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Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions

Preliminary Report, November 2006

Handicap International

Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munition / 3

Table of Contents 2

Acknowledgments 4

Abbreviations and Acronyms 5

Introduction 6

Methodology and Research Team 8

Focus: Southeast Asia 11

CAMBODIA 11LAO PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 14VIETNAM 18

Focus: Africa 22

CHAD 22ERITREA 23ETHIOPIA 25SIERRA LEONE 26SUDAN 27

Focus: Southeast Europe 30

ALBANIA 30BOSNIA and HERZEGOVINA 32CROATIA 33KOSOVO 35MONTENEGRO 39SERBIA 40

Focus:

Commonwealth of Independent States 42

CHECHNYA/RUSSIAN FEDERATION 42TAJIKISTAN 43

Focus: Greater Middle East and

North Africa Region 45

AFGHANISTAN 45IRAQ 49KUWAIT 54LEBANON 56SAUDI ARABIA 61SYRIA 61WESTERN SAHARA/MOROCCO 62

Conclusion 65LESSON 1:

Data Collection, the Devil is in the Detail 65LESSON 2:

Cluster Munitions Cause DisproportionateLong-Term Civilian Harm 66LESSON 3:

Cluster Submunitions Casualties are YoungMales at Work 67

LESSON 4:

Immediate and Comprehensive ClearanceReduces Civilian Casualties 68

Tables

TABLE 1: Confirmed Cluster SubmunitionsCasualties in Affected Countries 69

TABLE 2: Status of Casualty Data Collection in Cluster Submunitions Affected Countries 70

Selected Biography 71

Table of ContentsTable of Contents


AcknowledgmentsAcknowledgments

his preliminary report was conducted,written and produced by HandicapInternational, with the financial support

of the Government of Norway.

Handicap International (HI) would like toexpress its appreciation to the many mineaction organizations, organizations workingwith people with disabilities, disabled people’sorganizations and the other individuals andorganizations that provided information, time,resources and expertise for this study.

HI owes special thanks to the cluster sub-munitions and other mine/ERW survivors, fami-lies and communities who shared their experi-ence.

The team values the support of theInternational Campaign to BanLandmines/Landmine Monitor and the ClusterMunition Coalition networks.

It would also like to thank the followingorganizations and individuals for their assis-tance: Albanian Mine Action Executive (AMAE),Andrew Wells-Dang and Catholic Relief Services(CRS) Vietnam, Cambodia Mine UXO VictimInformation System (CMVIS), Croatian Mine

Action Center (CROMAC), Clear PathInternational (CPI), HIB-Cambodia, JulienTemple, Reuben Nogueria-McCarthy and EdithKaram from UNICEF, the Iraqi Health and SocialCare Organization (IHSCO), John C. Brown fromVVAF Iraq, Landmine Action UK (LMA UK), theLandmine Resource Center staff (LMRC), theNational Demining Office (NDO) and the UNMine Action Coordination Center for SouthLebanon (MACC-SL) in Lebanon, Mines AdvisoryGroup Iraq (MAG), the National Authority forProsthetics and Orthotics (NAPO) and the UNMine Action Office in Sudan (UNMAO), theNational Demining Office in Chad (HCND), theOffice of the Kosovo Protection CorpsCoordinator (OKPCC) EOD Management Unit,Rosy Cave at the United Nations Institute forDisarmament Research (UNIDIR), Steve Goose,Mark Hiznay and Bonnie Docherty at HumanRights Watch (HRW), UN Mission in Ethiopiaand Eritrea Mine Action Coordination Centre(UNMEE MACC) and Zamanuddin Noori andOlivier Moeckli of the International Committeeof the Red Cross (ICRC) in Afghanistan, as wellas several people who provided anonymousinformation.

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6 / Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions

AMAE Albanian Mine Action ExecutiveAO Aviatsionnaya Oskolochnyang

(Aviation Fragmentation)ARCS Afghan Red Crescent SocietyBHMAC Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine

Action CenterBLU Bomb Live UnitCBU Cluster Bomb UnitCBR Community-Based RehabilitationCCW Convention on Certain

Conventional WeaponsCEM Combined Effects MunitionCMC Cluster Munition CoalitionCMVIS Cambodia Mine UXO Victim

Information SystemCPI Clear Path InternationalCROMAC Croatian Mine Action CenterDispenser Container or bomb from which

submunitions are ejectedDPICM Dual-Purpose Improved

Conventional MunitionsEOD Explosive Ordnance DisposalERW Explosive Remnants of WarFootprint Extent of surface area covered by a

cluster munitions strikeGICHD Geneva International Centre for

Humanitarian DeminingHI Handicap InternationalHRW Human Rights WatchICBL International Campaign to Ban

LandminesICRC International Committee of the

Red CrossIDP Internally Displaced PersonIHSCO Iraqi Health and Social Care

OrganizationIMSMA Information Management System

for Mine ActionKISR Kuwait Institute for Scientific

ResearchLMA UK Landmine Action UKLIS Landmine Impact Survey

MAC-MACC Mine Action Center/Mine ActionCell - Mine Action CoordinationCentre

MAG Mines Advisory GroupMCC Mennonite Central Committee MRE Mine Risk EducationNATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNDO National Demining OfficeNGO Non-Governmental OrganizationNMAA National Mine Action AuthorityNRA National Regulatory AuthorityOKPCC Office of Kosovo Protection Corps

CoordinatorPTAB Protivotankovaya Aviatsionnaya

Bomba (Anti-tank Aviation Bomb)TMAC Tajik Mine Action CellUN United NationsUNDP United Nations Development

ProgrammeUNICEF United Nations Children’s FundUNIDIR United Nations Institute for

Disarmament ResearchUNMACA UN Mine Action Center for

AfghanistanUNMIK United Nations Mission in KosovoUNOPS United Nations Office for Project

ServicesUNMAO United Nations Mine Action OfficeUNMEE United Nations Mission in Ethiopia

and EritreaUXO Unexploded OrdnanceVVAF Vietnam Veterans of America

Foundation

Abbreviations and AcronymsAbbreviations and Acronyms


IntroductionIntroduction

he July-August 2006 Lebanon conflictdrew widespread attention to the long-term impact of cluster munitions on civil-

ian populations. Calls for a ban of this indis-criminate weapon are becoming louder. Onecountry – Belgium – has already taken this step,adopting legislation supported by HandicapInternational, and initiatives are underway in atleast eight other countries.

As in the case of Lebanon, previous usage ofcluster munitions has sparked eloquent verbalcondemnations and has been at the forefront ofintermittent international interest and activismsince the first extensive utilization in South-east Asia in the 1960-70s. Since then – like theitems themselves – the issue of cluster muni-tions and their impact lay largely dormant untilthe outbreak of the Balkan and Gulf conflicts.However, for more than 30 years, states failedto address the lasting humanitarian impact ofcluster munitions.

More than half a century has passed since thedesign and first use of cluster munitions.Ensuing decades have seen both the number ofcasualties mount, and the use of these muni-tions proliferate. Spreading through new con-flicts to destroy lives, disrupt communities, anddeny vulnerable populations’ access toresources needed for economic recovery, clus-ter munitions simultaneously assure both acostly and lethal legacy of war for post-conflictgenerations.

Cluster munitions are imprecise weapons,designed to strike a greater surface area thanmany other conventional weapons by dispers-ing smaller yet highly lethal explosive submuni-tions. The cluster submunitions scattered onthe surface create a ‘footprint’. The footprint ofa single cluster munitions strike is often hun-dreds of meters wide, and more than 1,000 sub-munitions can be dispensed at a time.Oftentimes, targets are struck more than once

to ensure success, creating wider and overlap-ping contamination. Within the footprint, sub-munitions indiscriminately kill and injure mili-tary targets and civilians.

Even when accepting the low official failurerates of optimal test conditions, large numbersof submunitions fail to explode upon impact. Inreality, failure rates are often significantly high-er due to soil and weather conditions, as well asincorrect delivery and frequent malfunctioningof self-destruct and self-neutralization mecha-nisms, as was seen in Lebanon. Consequently,a fatal footprint remains until all deadly debrisis cleared and the actual strike is only the start-ing point of the long-lasting harm the weaponcan cause.

Yet, unlike the initial blasts, the effects of unex-ploded submunitions do seem more discrimi-nate; affecting many more civilians than mili-tary personnel, killing and injuring children atplay, families returning after war and youngmen and women in the course of their dailylives, as well as those clearing failed submuni-tions and peacekeepers.

Unlike many instances of production, stockpil-ing and combat use, the human impact duringand after the conflict have not been routinelyrecorded nor publicized. As a result, the fullscope of the problem is largely unknown andundervalued.

Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of

Cluster Munitions is an unprecedented prelimi-nary effort to document the impact of clustermunitions on the lives of people in 23 countriesand areas that are not internationally recog-nized, which are confirmed to be affected bycluster munitions. Despite its preliminary char-acter, this report is the first comprehensivestudy systematically analyzing the impact ofcluster munitions on civilian populationsthrough casualty data. It utilizes the limited

T


information available on casualties of clustersubmunitions to track the human impact fromthe initial cluster munitions strikes, over theshort-term post-strike emergency phase, to thepost-conflict period, which can affect the livesof individuals, families and communities forgenerations. By identifying which peoplebecome casualties, when, how and why, theresearch goes beyond simply assessingwhether cluster munitions are indiscriminateand excessively injurious.

Fatal Footprint is part of an ongoing project thatseeks to improve understanding of the impactof cluster munitions by documenting short-,mid- and long-term casualties, cumulativeeffects of disability, mortality and resourcedenial on families and communities. It also pro-vides insight into the items and activities pos-ing the greatest threats in affected areas. Thiswork has been made possible with the supportof the Government of Norway, which has alsotaken a lead and pledged to work towards aninternational ban on cluster bombs.

At the international level, the Third ReviewConference of the Convention on Prohibitions orRestrictions on the Use of Certain ConventionalWeapons, to be held from 6 to 17 November2006, provides a unique opportunity forMember States to acknowledge and tackle thelasting human impact of cluster munitions andhasten the establishment of a legally bindinginstrument on these weapons.

Brussels, 2 November 2006


Initial inquiries clearly indicated the needto analyze data of all casualties caused by clus-ter submunitions, including both those peoplekilled and injured as a result of cluster muni-tions strikes and people involved in incidentsresulting from submunitions as remnants ofwar.

The study outline and preparations start-ed in April 2006 and the research resulting inthis preliminary report was conducted frommid-July to mid-October 2006 by a team ofresearchers, information providers and expertswith experience in mine action, mine victimassistance, data collection and post-conflictsocieties. A final report is scheduled to appearin 2007 as part of a larger project.

Initially, background information on clus-ter munitions use, technical specifications, aswell as existing published information on clus-ter submunitions casualties was compiled inone place and studied. Following that, a broadrange of research methods, including analysisof publications, email, telephone and face-to-face interviews (at international forums) wereused. A data gathering and management sys-tem was developed to store, streamline andcorrelate casualty data, strike data and techni-cal specifications. In addition, a field trip toLebanon was undertaken from 30 August to 10September in order to conduct first-handresearch. Information from anterior field tripsto, among others, Cambodia (April 2006),Kosovo (October 2005), and Afghanistan(August 2006) was also included. One teammember is based in Vietnam and experienceand resources within the Cluster MunitionCoalition and the International Campaign toBan Landmines were employed.

Tailor-made queries were drawn up for rel-evant experts and information providers sup-plying both casualty data and correlating strikedata. The results of these enquiries, as well asother responses, were compiled, standardized,

andicap International has utilized its fieldand research experience in the area ofvictim assistance and data collection toprovide a better understanding of the

consequences of cluster munitions use on peo-ple in 23 contaminated countries and areas notinternationally recognized.

The report takes a regional approach,comprising individual country profiles, whiletaking into account both the wider regional andhistorical context and country-specific charac-teristics of cluster munitions used. A fewselected cases of cluster munitions use andsubsequent human impact have been elaborat-ed for their relevance with regard to the scale ofcontamination, historical and contemporarysignificance, as well as various ways of dealingwith and recording post-strike impact. Theresearch has been divided into five regions:Africa, the Commonwealth of IndependentStates, the Greater Middle East and North AfricaRegion, Southeast Asia, and SoutheasternEurope. Three countries in the Southeast Asiaregion, three countries in the Greater MiddleEast and North Africa Region, and Kosovo werechosen as key cases for their geographical, his-torical and contamination diversity and paral-lels.

Each country profile contains a shortbackground section explaining cluster muni-tions use and contamination to describe thepotential extent of unexploded cluster submu-nitions pollution. Secondly, the availability andcompleteness of casualty data and injury sur-veillance mechanisms are assessed in order todefine the scope of underreporting. Thirdly,available casualty data are presented and ana-lyzed to the fullest extent possible to draw acasualty profile to be used in assistance plan-ning and to be taken into account when consid-ering the unwanted effects of cluster munitionsuse. A selection of survivor testimonies isincluded to show the human face of cluster sub-munitions casualties.

Methodology and ResearchTteamMethodology and Research Team

H


crosschecked and analyzed. Where necessary,queries were refined and missing data was pur-sued by consulting known sources to obtain themost complete information possible. The studyemployed quantitative analysis of the statisticaldata available from existing data collection sys-tems. The researchers extracted information onspecific numbers of casualties, age, gender,groups most at risk, time, location, activity andnature of the incident, for each country profile.

The study aims to detail the human impactand the scope of the problem to increase thepossibilities for improved, more effective andvaried assistance for the victims, i.e. the affect-ed individual, his or her family and affectedcommunities. Handicap International sections,in partnership with other civil society groups inrelevant European and cluster munitions-affect-ed countries, will disseminate the Fatal

Footprint study to provide systematic informa-tion and to support others in preventing similarincident from occurring in the future.

By looking at data collection mechanismsand examining the degree to which they aresystematic and effective and how comprehen-sive the resulting data is, Fatal Footprint identi-fied areas where information collection anddatabase resources are in need of support.

At the preliminary report stage, the Fatal

Footprint study has already compiled the most

comprehensive publicly available data on

casualties of cluster submunitions. But the

authors acknowledge required information is

missing. They call on relevant sources to pro-

vide casualty and strike data in their posses-

sion so that the humanitarian needs generated

by cluster munitions can be addressed more

adequately.

Research Team

• Habbouba Aoun (Coordinator, LandmineResource Center, Balamand University,Beirut, Lebanon) was co-researcher for theLebanon country profile and facilitated thefield mission to Lebanon.

• Stan Brabant (Head, Policy Unit, HandicapInternational, Brussels, Belgium) assisted inmany aspects of the report’s production anddevelopment, and together with KatleenMaes and Hugh Hosman developed thevision of the study and defined the researchmethodology.

• Patricia Campbell (Victim AssistanceSpecialist, HI-Landmine Monitor, Maputo,Mozambique) conducted backgroundresearch on various countries and issues.

• Hugh Hosman (Data ManagementSpecialist, HI, Hue, Vietnam) conductedresearch on Southeast Asia, theCommonwealth of Independent States, sev-eral Balkan countries and was in charge ofdata management, as well as study concep-tion.

• Katleen Maes (Victim AssistanceCoordinator, HI, Brussels) conductedresearch on Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanonand was in charge of general coordinationand final editing of the report, as well asstudy conception.

• Loren Persi (Specialist Researcher, HI,Prague, Czech Republic) conducted researchon Kosovo, Africa and several countries inthe Greater Middle East and North AfricaRegion.

• Yolande Hoornaert and HildegardeVansintjan (HI Communications Departmentand Policy Unit) facilitated the printing anddistribution process.


The Second Indochina War, which beganin Vietnam, was characterized by high levels ofUS aerial bombardment, which spread to theneighboring countries of Cambodia and the LaoPeople’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR).Subsequently, all three countries face varyingdegrees of post-conflict cluster submunitionscasualties and contamination.

CAMBODIA

Key Findings

• Differentiation of ERW type casualties,including those caused by cluster submuni-tions, started in September 2006. The exer-cise has, so far, confirmed 120 cluster sub-munitions casualties (29 killed and 91injured).

• The total number of cluster submunitionscasualties is unknown, as complete informa-tion on strike, post-strike and post-conflictcasualties is not available.

• From 1969-1973 the United States used awide range of BLU cluster submunitions

Confirmed Casualties: 1998 – 2006

Total Strike Post- Post-

Strike Conflict

Grand Total 120 N/A N/A 120

Injured 91 91

Killed 29 29

Unknown Status 0 0

Man 43 43

Woman 12 12

Boy 56 56

Girl 9 9

Military 0 0

Deminer 0 0

Unknown 0 0

Dominant Activity Handling submunitions (70)

Dominant Location Livelihood areas (67)

resulting in an estimated post-strike contam-ination of 1.92 to 5.77 million submunitions.

Use Background and Contamination

The US used cluster munitions inCambodia from 1969-1973 in an attempt tointerdict the flow of supplies on the Ho Chi MinhTrail, as well as Vietnamese regular and irregu-lar forces operating from eastern Cambodia.1

The number of cluster munitions strikes is esti-mated at 17,235.2 Air-delivered submunitionsused include: BLU-3, 18, 24/66, 26/36/59, 49,61, 63/86, and 77, and M28. Of an estimatedtotal of 19.23 million submunitions dispensed,the BLU-26 was the most common at nearly 54percent (10.37 million units), followed by theBLU-24 at 20 percent (3.93 million units) andthe BLU-61 and 63 at 17 percent (3.3 millionunits)3.

Submunitions manufacturers of the peri-od estimated a 10 percent failure rate, “but it isnow generally agreed that the actual rate wasapproximately 30 percent because the ord-nance was often not dropped in accordancewith manufacturers’ specifications.”4 Acceptinga low failure rate of 10 percent, at least 1.92 mil-lion submunitions became ERW. However,using the higher rate of 30 percent, initial con-tamination could be as high as 5.77 million sub-munitions. In optimal condition testing at NellisAir Force Base in 1966, BLU-26 submunitionshad a 26 percent failure rate after deployment.5

But given tree canopy and soil conditions ineastern Cambodia, the failure rate was likely atleast 30 percent resulting in 3.11 million unex-ploded BLU-26s.

Data Collection

Data collection is considered nearly com-plete in Cambodia and the Cambodia Mine UXOVictim Information System (CMVIS) is the defin-itive source of landmine/ERW casualty data,6

containing records on over 62,556 casualtiescollected through the Cambodian Red Crossnetwork and mine action operators.7

Focus: Southeast AsiaFocus: Southeast Asia


In 2005, CMVIS developed a new data col-lection form for differentiating ERW types,including cluster submunitions, among land-mine/ERW casualties. In September 2006, afinal review process of the new form was under-way to expand the differentiation processthrough training of data collection imple-menters.8

Casualties and Analysis9

A CMVIS pilot project resulted in detailedrecords for 120 cluster submunitions casualtiesin 64 incidents: 29 killed and 91 injured in 18provinces of Cambodia10 and dated from 1998 to2006. Analysis of available data shows thatmales are most at risk: 83 percent (99 casual-ties) were male; men accounted for 36 percent(43: 16 killed and 27 injured) and boys under 18for 47 percent (56: 10 killed and 46 injured),respectively, of all cluster submunitions casual-ties. Boys were 86 percent of child casualties;only nine were girls (one killed and eightinjured). Twelve casualties were women (twokilled and 10 injured).

On average 1.8 persons were involved perincident. However, 18 percent of total incidentsinvolved three or more people and accountedfor 39 percent of total cluster submunitionscasualties.

The most common incident activity washandling submunitions at 58 percent of allcasualties (70), followed by “doing nothing” at26 percent (31), and then livelihood activities at13 percent (16). The most common incidentlocations were livelihood areas (such as ricefields and forests, etc.) at 56 percent (67), in vil-lages at 25 percent (30), and along roads at12.5 percent (15). Handling cluster submuni-tions in livelihood areas accounted for 37 per-cent (44) of all reported casualties. The worstof these incidents occurred on 1 April 2003, inthe village of Chuuk (Krouch Chhmar District,Kampong Cham province), when two men, twowomen, a boy, and a girl, ranging in age from 17

to 24, encountered a submunition in a ricepaddy: the girl was killed and the rest wereinjured.

