Balmukand vs Kamla Wati & Ors on 27 January, 1964The appellant entered into a contract with the karta for thepurchase of property belonging to a joint Hindu family.This property consisted of a fractional share belonging tothe family in a large plot of land. Earnest money waspaidto the karta.As the karta did not execute the saledeedthe appellant instituted a suit for specificperformance.The other members who are the brothers of the karta and whowere adults (1) A.I.R. 1962 Raj 3. (2) 1959 All. L.J. 340. 134--159 S.C.--21322at the time of the contract were also impleaded in thesuitas defendants. The suit was resisted on thegroundthatthere was no legal necessity and that the contract forsalewas not for the benefit of the family. The trial court aswell as the High Court upheld these contentions.Beforethis Court it was contended that even though therewas no legal necessity the transaction was for the benefitof the family whichthe karta as a prudent owner wasentitled to enter into for the benefit of the family.Held:(i) For a transaction to be regarded as one which is ofbenefit to the family it need not necessarily be only of adefensive character, but what transactions would be for thebenefit of the family would depend on the facts andcircumstances of each case. In each case the Court must besatisfied from the material before it that it was infactsuch as conferred or was necessarilyexpected to conferbenefit on the family at the time it was entered into.(ii) No part of the joint family property could be partedwith or agreed to be parted with by the manager on theground of alleged benefit to the family when the transactionis opposed by the adult members of the family.(iii)In the present case the appropriate pleas were notraised by the plaintiff nor the necessary evidence led. Thegranting of specific performance is always in the discretionof the court.In the facts and circumstances of thecasethe courts below were justified in refusing to orderspecific performance and the appeal is dismissed.Jagatnarain v. Mathura Das, I.L.R. 50 All. 969, HonoomanPrasadPandeyv. Babooee Munraj Koonwaree, (1856) 6Moo.I.A. 393 Sahu Ram Chandra v. Bhup Singh, I.L.R. 39 All. 437,Palaniappa Chetty v. Sreemath Daiyasikamony PandaraSannadhi, 44 I.A. 147, Sital Prasad Singh v. Ajablal Mander,I.L.R.18 Pat. 306 and In the matter of A. V.Vasudevan &Ors. Minors. A.I.R. 1949 Mad. 260. referred to.

Guramma Bhratar Chanbasappa ... vs Malappa on 19 August, 1963HEADNOTE:'A' died on January 8, 1944. He left behind him three wivesand two widowed daughters, children of his predeceased wife.The senior most widow filed a civil suit for partition andpossession of 1/6th shareafter setting aside thealienations made by her husband on January 4 and 5, 1944.It was alleged that at the time of the deathof 'A' hisyoungest wife was pregnant and that she gave birth to a malechild on October 4, 1944. On January 30, 1944, the seniormost widow took her sister's son in adoption.A fewdaysbeforehis death 'A' executed two deeds of maintenance infavourof his two wives (defendant Nos. 1 and 2) andalsoexecuted deeds of gift in favour of widowed daughter, a sonof anillegitimate son and a relative. Long before hisdeath he also executed twodeeds viz one a deed ofmaintenance and a deed of gift in favour of the seniormostwidow (the plaintiff). To this suit the twowidowsweremade defendants 1 and 2; the alleged adopted son, defendant3,(1) A.I.R. 1960 Mad. 443.(2) L. R. 63 I. A. 372.(3) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1140.498the alleged posthumous son, defendant 4; and the alieneesdefendants 5 to 8. These two appeals ariseout of thecertificate granted by the High Court.Held (1) that the existence of a son in embryo does not in-validate an adoption.Narayana Reddi v. Varadachala Reddi, S. A. No. 223 of1859M.S.D. 1859, P. 97, referred to.Nagabhushanam v. Seshammagaru, (1878-81) I.L.R. 3 Mad. 180Shamvahoo v. Dwarakadas Vasanji, (1888) I.L.R. 12 Born. 202,Daulat Ram v. Ram Lal, (1907) I.L.R. 29 All 310, approved.