false (mostly) state v. korell, 213 mont. 316 (1984) state v. byers, 261 mont. 17 (1993) citing...
TRANSCRIPT
State v. Korell,213 Mont. 316 (1984)
State v. Byers, 261 Mont. 17 (1993)
Citing Leland v. Oregon, 343 US 790 –
but see Treweiler’s dissent in Byers
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 US 68 (1985);
Smith v. McCormick,914 F. 2nd 1153 (9th Cir 1990)
When an indigent defendant places his mental state at issue he is constitutionally
entitled to secure the assistance of a competent
psychiatrist who conduct an appropriate examination and
assist in evaluation, preparation and
presentation of the defense.
A DEFENDANT IN MONTANA HAS A RIGHT TO HAVE THE
STATE PROVE EVERY ELEMENT OF A CRIMINAL
CHARGE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT –
INCLUDING THE MENTAL ELEMENT.
True
State v. Doney, 194 Mont. 22 (1981)
(1) State must prove each and every element – including the mental
element – of each crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt;
(2) Jury must acquit if they find any reasonable doubt about any
element – including the mental element;
(3) No burden of proof or disproof with respect to any element – including state of mind – rests
with the defendant.
State v. Watson, 211 Mont. 401 (1984)
“The defendant is presumed to be sane. However, this presumption is rebutted and disappears whenever reliable evidence is introduced that raises a reasonable doubt as to the
defendant’s sanity.”
“It makes no difference from which side this evidence comes. From the moment it appears, the burden is at once upon the State to establish the
resopnsibility of the defendant, beyond a reasonable doubt.”
A DEFENDANT CANNOT BE CRIMINALLY PROSECUTED
OR PUNISHED FOR A CRIME WHILE SUFFERING FROM A MENTAL DISEASE
OR DEFECT.
True – If it interferes with his/her ability to
understand and participate
“The only fair reading of the examiner’s opinion is that it is, at best, a ‘conditional’
opinion that Bostwick was competent. Indeed, the competence opinion is
conditioned on the existence of at least two circumstances: (1) that the defendant is
receiving competent advice from his mother; and (2) that the accommodations outlined by the examiner be made for the
trial. In our view such a conditional competence opinion not only does not
negate the possibility of sufficient doubt regarding fitness, it is, in and of itself, a significant indicator of doubt regarding
Bostwick’s competence.”
State v. Bostwick,1999 MT 237
Great Falls v. DPHHS, 2002 309 Mont. 467 (2002)
“A municipal court may commit a criminal defendant if it determines, in accordance with Montana law, that the defendant suffers from a mental disease or defect and lacks the fitness to proceed to trial
State v. Korell, 213 Mont. 316 (1984)
The jury determines whether the defendant committed the offense
with the requisite state of mind; e.g., whether he acted purposely
or knonwingly. The sentencing judge determines whether, at the
time the defendant committed the offense, he was able to
appreciate the criminality of the act of conform his conduct to the
requirements of law.
State v. Cowan, 260 Mont. 510 (1993)
State v. Collier, 277 Mont. 46
State v. Meckler, 345 Mont. 302 (2008)
MONTANA’S STATUTORY SCHEME FOR DEALING WITH MENTAL ILLNESS ALLOWS FOR CONVICTION AND
PUNISHMENT OF THOSE WHO ARE UNABLE TO APPRECIATE THE
CRIMINALITY OF THEIR CONDUCT – AND IT SUBSTITUTES FOR THE INSANITY DEFENSE THE MERE
OPTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT TO TAKE MENTAL ILLNESS INTO
CONSIDERATION WHEN DECIDING THE DEGREE OF PUNISHMENT OR NATURE OF THE DEFENDANT’S CONFINEMENT. True
(in only 4 states)
IN DETERMINING WHETHER A DEFENDANT SUFFERS FROM MENTAL
ILLNESS THE DEFENDANT HAS A RIGHT TO DEMAND
THE USE OF A PARTICULAR TEST.
False
IN MONTANA, ANTISOCIAL PERSONALITY DISORDER CAN LEGALLY DEPRIVE A
DEFENDANT OF THE ABILITY TO ACT WITH
KNOWLEDGE/PURPOSE OR TO APPRECIATE/CONFORM
True(But if the defendant’s sole Dx is APD
do you really think it matters?)