Conflict/Post-Conflict Comparison

All confirmed submunitions casualtiesreported are post-conflict: while specific infor-mation on civilian and military casualties duringthe conflict is not available, estimates rangefrom as low as 30,000 to as high as 500,000Cambodians killed during the US bombing cam-paigns: how many of these were due to clustermunitions will likely never be known.11

Comparison with Post-Conflict Casualties

Attributed to Mines and ERW

There was insufficient data with differenti-ation of ERW item type to permit extensive com-parison of trends among landmine and clustersubmunitions casualties. However, a randomsample of 120 landmine casualties showed atotal of 104 incidents, as opposed to 64 for clus-ter submunitions.12 Further analysis of the sam-ple showed that only 42.5 percent of casualties(51) occurred in livelihood areas and seven per-cent (eight) in villages. Handling a landmineaccounted for only nine percent (11) of land-mine casualties. On average 1.2 people wereinvolved per incident. Only three percent(three) of total landmine incidents involvedthree or more people, and these accounted foronly nine percent (11) of landmine casualties.

Life Experience

In 2005, Choen Ha and two other boyswere playing near their village in KampongSpeu province when they found four steelballs. Each took a turn throwing them,playing ‘marbles’. They did not know thatthe balls were BLU-63s, or that they weredangerous. When the third boy’s turncame, he struck his mark and one of theitems exploded. One boy died of massiveabdominal injuries from the shrapnel,while the two other boys were injured.

Ha was 17 at the time of the incident nearRol An Beng village and did not finishschool. To pay for medical treatment hisfamily spent their entire life savings.There are eight in his family and Ha is thethird of six children (four boys and twogirls): they are all “angry against theAmericans” and during the interviewcalled for clearance, destruction of stock-piles, and a ban on the production of clus-ter munitions.13

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LAO PEOPLE’S

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Key Findings

• Forty-two percent of incidents involve sub-munitions, leading to at least 4,813 con-firmed cluster submunitions casualties.

• All recorded casualties are civilians – with 57percent resulting from livelihood activities.

• From 1964-1973 the United States used awide range of BLU submunitions resulting inan estimated contamination of 20.9 to 62.6million submunitions.


Cluster munitions were used in vast quan-tities by the US from 1964 to 1973 in an attemptto interdict the flow of supplies on the Ho ChiMinh Trail in southern Lao, and in support ofRoyal Lao Government military campaigns inthe north, during the conflict with Vietnam.14

Air-delivered submunitions used include: BLU-3, 7, 18, 24/66, 26/36/59, 42/54, 43, 44, 45, 61,63, 66, 73, and Mk 118.15 The most commonsubmunitions encountered are the BLU-3, 24,26, 42, 61, and 63.16 Of the approximately208.75 million submunitions dispensed, theBLU-26 was the most common at 76 percent(158.79 million units), followed by the Mk 118 atsix percent (13.18 million).18

Accepting low and high failure rates of 10and 30 percent, respectively, between 20.9 and62.6 million cluster submunitions became ERW.With a failure rate of 26 percent in optimal con-dition testing,19 there were at least 41.3 millionunexploded BLU-26s alone remaining at theend of the war, and 47.6 million given a more



Strike Conflict

Grand Total 4,813 N/A N/A 4,813

Injured 2,165 2,165

Killed 2,521 2,521

Unknown Status 127 127

Man 2,257 2,257

Woman 470 470

Boy 1,654 1,654

Girl 275 275

Military 0 0

Deminer 0 0

Unknown 157 157

Dominant Livelihood (2,674), tampering Activities (809), playing with ERW (571)

Dominant Livelihood areas (2,761), Locations in villages (1,188)

likely 30 percent failure rate. Cluster submuni-tions accounted for 46 percent (319,379 items)of all ERW located and destroyed by UXO Laofrom 1996 to December 2005.20

In August and September 1995, a US mili-tary team visited Lao to examine demining/ERW clearance options and made the followingassessment: “Submunitions consist of threetypes: impact fused, time delay fused, and anti-disturbance fused… [b]ecause there is no wayto determine the type of fuse… they must all betreated as anti-disturbance devices. US doc-trine considers all areas littered with submuni-tions… as minefields.”21

Data Collection

Data collection is incomplete, since Laohas no nationwide data collection or injury sur-veillance system. However, the NationalRegulatory Authority (NRA) has as part of itsmandate to develop and maintain a nationalcasualty surveillance system and has begun theprocess.22

The Handicap International (HI) impactsurvey and UXO Lao are the primary sources ofERW casualty data and together provided indi-vidual records on 11,410 post-conflict casual-ties. Within this total, the HI survey data holds10,639 detailed records, and an additional1,279 who were not interviewed for a total of11,918 reported casualties.23 UXO Lao, whichreceives reports of new casualties but does notactively collect data, has records on 870mine/ERW casualties (260 killed and 610injured) from 1999 to December 2005,24 thoughrecords for only 771 detailed records were avail-able.

All data sources in Lao differentiate ERWitem types: for example, in the HI survey therewere only 12 percent of items reported as‘unknown’ and the UXO Lao data generallyspecifies the BLU type encountered.

Casualties and Analysis

In total, 4,813 cluster submunitions casu-alties were reported from 1973 to 2006: 2,521killed, 2,165 injured, and 127 whose status wasunknown.25 This is 42 percent of the total 11,410casualties with detailed records. Therefore,based on the extrapolation of an average rate of42 percent cluster submunitions casualtiesamong the 1,279 reported casualties lackingdetailed records, there are likely at least 537additional cluster submunitions casualties.This leads to an estimated total of 5,350 clustersubmunitions casualties.

Analysis of available data for 4,656 clustersubmunitions casualties (excluding 157 casual-


ties for whom not all the required details wererecorded) shows that males are most at risk andaccounted for 84 percent (3,911) of all clustersubmunitions casualties, with men represent-ing 48 percent (2,257) and boys 36 percent(1,654), respectively. Boys make up nearly 86percent of child casualties (1,929). Womenaccounted for 10 percent (470) and girls for sixpercent (275) of the total.

The most common incident activities wererelated to livelihood (digging, planting, harvest-ing, collecting forest products and cooking) at57 percent (2,674), followed by tampering at 17percent (809), and then playing with ERW at 12percent (571). By far the most common activi-ties for both women and girls were livelihoodareas, accounting for 71 percent (532) of a total745 female casualties; females make up 20 per-cent of casualties engaging in livelihood activi-ties.

Locations where incidents were most like-ly to occur were livelihood areas (rice fields,forests, streams, etc.) at 59 percent (2,761) andvillages at 26 percent (1,188) of casualties.26

Again, by far the most common incident loca-tion for females were livelihood areas, account-ing for 57 percent (423) of all female casualties.Approximately 39 percent (1,801) of cluster sub-munitions casualties occurred in livelihoodareas and involved livelihood activities, whiletampering in livelihood areas constituted ninepercent (430) of total casualties and playingwith ERW four percent (209).

Comparison with Casualties due to

Mines/Other ERW

When unknown or unidentified ERW casu-alties are included, cluster submunitions casu-alties averaged 44 percent of all casualties forthe period 1973-1996,27 which was as much asall other ERW and mines together (12 percentunknown). From 1999-2005, this was an aver-age of 42 percent, but in the first four months of2006, it peaked to 72 percent of all recordedcasualties.28

When the item type is known or differenti-ated in data collection, cluster submunitionscasualties made up at least 51 percent of casu-alties between 1999 and 2006, similar to someother affected countries in the region.29

With high number of incidents involvinglivelihood activities that disturb soil or vegeta-tion, in combination with (disturbance fuzed)munitions that have become increasinglyunstable over the decades, cluster submuni-tions are the likely cause of a similar proportionof incidents where the device type is unknown.According to the NRA, annual ERW casualties

are estimated from 200 to 400, so it is likelythat between 80 (at 42 percent) and 200 (at 51percent) per year are cluster submunitionscasualties.30

In the HI national survey, 49 percent of10,639 casualties with detailed records indicat-ed that more than one person was involved inthe incident (5,168). Cluster submunitionsaccounted for 43 percent (2,229) of multiplecasualty incidents, with all other ERW combinedat 47 percent (2,442), and mines at 10 percent(497).31

Cluster submunitions alone accounted for40 percent (1,815) of 4,525 of those injured, andled to the greatest proportion of multipleinjuries amongst all other casualties, with 64percent (706) of 1,109 total multiple injuries.Among all survivors, 68 percent (3,060) hadamputations and three percent (143) were mul-tiple amputees: cluster submunitions survivorswere 40 percent (1,211) of amputees and 43 per-cent (61) of multiple amputees.32

Life Experience

In 2003, Dam was injured near his home inPhalanexay district when he found andplayed with a BLU-63 submunition. Hisinjuries were typical of many such inci-dents – massive abdominal trauma,shrapnel wounds, as well as a leg and anarm broken by the blast. Evacuated toSavannakhet he received initial treatment,and after two days seemed stable: howev-er, his condition deteriorated as infectionset in. The family had no money to pay fortreatment so HI decided to evacuate Damto Thailand. His father recalled that whenthe boy was ferried across the river hethought he would never see his son aliveagain.

Nearly 12 now, Dam was revisited by HIstaff in September 2006. When ques-tioned directly about what happened hedid not reply. His father explained thatDam does not remember the event itself –instead he has recurring nightmares of theexplosion. But he went on to say that hehad returned to school and is doing well.One thing Dam did have to say was that hetries to avoid ERW, but they are every-where in the fields near the village.33




VIETNAM

Key Findings

• Total post-conflict submunitions casualtiesare estimated at 34,550 to 52,350 – 1,275are confirmed.

• The vast majority of casualties are civiliansdoing livelihood activities – at least 50 per-cent of incidents where the device is knownwere caused by submunitions.

• From 1965-1973, the United States used awide range of BLU submunitions with an esti-mated contamination of between seven and21.2 million.


Cluster munitions were used by the USfrom 1965-1973 during the conflict in Vietnam.Fifty-five out of 64 provinces were struck withcluster munitions and a number of cities weretargeted, including Hai Phong, Hai Duong,Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh, and Hue.34 Air-delivereddevice types used include: BLU-3, 24/66,26/36/59, 32, 42/54, 43/44, 59, 61, 63/86, 77,and 87.35 Artillery-delivered cluster munitionswere also used in three provinces.36

US military records show that the level ofall air-delivered munitions in the A Luoi districtof Hue province peaked in 1972 to approximate-ly 120,000, which is nearly half of all ordnancedropped between 1965 and 1973 and aboutthree times the rate of 1971. Cluster munitionsalso accounted for nearly half of the total muni-tions dropped on the district in the final year ofthe war.37

In total, 413,130 tons of submunitionswere dispensed in Vietnam, 34 percent of what



Strike Conflict

Grand Total 1,275 N/A N/A 1,275

Injured 557 557

Killed 278 278

Unknown Status 440 440

Man 391 391

Woman 104 104

Boy 278 278

Girl 56 56

Military 5 5

Deminer 1 1

Unknown 440 440

Dominant Livelihood (596) Activities

Dominant Livelihood areas (602)Location

was dropped on Lao, for an estimated 70.9 mil-lion.38 Accepting a low failure rate of 10 percent,more than seven million submunitions becameERW; however, using the higher rate of 30 per-cent, initial contamination could have been 21.2million submunitions.39

Data Collection

Casualty data collection is incomplete, asVietnam has no national data collection orinjury surveillance system.40 Project RENEW andClear Path International (CPI) are the primaryoperational sources collecting ERW casualtydata. CPI has shared its new casualty data withRENEW, whose database contains records ofcasualties in Quang Tri province from 1975 to2006. However, detailed full province data wasunavailable from RENEW due to a databaseupdate in progress.41 In both the RENEW andCPI data, ERW type is differentiated if known.

A survey was conducted in A Luoi districtof Thua-Thien Hue province in 2001, which dif-ferentiated ERW types.42 In 2005, the first phaseof a national landmine/UXO impact survey wasconducted in three provinces, but it is notknown what level of detail was collected andthe November 2005 summary report did not dif-ferentiate casualties per device type.43 CatholicRelief Services (CRS) conducted an MRE base-line study, including casualty data in three dis-tricts and one municipality of Quang Tri in mid-2006.44


In total, 1,275 cluster submunitions casu-alties were recorded from 1973 to 2006: 278killed, 557 injured, and 440 with unknown sta-tus. At least one was military clearance person-nel.46

An analysis of available data for 835 clus-ter submunitions casualties (excluding 440unknown status casualties) shows that malesare most at risk at 81 percent (675) of all clustersubmunitions casualties. Adult men accountedfor 48 percent (397) and boys 33 percent (278),respectively, of all reported casualties. Boysrepresented 82 percent of 334 child casualties.Women accounted for 12 percent (104) and girlsfor seven percent (56) of the total.

The vast majority of casualties, i.e. 71 per-cent (596), occurred during livelihood activities,followed by playing at six percent (48) and col-lecting war waste at five percent (39).Livelihood activities caused 79 percent of allfemale casualties (126).

Incidents in livelihood areas (rice fields,grazing areas, forests, and streams) accountedfor 72 percent (602) of casualties and incidents


within villages accounted for 12 percent (99).More than three quarter of female casualties(122) occurred in livelihood areas.

Nearly 40 percent (329) of all cluster sub-munitions casualties reported that they wereinvolved in an incident causing multiple casual-ties.



Submunitions caused 33 percent (1,275)of all recorded landmine/ERW casualties(3,914), and accounted for 50 percent where theitem was known in available data from 1973 to2006 for Vietnam. Between 2003 and 2005, therate of casualties known to be caused by clustersubmunitions was 55 percent. This correspondsclosely with the rate of cluster submunitionscasualties among ERW casualties generally inboth Lao and Tajikistan.47 Therefore, it is likelythat cluster submunitions cause a similar pro-portion of incidents where the device type isunknown.

According to estimates provided by theMinistry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairsthere were 104,701 civilian landmine/ERWcasualties between 1975 and 2000, 38,849 peo-ple were killed and 65,852 injured.48 If clustersubmunitions casualties constituted 33 to 50percent of total recorded casualties, they couldaccount for an estimated 34,550 to 52,350 civil-ian casualties between 1975 and 2000.

Without nationwide data collection, insuf-ficient data exists to establish a reliable annuallandmine/ERW casualty rate, but estimatesindicate that there are between 1,200 and 3,000each year.49 Taking the low estimate intoaccount, this could mean there are between396 and 600 cluster munitions casualties annu-ally in Vietnam.

Conflict/Post-Conflict Comparison

Given the estimate of nearly four millionVietnamese civilians and 1.5 million militarypersonnel killed during 30 years of conflict,50

and nearly a decade of use of cluster munitionsin 55 of 64 provinces, a significant portion ofthose casualties were certainly caused by clus-ter submunitions. However, the extent of thesecasualties will likely never be known.

Life Experience51

Ho Van Lai was injured in a cluster submu-nitions incident in August 2000, whichkilled two cousins and slightly wounded asibling. The boys were playing among thepine trees near their homes, where the vil-lage children often play, when they foundwhat looked like a small metal ball in thesandy soil – a ball which exploded min-utes later as they were kicking it back andforth.

Lai was blinded in one eye and lost partialvision in the other. He lost a leg, part ofthe remaining foot, one hand and thethumb of the other, and was terriblyscarred by the blast. After his initial recov-ery, he faced three surgical revisions to befitted for prosthetics, spending months inrecovery and rehabilitation. As with manyyoung boys, playing football was Lai’spassion, and something he thought hewould never be able to do again.Eventually he returned to school andsome three years later was again seenplaying football.

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Cluster munitions use in Africa demon-strates that even limited use of the weapon canhave a significant human impact. However, theextent of the threat of unexploded submuni-tions has not been assessed and improved datacollection is needed to asses the humanitarianimpact and long-term needs of survivors.

CHADKey Findings

• Several locations in Chad are contaminatedwith cluster munitions.

• The absence of complete casualty data anddata differentiated by item type impedesassessment of the human impact of clustersubmunitions.


Cluster munitions were used in Chad bythe Libyan army after the departure of its troopsfrom the country in mid-1987.52 The 2002Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) reports 92 siteswith cluster munitions contamination.53

Submunitions and/or their containers havebeen found in several areas of the followingregions of Chad: the Borkou Ennedi Tibesti(BET) region (northeastern Chad), the Biltineregion (northeastern Chad), and east ofN’Djamena.54

Two types of submunitions have beenfound, both of former Soviet Union (USSR) man-ufacture: PTAB-2.5 antivehicle submunitionsand AO-1SCh antipersonnel submunitions.55

There have also been reports of French use ofcluster munitions in Chad.56 However, as of 3October 2006, mine clearance operators havenot found evidence of unexploded French sub-munitions.57

In Chad, mines and other ERW seem topose a graver danger than unexploded submu-nitions. The National High Commission forDemining (Haut Commissariat National deDéminage, HCND)58 recorded clearance and

destruction of only 157 submunitions. This isapproximately 0.01 percent of the total of158,034 ERW cleared between September 2000and March 2006.59

Data Collection

There is no comprehensive data collectionmechanism in Chad. HCND reports of ERWcasualties are not differentiated by type of ord-nance; even the distinction between mine andERW incidents may not always be clearlyrecorded.60 Fatal casualties often go unreportedand accurate reporting of new casualties isaffected by limited access to incident loca-tions.61 The LIS for Chad did not adequately dif-ferentiate between casualties of mines andERW62 and no differentiation for casualties ofcluster submunitions was made.


HCND is not able to estimate the numberof casualties related to cluster submunitionsdue to a lack of clear incident reporting.63 TheInternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)does not know of cluster submunitions casual-ties, and is not in a position to provide informa-tion about some of the areas affected by clustermunitions.64 Mines Advisory Group (MAG) doesnot have knowledge of casualties due to clustersubmunitions in Chad.65

Of the 339 casualties of mines and ERWrecorded in the LIS, 330, or 97 percent, werecivilian. The most common activity type duringincidents recorded in the LIS was tampering,representing 121 casualties, or 36 percent, thenext most common activity was herding, 73people, or 22 percent.66 The LIS data show thatmany casualties sustained injuries to the upperbody, and state that this is predominantlycaused by tampering with ERW.67,

Focus: AfricaFocus: Africa


ERITREA

Key Findings

• Cluster submunitions casualties have beenreported as the immediate result of at leasttwo strikes, and as a result of post-strikecontamination.

• The limited casualty data collection mecha-nism does not include specific reference tocluster submunitions casualties.


Ethiopian forces used cluster munitions inEritrea during the Badme border area conflict,which started in 1998.68 On 9 May 2000, theKorokon internally displaced persons’ (IDP)camp was bombed with UK-manufacturedBL755 cluster munitions each containing 147submunitions. Soviet-designed PTAB and AO-1type submunitions were also found in theBadme area.69 Contamination from unexplodedcluster submunitions was reported in theKorokon IDP camp in Gash Barka, as well as atan IDP camp in Adi Bare in Shambiko, both inSector West of the Temporary Security Zone(TSZ).70

In May 2000, the Ethiopian airforce report-edly hit the military and civilian airports inAsmara with rockets and cluster munitions.71

According to an Eritrean Ministry of ForeignAffairs press release, the bombing of the airportfacilities and a nearby soap factory missed theintended targets.72 It has also been alleged thatthe Eritrean ports of Massawa and Assab on theRed Sea coast were struck with cluster muni-tions in the same period.73

Data Collection

The Mine Action Coordination Centre(MACC) of the UN Mission in Ethiopia andEritrea (UNMEE) collects casualty data in theTSZ. The information is entered into IMSMA butdoes not provide a breakdown according todevice type beyond mine and ERW, making itdifficult to identify cluster submunitions inci-dents. This lack of detail in reporting isbelieved to be exacerbated by the limited tech-nical knowledge of investigators andreporters.74 Casualty data in the TSZ is primari-ly reported by military observers, UNMEE MACCstaff, ICRC, and NGO workers.75


The total number of cluster submunitionscasualties is unknown, but recorded casualtiesinclude at least seven people killed and threeinjured: eight of them were children.

One child was killed during the clustermunitions strike on the Korokon IDP camp inMay 2000. The low level of casualties duringthe strike has been attributed to the high failurerate of the submunitions, subsequently result-ing in extensive ERW contamination.76 Many ofthe unexploded submunitions found at Korokonfailed to arm correctly, which may have alsoresulted in them being less sensitive to han-dling.

