Dear Reader,

Welcome to the Fall 2010 edition of the Virginia Policy Review. I am proud to serve as VPR’s third Editor-in-Chief, and to continue the tradition of excellence established by my predecessors over the past three years. Our new editing team has worked very hard to bring you this edition, and we hope that you will enjoy the variety of articles featured inside.

Although the midterm elections offer an immediate subject for critical analysis, our contributors fo-cused instead on some of the broader systemic issues facing our country, such as the potential impact of term limits on competitive elections and the product recall system that seeks to protect American consumers. Other contributors assessed major issues facing the international community, including terrorism in North Africa, the growing influence of China in Latin America, and the potential future direction of North Korea.

This focus on systemic issues should serve as a reminder to our readers to step back from the widen-ing political divide, highlighted during this election season. Rather than focusing on the partisanship that threatens to paralyze Washington, this edition of VPR emphasizes the complex issues we face as a nation and as part of the international community. It is my sincere hope that the critical nature of these issues will inspire critical thinking and creative action in Washington, whatever the outcome on election night.

The articles in this edition span the globe: from North Korea to Alaska, Richmond to Peru, Somalia to the Chesapeake Bay. The Grounds of the University of Virginia, now ablaze with autumn color, provide an arena for contemplation and discussion of all of these regions and their critical issues. I hope that VPR can meaningfully contribute to this discussion and that our readers find this edition thought-provoking and inspirational.

Chloë C. Bowser Editor-in-Chief

Virginia Policy ReviewEDItOR’S NOtE

Editor-in-Chief:

Business Manager:Layout Editor:

Domestic Senior Editor: Regional Senior Editor:International Senior Editor:

Associate Editors:

Political Cartoonist:

Staff Acknowledgments:

We welcome your thoughts. Please forward any comments, questions, or concerns to virginiapolicyreview@gmail.com or visit us online at www.virginiapolicyreview.com.

Chloë C. Bowser

Christine MaiLily Young

Lauren AxselleGrace StuntzMolly Schmalzbach

Katie AloisiAlyssa BrownCourtney CampbellAnna DraganovaMichael KarlikBorna KazerooniMeaghan MalloyAnna MohanMackenzie Porter

Jason Anderson

Virg

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VOLUME IV, ISSUE 1Fall 2010

CONtENtS

International

Al-Shabab:The New talibanAndrew Koch

Peru’s Current Conditions: Cause for ConcernMatthew Klumpp

North Korean Dynastic Succes-sion:The Past Begets an Uncertain FutureJosé Cárdenas and Eric Kimpton

Bypassing Politics: Education as a Powerful Yet Neu-tral Development SolutionMelina Schoppa, Rachel Smith, and Erin Boehmer

The European Court of Justice: A Mechanism for Rethinking Im-migration Policy in the European UnionPatrick Martin

Domestic

term Limits: The Wrong Remedy for Career PoliticiansMichael Karlik

Combating Recall Fatigue: Improving the Recall Notification SystemNia Harrison

Drilling in the ANWR: Possible or a Bad Idea?Mary Ortiz

Regional

In-Stream technologies and Nu-trient trading Systems: Lowering the Cost of a Cleaner BaySean Callahan, Ruth Schaap, and Grace Stuntz

The Dillon Rule: An Impediment to Local Self-Governance?Neal Modi

About the Illustrator

Acknowledgements

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When the media mentions Somalia, the story most often focuses on piracy off the coast in the Gulf of

Aden and the Indian Ocean. Although the pirate situation could cause economic losses, the United States should be more concerned with the rise of a terrorist organization, al-Shabab, and the possibility of a state sponsor of terror in a geographically strategic region.

