwhetheratortdutyhasbeencreatedbyforeseeabilityofharm.”Id.at*4.Thecourtbracketeditsanalysiswithtwocasesdecidedeighty-fiveyearsapart,Skillingsv.Allen,143Minn.323,173N.W.663(1919)(parentsofdaugh-terwithscarletfeverweretoldthatshewasnotcontagiousandthattheycouldvisitherinthehospital),andMolloyv.Meier,679N.W.2d711,717(Minn.2004)(physi-cians’failuretodisclosethatakeytesttodeterminegeneticdisorderwasnotper-formedondaughterwithgeneticdisorder).Thosecases,saidthecourt,“teachusthatadutyarisesbetweenaphysicianandanidentifiedthirdpartywhenthephysicianprovidesmedicaladviceanditisforeseeablethatthethirdpartywillrelyonthatad-vice.”2019WL1646469,at*5. 119. Senogles,902N.W.2dat48;Montemayor,898N.W.2dat633. 120. TheMinnesota cases are sprinkledwith the “close cases” rubric.See, e.g.,Bjerke v. Johnson, 742N.W.2d 660, 667–68 (Minn. 2007); Lundgren v. Fultz, 354N.W.2d25,28(Minn.1984).Butevenwithouttheterm“closecases,”acarefulsiftingofthefactsisnothingnew.SeeIll.FarmersIns.Co.v.TapemarkCo.,273N.W.2d630,637–38(Minn.1978).Attimes,theMinnesotaSupremeCourthasexpressedconcernaboutleavingtheforeseeabilityissuetojuries.See,e.g.,Cooneyv.Hooks,535N.W.2d



ratheranapproachthatmoreclearlygivesthebenefitofthedoubttothe injured plaintiff in cases that are on the fence. The court’s ap-proachinMontemayorandSenogleswasreinforcedinarecentdeci-sion,Hensonv.UptownDrink,LLC.121

Hensonaroseoutofthedeathofanoff-dutybaremployeewhoslippedandhithisheadonthesidewalkwhileaidingthebarmanagerinescortinganintoxicatedanddisruptivepatronfromthebar.122Theplaintiff asserted innkeeper’s liabilityandCivilDamagesAct claimsagainstthebar.123Theinnkeeper’sliabilityclaimrequiredproofthattheinjurywasforeseeable,124whichthedistrictcourtheldinvolvedaclosequestionoffact.125Thesupremecourtaffirmedthatholding.126The evidence was clear that the disruptive patrons had been industupswithotherpatronsandbaremployeesbeforethealtercationthatledtoHenson’sdeath.127Thecourtconcludedthatthe“evidenceisenoughtocreateadisputedissueofmaterialfactordisputedrea-sonableinferencesfromundisputedfacts.”128

609,612(Minn.1995);Alholmv.Wilt,394N.W.2d488,491n.5(Minn.1986).Thatshipseemstohavesailed,however. 121. 922N.W.2d185(Minn.2019). 122. Id.at188–89. 123. Id.at190. 124. Id. 125. Id.at192.Thecourtofappealsaffirmedthedistrictcourt’sfindingbutre-versedthecourt’sconclusionthattheplaintiffassumedtheriskbecausetheissueofwhetherthedefendantenlargedtherisktotheplaintiffpresentedafactquestionforthefact-finder.Hensonv.UptownDrink,LLC,906N.W.2d533,540(Minn.Ct.App.2017). The supreme court reversed that determination, holding that primary as-sumptionofriskdidnotapplyininnkeeperliabilitycases.Henson,922N.W.2dat191.Coupledwithitssame-daydecisionintheskiingaccidentcaseofSoderbergv.Ander-son,922N.W.2d200(Minn.2019),thecourtnarrowlyconfinedthedoctrineofpri-maryassumptionofrisktocasesinvolvinginherentlydangeroussportingactivities.Seeid.at206. 126. Henson,922N.W.2dat192.Thecourtexplainedthattheinnkeeperliabilitytheoryrequiresproofoffourelements:“(1)noticeoftheoffendingparty’s‘viciousordangerouspropensities’by‘someactorthreat,’(2)adequateopportunityfortheinn-keepertoprotecttheinjuredpatron,(3)failureonthepartoftheinnkeepertotakereasonablesteps todoso,and(4) foreseeable injury. Id. at190(quotingBoonev.Martinez,567N.W.2d508,510(Minn.1997)). 127. Id.at192–93. 128. Id.at193.



