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Discipline without democracy: military dominance

in post-colonial Burma1

NICHOLAS FARRELLY*

After five decades in which military dominance defined post-colonialpolitics, Burma has recently embarked on a long-delayed process of politicalreform. The gradual democratisation of the country’s political institutionshas meant that the history of its two twentieth-century coups is increasinglyoverlooked. This article presents a focused study of military interventionismin Burma and offers explanations for the successful entrenchment of militaryrule. The mindset of the military leadership and its success at sideliningopponents is explored alongside a preliminary consideration of the role thatinternational support has played. Crucially, military leaders have beenexasperated by what they consider feeble (and foreign-controlled) civilianauthorities that have been incapable of preventing national fragmentation.This mindset, plus effective repression and support by neighbouringcountries such as China, formed the basis of the military’s rule. Therefore,the prospects of future democratisation efforts will rely on a fullerunderstanding of the processes that led the armed forces to exert consistentdominance.

Keywords: Burma; coups; democratisation; military; Myanmar

Among the five countries*Burma, Fiji, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea andThailand*considered in this special issue’s comparison of post-coup militaryconsolidation and processes of redemocratisation, Burma exemplifies long-termmilitary dominance.2 Its armed forces (the Tatmadaw) are the centralinstitution of post-colonial politics, asserting leadership across all aspects ofnational life. Ongoing efforts to create a new consensus for ‘discipline-flourishing democracy’ are the most recent example of the persistent militarisa-tion of Burma’s politics. During the twentieth century, there were two coupsd’etat that led to military dominance: the pivotal intervention was by GeneralNe Win on March 2, 1962, followed by his subordinates’ awkward ‘self-coup’on September 18, 1988. Since the first coup, Burma has experienced over 50years of sustained military involvement in politics. Compared, however, toother countries that have experienced multiple coups (such as Fiji and

*Nicholas Farrelly is a Research Fellow at the School of International, Political and Strategic

Studies, College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University, Canberra, and co-founder

of New Mandala, a website on mainland South-East Asia. <Nicholas.Farrelly@anu.edu.au>

Australian Journal of International Affairs, 2013

Vol. 67, No. 3, 312�326, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2013.788122

# 2013 Australian Institute of International Affairs

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Thailand), Burma is not usually described with respect to a ‘coup culture’.Instead, the longevity and relative stability of military rule has generated otherframeworks for understanding militarised politics and government. Burma is anexample of a country which, while coups have proven momentous in itspolitical history, does not tend to be classified as ‘coup-prone’.

Burma’s comparatively low vulnerability to coups is based on a high degree ofcommand unity and cohesion within the armed forces. Indeed, the mentalitydefining the political role of the armed forces was established well before the1962 coup; Feit (1973, 259) argues that because ‘Burmese officers came to thearmy from politics [they] had defined their political position as early as 1945’.And, with some notable exceptions, the military leadership has maintained aunited front, and surprising discipline within its own hierarchy, ever since. Anti-communist battles hardened the military’s resolve and generated ingrainedinstitutional scepticism about supposedly feeble and self-serving civilian politi-cians who have been unwilling to tackle the country’s problems aggressively,especially in ethnic minority areas. Civilian commitments to fundamentalprinciples of national sovereignty, non-disintegration of the union and stabilityhave often been questioned. In fact, anxiety about the potential for territorialfragmentation is the principle motivation for those who consider the military’srole essential to national survival. Writing soon after the 1962 coup, Trager(1963, 325) noted that the ‘leadership [of the armed forces] has been historicallyand deeply involved in the development of Burmese nationalism on the road toindependence and since’. Nationalist impulses define a vision of Burmese societythat prioritises unity above diversity and tolerates no secessionist claims.

