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Edited by John Akokpari, Angela Ndinga-Muvumba and Tim Murithi

UnionAfrican

the

Institutionsand its

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First published by Fanele – an imprint of Jacana Media (Pty) Ltd in 2008

10 Orange StreetSunnysideAuckland Park 2092South Africa+2711 628 3200www.jacana.co.za

© Centre for Confl ict Resolution, 2008

All rights reserved.

ISBN 978-1-920196-03-5

Set in Sabon 10/12ptPrinted by CTP Book Printers, Cape TownJob No. 000582

See a complete list of Jacana titles at www.jacana.co.za

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Contents

Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv

Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix

List of Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxi

INTRODUCTION

Building an African Union for the 21st Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1Tim Murithi and Angela Ndinga-Muvumba

PART ONE: FROM THE OAU TO THE AU: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

1. Renaissance of Pan-Africanism: The AU and the New Pan-Africanists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25Kay Mathews

2. From Non-Interference to Non-Indifference: The Emerging Doctrine of Confl ict Prevention in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41Musifi ky Mwanasali

3. From Military Security to Human Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63Eboe Hutchful

4. Dilemmas of Regional Integration and Development in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85John Akokpari

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PART TWO: PEACE AND SECURITY

5. The Peacemaking Role of the OAU and the AU: A Comparative Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113Solomon Gomes

6. The Peacekeeping Travails of the AU and the Regional Economic Communities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131Adekeye Adebajo

7. Accelerating the Response: An Evolving African HIV/AIDS Policy? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163Angela Ndinga-Muvumba

8. Africa’s Internally Displaced Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183Francis Deng

PART THREE: GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

9. The Birth and Evolution of NEPAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207Chris Landsberg

10. NEPAD and its Discontents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227Sheila Bunwaree

11. NEPAD’s African Peer Review Mechanism: Progress and Prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241Adebayo Adedeji

12. The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Origins and Prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271Ahmed Motala

13. A Critical Appraisal of the African Union–ECOSOCC Civil Society Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291Charles Mutasa

14. The Pan-African Parliament: Progress and Prospects . . . . . . . . . 307Baleka Mbete

15. Africa and Gender Equality: Priorities for the AU . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317Winnie Byanyima

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PART FOUR: THE DIASPORA AND EXTERNAL ACTORS

16. The AU and Africa’s Three Diasporas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333Francis Kornegay

17. The AU and the EU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355Daniel Bach

CONCLUSION

Building a Unifi ed Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371John Akokpari

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383

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Contributors

Adekeye Adebajo is Executive Director of the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa. He served as the Director of the Africa Programme of the New York-based International Peace Academy (IPA) between 2001 and 2003. During the same period, Dr Adebajo was an Adjunct Professor at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA). He previously served on United Nations (UN) missions in South Africa, Western Sahara, and Iraq. Dr Adebajo is the author of Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau; Liberia’s Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa; and co-editor of South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era; A Dialogue of the Deaf: Essays on Africa and the United Nations; Managing Armed Conflicts in the Twenty-First Century; and West Africa’s Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region. He obtained his doctorate from Oxford University, where he studied as a Rhodes Scholar.

Adebayo Adedeji is a member of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) Panel of Eminent Persons and was appointed its Chairperson for the period of 2007 to 2008. He is also the Chairperson of the African Union (AU) High-Level Panel which was mandated to conduct an independent audit review of the Union by the AU heads of state and government in Accra, Ghana in July 2007. He has been a proponent and architect of regional integration in Africa since the early 1970s, beginning with the establishment of the Economic Community of West

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African States (ECOWAS). During his tenure as Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission of Africa from 1975 to 1991, Adedeji led the development of the Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA), which later became the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Between 1971 and 1975, he was Minister of Economic Reconstruction and Development in Nigeria. He has published widely on African political economy, development and security, and most recently co-edited South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era. Professor Adedeji is also the director of the African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies (ACDESS), a think-tank based in Ijebu Ode, Nigeria.

John Akokpari is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Studies at the University of Cape Town, South Africa. In 2007 he was a Visiting Research Fellow at the Japan External Trade Organisation’s (JETRO) Institute of Developing Economies in Chiba, Japan. He is the author of numerous publications on globalisation, development and trade and has published in academic and policy journals. Dr Akokpari obtained his doctorate in politics from Dalhousie University in Halifax, Canada.

Daniel Bach is the Director of Research at the Centre d’Etude d’Afrique Noire (CNRS), in Bordeaux, France and a Professor at Institut d’Etudes Politiques, University Montesquieu Bordeaux IV. He has also taught at Obafemi Awolowo University in Nigeria and Boston University in the United States. His research interests are in international relations and the politics of regional integration. Professor Bach has published extensively on Nigerian federalism and its politics; regional institutions and regionalisation processes in Africa; the interactions between regionalisation and the globalisation of the world economy; and relations between the European Union (EU) and Africa. Among other publications, he is co-editor of Regionalisation in Africa: Integration and Disintegration.

Sheila Bunwaree was an Archie Mafeje Fellow at the Africa Institute of South Africa in 2006 and also a Visiting Fellow at the Australian National University (ANU) in Canberra, Australia. She teaches sociology and political science at the University of Mauritius, Renduit. Dr Bunwaree’s research interests include globalisation, gender and governance.

Winnie Byanyima is the Director of the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Gender Team in its Bureau for Development Policy in New York. She was the Director of the Gender, Women and Development Department at the African Union Commission in Addis

The African Union and its Institutions

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Ababa, Ethiopia between 2004 and 2006. Ms Byanyima has also been a Member of Parliament in Uganda and a prominent activist within the gender equality movement in Africa. She was a Visiting Fellow at the African Gender Institute (AGI), University of Cape Town, between 2003 and 2004.

Francis Deng is the UN Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities. He served as the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Internally Displaced Persons between 1992 and 2004. He was also a Professor at the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies in Washington DC, having been a senior fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, also in Washington DC. Professor Deng was formerly Sudan’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and has served as the Sudanese Ambassador to the United States, the Scandinavian countries and Canada. He has authored and edited numerous publications in the fields of law, conflict resolution, international displacement and human rights. In 2006, Professor Deng was awarded the Rome Prize for Peace and Humanitarian Action, sponsored by the city of Rome, Italy, for his work on internal displacement. He is also the author of several books including Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis of Internal Displacement.

Solomon Gomes is a Senior Political Officer at the African Union Commission in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and advisor to its Darfur Integrated Task Force. He served as Special Assistant to the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) between 2000 and 2004. Dr Gomes also served as Deputy Permanent Observer of the Organisation of African Unity’s (OAU) mission to the United Nations in New York. He has been the coordinator of the OAU Observer Mission to the UN Mission in Western Sahara (MINURSO) and a Senior Political Officer in the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). Dr Gomes obtained his doctorate from the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies in Washington DC.

Eboe Hutchful is Professor of Africana Studies at Wayne State University in Detroit, Michigan and chair of the African Security Sector Network (ASSN), a multidisciplinary network spanning African think-tanks, civil society organisations, security practitioners and parliamentarians active in the area of security sector governance and transformation. He also heads African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR), a non-

Contributors

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governmental organisation based in Accra, Ghana. Professor Hutchful has taught at several universities in Africa and North America, including the University of Toronto, Trent University, the University of Port Harcourt, and the University of Ghana. He is the author and co-editor of several books including Military and Militarism in Africa; Ghana’s Adjustment Experience: The Paradox of Reform; and Budgeting for the Military Sector in Africa: The Processes and Mechanisms of Control.

Francis Kornegay is a Senior Researcher on foreign affairs at the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) in Johannesburg, South Africa, where he is Head of the Centre’s project on the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) trilateral forum. He has worked for members of the United States Congressional Black Caucus, and he is a frequent contributor of critical commentaries in South African newspapers and electronic media.

Chris Landsberg is Special Research Professor of Politics at the University of Johannesburg, South Africa. Professor Landsberg has also been the Director of the Centre for Policy Studies in Johannesburg and was a co-founder of the Centre for Africa’s International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand, where he is also a board member. He is author of The Quiet Diplomacy of Liberation: International Politics and South Africa’s Transition; and co-editor of From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s Regional Security Challenges and South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era. He obtained his doctorate from Oxford University, where he studied as a Rhodes Scholar.

Kay Mathews, a noted expert on African and international politics, is Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia. From 1991 to 2003 he was Professor of African Studies (and Head of Department) at the University of Delhi, India. Prior to that he was Senior Lecturer and Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. Professor Mathews is author of over 80 publications, including two edited books, twenty chapters in edited books, journal articles and entries in well-known encyclopaedias. He has also served on the editorial boards of scholarly journals, including the editorship of the Africa Quarterly, based in New Delhi, between 2001 and 2003.

Baleka Mbete joined the African National Congress (ANC) in Swaziland in 1976. She has worked for the ANC in different capacities, including in

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its Department of Information and Publicity, which broadcast into South Africa through its Radio Freedom. She has been in leadership structures of the ANC Women’s League since 1978, and in 1991 became a member of the ANC’s National Executive Committee. She was one of the ANC’s constitutional negotiators at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) and the Constitutional Assembly. Ms Mbete was the Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly of South Africa from 1996 to 2004, and was elected Speaker of the Assembly in April 2004. She is a member of the Pan-African Parliament (PAP).

Ahmed Motala was the Executive Director of the South African-based Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) between 2005 and 2007. Mr Motala is a human rights lawyer and activist, and he has worked over the past 16 years on an array of human rights and development issues at the national, continental and international levels. He has been Executive Director of the Human Rights Institute of South Africa; Legal Adviser on Africa of the international secretariat of Amnesty International; Human Rights Officer for Save the Children United Kingdom; and litigating attorney and investigator for Lawyers for Human Rights, based in South Africa. Mr Motala has written on a range of human rights topics, including the African human rights system, and presented papers at numerous workshops and symposia.

Tim Murithi joined the Direct Conflict Prevention Programme at the Institute for Security Studies’ (ISS) office in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia as a Senior Researcher in May 2007. Between 2005 and 2007, he was a Senior Researcher at the Centre for Conflict Resolution in Cape Town, South Africa. From 1999 to 2005, Dr Murithi worked as a Programme Officer in the Programme in Peacemaking and Preventive Diplomacy at the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), in Geneva, Switzerland. Dr Murithi has worked as a consultant on conflict resolution for the Organisation of African Unity; the United Nations Development Programme in Sierra Leone; the UN-affiliated University for Peace; the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID); and the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Author of numerous publications, his most recent is entitled The African Union: Pan-Africanism, Peacebuilding and Development.

Charles Mutasa is the Executive Director of the African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD), which is based in Harare, Zimbabwe. He also represents AFRODAD in the African Union’s

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Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC). Mr Motala serves in the interim ECOSOCC’s bureau as the Deputy Presiding Officer for Southern Africa. He is the author of numerous publications on the AU and civil society.

Musifiky Mwanasali is currently working in the political affairs division of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), in Khartoum, Sudan. Since 2004, Dr Musifiky has been an officer at the UN Department of Political Affairs in New York. He previously served as Regional Adviser for the Regional Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Central Africa, in Yaounde, Cameroon, and as a political analyst in the Conflict Management Centre at the African Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Dr Mwanasali has also held teaching and research posts in academia and in think-tanks in both Africa and the United States. He has contributed chapters to, among others, A Dialogue of the Deaf: Essays on Africa and the United Nations; From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Challenges; Zones of Conflict in Africa; and Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars.