B.ForeseeabilityinFenrich

TheMinnesotaCourtofAppealsinFenrichdrewthelineincon-cludingthattheschooldidnotoweadutytotheplaintiffsbecausetheaccidentwasnotforeseeableasamatteroflaw.129TheMinnesotaSu-premeCourtdrewthelineinadifferentplaceandreversed.130

Thecourtlauncheditsdiscussionoftheforeseeabilityissuewithanodtothefamiliarstandardsthecourthasusedinothercases.ThecourtlookedtoFossv.Kincadeforthepropositionthatin“determin-ingwhetheradanger is foreseeable, [thecourt] ‘look[s]atwhetherthespecificdangerwasobjectivelyreasonabletoexpect,notsimplywhether itwaswithin the realmofanyconceivablepossibility.’”131Thekeyquestioniswhetherforeseeabilityisaquestionforthecourtorforthejury.132Thecourthasconsistentlytakenthepositionthat,whiledutyisaquestionoflawforthecourt,foreseeabilityisaques-tionforthetrieroffactinclosecases.133

Because summary judgmentwasgranted for thedefendantontheforeseeabilityissue,thecourtviewedtheevidenceandreasonableinferencestobedrawnfromtheevidenceintheplaintiff’sfavor.134

Thecourtlistedthekeyfacts,onbothsidesoftheissue:• T.M.’sparentssaidthattheywerecomfortableinhaving

T.M.,alicenseddriver,drivetothemeet.• TherewasnoevidencethatT.M.hadanyhistoryofim-

properdriving.• T.M. was following the vehicle driven by the assistant

coach.• TherewasnoindicationthatT.M.wastired.135

Thefactsalsoindicatedthat:• T.M. was only sixteen and had been licensed for six

months, and was not legally entitled to drive multiplepassengersundertheageof20.

129. Fenrichv.BlakeSch.,901N.W.2d223,234(Minn.Ct.App.2017). 130. Fenrichv.BlakeSch.,920N.W.2d195,207(Minn.2018). 131. Id.at 205 (quoting Foss v. Kincade, 766N.W.2d 317, 322 (Minn. 2009)).However,thereareotherformulations. 132. Foss,766N.W.2dat322–23. 133. SeeSenoglesv. Carlson,902N.W.2d38,44 (Minn.2017);Montemayorv.SebrightProds.,Inc.,898N.W.2d623,629(Minn.2017);Domagalav.Rolland,805N.W.2d 14, 27 (Minn. 2011); Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660, 667–68 (Minn.2007). 134. Fenrich,920N.W.2dat205. 135. Id.



• Theassistantcoachdidnotprovidehimwithanydirec-tionsinpreparationforthedrive,otherthanto“keepitsafeandkeeprolling.”

• TheassistantcoachtoldthevolunteercoachtoridewithT.M.,butdidnotgivehimanyspecificdirectionstomon-itorT.M.’sdriving,norwasthevolunteercoachtoldtositinthefrontseatwherehecouldhavebettermonitoredT.M.’sdriving.

• Absentadultsupervision,therecordindicatedthatT.M.wasdistractedbyanelectronicdevicewhiledriving,andthatmayhavebeenthecauseoftheaccident.136

Thecourtsummedup:“Areasonablefactfindercouldconcludethat, under these circumstances, it was foreseeable that a teenagedriveronalongtrip,inacarwiththreeotherteenagers,couldgetdis-tractedandcollidewithanotherdriver.”137Thecourtsawitasa“closecall,”138butthattheissuehadtoberesolvedattrial.

V.THETRIAL

ThelastparagraphoftheFenrichopinionprovidesguidepostsfortrialofthecase:

Aswedidintworecentcasesinvolvingtheissueofdutyofcareinthecontextofsummaryjudgment,wedecidetodaythatforeseeabilityisatleastaclosecall,meaningthatsum-maryjudgmentontheelementofdutywasnotappropriateandthecaseshouldhavebeentried.Nothinginourdecisionprevents thedistrict court fromdecidingby trialwhetherthefactsshowmisfeasanceornonfeasance.Andnothinginourdecisionprevents the school fromarguingat trial thespecificelementsofnegligence:thattheschoolhadnodutybecauseitsconductdidnotcreateaforeseeableriskofin-jurytoFenrich;thattheschooldidnotbreachaduty;andthattheschool’sconductwasnotthedirectandproximatecauseoftheinjuries.139First,“foreseeabilityisatleastaclosecall,”makingitanissuefor

trial.140Second,nothinginthesupremecourt’sdecisionpreventsthe

136. Id.at206. 137. Id.at206(citingBjerke,742N.W.2dat667). 138. Id.at205(citingSenogles,902N.W.2dat48;Montemayor,898N.W.2dat633). 139. Id.at206–07(citationsomitted). 140. Id.at207.