More generally, and especially compared to the fragile situations in Papua NewGuinea and Thailand, Burma’s experience of coup politics is notable because ofthe military’s success at entrenching its control. Opponents of military rule haveoften proved timid by comparison. Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League forDemocracy is the best known and most popular opposition force, but even it hasstruggled to disrupt military plans. That Aung San Suu Kyi was incarcerated formost of the past two decades demonstrates the willingness of the armed forces todiscipline its civilian opponents. Fractiousness among Burma’s democratic forceshas not assisted. The most robust resistance to military rule has historically beengalvanised in ethnic minority regions, where subnationalism has been a potentaddition to the already disturbed political mix. This has echoes of the ethnicpolitical preoccupations of Fijian military politics. In Burma, around 40 percentof the population identify as ethnic (i.e. non-Burman) minorities. In all of theethnic states*Mon, Karen, Karenni, Shan, Kachin, Chin and Rakhine*ethnicminority groups have built armies, some of them with tens of thousands offighters, to fortify their political claims. This proliferation of non-governmentarmed groups, many of which have been fighting for more than half a century, isan extra complication for analysis of the military in Burma’s politics. Im-portantly, the consolidation of military power is not simply an issue for thecentral Myanmar government, but is also a factor in the local politics of many

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ethnic groups.3 They, too, face the challenges of maintaining united command

and purpose in the face of significant internal and external challenges.The question of post-coup redemocratisation or military consolidation

encourages analysis of political, economic, strategic and historical factors.

Jackman (1976, 1090) posits that ‘direct control of the machinery of govern-ment’ is a core consideration of analysts hoping to understand ‘an irregular,

extra-constitutional power transfer*that is, a military coup d’etat’*in waysthat ‘distinguish regimes such as the one headed by General Ne Win of Burmafrom that headed by General Dwight Eisenhower of the United States’. In Burma,

the thoroughly entrenched system of military rule which began with Ne Win has,since only November 2010, begun a tentative transition to a constitutional,

quasi-civilian parliamentary form. This system has been described as ‘discipline-flourishing democracy’, an inelegant phrase crafted at the insistence of militarythinkers. Some, like Prager Nyein (2009, 647), are convinced that ‘the new

constitution confirms the current power position of the military in state andsociety . . .with a civilian veneer not unlike the 1974 constitution established by

the Ne Win regime’. It is true that in 2013 most of the senior positions in Burma’spolitical system were still controlled by serving or retired military officers. Thepresident, Thein Sein, is a former senior army officer who traded his uniform for

a civilian political career. Nonetheless, his stewardship of the glasnost-stylereform process*he makes decisions to cautiously unravel aspects of military

dominance*has been warmly welcomed by domestic and international con-stituencies exasperated by decades of military rule.

For now, the two coups which have kept the army at the centre of national life

continue to fade into obscurity. The fiftieth anniversary of the 1962 coup wascompletely ignored by Burma’s official media. There is usually heightened tension,

and extra security in Yangon, for the milestone dates marking the violent events ofAugust 1988, but there is still almost no public discussion of the September 1988coup. Years of stern media restrictions mean that the coups are deliberately

overlooked; a fog has descended over these episodes in Burma’s political history.This helps explain why thorough scholarly or journalistic analysis of Burma’s

coups or their impact is lacking. In order to situate an argument about militarydominance and persistent hesitation about democratic reform, this article beginswith a historical consideration of the two twentieth-century coups. The second

section discusses the various phases of military consolidation and liberalisationafter the respective coups, while the third part tests a number of explanatory

propositions about the longevity and persistence of military control in Burma. Thearticle then concludes with an outlook on the years ahead.

A short history of Burma’s coups

Within months of gaining independence from Britain in 1948, Burma wasalready struggling to introduce a democratic political culture. The end of World

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War II and the gradual retreat of the British Empire from Asia left it in a

precarious situation (Aung-Thwin 1985). The situation was not helped by the

political and social tumult which followed the assassination of General Aung

San, one of the country’s independence heroes. Instead of benefiting from a

charismatic figure with the potential, at the very least, to unify Burma’s

competing political factions and ethnic groups, the remaining leaders squabbled

and fought. Burma lurched quickly into ‘turmoil . . .and . . . the maelstrom of

civil war’ (Tin Maung Maung Than 2007, 52). Then, on October 28, 1958,

‘General Ne Win, commander of Burma’s armed forces, assumed control of the

government of the Union of Burma’ (Dupuy 1960, 429) in the context of an

invitation from Prime Minister U Nu. While this was not a coup in any strict

interpretation of the phenomenon, it established a pattern of military rule that

continues to this day. Dupuy acknowledges that:

On the record, the General took over as Prime Minister at the invitation of

his predecessor, U Nu. The assumption of authority was completely legal

and constitutional, following a unanimous nomination by Parliament. But

behind the constitutional facade were other facts (ibid.).