The May 2000 cluster munitions strike onAsmara airport facilities reportedly resulted inat least two civilians injured during the strike,as the intended targets were not hit. 77

By August 2000, UNMEE MACC receivedreports of three children killed in separate inci-dents in the BL755-contaminated area nearKorokon.78 Also in 2000, a 16-year-old boy waskilled attempting to open a BL755 submunitionwith a stone.79 HALO Trust found some 20BL755 submunitions collected by children at anearby site. Some of the children had beenusing the copper cone of the submunitions’explosive charge to make bells. Other risk-tak-ing behavior included adults moving unexplod-ed submunitions to prevent children from play-ing with them.80

In January 2006, two boys were killed andone injured while tampering with ERW near thevillage of Ksad Ekka. Preliminary investigationby UNMEE determined that the device waseither a grenade or a submunition.81

ETHIOPIAKey Findings

• One cluster munitions strike reportedlycaused more than 200 casualties in Ethiopia,but the scope of the problem is unknown dueto the lack of an adequate casualty datamechanism.

• Use of cluster munitions and subsequentsubmunitions contamination has not beenrecorded or differentiated by mine actionactors or in the Landmine Impact Survey.


The Eritrean army used cluster munitionsagainst Ethiopia during the Badme border con-flict that began in 1998. On 5 June of that year,Eritrea launched air-delivered Cluster munitionstargeting the Mekele airport runway. At leasttwo cluster munitions struck a school and a res-idential area in Mekele instead. The EritreaEthiopia Claims Commission in The Haguefound that the cluster munitions strike resultedin civilian “deaths, wounds and suffering.”82 Itwas reported that submunitions pose “at least


some extent” of a threat on the Ethiopian sideof the TSZ.83 However, the UNMEE MACC has notfound evidence of submunitions during land-mine/ERW clearance. The UNDP remarked thatthe nationwide LIS undertaken in 2003-2004did not report unexploded submunitions foundas ERW. Moreover, the UNDP in Ethiopia is notaware of cluster weapons being used inEthiopia or by Ethiopia.84 However, the SurveyAction Centre (SAC) – responsible for the LIS –indicated that the reason for not having infor-mation on cluster munitions contamination inEthiopia is because, at the time of the LIS, clus-ter munitions were not considered to be a con-cern. According to SAC, the LIS could, if askedand needed, distinguish casualties from clustermunitions, as well as other ERW and land-mines.85

Data Collection

There is no nationwide casualty data col-lection mechanism in Ethiopia. Existing datacollection is not coordinated nor is it clearwhich organization has the mandate to collectdata. It was reported that, in 2005 and 2006,the Ethiopian Mine Action Office (EMAO) wasnot able to collect casualty data due to a lack ofpolitical will, coordination and funding issues.Information contained in IMSMA at EMAO is notaccessible. Various operators handed responsi-bility of casualty data collection to the localBureaus of Labor and Social Affairs (BoLSA).However, these have not been able to generatedata and it is unclear if data is collected.86


Cluster munitions targeting the Mekeleairport instead struck the Ayder school and sur-rounding neighborhood, resulting in a total of238 civilian casualties: 53 killed (including 12children) and 185 injured (including 42 chil-dren).87 Additionally, cluster munitions used on11 June 1998 in Adigrat are reported to havekilled four and injured 30.88

The number of post-strike casualties isunknown due to inadequate data collection anda lack of information on cluster munitions con-tamination, which impede a full grasp of thescope of the problem.

SIERRA LEONE

Key Findings

• There are at least 28 reported cluster submu-nitions casualties in Sierra Leone.


Cluster munitions were reportedly used inSierra Leone by Nigerian forces undertaking anEconomic Community of West African StatesMonitoring Group (ECOMOG) intervention mis-sion after a military coup in May 1997. On 11December 1997, three cluster munitions wereallegedly dropped in Kenema, 240 kilometresfrom Freetown.89 According to 1997 mediareports, two cluster munitions also struckLokosama, near Port Loko in September 1997.This was denied by ECOMOG.90 In October 1997,Sierra Leone Armed Forces personnel accusedNigerian military pilots of using cluster bombson civilian targets in Freetown.91 It has beenreported that French-manufactured Belugacluster submunitions were collected in armshand-ins in Sierra Leone.92 British-manufac-tured BL755 munitions also appear to havebeen found near Freetown.93

Data Collection

There is no systematic ERW casualty datacollection in Sierra Leone.94


The cluster munitions strike by theNigerian ECOMOG mission in Kenema resultedin 28 casualties; 10 people were killed and 18injured.95 No further details regarding addition-al strike or post-conflict cluster submunitionscasualties are available and no ERW incidentscausing casualties have been recorded sincethe end of the civil war in 2002.96 This is partlydue to the non-existence of a data collectionmechanism.

SUDANKey Findings

• At least 36 cluster submunitions casualtieshave been reported, of which severaloccurred during cluster munitions strikes incivilian areas.

• Data collection is not comprehensive anddue to limited differentiation only 23 post-conflict casualties of cluster submunitionswere recorded in IMSMA.


Sudanese government forces used clustermunitions against the Sudan People’sLiberation Movement /Army (SPLM/A) in south-ern Sudan between 1995 and 2000.97 Clustermunitions strikes were mostly conducted byaerial bombing.98 The Sudanese governmentreportedly used cluster munitions, amongst


other weapons, specifically against non-militarytargets, including hospitals and IDP camps.99

Numerous cluster munitions strikes wereidentified between 1995 and 2000, includingfive cluster munitions dropped on cultivatedland surrounding Chukudum on 20 April 1995;at least 16 cluster munitions dropped inChukudum on 17 June 1996; at least seven loca-tions struck in Bahr al-Ghazal province in earlyFebruary 1998; Koba and Lomon in the NubaMountains attacked on 3 August 1998; onecluster munition dropped on Yei Hospital on 28September 1998; Nimule struck on 30September 1998; 24 cluster munitions droppedin Akak on 16 May 1999; two cluster munitionsdropped on Kajo Keji Hospital and Médecinssans Frontières (MSF) in Kajo Keji on 20 June1999.100 In late April or early May 2000, govern-ment troops reportedly used cluster munitionsaround the town of Bentiu.101

The Government of Sudan reportedly usedChilean-manufactured CB-130, CB-500 or CB-250-K cluster munitions, containing PM-1 CEMcombined effects submunitions.102 In 1996,HALO Trust identified submunitions found atChukudum as possible Soviet-manufacturedPTAB-1.5 and Chilean-designed PM-1 type sub-munitions.103 Cluster submunitions and/or dis-pensers have been found in Bahr al-Ghazal,Kordofan, Equatoria, Blue Nile and Upper Nileprovinces.104

Data Collection

No comprehensive countrywide casualtydata collection system exists in Sudan. The UNMine Action Office (UNMAO) maintains casualtydata in IMSMA;105 a limited number of entriesspecify cluster submunitions as the cause ofthe incident. The South Sudan Regional MineAction Center does not have detailed casualtyinformation, particularly regarding cluster sub-munitions causalities.106 Local actors also gath-er casualty data. However, many of these arenot entered into the IMSMA database as theinformation is incomplete.107

A national census has been mandatedunder the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of2005, and is scheduled for 2007.108 The censusis expected to include questions regarding peo-ple with disabilities and thus increase knowl-edge of mine/ERW casualties. Additionally,UNMAO plans to initiate a casualty data surveyas a part of a US$1.7 million project funded bythe UN Trust for Human Security.109 The NationalAuthority for Prosthetics and Orthotics (NAPO)has the capacity to collect data on cluster sub-munitions casualties through the patient files inits ICRC-supported database.110


There are at least 36 cluster submunitionscasualties in Sudan, including 16 killed and 20injured. At least six were children. UNMAO hasrecorded 23 post-strike cluster submunitionscasualties, nine people were killed and 14injured; 19 were males and four females. Of the10 casualties whose ages were recorded twowere children. The ages ranged from 10 to 32,the average age being 21. Activity at the time ofthe incident was recorded for twelve casualties:four activities were military; three were tendinganimals; three traveling; and one farming.111

Most casualties occurred in Kordofan (13) andBahr al-Ghazal (five).112 In 2005, UNMAO record-ed one submunition incident but the number ofcasualties was not known.113 Additionally, a 15-year-old girl was killed and another injured inMay 1996 when neighbors were burning sub-munitions from the Chukudum strike.114

Numerous casualties have been reportedduring strikes. However, there are some caseswhere more than one type of weapon may havebeen used, including in Labone IDP camp in1997, as well as in Adet and Thiet in 1998.115 Fivepeople were killed and three injured due to sub-munitions in the Nuba Mountains in August1998, and one person was injured in Yei hospi-tal in September 1998. In May 1999, one childwas killed and one injured during a strike inAkak (Bahr al-Ghazal).116


Cluster munitions were used in the Balkanregion in conflicts resulting from the breakup ofYugoslavia. The largest numbers of knowncasualties in Kosovo were a consequence ofunexploded submunitions scattered in the tensof thousands by NATO bombing. Children werethose killed and injured the most by the attrac-tive, but deadly submunitions.

ALBANIAKey Findings

• The total number of cluster submunitionscasualties is 56: 10 killed and 46 injurednearly all caused by KB-1 and BLU-97 submu-nitions.

• Cluster munitions were used by NATO andSerbian forces along the Albania-Kosovo bor-der.


Cluster munitions were used in 1999 dur-ing the Kosovo conflict by both the NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Serbianforces: BLU-97, M118, BL755, KB-1 and KB-2(Yugoslav) submunitions were reported.117

Additionally, at least two artillery-deliveredcluster munitions strikes were confirmed by theOrganization for Security and Cooperation inEurope (OSCE) in the Tropoja region.118

NATO executed six strikes along theKosovo-Albania border, allegedly againstSerbian military positions.119 Non-NATO clustermunitions strikes occurred further into Albaniaand included 13 April 1999, when two clustermunitions struck the small border village ofZogaj in the context of other shelling;120 on 15April, five Serbian rocket-fired 262 mm clustermunitions fell on fields near the hamlet ofKolsh, near the city of Kukës;121 on April 21,Russian-made cluster munitions were fired intoAlbania near Krume.122

Immediate surface clearance by theAlbanian Armed Forces located and destroyed2,759 unexploded submunitions: 97.5 percentwere KB-1s.123 The Albanian Mine Action

Executive (AMAE) stated that 13 areas along theKosovo-Albanian border have been identified ascontaminated with submunitions.124 Failurerates for NATO-used munitions were estimatedat between 20 and 25 percent, whereas 30 to35 percent of submunitions used by non-NATOforces failed.125

Data Collection

AMAE coordinates and conducts completenationwide casualty data collection, which isstored in the IMSMA database at its regionaloffice in Kukës. Data is collected by AMAEthrough its mine risk education (MRE) and com-munity-based rehabilitation (CBR) programs, aswell as its operational partners, primarily theKukës-based NGO Victims of Mines andWeapons Association (VMA-Kukesi). In January2006, AMAE completed identification of 467previously unknown ERW casualties in the“hotspots” in central Albania by collectingIMSMA incident and needs assessmentreports.126


Between 1999 and 2006, 56 cluster muni-tions casualties occurred in 35 incidents andone accident, including 10 people killed (ninemales and one female) and 46 injured (41males, and five females). On 24 May 2004, aKB-1 submunition detonated during a trainingsession for technical survey project personnel:two people were killed and 18 injured in theaccident.128 On average 1.7 persons wereinvolved per incident,129 and the mortality ratewas nearly twice that of landmine casualties.130

All but three of the reported submunitionscasualties were civilian: the United NationsInstitute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)identified two. Additionally, a policeman waskilled in the area of Kolsh when he picked up anunexploded submunition after the 15 April 1999strike.131 Additionally, it is unknown whether KLAcasualties, if there were any, are included inAMAE records or recorded as such.132

Focus: Southeast EuropeFocus: Southeast Europe


All but two casualties occurred post-con-flict. During the strike on Kolsh on 15 April 1999a young goatherd was injured.133

Submunitions casualties reported byAMAE involved either KB-1 (24, with two killed,22 injured) or BLU-97 (four killed) submuni-tions, while two other casualties resulted fromunidentified submunitions.

Life experience

In September 2001, 13-year-old Gazmirwas playing with some friends near hishouse in Krume, in the Kukës prefecture.Finding an interesting object, the childrenbegan to play with it. When the KB-1 sub-munition exploded Gazmir’s eyes wereinjured to the extent he was declaredlegally blind. Before the incident Gazmirhad been one of the top students in hisclass, though afterward his studiesbecame unsatisfactory. Aside from his ini-tial treatment, Gazmir has received sup-port for a private tutor, along with Englishand computer skills lessons.134

BOSNIA and HERZEGOVINAKey Findings

• Nine cluster submunitions casualties areconfirmed and dozens unconfirmed. Thetotal number of cluster submunitions casual-ties are unknown due to inadequate data col-lection.

• NATO and internal factions used clustermunitions.


NATO and internal factions used clustermunitions during the conflict from 1992 to 1995.Some examples of use include: Orkan M-87multiple rocket launcher firing on the town ofLivno and airplanes from a Krajina Serb-heldarea in Croatia bombing the UN safe area ofBihaç with cluster munitions.135 Bosnian Serbsstruck a refugee camp south of Tuzla with clus-ter munitions. Bosnian Serbs claimed that NATOstrikes also hit civilian targets in Banja Luka.136

The Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center(BHMAC) data does not confirm alleged casual-ties from these strikes.137

Data Collection

Incomplete nationwide casualty data iscollected by BHMAC. Additionally, due to theunification and verification of all operator data-bases, detailed information on landmine/ERW

casualties was not made available. The BHMACdatabase contains records on casualties occur-ring during and after the conflict, but it is notknown whether submunitions are differentiatedfrom other devices.138


The total number of submunitions casual-ties in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not known, asavailable data is very limited. There have beennine confirmed casualties between 1992-2006,including seven killed and two injured.

The cluster munitions strike on a refugeecamp south of Tuzla killed seven and dozensmore were reportedly injured. BHMAC identi-fied only two deminers injured in separate acci-dents with KB-1 cluster submunitions in 2002:one in Vogosca and one in Gornji Vakuf.According to BHMAC, both accidents werecaused by breach of procedure.139

CROATIAKey Findings

• Cluster munitions were used on several occa-sions by forces of the self-proclaimedRepublic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) and KB-1submunitions caused all reported casualties.

• There are 277 confirmed cluster submuni-tions casualties, including 258 killed, 17injured, and two unknown – two strikes onZagreb accounted for 243 of these.


Cluster munitions were used on severaloccasions by forces of the self-proclaimedRepublic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) between 1991and 1995, most notably on 2 and 3 May 1995when Orkan M-87 multiple rocket launcherswere used to hit civilian targets in Zagreb,which caused the majority of reported casual-ties.140

Data Collection

The Croatian Mine Action Center (CRO-MAC) and Croatian Mine Victims Association(CMVA) conduct nearly complete nationwidedata collection since 1991 and 1990 respective-ly. However, only 50 percent of the CROMACcasualties registered have complete details.141

Casualties from cluster submunitions are differ-entiated from casualties caused by otherdevices, but the total number of cluster submu-nitions casualties is unknown since few conflictcasualties were recorded.


Between 1993 and July 2005, 277 clustersubmunitions casualties have been confirmed,


including 258 killed, 17 injured, and two whosestatus was unrecorded. The May 1995 strikeson Zagreb accounted for 243 (88 percent) ofreported casualties: including seven peoplekilled and 236 injured in the two-day period,five were killed and 186 injured the first day, twokilled and 50 injured the second.142

Analysis of limited CROMAC data for 34cluster submunitions casualties, including 10killed, 22 injured and two unknown, shows that97 percent were civilians. Males accounted for82 percent of all casualties. Boys account for 43percent of the male casualties and the highestrisk activity for boys was playing (29 percent).CROMAC recorded two men and a womaninjured during strikes on 1 January and 1September 1993, in Zaton and Gospic, respec-tively.

From 1 January to 14 July 1993, there were12 male casualties from 11 post-strike incidents,including five killed and seven injured in Zadar,Muc, Sibenik and Sukosan. In 1994, one six-year-old boy was killed. In 1995, there were ninecasualties from four incidents: one man waskilled and eight people were injured, includinga woman, a girl, three boys, and three men.

The remaining nine casualties (threekilled, four injured, and two unknown) occurredin the post-conflict period between 1996 and2005. One deminer was killed clearing submu-nitions at a hospital in Zagreb. On averageabout 1.5 people were involved per incident.KB-1 submunitions have caused all known casu-alties reported by CROMAC.143

Life Experience

Ivan Mikulcic was 56 years old when thevillage of Pleso, some 500 metres from theZagreb airport, was shelled with clustermunitions: “On that day, the 2nd of May,1995, I was at my home at Pleso... On thatmorning at around 10.00, shelling started,and an unexploded cluster bomb of theOrkan type landed in my yard about 8metres away from me… Some of thebomblets of the bomb remained unex-ploded, but there was one that explodedsome 4 metres behind my back, injuringme and damaging my home.... At thatpoint, I was on my way to the shelter and Ionly managed to get hold of the doorknobwhen I felt this very sharp pain in my back.And to this day I’ve been carrying threepieces of shrapnel in my back… the physi-cian… told me that they were thus placedthat they would cause more damage bytaking them out than by leaving themthere.” 144

KOSOVO145

Key Findings

• Cluster munitions used by NATO.

• At least 164 casualties of cluster submuni-tions recorded in Kosovo; the majority werechildren.

• Sixty percent of cluster submunitions inci-dents involved two or more people.


The vast majority of cluster munitions con-tamination in Kosovo is the result of use byNATO forces against the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia during ‘Operation Allied Force’ fromMarch to June 1999. The United States and theNetherlands used CBU-87 cluster munitionseach containing 202 BLU-97 combined effectssubmunitions. Some CBU-99 and CBU-100munitions were also used. The United Kingdomused about 500 RBL755 munitions, each con-taining 147 dual-purpose antivehicle andantipersonnel blast and fragmentation submu-nitions.146

In 1999, NATO informed the UnitedNations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Mine ActionCoordination Centre (MACC) that 1,392 clustermunitions containing 289,536 submunitionswere targeted at 333 strike locations inKosovo.147 However, research suggests NATOforces dropped more than 2,000 cluster muni-tions containing approximately 380,000 sub-munitions.148 The credibility of the strike dataNATO provided some ten months after the endof the conflict seemed questionable due to“glaring inaccuracies,”149 and the problemappears to be wider than initially reported.150



Strike Conflict

Grand Total 164 N/A 147 15

Injured 103 96 7

Killed 59 51 8

Unknown Status 2 unknown

Man 50 39 11

Woman 3 3 0

Boy 83 81 2

Girl 1 1 0

Military 7 7 0

Deminer 15 13 2

Unknown 5 unknown 3 unknown

Dominant By-standing/passing by (40)Activities

Dominant Dakovica (29)Location


In 2001, failure rates of BLU-97 submuni-tions were estimated at some seven percent,and RBL755 submunitions at about 11 per-cent.151 The manufacturer assessed the failurerate of RBL755 submunitions at five percent.152

At a failure rate of five percent, about 14,500 to19,000 submunitions would have remainedunexploded.

Clearance data indicates that at least18,318 cluster submunitions have beendestroyed in the period June 1999-2005,153 andthe MACC has estimated that more than 20,000unexploded submunitions remained after thewar.154 All known strike areas were cleared tointernational standards by 2002.155 However,UNMIK continued to find submunitions in areasnot considered affected in 1999-2001 and by theend of 2005, 12 areas contaminated with sub-munitions still required clearance.156 This seemsto suggest either that the failure rate of the sub-munitions was higher than the official esti-mates or that more submunitions were used,considering that the submunitions cleared byKFOR EOD units and those destroyed byYugoslav forces during the conflict are notincluded in these totals.157 The unexploded sub-munitions were in a highly sensitive state, andcould explode as a result of being moved orpicked up.158

It has been alleged that the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia Air Force used BL755cluster munitions in the Kosovo conflict butnumbers used are not known.159

Data Collection

Between 1999 and 2001, the ICRC was thelead agency for data collection on mine/ERWincidents and collected the vast majority of thecluster submunitions casualty data stored bythe MACC in the IMSMA system. The MACC andpartners analyzed and verified data for 1999-2001, and included a comprehensive casualtyand incident recording system that alloweddata to be overlaid on maps depicting geo-graphic features and contaminated areas.160

Since 2002, the Institute of Public Health(IPH) within the Ministry of Health, Environmentand Spatial Planning has been responsible forinvestigating and recording all incidents involv-ing mines, submunitions and ERW in Kosovoand shares data with the UNMIK Office of theKosovo Protection Corps Coordinator (OKPCC)EOD Management Section.161 However, the orig-inal MACC records could not be accessed aftertransfer to the IPH,162 and maintenance of thedatabase was a concern.163 As a result, onlybasic total figures from the period based onUNMIK MACC monthly summaries are available.