Angela Ndinga-Muvumba is a Senior Researcher at the Centre for Conflict Resolution in Cape Town, South Africa, and Head of its HIV/AIDS and Security Project. Between June 2004 and March 2005, Ms Ndinga-Muvumba served as a Political Officer in the Bureau of the Chairperson of the Africa Union Commission in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. She also worked with the New York-based International Peace Academy’s (IPA) Africa Programme between 2000 and 2004 and has served as a consultant for the UN’s HIV/AIDS and Governance Commission. Ms Ndinga-Muvumba holds a Master’s degree in International Affairs from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) in New York. She has published a number of scholarly articles and chapters.

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Foreword

Ambassador Salim Ahmed Salim

THIS VOLUME, written by eminent scholars on Africa and practitioners who have worked in or with the African Union, is a particularly timely and welcome addition to the pioneering literature about our young institution. The African Union (AU) was born in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002, at a time when Africans were rediscovering a sense of pride in their continent and a desire to pursue an African Renaissance. Therefore, we need robust scholarship that provides us with objective reflection of the challenges and dynamics of Africa’s reassertion of its destiny.

As the former Secretary-General of the AU’s predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), between 1989 and 2001, and now the Special Envoy of the African Union for Darfur, I am struck by how relevant the AU is to a changing world and to a continent in transition. At the inauguration of the AU in July 2002, African leaders gathered in Durban to announce to the world that the continent was coming of age.

First and foremost, the new Union is a re-emergence of the quest for African unity, a project dating back to the years before independence in the 20th century. Pan-Africanism was an expression of resistance against colonial occupation and it became synonymous with the common aspiration for peace and freedom. The Pan-African movement thus gave birth, initially, to the Organisation of African Unity and has once again been the cornerstone of the continent’s political collective in the form of the African Union.

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Secondly, while the AU builds on the accomplishments of the OAU, it is a much broader organisation with a dynamic framework for providing vision, leadership and policy guidance, and for maintaining effective engagement and implementation in all spheres of the continent’s development. The organisational framework of the AU is closely built in alignment with the regional economic communities (RECs) such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). These institutions are sub-regional structural links to the continental body and will be critical to implementing regional integration and cooperation on peace and security, as well as governance and development issues.

Yet, the operationalisation of this new continental framework is a gradual process that generates its own dynamics, while simultaneously seeking to address several formidable challenges to Africa’s peace and development. The deployment of AU forces to Sudan’s western region of Darfur in 2004 demonstrated the organisation’s commitment, for example, to managing Africa’s conflicts.

The African Union has enumerated an impressive array of institutions which, once they are effectively operationalised, will provide us with the ability to stand united. The peace and security architecture is anchored by the 15-member Peace and Security Council, the African Standby Force, the Continental Early Warning System and the Panel of the Wise. Development will be buttressed by the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), while the continental legal framework will be enhanced by the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights as well as the African Court of Justice. Civil society is a key factor in the socio-economic emancipation of the continent, and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSSOC) will provide an important forum for engagement. The South African-based Pan-African Parliament as it evolves provides a space for African citizens to deliberate on key issues affecting the continent. These institutions, which are extensively analysed in this pioneering study, are premised on a commitment towards a renewed sense of Pan-Africanism and an aspiration towards an Africa that is integrated, prosperous and peaceful. The old adage states that “in unity there is strength”, and this is the fundamental realisation that African leaders gradually recognised and accepted when they inaugurated the Union. Although there are significant challenges facing us as we proceed with our responsibility to bring about peace, security and development on our continent, we are up to the task. We

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Foreword

may not complete this task in our life times, but will give our children and their children a much better foundation on which to advance the African cause.

I therefore commend the editors of this volume and all its authors for their intellectual courage in producing this book. This is a rich volume that will contribute towards framing the debate about the African Union among us Africans. It is an important contribution highlighting the transformation of our continental organisation and an informative publication which joins scholars, activists and policymakers in a discourse that has been considered for a long time to be the exclusive preserve of governments and diplomats.

It is a must-read for all those who are interested in the evolution of the Organisation of African Unity to the African Union.

Ambassador Salim Ahmed Salim Former Secretary General of the Organisation African Unity and Special Envoy of the African Union for DarfurDar-es-SalaamFebruary 2008

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Acknowledgements

A book of this nature could not have been possible without the assistance and co-operation of many people. The idea and scope of a book project on the new African Union emanated from the Centre for Confl ict Resolution, a pan-African policy research and training institution affi liated to the University of Cape Town, South Africa, in 2004. Conceived as an opportunity to deepen understanding about the new pan-continental institution, the project evolved as leading African intellectuals and policymakers became involved in a seminar on the African Union in Cape Town in July 2005, and then subsequently became contributors to this volume. We would like to thank them for their good-hearted hard work, tireless revisions of their initial chapters and patience during the process of fi nalising this project. We would also like to thank the other participants – too many to list - at the Cape Town seminar. The vigorous debates they generated helped to strengthen the conceptual themes of this volume.

CCR would like to thank the funders of its Africa Programme: the governments of Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and Finland, as well as the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund (RBF) in New York. Their fi nancial support and partnership has helped to establish our capacity to realise CCR’s Pan-African vision. In addition, we would like to thank Caroline Smith, Russell Clarke and all at Jacana Media for their input and effi ciency. Finally, we are very grateful to Derrick Fine, who undertook copyediting the manuscript with enthusiasm and diligence.

We would like to acknowledge our colleagues, whose assistance and

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support ensured the successful completion of this volume: Selma Walters at CCR who provided invaluable administrative support with good cheer and expertise; Elizabeth Myburgh also at CCR, who facilitated exchanges of information on the status of various versions of the manuscript; CCR staff in Finance, Communications and Human Resources, who are always working to keep things moving effortlessly; and Lawrence Michelo, a graduate student at the University of Cape Town’s Politics Department, who provided immense organisational assistance. These individuals and many others, whose names cannot be listed here for lack of space, have been generous with their time and energy, helping to bring this project to fruition.

We are deeply grateful to Adekeye Adebajo, the Executive Director of CCR, who is blazing a path for Africans to build their own institutions and forge their own destinies. He has not only provided leadership for this project but has also been gracious beyond measure. He has helped to keep the project on track both administratively and intellectually, and we have been fortunate to have been able to steal some of his time and expertise as a reader of this volume.

Finally, we would like to thank our families, near and far: this project would not have been possible without their encouragement and sacrifi ce.

This book, written by a diverse group of African scholars and practitioners, offers a pan-African perspective on the hopes for an effective Union. We hope that it will contribute signifi cantly to an understanding among specialists and the general public of the African Union, its institutions and prospects for the continent’s Renaissance.

John Akokpari, Angela Ndinga-Muvumba and Tim MurithiCape Town, South Africa 2008

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List of Acronyms

AASROC Asian-African Sub-Regional Organisations ConferenceACHPRRWA African Charter on Human and People’s RightsACJ African Court of JusticeACOTA African Contingency Operations Training Assistance ACP Africa, Caribbean and the PacificACRI African Crisis Response InitiativeACS Association of Caribbean States ADB African Development BankADDI African Diaspora Dialogue Initiative AEC African Economic Community AFSTRAG African Strategic and Peace Research GroupAFFORD African Foundation for DevelopmentAGOA Africa Growth and Opportunity Act AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ALF African Leadership Forum AMIB African Union Mission in BurundiAMIS African Union Mission in SudanAMU Arab Maghreb UnionANC African National CongressAPF African Peace FacilityAPSF African Peace Support FacilityAPR African Peer Review APRM African Peer Review MechanismARV/ARVs Antiretroviral/Antiretrovirals ASF African Standby Force

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AU African UnionAUC African Union CommissionAWA AIDS Watch Africa BINUB UN Integration Office in BurundiBLSN Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and NamibiaCADSP Common African Defence and Security Policy CAR Central African Republic CARICOM Caribbean Economic CommunityCBC Congressional Black CaucusCCR Centre for Conflict ResolutionCDSP Common Defence and Security PolicyCEC Commission of the European CommunitiesCEMAC Communauté Economique et Monétaire d’Afrique

Centrale (Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa)

CEN-SAD Community of Sahel-Saharan StatesCEPGL Communauté Economique des Pays de Grand LacsCEWARN Conflict Early WarningCFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy CHA Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies CIA Central Intelligence Agency CMCA Commission on Mediation, Conciliation and

ArbitrationCODESRIA Council for the Development of Social Science

Research in AfricaCOMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern AfricaCOPAX Conseil de Paix et de Securité de l’Afrique Centrale COREPER Committee of Permanent Representatives CSOs Civil society organisationsCSSDCA Conference on Security, Stability, Development and

Cooperation in AfricaDDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integrationDRC Democratic Republic of CongoDWGD Directorate of Women, Gender and DevelopmentEAC East African CommunityEASBRIG Eastern Africa Standby BrigadeEBA Everything but armsEC European CommissionECA Economic Commission for AfricaECCAS Economic Community of Central African StatesECDC Ethiopian Community Development Centre

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ECOMOG ECOWAS Monitoring GroupECOSOCC Economic, Social and Cultural CouncilECOWAS Economic Community of West African StatesEDF European Development Fund EEC European Economic Community EGM External guarantor’s modelEPAs Economic Partnership Agreements EPRD European Programme for Reconstruction and

Development ERC Emergency Relief CoordinatorESA East and Southern AfricaESDP European Security and Defence PolicyESF ECOWAS Standby ForceEU European UnionFDA Foundation for Democracy in Africa FDI Foreign direct investmentFOMUC Force Multinationale en CentrafriqueGDP Gross Domestic ProductGFATM Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and

Malaria GNP Gross National ProductG–8 Group of EightHDI Human development indexHIPC Highly Indebted Poor CountriesHIV Human Immunodeficiency VirusHSGIC Heads of State and Government Implementation

Committee IADCC Inter-African Diaspora Coordination ConferenceIASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee IBSA India-Brazil-South Africa ICJ International Commission of Jurists ICJ International Court of Justice ICRC International Committee of the Red CrossICT Information Communication TechnologyIDPs Internally displaced personsIEMF Interim Emergency Multilateral ForceIGAD Inter-governmental Authority on DevelopmentIGOs Inter-governmental organisationsIMF International Monetary FundISDSC Inter-state Defence and Security CommitteeISI Import substitution industrialisation

List of Acronyms

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ISDDC Inter-state Defence and Diplomacy CommitteeJEM Justice and Equality MovementLDCs Least developed countriesLPA Lagos Plan of Action LRA Lord’s Resistance Army MAP Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery

ProgrammeMDGs Millennium Development GoalsMINUB UN Mission in BurundiMONUC Mission des Nations Unies au Congo (UN Mission in

the Congo)MSC Military Staff CommitteeNAI New African Initiative NAM Non-aligned MovementNATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganisationNEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s DevelopmentNGOs Non-governmental organisationsNRA National Resistance ArmyOAS Organisation of American StatesOAU Organisation of African UnityODA Overseas development assistanceOCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and

DevelopmentOHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights ONUB UN Peace Operation in Burundi OPDS Organ on Politics, Defence and SecurityOSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in EuropePAE Pacific Architectural EngineersPAP Pan-African ParliamentPDF Popular Defence ForcePRC Permanent Representatives CommitteePRSPs Poverty Reduction Strategy ProgrammesPSC Peace and Security CouncilPSD Peace and Security Department PSOs Peace and Security Operations PTA Preferential Trade AreaRECs Regional Economic Communities REPAs Regional Economic Partnership AgreementsRPTC Regional Peace Training CentreRRM Rapid Reaction Mechanism

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List of Acronyms

SACU Southern African Custom UnionSADC Southern African Development CommunitySADCBRIG Southern African Development Community BrigadeSADCC Southern African Development Coordination

Conference SADR Saharan Arab Democratic Republic SADSEM Southern African Defence ManagementSALW Small arms and light weaponsSAPs Structural Adjustment Programmes SDGEA Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in AfricaSIPO Strategic Indicative Plan for the OrganSLM/A Sudan Liberation Movement/ArmySOEs State-owned enterprisesSPA Strategic Plan of ActionSRCC Sub-regional coordination conferenceSSA Sub-Saharan AfricaSSR Security sector reformSTAP Short Term Action PlanSTIs Sexually transmitted infectionsTB TuberculosisTDCA Trade, Development and Cooperation AgreementTRIs Technical research institutionsTRIMS Trade-Related Investment MeasuresTRIPS Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual PropertyUDEAC Union Dounier et Economique de l’Afrique Centrale

(Custom and Economic Union of Central African States)

UEAC Union des Etats de l’Afrique Central (Union of Central African States)

UEMOA Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (West African Economic and Monetary Union)

UK United KingdomUMA Arab Maghreb Union (see also AMU)UN United NationsUNAIDS Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDSUNAMIS UN Advance Mission in the SudanUNDP United Nations Development Programme UNECA UN Economic Commission for AfricaUNGASS United Nations General Assembly Special Session on

HIV/AIDSUNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

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UNICEF United Nations Children’s FundUNMIL United Nations Mission in LiberiaUN-NADAF United Nations New Agenda for the Development of

Africa in the 1990sUPDF Ugandan Peoples’ Defence Forces US United StatesUSSR Union of Soviet Socialist RepublicsWHADN Western Hemisphere African Diaspora NetworkWHO World Health OrganizationWIDER World Institute for Development and Economic

Research WTO World Trade Organisation

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Introduction: Building an African Union for the 21st Century

Tim Murithi and Angela Ndinga-Muvumba

AT THE DAWN OF THIS NEW millennium, African leaders gathered in Durban, South Africa, to lay the foundation of what South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki has proclaimed will be the “African Century”.1 On 9 July 2002, the African Union (AU) was inaugurated as the conti-nent’s paramount Pan-African institution. The AU is the successor of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) which had been in existence since May 1963. This evolutionary transition from the OAU to the AU caught many analysts by surprise. Although previous generations of Pan-African thinkers, such as Kwame Nkrumah, W.E.B. du Bois, Cheikh Anta Diop, George Padmore, Frantz Fanon, Patrice Lumumba and Leopold Senghor, had dreamed about the idea of forging a more pronounced continental bond, the emergence of the AU had not been widely predicted or dis-cussed in policy-making and scholarly circles.

Barring the AU’s presence in Darfur, Sudan, most reviews of the new body’s relevance generated little debate during its first five years of existence between 2002 and 2007. However, a resurgence of Pan-Africanism swept the continent during the Assembly of the AU heads of state and government at its 9th Ordinary Session in Accra, Ghana, from 1 to 3 July 2007. The focus of the summit was the proposal to establish a “United States of Africa” with an appointed president, ministers of foreign affairs, finance, health and more, as well as a central bank. 2 At stake was the pan-Africanist vision to unify the continent, first imagined after independence by Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, who had proposed these very ideas, and then dispirited in the immediate post-independence era of the 1970s.3

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The new proposal of a “United States of Africa”, initiated and then doggedly pursued by Muammar Gaddafi of Libya and a number of other African leaders such as Senegal’s Abdoulaye Wade, was both pragmatic and poetic: a united Africa could meet the political and economic chal-lenges of a globalised 21st century, and her people would no longer be divided by state boundaries that were instituted by colonial masters. The idea of an African Union Government, ironically, has also been linked to the progress made by the European Union (EU) since its establish-ment in 1957 as the European Economic Community (EEC). European unification, which followed after nearly 40 years of cooperation since the European Coal and Steel Community was established in 1951, has generated anew African dreams of integration. Whether or not European integration can be used as a legitimate blueprint for Africa remains an open question in the face of strong Pan-Africanist convictions and aspi-rations.4

In July 2006, the African Union produced a detailed report entitled: A Study on an African Union Government: Towards the United States of Africa, at the 7th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State, in Banjul, Gambia.5 This report assessed the feasibility and ramifications of establishing a Union Government and laid the foundation for subsequent debates. From 8 to 9 May 2007, the Executive Council of AU Ministers of Foreign Affairs met in Durban, South Africa, to brainstorm on the state of the African Union in general, and to address some of the pro-posals and recommendations that emerged from the study. In addition, from 28 to 30 May 2007, the AU convened an All-inclusive Continental Consultation on the Union Government project, at its headquarters in Addis Ababa, as part of the preparations towards the Accra meeting. This meeting brought together government representatives of AU mem-ber states, parliamentarians, civil society representatives and academics to engage with the findings of the study and to discuss prospects for a Union Government.

The July 2007 Accra summit focused on three options for the way forward. First, should the AU focus on strengthening its Commission and existing regional economic communities (RECs)? Or should there be a plan laid out to establish a Union Government by 2015 with execu-tive powers belonging to a president and cabinet? Finally, should the AU simply establish a “United States of Africa”? 6 These three options – respectively encompassing radical and gradual approaches to unity – were hotly debated by the presidents and prime ministers, but also commented upon by academics and civil society activists.

The framework for unification being sought by Muammar Gaddafi


3

and Abdoulaye Wade was heavily criticised as impractical and inop-portune. Citing the importance of first implementing the institutions, structures and objectives under the AU Constitutive Act of 2000, many observers accepted that the debate had to happen – but that African states must first focus on unfulfilled goals, before aspiring to greater levels of achievement. Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, while initially supporting immediate unification, pontificated on the importance of “first things first”. He argued that the continent was neither economi-cally integrated, nor were the people of Africa suitably like-minded for federalism.7 Meles Zenawi suggested that the continental body had not sufficiently strengthened the Addis Ababa-based AU Commission, which had resulted in an uncoordinated and weak implementation of the Constitutive Act.8 Thabo Mbeki of South Africa did not significantly contribute to the debate – but in a lecture delivered at the University of Cape Coast in Ghana, the president cited three processes which must first be realised in order to ensure that African integration is meaningful to African peoples, and not just their governments: implementation of the 1991 African Economic Community (AEC); execution of NEPAD’s pro-grammes; and strengthening Africa’s eight RECs – the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); the East African Community (EAC); the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD); the Southern African Development Community (SADC); and the Arab Magreb Union (UMA).9

The essence of these arguments was that unification can not just be “declared” but that clear, realistic timelines must be set within a frame-work that would allow African countries – with their different and widely varied socio-economic structures, political dispensations, and relations to the rest of the world – to move towards deeper and more meaningful integration over time.

The conclusion of the July 2007 summit fell on this consensus. Signed on 3 July 2007, the Accra Declaration is reflective of classic African statecraft: it is both “radical” and “gradualist”.10 The Accra Declaration seemingly embraces Gaddafi’s vision – with agreement “to accelerate the economic and political integration of the African continent, including the formation of a Union Government for Africa with the ultimate objective of creating the United States of Africa”.11 Nevertheless, the rest of the declaration outlines a strategy which entails old commitments to rationalise and harmonise the RECs and to create new mechanisms such as the establishment of a ministerial committee to

Introduction


4


examine “the contents of the Union Government concept and its rela-tions with national governments” and “elaborate a road map together with timeframes for establishing the Union Government”. 12

The Accra debate generated important re-thinking about the purpose of the new African Union, and helped bring to light the interests of its member states, some of whom seek unification as a means to leverage their competitiveness in the global market, while others are reluctant to cede sovereignty out of self-interest. Scholars and practitioners will continue to follow the evolution of Pan-Africanism embodied in the Accra Declaration.

Research on, and about, the African Union lags behind the establish-ment of its many organs, institutions, mechanisms, protocols and dec-larations, as well as the AU’s activities and influence on Africa’s peace and security, governance, and development architectures. Consequently, there is a dearth of scholarly work on the new body, and academics, researchers and analysts are still playing catch-up in producing detailed and analytical knowledge about the AU. This volume brings together the analysis and research of 17 largely Pan-African scholars, policy-makers, practitioners and civil society representatives, and thus contributes to filling this gap in the literature.

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) based in Cape Town, South Africa, conceived and edited this book project. Since October 2003, CCR has been implementing a vision of transforming itself from being a principally South African body into a uniquely Pan-African organisa-tion. This vision is grounded in CCR’s new Africa Programme. One of the key areas of policy research is on the AU. In August 2005, CCR held a seminar in Cape Town on the theme Building an African Union for the Twenty-First Century: Relations with Regional Economic Communities, The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and Civil Society. This was a follow-up meeting to a successful policy advisory group meeting held in Johannesburg, South Africa in December 2004, on the theme of “The AU/NEPAD and Africa’s Evolving Governance and Security Architecture.13

The August 2005 policy seminar sought to examine the significance and progress of the AU, and to assess its institutions and relationships with NEPAD, civil society and Africa’s regional economic communities such as ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD, ECCAS and the AMU. The meeting aimed to provide a platform for debate and to review the efforts of key actors working in the security and governance spheres. The AU and its programme for economic recovery – NEPAD – as well as Africa’s RECs and civil society actors, have outlined strategies and committed them-


5

selves to addressing Africa’s challenges in the 21st century. The CCR seminar thus provided a platform for intellectual engage-

ment with the security, governance, socio-economic and development objectives and functions of the AU, NEPAD, the RECs and civil society. The meeting also produced policy recommendations and promoted an informed discussion on the most appropriate division of labour among the AU, NEPAD, RECs and civil society in achieving their common objectives. As these actors embark on this necessary and urgent mis-sion, they continue to face major challenges, including limited capacity in terms of finding requisite financial and human resources to imple-ment socio-economic programmes to address poverty, conflict and other obstacles to peace and prosperity in Africa.

This unique volume’s predominantly Pan-African voices debate pertinent issues relating to building an effective security and govern-ance architecture in post-Cold War Africa. The 17 authors are from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Gambia, Ghana, India, Mauritius, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe, the United States (US) and France. The editors are from Ghana, Kenya and Uganda.

This introduction highlights the key issues in efforts to build an African Union for the 21st century, as well as providing an overview of the con-tents of this volume. The book is arranged into four parts:

• Conceptual issues marking the transition from the OAU to the AU;

• Issues relating to peace and security;• Topics around governance and civil society; and• The AU’s relationship with the African Diaspora and external

actors.

