fedcon policy notes

7/26/2019 Fedcon Policy Notes

1/19

Table of Contents

1. Federal Balance....................................................................................2Commonwealth Power v Federalism...................................................................2

Expansion of Cth Power........................................................................................................ 2

2. Constitutional Interpretation.................................................................9

What are the main interpretative approaches...................................................9LEGALISM/LITERALISM.......................................................................................................... 9

!ssa" Plans............................................................................................1#Trade and Commerce Power s $1%i&..................................................................1#'aces Power s $1%((vi&....................................................................................1)*udicial Power and +etention...........................................................................1)


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FEDC! PLIC" !TES

1. Federal Balance

Commonwealth Power v Federalism

!(pansion of Cth PowerImplied Immunity of Instrumentalities

IMPLIED IMM#!IT" F I!STR#ME!TALITIES, now onl" applies to the institutions of state-ovts not their powers%&This doctrine meant that both the States and the Commonwealth were normally to be immune fromeach others laws. Commonwealth legislation therefore did not bind State government ocials and

vice versa unless expressly provided for in Constitution or necessarily implied by Constitution.Dmden v !edder$%9&'(

State )aws *on+tapp), to Cth o-ersor proe*res

"rith C# $for the Court%&. The Co00onwea)th an* the States are so1erein an* are on), s34et to

the restritions i0pose* 3, the I0peria) onnetion an* the pro1isions ofthe Constittion.

'. The Constittion a))ows the Co00onwea)th to exerise its powerswithot an, interferene or restritions5 exept those pro1i*e* for in theConstittion.

(. State atte0pts to fetter this power 0st therefore 3e onsi*ere* to 3e

inoperati1e.Dea)in v *ebb%9&'

Cth o-er i00nefro0 state ino0e tax

"rith C# $for the Court%&. In or*er to i1e e6et to the fe*era) )aws $those o1ernin how 0h a

0inister sho)* 3e pai*(5 the Co00onwea)th Ministers 0st 3e i00nefro0 state 3ase* taxation.

'. State taxation of fe*era) sa)aries is open to 2 o34etions7&% it interferes with Co00onwea)th aenies8'% it interferes with the free*o0 of ation of the Co00onwea)th in the

transfer of its o-ers fro0 State to State.+unicipal Council ofSydney v Commonwealth$+unicipal ,ates

Case% $%9&'(

S%%' Const7 Cthpropert, not s34etto state taxation

The isse in this ase was whether ertain 3i)*ins5 whih weretransferre* fro0 the !S o1ern0ent to the Co00onwea)th atFe*eration5 ontine* to 3e )ia3)e to 0niipa) rates one the, were1este* in the Co00onwea)th.

The :CA he)* that the 3i)*ins were no )oner )ia3)e to 0niipa) rateson the 3asis5 not of the i0p)ie* i00nities *otrine5 3t on the 3asis of s%%' of the Constittion5 3, whih ;propert, of an, a *o0esti 0atter.

It fo))ows that sine this is a *o0esti 0atter5 it fe)) n*er the Statesreser1e* power.

Essentia)), rea* s ?% as se)f@)i0itin > if it *ea)s with a ertain hea* ofpower then it is the on), one Cth an re), on to re)ate that power.

Commentar" on R v Barger3 Blac4stone 5 Williams su--est that the real basis for this

decision is the view that the Commonwealth power withrespect to industrial relations is limited b" the restriction in s$1%(((v& of that power to industrial disputes 6e(tendin-be"ond the limits of an" one /tate7 leavin- the re-ulation of


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intrastate industrial disputes to the /tates.

This 8ud-ment had the eect of limitin- the Commonwealth7spower to char-e 6e(cise duties7 and their -eneral power of6ta(ation7. It was also used to e(clusivel" enable the /tates tore-ulate labour conditions.

ngineers

Re4ete* i0p)ie* instr0enta)ities an* *estro,e* the reser1e* power *otrines.!n-ineers

E1en thoh the, *i*n+tha1e to5 0a4orit, wentfrther in their4*0ent an*o3)iterate* the reser1e*powers *otrine/s %&an* *i*n+t pro1i*e anexp)anation