districtcourtfromdeciding“bytrialwhetherthefactsshowmisfea-sanceornonfeasance.”141Third,thereisnothinginthecourt’sopinionthat“preventstheschoolfromarguingattrialthespecificelementsofnegligence.”142That includes thearguments that theschooldidnotoweadutytotheFenrichsbecausetherewasnoforeseeableriskofinjury;thattheschooldidnotbreachitsduty;and“thattheschool’sconductwasnot thedirectandproximatecauseof the injuries.”143Theissuesareeitherfortrial,toberesolvedattrial,orbytrial.Sum-mary judgment is inappropriate,but thatonlymeansthereare factissuestoberesolvedattrial.Theplaintiffmayormaynotprevail,buttheplaintiffmadeenoughofashowingtogetthecasetotrial.144Butwhodecidestheissues,judgeorjury?Andwhataretheguidelinesiftheissuesareforjuryresolution?

A.Foreseeability

Theissueofdutyisaquestionoflawforthecourt.145Acourtmaydecidethatthere isnodutyforreasonsofprincipleorpolicy,146or 141. Id.(emphasisadded). 142. Id.(emphasisadded). 143. Id.TherearefourelementstoanegligenceclaiminMinnesota:duty,breachofduty,proximatecause,anddamages.See,e.g.,Bjerkev.Johnson,742N.W.2d660,664(Minn.2007);Gradjelickv.Hance,646N.W.2d225,230(Minn.2002);Funchessv.CecilNewmanCorp.,632N.W.2d666,672(Minn.2001);Lubbersv.Anderson,539N.W.2d398,401(Minn.1995). 144. Onmotionsforsummaryjudgment,courtsweightheevidence,determinewitnesscredibility,resolvefactualdisputes,ordecidethemeritsofthecase.Foleyv.WCCOTelevision,Inc.,449N.W.2d497,506(Minn.Ct.App.1989).AsthesupremecourtnotedinLundgrenv.Fultz,theissueofwhethertheshootingwasforeseeablepresentedaclosequestionthatshouldberesolvedbyajury.354N.W.2d25,28(Minn.1984).LundgreninvolvedtheallegednegligenceofaUniversityofMinnesotapsychi-atristforrecommendingtoUniversitypolicethattheyreturnhandgunstooneofhispatients,whothenusedoneofthegunsinarandomshooting.Id.at26–27.Thecourtnotedthat“[i]tmaybethatplaintiffwillbeunabletoproveacase,eithertothetrialcourtorthejury,butenoughofashowinghasbeenmadetoescapeasummaryjudg-mentmotion.”Id.at29. 145. SeeDomagalav.Rolland,805N.W.2d14,22(Minn.2011). 146. PolicyissuesrelatingtodutypermeatetheMinnesotacases.Seee.g.,Funch-ess,632N.W.2dat673(discussinglandlord’sdutytotenant);K.A.C.v.Benson,527N.W.2d553,561(Minn.1995)(discussingnegligentexposuretoAIDS);M.H.v.Cari-tasFam.Serv.,488N.W.2d282,287–88(Minn.1992)(discussingnegligentmisrepre-sentationbyanadoptionagency);Lundgren,354N.W.2dat27(discussingpsychia-trist’sdutytocontrolconductofapatient);Stadlerv.Cross,295N.W.2d552,554-55(Minn.1980)(discussingnegligentinflictionofemotionaldistress).Stadlerisagoodexampleofacasewheretheemotionalharmwasinflictedupontheparentswhowere



that an injury or accident is not foreseeable as amatter of law.147However,evenifpolicyhurdlesarecleared,theremaybefactualdis-putesthathavetoberesolvedbeforeliabilitycanbeimposed.148Fore-seeabilityisoneofthoseissues.

Foreseeabilitybecomesa jury issue in closecases.This canbehandledinoneofthreeways.First,therecouldbeaspecificjuryin-struction and correlative special verdict question on the issue thatwouldprecedeajury’sconsiderationofthebreachissue.Second,theforeseeabilityissuecouldbeaspecificfactorforthejurytodecideinconsideringthebreachissue.Third, the jurycouldbe instructedonthegeneralnegligence issueandasked to simplyconsiderwhetherthedefendantusedreasonablecare,withoutspecificmentionoffore-seeability.