The unifying theme of the book is the need to consolidate and enhance efforts to strengthen the AU’s programmes and initiatives, as well as its relationship with NEPAD, Africa’s RECs and civil society.

KEY ISSUES IN BUILDING A NEW AFRICAN UNION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

The transformation of the OAU into the AU generated a great sense of optimism that was further reinforced by the adoption of NEPAD as the AU’s framework for development in 2005.14 NEPAD was due to have been integrated into the AU as a specialised agency by 2006, though this relationship continues to be fraught with tensions and difficulties.15 At

Introduction


6


the same time, Africa’s RECs such as SADC, ECOWAS, ECCAS, IGAD and the AMU, are seeking to strengthen their own governance and secu-rity mechanisms. Civil society actors are also actively working across the continent to address the challenges faced by Africa’s 800 million people. The real test now facing these actors is collectively to transform the African Union into a credible and effective inter-governmental process and institution.

Constructing an African Peace and Security ArchitectureThe challenge of achieving peace, security and development in Africa has been affected by sub-regional, global and continental events. Historically, the primary threats to security in Africa emerged predominantly from the conflicts generated and perpetuated by the Cold War between 1945 and 1990, as well as internal governance malpractices by Africa’s military and civilian autocrats. After the Cold War, the continent’s promise of peace and development remained largely unfulfilled. Instead, Africa was confronted with an increase in intra-state conflict in places like Liberia, Somalia and Sierra Leone, culminating in the tragic genocide in Rwanda in 1994 in which nearly one million people were killed. Today, security and stability remain key challenges in all parts of Africa. In addition, the nature of threats has expanded to include social issues like poverty, cor-ruption and public health issues such as HIV/AIDS.

This book recognises that, as Africa enters the 21st century, it has become increasingly clear that the continent must build and operational-ise its own effective security and governance architectures. The AU has adopted a proactive and interventionist stance to security challenges, placing the creation of an African Standby Force (ASF) by 2010 at the core of its peace and security agenda.16 The AU also outlined a Strategic Plan of Action (SPA) 2004–2007 to create an Africa-wide security regime.

In addition, the AU established a 15-member Peace and Security Council (PSC) to sanction military and diplomatic intervention in the affairs of African countries. This is a radical departure from the OAU’s four-decade-long obsession with non-intervention and non-interference in the affairs of its member states. The PSC has identified four situa-tions that would warrant AU intervention in the internal affairs of its members:

• Genocide;• Gross violations of human rights;• Instability in a country that threatens regional stability; and• Unconstitutional changes of government.


7

The increasing and expanding push to nurture, build and keep peace in Africa has significant human and financial resource implications for the AU. At the end of 2004, the AU envisaged an annual budget of $62 million for peace and security out of a total budget of $158 million. But it remains uncertain whether members will pay their dues and whether external donors will contribute sufficiently to this fund.

To take these efforts further, the NEPAD framework has launched an African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The APRM is monitoring and assessing the compliance of African governments with the norms of governance and human rights articulated in the AU’s Constitutive Act. This innovative mechanism of voluntary, self-imposed assessment seeks to raise the standards of governance and economic management in Africa so as to improve the livelihood of African people by promoting a governance climate that will encourage investment and development. At the time of writing, 26 countries had signed up to the APRM.17

Impunity during times of civil unrest and conflicts in Africa has proved to be a central concern for the African Union since 1960. Ten million Africans have died in about 40 wars. Within this context, securi-ty is no longer an issue that is confined to the demands and requirements of nation-states. Increasingly, people have to be placed at the centre of efforts to achieve security. This is why the notion of people-centred ‘human security’ has taken on greater prominence in Africa. On the continental level, the already established African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, as well as the proposed African Court of Justice (ACJ), are strengthening this approach.

Of Scaffolding and Mortar – Governance, Development and Civil SocietyAU member states have also recognised that they cannot achieve their governance and security objectives without the participation of, and collaboration with, Africa’s civil society organisations (CSOs). The Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) of 1991 has been the mechanism through which to har-ness civil society participation with the AU on development and security issues. 18 To complement the CSSDCA, the AU’s Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) and its South Africa-based Pan-African Parliament (PAP) have also been established to enable individuals and civil society groups to contribute towards formulating and assessing AU policies. ECOSOCC and the PAP, however, remain fledgling bodies in need of greater capacity and financial support.

The initiatives, institutions and programmes of the AU and its flag-

Introduction


8


ship economic development programme, NEPAD, are complemented by the efforts of the RECs to improve governance, economic development and conflict management in their respective regions. For instance, both ECOWAS and the SADC have established sub-regional parliaments and legal tribunals for arbitrating disputes between their member states. As part of a comprehensive strategy to accelerate development and to pro-mote continental integration, the AU, NEPAD and the RECs must find ways to reinforce each other in their efforts to promote peace, security and development. The AU’s mandate to coordinate the RECs must be carefully crafted, since several RECs like ECOWAS and SADC feel that they have more conflict management experience than the AU, a much younger institution by comparison.

Cementing External RelationsThe ‘founding fathers’ and ‘founding mothers’ of the African Union were, in part, motivated by a desire to strengthen Africa’s leverage to engage with the rest of the world and to manage the process of globalisa-tion to the continent’s advantage. The African Diaspora can play a role in enhancing Africa’s role in the world by promoting the development of the continent. A genuine engagement by the AU with Africa’s Diaspora could enhance the continent’s negotiating and resource mobilisation capacity with the international community. The European Union has demonstrated a willingness to engage with the AU. The EU is focused on organisation-to-organisation interactions, and welcomes continental AU–EU opportunities to devise common policies. The EU’s African Peace Support Facility (APSF) contributed about €250 million to conti-nental peacekeeping efforts in 2004, and most of these funds supported the AU’s peace operation in Sudan’s troubled Darfur region. The EU is also assisting with building capacity in the AU’s Peace and Security Department. Other key donors have also supported these efforts.

CONTENTS OF THE BOOK The AU is thus seeking to provide a foundation for strengthening African initiatives for peace, security and development. The chapters in this book recognise that the AU’s structures remain fledgling and under-resourced. However, this volume also provides concrete recommendations and strategies on how to address these concerns.


9

Part 1: From the Organisation of African Unity to the African Union – Conceptual IssuesThe first part of the book assesses conceptual issues relating to the transition from the OAU to the AU. Renaissance of Pan-Africanism: The AU and the New Pan-Africanists (Chapter 1) by Kay Mathews, an Ethiopia-based Indian scholar, provides a context for understanding the transformation of the OAU into the AU and assesses the revival of the spirit of Pan-Africanism after the end of the Cold War. The author analyses how Pan-Africanism has historically animated the struggle for freedom, human security and self-determination among Africans on the continent, and their Afro-descendants in the Diaspora.19

Mathews argues that Pan-Africanism is an ideal that can only be achieved if African countries build and sustain their collective security through democratic governance and economic development. The author argues that Pan-Africanism should ideally manifest itself as the willing-ness of African governments and societies to work collectively to improve the well being of people on the continent and in the Diaspora. Mathews concludes by noting that the true expression of Pan-Africanism will be achieved only when African states and societies regard the security and well being of their neighbours as fundamentally related to theirs.

In Chapter 2 – From Non-Interference to Non-Indifference: The Emerging Doctrine of Conflict Prevention in Africa – Congolese scholar, Musifiky Mwanasali, explores the implications of the AU Peace and Security Council’s mandate to interfere in the internal affairs of member states when there is an imminent threat to peace, security and stability. This includes, but is not exclusive to, war crimes and crimes against humanity. This new mandate reflects the AU’s acknowledgement of the “responsibility to protect”20 – the idea that the international community has a duty to intervene to protect people if governments abdicate their sovereign responsibilities. Mwanasali identifies the AU’s new conflict management doctrine as “non-indifference” – a radical departure from the OAU’s non-intervention policy. He interrogates the legal justifica-tion for external intervention in the internal affairs of member states by examining the AU’s Constitutive Act of 2000 and its 2002 Protocol creating the Peace and Security Council.21

Mwanasali contends that the OAU’s 1999 Algiers Decision and its 2000 Lomé Declaration laid the foundation for the AU’s new non-indifference to the internal matters of its member states. As a result of these agreements, suspension measures are now applied automatically against governments that seize power through undemocratic means.22

Introduction


10


Mwanasali also stresses that the experience of the OAU in establishing a Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in 1993, provides important lessons for the AU’s Peace and Security Council. The author explains that the AU’s new covenant of non-indifference must be matched by robust efforts to address the organisation’s legal, doctrinal and institutional weaknesses. Mwanasali concludes by noting that, while the AU has embraced a new conflict prevention doctrine, its norms and principles must be upheld to opera-tionalise the doctrine of non-indifference.

In Chapter 3 – From Military Security to Human Security – Ghanaian scholar, Eboe Hutchful, discusses how the commitment to the notion of the responsibility to protect is also influenced by the concept of human security. Human security emphasises that threats to the well being of people originate from many sources that have to be acknowledged and addressed.23 The author traces and untangles the complex notion of “security” as it is evolving in the post-Cold War era, and critiques the transition toward a less state-centric conceptualisation of security. However, Hutchful argues that the definition of human security does not exclude traditional notions of state security, but seeks to be more holistic.

Ultimately, Hutchful notes that the notion of human security is implicit in the AU’s adoption of a people-oriented vision of peace and development. Human security was first used in a 1994 United Nations Human Development Report, and encompasses economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security. Hutchful identifies a distinct tradition of an African human security concept in key AU documents, such as the CSSDCA and its Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) of 2004. The author concludes that, while there is an acknowledgement of the need to focus on people, the concept of human security is still widely contested, unwieldy, and has not been fully incorporated into the policy-making process of Africa’s regional and national institutions.

Another Ghanaian scholar, John Akokpari, assesses Dilemmas of Regional Integration and Development in Africa (Chapter 4). The AU has set for itself the challenge of building by the year 2025 “… an inter-dependent continent underpinned by political, economic, social and cultural integration; and an Africa that is capable of making use of its human and material resources”.24 Such an ambitious vision requires a shared consensus backed by genuine political commitment towards regional integration. There are major challenges in fulfilling this objec-tive, including weak state structures and fragile economies. Through the


11

AU and NEPAD frameworks, this blueprint is now emerging, and the challenge will be to transform this vision into reality.

Akokpari focuses on the relevance of, and obstacles to, an AU-led regionalism in Africa. He provides conceptual clarity on the many types of regionalism and explains why previous integration efforts over the last four decades have failed to deliver the benefits of stronger and inte-grated economic, political and social cooperation in Africa. He argues that the best model of integration is one that maximises the mobilisation of Africa’s resources, while minimising external dependence. The author observes that one of the reasons for creating the AU was to rationalise, and perhaps even consolidate, what the AU Commission’s Malian chair-person, Alpha Oumar Konaré, has called a “cacophony” of RECs. The AU has inherited many regional and sub-regional economic organisa-tions with overlapping mandates, and this has inevitably fragmented and duplicated regional resources for integration.