(2)that the High Court wasright in affirming thealienations made in favour of the plaintiff and was equallyjustified in setting side the alienations made in favour ofdefendants 1 and 2. The former documents wereexecuted by"A" in 1937 and 1939 when he wasthe sole survivingcoparcenar whereas the latter documents were executedwhenhe had ceased to have that power because the malechildi.e., 4th defendant was already conceived.(3)that a managing member of the family haspower to,alienatefor value joint family property either for familynecessity or for the benefit of the estate. Thesolesurviving member of a coparcenary has an absolute power toalienate the family property, as at the time of alienationthere is no other member who has joint interest in thefamily. If another member was conceived in the family orinducted therein by adoption the power of themanager wascircumscribed as aforesaid and if the alienations weremadeby the manager or father for a purpose not binding on theestate, theywould be voidable at the instance ofsubsequently born son or adopted son.Avdesh Kumar v. Zakaul Hassain, I.L.R. [1944] All 612, Chan-dramani v. jambeswara, A.I.R. 1931 Mad. 550and BhagwatPrasad Bahidar v. Debichand Bogra, (1941) I.L.R. 20 Pat.727,referred to. (4) that a gift to a stranger of joint family propertyby the manager of the family is void ashe has notthe absolute power of disposal over the joint Hindu familyproperty. Partha Sarathi Pillai v. Tiruvengada, (1907) I.L.R. 30 Mad.340, referred to.(5) that theHindu Law texts conferred a right upon adaughter or a sister, as the case may be, to have a share inthe family property at the time of partition. The right waslost by efflux of time. But it became crystallized into amoral obligation. The father or his representative can makea valid giftby way of reasonable provision for themaintenance of the daughter, regard beinghad to thefinancial and other relevant circumstances ofthe family.By custom or by convenience, such gifts arc made at the timeof marriage, but the right of the father or hisrepresentativeto make such a gift is not confined to themarriage occasion. It is a moral obligation and it continuesto subsist till it is discharged Marriage is only acustomary occasion for such a gift. But the499moral obligation canbe discharged at any time, eitherduring the life time of the father or thereafter. Applyingthe aforesaid principles, the deed of gift made by father tothe daughter, i.e. 8th defendant in the present case, waswithin his right and certainly reasonable.Jinnappa Mahadevappa v. Chimmava, (1935) I.L R. 59 Bom. 459,disapproved.Vettorammal v. Poochammal, (1912) 22 M.L.J. 321, Kudutammav. Narasimhacharyalu, (1907) 17 M.L.J. 528, Sundaramaya v.Seethamma, (1911) 21M.L.J.695, Ramaswamy Aiyyar v.Vengidsami Iyer, (1898) I.L.R. 22 Mad. 113, Bachoo v.Mankorebai (1907) I.L.R. 31 Bom. 373, Ramalinga Annavi v.Narayana Annavi, (1922) 49 I.A. 168, Sithamahalakshmamma v.Kotayya, (1936) 71 M.L.J. 259, Annamalai v. Sundarathammal,(1952)2 M.L.J. 782 and Churaman Sahu v. Gopi Sahu, (1910)I.L.R. 37 Cal.1 approved.(5) that theHindu Law applicable to Sudras applies tolingayats as well.(6) that in Bombay Presidency the rule accepted in DattakaChandrika hasnever been followed and the share of anadopted son in competition with a natural born son amongSudrashas always been 1/5th in the family property,i.e.1/4th of the natural born son's share.The rule in DattakaChandrika is that among Sudras an adoptedson and anafter born natural son take equal share in the familyproperty and it is followed in Madras and Bengal provinces.Tirkangauda Mallangauda v. Shivappa Patil, I.L.R. 1943Bom-706, Gopal Narhar Safray v. Hanumant Ganesh Safray, (1879)I.L.R.3 Bom. 273, Gopalan v. Venkataraghavulu, (1915)I.L.R.40 Mad. 632 and Asita v. Nirode, (1916) 20 C.W.N.901, referred to.Arumilli Perrazu v. Arumilli Subbarayadu, (1921) 48I.A.280, distinguished.Giriapa v. Ningapa, (1892) I.L.R. 17 Bom. 100and TukaramMahaduv. Ramachandra Mahadu, (1925) I.L.R. 49 Bom.672,approved.

