South Sudan – Country Overview

John David Garrett

This country overview looks at the factors that have most influenced the newly-formed sub-

Saharan state of South Sudan in adopting a decentralized legal order, along with a popular call for a

concrete federal constitution. It will therefore also be necessary to address the situation in Sudan

(considered 'quasi' sub-Saharan) prior to the succession of South Sudan from that state. In the first

section, the social, economic, political, and legal foundations in South Sudan are explained. The

overview will address how power is distributed via South Sudan's system – how practices of shared-rule

and self-rule exist (or not) within the system. The overview will then look at the normative dimensions

that have followed since being instituted as a decentralized state, along with any unintended

consequences and conflicts. Finally, the overview will end with a diagnosis of the apparent problems to

which a nominally decentralized government is blamed and to which a decentralized/federalist system

may or may not be able to address.

The social, economic, political, and legal foundations of South Sudan

The newly formed state of South Sudan is the result of two great conflicts in the history of

Sudan, that of 1955-1972 and 1983-2005, which culminated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

(CPA) in 2005 and the succession of South Sudan from Sudan in 2011 (e.g., Lokuji, 2011; Seymour,

2013). Ethnic tensions and a lack of distributive justice have been cited as the main reasons for the long

civil war and final succession of South Sudan. The government of Sudan in Khartoum (GoS) had tried

to stop any succession of the South, keep its political identity as 'Arab' rather than 'African' (with a

Muslim-Christian divide), and maintain GoS control of resources such as water and oil in South Sudan.

Groups that made up what is now South Sudan accused the GoS as being a neo-colonialist oppressor

denying the South political equality and equal access to resource wealth (e.g., Lokuji, 2011).

Upon its succession, South Sudan declared itself as a republic divided into three regions, ten

states, and 86 counties. The Transitional Constitution of South Sudan (TCSS) was formed in 2011 upon

the independence of South Sudan to deal with the formulation of the new government. While there was

an initial call for a federalist system, the government in Juba (GoSS) kept the country within the realm

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of a decentralized republic stopping short of creating a full-blown federalist constitution. The GoSS

promised inclusive governance, and it has since been constitutionally mandated via the TCSS. The

government is structured along the lines of 'trias politica' with executive, legislative, and judicial

branches both at the center and at the state level (CIA, 2015). In practice, though, governance has given

way towards a more centralized form with the GoSS in Juba holding the reigns of power (e.g., Obonyo

& Omia, 2015).

The normative dimensions 'decentralization', conflict, and a call for a federalist constitution

While shared-rule and self-rule has been adopted in theory by the state, it has apparently failed

to be realized with charges against the GoSS of ethnic favoritism via government posts, funds, etc. This

has led to new calls for justice and further hostilities within South Sudan between the apparently

marginalized ethnic groups and the GoSS. As a result, those marginalized groups have called for a

federalist constitution that would concretely allow semi-autonomous rule within 23 districts with a

guarantee of federal services and funds (e.g., Obonyo & Omia, 2015). Though, the call for 23 districts

may be irrelevant in actually dealing with conflict, as the two orders of government at the center and

regional state exist as detailed by Erk (2015).

Ethiopia also used a transitional authority in its road to a federalist constitution (Kefale, 2014).

As with Ethiopia, South Sudan will most likely face a call to power-sharing between the local and the

center based not just on defined territorial boundaries, but because of increasingly diverse cities and

gender relations (e.g. Obonyo & Omia, 2015). These normative changes influenced by both the

changing local conditions within cities due to changes with infrastructure and global influences with

regards to social egalitarianism could very likely cause a degree of unanticipated stress.

A diagnosis based on literature detailing other African reforms in decentralization and federalism

Ejobowah (2010) stated in his research regarding Nigerian ethnofederalism that, while power-

sharing as a normative need is quite important, fiscal autonomy was also fundamental. The “real evil in

Nigerian ethnofederalism” he said, was “financial dependence” on the center (p. 270). He went on to

set forward a 'viability test' that was considered essential for any normative peace, and that such a

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viability test could be satisfied with the proper distribution of Nigerian oil revenues, or responsibilities

in production and ownership. Garang (2015) added to this the idea of further leveraging oil resources as

a means to build small and medium-sized industries within South Sudan, further enhancing the ability

for economic autonomy and thereby political self-rule.