Part 2: Peace and SecurityThe second part of the book examines issues relating to Africa’s evolving security architecture. In his landmark An Agenda for Peace published in 1992, the former Egyptian UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Gali, argued for humanitarian intervention and promoted the use of regional security arrangements like the AU and RECs to achieve this objective. Boutros-Ghali’s successor, Ghanaian Kofi Annan, was also a vocal sup-porter of humanitarian intervention and a people-centred approach to security. Since the Rwandan genocide of 1994, it has become clear that Africa must develop its own humanitarian intervention capacity. In this regard, the AU should rethink its intervention strategies and train its civilian and military personnel to respond effectively to conflict and post-conflict situations.

The Peacemaking Role of the OAU and the AU (Chapter 5) by Gambian scholar and long-serving OAU/AU official, Solomon Gomes, offers a comparative analysis of the peacemaking role of the OAU and AU. The author discusses the major peacemaking and mediation chal-lenges faced by the OAU between 1963 and 2001. Gomes notes that the key organs of the OAU – the Council of Ministers and the Assembly of Heads of State and Government – could only intervene in a conflict situation if they were invited to do so by the parties to a dispute. Many intra-state disputes were viewed as internal matters and the exclusive preserve of the governments concerned. Regrettably, due to the doctrine of non-intervention, the OAU became a silent observer to the atrocities being committed by some of its member states.

Introduction


12


In spite of these constraints, Gomes highlights how the OAU made an effort to resolve border and territorial disputes, as well as political conflicts between Algeria and Morocco in 1963; Ethiopia and Somalia in the 1970s; and Libya and Chad in 1977. The OAU Charter also estab-lished a mechanism to conduct peacemaking initiatives: the Commission on Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. Gomes compares this Commission to the AU’s evolving security institutions. He points out that the AU is learning from the lessons of the OAU and has adopted a much more interventionist stance through its legal frameworks and institutions.

Nigerian scholar, Adekeye Adebajo, focuses on the AU’s post-Cold War peacekeeping challenges in The Peacekeeping Travails of the AU and the RECs (Chapter 6). He notes that the AU’s protocol relating to its Peace and Security Council, NEPAD’s peace and security propos-als, and the RECs’ security mechanisms all advocate the creation of a more robust Africa-wide system of conflict management. The Protocol Relating to the Peace and Security Council of 200225 subsequently led to the establishment of the AU Peace and Security Council in 2004. The author notes that a Military Staff Committee to provide advice on deployment and security requirements will complement the African Standby Force, to be established by 2010. The AU has been mandated to coordinate the activities of Africa’s RECs, since the ASF will comprise five brigades from each of Africa’s sub-regions: Southern, East, Central, West and North.

The AU’s Peace and Security Protocol also plans to establish a con-tinental early warning system and a Panel of the Wise. Adebajo argues that the continental force can also only be effective if there is much closer coordination and cooperation between the AU, the RECs, the UN and civil society, and if a stable source of funding for security activities is found. The chapter assesses the key actors and security dynamics in Africa’s five sub-regions.

Ugandan analyst, Angela Ndinga-Muvumba, discusses Accelerating the Response –An Evolving African HIV/AIDS Policy? (Chapter 7). The author argues that HIV/AIDS is a non-traditional threat to traditional security, as well as to governance and development. She emphasises that, as the leading cause of death of adults in Africa, HIV/AIDS may well be the 21st century’s foremost human security threat. In many ways, this chapter seeks to assess the practical implications of the concept of human security outlined by Eboe Hutchful in Chapter 4. Despite sig-nificant efforts on the part of African governments and civil society, the number of people living with HIV increased from 24.9 million in 2003 to


13

26.5 million in 2005.26 Ndinga-Muvumba argues that Africa’s response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic has been mixed, and that the continent’s leaders have yet to mobilise the political will and necessary resources to control the pandemic and to mitigate its long-term impact. While African leaders declared AIDS to be a “state of emergency” in the 2001 Abuja Declaration, only Botswana managed to meet the Declaration’s pledge to devote at least 15% of national budgets to health sectors by 2006. Ndinga-Muvumba examines the AU Commission’s role as an advocate for a heightened and enhanced African response to the HIV/AIDS pan-demic.27 She explains that the Commission has stressed that HIV/AIDS should be addressed as a multi-dimensional security, governance and development challenge and “mainstreamed” into all of the AU’s ini-tiatives. As an example of the practical implications for mainstream-ing HIV/AIDS, Ndinga-Muvumba returns to traditional security, and analyses the vulnerability and strategic importance of African militaries in both curbing the HIV/AIDS pandemic and building peace in African societies.

In the last chapter of Part 2, Sudanese scholar-practitioner, Francis Deng, the former UN Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities, focuses on Africa’s Internally Displaced Persons (Chapter 8). Deng notes that the issue of internally displaced persons (IDPs) is one that significantly affects the African continent, as Africa has half of the 25–30 million IDPs worldwide. He suggests that the OAU – and now the AU – has been broadly positive in its response to the issue of IDPs. However, there continues to be a “vacuum of responsibility” for IDPs, given the crisis of legitimacy facing several African countries. Like Musifiky Mwanasali in Chapter 3, the author notes that the guarantee of support and protection for this vulnerable group must be framed as a positive concept of state responsibility.

While serving as the UN Special Representative for Internally Displaced Persons between 1992 and 2004, Deng used his mandate to raise awareness and to mobilise civil society engagement on IDPs. Additionally, he established several key pillars to achieve his mandate, including the development of a normative legal framework for IDPs. This led to the drafting of the Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons in 1998. The author discusses the important efforts to develop an institutional framework that included several organisations, lead-ing to the establishment of a coordinating mechanism and an inter-agency standing committee in the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in New York.

Introduction


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Part 3: Governance and Civil SocietyPart 3 examines issues of governance relating to the rule of law, human and gender rights, and the participation of civil society in Africa’s evolv-ing governance architecture. The section presents a debate about NEPAD that contrasts the views of South African scholar, Chris Landsberg, with the views of Sheila Bunwaree, a scholar from Mauritius. In The Birth and Evolution of NEPAD (Chapter 9), Chris Landsberg is optimistic in his assessment of NEPAD. The author argues that the programme has much to offer the continent due to its focus on a new partnership with the rich world, “good governance” and human rights in Africa, and renewed attention on large-scale infrastructure for the continent’s development. Landsberg further argues that NEPAD is complementary to Africa’s needs because its programmes and processes make explicit links between democratic governance, peace and security, and economic growth and development.

In NEPAD and its Discontents (Chapter 10), Sheila Bunwaree is, in contrast, more sceptical about NEPAD, and highlights its focus on debt relief as opposed to debt cancellation, as well as what she considers as its harmful obsession with neo-classical economics and foreign direct investment. She argues that NEPAD represents old wine in a new bottle. For her, the NEPAD framework borrows heavily from failed modernisa-tion strategies, Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, and Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes (PRSPs). These programmes are seen as being championed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and as not having yielded development dividends or addressed poverty effectively on the continent for the last 25 years. Bunwaree’s major criticism of NEPAD is that it has not effectively placed people at the centre of its processes and initiatives, and does not have clear mecha-nisms of accountability to African citizens. She points out that NEPAD is largely a top-down initiative, and that some of its architects have been accused of violating the human rights of their own people.

Nigerian scholar-practitioner, Adebayo Adedeji, discusses NEPAD’s African Peer Review Mechanism: Progress and Prospects (Chapter 11). The author himself a member of the African Peer Review Mechanism Panel of Eminent Persons, notes that the APRM is one of the positive innovations of the NEPAD programme. Adedeji argues that the APRM represents a commitment to African self-monitoring and accountability by relying on a system of peer pressure through which governments can monitor each other’s political and economic performance.28 He


15

explains that the APRM’s review process is a performance assessment of key governance indicators (political, economic and corporate), thereby promoting the values and outcomes of democratic governance and con-stitutional government.

Adedeji observes that the APRM lacks an enforcement mechanism, since it is voluntary. In spite of this constraint, 26 African countries have already signed up to the process, supporting the views of the APRM’s proponents that a peer review mechanism can only succeed if it is vol-untary. Adedeji further notes that the APRM seeks to enhance African “ownership” of its development and governance agenda, to identify, evaluate and disseminate best practices, as well as to monitor progress towards previously agreed governance goals. Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, and Rwanda agreed to be the first countries to be reviewed in 2004. Algeria, Egypt, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda are also involved in review processes.29 The structures for imple-menting the APRM were established in May 2004, and the Panel of Eminent Persons has made progress in popularising the integrity of the process.30 Adedeji suggests that the APRM must be respected in order to ensure that governance audits are properly conducted. The mechanism represents a potentially innovative effort to increase the accountability of African governments to their citizens.

In The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Chapter 12), South African human rights activist, Ahmed Motala, assesses the emer-gence of and prospects for the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights that will be established in East Africa. The author notes that the AU established the African Court in order to ensure and promote the rule of law in Africa. The African Court will complement other AU institutions by seeking to ensure the protection of human and minority rights. Motala notes that the body is empowered to act both in a judicial and in an advisory capacity.

Article 2 of its Protocol states that “the Court shall, bearing in mind the provisions of this Protocol, complement the protective mandate of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights conferred upon it by the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights”.31 The African Court can assess cases submitted to it by member states or citizens, who have been victims of human rights violations. Motala believes that it will be important to ensure that the African Court is not undermined by political interference so that it can serve as a genuine arbitrator and mechanism to check excesses of state power.32

Related to the issue of ensuring the rule of law is the importance of enhancing the participation of civil society actors in Africa’s evolving

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governance architecture. Zimbabwean human rights practitioner, Charles Mutasa, provides A Critical Appraisal of the African Union–ECOSOCC Civil Society Interface (Chapter 13). Article 22 of the AU’s Constitutive Act stipulates that “the Economic, Social and Cultural Council shall be an advisory organ composed of different social and professional groups of the member states of the Union”.33 The Economic, Social and Cultural Council was launched in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in March 2005, and provides a vehicle for civil society – non-governmental organisations (NGOs), professional groups, trade unions and other stakeholders – to establish formal relations with the AU and to take part in its work.34 Mutasa stresses that the overall aim of this body is to provide a forum for civil society to influence the formulation, implementation, moni-toring and evaluation of AU policies and programmes, though much progress is still required to achieve this goal.

The next chapter builds on the theme of the participation of civil society by examining the establishment, functions and recent activities of the AU’s 265-member Pan-African Parliament. In The AU’s Pan-African Parliament: Progress and Prospects (Chapter 14), the Speaker of the South African Parliament, Baleka Mbete, provides a personal reflection of the activities of the PAP. The author notes that the AU created the PAP to enable the effective participation of civil society in Africa’s evolv-ing governance and security architectures.35 The PAP was inaugurated in South Africa in March 2004. The PAP aims to provide a vehicle for African citizens to contribute towards deliberating and providing advice on how to deepen democratic governance on the continent. Mbete notes that the PAP currently debates the AU budget and the reports of the AU’s Peace and Security Council, while its president – Tanzania’s Getrude Mongella – attends the twice-yearly meetings of the Assembly of the AU Heads of State.