M/S Nopany Investments (P) Ltd vs Santokh Singh (Huf) on 10 December, 2007In a Hindu family, the Karta or Manager occupies a unique position. It is not as if anybody could become Manager of a joint Hindu family.As a general rule, the father of a family, if alive, and in his absence the senior member of the family, is alone entitled to manage the joint family property."From a reading of the aforesaid observation of this court in Sunil Kumar and another Vs. Ram Prakash and others [supra], we are unable to accept that a younger brother of a joint hindu family would not at all be entitled to manage the joint family property as the Karta of the family. This decision only lays down a general rule that the father of a family, if alive, and in his absence the senior member of the family would be entitled to manage the joint family property. Apart from that, this decision was rendered on the question whether a suit for permanent injunction, filed by co-parcerners for restraining the Karta of a joint hindu family from alienating the joint family property in pursuance of a sale agreement with a third party, was maintainable or not. While considering that aspect of the matter, this court considered as to when could the alienation of joint family property by the Karta be permitted. Accordingly, it is difficult for us to agree with Mr. Gupta, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, that the decision in Sunil Kumar and another Vs. Ram Prakash and others [supra] would be applicable in the present case which, in our view, does not at all hold that when the elder member of a joint hindu family is alive, the younger member would not at all be entitled to act as a manager or Karta of the joint family property. In Tribhovandas's case [supra], this court held as follows: "The managership of the joint family property goes to a person by birth and is regulated by seniority and the karta or the manager occupies a position superior to that of the other members. A junior member cannot, therefore, deal with the joint family property as manager so long as the karta is available except where the karta relinquishes his right expressly or by necessary implication or in the absence of the manager in exceptional and extraordinary circumstances such as distress or calamity affecting the whole family and for supporting the family or in the absence of the father whose whereabouts were not known or who was away in remote place due to compelling circumstances and that his return within the reasonable time was unlikely or not anticipated."(Emphasis supplied) From a careful reading of the observation of this court in Tribhovandas's case [supra], it would be evident that a younger member of the joint hindu family can deal with the joint family property as manager in the following circumstances: -(i) if the senior member or the Karta is not available;(ii) where the Karta relinquishes his right expressly or by necessary implication;(iii) in the absence of the manager in exceptional and extra ordinary circumstances such as distress or calamity affecting the whole family and for supporting the family;(iv) in the absence of the father: -(a) whose whereabouts were not known or(b) who was away in a remote place due to compelling circumstances and his return within a reasonable time was unlikely or not anticipated.Therefore, in Tribhovandas's case [supra], it has been made clear that under the aforesaid circumstances, a junior member of the joint hindu family can deal with the joint family property as manager or act as the Karta of the same.7. From the above observations of this court in the aforesaid two decisions, we can come to this conclusion that it is usually the Father of the family, if he is alive, and in his absence the senior member of the family, who is entitled to manage the joint family property

Madras High CourtS. Periannan vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax on 20 December, 1990 A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in Mangal Singh v. Harkesh, dealing with the same question, observed as follows (p. 47) :"The general rule laid down by these cases which is common to Mitakshara and Dayabhaga both, therefore, appears to be that whatever may be the extent of the contribution of the acquiring member himself out of his self-acquired funds, if he takes the aid of any portion of joint or ancestral property in acquiring the property, however small that aid may be, the property so acquired assumes the character of joint family property and cannot be claimed by him as a self-acquisition. In this view of the matter, the extent of his contribution or that of the family fund becomes immaterial. If any help is taken from the family property, it is enough to make the self-acquired property the property of the famil