Ifthefirstapproachisfollowed,afindingthataninjuryoracci-dentwasunforeseeablemightbeconclusiveonthedutyissue,butafindingthattheinjuryoraccidentisforeseeablewouldnotbeconclu-sive on the breach issue. The jury would still have to determinewhether the defendant used reasonable care under the circum-stances.149

neartheirchildwhenthechildwashitbyatruck.295N.W.2dat553.Theissueinthecasewaswhetherthesupremecourtshouldadoptbystanderrecoverytheory inanegligent inflictionofemotionaldistresscase. Id.Whiletheemotionalharmtothebystander parents, whowere nearby when their five-year-old child was hit by apickup truck, may have been foreseeable, the supreme court held that recoveryshouldbelimitedtothezone-of-dangerrule,whichhadbeentheruleinMinnesotasincePurcellv.St.PaulCityRy.Co.,48Minn.134,50N.W.1034(1892).Stadler,295N.W.2dat553. 147. SeeFossv.Kincade,766N.W.2d317,323(Minn.2009)(holdingitisunfore-seeablethatachildwouldattempttoclimbabookcaseinaneighbor’shome). 148. See,e.g.,Huberv.NiagaraMach.andToolWorks,430N.W.2d465,467(Minn.1988)(citationsomitted)(holdingamanufacturer’sdutytowarnisaquestionoflawforresolutionbythecourt,but if there isaspecific factualdisputeconcerningthemanufacturer’s awareness of a risk, the issue should be resolved by the jury);RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OFTORTS:LIABILITYFORPHYSICALANDEMOTIONALHARM§40cmt.e(AM.LAWINST.2010)(“Ifdisputedhistoricalfactsbearonwhethertherelationshipexists,aswithadisputeoverwhetheraplaintiffwasapayingguestinahotelorwasatrespasser,thejuryshouldresolvethefactualdisputewithappropriatealternativeinstructions.”).Asanotherexample,theremaybeafactquestionastowhetheranentrantonlandisatrespasser.Theentrant’sstatuswillbedeterminativeofthedutyissue.Id.§50cmt.e,Reporters’Note. 149. See4MNPRACCIVJIG25.10(6thed.2014).CIVJIG25.10isthestandardjuryinstructiononnegligence.Seeid.“Negligence”isdefinedas“thefailuretousereason-ablecare.” Id.The instructiongoeson toprovide that there isnegligence “whena



Thesecondapproachwouldrequireamodificationofthestand-ardjuryinstructiontoincludethestandardfactorsrelatingtobreach.TheThirdRestatementofTortsprovidesthat:

Apersonactsnegligentlyifthepersondoesnotexerciserea-sonablecareunderallthecircumstances.Primaryfactorstoconsiderinascertainingwhethertheperson’sconductlacksreasonablecarearetheforeseeablelikelihoodthattheper-son’sconductwillresultinharm,theforeseeableseverityofanyharmthatmayensue,andtheburdenofprecautionstoeliminateorreducetheriskofharm.150Includingthosefactorsinajuryinstructionwouldbeconsistent

withexistingMinnesotacase law.Forexample, inEricksonv.CurtisInvestmentCo., the supremecourt concluded inaparking-ramp-as-saultcasethatthenegligenceissuewasforthejury,butthecourtalsoheldthatthejuryinstructioninthecaseshouldincludetheforeseea-bilityissue:

Weholdthatthedutyshouldbedefinedandexplainedtothejuryalongthe following lines:Theoperatororownerofaparkingrampfacilityhasaduty tousereasonablecare todetercriminalactivityonitspremiseswhichmaycauseper-sonal harm to customers. The care to be provided is thatcarewhichareasonablyprudentoperatororownerwouldprovideunderlikecircumstances.Amongthecircumstancesto be considered are the location and construction of theramp, thepractical feasibility and cost of various securitymeasures,andtheriskofpersonalharmtocustomerswhichtheowneroroperatorknows,orintheexerciseofduecareshouldknow,presentsareasonablelikelihoodofhappening.Inthisconnection,theowneroroperatorisnotaninsurerorguarantorofthesafetyofitspremisesandcannotbeex-pectedtopreventallcriminalactivity.Thefactthatacrimi-nalassaultoccursonthepremises,standingalone,isnotev-idence that the duty to deter criminal acts has beenbreached.151

person ... [d]oessomethinga reasonablepersonwouldnotdo;or ... [f]ails todosomethingareasonablepersonwoulddo.”Id. 150. Restatement(Third)ofTorts:LiabilityforPhysicalandEmotionalHarm§3(Am.LawInst.2010). 151. 447N.W.2d165,169–70(Minn.1989).Thereareotherexamples.InBilottav.KelleyCo.,JusticeSimonettsuggestedthatajurymightbeinstructedondesignde-fectasfollows:Aproductisunsafelydesignedif,byreasonofitsdesign,theproductisinadefectiveconditionunreasonablydangeroustotheuser.Themanufacturerhasadutytouse