Indeed, Sao Sanda (2008, 240) calls the 1958 transfer of power ‘the first

military coup d’etat’ and suggests that Ne Win’s ‘Caretaker Government laid

the foundations for the major military coup of 1962’. Both then and now, there

was confusion about the causation of events; it all happened at a time when the

institutions of post-colonial parliamentary democracy were failing. Banditry

made travel outside the major towns dangerous and expensive. Crime swept

across the country, bringing with it a mood of crisis. The political factions that

had worked uneasily together to end British colonial rule never agreed on the

best direction after independence. By 1962, ‘Ne Win [had] assembled radical

socialists to counter [the] communist ideology of the CPB [Communist Party of

Burma]’ (Badgley and Aye Kyaw 2009, 299). Ultimately, these ideological

disputes culminated in economic collapse and a more general breakdown in the

social and political order.4

Not willing to see what he considered further weakening of the country, Ne

Win launched a coup on March 2, 1962 to wrest full and final control from the

parliament and politicians. Perry (2007, 24) argues that ‘the event did not

attract a great deal of attention’ as it was, in those years of cold war

competition, ‘just another Third World coup’. For Ne Win, the coup was

justified by the threat of territorial fragmentation, especially in the Shan State.

Since then, Burma’s political trajectory has been largely determined by the

ambitions of senior military leaders, who have ‘assumed a Praetorian role’ (Tin

Maung Maung Than 2007, 53). Even in the immediate aftermath of the

takeover, there was an appreciation that ‘[r]ecent developments (the coup d’etat

of March 1962) presumably will mean an extended military regime’ (Lissak

1964, 9). The first 26 years (1962�1988) of direct military involvement in

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politics were characterised by a uniquely Burmese medley of socialism,

mysticism and isolationism. This period, with Ne Win in charge, is often

described by one of the slogans of the era: ‘The Burmese Way to ‘‘Socialism’’’

(Fenichel and Khan 1981). This vernacular ideology led to further economic

decay and widespread conflict.It was during these years that insurgencies in ethnic minority regions peaked.

In response, the government continued to argue that ‘the integrity of the unitary

state must be preserved’ (South 2008, 34). Two dozen different groups took up

arms against the central government. The strongest of these were the CPB, with

its major bases in the Shan State; the Karen National Liberation Army, which

controlled territory along the Thailand�Burma border; and the Kachin

Independence Army, operating in portions of the Kachin and Shan States.

These armed insurgencies helped to justify the dominance of Ne Win’s

government. Trager (1963, 325) argues that the armed forces as an institution

were well prepared for this task as they had, since independence, demonstrated

cohesion ‘as one of the few disciplined sectors of Burmese life’. Preoccupied

with existential threats to territorial integrity, the army remained central to all

government decision-making and sought to emphasise its unique role in

securing the country’s independence from Britain (Selth 1986).More broadly, the army has consistently linked its own status to the value,

and prestige, of pre-colonial rule. According to Aung-Thwin (1985, 245): ‘the

coup of 1962 could be interpreted more as a resurrection than a true

revolution’. Identifying continuities with the pre-colonial period, Aung-Thwin

(1985, 247) called the coup ‘an effort to restore meaningful order to a

psychologically disoriented society, thereby resurrecting a cultural identity

that had been made ambiguous (and thus its worth made ambivalent) by a

period of meaningless order’. His reference to a ‘meaningful order’ implies

that the coup of March 2, 1962 reinstituted patterns of governance which

had been disrupted by British colonial intervention. Aung-Thwin argues that

while

the immediate circumstances [of the coup] may have been more political and

even personal, the reason given was very nearly correct from the perspective

of our argument: it was carried out essentially to resurrect meaningful order

in a society that had experienced extreme social and psychological

dysfunction; the type of order that neither the colonial system nor the

subsequent artificial Parliamentary system had provided (Aung-Thwin

1985, 256).5

This argument defines the terms of military interventions in Burmese society not

as disruptions, but as efforts to create or recreate appropriate systems of rule.

Aung-Thwin’s postulation that the colonial and parliamentary systems had

failed on the terms that mattered for Burma’s nationalist military elite is one

that requires considered scrutiny.

