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The author is AssistantVice President,Academics, Embry-Riddle AeronauticalUniversity, Prescott,Arizona, and Chair ofthe TRB AviationSecurity and EmergencyManagement Committee.

Globalization, security, and terrorism arewords often invoked by experts in news-papers, on television, and in the blog -osphere, tweeted via the latest versions

of social networking, and even occasionally pro-nounced in person. As if at the mercy of HumptyDumpty in Through the Looking Glass—whose wordsmeant whatever he chose them to mean—each ofthese words is applied similarly and differently by thesame and different people, so that confusion results.Before examining how globalization has affected, isaffecting, and will affect aviation security—especiallyin the context of terrorism—the first step is to clearthe verbal air.

Globalization What is globalization, and when did it begin? Theword appears in dictionaries in the mid-1940s,

although some treat the word as newly coined. Mostdefinitions point to the increasing degree by whichanyone can be affected by anyone else who is some-where else in the world. Most definitions also notethe increasing interconnectivity among people. Any-thing and anyone may be involved—from war, poli-tics, and sociocultural matters, to health, wealth, andthe pursuit of happiness.

Different groups of scholars have identified dif-ferent starting points for globalization. Some choose1989, with the end of the Cold War and the increaseof what is termed postindustrial capitalism. Othersfavor the 1950s, with the decolonization of the Euro-pean empires in Africa and Asia; some point to 1492,with the rise of European sea exploration and trade;and yet others go back past the expansion of Islamin the 7th through 9th centuries to Alexander theGreat in the late 4th century BC.

Fear of FlyingGlobalization, Security, and TerrorismR I C H A R D W . B L O O M

U.S. Air Force 119thSecurity Forces Squadronairmen detain simulatedsuspects—members of the119th Student Flightunit—as part of a trainingexercise at the NorthDakota Air NationalGuard facility at HectorInternational Airport inFargo, North Dakota.

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This brief history indicates that globalization isnothing new, is not as new as some maintain, is newonly to people who do not study history, or is newonly through the latest technologies interacting withthe latest in human nature.

SecuritySometimes security is considered a state of mind,signifying that someone feels safe from intentionalharm; safety then becomes freedom from uninten-tional harm. Security may be an objective conse-quence—someone is safe from intentional harm—and may imply a meaning not accurate in the realworld—that someone can be completely safe fromintentional harm. Security may refer as well to whatis done to achieve any of those goals—for example,employing behavioral recognition and verbal inter-rogation, explosives detection, biometrics, profiling,

data mining algorithms, and the old standby, doorlocks.

An immediate conclusion is that experts may bearguing about different kinds of security. Appliedresearch about globalization’s effects on the mean-ings, perceptions, and expectations of security is allover the board.

Terrorism“One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedomfighter” is an old canard that must be put to rest. Thestatement is true to the extent that one man’s canni-bal is another man’s gourmand. The behaviors occurregardless of what they are called, but preventingthese behaviors requires action.

Some experts state that terrorism involves threat-ening, injuring, or killing innocent people; someretort that no one is innocent. Other experts statethat terrorism is violence to further political or reli-gious beliefs. Yet apprehended and incarcerated ter-rorists may point to lifestyle choice, group influenceand pressure, or sincere mystification. Most expertsagree that the victims of terrorism are not only thosewho are threatened, injured, or killed, but those whoare direct survivors or indirect observers—especiallythrough mass media and telecommunications.

If terrorism is successful, these victims are morelikely to think, feel, and act in the manner desired byterrorist planners. If no one finds out about terror-ism, it does not work. One conclusion may be thatcounterterrorism should entail less screening of peo-ple and things and more prevention or censorship ofthe news. The main issue then becomes freedom oflife versus freedom of speech without life. Global-

A crowd celebrates atopthe Berlin Wall followingthe official opening ofthe Brandenburg Gate.The fall of the Berlin Wallin 1989 was a significantevent in the history ofglobalization.

Convicted Lockerbiebomber Abdelbaset AliMohmet al-Megrahiarrives in Tripoli, Libya,August 20, 2009, afterbeing freed from aScottish prison.