The Somali transitional Federal Govern-ment (tFG), whose five-year mandate was extended for two years in 2009, is essentially non-existent. The government controls only a few streets in the capital, Mogadishu, and is continuously besieged by rebels groups, al-Shabab the most prominent among them.1 Al-Shabab has emerged from the various groups of insurgent rebels as the primary faction prepared to take over what remains of the fractured country.2

Al-Shabab, which means “the Youth” in Arabic, formed as the military wing of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The ICU was the ruling militia following the breakdown of Barre’s dictatorship in 1991, but it disinte-grated during the 2006 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia. Al-Shabab formally separated itself from the ICU and immediately began fight-ing the Ethiopian invaders and the Western-backed transitional government forces.3 Since the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, al-Shabab has increased its territorial hold-ings to include much of south and central Somalia.

Members of al-Shabab number in the thou-

sands and are mostly young Somali men from the Hawiye clan, although recently there has been an influx of foreign fighters. The organization “recruits” by taking young children and indoctrinating them to the cause through brainwashing techniques.4 The group’s stated goal is to overthrow the government and to implement strict Sharia law throughout the whole country.5 As such, al-Shabab has already begun to implement draconian policies, including stoning women for adultery and amputating the limbs of thieves, in the areas under its control. The organization has also banned the playing of music and videos, and has forbidden shav-ing.6 Additionally, during the World Cup, al-Shabab declared soccer “a satanic act” and forbade watching or playing the popu-lar sport. In fact, five people were killed for watching or playing the game while many others were tortured or imprisoned under the policy.7

Since 2007, al-Shabab has claimed to be af-filiated with al-Qaeda. Leaders of al-Qaeda have visited Somalia, and al-Shabab mem-bers, including the current leader, Sheik Moktar Abu Zubeyr, have trained in al-Qae-da camps in Afghanistan.8 Like al-Qaeda during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, al-Shabab has also started recruiting foreign-ers to fight in Somalia. So far, the group has focused on radicalized young men from the huge Somali diaspora around the world, but reports indicate that they have also recruited Islamist fighters from the United States, Ye-men, Pakistan, and various African nations.9 The most prominent example of al-Shabab’s

Al-Shabab:The New taliban?

by Andrew Koch

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have joined the organization in Somalia.

A country fragmented by continuous fight-ing, strong regional warlords, and tribal differences, Somalia today is very similar to Afghanistan before the rise of the taliban. As such, it is pos-sible the country will become what taliban-governed Afghanistan once was: a supporter of terrorism. Al-Shabab bears many of the same characteristics as the taliban. The taliban success-fully consolidated power in part because it brought relative peace to Afghanistan after thirty years of warring. Simi-larly, al-Shabab has fought against the warlords and crime bosses in the streets of Mogadi-shu, and the areas solidly under its control are relatively peaceful.10 Further-more, in Somalia, the practice of Islam has traditionally been moderate, so al-Shabab’s implementation of strict Sharia law has frightened many Somalis, just as the taliban’s similar actions did in Afghanistan.11 Also like the taliban, al-Shabab has tense rela-tions with its neighbors. The taliban vowed to invade Shia-dominated Iran following its consolidation of power,12 while al-Shabab

has declared jihad on several surrounding countries including Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda.13 In addition to declaring jihad, al-Shabab claimed responsibility for the terror-ist attack that killed 74 people in Kampala, Uganda, earlier this year. It has also vowed

to drive the African Union peacekeeping forces out of Mogadi-shu. Like the taliban, it supports and har-bors al-Qaeda mem-bers inside its area of control. The United States should be extremely concerned about these parallels and the consequences of the rise of an ultra-Islamist state in a strategic and volatile part of the world.

The potential effects of an al-Shabab-controlled Somalia are already being felt throughout the volatile East African region. These ef-fects have been felt especially in Kenya

where most Somali refugees have relocated. Kenya, already a state fragmented by tribal differences, has found it difficult to monitor the 2.5 million ethnic Somalis living within its borders. Now the Kenyans must struggle with the threat of Kenyan-Somali Islamists training in camps established by al-Shabab in Somalia and running operations throughout Kenya.14 Kenya’s problems could soon be the norm

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foreign recruitment is the twenty Minne-apolis men who disappeared mysteriously between 2007 and 2009 and are believed to throughout East Africa if al-Shabab follows the course of the taliban in Afghanistan. The region as a whole will become increasingly unstable, as al-Shabab solidifies its control in Somalia.