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The situation is further complicated by difficulties in understanding the

motivations of Burma’s 1962 coup-makers. We can speculate on their intentions

to a large extent, but, as Selth (2009) has eloquently argued, there is much that

we simply cannot know when it comes to Burma’s military affairs. And, as

Marshall (2002, 155) clarifies: ‘In Burma, history stopped in 1962, and

propaganda began’. When Ne Win and his allies were contemplating the 1962

coup, there must have been some appreciation of, as Lissak (1964, 9) describes it,

a ‘balance of rewards’ leading towards the renewal of ‘the ‘‘golden age’’ before

and immediately after independence’. Lissak (1964, 9) goes on to recount that:

Colonel Maung Maung, the number three man in Ne Win’s first adminis-

tration, put it in this way: ‘After the Second World War was over and we

had obtained our independence, the cream of the resistance movement

stayed with the Burma army, and most of the rest became politicians. It was

irksome to find that those who could not hold their own in the army came,

in time, to be our political superiors’.

After all of this effort, in 1974, General Ne Win relinquished his military

position and took the presidency under a new, civilianised constitution (South

2008, 35), which provided a renewed foundation for managing ethnic issues

(Taylor 1979). But not everything was smooth for Ne Win’s ruling group.

Martin (1977, 155) states that ‘in 1976 ominous signs of opposition to

President Ne Win’s leadership appeared within the Burmese army itself’. What

followed was likely an abortive coup led by army officers ‘said to have

denounced the ‘‘socialist economic system’’’. In response, beginning on

September 10, 1976, there was a trial of a group of junior army officers, who

were accused of plotting to stage a coup and kill Ne Win; it was, according to

Martin (ibid.), ‘allegedly the first such attempt by members of the army since

Ne Win himself came to power by a military coup in March 1962’.It was not until September 18, 1988, in the aftermath of nationwide

demonstrations and popular agitation against the faltering socialist govern-

ment, that a new military clique actually did seize power. This ‘self-coup’*also

described as a ‘bloody coup d’etat’ (Seekins 1992, 246) and ‘bloody, repressive

coup’ (Steinberg 1990, 587) or a ‘pseudo-coup’ (Burma Watcher 1989, 179;

Lintner 1990, 50) and ‘stage-managed coup’ (Seekins 1997, 525)*catapulted

Burma in a more explicitly militaristic direction. Hard-line factions triumphed

over more moderate views. The re-entrenchment of military control was

justified as a response to an alleged conspiracy designed ‘to wrest State power

by means of BCP [Burma Communist Party] underground movements’ and

‘urban guerrilla warfare’ (Tin Htwe 1989, 2). Beyond the post-coup rhetoric,

however, it is difficult to deduce exactly what happened. When Hans-Bernd

Zollner (2011, 256), for example, asks, ‘What happened in Burma in 1988?’, he

suggests that: ‘An honest first answer to this question must be: We do not

know’. What we do know is that the ‘coup’ was followed by a period of

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significant social stagnation defined by unprecedented military dominance and

the development of a crony-capitalist economic regime. Cosy ties to the Chinese

government and its allied commercial interests, and to facilitators in Singapore,

Thailand and elsewhere, ensured a steady flow of foreign investment,

technology and moral support (Selth 1996). Under these arrangements, direct

rule by the Tatmadaw stretched from the 1988 coup until November 2010,

when a transition to a quasi-civilian administration reintroduced formal

democratic processes, if not democratic culture.The 1988 coup came at the end of a series of protests that could have toppled

the military from its privileged position. Since 1974, the army had been

gradually replaced as the key element in the country’s bureaucracy by civilian

technocrats sourced from the Burma Socialist Programme Party. Mistrust

between uniformed officers and the civilian leadership was widespread. These

underlying conflicts were finally ignited by a deeply destabilising, even

traumatising, series of political and economic events starting in 1987. First, a

decision to devalue the currency led to widespread popular anger about cost-of-

living pressures. Subsequently, a violent crackdown on protestors in August

1988 generated a power vacuum that was filled by a new military group, the

State Law and Order Restoration Council. Led by General Saw Maung, it

brought the armed forces high command into explicitly political positions once

again. Taylor argues that:

the fact that the 1988 demonstrations were conducted in the name of

democracy, and soon gained a highly visible and distinctive heroine in the

form of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of the slain independence hero

General Aung San, provided the military regime’s opponents with a perfect

spokesperson through which to appeal for Western support (Taylor

1998, 4).