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ization is not only affecting the meanings, percep-tions, and expectations of terrorism but is increasingthe number and variety of means by which terroristscommunicate and engage in acts of violence.

Globalization affects two goals of aviation securityin response to terrorism—first, finding terroristsbefore they attack; and second, finding explosivesand other weapons before they can be employed.

Finding Terrorists All methods of finding terrorists include collectingand analyzing information about people, develop-ing a valid link between the information and theprobability that a person directly or indirectly willengage in or support terrorism, and then acting toprevent or minimize terrorism in specific cases. Thekinds of information collected and analyzed includevoice intercepts, relayed discussions, and observa-tions, as well as past travel behaviors, known asso-ciates, facial expressions, and choice of clothing.

The biggest problem is developing valid linksbetween information and predicted behavior. Pre-dictions of human behavior—for example, of vio-lence—are extremely difficult. This should not besurprising; human social behavior is unknowable—although this explanation may not fare well after aterrorist event.

ChallengesChallenges to linking information to predictedbehavior include the following:

1. The same information may mean somethingdifferent in different contexts, especially when psy-chological triggers are added or withheld.

2. Depending on the parameters, many peoplemay change from terrorism-inclined to not inclinedand back again, and from being inclined or notinclined in different ways.

3. Most people have less than complete awarenessabout their own behaviors, thoughts, feelings, moti-vations, and inclinations, even if they desire to befully aware or to share this awareness during an inter-view or interrogation.

4. Experts often are confounded by the paradoxthat the most sophisticated terrorists will not looklike terrorists, yet most people do not look like ter-rorists.

5. The greatest majority of people are extremelyunlikely to engage in terrorism, except in the mostextreme situations; therefore, a system for findingterrorists must be extremely accurate, or hordes ofnonterrorists will be identified and treated as terror-ists with noxious, self-induced security, economic,and political consequences for commercial aviation.

6. Without high accuracy in detecting a terrorist,certain nonterrorists may become terrorists becauseof their treatment by security authorities whowrongly identify them as terrorism-inclined.

7. Some terrorists inevitably will be treated asnonterrorists in a less-than-perfect security system,and successful terrorism will result.

Because of points 4 through 7, some experts sup-port random screening of air passengers—or a mod-ification of random screening—even if those pulledout for secondary screening include a 4-year-oldchild or a 90-year-old grandmother, who may havesomething dangerous planted on them.

8. A commonly accepted terrorist indicator,stress, is not all that useful. Stresses arise from manyreasons not related to terrorism—such as trying toavoid missing a flight; moreover, someone about toengage in terrorism who believes it is God’s will orthe key to some other good may not appear stressed,but calm, tranquil, and even blissful.

9. The typical explanations for terrorism—suchas ethnic, sectarian, tribal, economic, and personalgrievances—may be superficial, offering few insightsinto the underlying psychology.

10. All experts depend on combinations of faith,intuition, logic, authority, observation, and experi-mentation to link information to predicted behavior,although all of these approaches have flaws.

11. A contemporary perspective holds that a per-son’s individual identity, mind, nature, personality,and concepts of causality, space, and time may be lan-guage fictions that have practical value in describingself and reality but may not actually exist. Yet if thisis the case, the foundation for the screening criteriadeveloped by experts is tenuous. 23

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A U.S. Customs andBorder Protection canineofficer checks arrivingluggage. Aviation securityrelies on a range ofdetection measures, fromtrained dogs to X-rays.

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A New LanguageIn today’s era of globalization, developments toimprove the identification of terrorists before theystrike are unclear. Depending on disparities in tech-nological sophistication, including cybersecurity, thetrue purpose of a potential threat may or may not behidden.

As more people use the latest communicationstechnologies, human nature and the best language todescribe it may be changing across groups of peopleand within individuals, impeding the identificationof people who pose a threat and of their modusoperandi. In addition, the number, structure, per-meability, function, and process of terrorist networksand organizations are significantly changing, alongwith the psychological, social, cultural, and physicalboundaries they may need to cross.

