UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

ATTACHMENT 1 ____________________________________

Leisha Tringali, Civil Action No.: 1:14-cv-124-LM

Plaintiff

vs.

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND

Hannah Attuso FOR JURY TRIAL

Amy Pitter,

Laurie McGrath, COUNT 1 - Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law under

Doug Comfort,COUNT II - Notice and Opportunity to

Darrin Davis, be Heard

Mary Ellen Lembo COUNT III - Aggravated IdentityTheft

Rachel Kaprielian, COUNT V - Negligence

“Mr. Aniliton”, COUNT VI – RICO

Unknown Defendants 1-10

Defendants

____________________________________

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. This is a complaint for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, with pendant state claims against individuals, which gives the district court original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by any person to redress the deprivation, under color of state law, of any right secured by the Constitution of the United States and to recover damages or other relief for such civil rights violations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331.

A. For declaratory and injunctive relief- Defendant(s), violated The plaintiff, Leisha Tringali’s protected due process rights by a pattern and practice of criminally editing, falsifying, and manipulating a temporary child support order by creating a synthetic identity then denied the plaintiff the ability to conduct an administrative review to deprive her of any meaningful remedy.

B. For damages - Defendant(s), in conspiracy with each other, deprived the plaintiff of due process and equal protection of the law in the Massachusetts by denying her liberty and illegally seizing her property.

C. For Pendant State Claim- Defendant(s), by their actions intentionally interfered with Leisha Tringali’s pursuit of happiness, by their fraudulent and deceitful actions by illegally modifying a temporary order.

2. Jurisdiction for this action is pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331, as it deals with a civil complaint arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, more specifically, 42 U.S.C. §1983, and the 4th, 5th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution.

3. Jurisdiction for this action pursuant to Title 28 U.S. Code §§ 1331 and 1343. Actions of the defendant(s) has further aggrieved plaintiff in the state of New Hampshire in which the plaintiff resides. Therefore, jurisdiction under 28 USC §1332 and venue lie with this Court.

4. Jurisdiction of the pendant state claim is pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367, as it is founded on essentially the same factual foundation.

5. The First issue is "Convenience" and second issue is the "interest-of-justice" standard under 28 USCA 1406.

PARTIES

6. The plaintiff is a resident of 2 Holly Lane, Londonderry, New Hampshire 03053 and a citizen of the United States.

7. The defendant Hannah Attuso is being sued individually and in her official capacity as an employee of the Department of Revenue Child Enforcement Agency, her principal place of business is 100 Sylvan Road, 100 Trade Center, Woburn, Massachusetts 01801.

8. The defendant Amy Pitter is being sued individually and in her official capacity as an employee of the Department of Revenue Child Enforcement Agency, her principal place of business is located at 100 Cambridge St. Boston, MA 02114.

9. The defendant Laurie McGrath is being sued individually and in her official capacity as an employee of the Department of Revenue Child Enforcement Agency, her principal place of business is located at100 Cambridge St. Boston, MA 02114.

10. The defendant Doug Comfort is being sued individually and in his official capacity as an employee of the Department of Revenue Child Enforcement Agency, his principal place of business is located at

100 Sylvan Road, 100 Trade Center, Woburn, Massachusetts 01801.

11. The defendant Darrin Davis is being sued individually and in his official capacity as an employee of the Department of Revenue Child Enforcement Agency, his principal place of business is located at 100 Sylvan Road, 100 Trade Center, Woburn, Massachusetts 01801.

12. The defendant Mary Ellen Lembo is being sued individually and in her official capacity as an employee of the Department of Revenue Child Enforcement Agency, her principal place of business is located at at100 Cambridge St. Boston, MA 02114.

13. The defendant Mr. Anilton is being sued individually and in his official capacity as an employee of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Execustive Office of Transportation Registry of Motor Vehicles his principal place of business is located at 76 Ross Way, Quincy, MA 02269.

14. The defendant Rachel Kaprielian is being sued individually and in her official capacity as an employee of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Execustive Office of Transportation Registry of Motor Vehicles her principal place of business is located at 10 Park Plaza, Suite 4160. Boston, MA 02116.

15. Unknown Defendant(s), John Doe(s), are individuals whose identities are not yet known to the plaintiff, but whose actions caused sever and permanent injury to the plaintiff.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

16. There is a well defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved in this case. The questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class which predominate over questions which may effect individual Class members include the following:

(I). Whether Defendant(s) have and continue to violate the provisions of the U.S. constitutions in connection with post judgment enforcement of collection of child support; and, specifically, the illegal suspension of licenses and the illegal seizure and taking of private property without due process of law.

(II) Whether Defendant(s) have and continue to violate statutory requirements and standards in connection with the post judgment enforcement of collection of child support; and, specifically, the illegal suspension of licenses and the illegal seizure and taking of private property without due process of law.

(III) Whether Defendant(s) have and continue to violate the requirements and standards of applicable Court Rules in connection with the post judgment enforcement of collection of child support; and, specifically, the illegal suspension of licenses and the illegal seizure and taking of private property without due process of law.

