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Elena and Nkem's FB NewspaperTRANSCRIPT
“...The relationship between
performance and ownership
concentration should vary
protection afforded small
between performance and ownership
publicly traded and privately held
companies located in smaller European
economies (Austria, Belgium, Finland,
represent the five legal families (German,
French, Scandinavian, Common Law, and
Eurasian, respectively), yet are
stock markets. This paper is the first cross-
country study we know of to explore the
relationship between corporate
“Ownership and Performance in Europe”
down the sample by size and by one-digit
SIC industry category. We conclude with
some implications for the literature and for
future research.
Ownership Concentration and
results. Although some studies find that
ownership concentration and performance
most recent salient finding (Demsetz and
Villalonga, 2001) is that in an environment
where ownership structure is endogenous -
where shares can be freely traded in a
liquid equity market - ownership structure
and performance arise together, and we
should expect no clear relationship
between them.
relationship between ownership and
whether the controlling block is held by a
single shareholder, or by a coalition of
shareholders. (Bolton and von Thadden
[1998] present a theoretical model that
specifies conditions when either dispersed
or concentrated ownership may be ideal.)
In environments with poor legal protection
(e.g., Bulgaria as analyzed by Atanasov,
2005), a single blockholder will be able to
divert a large portion of the value away
from minority shareholders. This diversion
could take many forms: transfer pricing o
intermediate goods that reduces profits,
loans made to other firms or individuals at
interest rates that provide subsidies to the
borrower, and even outright asset stripping
(selling corporate assets at below-market
prices to another entity fully owned by the
majority shareholder). For these reasons,
we might expect to see a negative
relationship between return on assets
(ROA) and ownership concentration by a
single bockholder in environments with
Solu"ion Rea#$ed
O%ne&s$i'
he is the best candidate to assume full control and
highest market share of the
business (56%)
T$e (usiness
remain as allocated
shares as private and not
public
the current management contract system and not the
franchise system
T$e Family
family mansion with all members still living
harmoniously and
ene&a"ion "o #ome- Will "$e s"&u#"u&e
o+ "$e di.ision o+ "$e s$a&es sus"ain su#$
#$anes o& %ill i" $a.e "o (e &e.ised-
Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0uv8_ioE3iI
The Harilela rothers !cloc"wise #rom #ro$t% &eor'e( )eter( &ary( *i"e( ob a$+ Hari
Source: Ho$' ,o$' &e$eral -hambre o# -ommerce(
hhtp://www.chambre.or'.h"/i$#o/member_a_wee"/harilela.asp.
performance and ownership
concentration should vary
protection afforded small
between performance and ownership
publicly traded and privately held
companies located in smaller European
economies (Austria, Belgium, Finland,
represent the five legal families (German,
French, Scandinavian, Common Law, and
Eurasian, respectively), yet are
stock markets. This paper is the first cross-
country study we know of to explore the
relationship between corporate
“Ownership and Performance in Europe”
down the sample by size and by one-digit
SIC industry category. We conclude with
some implications for the literature and for
future research.
Ownership Concentration and
results. Although some studies find that
ownership concentration and performance
most recent salient finding (Demsetz and
Villalonga, 2001) is that in an environment
where ownership structure is endogenous -
where shares can be freely traded in a
liquid equity market - ownership structure
and performance arise together, and we
should expect no clear relationship
between them.
relationship between ownership and
whether the controlling block is held by a
single shareholder, or by a coalition of
shareholders. (Bolton and von Thadden
[1998] present a theoretical model that
specifies conditions when either dispersed
or concentrated ownership may be ideal.)
In environments with poor legal protection
(e.g., Bulgaria as analyzed by Atanasov,
2005), a single blockholder will be able to
divert a large portion of the value away
from minority shareholders. This diversion
could take many forms: transfer pricing o
intermediate goods that reduces profits,
loans made to other firms or individuals at
interest rates that provide subsidies to the
borrower, and even outright asset stripping
(selling corporate assets at below-market
prices to another entity fully owned by the
majority shareholder). For these reasons,
we might expect to see a negative
relationship between return on assets
(ROA) and ownership concentration by a
single bockholder in environments with
Solu"ion Rea#$ed
O%ne&s$i'
he is the best candidate to assume full control and
highest market share of the
business (56%)
T$e (usiness
remain as allocated
shares as private and not
public
the current management contract system and not the
franchise system
T$e Family
family mansion with all members still living
harmoniously and
ene&a"ion "o #ome- Will "$e s"&u#"u&e
o+ "$e di.ision o+ "$e s$a&es sus"ain su#$
#$anes o& %ill i" $a.e "o (e &e.ised-
Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0uv8_ioE3iI
The Harilela rothers !cloc"wise #rom #ro$t% &eor'e( )eter( &ary( *i"e( ob a$+ Hari
Source: Ho$' ,o$' &e$eral -hambre o# -ommerce(
hhtp://www.chambre.or'.h"/i$#o/member_a_wee"/harilela.asp.