The original data appears to have containedinformation on name, status, place, age, gen-der, activity, marking, contact information, andoften a brief note regarding the incident. Thedatabase also contained some records of peo-ple involved in an incident who escaped injury.


The casualty data possessed by OKPCCEOD shows 164 civilian casualties of clustersubmunitions in Kosovo from June 1999 to2006. The total casualties are likely to be signif-icantly higher, as the number of casualties dur-ing strikes is not known and casualty datamight have been lost. Military, deminers andsome civilian clearance casualties are probablynot included in these totals.165

As the conflict ended, cluster submuni-tions caused “considerable casualties amongstthe rapidly returning civilian population”166 andat least 45 people were killed and 106 injuredbetween 1999 and 2001. Incidents “generallyinvolved groups of younger people, often withvery tragic results.”167 Analysis of data from thefirst months after the strikes corroborates this:81 casualties were boys under 18, compared to62 adults. Only four female casualties of clustersubmunitions were recorded in the post-strikeperiod, three of them adults in a single civilianclearance accident. It seems likely that clustersubmunitions incidents were unreported duringthe emergency post-strike phase, 1999-2001,due to data collection challenges and impreciseattribution of devices responsible. For example,among the 54 casualties of unknown devicesfrom June 1999 to November 2000, one incidentstands out as having similar characteristics tomany submunition incidents: an incident inApril 2000 injured four boys aged 10 to 14 andtwo women in their early 20s in their homewhen one of the boys brought back an objectfrom the field looking “like a tin of Coca Cola” –a description often used for BLU-97 submuni-tions.168

All of the 10 casualties recorded in thepost-conflict period from 2002 to 2006 weremales.

The average age of all known civilian clus-ter submunitions casualties in Kosovo is 19.Individual cluster submunitions incidents areoften responsible for causing multiple civiliancasualties. Over 60 percent of all submunitionsincidents resulted in two or more casualties, theaverage casualty rate per incident being 2.7. At 25 percent, the most common activity at thetime of the incident was passing or standingnearby (40 people). Other activities include,tampering 16 percent (25), tending animals 14


percent (23), and playing and recreation ninepercent (14); other/unknown accounted for 14percent (23).

Cluster munitions casualties have beenrecorded in 20 municipalities, with most casual-ties recorded in Dakovica (29). Five othermunicipalities recorded over 10 casualtieseach: Kosovska Mitrovica (14), Urosevac (13)Kacanik (15), Podujevo (12) and Prizren (12).



Cluster submunitions were responsible for31 percent of total recorded casualties between1999-2005, while mines caused 52, other ERW16 percent and one percent was unknown.However, submunitions were responsible for 49percent of deaths, compared to 34 percent frommines and 17 percent by other ERW. BetweenJune 1999 and May 2001, cluster submunitionscaused 84 percent of total ERW casualties.169 Inthe period from 2002 to 2006, this declined to14 percent of ERW casualties due to clearanceefforts.

Conflict/Post-Conflict

All confirmed casualties reported in theoriginal MACC database occurred as a result ofunexploded munitions after NATO bombingbetween March and June 1999.170 Seven inci-dents of NATO cluster bomb strikes resulting incivilian casualties in the (former) FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, havebeen substantiated, and an additional five pos-sible incidents are unconfirmed. It is believedthat 90 to 150 civilians have been killed duringcluster munitions strikes.171 Human RightsWatch (HRW) identified at least 12 people killedand a further 50 injured during NATO clustermunitions strikes in Kosovo. However, many ofthe incidents were not independently verified.172

Therefore, they are not included in the casualtystatistics of this study. Seven casualties from atampering incident with an unexploded submu-nition during the conflict period have beenincluded in the post-strike data. All casualtieswere boys from the same family aged two to 16:five were killed and two injured.173

Civilian/Military Comparison

A total of 22 casualties were likely to havebeen involved in clearance activities or weremilitary personnel, accounting for 13 percent ofcasualties. Some accidents include clearanceby former KLA and foreign peacekeepers.174 TwoBritish KFOR soldiers were killed while clearingsubmunitions.175 Former KLA soldiers were

reportedly assisting at the time; three were alsokilled and another two were injured.176 NoYugoslav/Serb forces have been identified ascasualties of submunition contamination inKosovo. The majority of incidents involvingclearance/EOD and the military occurredbetween June and September 1999.

Life Experience177

In August, 1999, about three months afterthe NATO cluster munition strikes,Adnan’s family went to swim in a smalllake a few kilometers from their village. Atthe time, Adnan was almost seven yearsold. On the bank of the lake Adnan founda yellow metal can. He did not know thatthe object was an unexploded BLU-97cluster submunition. Adnan brought theobject back to his family.

Adnan’s older brother, Gazmend (17 yearsold) was holding the submunition when itfell to the ground and exploded. Theexplosion killed both Gazmend and theirfather. Adnan sustained injuries to his leftarm and leg and was taken to the closesthospital.

Adnan’s sister, Sanije (14) later returned tothe site to collect family belongings, whichhad been left behind. While at the site,Sanije stepped on a cluster munition andwas killed.

Adnan received medical care for twomonths after the incident. He had lost a lotof blood and suffered from anemia. Due tothe injuries to Adnan’s left arm he isunable to lift heavy objects. Adnan couldnot return to school until late January2000. By the age of 13, Adnan had lostinterest in school, his grades were suffer-

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ing and he was expected to drop out alto-gether.

Adnan’s older sister, Ymrije, cares for bothAdnan and their mother, who was severe-ly traumatized. The family of three nowlive on a pension of just 62 euro a month.

MONTENEGROKey Findings

• Cluster munitions used by NATO.

• At least one civilian was killed and anotherthree injured by cluster submunitions.


NATO forces used cluster munitionsagainst targets of the (former) Federal Republicof Yugoslavia during the 1999 Kosovo conflict.On 28 April 1999, NATO planes struck theGolubovci military airport south of Podgorica inMontenegro with cluster munitions.178

Data Collection

There is no comprehensive data on ERWcasualties in Montenegro.179


The strike on the Golubovci airport inMontenegro caused four civilian casualties, onekilled and at least three injured.180 A 61-year-oldwoman was killed in a village near the airport asa submunition hit her head as she was runningfrom the village.181

No post-conflict casualties are known.

SERBIAKey Findings

• Cluster munitions used by NATO and possi-bly by Yugoslav forces.

• Total number of cluster submunitions casual-ties is unknown, 45 casualties were record-ed, including 15 killed and 30 injured, mostresulting from the NATO strike on the city ofNis.


NATO used cluster munitions in Serbiaduring the military intervention in 1999.Submunitions used during the NATO air cam-paign in Yugoslavia from March to June 1999include: RBL755, BLU-97 and Mk 118 Rockeye.182

Yugoslav factions used KB-1, and KB-2,183 but itis unknown if these are contaminating Serbianterritory. In early 2006, six main areas of Serbiaremained contaminated with cluster submuni-tions: Nis, Kraljevo, Kursumlija, Sjenica, MountKopaonik and Vladimirci.184

Data Collection

Casualty data collection and registrationof landmine/ERW survivors in Serbia is notcomprehensive.185 Press reports and ICRCrecords provide very limited information regard-ing strike, post-strike and post-conflict casual-ties.


The total number of submunitions casual-ties in Serbia is not known and casualty statis-tics from the Serbian Mine Action Center werenot made available.

Between 1999 and August 2005, 45 casu-alties have been reported, including 15 killedand 30 injured, two of which were clearancepersonnel. All but three casualties occurredduring the NATO strike on an airfield in the cityof Nis on 7 May 1999, which also hit the nearbyhospital and residential areas; the strike killed14 and injured 28.186 On 9 October 2000, anArmy pyro-technician was seriously injuredwhile defuzing six submunitions, losing bothlegs and hands, and his sight and hearing werepermanently impaired.187 A deminer was injuredwhile clearing submunitions from a factory inNis in August 2005.188

The ICRC recorded six civilian casualtiesfrom unexploded submunitions in Serbia andMontenegro between 1999 and 2002.189

However, insufficient information is available toverify if these are included in the statisticsabove.

Life Experience

“Vladimir Jovanovic, a 72-year-old Serb,was injured in the 1999 cluster bombattack on his home city of Nis, Serbia. Hedied on April 4, 2000, some elevenmonths later, while working in his yardwith a shovel, an unexploded clusterbomblet from the same attack took hislife.”190

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The Russian Federation has made exten-sive use of cluster munitions in Chechnya and,to a lesser extent, in Tajikistan. Allegedly, Tajikand Chechen factions have used cluster muni-tions as well. In Chechnya, civilian targets wereoften deliberately hit, but the full scope of theproblem is unknown due to a lack of informa-tion.

CHECHNYA/

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Key Findings

• Cluster munitions were used extensively byRussian Federation forces, often directlyagainst civilian targets. Chechen use hasalso been alleged.

• The total number of cluster submunitionscasualties in Chechnya is not known butthere are at least 624 reported casualties,including 305 killed and 319 injured.


Cluster munitions have been used exten-sively by Russian Federation forces inChechnya, both during the 1994-1996 war andagain during the recurrence of hostilities start-ing in September 1999. Chechen use has alsobeen alleged. Civilian targets, such as publicmarkets, were struck on several occasions. Anda HALO demining team got hit.191 The entirearray of cluster munitions in the Russian arse-nal has been deployed in Chechnya and typesused include: AO-2.5 and AO-1SCh, ODS-OS,OFAB-2.5, PTAB-1/M, PTAB-2.5/M, and ShOAB-0.5 bomblets.192

Specific information regarding the fullextent of contamination is not available, as“…no comprehensive surveys have been doneto document unexploded cluster munitions…”193

However, HALO encountered unexploded sub-munitions in Chechnya between 1997 and 1999,including the AO-2.5RT.194

Data Collection

Documenting the human impact of clustermunitions is difficult due to episodic conflict.UNICEF, through its partner Voice of theMountains, is the primary source of informationon mine/ERW casualties in Chechnya.195

However, UNICEF does not differentiate clustersubmunitions casualties from other ERW casu-alties.196 There have been numerous mediareports of significant civilian casualties due touse in populated areas.


The total number of submunitions casual-ties in Chechnya is not known. However, at least624 casualties were identified: 305 killed and319 injured. In the worst strike incident report-ed, Russian aircraft struck a public market,inflicting 246 civilian casualties: 60 were killedand 186 injured.

The worst post-strike incident involved atleast 24 people, where seven were killed and atleast 15 children injured.

This number is believed to be significantlylower than actual casualties owing to the lack ofdata collection, the intensity of bombardment,and the episodic nature of the conflict inChechnya.

TAJIKISTANKey Findings

• A total of 48 cluster submunitions casualtieswere confirmed, all of which were caused byAO-2.5 submunitions; this is nearly 55 per-cent of all recorded ERW casualties.


In the period 1992-1997, cluster munitionswere used in Tajikistan by unknown forces dur-ing the civil war,198 reportedly delivered by heli-copter and rocket. As recently as 2000, there

Focus: Commonwedalth of

Independent States

Focus: Commonwealth of

Independent States


were reportedly instances of use along the bor-der with Afghanistan.199

The Russian-manufactured RBK series(250, 275, and 500) and KMG-U cluster muni-tions were used in Tajikistan, and their submu-nitions payloads include: AO-2.5 and AO-1SCh,ODS-OS, OFAB-2.5, PTAB-1/M, PTAB-2.5/M,and ShOAB-0.5 bomblets.200 The Tajik MineAction Cell (TMAC) reported that it has clearedAO-2.5 (422), and ShOAB-0.5 (21) submunitionsfrom ‘mined areas’.201

Data Collection

Data collection is conducted by TMACthrough the Red Cross Society of Tajikistan andis considered incomplete, though efforts wereunderway in 2006 to integrate all sources ofcasualty information into IMSMA. Informationspecifically regarding strike and post-strikecasualties was not available.160

Casualty Data Analysis

The total number of submunitions casual-ties in Tajikistan is not known. TMAC reported48 confirmed cluster submunitions casualties,including 30 killed and 18 injured as of 26September 2006. All reported submunitionscasualties were caused by AO-2.5 bomblets.203

Cluster submunitions casualties accounted for54.5 percent of all (80) ERW casualties reportedby TMAC. This casualty rate is similar to that inLao PDR and Vietnam where the ERW type isknown.204 The mortality rate for submunitionscasualties in Tajikistan is 62.5 percent and islikely due to incidents occurring in remote loca-tions where emergency transport is not avail-able.205


The greater Middle East region has seen someof the most extensive use of cluster munitions– in Iraq – as well as the most recent use ofthese weapons in Lebanon. In several coun-tries in the region, cluster munitions have beenused at various points in time, resulting inoverlapping contamination. This, as well ashampered clearance due to the security situa-tion in a couple of countries, exacerbatedcasualty rates and it is likely that this trend willcontinue for the foreseeable future.

AFGHANISTAN

Key Findings

• Cluster munitions were used by the SovietUnion, the Taliban, the Northern Alliance andUnited States troops between 1980 and2002.

• Until 1 July 2006, 701 casualties were record-ed, but the majority of pre-2001 casualtiesare unrecorded.

Confirmed Casualties: 1980 – 1 July 2006


Strike Conflict

Grand Total 701 216 71 414

Injured 550 167 53 330

Killed 150 49 18 83

Unknown Status 1 0 0 1

Man 305 93 28 184

Woman 49 14 6 29

Boy 224 77 29 118

Girl 31 7 2 22

Military 82 25 6 51

Deminer 10 0 0 10

Unknown 0 0 0 0

Dominant Farming/Tending animals (284)Activities

Dominant Herat (103)Location

• Projected average casualty rate is 25 to 30casualties per year.


Cluster munitions were used during theSoviet invasion (1979-1989), the civil war (1992-1996), Taliban regime (1996-2001) and US offen-sive (2001-2002). Though unconfirmed whichtypes of cluster munitions the Soviets used, themost commonly deployed canister was RBK-500, which can carry the following submuni-tions: OFAB-50UD, AO-2.5RTM, OAB-2.5RT,BetAB or improved BetAB-M, PTAB, and PTAB-1M.206 In 1995, the Afghan government claimedthat Russian forces bombed the city of Taloquanand surrounding areas with cluster bombs.207

Taliban and Northern Alliance forces mainlyused surface-delivered cluster munitions, firedfrom BM-21 122 mm multiple rocket launch-ers.208

During the offensive against the Talibanbetween 7 October 2001 and 18 March 2002,the United States mainly used air-deliveredcluster munitions: CBU-87 combined effectsmunitions and CBU-103 with wind correctedmunitions dispenser kits. Each of these muni-tions contain 202 BLU-97s. These types ofmunitions are used for large or moving targets,but this makes them dangerous in populatedareas, to which the Taliban targets were oftenclose.209

In 232 strikes, the US dropped approxi-mately 1,228 cluster munitions containing248,056 submunitions.210 BLU-97 submunitionshave an official failure rate of seven percent.211

However, based on its clearance records the UNestimates that approximately 40,000 submuni-tions (16 percent) did not explode.212

Data Collection

Information on cluster submunitions casu-alties is collected as part of both theInternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

Focus: Greater Middle East

and North Africa Region

Focus: Greater Middle East

and North Africa Region


and UN Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan(UNMACA) databases. The ICRC started datacollection in 1998 and is the principal source ofERW casualty data, providing the UNMACA withabout 95 percent of its information on newcasualties. The ICRC carries out community-based data gathering in all mine-affected areasvia the Afghan Red Crescent Society (ARCS).UNMACA started data collection in 1988 andrecords data in the IMSMA-format. It is antici-pated that the ICRC/ARSC data collectioncapacity will be handed over to UNMACA andintegrated into one database by 2007.212

The Italian NGO Emergency also collectscasualty data via its three surgical centers,which is not integrated in the ICRC or UNMACAdatabase. These centers distinguish betweenmine and ERW casualties, but do not differenti-ate cluster submunitions casualties.214 However,as Emergency Hospital in Kabul is the mainreferral hospital for serious trauma, it is likelythat submunitions casualties are treated here.

The collection of comprehensive landminecasualty data in Afghanistan remains problem-atic, due in part to communication constraintsand the time needed to centralize information.In 1998, ICRC data collection only covered asmall part of the country, but as of 2006, it hasa presence in all provinces. However, it is stillbelieved that some of the casualties who diebefore reaching medical assistance are notrecorded. It is, therefore, likely that, due to thegenerally higher mortality rate for cluster sub-munitions casualties, a significant number ofthese casualties were not recorded in earlieryears.


In total, the ICRC collected information on701 submunitions casualties occurring between1980 and July 2006 in Afghanistan, including150 people killed, 550 injured, and oneunknown. The vast majority of casualties weremale: 57 percent (397) were men and 32 per-cent (224) were boys under 18. Girls under 18made up four percent of casualties (31) andwomen seven percent (49).

Nearly half of the casualties between 1980and 2006 occurred while carrying out livelihoodactivities: tending animals (149 or 21 percent),farming (135 or 19 percent) and collectingwood/food/hunting (56 or eight percent). Boysunder 18 accounted for 52 percent (77) of thecasualties tending animals. Boys and girlsunder 18 accounted for 84 percent (or 56) of 67casualties occurring while playing; they alsomake up 48 percent of 42 tampering casualties.Two boys were injured due to military activity.Incidental passing by (59) and traveling (55)account for 16 percent of casualties.

Only 18 casualties, including seven dem-iner casualties, occurred in marked areas; thisequals less than three percent of casualties.Most people sustained multiple all-bodyinjuries and 49 people (partially) lost their eye-sight: at least 273 people needed an amputa-tion, often of multiple limbs. Seven percent ofcasualties (46) had received mine risk educa-tion, only one of them got injured while tamper-ing with submunitions.

Conflict/Post-Conflict

A total of 121 casualties (17 percent) dueto cluster submunitions were recorded asoccurring during the six-month strike periodbetween October 2001 and March 2002. While itis not possible to state with absolute certaintythat these were due to new cluster munitionsuse, the location of the incidents in correlationwith known strikes, media articles, and casestudies seems to suggest this is likely for mostincidents.216 Due to incomplete data collection,only 95 casualties were recorded as occurringduring the Soviet invasion.

Casualty rates were low in the immediateaftermath (12 months) of the Soviet invasionand the US strikes; 71 casualties or 10 percent,possibly because many people sought refuge inneighboring countries or in Kabul.

Most of the recorded casualties are post-conflict casualties, at 414 or 59 percent; 321occurred 12 months or more after the end of theSoviet invasion and 93 after US cluster muni-tions strikes. Post-conflict cluster submunitions

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casualties remain relatively constant in bothcases. The recent return of refugees could con-tribute to the relatively consistent level of post-conflict casualties. The post-conflict average fornearly 12 years after the Soviet invasion was 27casualties per year, but there has been a slightincrease in the annual average to nearly 29casualties per year in the post-conflict periodafter the US invasion. Experts confirm theapparent trend that there will be 25-30 newsubmunitions casualties per year, mostly due toold Soviet contamination, but also due to newerUS munitions, which have not yet beencleared.217

Civilian/Military Comparison

Only 35 casualties (seven percent) of 464cluster submunitions casualties recordedbetween 1998 and 2006 were military (includ-ing military deminers). Only four military casu-alties occurred during the six months of the USoffensive when the majority of cluster muni-tions were used: in comparison, at least 117civilian casualties occurred in the same period(7 October 2001-18 March 2002).

Between 1980 and 1997, 53 of 237 casual-ties (22 percent) were military (including mili-tary deminers), including one 14-year-old and a12-year-old; 18 military casualties occurred dur-ing the conflict between 1980 and 1989.

Life Experience

Afghanistan, 2002: Three Afghan boyswere photographed at a huge ammunitionwasteland near Bagram Air Base inAfghanistan. Several days after this photowas taken, these three boys were killed,apparently trying to scavenge valuablemetal from the ammunitions dump.218

IRAQ219

Key Findings

• Cluster munitions were used during the Iran-Iraq war, 1991 Gulf War, subsequent CoalitionForces operations and the 2003 war and itsaftermath.

• At least 2,060 cluster submunitions casual-ties were recorded, estimated casualties(from various sources) are 5,500 to 6,000.

• Limited casualty data is available due toinsecurity, a lack of political will, and theabsence of a comprehensive data manage-ment system.