State v. Wooster, 293 Mont. 195 (1999)
“Uncertainty of diagnosis in this field and the tentativeness of professional judgment.”
“Antisocial Personality Disorder must be distinguished from criminal behavior undertaken for gain that is not accompanied by the personality features characteristic of this disorder.”
“Only when antisocial personality traits are inflexible, maladaptive, and persistent and cause significant functional impairment or subjective distress do they constitute Antisocial Personality Disorder.”
State v. Wooster, 293 Mont. 195 (1999)
“We conclude that a person with antisocial personality disorder has a condition that is manifest by much more than ‘only . . . Repeated criminal or other antisocial behavior’ and that this condition is not excluded by §46-14-101.”
AN EXPERT WITNESS MAY TESTIFY AS TO WHETHER A
DEFENDANT HAD THE CAPACITY TO ACT WITH
KNOWLEDGE AND/OR PURPOSE.
True
State v. Santos*, 260 Mont. 510 (1993)
“Questions and expert opinions on a criminal defendant’s mental capacity are not prohibited under [§ 46-14-213] ; what the statute prohibits are expert opinions on
the ultimate issue of whether the defendant actually possessed the
reqquisite mental state at the time the offense was committed.”
The expert’s testimony concerned his expert opinion of the defendant’s ability to know right from wrong with
regard to the content of his letters. The letters provided the expert
examples of the defendant’s ability to know right from wrong at the time
the letters were written – not an opinion regarding the defendant’s
actions at the time of the offense.
State v. Sandrock* 277 Mont. 46
MENTAL DISEASE AND DEFECT IS AVAILABLE AS
A DEFENSE IN MONTANA – BUT IT IS AN AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSE WHICH THE DEFENDANT MUST PLEAD
AND PROVE.
False (technically)
“Evidence of mdd is not an affirmative defense. It is
evidence of a condition that could have prevented the defendant
from having the requisite state of mind. Whether the defendant
actually has a mdd – and whether that disease precludes the
required mental state – are questions of fact for the jury.”
State v. Byers, 261 Mont 17 (1993)
State v. Cowan, 260 Mont. 510 (1993)
§ 45-5-112, MCA, establishes a ‘permissive
inference’ – not a conclusive presumption.
The ultimate determination is left to
the finder of fact.
ONCE A DEFENDANT IS CONVICTED EVIDENCE OF A MENTAL DISEASE/DEFECT IS
IRRELEVANT IN FURTHER MONTANA COURT
PROCEEDINGS.
False
See also: State v. Tibbetts, 226 Mont. 36 (1987)
(1) Burden of proof at sentencing is on the
defendant;(2) Reviewing court not
limited to evidence presented at trial;
(3) Court has discretion.(1) .
State v. Doney, 636 P. 2nd 1377 (1981)
State v. Cowan, 260 Mont. 510 (1993)
State v. Collier, 277 Mont. 46
State v. Meckler, 345 Mont. 302 (2008)
State v. Gallmeier, 2009 MT 68
(1) Burden of proof in sentencing is on the
defendant;(2) Court shall sentence to
DPHHS only if defendant proves she was unable to
appreciate / conform at time of offense;
(3) the specific facts control the inquiry.
State v. Raty, 214 Mont. 114 (1984)
Court revisited DOC sentence after defendant presented evidence that
sentencing court “did not fulfill its duty to
independently evaluate the defendant’s mental
condition.”
ONCE A DEFENDANT IS SENTENCED,
EVIDENCE OF A MENTAL DISEASE AND DEFECT IS
IRRELEVANT IN FURTHER MONTANA COURT
PROCEEDINGS. False
(Sort of)
State v. Boulton, 332 Mont. 538 (2006)
(1) Revocation proceedings are civil in nature;
(2) § 46-14-311 and § 46-14-312 do not apply in
revocation proceedings
Boulton: “These conclusions do not mean that
evidence of mental disease or defect is always irrelevant and inadmissible in a revocation proceeding.
***A mental disease or defect may constitute a
circumstance where fundamental fairness might lead a court to continue or reimpose a probationary sentence. The court has considerable discretion
to order mental evaluations and consider the impact of a defendant’s
mental condition.Thus, evidence of mental disease and
defect can be appropriately considered by the revoking court.