Mbete further notes that the PAP is mandated to exercise oversight on issues of governance and development on the continent. According to the Protocol, the continental parliament can “discuss or express an opinion on any matter, either on its own initiative or at the request of the Assembly”.36 The PAP can also make recommendations on how to achieve the objectives of the AU, and will strive to contribute towards the coordination and harmonisation of policies, measures, programmes and activities of the RECs and national parliaments in Africa. The PAP is expected to become more effective after five years (by 2009) when it becomes an elected body and assumes full legislative powers. It could serve as another platform for civil society to influence policy formulation, and to monitor implementation of the AU and NEPAD frameworks.


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The final chapter in Part 3 – Africa and Gender Equality: Priorities for the African Union (Chapter 15) – by Winnie Byanyima, the Ugandan former Head of the AU Gender Directorate and now Director of the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Gender Team, Bureau for Development Policy in New York, examines the AU’s efforts to promote gender equality in Africa.37 The author notes that the African women’s movement has worked for over 30 years to build a consensus around the idea that development and democracy in African societies cannot be achieved without gender equality and the empowerment of women. The AU Constitutive Act’s emphasis on the promotion of gender equality signals that the importance of this issue has been recognised at the continent’s highest political level.

Byanyima highlights the fact that the Constitutive Act promotes the principle of gender parity among women and men in decision-making positions. A concrete example of gender parity is that five of the ten AU Commissioners are women. Various AU organs have been mandated to support processes that enhance the role of women in peace processes, accelerate economic empowerment, implement gender equality legisla-tion and the political participation of women, and increase the access of women and girls to education, health and social services.

The promotion of gender equality is also consistent with the AU’s new vision of building effective partnerships between governments and civil society. However, Byanyima notes that despite the AU’s progressive gender policies, real parity between women and men is far from being achieved, even within the AU. This is also a reality in many of Africa’s public institutions and reflects a divide between the various declarations and assertions for gender equality, and the reality of the situation on the ground. Byanyima also argues that achieving gender equality will involve a lengthy process of cultural transformation, and she highlights the importance of integrating gender perspectives into strategies for eco-nomic development and conflict management on the continent.

Part 4: The Diaspora and External ActorsPart 4 assesses the AU’s relationship with the African Diaspora and the European Union. In The AU and Africa’s Three Diasporas (Chapter 16), African-American scholar, Francis Kornegay, notes that the AU has des-ignated the African Diaspora as its sixth sub-region to complement its other five sub-regions: West, North, Central, East and Southern Africa. The author notes that ‘the African Diaspora’ is a generic term referring to people of African descent who live outside the African continent. Historically, the Diaspora communities came about as a result of the

Introduction


18


trans-Atlantic slave trade between 1500 and the late 1800s. This gave rise to new African-descended nationalities in the western hemisphere – Afro-Cubans, Afro-Brazilians, African-Americans, and Afro-West Indians.

The African Diaspora also contributed to establishing several nation-states, including Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Grenada, the Dominican Republic and Haiti. The Diaspora is further composed of African expatriate communities of nationals from existing AU member states, who are either citizens or otherwise residing in countries outside Africa. Kornegay observes that the AU defines ‘the African Diaspora’ as “peoples of African origin living outside the continent, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality and who are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and the building of the African Union”.38 The Diaspora is expected to engage with the AU mainly through the ECOSOCC mechanism.

In The AU and the EU (Chapter 17) French scholar, Daniel Bach, tackles the relationship between the AU and the EU. The author notes that, due to the limited capacity that the AU has to transform its objec-tives into practical action, it will need to continue collaborating with other organisations and require support from partners like the EU and the UN. The three key areas of the strategic partnership between the AU and the EU are peacekeeping, institution-building and policy dialogue. The EU Peace Facility for Africa (a grant of €250 million) supported the AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur between 2004 and 2006; the Communauté Economique et Monétaire d’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC) in November 2005; and capacity-building for the AU Commission’s Peace and Security Department.

In 2000, the EU and African countries signed the Cotonou Convention for a period of 20 years. The agreement seeks to provide an overarching framework for Europe’s engagement with Africa. However, the EU has other agreements that have affected Africa’s power to negotiate as one bloc. There is the EU-South Africa Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement of 1999, and the Euro-Mediterranean partnership agree-ments with North African states signed in December 2003. Bach notes that the negotiation of the regional Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and various African sub-regional groupings have faced various obstacles due to the possible adverse implications that may result from liberalising trade relations with the EU. He also observes that Brussels is monitoring ongoing developments such as the APRM, which many European politicians and parliamentarians view as the litmus test for the AU’s credibility and sustainability.


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Overall, this book presents a positive but realistic picture of the African Union, while diagnosing several key challenges. The AU has established an impressive array of institutions to deal with Africa’s secu-rity and governance problems. However, it is obvious that without ade-quate resources and genuine political will, these well-intentioned objec-tives may amount to nothing. Undoubtedly, the AU is a work-in-progress that will require a concerted effort and commitment by all its members to adhere to the noble principles enshrined in the AU Constitutive Act. Only by achieving these goals, will the aspiration of building an effective African Union for the 21st century be fulfilled.

Notes1 Thabo Mbeki, “Speech of the President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, at the Launch of

the African Renaissance Institute”, Pretoria, South Africa, 11 October 1999, available at: http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/speeches/mbeki991011.htm (accessed: 18 September 2006).

2 Adekeye Adebajo, “United States of Africa? Africa’s Quest for El Dorado,” Mail & Guardian, 29 June 2007.

3 Kwesi Kwaa Prah, “Without Unity There is No Future for Africa,” Mail & Guardian, 29 June 2007.

4 Praa, “Without Unity”.5 African Union, Study on an African Union Government: Towards the United States of

Africa, (Addis Ababa: African Union, 2006).6 Adebajo, “United States of Africa”.7 Asare Otchere-Darko, “And Gaddafi Shifted,” The Statesman, 7 July 2007.8 Ibid.9 Thabo Mbeki, “Goal of Unity Requires Africans to Look Hard at the Mirror of History,”

The Sunday Independent, 8 July 2007.10 AU, Accra Declaration, 9th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Heads of State,

Accra, Ghana, 3rd July 2002.11 African Union, Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government (Accra

Declaration), 3 July 2007, Accra, Ghana, paragraph 1.12 African Union, Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government (Accra

Declaration), 3 July 2007, Accra, Ghana, paragraph 2b (i and iv).13 See the report by the Centre for Conflict Resolution and the Centre for Policy Studies

The AU/NEPAD and Africa’s Evolving Governance and Security Architecture, Johannesburg, South Africa, 11–12 December 2004, available at: http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za (accessed: 18 September 2006).

14 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework, Midrand: NEPAD Secretariat, June 2005.

15 CCR/CPS, The AU/NEPAD and Africa’s Evolving Governance and Security Architecture.

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16 Timothy Murithi, The African Union: Pan-Africanism, Peacebuilding and Development, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005); Musifiky Mwanasali, “Emerging Security Architecture in Africa”, in Centre for Policy Studies Policy Issues and Actors, 7, 4 (February 2004); Jakkie Cilliers and Mark Malan, “Progress with the African Standby Force”, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Paper 107 (May 2005).

17 As of February 2007, 26 countries had signed the Memorandum of Understanding acceding to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM): Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Republic of Congo, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia.

18 Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA), Organisation of African Unity, Kampala, Uganda, 1991; and OAU Solemn Declaration on CSSDCA, Lomé, Togo, 8–9 May 2000, AHG/Decl.4 (XXXVI) 2000.

19 See, for example, Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, (London: Panaf, 1963); and Ali Mazrui, Towards A Pax Africana, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1967).

20 See The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, (Ottawa: International Development Research Council, 2001). See also Francis Deng et al, Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa, (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996).

21 CCR, A More Secure Continent: African Perspectives on the UN High-Level Panel Report – A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Cape Town, South Africa, 23–24 April 2005, available at: http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za; accessed: 18 September 2006.

22 The 1999 Algiers Decision on Unconstitutional Changes of Government stands as one of the very few decisions drafted directly by African heads of state and government. It was turned into a Declaration that they adopted a year later in Lomé, Togo, and which is currently under review at the AU. Both the Decision and the Declaration were applied firmly in the case of the Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau and Niger. However, the case of Madagascar, following the decision by the current head of state to proclaim himself president, nearly split the AU.

23 See the Principles of the Human Security Network, First Ministerial Meeting, Lysøen, Norway, 20 May 1999, available at: http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org; accessed: 18 September 2006.

24 African Union, Commission of the African Union, Strategic Plan of Action 2004–2007, AU Commission, December 2004, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

25 AU, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 1st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Heads of State, Durban, South Africa, 9 July 2002, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 9 July 2002, available at: http://www.africa-union.org/official documents/treaties, conventions and protocols; accessed 18 September 2006.

26 AU, Africa’s Common Position to the UN General Assembly Session on AIDS (June 2006), AU, Special Summit of the African Union on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Abuja, Nigeria, 2–4 May 2006, Sp/Assembly/ATM/3 (I) Rev.2, p.1.

27 See the AU Commission, HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan 2005–2007; and AIDS Watch Africa (AWA) Strategic Plan, 28 June–2 July 2005, Sirte, Libya, EX.CL/194 (VII).

28 The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), The African Peer Review Mechanism, March 2003.

29 Ayesha Kajee, “NEPAD’s APRM: A Progress Report, Practical Limitations and Challenges”, in SA Yearbook of International Affairs, 2003–2004.


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30 The members of the APRM Eminent Persons Panel are: Professor Adebayo Adedeji from Nigeria; Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat of Kenya; Dr. Graça Machel from Mozambique; Dr. Dorothy Njeuma from Cameroon; Ms. Marie-Angelique Savané from Senegal; and Dr. Chris Stals from South Africa.

31 AU, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 2004.

32 AU, Decisions, Declarations and Resolutions, Assembly of the African Union, Fifth Ordinary Session, 4–5 July 2005, Sirte, Libya, AU/Dec.73–90 (V).

33 African Union, Constitutive Act, (Lome: Togo, 2000), Article 22. 34 See Articles 2 and 3 of the AU Statutes of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council

of the African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 2005, available at: http://www.africa-union.org/organs/ecosocc/statutes-en.pdf, (accessed: 18 September 2006), and Articles 9 and 10 of the AU Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council.

35 Jakkie Cilliers and Prince Mashele, “The Pan-African Parliament: A Plenary of Parliamentarians”, African Security Review, 13(4), 2004.

36 Organisation of African Unity, Draft Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Pan-African Parliament, Sirte, Libya, 2 March 2001.

37 CCR and the International Peace Academy (IPA), Building an African Union for the 21st Century, Analytical Report of the Brainstorming Meeting of the Commission of the African Union and Eminent Personalities, 25–28 October 2003, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

38 AU, “Decision on the Definition of the African Diaspora”, Decisions, Declarations and Resolutions, Assembly of the African Union, Fifth Ordinary Session, Sirte, Libya, 1–2 July 2005, EX.CL/Dec.221 (VII).

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Conclusion: Building a Unified Africa

John Akokpari

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) in July 2002 at the summit of African Heads of State and Governments in Durban, South Africa, spawned consider-able euphoria and optimism. The optimism was informed by the hope that the AU would mitigate Africa’s seemingly intractable challenges and thus succeed where the OAU had failed. The AU’s adoption of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), formulated a year earlier, as a major blueprint framework for development,1 further height-ened this sense of optimism. Crafted in partnership with the world’s industrialised countries, NEPAD promised to transform positively Africa’s governance and its overall political economy.2 Together, the AU and NEPAD generated a new vision to develop Africa by strengthen-ing its institutions of governance, many of which have since remained ineffective. The AU and NEPAD aim to enhance the capacities of their institutions more effectively to meet their economic and political objec-tives. Thus, although African civil society expressed disquiet with the formation and formulation of the AU and NEPAD, with some sceptics denouncing NEPAD as “dead” even before it was born,3 the year 2002 inspired hope for Africa and its development partners.