(IV) Whether Defendant(s) know, have reason to know, or, recklessly disregard applicable constitutional, statutory and rule standards, guidelines, protections, and, requirements in the course of post judgment enforcement collection of child support; and, specifically, the illegal suspension of licenses and the illegal seizure and taking of private property without due process of law.

(V) Whether Defendant(s) and their agents should be compelled to account for and disgorge illegal profits, payments and revenues generated from and/or in the course of these illegal and unconstitutional actions; and, specifically, the illegal seizure and taking of private property without due process of law.

(VI) Whether Defendant(s) and their agents should be compelled to make restitution for all private property illegally seized and taken in violation of constitutionally protected and guaranteed rights to due process of law and/or in violation of applicable standards and procedures imposed by statute and court rule.

STATEMENT OF CLAIM

17. Now comes the plaintiff in the above entitled action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages against the above named defendant(s) for the harm created to the plaintiff by the unlawful criminal acts under the “color of law”.

18. At issue in this case is the defendant(s) pursuit of administrative enforcement actions against the plaintiff which violated her due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution.

19. The plaintiff is aggrieved by the defendant(s) final determination regarding actions taken in collecting and disbursing child support or, regarding the plaintiff's failure to comply with a subpoena, summons, or orders in which the plaintiff was never legally named as a party.

20. On September 29, 1998, the Middlesex Probate and Family Court ( Dilday, J. ) modified the Judgment of Divorce dated August 20, 1996. Judgment was entered in accordance with a stipulation dated September 29, 1998 that Matthew Tringali ( biological Father ) and Leisha Tringali ( biological Mother ) shall have joint legal and physical custody under case docket 96D 1305.

21. The plaintiff asserts that by incorporating the custody agreement into the judgment of absolute divorce, it became enforceable through the courts, as a valid provision of the decree.

("Once the court decides to incorporate an agreement between the parties as part of its decretal relief, something which it does not necessarily have to do, particularly as to provisions relating to children, the agreement is included within the order and is enforceable as a valid provision of the decree.").See Kemp v. Kemp, 287 Md. 165, 175, 411 A.2d 1028 (1980)

22. On June 25, 2002 the defendant, Hannah Attuso filed notice of appearance for DOR/CSE as counsel with the Middlesex Probate and Family Court ( Donnnelly, J. ) The defendant Hannah Attuso further motioned the Middlesex Probate and Family Court to request for financial statement against Leisha Eshbach. [ Id. 1 ]

23. The plaintiff alleges the defendant, Hannah Attuso denied due process to the plaintiff when deciding the amount of her child support obligation.

24. The plaintiff alleges by the defendant, Hannah Attusos failure to provide proper notice deprived

plaintiff of a full and fair opportunity to be heard.

As the Supreme Court so aptly wrote: "The point is straightforward: the Due Process Clause provides that certain substantive rights — life, liberty, and property — cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures." Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1493, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985).

Those "constitutionally adequate procedures" require notice and an opportunity to be heard. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S.Ct. 652, 656-57, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950); Notice must be "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Mullane, 1052* 1052 339 U.S. at 314, 70 S. Ct. At 657.

Notice must be "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the dependency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Mullane, 1052*1052 339 U.S. at 314, 70 at 657.

25. Procedural due process demands that a party affected by government action be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before being deprived of a property interest.

26. The plaintiff asserts that her legal name is Leisha Tringali. Plaintiff further asserts that her legal name is not now nor ever was her name Leisha Eshbach.

27. The plaintiff declares any order that names Leisha Eshbach can not be enforceable upon plaintiff without violating her due process rights.

28. The plaintiff asserts that a temporary order for child support is classified in the broader category of “pendente lite” orders. These are court orders that are temporarily enforced until the end of trial or court proceedings.

29. On December 5, 2003 the Middlesex Probate and Family Court ( McSweeny, J. ) appointed Peter Tringali permanent guardianship with custody of the minor child ZT under docket number 99P 5181GM. [ Id. 2 ]

30. The plaintiff claims Judge McSweeny did not order child support regarding of the minor child ZT in the Decree.

31. The plaintiff asserts any temporary order of support that the defendants are using against the plaintiff would not be enforceable after the entry of a final judgment and or decree.

32. The plaintiff claims that it was the responsibility of the defendant(s) to file for a modification as the plaintiff continues to declare any order that names Leisha Eshbach can not be enforceable upon plaintiff without violating her due process rights

33. The plaintiff alleges by the defendant(s) have continued use of a null and void order that the plaintiff will not recognize nor will comply with as it was done without notice, she was not named and

furthermore has a Decree that would superceed any prior temporary order.

34. The plaintiff alleges the unknown defendant(s) without the express authorization of the plaintiff transferred her personal identifying information ( Social Security Number ) to obtain child support payments under a synthetic identity created by the unknown defendant(s) ( DTA)

35. On or about March 24, 2003 the plaintiff alleges the unknown defendant(s) DOR levied $475.98 from Citizens Bank of Massachusetts from Leisha Tringali, the plaintiff’s account. Account number 110998-XXX-X.