Policy RecommendationsThe United States must not ignore Somalia as it did Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. Al-Shabab has proven that it is willing both to harbor terrorists and to conduct terrorist operations of its own, and as such, the United States must treat it as an existential threat. While it is not economically wise, politically smart, or strategically feasible for the United States to use military force to prevent the establish-ment of a state led by al-Shabab, it is im-portant for the United States to increase its presence not only in Somalia but also in the entire region. The military and intelligence community should increase the use of armed drones in the skies over Somalia to target al-Shabab leadership and visiting al-Qaeda operatives. The intelligence community should also increase its presence by establish-ing human intelligence penetrations within all-Somali rebel groups, especially within al-Shabab itself. Further, the government should look into assisting a Somali national-ist alliance of militias against al-Shabab. The primary recipient of American aid at the moment is tFG President Sharif Ahmed, a former ICU member and an Islamist. This aid has proved worthless because of corrup-tion within Ahmed’s government. Without a strong alternative, the Somali people will have nowhere to turn besides al-Shabab.

The United States government should assist surrounding countries with military and in-telligence operations in order to ensure that the members of al-Shabab do not spread into their countries. The U.S. must work with the international community in order to stop the recruitment of foreign fighters who tend to be more committed to the Islamist cause and thus less likely to move for a peaceful com-promise. These fighters are mostly Pakistanis and Arabs from the al-Qaeda training camps still operating in Afghanistan.15 Their supe-rior training and commitment to the Islamist cause is evidenced by the actions of foreign fighters in Afghanistan during both the Soviet invasion in 1979 and the American invasion in 2001.16 Attempting to deny these foreign fighters a foothold in Somalia may promote the fragmentation of al-Shabab, which will prevent Somalia from becoming a state sponsor of terrorism.

Fortunately, there is already evidence of this fragmentation. In 2009, some of al-Shabab’s commanders and followers defected to the transitional government, claiming that the group was falsely interpreting Islam.17 Other rebel groups have also turned against al-Shabab. In January 2009, a united group of militias repelled al-Shabab’s attempt to assert control over the Somali province of Galgadud. The United States, however, must also recognize that like Afghans, Somalis dis-trust foreigners and especially foreign armies. Somalis will not stand for the continued presence of foreign African Union peace-keepers (the majority are from Uganda and Burundi), and maintaining the peacekeep-ers has increased al-Shabab’s support.18 The United States should pressure the African Union either to commit fully to a long-term occupation or to withdraw its ineffective and

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controversial forces.

Finally, the American government should consider formally recognizing the Republic of Somaliland as an independent democratic state. Somaliland asserted its independence in May 1991 and has remained relatively democratic since its founding.19 A demo-cratic Somaliland would set an example for Somalis, demonstrating that they do not have to suffer through an Islamist regime. A democratic state would also offset the rise of an al-Shabab-controlled state in the south and add some stability and security to the region. The United States must act against the threat of al-Shabab or risk allowing a taliban-type regime to emerge in a strategic part of the world.

Endnotes1 Paul, Katie. “Bombs in Uganda Signal the Arrival of Jihad.” Newsweek. 12 July 2010. Web. 29 Sept. 2010. <http://www.newsweek.com/2010/07/12/jihad-moves-into-africa-s-breadbasket.html>.2 The northern states of Somaliland and Puntland in the north are both administrated independently. While Somaliland has claimed independence from Somalia, Puntland is still part of the country. 3 James, Randy. “Al-Shabab: A Brief History.” time Magazine. 07 Dec. 2009. Web. 28 Sept. 2010. <http://www.time.com/time/world/ar-ticle/0,8599,1945855,00.html>. 4 Somaiya, Ravi. “Who Is Al-Shabab?” News-week. 12 July 2010. Web. 28 Sept. 2010. <http://www.newsweek.com/2010/07/12/the-rise-of-al-shabab.html>.5 Ibid.6 James, Randy. “Al-Shabab: A Brief History.” time Magazine. 07 Dec. 2009. Web. 28 Sept. 2010. <http://www.time.com/time/world/ar-