However, in spite of this generally buoyant feeling, the AU has far from established cordial relationships with interested partners, institu-tions and relevant stakeholders, including NEPAD, civil society and external actors in the last five years. Debates and discussions are still rag-ing on how undemocratic and exclusionist NEPAD has been,4 and also


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on how best to strengthen relations with these institutions and actors in a way that enhances the ability of these emerging trans-national initiatives to promote Africa’s socio-economic development. Destructive conflicts, HIV/AIDS, poverty, marginalisation, dependence and debt continue to undermine Africa’s growth and development, even threatening the con-tinent’s peaceful existence. Concerns about NEPAD are informed by the need to reverse Africa’s enormous development challenges that have been compounded by globalisation and liberalisation. The ability of the AU to confront these challenges effectively depends on the strength and partner-ship between the AU and its institutions. The 17 chapters in this volume have shed light on these issues, underscoring the variety of opportunities and challenges facing the AU and its institutions in a new century.

FROM THE OAU TO THE AUCreated in the Cold War decade of the 1960s, the OAU became part of what is now metaphorically described as the “old regionalism”.5 Enmeshed in Cold War politics, the OAU became a captive of the unfold-ing ideological contestations of the age and failed firmly to dictate the course of African development. Unable to locate itself at the centre of African politics for nearly 40 years, it became difficult, if not impossible, for the OAU to recapture the initiative in a post-Cold War environment marked by a completely new set of challenges. In the light of widespread ideological differences, the only unifying factor among African leaders in the 1960s was a collective desire for the decolonisation of the continent. Thus, once apartheid was dismantled in 1994, concluding Africa’s som-bre chapter on occupation and foreign domination, the OAU became anachronistic, with a highly truncated capacity to deal with the conti-nent’s new post-Cold War governance and security challenges, including marginalisation, debt, HIV/AIDS and governance. Obsolete in the post-Cold War era, the demise of the OAU became inevitable.

The aims of the AU, as set out in Article 3 of the Constitutive Act of 2000, are in many ways similar to those of the OAU with a few addi-tions to reflect the realities of the post-Cold War era. However, the most remarkable addition to the AU programme is the provision of Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act, sanctioning intervention in the internal affairs of states. Such intervention is legitimated on three interrelated grounds – to prevent war crimes, genocide and crimes against human-ity. The non-interventionist posture of the OAU severely incapacitated it from dealing with grotesque human rights abuses, genocide and vari-ous challenges of governance in member states. The right of the AU to


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intervene in states means that African governments could no longer hide behind the shield of ‘sovereignty’ or ‘territorial integrity’ to perpetuate internal aggression, overt or covert, against their citizens.6 This right to intervene in countries, along with the AU’s concern to promote democ-racy and good governance through the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) have set the AU apart as a visionary organisation determined to revitalise the tattered image of Africa.

In spite of its promises and vision, the AU is not immune to criti-cism. Some criticisms against the organisation centre on the absence of criteria upon which membership is based. The automatic inclusion of states in the AU means that the new organisation is composed of many of the corrupt, inept and brutal leaders in the OAU, whom Ali Mazrui uncompromisingly characterised as “democra-cides”.7 Indeed, some observers are inclined to depict the AU as “old wine in new bottles”.8 Critics are concerned that the AU summits have become the usual annual funfair gathering of leaders with flamboyant resolutions and little action. Other criticisms include the AU’s failure to make popular consulta-tion; its slowness in delivery; and its unclear relationship with NEPAD. Questions continue to be raised about whether NEPAD is indeed owned by the AU. Moreover, while the AU sets out to intervene in states on previously stated grounds, the modalities for such interventions are far from established. This potentially leaves room for interpretation and contestation between perpetrating states and the AU, and can ultimately delay intervention where this is required. Together, these criticisms depict the AU not as fundamentally different from its predecessor, but as more or less a continuation of the old and discredited order.

PEACE AND SECURITY

Article 3 of the AU’s Constitutive Act of 2000 specifically identifies the promotion of peace, security and stability as a prime objective of the AU. Peace and stability have remained elusive in large parts of Africa, compelling the AU and Africa’s regional organisations to assume the responsibility of resolving conflicts on the continent. This new responsi-bility has been necessitated by developments within and beyond Africa. The ending of the Cold War eroded Africa’s strategic importance, lead-ing to a retreat of the West from peacekeeping operations in Africa. The Balkan wars in the early 1990s did not help Africa either. The US and its North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies became deeply involved in ending the Balkan wars and hardly had the time or the incli-

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nation to attend to the seemingly unending conflicts in Africa. And, so far, the AU is still in the process of establishing its African Standby Force (ASF) which is to be ready for deployment by 2010. The full function-ing of the AU’s 15-member Peace and Security Council (PSC), an organ with functions similar to those of the UN Security Council, as well as the African Standby force, may enhance Africa’s ability to deal speedily with conflicts and insecurity.

Meanwhile, the AU remains nascent and lacks the resources and mobility to intervene militarily in conflicts. This is amply demonstrated by the organisation’s declining ability to assemble an effective stabilisa-tion force in Somalia to replace Ethiopian troops who have established some semblance of stability since December 2006. Similarly, the AU was only able to deploy 7,000 troops and monitors – largely under-financed and ill-equipped – to Darfur, an area the size of France, where over four years of ethnic cleansing has killed 200,000 and displaced 2.5 million people.9 The AU’s record has so far not been any better in less militaris-tic situations. In Zimbabwe, where political tension between the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) is threateningly turning into violent confrontation between supporters of the parties, the AU’s impact has been minimal. The euphoric and nationalist slogan “African solutions to African’s problems” celebrated with the inaugu-ration of the AU, has not yet been given full effect as the organisation still relies on the international community for support in its peacekeep-ing operations. Against a background of western ‘neglect,’ the AU has sought to strengthen the capacities of Africa’s regional economic com-munities (RECs) as well as establishing partnership with external actors under a new security architecture.10

Under the AU’s new security paradigm, the conventional frontiers of security from the Cold War era have been expanded, for example, from ideologically-defined state security to human security. Africa’s new security architecture recognises the shifts in the sources of insecurity – from external to internal and from military to non-military threats to people including HIV/AIDS and diseases, internal displacement, poverty, famine, hunger and environmental degradation. The thrust of the AU’s new security agenda, is to enhance the capacities of Africa’s RECs and institutions more effectively to counter these threats, in particular, to maintain peace and security. In addition to strengthening the RECs, the AU also seeks partnership with, and assistance from, external actors. Aware of the enormous peace and security challenges facing the AU, the international community has often been willing to support Africa’s peace


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and security initiatives. Africa’s western partners have thus provided financial and other logistical assistance towards the peacekeeping opera-tions of Africa’s regional bodies.

The UN took over regional peacekeeping efforts in the Central African Republic (CAR), Sierra Leone, Liberia, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire and Burundi between 1999 and 2004. The US has been involved in establishing the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) in 1996 to train approximately 9,000 African soldiers to respond speedily to peacekeeping and humanitarian demands on the continent. ACRI has since been replaced by the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA).11

However, some observers have criticised Washington for using ACRI as an “exit strategy” for avoiding the responsibility of involving American and western peacekeepers in Africa’s conflicts.12 Even before ACRI and ACOTA, British, French and American assistance had been visible, for example, in ECOWAS’ peacekeeping efforts in Liberia, Sierra Leone and recently in Côte d’Ivoire.13 Similarly, the European Union (EU) has supported AU peacekeeping efforts in Darfur and the Central African Multinational Force (CEMAC); engaged in capacity-building for the AU Commission’s Peace and Security Department; and provided, through its Peace Facility for Africa, a grant of €250 million towards AU peace efforts, largely in Darfur.14 The creation of a Peace and Security Council by the AU in 2004 has received the support of Africa’s western partners, which are keen to assist it financially.

The current crises in Darfur and Somalia clearly show that the AU is still far from able independently to provide ‘African solutions to African conflicts’. The AU will thus continue to depend on external assistance for its peacekeeping requirements even after the proposed African Standby Force has been established.

GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY Until the establishment of the AU’s Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) and the inauguration of the Pan-African Parliament, African civil society had been critical of the AU for failing to consult widely on the decision to transform the OAU into the AU, and on the design and implementation of NEPAD. The initial decision of the OAU Summit in Libya in 1999 and the subsequent adoption of the AU’s Constitutive Act in Togo in 2000, were done exclusively by Africa’s lead-ers. The European Union, whose success the AU is seeking to replicate, has involved not only member governments, but also member citizens in

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nearly every stage of the integration process through referenda on key issues. (Though many have also noted the elitist origins of the EU and its “democratic deficit” which led to French and Dutch voters rejecting the EU Constitution in 2005). In this involvement, states retained the right to accept or reject particular initiatives. In some cases, a strong position of the citizenry has led to a rethinking, a reformulation or a retracting of policy. The internal democratic workings of the EU afford citizens the same rights they enjoy under their national governments to influence regional programmes. It is this freedom that enabled Britain and Sweden, for example, to stay out of the common European currency, the euro, introduced in 2002. By constantly engaging with citizens, the EU instilled a sense of ownership among its populace; by exercising the right to influence its direction, citizens gained a sense of belonging to the Union. The AU, in contrast, has failed to engineer such practices of citizen participation in its major decisions, while paradoxically profess-ing to promote good governance. ECOSOCC and the PAP are important institutions of the AU that may yet rectify these lapses.

Following the adoption by AU leaders of the Statute of ECOSOCC in July 2004, ECOSOCC was constituted in 2005. Its creation was influenced by the African Charter on Popular Participation and Human Rights adopted in Arusha, Tanzania, in 1990. This Charter called, among other things, for the participation of civil society in structures of African governance. ECOSOCC is thus meant to provide a forum for civil soci-ety – business, media, women, youth, and other social groups in Africa. The body is expected to champion the views of non-state constituencies as alternative sources of ideas on development and democracy.

However, acting principally in an advisory capacity, questions are being asked about the efficacy of ECOSOCC as a forum for civil society engagement with the AU. Some observers see this as contradictory in that, while the AU professes in theory to uphold principles of democratic governance and popular participation, the organisation has stifled these very virtues in practice by conferring only advisory roles on ECOSOCC. How an advisory institution can influence an organisation like the AU that has historically lacked consultation and debates, remains to be seen. The nomination of Kenyan environmentalist and 2004 Nobel peace laureate, Wangari Maathai, as the interim president of ECOSOCC, also raised concerns, since Maathai was then the deputy environment min-ister in the Kenyan government. It was feared that, as a minister whose primary loyalty was first and foremost to the Kenyan government, Maathai was likely to project the views of Nairobi, rather than those of civil society. However, Maathai, along with several cabinet ministers,


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resigned from the Kenyan government in January 2006 following allega-tions of mismanagement within the government. This abated concerns over possible biased leadership within ECOSOCC.15 The importance of ECOSOCC cannot be overemphasised. With the unwillingness of African leaders to chastise their peers, and the fact that the APRM’s abil-ity to bring good governance-stifling regimes to order is still untested, the traditional role of a continental ‘opposition’ falls squarely on the shoulders of ECOSOCC. Thus, the key concern is how to strengthen ECOSOCC to make it play this critical role.