36. On or about April 26, 2003 the plaintiff alleges the unknown defendant(s) DOR intercepted an insurance claim payment from the plaintiff in the amount of $1327.50.

37. On or about September 13, 2003 the plaintiff alleges the unknown defendant(s) DOR levied $1906.00 from Citizens Bank of Massachusetts from the plaintiff‘s account. Account Number 110998-XXX-X.

38. On September 13, 2006 the plaintiff faxed a request for an administrative review with the DOR/CSE. Plaintiff clearly stated she was never given proper notice. [ Id. 3 ]

39. The plaintiff requested an administrative review with the DOR/CSE and was never given proper notice of the outcome by the unknown defendant(s).

40. Around October 2006 the plaintiff alleges the defendant, Doug Comfort intercepted an insurance claim settlement payment from the plaintiff in the amount of $5,000.00. [ Id. 4 ]

41. Around October 2006 the plaintiff alleges the defendant, Doug Comfort intercepted another insurance claim settlement payment from the plaintiff in the amount of $5,000.00. [ Id. 5 ]

42. The plaintiff affirms her belief that the seizure of her property was prohibited, inter alia, by the Fourth Amendment, and argues that the seizure of plaintiff's private property for public use without just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.

43. The defendant, Doug Comfort is an employee of the Department of Revenue Child Support Enforcement Agency.

The defendant, Doug Comfort job description is Child Support Enforce Spec ( C ). His job duties include but not limited to as a first level supervisor, a preliminary function as a trainer, and doing expert level work beyond the general competencies of the job. Training Specialist, formulate policy, provide technical consultations on complex assignments, or perform work at an expert level. Child Support Enforcement Specialists evaluate and monitor child support cases

to establish paternity and to establish, modify, and enforce child support orders; prepare cases for court action; ensure compliance with child support agreements and court orders; conduct research to locate non-custodial parents and identify asset/income available to meet child support obligations; research cases involving failure to pay court-ordered child support; ensure the accuracy of case information by performing reviews and adjusting case information when needed; and assist custodial and non-custodial parents by providing information to them regarding their child support cases through telephone calls, in face to face meetings, or in writing.

44. On June 13, 2011 the plaintiff claims she was denied the renewal of her license - operating privileges. The New Hampshire Registry of Motor Vehicles declared that plaintiff’s right to operate was under suspension by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in a National Database Registry.

45. On June 13, 2011 the plaintiff claims she was denied her application for renewal of her driver’s license in the State of New Hampshire where plaintiff resides.

46. On June 13, 2011 the plaintiff claims she contacted the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Registry of Motor Vehicles ( hereinafter the “RMV” ) call center in Quincy, Massachusetts. The plaintiff spoke with an employee named Derek Anderson to find out why her renewal was denied.

47. The plaintiff alleges Derek Anderson explained that on June 23, 2010 the RMV received a computer generated notice of suspension by the DOR/CSE. Derek Anderson further stated that on July 3, 2010 plaintiff’s license went under suspension due to child support obligations.

48. The plaintiff alleges she explained to Derek Anderson that there is no legal order for her to pay child support. The child support order was fraudulent and asked if they had a copy of said order. Derrek Anderson put plaintiff through to his supervisor The defendant, "Anilton".

49. The plaintiff alleges she then again explained to the defendant, Anilton that there is no legal order for her to pay child support. The child support order was fraudulent. Plaintiff asked if the RMV had acopy of said order. The defendant, Anilton stated the RMV did not have the order only a computer generated notice from the DOR/CSE.

50. The plaintiff alleges the defendant, Anilton did not lift the suspension of the plaintiff’s license and quoted MGL 119 s.16 (b) as his authority.

According to the DOR/CSE, M.G.L. c 119A, § 16, gives them the authority to suspended a individuals business, trade, professional, recreational or motor vehicle license or virtually any other license or registration that a person has legally obtained.

51. The plaintiff alleges the defendant, Anilton stated “Once you have cleared your outstanding obligation, you must present the Registry of Motor Vehicles with an official notice from the Child Support Enforcement Division of the Massachusetts Department of Revenue, stating that you are in compliance with the payment plan and are eligible or reinstatement”.

52. The plaintiff alleges the defendant, Anilton insinuated that plaintiff owed child-support with no proof from the DOR/CSE other then a computer generated letter.

53. On June 23, 2011 the plaintiff alleges the defendant, Rachel Kaprielian, Registrar of the

Commonwealth of Massachusetts Execustive Office of Transportation Registry of Motor Vehicles sent Leisha Tringali a notice of suspension effective on July 3, 2010. [ Id. 6 ]

The Supreme Judicial Court has "construed the `original cause' language to mean an affirmative act (not a failure to act) by a public employer that creates the `condition or situation' that results in harm inflicted by a third party." See Kent v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 312 - Mass: Supreme Judicial Court 2002

It is appropriate to consider the magnitude of the potential harm that the defendant's conduct would have caused to its intended victim if the wrongful plan had succeeded, as well as the possible harm to other victims that might have resulted if similar future behavior were not deterred - TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 US 443 - Supreme Court 1993

54. The plaintiff claims that for the defendant(s) Rachel Kaprielian and Anilton to implicate and enforce M.G.L. c 119A, § 16, in the manner in which they chose to enforce against the plaintiff, would

with no doubt have to violate her rights under the 5th, 7th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution.