Analysis of MRE data collection in Iraqreportedly revealed cluster submunitions casu-alties as early as 1985:220 frequent Iraqi use of155-mm artillery projectiles could corroboratethis.221

During Operation Desert Storm from 17January to 27 February 1991, the US forces usedat least 47,167 air-delivered cluster munitionscontaining more than 13 million submunitions:BLU-61/63, 97, BLU APAM, as well as Rockeyes.An estimated 2.6 to 5.9 million submunitionsdid not hit the intended target.222 Additionally,an estimated 30 million sea-launched (withcruise missiles) or artillery-delivered DPICMsubmunitions were used.223 More than 11 millionsubmunitions were delivered by multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) such as theM26.224 On 21 February 1991 alone, 220,248M77 submunitions were fired from MLRS M270

Total Confirmed Casualties

1991 – 2006: 2,060

Confirmed Casualties

March 2003 – May 2006


Strike Conflict

Total 1,018 720 202 96

Injured 801 613 131 57

Killed 200 90 71 39


Man 336 324 11 1

Woman 87 84 3 0

Boy 119 108 11 0

Girl 59 56 3 0

Military 6 0 6 0

Deminer 0 0 0 0

Unknown 411 148 168 95

Dominant Accidental passing by/Activities livelihood actvities

Dominant Near homeLocation

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launchers.225 UK troops used 100 JP-233, eightBL755 and 385 CBU-87 cluster munitions;226

resulting in at least 103,446 BLU-97 submuni-tions delivered. It is not known how manyBeluga cluster munitions French troops used.

Cluster munitions were used to attackmobile SCUD missile launchers, tank and vehi-cle columns, and dual use targets in urbanareas. As a result, unexploded submunitionswere found on roads, bridges and civilian infra-structure. The failure rate was increased due tothe height the cluster bombs were droppedfrom and the soft soil conditions; up to one-third reportedly did not explode.227 When takingthe official five percent failure rate,228 a total ofmore than two million submunitions wouldhave failed to explode.

Since the 1998 Operation Desert Fox, JointStand Off Weapons containing BLU-97 submu-nitions have been used, also in the no-fly zones,resulting in some of the most recent contamina-tion in the northern part of the country.229

During the 2003 conflict, the US forcesused a minimum of 10,782 artillery-deliveredcluster munitions containing between 1.7 andtwo million submunitions;230 including M42,M46 and M77 types. Analysis of strikes identi-fied by Human Rights Watch and analysis ofCBU231 data for 1,555 strikes in 767 locations,indicates that Coalition Forces dropped at least2,477 air-delivered cluster munitions between20 March and 9 April 2003. At least 385,062BLU-97, 44,954 Mk 118, 880 BLU-108, and10,290 RBL755 submunitions were delivered:these total 441,186 submunitions, or 27,574items per day for 16 days.232

Between 1 May 2003 and 1 August 2006,the US dropped 63 CBU-87 bombs, containing atotal of 12,726 CBU-97 bomblets.233

BLU-97 submunitions have an estimatedfour to six percent failure rate; M77 submuni-tions have a five to 23 percent estimated failurerate;234 M42 and M46 DPICM submunitions havean average failure rate of 14 percent.235

In the northern parts of Iraq, MAG cleared205 sites, mostly in Erbil (90) and Kirkuk (96)containing mainly BLU-97s but also KB-1s.236

Data Collection

Sources of information on cluster submu-nitions casualties are fragmented and incom-plete. During the 2003 conflict and its after-math, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)strongly discouraged casualty data collection,especially in relation to cluster submunitions.237

As of September 2006, there was no datacollection mechanism for new mine/ERW/IEDcasualties in Iraq. This was largely due to the

security situation, a lack of funds and capacityat the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA),which is responsible for casualty data collec-tion, and the larger political context in Iraq. Inthe northern parts of Iraq, the regional mineaction offices, MAG, and other service providerscollect casualty data, but do not distinguishcluster submunitions casualties from otherERW casualties.

The Iraq Landmine Impact Survey (ILIS)differentiated cluster submunitions casualtiesin a limited number of southern and centralareas of Iraq.

The Iraqi Health and Social CareOrganization (IHSCO) set up a war victim sur-veillance system in mid-2004. Since early 2006,restrospective data collection focused onmine/ERW casualties occurring after March2003 in six governorates (Baghdad, Karbala, al-Muthanna, Babel, Thi Qar and Diyala). It differ-entiates cluster submunitions casualties. As ofAugust 2006, operations are on hold due tosecurity reasons.238

In addition, the federal and regionalMinistries of Health register war-injured withdisabilities but this does not distinguish thedevice that caused the injury and includes peo-ple injured by IEDs and bullets.239 In 2003, CIVICcollected information on civilian war victimsthat includes a number of cluster submunitionscasualties.240 Prior to 2003, UNOPS and MAGcollected casualty data in Northern Iraq. In2001, the ICRC reportedly collected data onmine and ERW casualties in southern Iraq.241

However, this information was not made avail-able. In Basra, southern Iraq, the UN set up acasualty monitoring system to remedy the lackof data collection. This system was never oper-ationalized due to the 2003 war.


Data compiled from various sources doesnot indicate the scope of the problem, nor doesit allow in-depth crosschecking and the creationof a casualty profile for risk education and sur-vivor assistance purposes. However, the limiteddata available indicates that the number ofcasualties due to cluster submunitions is vastlyunderreported.

At least 2,060 people were confirmedcasualties of cluster submunitions between1991 and 2006, including 733 killed, 1,310injured and 17 unknown. Among these casual-ties were at least 255 children.

These totals should be considered incom-plete as they do not include any estimates ordata that could not be cross-referenced in orderto avoid duplication. Analysis of media andresearch documents including casualty esti-


mates would indicate that there were at least5,500-6,000 casualties due to failed clustersubmunitions in Iraq between 1991 and 2006.

March 2003 – September 2006

Analysis of Human Rights Watch data indi-cates that there were at least 695 casualties ofcluster munitions between March andSeptember 2003, including 84 killed, 594injured and the status of 17 is unknown. At least157 of the casualties were children.242 This totaldoes not include estimates and casualtieswhere the cause of injury was not confirmed tobe due to cluster munitions. As a result, thisdoes not include 635 civilian casualties (254killed and 381 injured) in al-Najaf, which arereportedly mostly due to cluster munitions.243

Human Rights Watch estimates the total num-ber of casualties due to cluster munitions to beover 1,000.244 However, UNICEF estimated thatmore than 1,000 children had been killed orinjured “by weapons such as cluster bombs.”245

Handicap International identified an addi-tional nine child casualties occurring in April2003, including three killed and six injured, allbut one were boys.246

Spanish peace brigade members recordednine people killed (including one woman) and36 injured (five women, two boys, one girl andtwo men) in al-Rashid and Yusifia (Baghdad)during cluster munitions strikes on 25 and 26March, and 3 April 2003. They also recorded fivemen and a child injured by cluster munitions inal-Dora on 2 April.247

Analysis of Iraqi Health and Social CareOrganization (IHSCO) data recorded betweenMarch and June 2006 indicates that 148 of 193casualties (77 percent) are due to cluster muni-tions (compared to 26 antipersonnel mine casu-alties), including 40 killed and 108 injured. Thevast majority of cluster submunitions casual-ties, i.e. 83 percent were male (123). Childrenaccounted for 57 casualties, and the age groupbetween 11 and 20 is the largest with 43 casual-ties. In line with casualty profiles of other clus-ter contaminated countries, it is very likely thatthe overwhelming majority of these are male.Nearly half of the casualties occurred while car-rying out livelihood activities (48 percent):farming (29 percent or 43 casualties), herding(18 percent or 26); and collecting water/wood/herbs (one percent, two). Self-clearancecaused five casualties, military activity and col-lecting scrap metal one casualty each. Of totalcasualties, 92 people (62 percent) did not knowthe area was dangerous, but 34 (23 percent)knowingly went into a dangerous area for eco-nomic reasons. Most casualties occurred inKarbala (57) and Babylon (32).248

The Iraq Landmine Impact Survey record-ed 95 recent casualties due to cluster munitionsuntil April 2006.249 It noted that in the south-central parts of Iraq (Karbala, Najaf;Qadissiyah, Wassit and al-Hilla), cluster muni-tions were “the most important cause of deathand injury.” These governorates “have the high-est rates of victimization… due to the new con-tamination from the most recent war”250 andcluster submunitions casualties account for 77percent of recent casualties. In Najaf, 83 per-cent of recent casualties were due to clustermunitions, in Karbala 81 percent, in al-Hilla 80percent, in Qadissiyah 72 percent and in Wassit67 percent. In comparison, in the four southerngovernorates (Basra, Thi Qar, Messan and al-Muthanna), submunitions accounted for onlynine percent of recent casualties. These figuresare incomplete as only a limited number of com-munities were visited due to security reasons.

The list of civilian casualties compiled byCIVIC and the Iraqi Body Count (IBC) databaseincludes at least 25 fatal casualties (12 men,one woman, seven boys and five girls) due tocluster munitions between March and April2003. One additional cluster submunitionscasualty is recorded in the IBC database asoccurring on 19 March 2006.251 However, theIraq Body Count estimated in May 2003 that200 to 372 civilians were killed by failed clustersubmunitions, including at least 147 post-con-flict.252

Pre-2003 Casualties due to Cluster

Submunitions

Up to August 1991, 168 Iraqis were report-ed killed and 440 injured due to cluster submu-nitions.253 More than 4,000 civilians have beenkilled or injured by failed cluster submunitionssince the end of the 1991 Gulf War.354 Up toFebruary 1993, at least 1,600 people werekilled, including 400 Iraqi civilians, and 2,500injured due to submunitions.255

The media reported on various incidents,including an eight-year-old boy killed and his sis-ter injured by an unexploded cluster submuni-tion at a family picnic in 1993. In 1994, an unex-ploded submunition killed a 13-year-old boy andhis 11-year-old sister. In 1997, a farmer was killedworking his field in Qadissiyah governorate; oneother person was injured in the incident.256 InMay 2000, three Iraqi children between 13 and 16were killed, and one injured by an unexplodedbomblet. Also in 2000, three children wereinjured in a rural area near Mosul.257 In February2001, a boy was killed by a cluster bomblet inKarbala province, six children were injured in anincident in the southern city of Basra, and twoboys were injured by a cluster submunition whiletending sheep in western Iraq.258


During the 1991 Gulf War, at least 80 UScasualties, including 25 killed, were attributedto unexploded submunitions.259 More than 100EOD experts are reported to have died duringclearance activities in the aftermath of the war,including one Egyptian Brigadier General.260

Due to the high failure rate of artillery-deliveredsubmunitions, the US military post-conflictcasualty rate became so serious that it resultedin a Congressional investigation.261

KUWAITKey Findings

• Cluster submunitions from the 1991 Gulf Warcaused up to 4,000 casualties until 2003; butcasualties in Kuwait declined as of 1995.

• The total number of cluster submunitionscasualties in Kuwait is not known due to alack of up-to-date data collection.Nevertheless, submunitions continue tocause casualties.


The United States, the United Kingdomand France used cluster munitions in Kuwaitduring the Gulf War in January and February1991.262 The following cluster munitions andtheir submunitions contributed to the ERWproblem in Kuwait: US-manufactured CBU-52cluster munitions (BLU-61 submunitions), CBU-58 (BLU-63), CBU-59 (BLU-77), CBU-71 (BLU-86), CBU-87 (BLU-97), Mk 20 Rockeye (M118),M483 and M864 projectiles (M42 & M46DPICM), MLRS M270 (M77 DPICM); BL755 of UKmanufacture203 and French-made BL-66 Beluga(GR-66-EG).264 According to the US GeneralAccounting Office, unexploded submunitionscreated “de facto minefields, or ‘dudfields’” insome battle areas of Kuwait.265 Between 1991and 2001, more than 1.6 million ERW and mineswere cleared, reducing the long-term impact ofunexploded submunitions,266 and resulting in adrop in casualties by 1995.267 However, by 2002,annual clearance still unearthed more than2,400 submunitions, an amount similar to theprevious year.268 In February 2006, two clustermunitions were found during road constructionin northern Kuwait, and there were unofficialreports that cluster munitions were discoverednear a military airbase and in an industrialarea.269

Data Collection

The Kuwait Institute for ScientificResearch (KISR) collected the most comprehen-sive information on civilian war casualties. InJanuary 2001, KISR established a casualty data-base for the period August 1990-January 2001.

Casualty data collected by KISR from govern-ment hospitals includes: gender, age, national-ity, residence, occupation of the casualties,date and location of the incident, type of injury,hospital name and treatment. However, clustersubmunitions were not differentiated in allcases.270 Funding constraints have preventedKISR from updating the database since 2001.271


Estimates by the Kuwaiti Defense Ministryand the US Army’s National Ground IntelligenceCenter analysts indicate that more than 4,000civilians were killed or injured by cluster sub-munitions since the end of the 1991 Gulf War,including at least 1,200 Kuwaiti civilians killedin the first two years after the war.272

KISR recorded 1,652 war casualties inKuwait between 1991 and 1992. Between 1991and 2001, ERW caused 175 (seven percent) ofthe 2,386 war injuries and 119 (28 percent) ofthe 421 deaths recorded.273 According to Kuwaitimedical personnel, approximately 60 percent ofthose injured by ERW were children under 16.374

Eighty-four people were killed and 200 injuredduring the ERW clearance operations inKuwait.275

Submunition incidents continue to bereported: in 2000, a BLU-97 injured three peo-ple and a Rockeye submunition killed one per-son.276 In 2005, a soldier was injured by a clus-ter submunition during clearance activity innorthwest Kuwait.277 On 1 May 2006, a trucktransporting cleared cluster and other muni-tions exploded in Kuwait, injuring two people.278

LEBANON

Confirmed Casualties 1975 – 9 October 2006


Strike Conflict

Grand Total 494 53 176 265

Injured 376 35 141 200

Killed 118 18 35 65


Man 276 31 72 173

Woman 46 6 13 27

Boy 92 10 31 51

Girl 22 6 7 9

Military 15 0 10 5

Deminer 4 0 4 0

Unknown 39 0 39 0

Dominant Near house (108)/ agriculture Activities (73)/playing (59)

Dominant Near house (108)Location


Key Findings

• At least four million submunitions weredelivered in July-August 2006.

• After 14 August 2006, 142 casualties wererecorded and prior to 12 July 2006, 338 wererecorded.

• The average pre-2006 conflict casualty ratewas 2 per year but the average post-2006conflict rate is 2.5 per day.


Israel has used cluster munitions inLebanon in 1978, 1982, 1996, December 2005279

and July-August 2006. The most used types are,prior to 2006: BLU-18Bs, BLU-26B, BLU-63, Mk118, M42 and M43.280 Israel discontinued theuse of cluster munitions for several years after1982, when the Reagan administrationannounced in July of that year that it would pro-hibit new exports of cluster munitions to Israel,as Israel may have violated its 1952 MutualDefense Assistance Agreement with the UnitedStates prohibiting use of cluster munitions incivilian areas, such as Fakhani, Sabra, Shatila,Burj al-Barajneh, Haret Hreik, and Dahya sub-urbs of Beirut.281

In the 2006 conflict, air-delivered BLU-63(mainly produced in 1973), artillery-deliveredM42, M46, M77 and M85, both the Israeli copyof the M42 and a newer model with a self-neu-tralisation and a self-destruct mechanism wereused. In addition, Chinese-produced MZD-2282

and a Chinese-manufactured KB-2 were report-edly found.283 The media reported an army com-mander stating that Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)had launched 1,800 M26 rockets, which,together, contain 1.59 million M77 submuni-tions. This number does not include otherground-delivered or air-delivered cluster muni-tions. The UN found an emerging failure rate ofapproximately 40 percent,284 which is higherthan the official failure rate of between five and23 percent.285

Media reports also stated that the IDFfired approximately 160,000 artillery projectilesof which 20 percent are assumed to be clustermunitions. This would mean an additional 2.8million cluster submunitions were delivered.286

Overlapping cluster munitions footprints, clear-ance of certain visible cluster munitions dis-turbing the footprints, and incomplete survey-ing make it impossible to estimate a total num-ber of cluster munitions delivered, as well as anoverall failure rate. However, the UN MineAction Coordination Center in South Lebanon(MACC-SL) estimates the failure rates between32 and 40 percent overall.287 This would meanthat 1.28 to 1.6 million unexploded submuni-tions remained on the ground. MAG experts

estimate the failure rate of the BLU-63 at 80percent on average and the failure rate of theM-series at 25 percent on average in theNabatiyyah area. They did not locate clustermunitions strikes above the 703° line on theUnited Nations Interim Force in Lebanon(UNIFIL) map.288

Various explanations were given for theincreased cluster munitions use in the last daysbefore the ceasefire, such as the failure todestroy mobile rocket launchers with precisionweapons and the change in command from anair force commander to an infantry general – thelatter for whom cluster munitions would be amore operational weapon of choice.289 Otherexperts stated that the strike patterns suggestuse of cluster munitions as flank protection,especially in the Marjayoun valley, which is sur-rounded by the worst-contaminated areas.However, the bombing was done in such a waythat two layers of submunitions were dropped:one layer before more powerful precision muni-tions destroyed the target, leading to clustermunitions in the rubble; and one after destruc-tion, resulting in cluster munitions on top of therubble.290

Hezbollah use of a small number of (KB-1)cluster munitions has been alleged.291

Data Collection

The Lebanon Mine Resource Center(LMRC) at the Faculty of Health Sciences of theUniversity of Balamand maintains a mine casu-alty database, providing both the NationalDemining Office (NDO) and MACC-SL, withcasualty data for their IMSMA databases.IMSMA is synchronized at the NDO. LMRC con-tinuously updates its database by visiting newcasualties and verifying and re-surveying previ-ously recorded casualties and affected commu-nities.

During the 12 July-14 August conflict, theLebanese Red Cross collected data on its inter-ventions, including medical information. Theinformation is broken down so that the weapon-injured can be extracted.292 However, this infor-mation was not made available.

Since the 2006 ceasefire, UN communityliaison officers and EOD teams at MACC-SLrecord casualty data when they come across itduring their activities. However, the collectedIMSMA forms contain only the minimum neces-sary information (such as name, date, location,killed/injured), pending re-surveying and verifi-cation after the emergency phase. Unconfirmedcluster munitions casualties are also recordedpending verification.293

LMRC data collection and MRE teams, aswell as NDO teams collect casualty information.


In addition, the national media report exten-sively on new casualties, including those in thenews bars on TV.

However, experts state that a significantnumber of casualties could go unreported.294

Casualties are only reported from accessibleareas,295 which have electricity and means ofcommunicating, but “As of September 5, 2006,nearly 80 percent of the villages in the Southwere still without electricity or water.”296 UNIFILmedics have also treated cluster munitionscasualties, which are said not to be included inIMSMA.297

It is also understood that most Hezbollahcasualties due to cluster submunitions duringand after the conflict are not included in thedatabases, and that those included are notrecorded as such.298


As of 9 October 2006, there are at least494 recorded cluster munitions casualties inLebanon, including 118 killed and 376 injured.Children make up 23 percent of casualties, butmost of them, 92, are boys (19 percent of thetotal). A total of 338 casualties were recordedprior to 12 July 2006 and 156 casualties wererecorded between 12 July and 9 October 2006.These recorded totals do not include up to 30unconfirmed cluster munitions casualtiesoccurring during or shortly after the 2006 con-flict or people treated by the UNIFIL battalions(up to 145 people).299 Nor does it includeHezbollah casualties due to cluster submuni-tions, as this information was not obtained.

Post 12 July 2006

During the Conflict (12 July – 14 August)

Cluster munitions were used throughoutthe conflict, but 90 percent seem to have beenused in the last 72 hours. As most people leftSouth Lebanon prior to 10 August, thisundoubtedly reduced the number of civiliancasualties during the conflict. However, approx-

imately 100,000 civilians were unable to leaveand a minority chose to stay behind to protecttheir property.300

Between 12 July and 14 August, theLebanese Red Cross recorded 285 people killedand 886 injured.301 The information is brokendown so that the weapon-injured can beextracted. This information was not made available.