While this is true, it also strengthened the resolve of military commanders, who

were unwilling to surrender any power to an opposition leader they considered

unqualified and, worse still, foreign.6 Indeed, Aung San Suu Kyi’s marriage to a

British citizen made her vulnerable to the regime’s attacks in this regard.Guyot describes the priorities of the military in those years by drawing on

their immediate post-coup statements:

Declaration No. 1 of the newly established State Law and Order Restoration

Council (SLORC) . . .vowed that the military did not ‘wish to cling to State

power for long,’ and the council chairman, Senior General Saw Maung,

enumerated the de facto government’s four tasks: (1) maintain law and

order; (2) provide secure and smooth transportation; (3) strive for better

conditions of food, clothing, and shelter for the people and render necessary

assistance to the private sector and the cooperatives to do so, and after these

are accomplished; (4) hold multiparty democratic general elections (Guyot

1991, 205).

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These four goals were developed in an effort to postpone the unravelling of thesystem of government that had been in place since 1962. The leaders of the ‘self-coup’ group worked closely with members of the former government to ensurethat their interests were protected, at least in the immediate aftermath of thetransfer of power. Steinberg (1990, 587) introduced the idea that the coup ‘wasdesigned to shore up a collapsed government in the face of a popular revolution.It prompted the severing of most foreign assistance on human rights groundsand thus the suspension or cancellation of many contracts under foreign aid’. Inresponse to the potential for political and economic disaster, trade with Chinaand Thailand was regularised, ceasefires were agreed with many ethnic armies,and a new pro-market philosophy infused government policy.

Political, economic and social conditions since the 1988 coup have remainedheavily contested. Multiparty democratic general elections were held in 1990but, when the triumph of the National League for Democracy was ignored,Burmese politics began its descent into ever more entrenched military rule.David and Holliday (2006, 91) suggest that, since 1990: ‘Myanmar has beentrapped in political deadlock, with neither the military junta nor the array ofopposition groups that face it able to impose a viable political solution on thecountry’. Internal power struggles have generated conflict within the rulinggroup. While this group was originally led by Saw Maung, it was in 1992 thatGeneral Than Shwe took charge, and later changed the junta to the State Peaceand Development Council. With the title ‘Senior General’, Than Shwe servedfor almost two decades as head of state. Taylor suggests that:

A long-held belief amongst the armed forces, repeated in their speeches and

training manuals, is that civilian politicians are self-serving and anti-

national . . .At the present time, in the eyes of the military, this belief is

lent credence by the financial and verbal support received from Western

governments and organisations by groups opposed to the regime (Taylor

1998, 11).

The implication of this military mindset has been apparent during the mostrecent years of military rule. Under siege from foreign and domestic enemies*often described as ‘internal and external destructionists’ (see Skidmore 2003,5)*the military has sought to defend its key interests. Taylor (1998, 12) goes sofar as to argue that the anti-engagement and pro-sanctions policies adopted bysome Western governments ‘with the intention of speeding political change inMyanmar probably have the opposite effect’.

Phases of military consolidation and liberalisation

The two twentieth-century coups were key events, making the dominance of thearmed forces the defining characteristic of contemporary Burmese politics. Andwhile ‘[i]n modern Burmese history, power and factional struggles were more

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the rule than the exception, for they were present in almost all post-independence governments’ (Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2008, 149), there has actuallybeen a remarkable capacity to maintain military dominance across thegenerations. While, in Kyaw Yin Hlaing’s (2008) phrase, individual ‘hegemons’have come and gone, the military has remained in charge. Curiously, and withthe exception of Kyaw Yin Hlaing’s study of factional disputes and powerstruggles, there has been little attention to the specific processes of militaryconsolidation.

During the years since 1962, the armed forces have sought to claimunquestioned authority as the only national institution capable of defendingthe country against internal and external threats, but, in practice, the level ofmilitary control has varied. Military control was not applied uniformly acrossthe country, and the experiences of post-coup politics have been veryinconsistent (Callahan 2007). At times, the military has appeared vulnerableto popular protest movements, and its policies for maintaining power haveoccasionally backfired. The current period of political reform fits a patternwhere military consolidation is followed by tentative liberalisation. In the past,the liberal phase has usually been followed by anxiety, miscalculation andcrackdowns. As Beyrer (1998, 87) reports: ‘There have been repeated civilianand student uprisings against the Ne Win regime, and its successor, The StateLaw and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), all of which have met withbrutal state repression’.