55. Although according to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts having a drivers license is a privilege, the suspending of a license without a valid court order or a hearing on an allegation is a clear violation of one’s due process.

56. The plaintiff hereby asserts and declares that application of M.G.L c. 119A, § 16 is unconstitutional for the following reasons;

( a.) Plaintiff, Leisha Tringali was never afforded a hearing for a child support order.

( b.) Plaintiff was never afforded a hearing regarding the suspension of her driver’s license.

57. Under the VII Amendment (part of the “Bill of Rights”) of the United States Constitution it states the following;

“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”

58. The Massachusetts Constitution further backs this Amendment by stating the following;

For this purpose, “[a] right is ‘clearly established’ if it meets one of three tests: (1) it is defined with reasonable clarity; or (2) the Supreme Court or this Circuit has affirmed its existence; or (3) a reasonable defendant would understand form existing law that his acts were unlawful” Cook v. Sheldon 41 f.3d 73 (2nd Cir. 1994)

59. Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust

an illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution. YICK WO v. HOPKINS, 118 US 356, (1886)

60. “In all controversies concerning property, and in all suits between two or more persons, except in cases in which it has heretofore been other ways used and practiced, the parties have a right to a trial by jury; and this method of procedure shall be held sacred, unless, in causes arising on the high seas, and such as relate to mariners' wages, the legislature shall hereafter find it necessary to alter it.”

61. After a careful examination of the VII amendment and Article XV, no where does it exempt the Commonwealth, oblige or obligor, custodial or non-custodial, husband or wife, male or female or does it make any special provision for any child-support that is allegedly in the arrears but to the contrary it clearly states ALL controversies.

It has further said:

"Not only is a biased decision maker constitutionally unacceptable but `our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.'" Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 48, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 1465, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1974); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 US 564 - Supreme Court 1973

62. Considering that the DOR/CSE and the plaintiff had two separate opinions on what might have been owed and/ or who might have owed it, that without doubt constituted a controversy and for the Commonwealth not to provide a jury trial violated plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional right.

63. For the RMV to suspend the plaintiff’s driver license or any other license by a request from the DOR/CSE or any other third party with no valid court order would violate plaintiff’s due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United State Constitution.

64. The FifthAmendment (part of the “Bill of Rights”) states;

“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”

65 While the Fourteenth Amendment under section one states;

“All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

66. There the Supreme Court Said:

The Due process Claus entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases. This requirement of neutrality in adjudicative proceedings safeguards the two

central concerns of procedural due process, the prevention of unjustified or mistake deprivations and the promotion of participation and dialogue by affected individual in the decision making process. The neutrality requirement helps to guarantee that life, liberty, or property will not be taken on the basis of an erroneous or distorted conception of the facts or the law. At the same time, it preserves both the appearance and reality of fairness, “generating the feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice has been done,” by ensuring that no person will be deprive of his interested in the absence of a proceeding in which he may present his case with assurance that the arbiter is not predisposed to find against him. PORTER v. SINGLETARY 49 F.3rd 1483 (11th Cir. 1995) Quoting Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc. 446 U.S. 238, 100 S.Ct. 1610, 64 L.Ed 2nd 182 (1980).

67. The DOR/CSE are state actors, acting under the “color of law” they should have known that suspending the plaintiff’s driver’s license was an arrestable offense which would cause her a loss of her liberty and then a loss of her property defending these offenses.

68. The plaintiff again reiterates that according to the RMV having a driver’s license is a “privilege” and with that said, the Fourteenth Amendment further states that;

“... No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;”

69. On September 18, 2011 the plaintiff claims she attempted to file a motion to dismiss/vacate any and all child support orders against Leisha Eshbach with the Middlesex Probate and Family Court under docket 96D 1305. The clerk of the court stated that plaintiff “could not file a motion to dismiss/vacate because there was no valid order in effect” in the file.

70. The plaintiff argues that because no motion or modification could be filed there is no valid order the plaintiff would be unable to seek relief under an appeal.

71. On October 13, 2011 the plaintiff mailed a certified demand letter to Doug Comfort. The plaintiff raised the issue of due process declaring proper service to her has never been served or ordered.

72. The plaintiff asserted that the DTA created a synthetic identity of Leisha Eshbach and the DOR/CSE attached the Social Security Number of the plaintiff to the name of Leisha Eshbach. The plaintiff asserted that this was Identity Theft.