There are several confirmed and uncon-firmed instances of cluster submunitions casu-alties. On 19 July 2006, one person was killedand 12 injured during a strike using artillery-fired cluster munitions in Blida; casualtiesincluded five girls and two boys under 18, fourwomen and two men.302

On 18 and 21 July, two children werereportedly killed in a cluster munitions explo-sion in Naqoura.303

Members of the Cluster Munition Coalition(CMC) have records of at least four fatal civiliancasualties, including two children, due tobombing during the conflict in Yaroun. However,it is unclear whether the casualties were direct-ly inflicted by cluster munitions. One elderlyman reported by the CMC died as a result of acluster munitions strike in Beit Yahoun on 10August 2006.304

Ragheb Harb Hospital run by the IranianRed Crescent in Nabatiyyah, reported that itreceived 10 to 15 casualties with injuries consis-tent with cluster submunitions in the last fourdays of the conflict.305 Villagers in Ayn Baal vil-lage (Tyre) stated that up to six childrenbetween one and 13 years of age died as aresult of cluster munitions strikes on day 13 and14 of the conflict. This happened along the roadlinking Ataroun and Tyre.306 No additional evi-dence corroborates these statements.

Post-Strike (14 August – 9 October)

Analysis of the LMRC database indicatesthat there were at least 142 casualties, includ-ing 21 killed and 121 injured to 9 October 2006.Analysis is available of 107 detailed and verifiedrecords. The majority of casualties were male:65 percent men (70) and 21 percent boys under18 years of age (23); four casualties were girls(four percent) and six women (six percent); fourpercent were unknown. Most casualties (50)occurred near or in the house, 15 occurred whilefarming, 10 while shepherding. Eight casualtiesoccurred while playing with the submunition,seven of them were children; another eightcasualties occurred during clearance activities(including four military casualties). At least oneperson was a Syrian citizen.

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Most casualties occurred in Nabatiyyah,Bint Jbeil, and Tyre. Thirteen casualtiesoccurred on the first day of the ceasefire (14August 2006), and 11 on 18 August. In the firstmonth after the ceasefire, casualties averagejust over three per day, after that the averagedaily casualty rate went down to just over two.

There were additional unconfirmedreports of one Hezbollah militant killed inYohmour and two injured in the greaterNabatiyyah area while carrying out clearanceactivities in the aftermath of the conflict. It wasadded that Hezbollah cleared many submuni-tions but “at a great cost.”307

Casualties Prior to 12 July 2006

The LMRC recorded 338 cluster munitionscasualties between 1975 and 2005, including95 killed and 243 injured. Most of these casual-ties occurred in West Bekaa, Nabatiyyah andHassabiyyah. Twenty-three percent of casual-ties were children (80), but 65 of 95 fatal casu-alties were children – 52 of them boys. The mainactivities at the time of the incident were agri-culture (58) and activities near the house (58).Only five men were recorded as military casual-ties.

There were are on average two or threenew casualties per year due to cluster muni-tions strikes before 2006. This rate is predictedto remain stable, as many markings have disap-peared or deteriorated over time, whereasclearance activities are limited. However, it islikely that some casualties in the WesternBekaa area and border areas remain unrecord-ed.308

In 2005- 2006, there were several clustermunitions incidents due to munitions deliveredin late 2005. However, no casualties werereported.309



As of September 2006, the database con-tained records of 3,457 casualties (929 killedand 2,528 injured). Before 12 July 2006, clustermunitions casualties constituted nearly 11 per-cent of casualties; as of 9 October, this is over13 percent. Other ERW constitute 20 percent ofcasualties.

Life Experience

Salima (left) is a mother of five, threedaughters and two sons, of whom two aredisabled – Ali (23) and Maryam (42) – andstill live with her. During the recent con-flict, eight suspected Hizbollah militantswere living in a neighbor’s house and theneighborhood was repeatedly hit withcluster munitions so the family tookrefuge in Salima’s parents’ house until theceasefire. While walking home with herfather and the children, Salima noticeddestruction everywhere, as well as severalsubmunitions with ribbons. Salima’sfather carefully moved one submunitionoff the road with his foot so that his grand-children would not step on it. When theyarrived at the house, Maryam and Ali wait-ed outside while Salima and her fatherproceeded to enter the house. Salimamoved the big stones by hand and sweptthe small rubble away with a broom. All ofa sudden, she felt something strange, butdid not hear an explosion. She had hit asubmunition with her broom. Salima sus-tained shrapnel injuries in her head, oneon her forehead, and severe shrapnelinjuries on her chest, thighs, and waist.She has undergone several operationsand still needs regular treatment.

Salima, who worked in tobacco and has asmall olive grove, may never be able towork again. The olive grove and the gar-den around the house are still off-limitsbecause there are more submunitionsscattered there, and all the olives will belost unless the family engages in risk-tak-ing behavior in order to harvest the crop.

Ali, in the meantime, is traumatized by theevents and ever since he heard the ‘boom’and then his mother screaming, he has cuthimself off from society and only identifieswith the cartoons on TV, something he didnot do before the incident.310

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SAUDI ARABIAUse Background and Contamination

Cluster munitions were used by the USagainst Iraqi forces in the 1991 Gulf War in Rasal-Khafji (northern Saudia Arabia) during the‘Battle of Khafji’, from 29 January to 2 February1991.311 ERW is found in the northern borderareas of Saudi Arabia, which are sparsely inhab-ited.312

Data Collection and Casualties

There is no known war casualty data col-lection mechanism in Saudi Arabia and thereare no reported casualties due to cluster sub-munitions. Due to contamination being insparsely populated areas, it is likely that thehuman impact is not significant. Nevertheless,due to the remote and inhospitable environ-ment it is possible that casualties go unreport-ed.

SYRIA Key Findings

• The number of cluster munitions casualtiesin Syria is not known, but at least one foreignpeacekeeper was killed.


Israel used cluster munitions in the GolanHeights area during the October 1973-May 1974war and remaining contamination is reported.313

Israel also reportedly used air-delivered clustermunitions against non-state armed group train-ing camps near Damascus in 1973.314

Data collection

There is no casualty data collection mech-anism in Syria but, in an ad hoc manner, local

NGOs and health posts in mine/ERW-affectedareas report casualties to the local governorateauthorities for pension and compensation pur-poses. The local authorities do not keep a cen-tral database.315 It is not known if casualties dueto cluster submunitions are differentiated.


Due to the non-existence of a data man-agement system, the number of casualties ofcluster submunitions, as well as mines andother ERW, is unknown.

One incident resulting in at least oneAustrian medic of the international peacekeep-ing force killed, was attributed to a cluster sub-munition having come loose from a hillside inthe Golan Heights area due to melting snow.316

WESTERN SAHARA/ MOROCCOKey Findings

• There have been at least two civilian clustersubmunitions casualties in Western Sahara.

• Due to limited and inconsistent reporting,the total number of cluster submunitionscasualties is not known; developments indata collection, combined with survey work,could improve knowledge about cluster sub-munitions casualties.


Cluster munitions were used in WesternSahara317 between 1975 and 1991 by the RoyalMoroccan Army, when it fought the PolisarioFront intermittently.318 The 1991 ceasefire result-ed in a territory divided by 2,400 kilometers ofdefensive earthen walls – known as berms –between Polisario and Morocco and an exten-sive mine/ERW problem, with approximately10,000 Saharawi nomads living in affectedareas on either side of the berms.319

Submunitions used include US-manufac-tured artillery-delivered M42.320 The full extent of cluster munitions contamination inWestern Sahara in not known, but LandmineAction UK has reported significant pollution by air-dropped or ground-delivered clustermunitions.321

The UN Mission for a Referendum inWestern Sahara (MINURSO) indicates that clus-ter submunitions are scattered in the areas ofMehaires, Tifariti and Bir Lahlou, where theMoroccan Army conducted offensive operationsin August and September 1991.322

Submunitions, other ERW, and mine contamina-tion is mainly concentrated in Polisario-con-

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trolled Western Sahara, but areas underMoroccan control are also affected.323

Data Collection

There is no comprehensive casualty datacollection system in Western Sahara. MINURSOhas maintained some casualty data. However,its archived records are not comprehensive andare difficult to access due to a lack of system-atized and standardized record keeping, a lackof verification mechanisms, as well as time con-straints.324 MINURSO recorded incidents but didnot always record casualty specifications forthese incidents.325 Data is stored in IMSMA, buttraining of MINURSO, Landmine Action UK andPolisario data collectors is needed to optimizedata management between the parties.326 At theend of 2006, Landmine Action UK was sched-uled to undertake casualty data collection inWestern Sahara in the course of a survey andclearance project.327

In November 2005, the SaharawiCampaign to Ban Landmines conducted a casu-alty survey in the four main refugee camps, butthey could not provide the information, as thecasualty form did not differentiate submuni-tions. However, this could be recorded in thegeneral remarks.328


In 1998, one cluster submunitions incidentresulted in two fatal casualties.329 MINURSOrecorded two cluster submunitions incidentsout of a total of 39 mine and ERW incidents from1992 to 2000. The number of casualties as aresult of these two submunitions incidents isnot known. In comparison, four incidents due toantipersonnel mines and 16 incidents due tounidentified ERW (41 percent) were reported inthe same period.330


Cluster munitions, developed and firstused during the Second World War by theSoviet Union and Germany respectively,emerged as a tool of modern warfare inSoutheast Asia between 1964 and 1973. Sincethen, hundreds of millions, perhaps billions, ofthese munitions have been used in at least 23countries or areas that are not internationallyrecognized, and their use has been alleged inseveral other places.

Exactly how many cluster submunitions liedormant, no one can say.

Exactly how many cluster submunitionscasualties there are, no one can say either.

Nevertheless, Fatal Footprint compiledstatistical evidence of at least 11,044 recordedand confirmed cluster submunitions casualties.This does not include extrapolations or esti-mates, which could be as high as 100,000 clus-ter submunitions casualties. This number is sig-nificant, and higher than anticipated at the out-set of this study, given that:

• cluster munitions have been used in only23 countries/areas (compared to morethan 90 mine-affected countries and minecasualties in 125 countries)

• data collection, as well as information pro-vided is limited and often incomplete

This study marks a watershed. It is thefirst time that all available casualty data hasbeen compiled in one document. Nevertheless,the authors acknowledge that much informa-tion remains missing, was pieced together fromvarious public sources, or was not made avail-able. It is apparent that users of cluster muni-tions rarely provided information on casualties,be it their own or other casualties (civilian ormilitary) – even though it is alleged that, inmany cases, this type of information wasrecorded.

As a result, many casualties were notcounted and it is unlikely that they will ever be.This means that the full scope of the problemwill probably never be known.

Despite limited data, a few lessons can bedrawn from the overwhelming similaritiesexhibited by various countries affected by clus-ter munitions, which will continue to pose a sig-nificant, lasting and non-discriminatory threat.

LESSON 1: Data Collection, the Devil is in the Detail

Nearly all data collection mechanisms lackthe capacity to carry out prospective, proactivedata collection and only record casualties thatare brought to their attention, rather thanactively seeking out new casualties. In mostcountries, these mechanisms are not nation-wide and contain insufficient detail. The mainproblem is that they do not differentiatebetween types of ERW or have only starteddoing so recently. But often personal details,the number of casualties involved in an incidentand injury types are missing. Various data setsalso exhibit a lack of common terminology fordevice, activity, and location types, standard-ized methodology, and categories of informa-tion collected, as well as quality control andverification mechanisms.

Additional issues impacting data collec-tion are that many casualties or their communi-ties do not know exactly what type of devicecaused the incident, data collectors might nothave the expertise to deduce this type of infor-mation and casualty databases or injury sur-veillance mechanisms are not linked to strike ormine-use data. Consequently, a large percent-age of casualties are recorded as caused by anunknown device or an erroneous device isinserted.

Analysis shows that only 17 percent (four)of cluster munitions-affected countries or areashave near complete data collection, 61 percent(14) have limited or episodic data collection and22 percent (five) have no data collection sys-tem. Only 13 percent (three) possessed orshared data on conflict casualties and 43 per-cent (10) differentiated to some extent between

ConclusionConclusion


cluster submunitions and other ERW. An over-whelming majority, i.e. 91 percent (10,097), ofall confirmed submunitions casualties occurredwhere there is limited or no data collection.

Complete information on cluster submuni-tions casualties for the three stages (strike,post-strike, and post-conflict) at which clustermunitions pose a threat is impossible to obtain.In most cases, the nature of conflict and itsimmediate aftermath do not lend themselves toeffective data collection. Very little informationis available about casualties during strikes,unless they are widely reported in the media.From existing data, it is often impossible toascertain whether a casualty occurred during astrike or due to a failed submunition shortlyafterward. Little effort is undertaken to improveinformation on strike and post-strike casualtiesretroactively. Even in countries where data col-lection is considered complete, such asLebanon, information about casualties duringstrikes is scarce and it is believed that post-strike casualties are underreported.

Similarly, not all casualties are recorded,such as internally displaced people or refugees,but also insurgent, militant, and military casual-ties are not included in many databases.Sometimes this information is recorded but notmade publicly available, possibly also to down-play the impact of cluster munitions on one’sown troops.

While the military casualty figures aredoubtless significantly underreported, civiliancasualties were found to be vastly underreport-ed in most high-use locations, namely:Afghanistan, Cambodia, Chechnya, Iraq, LaoPDR and Vietnam.

Planning of appropriate and comprehen-sive survivor assistance and MRE activities isinhibited by lack of sufficient data.

LESSON 2: Cluster Munitions Cause Disproportionate

Long-Term Civilian Harm

Nearly all recorded cluster submunitionscasualties are civilian, i.e. 98 percent. Only 124military and 59 demining casualties have beenrecorded. Additionally, cluster submunitionsincidents involve more people at a time, aremore fatal and result in more multiple injuriesthan mines and other ERW. In countries wheremine casualties are relatively few and ERWcasualties are many, cluster munitions kill andinjure more people than any other ERW devicetype.

Even limited information on casualtiesduring strikes indicates that many cluster sub-munitions casualties were civilians. Cluster

munitions are wide-surface weapons contami-nating more than the military target; they wereused in indiscriminately high quantities, as inLao; they were often used near civilian areas, asin Afghanistan; and they sometimes explicitlytargeted civilian targets, as in Chechnya.

Additionally, in the post-strike and post-conflict period, unexploded submunitionscause a lasting threat. Due to their instability incomparison with other ERW types, failed sub-munitions dominate among new incidents inpost-conflict situations, regardless of how limit-ed their use. In parts of Southeast Asia, clustersubmunitions continue to cause nearly half ofthe recorded casualties more than threedecades after their use, which is more than allother known item types combined. Failed sub-munitions used in the 1980s continue to causecasualties at a steady rate in Afghanistan andLebanon.

In some areas of Iraq, cluster submuni-tions casualties represent between 75 and 80percent of all casualties. While in Tajikistan sub-munitions casualties were only a small percent-age of all casualties, they were 55 percent ofERW casualties.

In all instances of systematic cluster muni-tions use, failure rates of manufacturers areconsiderably lower than the experience of clear-ance operators or known and estimated levelsof contamination. In some cases, submunitionswith an unacceptably high failure rate are used.It was known from the outset that the mostwidely used submunition in the Southeast Asiaconflict, the BLU-26, had a failure rate of 26 per-cent under optimal test conditions. One of thecluster submunitions in the Israeli stockpileused in Lebanon in 2006 is of the same type andage as those delivered more than three decadesago in Southeast Asia: the US-manufacturedBLU-63. This submunition’s failure rate hasbeen far above the manufacturer specifications– as high as 80 percent by some estimates.

The recent Israeli use of cluster munitionsin Lebanon, with the majority of submunitionsdelivered when the user knew the conflict wasabout to end, pointedly parallels a scenedecades previous when US strikes escalatednear the end of the Second Indochina War. TheUS continued sporadic use of cluster munitionsafter the end of both the 1991 and 2003 wars inIraq.

Military personnel from user countriesconsider any post-cluster munitions strike envi-ronment a minefield, and the claim of dispro-portionate risk and harm posed to civilians isunquestionable.


LESSON 3: Cluster Submunitions Casualties are

Young Males at Work

Not only are civilians most at risk, but thevast majority of civilian casualties occur whilepeople carry on their normal, daily livelihoodactivities in their usual and accustomed places.In Lao, almost three quarter of casualtiesoccurred while farming, tending animals, andother livelihood activities in fields, rice paddies,or in the village. In Lebanon, both before andafter July 2006, most casualties occurred nearthe home, while people were inspecting conflictdamage, trying to salvage crops, or just walkingaround.

Males represent 84 percent of casualties,and constitute a similar percentage of casual-ties carrying out livelihood activities. However,under-18s represent a significant number ofthese male casualties at approximately 40 per-cent.330 In many cases, for example in Kosovoand Cambodia, boys are the largest casualtygroup; in other cases, such as Vietnam, they area close second. Boys constitute the vast major-ity of child casualties – averaging between 85and 90 percent. The majority of male child casu-alties occur while carrying out livelihood activi-ties, mostly tending animals. In Afghanistan,boys represent more than half of the casualtiestending animals, for example.

A small percentage (around 10 percent) ofcasualties occur while tampering or playingwith cluster submunitions. Again, boys makeup the majority of these casualties.

The number of casualties that occurewhile carrying out livelihood activities showsthe direct economic impact on cluster muni-tions-contaminated communities and coun-tries. In many of these countries, men are thetraditional breadwinners, and since adult malesand boys represent the majority of casualtiesthe socio-economic loss for both the immediateterm and distant future cannot be underesti-mated.

The significant number of child casualtiesalso requires adjusted survivor assistance pro-grams.

LESSON 4:Immediate and Comprehensive Clearance

Reduces Civilian Casualties

The experiences of Afghanistan,Cambodia, Iraq, Lao PDR, and Vietnam speakvolumes: extensive cluster munitions use gen-erally and failed submunitions particularly posea volatile and generational threat to civilianswhere clearance efforts are delayed. Immediateidentification and clearance of submunitionscontamination is the only way to minimize post-conflict casualties, as was shown in Kosovo andafter the US offensive in Afghanistan. InLebanon, it is acknowledged that emergencyclearance is the only way to halt the daily casu-alty occurrence. However, when failed submuni-tions are cleared rapidly, new use will con-tribute to and exacerbate the existing problemuntil the last submunitions are cleared.

A full reckoning of casualties from bothsubmunitions strikes and subsequent contami-nation is likely impossible, but a consistentlydisproportionate pattern of harm to civilianshas been demonstrated from even this prelimi-nary study. From Southeast Asia to Afghanistan,Iraq, Chechnya, Lebanon, and other places,reports of cluster munitions either targeted ator inadvertently used against civilians havecontinued, as do the reports of failed submuni-tions and their impact on communities – thenumber of casualties grows daily. Time and timeagain, this fatal footprint determines the fate ofindividuals and communities, often decadesafter the initial conflict.


TAB

LE

1:

Co

nfi

rme

d C

lus

ter

Su

bm

un

itio

ns

Ca

su

alt

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in

Aff

ect

ed

Co

un

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d

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ste

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s

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nk

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Mil

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rU

nk

no

wn

Ca

su

alt

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11,0

445,

581

3,83

01,

633

3,69

478

02,

524

458

124

593,

405

Afg

hani

stan

701

550

150

130

549

224

3182

100

Alb

ania

5646

100

215

11

320

5

Bos

nia-

Her

zego

vina

92

70

00

00

02

7

Cam

bodi

a12

091

290

4312

569

00

0

Chad

N/A

Croa

tia

277

258

172

103

121

14

246

Chec

hnya

624

319

305

04

01

10

061

8

Erit

rea

107

30

00

40

00

6

Ethi

opia

272

215

570

00

00

00

272

Iraq

2,06

080

120

01,

059

336

8711

959

60

1,45

3

Koso

vo16

410

359

250

383

17

155

Kuw

ait

54

10

00

00

01

4

Lao

PDR

4,81

32,

165

2,52

112

72,

257

470

1,65

427

50

015

7

Leba

non

494

376

118

027

646

9222

154

39

Mon

tene

gro

41

30

01

00

00

3

Saud

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bia

N/A

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ia45

3015

01

00

00

242

Sier

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2818

1028

Suda

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2016

00

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24

030

Syri

a1

01

00

00

01

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Tajik

ista

n48

1830

00

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Viet

nam

1,27

555

727

844

039

110

427

856

51

440

Wes

tern

Sah

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20

02

00

00

00

2


TAB

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2:

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Serb

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no

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nam

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not

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10-80 Committee, Hue Health Department, andHatfield Consultants Limited, A Luoi Thua-Thien

Hue, Living with UXO: Results of the Survey of

UXO Impacts on Socio-Economic and Human

Health in A Luoi Valley, Thua Thien Hue

Province, 2001.

John Borrie, Explosive remnants of war: Global

survey, Landmine Action, London, June 2003.

Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Report on

Baseline Survey in Dong Ha, Cam Lo, Dakrong

and Huong Hoa Districts, Hanoi, September2006.