Justice Simonett’s proposed instruction inBilotta v. Kelley Co.specifically includes the foreseeability issue.152 Short of that, how-ever,thegeneraljuryinstructionencompassesforeseeability,justasitencompasses theother factors involved indeterminingbreachofduty.153

Thethirdalternativeistosimplyusethestandardinstructiononnegligencewithoutanyspecificmentionofforeseeability.Thecourt’sconcerninits“closecases”istobesuretheissueisresolvedattrial.154Foreseeabilitywillbethesubjectofproofandargument.Survivingamotionforsummaryjudgmentontheissuedoesnotmeanthatfore-seeabilitywillnotbethesubjectofproofandargumentattrial.Ade-fendantmaymove for judgmentasamatterof law if theplaintiff’sproofisdeficient,andiftheplaintiffsurvivesthatmotion,thedefend-antmayarguethattheinjuryissounanticipatedthatthedefendantshouldnotbeconsiderednegligentforfailuretoguardagainstit.

Asecondquestioniswhethertherehastobeaspecificjuryin-structiononthemisfeasance/nonfeasanceissue.Here,thekeyissueiswhetherthedefendantactedaffirmativelyincreatingariskofin-jury.InFenrich,thefactsatthesummaryjudgmentstageweresuffi-cient to justify resolving the misfeasance/nonfeasance issue at

duecaretodesignaproductthatdoesnotcreateanunreasonableriskofharmtoanyonewhoislikelytobeexposedtothedangerwhentheproductisputtoitsin-tendeduseortoanyunintendedyetreasonablyforeseeableuse.346N.W.2d616,626n.2(Minn.1984)(Simonett,J.,concurringspecially).InPetersonv.Balach,294Minn.161,174,199N.W.2d639,648n.7(1972),thecourtsuggestedthatajurymightbeinstructedonvariousfactorstodeterminetheliabilityoflandownersincasesinvolvinginjuriestoentrantsonland:“Amongthefactorstobeconsideredmightbethecircumstancesunderwhichtheentrantenterstheland(licenseeorinvitee);foreseeabilityorpossibilityofharm;dutytoinspect,repair,orwarn;reasonablenessofinspectionorrepair;andopportunityandeaseofrepairorcorrection.” 152. 346N.W.2dat626n.2. 153. TheThirdRestatementofTortsprovidesthat:Apersonactsnegligentlyifthepersondoesnotexercisereasonablecareunderallthecircumstances.Primaryfactorstoconsiderinascertainingwhethertheperson’scon-ductlacksreasonablecarearetheforeseeablelikelihoodthattheperson’sconductwillresultinharm,theforeseeableseverityofanyharmthatmayensue,andthebur-denofprecautionstoeliminateorreducetheriskofharm.Restatement(Third)ofTorts:LiabilityforPhysicalandEmotionalHarm§3(Am.LawInst.2010). 154. See,e.g.,Bjerkev.Johnson,742N.W.2d660,667–68(Minn.2007);Lundgrenv.Fultz,354N.W.2d25,28(Minn.1984).



trial.155Giventhenecessityofconsideringthetotalityofthecircum-stancesinresolvingtheissue,156themostlogicalassumptionisthatthe issueofwhether there ismisfeasanceornonfeasancehas tobetestedbyamotionforjudgmentasamatteroflaw.