73. The plaintiff made the following demands and that they be met within 10 business day.

74. The certified letters were received on October 14, 2011. The plaintiff’s demands were not met.

75. On January 19, 2011 the Register of Probate’s office mailed plaintiff a copy of the temporary child support order.

76. On January 27, 2011 the plaintiff claims she filed a complaint with the Federal Trade Commission for Identity Fraud. Reference Case # 34668457

77. On January 27, 2011 the plaintiff claims she filed a criminal complaint with Matthew A. Kulesz

from the Pelham Police Department. Incident Report Id # 12-101-OF. [ Id. 6 ]

78. On March 29, 2012 the plaintiff filed a Federal Complaint. The plaintiff sued several state agencies and a state employee for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages. Plaintiff claimed that the defendants violated her procedural due process rights by enforcing a child support order against her without providing notice or a hearing.

79. On August 9, 2012 James Sweeny ( Attorney of Record ) filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state claim. Claiming immuntiy under the eleventh amendment.

80. On November 5, 2012 a telephone conference was held between Judge Paul J. Barbadoro and Attoeny James Sweeny. Attorney James Sweeny was directed to contact the plaintiff via letter to arrange a discussion of the case and possibility of resolving it.

81. During the telephone conference Judge Barbadoro states: " Regardless of what the merits are on the motion to dismiss, if that were true it would seem to me that the Attorney General's Office would have interest in trying to explore that matter with her and trying to resolve it, because I assume the Attorney General's Office doesn't support government takings of peoples property that's not owed. Is that a fair assumption? Attorney James Sweeny responds: Yes. [ Id. 7 ]

82. Plaintiff alleges Attorney James Sweeny never contacted the plaintiff as directed by Judge Paul J. Barbadoro.

83. On November 13, 2012 The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court found that the state agencies and the state employee acting in his official capacity were immune from claims for damages and other retrospective relief under the Eleventh Amendment, rejecting plaintiff’s argument that the state waived Eleventh Amendment immunity by accepting federal funds under the Social Security Act. The court also found that all claims against the state employee in his official and individual capacities were barred because the plaintiff failed to show that the employee was a proximate cause of the constitutional violations plaintiff alleged or has the power to implement the relief she seeks.

84. On June 4, 2013 the plaintiff alleges the defendant Laurie McGrath sent notice to the plaintiff that her Department had issued a new Income Order/ Notice of Support.[ Id. 8 ]

85. The defendant Laurie McGrath is the Deputy Commissioner for DOR.

86. The defendant Laurie McGrath intentionally retaliated against plaintiff by sending such notice knowing that there was a pending case that was under review with the First Circuit Court of Appeals and that Leisha Tringali was suing her department for Synthetic Identity Theft and knowing this would cause harm to Leisha Tringali.

87. On or about June 5, 2013 the plaintiff claims she contacted several employees from the Department of Revenue Child Support Enforcement Division and was referred to the District Attorney's Office as they refused to provide the plaintiff with any information in which has now been altered naming the

plaintiff, Leisha Tringali on their case file.

88. The plaintiff claims she left the defendant Darrin Davis a voice mail message.

89. The plaintiff claims she acknowledged that the defendant Darrin Davis was assigned to the case in which she is named.

90. The plaintiff asserted her right to access by means of a PIN number to gain access to the records so she could view all of the monies that had been illeaglly taken from her, stating that records should be made available to plaintiff as her name is now listed on the case as of this year.

91. The defendant Darrin Davis did not return plaintiff's call nor did he provide the documents in which plaintiff is entitled.

92. The defendant Darrin Davis job description is Child Support Enforce Spec ( A/B ). His job duties include but not limited to Child Support Enforcement Specialists evaluate and monitor child support cases to establish paternity and to establish, modify, and enforce child support orders; prepare cases for court action; ensure compliance with child support agreements and court orders; conduct research to locate non-custodial parents and identify asset/income available to meet child support obligations; research cases involving failure to pay court-ordered child support; ensure the accuracy of case information by performing reviews and adjusting case information when needed; and assist custodial and non-custodial parents by providing information to them regarding their child support cases through telephone calls, in face to face meetings, or in writing.

93. The defendant Darrin Davis failed in his duties to ensure the accuracy of the case information by performing reviews and adjusting case information when needed and assist the plaintiff by providing information regarding the child support cases through telephone calls, in face to face meetings, or in writing.

94. The plaintiff claims she left a voice mail message for the defendant Laurie McGrath on her direct line. The defendant Laurie McGrath did not return the plaintiff's call.

95. The defendant Laurie McGrath is associated with Massachusetts Department of Revenue with the role of Deputy Commissioner, Audit Division.

96. The plaintiff claims she left a voice mail message for the defendant Amy Pitter on her direct line. The defendant Amy Pitter did not return the plaintiff's call.

97. The defendant Amy Pitter is an employee of the Department of Revenue Child Support Enforcement Agency.

98. The defendant Amy Pitter serves as Commissioner of the Department of Revenue. She is responsible for overseeing DOR employees in offices across the state who work in child support enforcement.

99. Pursuant to M.G.L. 119A s. 10A (c ) the defendant Amy Pitter failer to determine if the plaintiff had incurred bank or similar fees as a direct result of administrative error by the IV-D agency, the IV-D agency may, at the discretion of the commissioner, reimburse the obligee or obligor for the fees from the account established pursuant to paragraph (3) of section 10.