The international community could also play a role in helping to foster cooperation in the

younger days of state. Either the existence or misperception of bias can present a significant obstacle

towards inclusive governance as Isumonah & Egwaikhide (2013) suggested was the case with the

distribution of Nigeria's oil wealth. Though, as Guelke (1994) determined with the inclusion of 'foreign,

independent, electoral observers' in South Africa's first democratic elections, conflict based on

accusations of bias could be avoided. While his study didn't preclude unfairness in that election process,

the presence of outside observers gave it legitamacy within the eyes of the electorate and acceptance of

the major competing parties.

As such, a degree of 'prudence' might be in order as Erk (2014) suggested with regards to the

expectations of the promise of federalism or of decentralization. Whether trying to make its

decentralization efforts work or giving in to the call for a full federal constitution, South Sudan might do

well to reflect on the experiences of South Africa, Ethiopia, and Nigeria. Erk (2015) outlined in these

experiences that 'solving' conflict between groups might be better framed as 'managing' conflict between

groups. In these initial steps of consolidating a government that can successfully manage conflict either

through decentralization or federalism (or neither), arbitration via the African Union and other

multilateral organizations with an interest in keeping regional stability might prove a wise undertaking

for the long-term.

Obonyo & Omia (2015) stated, inclusive governance is essential in providing “democracy and

peace dividends in states emerging from conflict” (p. 96). South Sudan is the newest African state,

recently relieved from conflict with Sudan only to find itself in its own internal conflict – apparently

deriving again from the perceived marginization of groups from a center authority. Religious and

regional identity was considered a major factor in the 'Arab' versus 'African' divide, but with its absence

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there seems a multitude of other factors which can arise and cause conflict between groups (e.g. Lokuji,

2011; Rothfuss & Yakubu, 2015). Osaghae (2003) stated in the case of Nigeria, “ethnic autonomy is a

function of power relations” that involves a struggle for “control of state power and resources” (p. 84).

If so, South Sudan will have to take quite seriously how it's going to most effectively distribute control

over its oil wealth and other natural resources in a way that will effectively reduce tension between

groups – federalism or not.

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Bibliography / References

Egwaikhide, F. O., & Isumonah, V. A. (2013). Federal presence in higher institutions in Nigeria and the

north/south dichotomy. Regional & Federal Studies, 23(2), 169-188.

Ejobowah, J. B. (2010). Territorial pluralism: Assessing the ethnofederal variant in Nigeria. Regional &

Federal Studies, 20(2), 251-274.

Erk, J. (2010). Federalism and decentralization in sub-Saharan Africa: Five patterns of evolution.

Regional & Federal Studies, 24(5), 535-552.

Erk, J. (2015). Federalism & decentralization: Evaluating Africa's track record. MOOC videos,

Universiteit Leiden.

Garang, J. A. (2015). How to leverage oil resources to enhance SME financing in South Sudan.

International Journal of Economic Policy in Emerging Economies, 8(2), 119-137.

Guelke, A. (1994). South Africa's 'peace' elections: The regional dimension. Regional Politics & Policy,

4(2), 117-125.

Kefale, A. (2014). Ethnic decentralization and the challenges of inclusive governance in multiethnic

cities: The case of Dire Dawa, Ethiopia. Regional & Federal Studies, 24(5), 589-605.

Lokuji, A. S. (2011). Beyond the North-South dichotomy in Sudan: Issues, actors, and interests. In M.

Baregu (Ed.) Understanding obstacles to peace: Actors, interests, and strategies in Africa's

Great Lakes region. Kampala, Uganda: Fountain Publishers, 170-221.

Obonyo, J. A., & Omia, D. O. (2015). Building legitimate and accountable government in South Sudan:

Re-thinking inclusive governance in the post CPA-2005.

Rothfuss, R., & Yakubu, J. (2015). The role of religion in the formation of a new state on the world map:

South Sudan. p. 3515-3540. The Changing World Religion Map. Springer, Netherlands.

Seymour, L. J. M. (2013). Let's bullshit! Arguing, bargaining and dissembling over Darfur. European

Journal of International Relations, 20(3), 1-25.

CIA, US. (2015). South Sudan. The world factbook. Retrieved from:

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/od.html

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