BSe %& ontines the pre1ios), existin powers of e1er, StatePar)ia0ent to )eis)ate with respet to $%( State ex)si1e powers an* $2(State powers whih are onrrent with Co00onwea)th powers. t it is afn*a0enta) an* fata) error to rea* se %& as reser1in an, power fro0the Co00onwea)th that fa))s fair), within the exp)iit ter0s of an expressrant in se ?%5 as that rant is reasona3), onstre*5 n)ess thatreser1ation is as exp)iit), state*

Latha0 @ o00entator Fa1ore* a sper )itera)ist approah that fa1ore* 3ritish stat interp

BIt t o6 Astra)ian )aw fro0 A0erian pree*ents5 a opiossore of thoroh), re)e1ant )earnin5 in fa1or of the ra33e*En)ish r)es of stattor, interpretation5 whih are one of the

sorriest featres of En)ish )aw5 an* are ... parti)ar), nsite* tointerpretation of a rii* Constittion

:ea*s of Power/!(ternal :airs Power s $1%((i(&

Pro@Expansion of Cth PowerR 1 ress E1att MTiernan7

expansi1e 1iew7 that Par)ia0ent was o0petent to i1e e6et to non@3in*inreo00en*ations/*rafts/$)ess than treat, *os( > howe1er this is notathoritati1e an* the estion is sti)) open.

o Can exten* power to internationa) aree0ents5 not 4st to treaties.oowarta Mrph, =7

Cth nee*s to 3e a3)e to )eis)ate on a)) t,pes of treaties otherwise the, wo)*3e an internationa) ripp)e na3)e to partiipate f)), in the e0erin wor)*or*er > wo)* nee* to ha1e a stron entra)ise* o1t to arr, this ot.

Stephen =7 Spporte* the test of ;internationa) onern+

Anti@Expansion of Cth Poweroowarta Gi33s C= $*issent(7

It is i0possi3)e to en1isae an, area of power whih o)* not 3eo0e thes34et pf th )eis)ation of the th 3ea0e part, to an appropriateinternationa) aree0ent. > th wo)* 3e a3)e to aire n)i0ite* )eis)ati1epower

broad view of !:P would mean that the power of the Cth parliament

could be e(panded b" simple e(ecutive action and e(panded in

such a wa" as to render meanin-less that limitation and division ofsoverei-n le-islative authorit" which is of the essence of federalism

The 1iew of E1att an* MTiernan == in 4urgess 0st 3e re4ete*. A )aw wi))on), 3e 1a)i* n*er s ?% $xxix( if the aree0ent is with respet to a 0atterwhih an 3e *esri3e* as an externa) a6air.

o The on), safear* seste* $the test of bona 6de( was that a treat,annot 3e entere* as a ;*e1ie+ > this is ins-ient.

o ona *e test o6ers at 3est a frai) shie)*Ha1ai)a3)e in rare ases4an) of /S*vCommonwealth$%9'(

;!o sin)e power sho)* 3e onstre* in sh a wa, as to i1e theCo00onwea)th par)ia0ent a ni1ersa) power of )eis)ation whih wo)*ren*er a3sr* the assin0ent of parti)ar aref)), *ene* powers to thatPar)ia0ent7

TasmanianDams

Dawson = $*issent(7 the wor*s rantin Co00onwea)th powers7

B... the wi*est interpretation whih the )anae 3estowin the0 wi)) 3ear5withot rear* to the who)e of the *o0ent in whih the, appear an* thenatre of the o0pat whih it ontains5 is a *otrine whih n*s no spport


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in JngineersK an* is npree*ente* as a )eiti0ate 0etho* of onstrtionof an, instr0ent5 )et a)one a ConstittionB.

Trade and Commerce s $1%i&

Pro@Expansion of Cth PowerSeon* Air)inesCase

ress an*Air)ines are at o**s7whi)e air)ines 0a


5/19

ra 1 !S

Anti@Expansion

Dixon C=7 Can+t se ini*enta) powers to ;o3)iterate the *istintion 3etween intra

an* inter State tra*e an* o00ere.+a/n

whi)e *ragg 0a


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Raes Power s ?%$xx1i(Pro@Expansion of Cth Power

Anti@Expansion of Cth Powerartin,eri ir3, =7 $*issent(

6ther than the :bori-inal 'ace in an" /tate73 interprete* this )ase as

)ea1in the re)ation of A3oriina) a6airs to the States.