100. Pursuant to M.G.L. 119A s. 10A ( b ) the defendant Amy Pitter failer to determine if the plaintiff that the IV-D agency has distributed a payment to an individual obligee that was not a child support collection on behalf of the obligee, or that the obligee was otherwise not entitled to the payment, the IV-D agency shall make diligent efforts to recover the payment from the obligee, including deducting the amount, or a portion thereof, from future collections of child support made on behalf of the obligee. Recovered amounts shall be placed in the account established pursuant to paragraph (1) of section 10. Where the IV-D agency does not recover the payment, the IV-D agency may issue a refund of an overpayment to an obligor, or a replacement payment to an individual obligee on whose behalf the child support collection was made, from the account established pursuant to paragraph (3) of said section 10.

101. The plaintiff asserts by the defendant Amy Pitter own negligence to make that determination has allowed harm to continue to the plaintiff and made no attempt to recover and refund the plaintiffs money in which was taken by fraud.

102. The defendant(s) Darrin Davis, Laurie McGrath and Amy Pitter conspired by all failing to provide the plaintiff access to the record in which their Department had her listed as a client and in which she is entitled.

103. By failing to provide the plaintiff access to the record harmed and continues to harm the plaintiff by altered records in which the plaintiff made clear to each and every one of the defendant(s) was done by fraud.

104. On June 4, 2013 the defendant Laurie McGrath sent notice to the plaintiff that her Department had issued a new Income Order/ Notice of Support.

105. The defendant Laurie McGrath is associated with Massachusetts Department of Revenue with the role of Deputy Commissioner.

106. The defendant Laurie McGrath intentionally retaliated against plaintiff by sending such notice knowing that this case was under review with the first circuit court of appeals and that the plaintiff was suing her department for Synthetic Identity Theft and knowing this would cause harm to the plaintiff. [ Id. 9 ]

107. The Supreme Judicial Court has "construed the `original cause' language to mean an affirmative act (not a failure to act) by a public employer that creates the `condition or situation' that results in harm inflicted by a third party." See Kent v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 312 - Mass: Supreme Judicial Court 2002

108. It is appropriate to consider the magnitude of the potential harm that the defendant's conduct would have caused to its intended victim if the wrongful plan had succeeded, as well as the possible harm to other victims that might have resulted if similar future behavior were not deterred - TXO

Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 US 443 - Supreme Court 1993

109. On June 11, 2013 the United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit entered Judgment essentially for the reason given by the District Court in it's memorandum and order dated November 13, 2012, the judgment of the District Court was affirmed.

110. On June 21, 2013 the plaintiff sent a disclosure request to Attorney James Sweeny for the district Attorney's Office and carbon copied the defendant Amy Pitter of the the Department of Revenue Child Support Enforcement Division. Enclosed plaintiff inserted a signed release for records as provided by the Department of Revenue Child Support Enforcement Division's website.

111. The plaintiff claims as to date no disclosures have been afforded to the plaintiff.

112. The plaintiff was seeking full disclosure from the Department of Revenue Child Support Enforcement Division's records. Encluded but not limited to the following:

113. The plaintiff asserted that it is not her policy to neither recognize nor deal with illegal orders that are at best null and void, Further stating she that would not comly with any request from the Department of Revenue Child Support Enforcement Division until the Department can provide a certify copy where the plaintiff, Leisha Tringali had been ordered to pay child support - in which they can not. Plaintiff forewarned that any and all documents sent to the plaintiff by Department of Revenue Child Support Enforcement Division will be taken as a direct threat of harm.

114. On July 8, 2013 the plaintiff received a letter from the State of New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services Division of Child Support.

115. Within the documents it states that The Division of Child Support Services ( DCSS ) has filed a petition with the court to register plaintiffs child support order issued by the State of Massachusetts for the purpose of enforcing the order.

116. A Registration Statement was enclosed. On this record the names of Leisha Tringali and Leisha Eshbach were named to identify the mother's information.

117. The Registration Statement was signed by the defendant Mary Ellen Lembo on June 19, 2013 under the penality of perjury that all information and facts concerning arrearage accrued under this order were true to the best of her knowledge and belief. [ Id. 10 ]

118. The defendant Mary Ellen Lembo is an employee of the Department of Revenue Child Support Enforcement Agency.

119. The Supreme Judicial Court has "construed the `original cause' language to mean an affirmative act (not a failure to act) by a public employer that creates the `condition or situation' that results in harm inflicted by a third party." See Kent v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 312 - Mass: Supreme Judicial Court 2002

120. It is appropriate to consider the magnitude of the potential harm that the defendant's conduct

would have caused to its intended victim if the wrongful plan had succeeded, as well as the possible harm to other victims that might have resulted if similar future behavior were not deterred - TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 US 443 - Supreme Court 1993

121. On July 26, 2013 plaintiff Motioned to Contest Validity of Registered Order. [ Id. 11 ]

122. On October 4, 2013 Peggy Rossing, Esq Staff Attorney for the Division of Child Support Services ( New Hampshire ) filed a Motion to Withdraw Registration of Foreign Order as the plaintiff provided proof that she has challenged the validity of the Department ( Massachusetts DOR ) attempted to register. The New Hampshire Department did not wish to proceed until the issues were resolved in Massachusetts.[ Id. 12 ]

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

The plaintiff is a prose litigant with no legal education to assist in drafting of her pleading and pleads with this court to hold her pleadings less stringent standards and construe her filings liberally.