Static wiring diagrams of terrorist entities maydecrease in value to those charged with protection.Terrorist individuals and organizations are not formalmembers and formal teams. A new language isneeded to describe the dynamics of ever-changingintent, cooperation, support, and social networkingby terrorist individuals and organizations—how per-sonnel for a specific terrorist act are mixed andmatched; how individuals and organizations appear,disappear, and reappear; how operational and sup-port capabilities are shared among individuals andorganizations with radically different ideologies andmotives; and how terrorists wittingly and unwit-tingly self-select and are selected for one-time acts.More and more, individuals can go online and findvalidation with others, as if in a self-reinforcing echochamber, losing any doubts that aviation terrorism orother terrorisms are true, good, and right.

Finding Explosives and WeaponryExperts rely on a variety of technologies to identifythe physical characteristics of explosives and otherweaponry intended for terrorism. Bulk forms andtrace amounts of proscribed materiel can be detectedand identified.

An example that highlights the main issues hasbeen in the news as much for prurient interest as forsecurity—the full-body scanner. The technologydetects bulk forms of explosives and other weaponryvia electromagnetic radiation, usually millimeterwaves or X-rays. The radiation reflected from an indi-vidual’s body is analyzed via computerized algo-rithms to depict differential densities of the body andobjects that may be in or under clothing. Aviationsecurity is supported when some of these objectsprove to be explosives or other weaponry, or whenthe technology deters bringing these items into anairport.

Technology ProblemsSeveral problems arise; accuracy is the first. Tech-nologies are not 100 percent accurate when testedrealistically in a laboratory, tested in field conditions,or employed operationally. Accuracy is furtheraffected by human performance factors, such as lowmotivation, fatigue, distractions, and the applicationof strategies for interpreting technical data. Manyadvocates of the technology concede that low-den-sity items of interest—constituted of liquid, powder,or thin plastic, for example—may go undetected, aswill items hidden between folds of body fat andwithin body orifices.

Second, a sophisticated terrorist entity has theintelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance capa-bilities to learn what the technology does and how.Planning then can focus on how to beat the system,go around it, target another aspect of the aviationenvironment, or choose another transportation modeor some other target. Most terrorists do not harboraviation fetishes or have a burning desire to disregard

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The controversial full-body scanner is designed todetect explosives or other weaponry. Problems suchas accuracy, cost, and possibility of malfunction mustbe addressed when relying on technology foraviation security.

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the most effective security impediments to achieveexplosive, ballistic, or some other more unspeakablesatisfaction.

Third, scanners are costly. Many have estimatedthe cost of fielding full-body scanners at all securitycheckpoints, both domestically and internationally,at several hundred million dollars. This includes onlythe purchasing costs, not the costs of operations andmaintenance, training, and any necessary structuralmodifications to the airport. Yet this or any otherspecific technology would be irrelevant for an infinitenumber of terrorism operations. The result is anextraordinary sunk cost, as well as the opportunitycost. This works to the advantage of terrorists, whoaim to harm the United States economically, as wellas physically.

Another cost problem involves the collateral eco-nomic damage that occurs when the integration ofthe technology with other aviation operations is sub-optimal. This can cut back the volume of air travel;online opportunities for communication, explo-ration, and other experiences are burgeoning.

Fourth, the exposure of people’s bodies has led tomodifications not in the best interests of security,such as blurring a passenger’s face or lowering thefidelity of the body image. Moreover, full-body tech-nology often is optional, with the alternative of bodypat-downs with or without wanding. The alternative,too, can be compromised through cultural and psy-chological concerns about sexual orientation, genderidentity, sexuality, sexism, sexual harassment anddiscrimination, and their social implications. Theseconcerns can bring out the worst in passengers, secu-rity personnel, and security.

Fifth, the cumulative effects of screenings and thepossibility of a malfunction projecting higher radia-tion levels raise potential health issues. Althoughmost experts state that the health risks are no morethan those from background radiation in the envi-ronment or from a few minutes of flight, the healtheffects of screening systems have not been wellresearched.

Sixth, the applied physics of security technologymay be poorly understood, or may be given the ben-efit of the doubt, or may be used as a cover for cor-ruption. All three may depend on a global belief inthe magic of technology and result in support for sys-tems that may have failed to detect explosives,weapons, and illicit drugs in Thailand, Iraq, andMexico, according to news reports.