The =rants Power s 9#Pro@Expansion of Cth Power

First #nifor0 TaxCase

Leis)ation isn+t a

rea) )i0itation onstatesOan* e1en if Ctho0p)ete),ex)*e* statesfro0 raisin taxes5Cth is entit)e* to *othat an* ortsan+t *o f< a))e6eti1e), oste*the states fro0

ino0e tax > 0a*eit po)itia)),i0possi3)e forstates to )e1, aonrrent tax

Latha0 C=7- the At *oes not prport to repea) State ino0e@tax )eis)ation $the Cth

Par)ia0ent annot *o this5 as it annot repea) an At whih it has no powerto enat(8

-the At *oes not prport to *epri1e the State Par)ia0ent of the power toi0pose an ino0e tax8 $the Cth Par)ia0ent annot *epri1e an, State ofthat power7 see Constitution ss %&5 %&(

- the Cth Par)ia0ent o)* not pass a )aw o0pe))in a State to srren*erthe power to tax ino0es or prohi3itin the exerise of that power 3, aState8

o estions of 0oti1es are not re)e1ant to the estion of the trenatre of a )aw8

- The she0e whih the Co00onwea)th has app)ie* to ino0e tax ofi0posin rates so hih as pratia)), to ex)*e State taxation o)* 3eapp)ie* to other taxes so as to 0a


7/19

DGS ase Gi33s =7 s %% $re)iion( not s34et to onst an* therefore )i0its s 9

o ie. Cth an+t pa, states to prohi3it a re)iion for the0

PLIC" !TES ! FEDERAL FI!A!CIAL RELATI!S, wh" -rants are shithouse

Spei Prpose Pa,0ents t,in expen*itre to a spei prpose throh i0position of on*itionsre),in on s 9 has 3een a 0a4or sore of ;1ertia) sa) i03a)ane+5 thoh pro1i*in one so)tionto ;horionta) *isa) i03a)ane+.The 2&& Intero1ern0enta) Aree0ent siniant), rationa)ise* SPPs a))owin states inrease*Qexi3i)it, in on*ition of ser1ies an* intro*e* !ationa) Partnership Pa,0ents to fn* speipro4ets to rewar* states that *e)i1er nationa)), siniant refor0s. This 0a, 3e sai* to so0e extentto a))e1iate the 1ertia) sa) i03a)ane.

'ussell >atthews0ertical o1ern0ents at eah )e1e) cannot o00an* the nania) resoresneessar, to arr, ot expen*itre responsi3i)ities an* 3e he)* aonta3)e for 3oth spen*in an*taxin *eisions.Fators ontri3tin to this 1ertia) sa) i03a)ane state has osts5 fe*era) has re1ene

%. The onentration of nania) power an* Qexi3)e re1ene sores $in parti)ar ino0e tax( inthe han*s of fe*era) o1ern0ent

2. Rapi* rowth in osts of pro1i*in state ser1ies $e*ation5 hea)th5 transport( an* fastrowth of fe*era) taxation re1enes

*etar, i03a)anes ha1e )e* to po)itia) pressres for7a( transfer of re1ene sores fro0 fe*era) o1ern0ent5 or3( for intero1ern0enta) rants in the for0 of enera) re1ene sharin pa,0ents

here these 1ertia) sa) a*4st0ents ha1e ta


8/19

:owe1er states are sti)) *epen*ent on resores raise* 3, Cth

The critical lac4 of state revenue partl" came about because of the uniform ta(

scheme thus the use of s 9#

Pro@Expansion of Cth Power

Anti@Expansion of Cth Power

Leis)ation

S%&9 Const7 on), protets Cth )aws5 not state ones. So Cth )aws o1erri*e state )aws.