Similarly, the Pan-African Parliament is designed to promote civil society participation in the activities of the AU. Created by Article 17 of the AU’s Constitutive Act, the PAP was established in March 2004 and located in South Africa. The Parliament is one of nine organs earmarked for establishment by the Abuja Treaty of 1991 establishing the African Economic Community.16 However, like ECOSOCC, the PAP is an advi-sory body with limited legislative roles and highly restricted powers to initiate policy changes within the AU. Members of the PAP are appointed by national governments rather than elected by civil society. As such, the PAP is neither representative nor accountable to African peoples, thus undermining the institution’s claim to articulate the interests of civil society. In many of the countries (except South Africa whose delegation include opposition members and civil society representatives), govern-ments have been careful to delegate mainly members of their parties or sympathetic parties, often sidelining opposition elements and individu-als likely to be critical of their policies. As such, it is not exactly clear if members of PAP represent their governments or civil society. Mostly coming from ruling parties, members of PAP will tend to project the interests of national governments. This potentially undermines the pur-pose of PAP as a governance institution for representing civil society.

A pioneering continental institution, the idea is for PAP to exercise advisory and mini-legislative powers in the first five years of its estab-lishment and to become elective with full legislative powers by 2009.17 The continental parliament would then become a truly representative body with unfettered legislative powers to serve as a credible forum for public participation within the AU. On becoming representative, the PAP is expected to exercise its other functions enshrined in Article 11 of the Abuja Treaty of 1991, including overseeing the budget of the AU, harmonising policies towards regional integration, making recommenda-tions for the promotion of human rights, strengthening democratic insti-tutions and improving governance among member states. Meanwhile, with a budgetary requirement in excess of $10 million per annum,18

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there is concern that a great deal of financial resources is being dissipated on an institution, which is only advisory in function, though the PAP itself continues to suffer from financial problems. The rule for member countries returning five representatives to the PAP is also considered unfair to the more populous and relatively affluent countries like South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt and Libya who bear the greatest financial burden of the institution.

Despite these apparent shortcomings, the PAP is a forward-looking institution for giving prominence to women, a constituency that has historically suffered considerable marginalisation in decision-making at higher levels. The Speaker of the PAP, Tanzanian, Getrude Mongella, is a woman, along with one of the four deputy speakers of the parliament. Although a few African countries, including Lesotho and South Africa, already have women as speakers of their national assemblies, the election of a woman as Speaker of the PAP is noteworthy. Moreover, of the 45 countries currently represented in the PAP, only seven – Angola, Egypt, Mauritius, Namibia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Togo – have all-male delegations. Senegal and Zimbabwe have three women each in their five-person delegations. Altogether, about a quarter of the current member-ship of the PAP is made up of women. This development testifies to the AU’s increasing commitment to abide by the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights that gives equal representation to both men and women in decision-making. With a woman speaker and a significant number of women in the Assembly, the PAP is placed in a better position to deal with gender issues, and to formulate policies that seek to consolidate the position of women in mainstream politics and development. Yet, this is the furthest the AU has gone in involving women at higher decision-making levels. While five of the first 10 AU Commissioners were women, the summit – the organisation’s highest decision making body – has only one female member: the elected presi-dent of Liberia, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. The massive under-representation of women in the AU summit of leaders is indicative of the huge task involved in reversing the marginalisation of women in Africa.

THE DIASPORA AND EXTERNAL ACTORS In the context of globalisation, coupled with the positive contribution of the African diaspora to meeting its objectives, the AU has broadened the definition of Africa’s civil society to include the African Diaspora. The African Diaspora is a generic term referring to three important constitu-encies, including the historical diaspora communities that are descended


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nationalities in the western hemisphere – Afro-Cubans, Afro-Brazilians, African-Americans and Afro-West Indians; African Diaspora-derived nation states such as Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Grenada, the Dominican Republic and Haiti; and the numbers of African expatriate communities of nationals from existing member states of the AU, who are either citizens of, or otherwise residing in, non-African countries. Thus, in addition to Africa’s five identifiable regions – North, South, East, West and Central – the African Diaspora is considered by the AU to be the sixth region of the continent. Geographically external, but integral to Africa culturally and historically, the diaspora is a critical constituency of the AU. Historically, the contribution of the diaspora to Africa’s emancipation from colonial rule (particularly the end of apartheid in South Africa) and its pursuit of regionalism cannot be overemphasised.19 Many of Africa’s first generation leaders were either part of, or inspired by, Africans in the diaspora. In recent years, the financial contribution of the diaspora to Africa in the form of migrant remittances has been substantial.

By including the Diaspora in Africa’s civil society network, the AU is not only seeking active diaspora involvement in the continent’s devel-opment, but also aiming to impact on the organisation’s policies. The inclusion of the Diaspora in the AU’s development and security agendas could generate positive results. This could, for example, include the evolution of programmes that could deal with Africa’s “brain drain”, a problem that has escalated in recent years. While it is difficult to reverse the “brain drain” to the rich North due to unrewarding, even inauspi-cious, conditions in much of Africa, it is possible to evolve a programme in partnership with the Diaspora and under the auspices of the AU to manage and maximise the benefits from African migrants. In addition to helping to establish a common African identity, the AU’s pleas for international concessions, including debt cancellation, environmental protection and better treatment for African migrants in the West, could be augmented by the voice of the diaspora. Yet, while recognising the advantages of engagement with the Diaspora, the AU is yet to spell out clear details on how to integrate this group into its overall programmes. As a forum for civil society participation, ECOSOCC should assume the task of working out a programme that adequately incorporates and pro-motes the participation of the Diaspora in the activities of the AU.

Besides the diaspora, the AU also works in partnership with other external actors to help meet its objectives, especially regarding develop-ment and security. The imperative to seek collaboration with external partners is informed by the enormity of the challenges facing Africa, coupled with its lack of adequate resources. In addition to soliciting

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assistance in its peace and security project, AU countries hope to attract foreign direct investments (FDI) and overseas development assistance (ODA) through NEPAD. Africa’s share of FDI and ODA has seen a tremendous decline since the abatement of the Cold War.20 The original plan in NEPAD aimed to receive about $64 billion in aid annually for Africa if donor governments met their commitments.21 Alongside the objective of attracting aid and investment, AU governments also aim to achieve the reduction or annulment of Africa’s $290 billion debt.

However, accessing aid, foreign investments and gaining debt cancel-lation are contingent on Africa meeting political and economic condi-tionalities set by donor governments. These include: improving gover-nance practices (such as ending corruption, holding regular competitive multiparty elections, respecting the rule of law and human rights); and liberalization of national economies. The African Peer Review Mechanism, instituted by the AU and involving about 26 countries, is a means of demonstrating to creditors Africa’s attainment of these con-ditionalities. However, given the failed promises of rich countries in the past, it remains to be seen if the meeting of good governance and liber-alization conditionalities will bring about debt relief or increase Africa’s access to aid and investment.

While spawning opportunities, the AU and its institutions also face enormous but not insurmountable challenges. With a genuine determi-nation of Africa to succeed, many of these challenges can be mitigated. The critical thing is for African governments to demonstrate more com-mitment to solving African problems, for example, in providing troops where these are required; improving governance performance through the APRM; strengthening key institutions such as ECOSOCC and PAP as forums of popular participation; accelerating the process of economic integration on the continent through rationalizing and strengthening existing RECs; evolving programmes that speedily incorporate the dias-pora into AU activities; and pushing the international community to augment the efforts of the AU. While these policies are not the ultimate panacea to resolving all of Africa’s ills, they will nevertheless provide a good starting point for the AU in setting the continent firmly on the road to durable peace and security in a new millennium.


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Notes1 Dot Keet “The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the African

Union (AU): Unity and Integration within Africa or Integration of Africa into the Global Economy?”, Alternative Information and Development Centre (AIDC), Johannesburg, October 2002.

2 John Akokpari “The AU, NEPAD and the Promotion of Good Governance in Africa”, Nordic Journal of African Studies 13(3), 2004, pp.243–263.

3 Ian Taylor “The Failure of the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development”, Contemporary Review, 282, 1648 (May 2003), pp.281–285.

4 William M. Gumede, Thabo Mbeki and the Struggle for the Soul of the ANC (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2005), p.212.

5 Bjorn Hettne “Globalisation and the new Regionalism: The second great transforma-tion”, in Bjorn Hettne, Andras Inotai, and Olvando Sunkel (eds.), Globalism and the New Regionalism, 1 (London: Macmillan, 1999): pp.1–24. Also, see Margaret Lee: The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003).

6 Jakkie Cilliers and Kathryn Sturman “The Right Intervention: Enforcement Challenges of the African Union”, African Security Review 11, 3 (2002), pp.29–39.

7 Ali Mazrui “Who Killed Democracy in Africa? Clues of the Past, Concerns of the Future”, Development Policy Management Forum Network Bulletin 9, 1 (2002), pp. 15–23.

8 Henning Melber The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) – Old Wine in New Bottles? (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2002).

9 “UN Security Council Meets AU Over Darfur”, Mail & Guardian (online), 9 June 2006.10 Centre for Conflict Resolution – CCR The AU/NEPAD and Africa’s Evolving Security

Architecture (Cape Town: (CCR), 2005). 11 Col Russell Handy “Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance: Developing

Training Partnerships for the Future of Africa”, Air and Space Power Journal (Fall, 2003), pp.57–64. Also, available online at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/fal03/handy.html.

12 David Francis, The Politics of Economic Regionalism: Sierra Leone in ECOWAS (Burlington: Ashgate, 2001), p.46.

13 John Akokpari “You Don’t Belong here: Citizenship and Africa’s Conflicts – Reflections on Ivory Coast” in Paul Zeleza (ed.) African Conflicts: Management, Resolution and Post-Conflict Recovery and Development (Oxford: James Currey, 2007), pp. 193-228 – Forthcoming.

14 CCR, The AU/NEPAD and Africa’s Evolving Security Architecture, p.4915 The ECOSOCC president is being assisted by four regional deputies – Fatima Karadja

(North Africa), Charles Mutasa (Southern Africa), Ayodele Aderinwale (West Africa) and Professor Maurice Tadadjeu (Central Africa).

16 www.pan-african-parliament.org/index2.htm17 Timothy Murithi, The African Union: Pan-Africanism, Peacebuilding and Develoment

(Burlington: Ashgate, 2005), p.103. 18 http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/13No4/ECilliers.htm (Accessed 15/10/07)19 Sam Asante, Regionalisation and Africa’s Development: Expectations, Reality and

Challenges (London: Macmillan, 1997).20 UN Information Department Africa Recovery 3, 1 (1999), pp. 6–7. Also, see Africa

Recovery 15, 3 (2001), pp.26–28.21 The Economist, 22 June 2002, p.44.

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