In the era of globalization, the ease of knowingthe parameters of a technology increases a terrorist’sadvantage. This also can lead to terrorists developingtechnology for use against security. Globalization’sincrease of social interconnectivity increases the pos-

sibilities of the type, timing, and location of a terroristattack obviating the specific technology at an airportor other venue.

Layers of SecurityIn addition to the goals of finding terrorists, explo-sives, and weapons, five other important issues affectaviation security and terrorism in an era of global-ization.

Intelligence OperationsIntelligence operations are necessary to find, appre-hend, interrogate, and—under legal and ethicalrules of engagement and adjudication—incarcerateor terminate terrorists before they can attack. Theinformation from these operations needs to betransmitted continuously and securely to aviation-related authorities, who then must modify policies,plans, programs, and moment-by-moment layersof security. With globalization, layers of securitymust protect against ever-changing threats inter-acting with ever-changing vulnerabilities leading toever-changing risks.

Psychological FactorsIndustrial and organizational psychology play a role.For example, the morale and performance of aviationsecurity personnel who screen at checkpoints wouldimprove with higher pay, better training, a profes-sional culture bordering on elitism, more positivemarketing of security careers, scientifically validatedprofessional training dealing with the detection oflow-probability events, and more respect.

Too many leaders throughout the intelligence,security, law enforcement, and political communities,for example, cultivate a can-do attitude that may leadto turf battles and interpersonal conflicts. Thedynamics of looking for evil may lead to committing 25

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Analysts monitor thetransportation networkat the TransportationSecurity Administration(TSA) Operations Center,which facilitatescommunication betweenTSA, governmentagencies, and lawenforcement and securityagencies. Intelligenceoperations andcommunication are partof a multilayeredapproach to security.

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evil—such as illegal acts and atrocities—to the detri-ment of those who are being protected. Some of thesedynamics include justifying unethical conduct asserving moral purposes, minimizing personal

responsibility for immorality, relabeling and misper-ceiving unethical and immoral consequences, anddehumanizing and blaming human targets. A signif-icant body of research suggests that globalization is

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In an internationalsecurity cooperativeexercise between theUnited States andCameroon, a U.S. Navylieutenant serves as amock captive for theCameroon Navy’s RapidIntervention Battalionteam at Douala NavalBase.

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The volcanic eruptions that began on April 14 from underIceland’s Eyjafjallajökull glacier have exemplified challenges

for transportation in a world of globalization. The eruptionsimmediately became a headline story worldwide, as denseclouds of volcanic ash forced temporary closures of Europeanairspace during April and May, affecting millions of travelers.Governments, companies, and other entities attempted tomanage the reports—in some cases, to provide accurate infor-mation, to satisfy the requests and needs of travelers and thegeneral public, and to reduce needless panic and distress.Other attempts, however, aimed to hide ignorance, to protectunprepared and poorly briefed decision makers, and toadvance other agendas ahead of the public welfare.

All of the attempts at managing the reports proved difficult,because of the global, 24-hour news cycle. The best informedand most effective managers of the story seemed to be notthose with formal authority over aviation and intermodal trans-portation, nor credentialed reporters, but the proverbial menand women on the street—now the cyberstreet—sending infor-mation via cell phone chatter and photos, by texting, Twitter,blogs, Internet chat rooms, Facebook, and You Tube—withsome of the videos going viral, that is, gaining rapid and vastworldwide distribution.

Emergency PlanningOne lesson for all transportation decision makers is that theseand other ever-emerging social networking media need to beintegrated into emergency planning and operations. The per-ceptions of travelers and the general public will continue toinfluence behavior and other reactions, for good or for ill. Man-aging the story of a transportation emergency is as importantas any other emergency task—not just spinning the challengebut helping to understand and meet it.

In an increasingly interdependent world, the eruptionsimmediately demonstrated the expanding role of politics inemergency response. The question of who owns the skies wasdifficult, and perhaps impossible, to answer to everyone’s satis-faction. National sovereignty; professional, sociocultural, andpersonal turf battles; and electoral campaigns were exposed asimpediments to daily commercial aviation operations, planningfor emergencies, and the implementation and evaluation ofemergency plans.