S 97 Cth *o0inane an* inQene o1er states throh rants power

A))an an* Arone, > So0e ran*o0 arti)e > not fro0 rea*insFe* annania)),*o0inate states

First),5 the :ih Cort has onsistent), phe)* the apait, of the Co00onwea)thto *o0inate the States nania)), throh its ontro) o1er the 0ost i0portantfor0s of taxation re1ene5 $rst nifor0 tax ase(throh its free*o0 to appropriate this re1ene to an, prposes that it thin


9/19

(. )onstitutional *nterpretation

Constitution s 3t this an 3e exee*e*5 so Cort+s 0etho* of interpretation nee*s to 3e netra)an* 3ase* entire), on )aw

The 0ore it appears the Cort is si0p), i1in e6et to hoies of Constittion+s fra0ers5 the0ore )eiti0ate the exerise of their powers wi)) 3e

What are the main interpretative approaches

#n*er the 03re))a of )ea)is05 there is7 riina)is0

Texta)is0

Inre0enta) Ao00o*ation

A!=:AI/>AIT!':AI/>interpreting the Constitution in its ordinary meaning3 however ma)es use of authoritative legal

materials other than the text of the Constitution 9 =T,I/SIC +T,I>S >>5*D

/aunders Lea)is07 an insistene that orts reso)1e )ea) estions 3, referene to stan*ar*s*rawn fro0 the 3o*, of existin )aw an* not on stan*ar*s that are s34eti1e orpersona) to the 4*e

B5W ngineerssaw a tri0ph of )ea)is0 as 0ost )eiti0ate 0etho* > a )itera)

interpretation of the text of the Constittion5 within a ontext of tra*itiona) )ea)prinip)es an* tehnies5 an* ir0stanes of its writinAe-alism is broader than literalism3

Can 3e app)ie* to a)) a*4*iati1e fntions not 4st onstittiona) interpretations

Ma as1er, )ear), *e0onstrate* in the Communist !arty Case

ante* to e0phasise that the reasonin sA!=:AI/>


10/19

:e,*on =

!o sh thinas tre)ea)is0/)itera)is0

?owever an" 6strict7 literal or le-alist approach is impossible as alle(istin- approaches resort somewhat to conte(t outside words of Const3

Denitions of )itera)is07 @ !one of these ata)), exist Exa0inin the wor*s in iso)ation

Exa0inin the wor*s in the ontext of the Const as a who)e5 an* nothin 0ore

A *otrine n*er whih there is on), a 1er, )i0ite* oasion to searh for0eanin otsi*e the text 3, referene to the wi*er histor, of the pro1isiononerne*.

o ;whih exp)ainJe*K the who)e 0atter.E1en arwi< *i*n+t tr), s3sri3e to )itera)is07

o In D5"S arwi< rea* the onst in )iht of its histor, in or*er to*eter0ine it+s %9&& 0eanin.

!either *i* Dixono Dixon )i Rosoe Pon* state* that ;the preept of )aw+ was fon* n*er prinip)es5

oneptions an* stan*ar*s.o Precept a enera) r)e inten*e* to re)ate 3eha1ior or thoht.

;:ar* ases+ are haraterise* 3, the a3sene of an, xe* an* *enite r)es8

where the, are )i


11/19

i1in the f)) reasons an* ths 0a


12/19

Di* a))ow referene to ear)ier *rafts of the Constittion to she* )iht on intention

iarre sitation of a))owin so0e historia) 0ateria)s 3t not a)) $*e3ates(ontine* nti) Cole v *hit6eld where *e3ates were se* to i*entif, ;theonte0porar, Ji.e. historia)K 0eanin of )anae se*5 the s34et to whih that)anae was *irete* an* the natre an* o34eti1es of the 0o1e0ent towar*sfe*eration fro0 whih the o0pat of the Constittion na)), e0ere*+5 3t ;notfor the prpose of s3stittin for the 0eanin of the wor*s se* the sope an*e6et > if sh o)* 3e esta3)ishe* > whih the fon*in fathers s34eti1e),

inten*e* the setion to ha1e+ ri-inalism endorses reference to historical materials as a -uide to

meanin- te(t would have had to 6literate and informed7 readers of theconstitution in 19 $texta) oriina)is0( not to s34eti1e intention of fra0ers$intentiona) oriina)is0(

*or)Choices

Con3 : AI>IT *D+ICI:A :CTI0I/>'I=I:AI/>

J%%K States that ati1is0 cannot )eiti0ate), 3e *ep)o,e* in the ser1ie of s3stanti1esoia) an* po)itia) 1a)es5 3t can )eiti0ate), 3e *ep)o,e* in *efene of the soia)

an* po)itia) proe*res 3, whih or onQits o1er s3stanti1e 1a)es are 0anae*.StephenGae)er

Po)itia) aonta3i)it, pro1i*es the or*inar, onstittiona) 0eans of onstrainin o1tpower7 4*iia) *eferene is appropriate where po)itia) aonta3i)it, is inherent), stron

o e. Don+t nee* to 3e too 1ii)ant wrt the enera) reah of Cth )eis)ati1epower.