ticle/0,8599,1945855,00.html>.7 Somaiya, Ravi. “Who Is Al-Shabab?” News-week. 12 July 2010. Web. 28 Sept. 2010. <http://www.newsweek.com/2010/07/12/the-rise-of-al-shabab.html>.8 Ibid.9 James, Randy. “Al-Shabab: A Brief History.” time Magazine. 07 Dec. 2009. Web. 28 Sept. 2010. <http://www.time.com/time/world/ar-ticle/0,8599,1945855,00.html>.10 Hanson, Stephanie. “Al-Shabaab.” Council on Foreign Relations. 28 July 2010. Web. 28 Sept. 2010. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/18650/alshabaab.html>.11 “Somalia and the African Union: Be Beefier.” The Economist. 29 July 2010. Web. 28 Sept. 2010. <http://www.economist.com/node/16705473?story_id=16705473>.12 Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: the Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. New York: Penguin, 2004. Print. Pgs. 339-340.13 Morgan, David S. “Who Are the Al-Shabab Militants?” CBS World News. 12 July 2010. Web. 28 Sept. 2010. <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/07/12/world/main6670437.shtml>. 14 “Somalia and the United States: What’s to Be Done?” The Economist. 16 Sept. 2010. Web. 28 Sept. 2010. <http://www.economist.com/node/17046720?story_id=17046720>.15 Raghavan, Sudarsan. “Foreign Fighters Gain Influence in Somalia’s Islamist Al-Shabab Mi-litia.” Washington Post. 08 June 2010. Web. 01 Oct. 2010. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/07/AR2010060704667.html>.16 Schroen, Gary C. First In: An Insider’s Ac-count of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on terror in Afghanistan. New York: Presidio/Bal-lantine, 2006. Print. Pgs 340-341.17 Morgan, David S. “Who Are the Al-Shabab Militants?” CBS World News. 12 July 2010. Web. 28 Sept. 2010. <http://www.cbsnews.com/

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stories/2010/07/12/world/main6670437.shtml>.18 “Somalia and the African Union: Be Beefier.” 19 “Somalia.” Central Intelligence Agency. 30 Aug. 2010. Web. 28 Sept. 2010. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html>.

Andrew Koch is a third year at the University from Williamsburg, Virginia. He is a double major in history and foreign affairs. Besides academics, he is an active member of the International Relations Organization and the Jefferson Literary and Debating Society. He also currently serves as the Secretary General of the thirtieth annual Virginia Model United Na-tions Conference being held this November.

Narcotics trafficking and Chinese economic policies are placing Peru-vian politics in a precarious posi-

tion. Maintaining a strong and stable Peru is not only vital to the continued stability of South America, but also to the interests of the United States abroad. Peru is strategic for the United States because it essentially bifurcates the typically anti-American Boli-varian Alliance, by linking Chile and Co-lombia and keeping open Pacific-coast access to Brazil. Similarly, the U.S. has a historic commitment to its neighbors in the Ameri-cas, obliging the U.S. to be vigilant towards extra-hemispheric influences in Latin Amer-ica. This paper operates under the assump-tions that China is a rising global power that should be carefully monitored for behaviors that disfavor U.S. interests and that narcotics

trafficking is an intrinsically malignant activity that the U.S. should strive to di-minish. If one accepts these assumptions, it follows that conditions in Peru are current-ly ripe for provoking continental instability and provide a cause for concern.

ChinaThe People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) influence in world affairs is a growing con-cern for the United States. Peru has the second-largest Chinese community in Latin America, with 4.2 million Peruvians (15% of the population) reporting to have some Chinese lineage.1 This established Chinese community has helped to serve as a gateway for increased interaction between the PRC and Peru.