Rosy Cave, Anthea Lawson and Andrew Sherriff,Cluster Munitions in Albania and Lao PDR: The

Humanitarian and Socio-Economic Impact, UNI-DIR, Geneva, September 2006.

Handicap International, Les systèmes d’armes à

sous-munitions, Etat des lieux, Lyon, August2003.

Handicap International, Living with UXO,

National Survey on the Socio-Economic Impact

of UXO in Lao PDR (Final Report), Vientiane-Brussels, 1997.

Human Rights Watch, Essential Elements for

Reducing the Civilian Harm of Cluster

Munitions: Examples of Policy and Practice,August 2006.

Human Rights Watch, Overview of a Dirty Dozen

Cluster Munitions, Washington, D.C., August2006.

Human Rights Watch, Off Target: The Conduct of

the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq, US,2003.

Human Rights Watch, Fatally Flawed: Cluster

Bombs and Their Use by the United States in

Afghanistan, Washington, D.C., December2002.

Human Rights Watch, Cluster Bombs in

Afghanistan: A Human Rights Watch

Backgrounder, October 2001.

Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in the

NATO Air Campaign, Vol. 12, No. 1 (D), February2000.

Human Rights Watch, Ticking Time Bombs:

NATOs Use of Cluster Munitions in Yugoslavia,

Vol. 11, No. 6 (D), June 1999.

Iraq Landmine Impact Survey, The Causes of

Death and Injury in Iraq due to ERW, Iraq, 18May 2006.

International Campaign to Ban Landmines,Landmine Monitor Report 2006: Toward a Mine-

Free World, Mines Action Canada, Canada,September 2006.

International Committee of the Red Cross,Cluster Bombs and Landmines in Kosovo:

Explosive Remnants of War, Geneva, August2000 (Revised June 2001).

Franklin Lamb, “Israel’s Gift to Lebanon,” in A

Quarter Century of Israel’s Use of American

Weapons in Lebanon (1978-2006), September2006.

Landmine Action UK, Explosive remnants of

war: Unexploded ordnance and post-conflict

communities, London, March 2002.

Rae McGrath, Cluster Bombs: The Military

Effectiveness and Impact on Civilians of Cluster

Munitions, UK Working Group on Landmines,Calvert’s Press, London, August 2000

Titus Peachey and Virgil Wiebe, Cluster Bombs

Appendix 1: Laos, Mennonite CentralCommittee, November 2000.

Titus Peachey and Virgil Wiebe, Clusters of

Death, Mennonite Central Committee, 2000.

Selected BibliographySelected Bibliography


Brian Rappert and Richard Moyes, Failure to

Protect: A case for the prohibition of cluster

munitions, LMA UK, London, September 2006.

William Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon

and the destruction of Cambodia, CooperSquare Press, 25 October 2002 (revised edi-tion).

Survey Action Center and HandicapInternational, Landmine Impact Survey:

Republic of Chad, Washington, D.C., 2000.

Swedish Committee for Afghanistan andSwedish Peace and Arbitration Society, Cluster

munitions in Afghanistan – implications for

international action and regulation, Stockholm,April 2006.

Virgil Wiebe, “Footprints of Death: ClusterBombs as Indiscriminate Weapons UnderInternational Humanitarian Law,” Michigan

Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, No. 1, Fall2000, pp. 142-149.

Virgil Wiebe, Cluster Bomb Use in the

Yugoslavia/Kosovo War, MCC, 1999.

Virgil Wiebe and Titus Peachey, Drop Today, Kill

Tomorrow: Cluster Munitions as Inhumane and

Indiscriminate Weapons, MCC, December 1997(revised June 1999).


1 National Defense University, “19. Operation PlanEl Paso,” http://www.ndu.edu/inss/; BBC, “Warand Protest - the US in Vietnam (1969 - 1970),”both accessed 3 October 2006; WilliamShawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the

destruction of Cambodia, Cooper Square Press,25 October 2002 (revised edition).

2 Landmine Action UK, Explosive remnants of war:

Unexploded ordnance and post-conflict commu-

nities, London, March 2002, pp. 48-49 (here-inafter LMA UK, Explosive remnants of war):“The GeoSpatial International CambodiaNational Level One Survey Project … has evi-dence of at least 17,235 United States clusterbomb attack sites – although the actual numberof bombs dropped on each of these target sitesis not known.”

3 Analysis of US strike data for Cambodia. Air-delivered antipersonnel and antivehicle mineswere excluded from this total, as were all fuel airexplosives, smoke, incendiary, and chemicalmunitions classified as BLU; see AndreasParsch, U.S. Military Aviation Designation

Systems: Directory of U.S. Military Rockets and

Missiles, Non-U.S. Military Aircraft and Missile

Designation Systems, http://www.designation-systems.net, accessed 4 September 2006.

4 Titus Peachey and Virgil Wiebe, Cluster Bombs

Appendix 1: Laos, Mennonite Central Committee(MCC), November 2000,http://www.mcc.org/clusterbomb/, accessed 8March 2006; UXO Lao, “Lao UXO Workplan1999,” Vientiane, 1999, p. 3.

5 Rae McGrath, Cluster Bombs: The Military

Effectiveness and Impact on Civilians of Cluster

Munitions, UK Working Group on Landmines,Calvert’s Press, London, August 2000, p. 16(hereinafter McGrath, Military Effectiveness).

6 International Campaign to Ban Landmines,Landmine Monitor Report 2006: Toward a Mine-

Free World, Mines Action Canada, Canada,September 2006, pp. 264-266 (hereinafterLandmine Monitor Report 2006).

7 Casualty data provided by Kao Vannarin, ProjectAdvisor, CMVIS-Handicap International (HI),Phnom Penh, 14 September 2006.

8 Email from Kao Vannarin, CMVIS-HI, Phnom

Penh, 4 September 2006.

9 Unless otherwise stated, casualty analysis isbased on 120 individual records provided by KaoVannarin, CMVIS-HI, Phnom Penh, 14 September2006.

10 The provinces with the most cluster submuni-tions casualties are also the four provinces withthe most ERW incidents in comparison with mineincidents and account for 48 percent of submu-nitions casualties: Kampong Cham (18), Kandal(14), Kracheh (14), and Stueng Traeng (12).

11 William Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon

and the destruction of Cambodia, CooperSquare Press, 25 October 2002 (revised edition).

12 CMVIS complete data was filtered for mine inci-dents only and for 120 casualties spread acrossthe same 18 provinces and in the same propor-tions as the cluster submunitions casualties.

13 Interview conducted by Vao Kannarin, CMVIS-HI,and Stan Brabant, Head, Policy Unit, HandicapInternational, Kampong Speu, 5 April 2006, pho-tos taken by the authors.


Appendix 1: Laos, November 2000,http://www.mcc.org/clusterbomb, accessed 8March 2006.

15 Handicap International, Living with UXO,

National Survey on the Socio-Economic Impact

of UXO in Lao PDR (Final Report), Vientiane-Brussels, 1997, p. 77 (Hereinafter HI, Living with

UXO); US Air Force CBU strike data summary(hereinafter USAF data summary) for Lao PDRbased on UXO Lao records and summarized byGeneva International Centre for HumanitarianDemining (GICHD), September 2006. This infor-mation was provided anonymously, 22September 2006.

16 HI, Living with UXO, p. 77.

17 Analysis of USAF data summary: air-deliveredantipersonnel and antivehicle mines andminelets were excluded from this total, as wereall fuel air explosives, smoke, incendiary, andchemical munitions classified as BLU.

18 Analysis of USAF data summary.

19 McGrath, Military Effectiveness, p. 31.

NotesNotes


20 UXO Lao, Programme Progress Report 2005:

[Draft] Summary of the 2005 UXO Lao Annual

Report, Vientiane, 2006, p. 6 (hereinafter UXOLao, Progress Report 2005).


Appendix 1: Laos, November 2000, p. 8,http://www.mcc.org/clusterbomb/, accessed 8March 2006.

22 Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 983.

23 HI, Living with UXO, p. 24. The actual data setholds 10,639 records, though the final reportindicates 10,649.

24 UXO Lao, Progress Report 2005, p. 6.

25 Analysis and total confirmed cluster submuni-tions casualties are based on HI, Living with UXO

survey data. This dataset was most usedbecause of its completeness of information andthe greater period of time it covers. Additionalrecords were provided by UXO Lao for the years1999-2003, and 2005-May 2006 (hereinafter,“UXO Lao” data); summarized UXO Lao data for2004 was drawn from, Rosy Cave, AntheaLawson and Andrew Sherriff, Cluster Munitions

in Albania and Lao PDR: The Humanitarian and

Socio-Economic Impact, UNIDIR, Geneva,September 2006, pp. 27-30. Together, thesedata sets cover the period 1973 – May 2006, withdetailed records of 11,410 total landmine/ERWcasualties.

26 Analysis of HI, Living with UXO and “UXO Lao”data.

27 HI, Living with UXO, p. 28.

28 NRA, “Activities & News,”http://www.nra.gov.la/#, accessed 5 October2006. The NRA site, new in September 2006,mentions that “[t]his year there has been amarked increase in casualties, related directly tothe increased value of scrap metal and the con-sequent hunting for and salvaging of UXO.”

29 “UXO Lao” data; see also the Tajikistan andVietnam reports.

30 NRA, “Activities & News,”http://www.nra.gov.la/#, accessed 5 October2006.

31 Analysis of HI, Living with UXO data.

32 Analysis of HI, Living with UXO data.

33 Case study and photos provided by Yvon LeChevanton, HI, Vientiane, September 2006.

34 Technology Center for Bomb and MineDisposal/Vietnam Veterans of AmericaFoundation (BOMICEN/VVAF) administrativequery of US ordnance records for tonnage deliv-ered originally provided to Landmine MonitorResearcher Andrew Wells-Dang, dated 4 May2004 (hereinafter BOMICEN/VVAF ordnancedata). The top 10 strike locations in descendingrank order, are: Quang Binh, Binh Phuoc, QuangTri, Binh Dinh, Ha Tinh, Quang Nam, Thua-ThienHue, Quang Ngai, Tay Ninh, and Kon Tum.

35 10-80 Committee, Hue Health Department, and

Hatfield Consultants Limited, A Luoi Thua-Thien

Hue, Living with UXO: Results of the Survey of

UXO Impacts on Socio-Economic and Human

Health in A Luoi Valley, Thua Thien Hue Province,2001, Appendix A7, Chapter 2, pp. 24-27 (here-inafter A Luoi Survey).

36 BOMICEN/VVAF ordnance data. The provincesin descending order are: Quang Binh, Thua-Thien Hue and Quang Nam.

37 A Luoi Survey, Appendix A4, Chapter 1, p. 1;Hatfield Consultants Limited and 10-80Committee, Development of Methodologies and

Technology for Supporting Clearance of

Landmines and Unexploded Ordnance in Viet

Nam, January 2003, Chapter 6, p. 5.

38 This estimate is based on the ratio of the submu-nitions types dropped in Lao.

39 BOMICEN/VVAF ordnance data.

40 Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 1171-1172.

41 Email from Hoang Nam, Coordinator, ProjectRENEW, Dong Ha, 25 August 2006.

42 A Luoi Survey, Appendix A7, Chapter 2, pp. 24-27.

43 BOMICEN/VVAF, “Survey Analysis Results,Unexploded Ordnance and Landmine ImpactAssessment and Technical Survey Report, Phase1,” Hanoi, 14 October 2005, pp. 7, 13

44 Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Report on

Baseline Survey in Dong Ha, Cam Lo, Dakrong

and Huong Hoa Districts, Hanoi, September2006 and data used for the MRE baseline studyin Quang Tri province sent by Andrew-WellsDang, Deputy Representative, CRS, 26September 2006.

45 Unless otherwise stated casualty data analysisis based on: Clear Path International (CPI) datasent by Tran Hong Chi, Program Coordinator, CPI,17 April 2006, and Catholic Relief Services datafor the MRE baseline study in Quang Tri provincesent by Andrew-Wells Dang, CRS, 26 September2006. Combined the data sets provide detailedrecords for 2,826 landmine/ERW casualties,including 835 cluster submunition casualties.Additionally, 440 cluster munitions casualties(out of 1,088) from the A Luoi survey are alsoincluded in the totals. But they are classified asunknown status since detailed records were notprovided. See, A Luoi Survey, Appendix A7,Chapter 2, pp. 28-29, 34-35.


47 See the Lao PDR and Tajikistan profiles in thisstudy.



50 Vietnam War, “Vietnam War Casualties,”http://www.vietnam-war.info/, accessed 10September 2006: “The Hanoi governmentrevealed on April 4 that the true civilian casual-ties of the Vietnam War were 2,000,000 in thenorth, and 2,000,000 in the south. Military


casualties were 1.1 million killed and 600,000wounded…,”

51 Clear Path International (CPI): Assisting

Landmine Survivors, their Families and their

Communities, Personal Stories, Ho Van Lai,http://www.clearpathinternational.org/,accessed 27 September 2006. Photo courtesyof CPI: additional information not found in Lai’sonline case study provided by the author.

52 Email from Michel Destemberg, Chief TechnicalAdvisor/Programme Manager, UNOPS/HCND,N’Djamena, 1 September 2006.

53 The Survey Action Center and HandicapInternational, Landmine Impact Survey:

Republic of Chad, Washington, 2000, p. 59(hereinafter Chad LIS).

54 Email from Michel Destemberg, UNOPS/HCND,N’Djamena, 1 September 2006.

55 Emails from Michel Destemberg, UNOPS/HCND,N’Djamena, 1 September 2006; Titus Peacheyand Virgil Wiebe, Clusters of Death, “Chapter 2:Cluster Munitions in the Russian Arsenal,”Mennonite Central Committee, 2000,http://www.mcc.org/clusterbombs/, accessed7 September 2006 (hereinafter Peachey andWiebe, Clusters of Death).

56 Handicap International, Where Are Cluster

Bombs Used? www.handicap-international.org.uk, accessed 24 August 2006;Human Rights Watch (HRW), Essential Elements

for Reducing the Civilian Harm of Cluster

Munitions: Examples of Policy and Practice,August 2006, p. 1 (hereinafter HRW, Essential

Elements).

57 Email from Didier Léonard, Program Manager,MAG, N’Djamena, 31 August 2006.

58 HCND: Haut Commissariat National deDéminage (National High Commission forDemining).

59 Emails from Michel Destemberg, UNOPS/HCND,N’Djamena, 1 September 2006 and 3 October2006.

60 Telephone interview with Michel Destemberg,UNOPS/HCND, N’Djamena, 2 October 2006.


62 John Borrie, Explosive remnants of war: Global

survey, Landmine Action, London, June 2003, p.17 (Borrie, Global survey).

63 Email from Michel Destemberg, UNOPS/HCND,N’Djamena, 1 September 2006.

64 Telephone interview with Thomas Merkelbach,Head of Delegation, ICRC, N’Djamena, 7September 2006.

65 Email from Didier Léonard, MAG, N’Djamena, 31August 2006.

66 Chad LIS, p. 33.

67 Chad LIS, p. 7.


69 LMA UK, Explosive remnants of war, pp. 50-53.


71 David Gough, “Ethiopian planes bomb Eritreancapital as refugee crisis grows,” The Guardian

(Asmara), 30 May 2000,http://www.guardian.co.uk/, accessed on 5October 2006.

72 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Eritrea, “PressRelease: Ethiopia Bombs Asmara Airport,”Asmara, 29 May 2000, http://www.dehai.org/,accessed on 5 October 2006.


74 Email from Tedla Gebrehiwot, MRECoordinator/Supervisor, UNMEE MACC, Asmara,8 September 2006.


76 LMA UK, Explosive remnants of war, pp. 50-51.

77 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Eritrea, “PressRelease: Ethiopia Bombs Asmara Airport,”Asmara, 29 May 2000, http://www.dehai.org/,accessed on 5 October 2006.

78 UNMEE MACC, UNMEE Mine Action

Coordination Centre Sitrep, Asmara, 14December 2000, p. 1.

79 LMA UK, Explosive remnants of war, p. 53.

80 Ibid., pp. 51-52.


82 Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial

Award-Central Front-Ethiopia’s Claim 2 between

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and

The State of Eritrea, The Hague, 28 April 2004,pp. 24-28 and pp. 30-31.

83 Borrie, Global survey, p. 17.

84 Email from Scott Pilkington, Senior TechnicalAdvisor UN Mine Action Advisory Team, UNDP,Addis Ababa, 12 September 2006.

85 Email from Mike Kendellen, Director for Survey,SAC, Washington, 29 September 2006.


87 Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial

Award-Central Front-Ethiopia’s Claim 2 between

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and

The State of Eritrea, The Hague, 28 April 2004,pp. 24-28.

88 Embassy of The Federal Democratic Republic ofEthiopia in London, “Ethiopia and Eritrea BorderConflict,” http://www.ethioembassy.org.uk/,accessed 12 September 2006.

89 McGrath, Military Effectiveness, p. 41; “ECOMOGair raid,” IRIN (Sierra Leone), 12 December 1997,available at University of Pennsylvania, AfricanStudies Centerwww.africa.upenn.edu/Newsletters/, accessed25 August 2006.

90 “ECOMOG shells Port Loko and coastal areas,”IRIN, 4 October 1997, available at University ofPennsylvania, African Studies Center,


www.africa.upenn.edu/Newsletters/, accessed25 August 2006.

91 Sierra Leone Web, News Archives, October 1997,http://www.sierra-leone.org/, accessed 25August 2006.

92 Eric G. Berman, Re-Armament in Sierra Leone:

One Year After the Lomé Peace Agreement,Occasional Paper No. 1, Small Arms Survey,Geneva, December 2000, p. 25; Control Arms,The call for tough arms controls: voices from

Sierra Leone, Oxfam, Amnesty International, andthe International Action Network on Small Arms(IANSA), January 2006, p. 12, available atwww.controlarms.org, accessed 7 September2006.





97 Peachey and Wiebe, Clusters of Death, “Chapter4: Cluster Munition Use in Sudan.”

98 Ibid.


100 McGrath, Military Effectiveness, p. 39; Peacheyand Wiebe, Clusters of Death, “Chapter 4:Cluster Munition Use in Sudan.”

101 McGrath, Military Effectiveness, p. 39; Peacheyand Wiebe, Clusters of Death, “Chapter 4:Cluster Munition Use in Sudan.”


103 Ibid., p. 39; Peachey and Wiebe, Clusters of

Death, “Chapter 4: Cluster Munition Use inSudan.”.

104 Email from Mohammad Kabir, InformationManagement Officer, UNMAO, Khartoum, 16September 2006.


106 Email from Bojan Vukovic, MRE/VA Coordinator,South Sudan Regional Mine Action Center, Juba,4 September 2006.


108 USAID, “U.S. Census Bureau Supports theSouthern Sudan Center for Statistics andEvaluation,” 2006,http://africastories.usaid.gov/, accessed 5October 2006.

109 Email from Yousif Mohamed Osman, TrainingDirector, NAPO, Khartoum, 4 September 2006.

110 Interview with Yousif Mohamed Osman, NAPO,Geneva, 20 September 2006.

111 Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO,Khartoum, 8 October 2006.

112 Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO,Khartoum, 16 September 2006.

113 Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 543-545.

114 Peachey and Wiebe, Clusters of Death, “Chapter

4: Cluster Munition Use in Sudan.”

115 HRW, “Government Bombing of Relief Sites andOther Security Risks,” Famine In Sudan, 1998:

The Human Rights Causes, 8 February 1999,http://www.hrw.org/reports/, accessed 6October 2006.

116 Peachey and Wiebe Clusters of Death, “Chapter4: Cluster Munition Use in Sudan;” McGrath,Military Effectiveness, p. 39.

117 Interview with Arben Braha, Director, and VeriDogjani, MRE-VA Officer, AMAE, Geneva, 18September 2006; Virgil Wiebe and TitusPeachey, Drop Today, Kill Tomorrow: Cluster

Munitions as Inhumane and Indiscriminate

Weapons, MCC, December 1997 (revised June1999), p. 5, http://www.mcc.org/cluster-bombs/, accessed 5 October 2006 (hereinafterWiebe and Peachey, Kill Tomorrow).

118 Virgil Wiebe, Cluster Bomb Use in the

Yugoslavia/Kosovo War, MCC, 1999,http://www.mcc.org/clusterbombs/, accessed30 September 2006 (hereinafter Wiebe,Yugoslavia).