4*iia) 1ii)ane is appropriate where po)itia) aonta3i)it, is wea< oren*anere*

o e. rt the riht to 1ote an* po)itia) speeh8nitedStates v Carolene

!roducts CoV&' #S %''$%9V(.

This 4*0ent sets ot three *i6erent sitations whih 0a, in1o


13/19

Stan)e, Fish Antonin Sa)ia+s pro texta)is07o what is written in the onstittion an* what the fra0ers ha* in 0in* 0a,

ha1e in*ee* 3een *i6erent > orts 0st )oo< as what is sai*5 not what isinten*e*

o A)so are* that 3, tr,in to re ot the intention of the fra0ers5 ortsenae in spe)ation that an )ea* the0 to prsin nexpresse*)eis)ate* intents

riina)ist texta)is0 a)so asserts that 3ease wor*s or sinsHareon1entiona)), orre)ate* with 0eanins5 the 0eanins the, on1entiona)), 3ear

wi)) 3e n*erstoo* in*epen*ent), of an, worr, a3ot an inten*er or an intentionU7 Sa)ia is a strit oriina)ist

=D :e,*on The searh is for ;the intention expresse* in the statte itse)f+ not for the intentionexpresse* e)sewhere. e *o not inire what the )eis)atre 0eant8 we as< on),what the state 0eans.

Sine the Constittion is to 3e onstre* as a statte5 there is a nee* to rea* it asa who)e with a 1iew to i1in e6et to the o34et an* prpose its )anaeexpresses5 to rea* it in )iht of the historia) ir0stanes srron*in itsenat0ent5 an* to i1e it the 0eanin it then 3ore.

The re)e1ant historia) fats sho)* 3e onsi*ere* to re1ea) three thins7%. hat the fra0ers of a Constittion 0a, 3e sppose* to ha1e c?u-h *3

Astra)ia has not a*opte* strit oriina)is05 of the t,pe that Sa)ia = a*1oates for.o i))strates this 3, sin an exa0p)e of how the ;in*stria) *isptes+ power

wo)* ha1e 3een onstre* 1er, *i6erent), to*a,5 as oppose* to how itwas onstre* %&& ,ears ao. It has a *i6erent 0eanin to*a, than what itse* to ha1e.

It is often seste* that ngineerso00itte* the :ih Cort to a rei0e of)itera)is0. The 0a4orit,+s approah is 3etter rear*e* as )ea)is0 with texta)is0as the instr0ent of that )ea)is0.

o The Ma4orit, 4sties in ngineersexpress), sai* that the Constittion was

to 3e rea* in )iht of the ir0stanes in whih it was 0a*e with


14/19

intentions an* hene the orts oht to i1e e6et to this intention. Three reasons wh, oriina) intent is a p)asi3)e theor, in re)ation to the Astra)ian

Constittion7%. The Astra)ian o0pat was far 0ore fon*e* in *e0orati prinip)es

than the #S.2. It is easier to *eter0ine the intention of peop)e 9& ,ears5 rather than 2&&

,ears ao.V. The en*s to whih )itera)is0 an* proressi1is0 ha1e 3een pt 3, the :ih

Cort are far )ess attrati1e than those to whih the expansi1e

interpretation of the #S Constittion has 3een *irete*.*or)Choices

Anti@Intent

G)eeson C=5 G00ow5 :a,ne5 :e,*on an* Crennan ==7 To prse the i*entiation of what is sai* to 3e fra0ers+ intention5 0h 0ore

often that not5 is to prse a 0irae. It is a 0irae 3ease the inir, ass0esthat it is 3oth possi3)e an* sef) atte0pt to wor< ot a sin)e o))eti1e 1iewa3ot what now is a *ispte* estion of power5 3t then was not present to the0in*s of those who ontri3te* to the *e3ates