However, in the current phase of liberalisation (since 2010), the repressiveinstincts of the government appear more muted than in the past. Since joiningthe Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1997 (Guyot 1998),Burma’s armed forces have endeavoured to build relationships with theirimmediate neighbours and have learned to tolerate a degree of internationalscrutiny. Burmese efforts to align with their South-East Asian neighbours, whohave been only too happy to accommodate such a large and strategically placedcountry, complement similar initiatives to work with China, India and othercountries. This quest for international legitimacy, and for more peacefulinternal conditions, now motivates a gradual move towards democratic rule.In practice, full engagement with Western democracies requires such a move.Access to international partnerships, and to the economic advantages thatfollow, provides another clear incentive for a shift towards a more transparent,if not democratic, system. Due to their shared membership of ASEAN and theirlack of historical enmity, it is Indonesia that Burma’s military leaders havelooked to most consistently for determining their approach to democratictransition. The Burmese reading of Indonesian politics as being completelymilitary-dominated under Suharto may be questionable, but even the post-NewOrder situation provides the comfort that Indonesia’s rambunctious democraticpolitics has allowed continued influence for the armed forces.7

Since the elections of November 7, 2010, when military-dominated legis-latures were endorsed in a vote that was neither free nor fair, the country has

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undergone a rapid transformation. The changes that have occurred may not,however, be permanent, and scepticism prevails about the ambitions of the

former military officers leading the reform process. This process of partial andincomplete redemocratisation followed the move, in 2005, to the new capital of

Naypyidaw. This sudden move was initially greeted with bewilderment byinternational audiences, which were convinced that it was yet another irrationaldecision from the paranoid despots of an isolated and erratic regime. The

Naypyidaw experiment has, in the years since, become key to the widertransition process, and is now considered a crucial step towards a moreconsolidated and professional approach to governance (Dulyapak 2009; Seekins

2009a). The investment in the new capital has been immense. It is designed, likemost planned cities, as both an ornamental and a monumental project.

In the lead-up to this current phase of liberalising transformation, there was

an unusual level of instability. Popular protests in September and October 2007,spearheaded by monks across the country, were followed by yet another violentcrackdown. Thousands of people were jailed and many more fled across the

border to Thailand. The death toll from this crackdown is difficult to verify, butit is likely that dozens of people were killed. Soon after that bloody episode,Yangon*and the delta areas where Burma meets the Andaman Sea*was

pulverised by Cyclone Nargis in May 2008 (Seekins 2009b). Approximately140,000 people were killed. Countless houses were destroyed and almost 2million acres of farmland were damaged. The scale of the catastrophe rattled

the military leadership. Only a week after the cyclone, it held a referendum toendorse the new constitution that had been drafted in a stage-managed process.

Many considered this timing inauspicious and pleaded with the generals topostpone the vote so that disaster recovery efforts could be the sole nationalpriority. Instead, the generals, overwhelmed by the tragedy, initially sought to

limit the dimensions of international assistance. But through the brokeringfacilitated by ASEAN, international assistance, especially from Westerndemocracies, began to flow. While still wary of foreign interference and

meddling, the productive role of international humanitarian actors appears tohave generated trust and new opportunities for cooperation.

Discipline without democracy: explanatory propositions

In Burma, I argue that long-term military consolidation after the two twentieth-

century coups can be explained by: (1) a mindset that is permanently scepticalof civilian leaders; (2) military successes in isolating and defeating politicalopponents; and (3) international support, especially from strategic partners

such as China, Singapore and Thailand. These explanations serve to distinguishthe situation in Burma from that in other countries in the region*such as

Indonesia*where internal ideological and command factors are usually lessrelevant. For Burma, the first two explanations tend to be more pronounced and

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prominent, while the third has received less attention. The context of long-standing support by China in particular has been widely ignored by analysts ofBurmese politics, who have tended to emphasise the idea that sanctions, orother international mechanisms, have a practical impact. Addressing this point,I have previously argued that the economic sanctions imposed on Burma duringthe years of military rule have proven merely ‘limited, Western and symbolic’(Farrelly 2009).