This increased relationship has become espe-

Peru’s Current Conditions: Cause for Concern

by Matthew Klumpp

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cially evident in recent years. While the Unit-ed States and Europe experienced an eco-nomic lull in recent years, China and Latin America fared better. According to the World Bank, Latin America’s GDP as a whole has grown approximately 4.5% in the past year, and Peru’s gross domestic product was 9.3% higher in April 2010 than it was a year earli-er.2 A large reason for this high growth rate, especially when compared with the economic slowdown elsewhere, is attributable to East Asian demand for South America’s abundant natural resources, including iron, ore, tin, and gold.3 In Peru specifically, China’s eco-nomic influence is startling. One scholar suc-cinctly points out that the “abundant mineral wealth possessed by Peru, and the availability of Pacific coast ports to export those miner-als, are natural complements to China’s need for metals and minerals as factor inputs.”4

Another reason for China’s inter-est in Peru lies in the lat-ter country’s fortunate geopolitical position. By construct-ing two parallel highways that traverse Peru’s mountainous interior, the Peruvian govern-ment is positioning itself to utilize Peru’s Pacific ports “to expand its own commerce with the PRC… [and also] serve as a gate-way between Asia and Latin America.”5 This leveraging action attracts Chinese investment by granting access to Peru’s resource-rich neighbors to the east, including Colombia and Brazil. Peru will continue to benefit from this expanding relationship, as it tends to export more than it imports. In 2006, Peru imported $1.01 billion from China and exported $2.91 billion in goods to China.6

This economic influence threatens U.S. interests in the region, especially if China were to somehow leverage its economic heft against the United States’ influence in South America.

The CIA’s World Factbook reports that in 2009, Peru’s top two international exporting partners were the United States (17.86%) and China (15.96%). In the same year, Peru’s top two importing partners were also the United States (23.96%) and China (10.74%).7 China’s rate of activity in Latin American imports and exports is expected to increase, while the United States’ activity is expected to decline for the next decade.8 The UN’s Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) reveals that “China’s high demand for food, energy, metals and minerals has benefited [Latin

American] exporters of these products by substantially improving their terms of trade and

stimulating growth” and recommends that, given “China’s increasing importance in the world economy, Latin America should pro-mote a strategic alliance with the country.”9 Such a regional response to China’s hunger for trade could undermine U.S. hegemony in the Americas. Another threat could come from countries with anti-American poli-cies in South America. These nations can be expected to offer Peru a warm welcome if it were to abandon the United States to profit from increased trade with China.

Diplomatically speaking, the PRC has also increased its activity in Peru. A publica-

If China surpasses the United States in eco-nomic, military, and diplomatic influence in

the region, it is possible that developing nations such as Peru could alter their allegiances to

favor the Chinese.

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tion by ECLAC reveals that an “increasing number of official visits by Chinese heads of state to Latin America and the Caribbean reflects an agenda of mutual interests which seems to be progressing.”10 The Peruvian and Chinese governments have also been meet-ing at the highest diplomatic channels in recent memory, including meetings between Peruvian president Alan Garcia and the PRC’s president Hu Jintao. In a 2008 visit to China, President Garcia vocalized Peru’s support for nonrecognition of taiwan and China’s political control over tibet – signifi-cant acts due to their timing, as they were contemporaneous with unrest in tibet.11 By comparison, both of these issues tend to raise tensions and circumlocution in U.S. – Chi-nese diplomatic relations. At the same time, the PRC has been selling military supplies to Peru since as early as their $800,000 sale of military equipment in 2007, a deal that also facilitated future purchases by granting Peru access to the Chinese military’s bidding and acquisition system.12 This military and political influence in Peru could offer an alternative allegiance if the U.S. were to let its relationship with Peru wither.

NarcoterrorIn the 1970’s and 1980’s, Peru suffered a Maoist insurgency. However, former Presi-dent Alberto Fujimori largely repressed it in 1992 by capturing the movement’s leader, Abimael Guzmán. Guzmán, who is currently serving a lifetime prison sentence, originally led the Partido Comunista Peruano - Send-ero Luminoso (PCP-SL) or “Shining Path.”13 This Maoist insurgency was a destabilizing force in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, practically delegitimizing the de facto gov-ernment at the time.