A )ear exa0p)e of this with rear*s to the orporations power in the Constittioni.e. s ?%$xx(. Corporations )aw was sti)) *e1e)opin an* it wo)* 3e inappropriateto asertain the s34eti1e intention of the fra0ers as it was sti)) 3ein *e3ate*.A)so5 the eono0i )ife an* ir0stanes 1ast), *i6er 3etween now an* the ti0ethe Constittion was 3ein fra0e*7 /S* v Commonwealth

A)so it wo)* 3e )i0itin to )oo< at the fra0ers s34eti1e intention as there ha1e3een a n03er of )o3a) e1ents whih the, o)* not ha1e foreseen.Ca))inan = +I//!T7 It is inonei1a3)e that the fra0ers 1isa)ie* a 3roa* power as the one now

asserte*. The Con1ention De3ates a1e ;on), the 0ost rsor, of attention+ to the power.

This is a )ear in*iation that the power was not perei1e* as far@reahin. The e1i*ene to 3e fon* in the De3ates is 1a)a3)e. The Constittion sho)* not

3e onstre* to ena3)e the Cort to spp)ant the peop)e+s 1oie n*er s %2 of it.rgumentsin -avour

or*s are s34eti1e e0pt, 1esse)s inten*e* to on1e, intention

De0orati > e)ete* *rafts0en 1 ne)ete* 4*es

Interpretations of rea*ers are p)ra)/inarate.

ho)e point of Const was to i1e e6et to intentions of fra0ers

IC'!>!T:A :CC>>+:TIThe interpretation the words and phrases in the Constitution without reference to historical meanings

and purely in line with modern meanings.Pro IA ften wor*s in the onstittion sest that the fra0ers antiipate* *e1e)op0ents in

the ftre an* wor*e* the Constittion in a wa, for it to 3e interprete* in )ine withonte0porar, a*1ane0ents.

, v 4rislan

E1i*ene of

IA

the fra0ers se* the wor*s other )i


15/19

2. It 0st fa)) within the prpose n*er),in those onstittiona) wor*s5 as*istint fro0 3ein inferre* fro0 )ater e1ents or points of 1iew.

Connotation+enotation +ichotom"

The C!!TATI! of wor*s in the Constittion is xe* as it was in %9&& $i.e. whatis to 3e i0p)ie* fro0 the wor*s 0st not hane(7 Street v ueensland 4arssociation $&00% &2 C>, E2&

:owe1er the DE!TATI! $the ata) 0eanin of the wor*( hanes with ti0e $itis s34et to new instanes5 or *i6erent , E2&

The essentia) 0eanin of the onstittion 0st re0ain the sa0e$C!!TATI!(5 a)thoh with the passae of ti0e its wor*s 0st 3e app)ie* tositations whih were not en1isae* at fe*eration $DE!TATI!(7 Street vueensland 4ar ssociation $&00% &2 C>, E2&

The *istintion 3etween a ;onnotation+ an* ;*enotation+ has 3een se* to arethat the 0eanin5 or ore harateristis5 of an expression sho)* 3e asertaine*as if xe* at %9&&5 3t that one so asertaine* it 0a, o0e to in)*e newthins o1er ti0e7 in*e,er = in , v !resident of Commonwealth $%9?9( %& CLR2&

Industrial,elationsCase

E1i*ene ofIA

Showe* that the externa) a6airs power was onstre* in )iht of the fat that as anew fe*eration an* externa) re)ations were in a stae of ontinin e1o)tion

PD'P/I0! IT!'P'!T:TI!rogressivism? accepts that ;udges ma)e choices but argues that those choices should consist with

contemporary valuesi))ia0 rennan The Constittion is *rafte* in enera) ter0s > reQetin the fat that the

*rafters the0se)1es *i* not aree on an, strit app)iation. Aor*in), the Constittion sho)* not ha1e an, stati 0eanin rather it

sho)* 3e a3)e to 3e a*apte* to rrent pro3)e0s an* nee*s. Therefore the )ti0ate estion sho)* 3e5 Fwhat do the words mean in our

timeGHAharon ara if we re)ie* on s34eti1e prpose5 we+* re0ain in the past.An*rew In)isC)ar

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