First, military consolidation in Burma is best explained by a mindset whichassumes that civilian politicians are too feeble to rule. Now that we see thebeginnings of a new transformation process, it seems clear that the military mayhave considered dispensing with direct leadership much earlier if there were notsuch strong doubts about the capacities of non-military leaders. Military controlis perpetually defended as a reasonable nationalist response to the prospect ofanarchy and fragmentation. From the perspective of senior military officers,there is a sacred obligation to ensure that Burma continues to be an independentcountry, free from colonial impositions. Their control is fundamentallypredicated on the requirements of national unity and the ‘non-disintegrationof the union’. Claims for independence or autonomy from minority ethnicgroups only reinforce the heavy-handed efforts of the government to maintaincentralised rule. The role of the armed forces in providing security in urbanBurma, and fighting counter-insurgency campaigns in ethnic areas, bolsters thisexplanation. The prospect of ethnic fracturing leading to a form of ‘Balkanisa-tion’ continues to scare the military and will remain one of its mainjustifications for claiming a political role.

Second, the military has proven successful at sidelining its opponents and,compared to countries such as Thailand or Indonesia, there has been notolerance for wide-ranging political debate. The Myanmar government has beenmore committed to censoring, disrupting and criminalising opposition activitiesthan many other authoritarian regimes. Partly, it has benefited from thelimitations in terms of communications technology fostered by the country’spoverty and isolation. Analysts speculate that the 2007 protest movement wasconsidered especially threatening because anti-government activists couldquickly disseminate footage and reports through the Internet. In fact, thatepisode may have convinced the senior military leadership that their survivalrequired a more subtle effort to ensure personal, institutional and nationalprestige. They may have also feared that, in time, wireless communicationtechnologies would make control impossible. Aung San Suu Kyi, whocommands immense personal popularity, has also been consistently out-manoeuvred by the military leadership. Her organisation’s current diminishedstatus is a direct outcome of the careful efforts to disallow its involvement inofficial politics. For two decades it was perched, as precariously as possible, onthe very edge of legality. Many of its leading members, including Aung San SuuKyi, have served lengthy terms of incarceration as a result of their politicalactivities. In ethnic areas, the armed forces have also managed to blunt the

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efforts of their fiercest ethnic critics. Most ethnic armies have spent the years

since 1988 under ceasefire conditions. Tatmadaw commanders have sought tomoderate the combat capacities of ethnic militias and, in some cases, non-government armed groups have been forced to accept new statuses as

subordinate Border Guard Forces, answerable to a Myanmar army chain ofcommand.

Third, the Myanmar government has received sustained regional supportfrom many countries in ASEAN and beyond. Its key international partnersinclude China, Singapore and Thailand, all of which have been well placed to

facilitate the consolidation of military rule since the coup of 1988. Individualsand businesses from these countries have been instrumental in a far-reaching

effort to undermine the sanctions imposed by Western governments. It is not acoincidence that these three countries are also well positioned to capitalise ontheir proximity to Burma in commercial and other dealings. Military

consolidation in Burma, with its ideological foundations and its demonstratedsuccess at neutering domestic opposition, has also benefited from these regional

links. Those links substituted for global economic ties during the years in whichsanctions impacted the ability of Burma’s elites to receive international financialtransactions. Importantly, the Myanmar government also benefited from the

support it received from Russia and China at the United Nations SecurityCouncil.

While these propositions help to explain the military’s consolidation after thetwo coups in 1962 and 1988, the reasons for the ongoing political transforma-tion are open to further debate. But some factors can already be identified as

essential. First and foremost, redemocratisation provides the armed forces witha chance to have their country enjoy the same status as its semi-democratic

South-East Asian neighbours. Against this background, Aung San Suu Kyi’svictory in the April 2012 by-election and her elevation to parliament willgenerate further opportunities for the armed forces to dispense with their long-

standing reputation for presiding over a pariah regime. Redemocratisation hasalso catalysed economic changes that are providing significant momentum for a

wider social transformation, even before sanctions are fully removed. The staleauthoritarian model no longer appears to hold appeal for Burma’s leaders and,after 50 years of military rule, fatigue may further help to explain why military

dominance is fading. Finally, the looming physical decrepitude of the mostsenior military figures may also have produced heightened anxiety about their

capacity to discourage territorial fragmentation or a rebellion led by democraticforces.