Under the VolcanoThe Eyjafjallajökull Eruptions, Globalization, and Lessons Learned

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Ash and steam continued to billow from Eyjafjallajökull in Iceland inearly May 2010.

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Political decisions carving up the Middle East and Africa inthe past 200 years have contributed to seemingly intractableproblems of governance, war, poverty, and disease; politicallycarving up the skies has contributed to present and future acci-dents. International and transnational organizations need totake the lead in developing optimal education, professional-ization, standardization, and viable policies and programs.

Sharing Applied ScienceThe eruptions demonstrated that applied science and engi-neering need to be shared worldwide. First-hand experienceduring the 1991 Mount Pinatubo eruptions in the Philippines—with a concurrent typhoon and earthquake—revealed that vol-canologists and seismologists have more work to do inpredicting the time, duration, intensity, and pattern of erup-tions. Engineers have more work to do in understanding andpredicting the effects of silicates, glass fibers, and other prod-ucts of an eruption on aircraft and aircraft engines.

The same applies to the short- to long-term health effects ofcontact with volcanic debris and its sequelae—although thisknowledge has advanced further than attempts to identify thehealth effects of the inhalation of, or physical exposure to,debris during the 1989–1990 Persian Gulf War, the 2003 inva-sion of Iraq, or the September 11, 2001, attacks on the WorldTrade Center.

In addition, more work is needed in operations research foraircraft, intermodal transport, passenger, cargo, and supportlogistics, particularly the development of mathematical models.More adaptive, quantitative approaches are needed for mod-eling revenue and cost projections, including insurance risk.The more that globalization fosters a global village—even onewith variations in the permeability of boundaries—the moreapplied mathematics can inform subjective judgment.

Security ImplicationsIn a world of globalization, nearly every transportation eventand the response to it have security implications. In effect,the world has become a research laboratory for criminals,including those who practice terrorism. Like daily securityviolations, a natural disaster precipitates a response thatthose who seek to harm the transportation system can eas-ily study. Not only can the response to an event be studiedto help predict and exploit a countercriminal response, butthe event itself and the response can serve as an ideal timefor criminal behavior. An example is the terrorist tactic ofcausing one explosion and then timing another to hit thefirst responders and any gathered observers. Another is theworldwide sharing of suicide terrorist tactics against trans-portation on land, sea, and in the air.

The increasingly sophisticated cybersecurity challenge exac-erbates the challenge to live, work, plan, and respond as ifalways being observed and analyzed for the next attack.

Videos on You Tube, Internet discussions, and other forms of socialmedia sharing proved to be the most effective methods ofdisseminating information about the volcanic eruption.

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exposing people to disinhibiting stimuli, rendering terrorism andinappropriate counterterrorism more likely.

Public RelationsAll foreign policy tools—military, diplomatic, economic, social, cul-tural, and humanitarian—should be used to improve internationalperceptions of the United States, so that fewer people engage in orsupport terrorism. With globalization, an increasing number ofinformation sources compete for attention, so that actual threats maybe ignored or discounted.

Many people, at least within the United States, expect 100 per-cent safety and security. Many will not tolerate casualties or ter-rorist attempts and seem to expect a perfect imperviousness tothreats. Despite the low frequency and small objective conse-quences of previous terrorism, the subjective psychological con-sequences have been much larger and longer-lasting. Thispsychology makes the United States a lucrative target and increasesthe probability of terrorist success—because objective success and

objective failure both qualify as subjective success. A more mature perspective on reality, the meaning of life, and

the nature of risk is needed. Globalization may help by facilitat-ing an understanding that significant risk is omnipresent, even asit varies from place to place and moment to moment.

Psychological WarfareTerrorism is ultimately psychological, and the war against terrorism, aspecific warfare technique, is actually a global psychological war. Theconflict is with ever-changing groupings of people who have used andare willing to use extraordinary violence to create a world that toler-ates certain ways of living but not others.

Antiterrorism and counterterrorism may identify, apprehend,incarcerate, and terminate many terrorists but may create asmany—if not more—terrorists, because of the way these actionsare communicated. Aviation security is only a part of the globalpsychological war, in which the victors and vanquished may notbe people, but the ideas they carry.