Plaintiff brings forth the following counts and allegations supporting her cause of action:

DEPERVATION OF RIGHTS UNDER THE COLOR OF LAW UNDER

Title 18, U.S.C., Section 242

The preceding paragraphs are hereby incorporated herein as though fully set forth and are made a part of this paragraph.

At all times relevant herein, the conduct of all Defendants were subject to the federal and state civil rights acts.

The plaintiff affirms her belief that the seizure of her property was prohibited, inter alia, by the Fourth Amendment, and argues that the seizure of plaintiff's private property for public use without just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.

Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States

All Defendant(s) acted under color of law but contrary to law, and intentionally and unreasonably deprived Leisha Tringali of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution, laws of the United States, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including:

(a) The plaintiff's right not to be deprived of property without due process of law, as

guaranteed by Amendments V and XIV of the United States Constitution.

(b) The plaintiff's right not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law, as

guaranteed by Amendments V and XIV of the United States Constitution.

Therefore the Plaintiff demands judgment against all Defendant(s), for compensatory and punitive damages in whatever amount the jury may determine, plus costs, interest, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD

Amendments V and XIV of the United States Constitution

The preceding paragraphs are hereby incorporated herein as though fully set forth and are made a part of this paragraph.

At all relevant times herein, Plaintiffs had a right under the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions not to be deprived by the government of her constitutionally protected interest. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4 &14; M.G.L.A. Const. Pt. 1, Art. 10.

Plaintiff is aggrieved by the defendant's final determination regarding actions taken in collecting and disbursing child support. Procedural due process demands that a party affected by government action be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before being deprived of a property interest.

The defendant(s) failed to afford either of these aspects of due process to plaintiff when deciding the amount of her child support obligation. Plaintiff alleges she was deprived of a full and fair opportunity to be heard.

As the Supreme Court so aptly wrote: "The point is straightforward: the Due Process Clause provides that certain substantive rights — life, liberty, and property cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures.” Tulsa Professional Collection Services v. Pope 485 U.S. 478, 108 S. Ct 1340, 1344, 99 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988)"

The plaintiff's complaint is based upon notice and an opportunity to be heard. The defendant, DOR/CSE has and continues to harm plaintiff through fraud by the use of temporary child support order in which the plaintiff is not named.

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), alleging that the temporary child support order was obtained through fraud.

Such a fraud suffices as a basis to set aside the temporary child support order under F.R.C.P. 60(b).

Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant her relief under F.R.C.P. 60(b)

Therefore the Plaintiff demands judgment against all Defendant(s),Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) set aside the temporary child support , for compensatory and punitive damages in whatever amount the jury may determine, plus costs, interest, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and, granting such other further relief that under the circumstances may seem appropriate to this Honorable Court.

AGGERVATED IDENTY THEFT UNDER

18 USC ｧ 1028A(a)(1) & (2)

The preceding paragraphs are hereby incorporated herein as though fully set forth and are made a part of this paragraph.

At all times relevant herein, the conduct of all Defendants were subject to the federal and state civil rights acts.

The Defendants are jointly and severally responsible and liable for disgorging all money that they wrongfully obtained through their illegal conduct, and for restoring such money to the Plaintiff, plus pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.

THEREFORE, the Plaintiff demands that Judgment be entered in her favor and against the Defendants: ordering the Defendants, to reimburse to the Plaintiff the amounts of money they have collected in the amount of $13,709.48 granting her pre-judgment and post-judgment interests; awarding her a reasonable amount for attorneys’ fees, plus the costs of this action; and, granting such other further relief that under the circumstances may seem appropriate to this Honorable Court.

NEGLIGENT SECURITY OF PERSONAL INFORMATION

The preceding paragraphs are hereby incorporatedherein as though fully set forth and are made a part of this paragraph.

At all times relevant herein, the conduct of all Defendants were subject to the federal and state civil rights acts.

Plaintiff claims for negligent security of personal information are based on the theory that accurate personal identifying information is the key that allows access to a person's financial accounts and credit.

The defendant(s) who maintain such information in the normal course of business have a legal duty to reasonably safeguard that information from being used for an illegitimate purpose.

This claim is analogous to a premises liability claim for negligent security resulting in criminal activity.

The plaintiff claims, the defendant(s) are alleged to have failed to take reasonable precautions to protect the plaintiff from foreseeable injuries caused by the agency in which the defendant(s) work or by a third party.