Conclusions

Since 2010, Burma has caught the world’s attention as a long-delayed process ofpolitical reform appears to be slowly but gradually democratising the country’s

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political institutions. This comes after two coups and 50 years of military rule.

It is inevitable that many will be sceptical of the changes that are under way.

They will want to see unambiguous evidence that the changes are permanentand that there is no prospect of regressive moves. This insistence on strong

proof for the irreversibility of the reforms fails, however, to appreciate the

political foundations for the military’s interventions in, and subsequentdominance of, Burmese politics. Burma is an exemplar of military dominance

and, while other countries in the South-East Asian and Pacific region have also

experienced sustained military involvement, the primacy of the Tatmadaw is

without peer. Its moves to implement forms of more transparent, andpotentially democratic, government are also exemplary. In doing so, the

military demonstrates a confidence and an appetite for taking new risks which

surprises casual observers. Notwithstanding the prospect that this process could

still end badly, the pace of change is quickening. Enthusiastic receptions forincremental changes only seem to embolden the decision-makers and incentivise

further risk-taking.For now, the early redemocratisation and liberalisation process in Burma

must be treated with due caution. Long-term political strife, especially in ethnic

areas, means that the 50 years of military rule will require careful unravelling.

As I have explained, continued military dominance has been founded inprevailing scepticism about civilian abilities to govern rebellious ethnic

minorities. Some nationalists fear that only the military can keep the country

together. While this remains the case, Burma retains the ingredients for a

comprehensive remilitarisation of politics. Its current period of glasnostawakens hope in those who understand that military dominance need not be

inevitable. Thus, as Burma continues to experiment with more democratic

processes and tests its capacity to build both an open economy and a more opensociety, it will remain a crucial case study for understanding the implications of

long-term military rule and the conditions under which it can potentially end.

Notes

1. I would like to note my special gratitude to Andrew Selth for his thorough and insightful

comments on my draft. The journal’s anonymous reviewer of this article also has my thanks

for their astute comments and suggestions on further sources.

2. Scholars have developed a range of compromises for dealing with the alternative names Burma

and Myanmar. My long-standing practice when writing about the contemporary politics of the

country is to use Myanmar for the government and Burma for the country. This helps clarify

ongoing contestation around the country’s system of government and, crucially, about

territorial control.

3. Inside ethnic armies there are also relatively regular periods of political turmoil; these

sometimes generate coup and counter-coup dynamics. In the Kachin Independence Army, as

just one example, a coup in 2001 led to a purge of senior political and military figures.

4. Spiro (1997) offers a masterful analysis of the political culture in Burmese villages before the

coup of 1962, when he and other foreign researchers were expelled from the country. It provides

evidence for the judgement that this period was deeply unsettled. Spiro (1997, 33) goes on to

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argue that: ‘Given . . .belief in the karmically based legitimacy of any government, villagers held

that in principle all citizens had a minimum set of responsibilities to the regnant regime’.

5. Aung-Thwin’s revisionism generates a further argument about the concept of coups and

revolutions in Burmese society. Aung-Thwin (1985, 256) considers it crucial that ‘[e]ven the

Burmese term ‘‘to hlan re’’, though translated now as ‘‘revolution’’ in the context of Burmese

history, implies less the creation of something new than it does resurrecting something old. Its

use, further, implies the replacing of illegitimate rule by what the actors considered legitimate

rule, making the coup of 1962 not a revolution but a resurrection, an attempt to recreate order

with meaning’.

6. Burma’s armed forces have a xenophobic streak, which is apparent not only in their dealings

with ethnic minorities, but also with others who are considered ‘foreign’. Perhaps the clearest

illustrations of their efforts to minimise foreign influence are captured by the 2008

constitution. Those with significant ‘foreign ties’ are precluded, by law, from taking the

highest political offices.

7. In discussions of political and military affairs concerning Burma, we sometimes overlook the

influence of other South-East Asian countries on Burma’s development. Even during the years

when Burma and its government were excluded from most conversations with Western

democracies, they retained regular contact, and even deepened relations, with their South-East

Asian neighbours.

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