Thefactualcausationissueisforthetrieroffactpursuanttothestandard instructions defining direct cause,157 but the proximate

155. Fenrichv.BlakeSch.,920N.W.2d195,207(Minn.2018). 156. Satterfieldv.BreedingInsulationCompany,266S.W.3d347(Tenn.2008),isagoodexampleofwhyitisnecessarytoconsiderthetotalityofthecircumstancesindetermining whether the case involvesmisfeasance or nonfeasance. The case in-volvedasuitbytheestateofadaughterwhoallegedthatshehadcontractedmeso-theliomafromrepeatedexposuretoherfather’sasbestos-contaminatedworkclothesoveranextendedperiodoftime.Id.at351–52.Thedefendant-employerarguedthatithadnodutytohertopreventherexposure.Id.at352.Thecourtsummarizedtheessentialissue:Theunderlyingdisputeinthiscaseisfundamentallyoneofcharacterizationandclas-sification.HasAlcoaengagedinanaffirmativeactthatcreatedanunreasonableandforeseeableriskofharmtoMs.Satterfield?IfAlcoadidcreatesuchariskofharm,aretherecountervailinglegalprinciplesorpolicyconsiderationsthatwarrantdetermin-ingthatAlcoaneverthelessowednodutyMs.Satterfield?Or,alternatively,doesthiscaseinvolveanomissionbyAlcoainfailingtocontroltheactionsofMr.Satterfield,itsemployee?Id.at355.TheTennesseeSupremeCourtreliedonProsserandKeeton’sdistinctionbetweenmisfeasanceandnonfeasance:Inthedeterminationoftheexistenceofaduty,thererunsthroughmuchofthelawadistinctionbetweenactionandinaction....[T]herearoseveryearlyadifference,stilldeeplyrootedinthelawofnegligence,between“misfeasance”and“nonfeasance”—thatistosay,betweenactivemisconductworkingpositiveinjurytoothersandpas-siveinactionorafailuretotakestepstoprotectthemfromharm.Thereasonforthedistinctionmaybesaidtolieinthefactthatby‘misfeasance’thedefendanthascre-atedanewriskofharmtotheplaintiff,whileby‘nonfeasance’hehasatleastmadehissituationnoworse,andhasmerelyfailedtobenefithimbyinterferinginhisaf-fairs.Id.at356(quotingW.PageKeeton,ProsserandKeetonontheLawofTorts§56,at373(5thed.1984)).Thecourtusedtheclassicexampleofadriverwhoseesapedestrianinacrosswalkbutfailstobrakeintimetoavoidinjuringher.Id.at357.Whilethefailuretoapplythebrakesisanomission,thedriverdrovethecarnegligently.Seeid.It’smisfeasanceratherthannonfeasance.Id.(citingJohnC.P.Goldberg&BenjaminC.Zipursky,TheRestatement(Third)andthePlaceofDutyinNegligenceLaw,54VAND.L.REV.657,691(2001)).Thecourtconcludedthat“AlcoaengagedinmisfeasancethatsetinmotionariskofharmtoMs.Satterfield.”Id.at364. 157. Thepatterninstructionsdefine“directcause”as“acausethathadasubstan-tial part in bringing about the (collision) (accident) (event) (harm) (injury).” 4MNPRACCIVJIG27.10(6thed.2014).



causeissuedoespresentproblemsifitisafactissueforthetrieroffact.Theproximate cause issuepresents someproblems, given thelack of consistency in the proximate-cause standards the supremecourthasusedinitsdecisions.Forexample,in1896,JusticeMitchellframeditthiswayinChristianson:

What amanmay reasonably anticipate is important, andmaybedecisive,indeterminingwhetheranactisnegligent,butisnotatalldecisiveindeterminingwhetherthatactistheproximatecauseofaninjurywhichensues.Ifapersonhadnoreasonablegroundtoanticipatethataparticularactwould or might result in any injury to anybody, then, ofcourse,theactwouldnotbenegligentatall;but,iftheactitselfisnegligent,thenthepersonguiltyofitisequallyliableforallitsnaturalandproximateconsequences,whetherhecouldhaveforeseenthemornot.Otherwiseexpressed,thelawisthatiftheactisonewhichthepartyought,intheex-erciseofordinarycare,tohaveanticipatedwasliabletore-sultininjurytoothers,thenheisliableforanyinjuryproxi-mately resulting from it, although he could not haveanticipatedtheparticularinjurywhichdidhappen.Conse-quenceswhichfollowinunbrokensequence,withoutanin-terveningefficientcause,fromtheoriginalnegligentact,arenaturalandproximate;andforsuchconsequencestheorig-inal wrongdoer is responsible, even though he could nothaveforeseentheparticularresultswhichdidfollow.158But,inLubbersv.Anderson,a1995case,theMinnesotaSupreme