All persons have a duty to exercise reasonable care not to subject others to an unreasonable risk of harm. See Walls v. Oxford Management Co., 137 NH 653 - NH: Supreme Court 1993 Whether a defendant's conduct creates a risk of harm to others sufficiently foreseeable to charge the defendant with a duty to avoid such conduct is a question of law, 145 N.H. 190, 193 (2000), because "the existence of a duty does not arise solely from the relationship between the parties, but also from the need for protection against reasonably foreseeable harm."143 N.H. 208, 211 (1998) (quotation omitted). Thus, in some cases, a party's actions give rise to a duty. 137 N.H. at 656. Parties owe a duty to those third parties foreseeably endangered by their conduct with respect to those risks whose likelihood and magnitude make the conduct unreasonably dangerous. 143 N.H. at 211.

When property is seized by a state and then remanded to the custody of the United States, the federal agency receiving the property must provide notice of the seizure to any interested parties within 90 days of the date of the initial seizure. 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(1)(A)(iv).

The Defendant(s) acted under color of law but contrary to law, and intentionally and unreasonably deprived Leisha Tringali of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution, laws of the United States, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including:

As a direct and proximate result of the acts and/or omissions of all defendant(s) as stated within this Complaint, The plaintiff, Leisha Tringali suffered injuries and damages, including, but not limited to:

(a.) Loss of liberty, property and cherished constitutional rights;. (b.) Emotional distress, humiliation, outrage, indignity, anguish, and shock;

(c.) Damage to her reputation; (d.) Attorney fees and costs; (e.) Economic loss

(f.) Other damages currently unascertainable

Therefore the Plaintiff demands judgment against all Defendant(s), for compensatory and punitive damages in whatever amount the jury may determine, plus costs, interest, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and, granting such other further relief that under the circumstances may seem appropriate to this Honorable Court.

RICO

The preceding paragraphs are hereby incorporatedherein as though fully set forth and are made a part of this paragraph.

At all times relevant herein, the conduct of all Defendants were subject to the federal and state civil rights acts.

The defendants constitute an illegal enterprise in acts or threat of acts in violation of Civil Rico Federal Racketeering Act USC 18, 1961-1963 et seq.

The following are particular violations:

(a) 18 USC 1001: Fraud

The defendant(s) knowingly and willfully falsified documents and or made use of all false documents knowing the same contained from a fraudulent documents.

(b) 18 USC 1951: Interference with interstate commerce

The defendant(s) robbed the plaintiff of her personal property against her will by means of actual and or threatened force to her personal propery and liberty.

The defendant(s) engaged in unlawful acts through a pattern of collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain directly or indirectly an interest in the plaintiff's personal property and liberties.

The Plaintiff bring this action seeking redress for the illegal acts of the Defendants, which have resulted in a loss of her property, and for declaratory and injunctive relief to end those practices and prevent further losses.

Therefore the Plaintiff demands judgment against all Defendant(s), for compensatory and punitive damages in whatever amount the jury may determine, plus costs, interest, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and, granting such other further relief that under the circumstances may seem appropriate to this Honorable Court.

PERMANENT INJUNCTION AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

The preceding paragraphs are hereby incorporated herein as though fully set forth and are made a part of this paragraph.

A permanent injunction and a declaratory judgment will serve the plaintiff's interest in putting an end to the Defendant(s) fraudulent conduct, where they, knowingly, intentionally and willfully, fraudulently collected and continue to attempt to collect funds from the plaintiff.

The Defendants’ unlawful conduct, if allowed to prevail, will cause the Plaintiff permanent irreparable injury.

The injuries to the Plaintiff far outweigh any harm which may be caused to defendant(s) should the Court grant the injunctive relief.

A permanent injunction and a declaratory judgment will serve that the Plaintiff will not be subjected to the Defendants’unlawful conduct and will not be deprived of her personal property.

Therefore the Plaintiff demands a permanent injunction and a declaratory judgment against all Defendant(s)

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully requested that Judgment be entered by this Honorable Court in favor of the Plaintiff and severally against the Defendants:

A. Granting the Plaintiff all the monetary compensations and equitable relief requested in the complaint.

B. Imposing upon the Defendants the payment of all costs and expenses to be incurred in this lawsuit.

C. Granting the Plaintiff reasonable attorneys’ fees. Pro se litigants may be entitled to Attorney fees and costs under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Award Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641, as amended 42 USC 1988

D. The issuance of a permanent injunction and declaratory judgment barring the Defendant(s) continued conduct and practices.

E. Granting the Plaintiff any other relief that she may be entitled to as a matter of law.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

The Pro Se Plaintiff, Leisha Tringali, demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable.

Under the VII Amendment (part of the “Bill of Rights”) of the United States Constitution it states the following;

“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”

NOTICE OF INTENT

Plaintiff, Leisha Tringali hereby gives notice that she intends to rely upon such other and further

evidence as may become available or apparent during trial in this action, and hereby reserves the right to amend her Complaint and to assert any such evidence by appropriate motion.

STATEMENT OF VERIFICATION

I have read the above complaint and it is correct to the best of my knowledge.

Date: _____________________

________________________________

Leisha D. Tringali ( Pro Se )