119 Rosy Cave, Anthea Lawson and Andrew Sherriff,Cluster Munitions in Albania and Lao PDR: The

Humanitarian and Socio-Economic Impact, UNI-DIR, Geneva, September 2006, p. 9 (hereinafterUNIDIR, Cluster Munitions in Albania).

120 Wiebe, Yugoslavia.


122 Ibid.

123 Interview with Arben Braha and Veri Dogjani,AMAE, Geneva, 18 September 2006; UNIDIR,Cluster Munitions in Albania, p. 11.

124 Interview with Arben Braha and Veri Dogjani,AMAE, Geneva, 18 September 2006.

125 UNIDIR, Cluster Munitions in Albania, p. 10.


127 Unless otherwise stated analysis of casualtydata provided via email by Arben Braha,Director, AMAE, 15 September 2006.

128 UNIDIR, Cluster Munitions in Albania, pp. 10-11;Wiebe, Yugoslavia.

129 The training incident accounts for 36 percent ofall incidents, excepting this incident, the casual-ty rate would be at 1.2 persons per incident.





134 Case study provided by Arben Braha, Director,AMAE, Tirana, 15 September 2006. At therequest of AMAE, the name given is fictional toprotect the privacy of the boy.

135 Roger Cohen, “NATO, Expanding Bosnia Role,Strikes a Serbian base in Croatia,” New York

Times (New York), 22 November, 1994; Michael


Beale, Bombs Over Bosnia: The Role Of Airpower

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Maxwell Air Force Base,Alabama, June 1996,http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/beale.htm,accessed 6 October 2006.

136 Wiebe and Peachey, Kill Tomorrow, p. 5.

137 BHMAC data consisted of summary reports priorto June 2005, which did not offer details on con-flict or post-conflict mine/ERW casualties.

138 Email from Dejan Babalj, Project DevelopmentOfficer, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 18 September 2006;Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 222-223.

139 Email from Dejan Babalj, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 18September 2006; Wiebe and Peachey, Kill

Tomorrow, p. 5.

140 Brian Rappert and Richard Moyes, Failure to

Protect: A case for the prohibition of cluster

munitions, LMA UK, London, September 2006, p.8 (hereinafter Rappert and Moyes, Failure to pro-

tect); Wiebe and Peachey, Kill Tomorrow, p. 5.


142 Rappert and Moyes, Failure to Protect, p. 8;Wiebe and Peachey, Kill Tomorrow, p. 5; Wiebe,Yugoslavia.

143 Analysis of data provided via email by LjiljanaCalic-Zmiric, Mine Risk Education and VictimAssistance Advisor, CROMAC, 4 September2006, and of casualties cited in Rappert andMoyes, Failure to Protect, p. 8. Unless otherwisestated all casualty analysis based on thesesources.

144 The International Criminal Tribunal for TheFormer Yugoslavia, Case No. IT-95-11 The

Prosecutor Of The Tribunal Against Milan Martic,http://www.un.org/icty/, accessed 7 October2006.

145 The tabular information is a composite of dataprovided by email from Bajram Krasniqi, PublicInformation Assistant, OKPCC EODManagement, Pristina, 1 September 2006;OKPCC EOD, “Incidents of Cluster Munition inKosovo 1999-2001 & 2001-2005,” provided byThomas Nash, Coordinator, Cluster MunitionCoalition (CMC), London, 21 September 2006;and data originally from UNMIK MACC Database1999-2001 provided by email from RichardMoyes, Policy and Research Manager, LMA UK,London, 21 September 2006. Unless stated oth-erwise, casualty analysis is based on thesesources.

146 HRW, Cluster Bombs in Afghanistan: A Human

Rights Watch Backgrounder, October 2001,www.hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/, accessed22 September 2006 (hereinafter HRW, Cluster

Bombs in Afghanistan); HI, Cluster Munitions

Systems: Situation and Inventory, Lyon, August2003, p. 14.

147 ICRC, Cluster Bombs and Landmines in Kosovo:

Explosive Remnants of War, Geneva, August2000 (Revised June 2001), p. 6.

148 Rappert and Moyes, Failure to Protect, p. 11.


150 GICHD and UNDP, “Case of Kosovo,” A Study of

Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action,Geneva, March 2001, p. 25.


152 United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Questions

59 and 60. RBL755, Select Committee on Public

Accounts Minutes of Evidence, APPENDIX 1,Supplementary memorandum submitted by theMinistry of Defence (PAC 00-01/170), 30 January2001, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/,accessed 29 September 2006.


154 HRW, Cluster Bombs in Afghanistan.

155 “UN set to transfer demining activities to Kosovoauthorities,” ReliefWeb, 14 December 2001,http://www.reliefweb.int/, accessed 29September 2006.




159 Landmine Action UK, Actiongroup Mine.de andMines Action Canada, Explosive Remnants of

War and Mines other than Anti-Personnel Mines:

Global survey 2003–2004, Landmine Action UK,London, March 2005, p. 98.

160 GICHD and UNDP, “Case of Kosovo,” A Study of

Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action,Geneva, March 2001, pp. 105-106; Landmine

Monitor Report 2001, p. 968.

161 UNMIK MACC, Monthly Summaries 1 June 1999 –30 November 2000; Landmine Monitor Report

2005, p. 962.

162 Telephone interview with Bajram Krasniqi,OKPCC EOD Management, Pristina, 29September 2006.


164 The tabular information is a composite of dataprovided by email from Bajram Krasniqi, OKPCCEOD Management, Pristina, 1 September 2006;OKPCC EOD, “Incidents of Cluster Munition inKosovo 1999-2001 & 2001-2005,” provided byThomas Nash, CMC, London, 21 September2006; and data originally from UNMIK MACCDatabase 1999-2001 provided by email fromRichard Moyes, LMA UK, London, 21 September2006. Unless stated otherwise, casualty analy-sis is based on these sources.

165 Email from Bajram Krasniqi, OKPCC, UNMIK,EOD Management, Pristina, 3 October 2006.Detailed records of 154 casualties were notavailable at OKPCC EOD.

166 The Praxis Group, Ltd., Willing to Listen: An

Evaluation of the United Nations Mine Action

Programme In Kosovo 1999-2001, Riverside,Geneva, 12 February 2002, p. 100.

167 UNMIK MACC, UNMIK Mine Action Coordination

Centre Quarterly Report 1 June – 30 September

2000, Skopje & Pristina, 2000, p. 4.


168 United Nations-Islamabad: “UXO Blues:Photographs by Luke Powell,” Situation in and

around Afghanistan, http://www.un.org.pk/,accessed 3 October 2006.

169 LMA UK, Explosive remnants of war, p. 8.


171 HRW, “Civilian Deaths in the NATO AirCampaign,” A Human Rights Watch Report, Vol.12. No. 1 (D), February 2000, p. 8 (hereinafterHRW, “Civilian Deaths”); Human Rights Watch,Cluster Bombs: Memorandum for CCW

Delegates, 16 December 1999,http://www.hrw.org/arms/memo-cluster.htm,accessed 25 September 2006.

172 HRW, “Civilian Deaths,” Appendix A: IncidentsInvolving Civilian Deaths in Operation AlliedForce.


174 John Borrie, Global survey, p.13; LMA UK,Unexploded Ordnance and Post-conflict

Communities, London, 2002, p. 13.

175 Mark Tran, “Soldiers were killed by NATObombs,” Guardian Unlimited, 22 June 1999,http://www.guardian.co.uk/, accessed 7September 2006.

176 “UK Nato bomb caused Gurkha deaths,” BBC

(UK), 22 June 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/;CNN, “Officials: Peacekeepers killed while clear-ing NATO bombs from village,” 22 June 1999,CNN (Pristina), http://www.cnn.com/, bothaccessed 7 September 2006.

177 Testimony collected by HI in 2005.

178 Select Committee on Defence, FourteenthReport, Annex B, available at http://www.publi-cations.parliament.uk/, accessed 6 October2006.


180 HRW, “Civilian Deaths,” Appendix A: IncidentsInvolving Civilian Deaths in Operation AlliedForce.


182 HRW, Cluster Bombs in Afghanistan, pp. 4-5.

183 CMC, Clusters Profile: Serbia and Montenegro,http://www.stopclustermunit ions.org/,accessed 6 October 2005.



186 HRW, Ticking Time Bombs: NATO’s Use of Cluster

Munitions in Yugoslavia, Vol. 11, No. 6 (D), June1999, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nato2/,accessed 4 September 2006; Steve Goose,“Cluster munitions: Towards a global solution,”Human Rights Watch World Report 2004, NewYork, 2004, http://hrw.org/wr2k4/12.htm,accessed 5 October 2006.



189 CMC, Clusters Profile: Serbia and Montenegro,http://www.stopclustermunit ions.org/,accessed 6 October 2005.

190 Virgil Wiebe, “Footprints of Death: ClusterBombs as Indiscriminate Weapons UnderInternational Humanitarian Law,” Michigan

Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, No. 1, Fall2000, pp. 142-149 (hereinafter Wiebe,“Footprints”).

191 Wiebe, “Footprints,” pp. 142-149; Peachey andWiebe, Clusters of Death, “Chapter 3: ClusterMunitions Use by Russian Federation Forces inChechnya;” Wiebe and Peachey, Kill Tomorrow.

192 HRW, Overview of a Dirty Dozen Cluster

Munitions, Washington, D.C., August 2006(hereinafter HRW, Dirty Dozen).

193 Peachey and Wiebe, Clusters of Death, “Chapter3: Cluster Munitions Use by Russian FederationForces in Chechnya.”

194 Peachey and Wiebe, Clusters of Death, “Chapter3: Cluster Munitions Use by Russian FederationForces in Chechnya.”


196 Analysis of casualty data provided by ZaurTsitsaev, Programme Assistant, ChildProtection/Mine Action, UNICEF NorthCaucasus, Nazran, 19 September 2006.

197 Analysis of casualty reports contained in: Wiebe,“Footprints;” Peachey and Wiebe, Clusters of

Death, “Chapter 3: Cluster Munitions Use byRussian Federation Forces in Chechnya;” Wiebeand Peachey, Kill Tomorrow, p. 5.

198 HRW, Essential Elements, August 2006.

199 CMC, Stop Cluster Munitions, Clusters Profile: Tajikistan, http://www.stopclustermuni-tions.org/, accessed 25 September 2006.

200 HRW, Dirty Dozen.

201 Email from Reykhan Muminova, VictimAssistance Officer, TMAC, Dushanbe, 26September 2006.

202 Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 699; emailfrom Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, Dushanbe, 26September 2006.

203 Email from Reykhan Muminova, TMAC,Dushanbe, 26 September 2006.

204 See the Lao PDR and Vietnam reports for details.


206 Greg Goebel, “Dumb Bombs and SmartMunitions,” 1 November 2004, http://www.vec-torsite.net/twbomb2.html, accessed 19September 2006.

207 Wiebe and Peachey, Kill Tomorrow, p. 8.

208 HRW, Cluster Bombs in Afghanistan, p. 2.

209 HRW, Fatally Flawed: Cluster Bombs and Their

Use by the United States in Afghanistan,Washington, D.C., December 2002, p. 21 (here-inafter HRW, Fatally Flawed).


210 Bonnie Docherty, “The Legality of U.S. ClusterMunition Use; Civilian Casualties During andAfter Attack,” at the Cluster Bombs – The Case of

Afghanistan International Seminar, Stockholm,Sweden, 5 May 2006.

211 HRW, Cluster Bomblets Litter Afghanistan, NewYork, 16 November 2001, http://hrw.org/eng-lish/docs/, accessed 19 September 2006.

212 Swedish Committee for Afghanistan andSwedish Peace and Arbitration Society, Cluster

munitions in Afghanistan – implications for

international action and regulation, Stockholm,April 2006, p. 44.

213 Interview with Zamanuddin Noori, Mine ActionProgramme Manager, ICRC, Kabul, 8 August2006.

214 Email from Alessandro Greblo, HumanResources Coordinator, Emergency, Milan, 1 June2006.

215 Unless stated otherwise: analysis of ICRC casu-alty data sent by Zamanuddin Noori, ICRC,Kabul, 4 September 2006.

216 HRW, Fatally Flawed; see also MCC for casualtiesreported in the media,http://www.mcc.org/clusterbomb/afghanistan/index.html.

217 Interview with Zamanuddin Noori, ICRC, Kabul, 8August 2006.

218 Photo by John Rodsted, Afghanistan, 2002.

219 Analysis of casualty data provided by HRW,IHSCO, CIVIC, ILIS, Spanish Brigade against theWar, Iraqi Body Count, HI and media reports.Only casualty data that allowed detailed analy-sis for crosschecking purposes was included inthe casualty table. Other estimates and figuresare mentioned but not included in the totals.

220 Interview with previous technical advisor ofIHSCO, Geneva, 17 September 2006.

221 Interview with Salomon Schreuder, Senior MineAction Advisor, UNDP-Iraq, Geneva, 20September 2006.


223 HRW, “Four U.S. Cluster Munitions of Concern,”Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper:

Cluster Munitions a Foreseeable Hazard

in Iraq, March 2003, http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/(hereinafter, HRW, “Four of Concern”).

224 HI, Les systèmes d’armes à sous-munitions, Etat

des lieux, Lyon, August 2003, p. 43.


226 Ibid., p. 34.

227 HRW, U.S. Cluster Bombs for Turkey, Vol. 6, No.19, December 1994,http://www.hrw.org/reports/1994/turkey2/,(hereinafter HRW, Bombs for Turkey); U.S.Congress, General Accounting Office (GAO),Operation Desert Storm: Casualties Caused by

Improper Handling of Unexploded U.S.

Submunitions, GAO/NSIAD-93-212, August1993, p. 4.

228 Ibid.

229 Emails from mine action operators in northernIraq (MAG-VVAF) September 2006.

230 HRW, Off Target: The Conduct of the War and

Civilian Casualties in Iraq, US, 2003, p. 80 (here-inafter HRW, Off Target).

231 Human Rights Watch and Handicap Internationalanalysis of US strike data identified the unitsused as CBU-87, 99, 103, 105, AGM-154, BGM-109, and RBL-755. Data summary availableupon request.

232 HRW, Off Target, p. 56.

233 Information provided to Titus Peachey,Mennonite Central Committee, by Department of the Air Force, 20th Fighter Wing, Shaw Air Force Base, SouthCarolina, Letter dated: 23 August, 2006, Signedby Mary F. Huff, Base Freedom of Information ActMg.


235 HRW, “Four of Concern.”

236 Information provided by Nabaz Tahir Abdulla,IMSMA Manager, MAG, Erbil, 24 September2006.

237 Emails from Iraqi and international sources, bothgovernmental and nongovernmental, duringAugust 2005, reaffirmed in August-September2006.

238 Email from Ahmed al-Zubaidi, Director, IHSCO,Baghdad, 23 August 2006.

239 Email from Muna Saffar, Advisor, VVAF, Baghdad,16 May 2006.

240 Email from Marla Ruzicka, Founder, CIVIC, 28August 2004.


242 HRW, Off Target, pp. 56-61, pp. 85-92, pp. 105-110, pp. 128-132 and hospital records sent byBonnie Docherty, Researcher, Human RightsWatch, New York, 1 September 2006.

243 HRW, Off Target, p. 130.

244 HRW, U.S.: Minimize Civilian casualties in Iraq,New York, 17 March 2006.

245 UNICEF, Press Release: In Iraq, unexplodedmunitions become child’s play,” Geneva, 17 July2003.

246 HI, Les systèmes d’armes à sous-munitions, Etat

des lieux, Lyon, August 2003, p. 43.

247 Group of Members of the Spanish BrigadeAgainst the War, Evaluation of the Attacks on the

Civilian Population of Baghdad Carried out by

the Governments of the United States of

America, The United Kingdom and Allied

Countries Between 20 March and 15 April 2003,26 April 2003, pp. 10-11, pp. 17-18.

248 Emails from Ahmed al-Zubaidi, Director, IHSCO,


Baghdad, 16 September 2006 and 1 October2006.

249 Recent casualties are those occurring in the 24months prior to the date of the survey. In total,13 of 18 governorates were surveyed, data col-lection in Salah al-Din (Tikrit) is ongoing and fulldata of Tameem (Kirkuk) and Wasit has not beenreleased.

250 ILIS, “The Causes of Death and Injury in Iraq dueto ERW,” pp. 1-2; provided by John C. Brown, IraqCountry Team Leader, VVAF, Iraq, 18 May 2006.

251 CIVIC and Iraqi Body Count, “Named and identi-fied victims of the war in Iraq: a memorial,”February 2006, http://www.iraqbodycount.org/.

252 Iraqi Body Count, How Many Civilians were

Killed by Cluster Bombs? 6 May 2003,http://www.iraqbodycount.org/.

253 “Iraq Says Bombs Left Over From Gulf War Kill168 Civilians,” Reuters, 7 Augustus 1991.

254 HRW, Persian Gulf: U.S. Cluster Bomb Duds a

Threat, Washington, 18 March 2003.

255 HRW, Bombs for Turkey.

256 Peachey and Wiebe, Clusters of Death.



259 HRW, “Four of Concern.”

260 “Growing Death Toll in EOD Operations,” Jane’s

Defence Weekly, June 20, 1992, p. 1061.

261 HRW, Bombs for Turkey.

262 HRW, Cluster Munitions: Measures to Prevent

ERW and to Protect Civilian Populations,Memorandum to Delegates to the Convention onCertain Conventional Weapons Group ofGovernmental Experts on Explosive Remnants ofWar, Geneva, 10-14 March 2003,http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/clus-ter031003.htm, accessed 25 September 2006.


264 Email from Rafaat Misak, Landmine MonitorResearcher, KISR, Kuwait, 28 August 2006; HRW,Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper: Cluster

Munitions a Foreseeable Hazard in Iraq, March2003, available at www.hrw.org/back-grounder/arms/cluster031803.htm, accessed25 August 2006.

265 United States General Accounting Office,“Appendix III: U.S. Gulf War Casualties byService,” GAO-02-1003: Military Operations:

Information on U.S. Use of Land Mines in the

Persian Gulf War, September 2002, p. 3 and p.32.

266 HRW, Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper:

Cluster Munitions a Foreseeable Hazard in Iraq,March 2003, available at www.hrw.org/back-grounder/arms/cluster031803.htm, accessed25 August 2006.

267 Ali Muhammad Khuraibe, “Nine years after theinvasion of Kuwait: the impacts of the Iraqi left-

over ordnance,” The Environmentalist, Volume19, Number 4, the Netherlands, December 1999,pp. 361-368.

268 HRW, Persian Gulf: U.S. Cluster Bomb Duds A

Threat: Warning Against Use of Cluster Bombs in

Iraq, Washington, 18 March 2003, available athttp://hrw.org/english/docs/2003/03/18/usint5409.htm, accessed 25 September 2006.




272 HRW, Ticking Time Bombs: NATO’s Use of Cluster

Munitions in Yugoslavia, Vol. 11, No.6 (D), June1999, available athttp://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nato2/,accessed 4 September 2006.

273 Information provided in an email by RafaatMisak, KISR, Kuwait, 28 August 2006.

274 HRW, NATO’s use of cluster

munitions in Yugoslavia,

www.hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/clus0511.htm,accessed 25 August 2006.


276 Email from Rafaat Misak, KISR, Kuwait, 28August 2006.



279 “Lebanon finds 25 cluster bombs: army,” Xinhua

(Beirut), 17 December 2005.

280 Franklin Lamb, “Israel’s Gift to Lebanon,” in A Quarter Century of Israel’s Use

of American Weapons in Lebanon (1978-2006),September 2006, http://www.ifamerican-sknew.org/cur_sit/clusterbombs.html (here-inafter Lamb, “Israel’s Gift”).

281 Ibid.

282 Presentation by Thomas Nash, CMC, Geneva, 21September 2006.

283 Interview with Andrew Gleeson, ProgrammeManager- Technical Operations Manager, MAG,Nabatiyyah, 5 September 2006.

284 Presentation by Christopher Clark, OperationsManager, MACC-SL, Geneva, 19 September2006.


286 Presentation by Christopher Clark, MACC-SL,Geneva, 19 September 2006.

287 Interview with Lt. Col. Hassan Fakeeh, LebaneseArmed Forces Representative, MACC-SL, Tyre, 8September 2006.

288 Interview with Andrew Gleeson, MAG,Nabatiyyah, 5 September 2006.

289 Interview with Christopher Clark, MACC-SL,Geneva, 19 September 2006.

290 Interview with Andrew Gleeson, MAG,Nabatiyyah, 5 September 2006.

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