Courtframedtheproximatecausetestasrequiringforesight:Wehavesaidthatinorderforaparty’snegligencetobetheproximatecauseofaninjury“theact[mustbe]onewhichthepartyought,intheexerciseofordinarycare,tohavean-ticipatedwaslikelytoresultininjurytoothers, ...thoughhecouldnothaveanticipatedtheparticularinjurywhichdidhappen.”159InGeorgev.EstateofBaker, thesupremecourt recentlystated

thatproximatecausemeansthatthenegligentactmusthavebeen“a

158. Christiansonv.Chicago,St.P.,M.&O.Ry.Co.,67Minn.94,97,69N.W.640,641(1896).Thesupremecourthasreaffirmedthestandardseveraltimes.See,e.g.,Kronzerv.FirstNat.BankofMinneapolis,305Minn.415,426,235N.W.2d187,194(1975);Orwickv.Belshan,304Minn.338,349,231N.W.2d90,97(1975);Hilligossv.CrossCos.,304Minn.546,547,228N.W.2d585,586(1975);Dellwov.Pearson,259Minn.452,454–56,107N.W.2d859,861–62(1961). 159. Lubbersv.Anderson,539N.W.2d398,401(Minn.1995).



substantialfactorintheharm’soccurrence.”160Thatisthestandardusedinthepatternjuryinstructionsonproximatecause,althoughthepattern instruction uses the term “direct cause.”161 The court inGeorgerejectedthe“butfor”standardastheproximatecausestand-ard“because‘[i]naphilosophicalsense,thecausesofanaccidentgobacktothebirthofthepartiesandthediscoveryofAmerica.’”162Thecourt said, however, that while the defendant’s negligent conductmusthavebeena“substantialfactor”intheinjury,italsohadto,ataminimum,havebeena“but-for”causeoftheplaintiff’sinjury.163But-forcausationbecomesanecessarybutnotsufficientconditionforcau-sation.164Therelationshipofthe“substantialfactor”standardtode-terminationsconcerningthescopeofadefendant’sresponsibilityfortheconsequencesofnegligentconductisnotclear.

Thatleavesthelawwiththreeembeddedstandards.Sometimes,thecourts,concernedabouttheproximatecauseissue,willconcludethatanobviousbut-forcauseofaninjuryisnotacause,butan“occa-sion”fortheinjury.165TherealdifficultyisthatMinnesotalawlacksamechanismforresolvingissuesconcerningscopeofliability.Perhapsthesimplestviewistofocusonthenegligentactsthatmadethede-fendant’sacts tortious,and thenaskingwhether the injury thatoc-curred is similar enough for thedefendant tobe responsible for it.ThatisthepositiontakenintheThirdRestatementofTorts.166

160. 724N.W.2d1,10(Minn.2006).TheMinnesotaSupremeCourtreaffirmedthisasthetestforproximatecauseincaseinvolvingCivilDamagesActclaims.SeeOsbornev.TwinTownBowl,Inc.,749N.W.2d367,372(Minn.2008). 161. 4MNPRACCIVJIG27.10(6thed.2014). 162. George,724N.W.2dat10–11(citationomitted). 163. Id. 164. Id. 165. See Kryzer v. ChamplinAmer. LegionNo. 600, 494N.W.2d 35, 37 (Minn.1992)(intoxicationofpatronwhowasinjuredwhilebeingejectedfromthelegionclubwasnotthecauseofherinjury,butonlythe“occasion”). 166. TheThirdRestatement’sprovisiongoverningthescopeofliabilityprovides,simply,that“[a]nactor’sliabilityislimitedtothoseharmsthatresultfromtherisksthatmadetheactor’sconducttortious.”RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OFTORTS:LIABILITYFORPHYSICALANDEMOTIONALHARM§29(AM.LAWINST.2010).TheRestatementrejectstheterm“proximatecause”becauseoftheconfusionitcauses.Id.§29cmt.b.Theconceptisstraightforward.Firstdeterminewhatrisksledtotheconclusionthatthedefendantactednegligently. Second, determinewhether the injury sustainedby theplaintifffallswithinthescopeofthenegligentlycreatedrisks.TheReporters’Notestocom-ment(b)ofsection29offeredthefouralternativeinstructions:

(1) Youmustdecidewhethertheharmtotheplaintiffiswithinthescope of the defendant’s liability. To do that, you must first



VI.CONCLUSION

Fenrichv.BlakeSchoolhighlightsrecurringissuesinMinnesotatort law, including the special relationship issue, the misfea-sance/nonfeasanceproblem,andtheissueofwhenforeseeabilitybe-comesaquestionforthetrieroffactandnotthejudge.Italsoinvitesinquiryintotheappropriatemethodofresolvingthoseissuesattrial,alongwiththeotherbasicissuesinanegligencecase.

TheessentialquestioninFenrichconcernedaschool’sresponsi-bilityfortheactionsofoneofitsstudentsincausinganaccidentwhile

considerwhyyoufoundthedefendantnegligent[orsomeotherbasisfortortliability].Youshouldconsiderallofthedangersthatthedefendantshouldhavetakenreasonablesteps[orothertortobligation] to avoid. The defendant is liable for the plaintiff’sharmifyoufindthattheplaintiff’sharmarosefromthesamegen-eral type of danger that was one of those that the defendantshouldhavetakenreasonablesteps[orothertortobligation]toavoid.Iftheplaintiff’sharm,however,didnotarisefromthesamegeneral dangers that the defendant failed to take reasonablesteps[orothertortobligation]toavoid,thenyoumustfindthatthedefendantisnotliablefortheplaintiff’sharm.

(2) Youmustdecidewhethertheharmtotheplaintiffiswithinthescopeof thedefendant’s liability.Theplaintiff’sharm iswithinthescopeofdefendant’sliabilityifthatharmarosefromthesamegeneraltypeofdangerthatwasamongthedangersthatthede-fendantshouldhavetakenreasonablesteps[orothertortobliga-tion]toavoid.Ifyoufindthattheplaintiff’sharmarosefromsuchadanger,youshallfindthedefendantliableforthatharm.Ifyoufindtheplaintiff’sharmarosefromsomeotherdanger,thenyoushallfindforthedefendant.

(3) Todecideifthedefendantisliablefortheplaintiff’sharm,thinkaboutthedangersyouconsideredwhenyoufoundthedefendantnegligent [orotherwise subject to tort liability].Thenconsidertheplaintiff’sharm.Youmust find thedefendant liable for theplaintiff’sharmifitarosefromoneofthedangersthatmadethedefendantnegligent [orotherwisesubject to tort liability].Youmustfindthedefendantnotliableforharmthatarosefromdif-ferentdangers.

(4) Youmustdecidewhetherthseplaintiff’sharmwasofthesamegeneral type of harm that the defendant should have acted toavoid.Ifyoufindthatitis,youshallfindfortheplaintiff.Ifyoufindthatitisnotthesamegeneraltype,youmustfindforthede-fendant.

Id.§29cmt.b,Reporters’Note.Thefourthalternativeisthesimplest.Seeid.Thescopeofliabilityconceptiscapturedinthefirstsentence.Seeid.Thesecondwouldnotbeusedwhenthecaseissubmittedonaspecialverdict.Seeid.



onatripwithotherstudentsandanassistantandvolunteercoachtoanout-of-seasoncrosscountrymeetinanotherstate.167Theschool’sliabilityturnedonwhethertherewasaspecialrelationshipbetweentheschoolandthestudentthatwouldimposeadutyontheschooltousereasonablecarefortheprotectionofathirdperson,and, ifnot,whethertheschoolcreatedanaffirmativeriskofinjurybecauseofitsinvolvementincoordinatingarrangementstosendthestudentstothemeet,and,ifitdid,whetheritwasforeseeabletotheschoolthatanaccidentinvolvingastudentdriverwouldoccur.168

Themicroviewisthatsummaryjudgmentwasinappropriateandthatthekeyissueshadtoberesolvedattrial.169Butdecisionsrever-berate.Fenrichstandsforbroaderpropositions.Oneisthatthecourtrejectedanycategoricalrulethatschoolscouldnotbeliableforinju-riescausedbystudentstothirdparties.170Althoughthatmayappeartocreatethepossibilityforapotentiallyunlimitedexpansionofliabil-ity,171thecourt’sfact-specificanalysisofthecaseanddisinclinationto find a special relationship between the school and student thatwouldimposeadutyontheschoolfortheprotectionofthirdpersonsbeliesthatconcern.

Incasesinvolvingclosecallsontheforeseeabilityissue,thesu-premecourtcontinuestorequireresolutionoftheissuebythetrieroffactwherethereareconflictedinferencesthatcanbedrawnfromthe facts.Thecourt’scontinuedcautionsonthat issuearecertainlyconsistentwithpastdecisions,buttheimpactisthatthecourt’sfoot-printinitsrecentdecisionsisclearinrequiringcarefulconsiderationofsummaryjudgmentmotionsinvolvingtheforeseeabilityissue.

167. Fenrichv.BlakeSch.,920N.W.2d195,198(Minn.2018). 168. Id.at201–02. 169. Id.at205. 170. Id.at202. 171. Id.at207(Anderson,J.,dissenting).

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