In terms of societal damage, the current actors that call themselves the Shining Path can be considered only nominally related to Guzmán’s organization. today, Shining Path’s operations concentrate more on the cultiva-tion and trafficking of coca crop, the base material for making cocaine, than political coups. According to the United Nations, Peru is “poised to overtake Colombia as the world’s largest producer of coca.”14 This statistic is partially due to the respective amounts of aid given to each country by the United States. While Colombia’s eradication efforts have received $5 billion this past year, Peru received a much smaller $71 million this year in antinarcotics efforts.15 This exhibits the balloon effect: as one productive region is squeezed, another portion of the continent expands its production to satisfy the demand for illicit substances.

Narcoterror is a self-financing operation. Shining Path members use terrorist acts to deter eradication efforts and keep cultivation underway. The lucrative nature of the trade, in turn, finances the terror campaigns. Not only do the leaders benefit financially from trafficking narcotics, but underprivileged farmers also gain an income from narcotics. This is a dangerous combination, creating the possibility of swaying the locals to prefer the Shining Path to the distant government in Lima. The recent capture of Comrade Izula, a high-level Shining Path operative, implies that the Peruvian government has a grasp on the situation.16 Even though its aspirations may not be directed towards a coup, the Shining Path’s blatant defiance of authority in the countryside stands to delegitimize the de facto Garcia government.

Conclusions

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These two influences in Peru are significant and worthy of the United States’ attention, as they have the potential to turn malignant. The possibility for political instability in Peru exists, especially since the current Peruvian administration has been battling corruption charges.17 Furthermore, Peru’s president Garcia is facing 60% disapproval ratings, de-spite impressive economic growth. This may be due to a large portion of the population feeling excluded from the growth, as 35% of the nation still lives in poverty.18 Such destabilizing activities in Peru are especially worrisome, given Peru’s neighbors. Any anti-U.S. activities in Peru are likely to receive the endorsement of the Bolivarian Alliance, if not direct aid. two members of this alliance, Bolivia and Ecuador, directly border Peru and are hungry for more influence in the re-gion. If China surpasses the United States in economic, military, and diplomatic influence in the region, it is possible that developing nations such as Peru could alter their alle-giances to favor the Chinese.

All of this implies that the United States should bolster its strategic relationship with Peru, being especially mindful of the dor-mant dangers found in Peru’s increasingly organized narcoterrorist groups and expand-ing Chinese influence. Such efforts could include supporting the diversification and industrialization of Peru’s economy, thereby reducing its reliance upon the exploitation of its natural resources and illicit trade. The U.S. can promote this diversification of trade by encouraging U.S. allies, such as Japan and South Korea, to increase their investment in Peru. By the same token, an increase in military sales to the Peruvian military could seriously help contain and suppress the resur-gent Shining Path in the countryside, while

improving bilateral relations and displacing China’s military influence in the country. Regional destabilization is certainly not im-minent, but the current conditions in Peru are a cause for concern, increased attention, and policy reassessment.

Endnotes1 Ellis, Robert Evan. China in Latin America: the Whats and Wherefores. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009. Print. Pg. 149.2 Goforth, Sean. “Growing Like It’s 2007.” Latin America. Foreign Policy Blogs, 1 July 2010. Web. 18 Aug. 2010. <http://latinamerica.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2010/07/01/growing-like-its-2007/>.3 Ibid.4 Ellis 150.5 Ellis 155.6 Ellis 148.7 “CIA - The World Factbook: Peru.” The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency, 3 Aug. 2010. Web. 18 Aug. 2010. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pe.html>.8 United Nations. Economic Commission for Latin America and Caribbean (ECLAC). In-ternational trade and Integration. The People’s Republic of China and Latin America and the Caribbean: towards a Strategic Relationship. By Alicia Bárcena and Osvaldo Rosales. Santiago, Chile: United Nations, 2010. Print. Pg. 12.9 ECLAC 23.10 ECLAC 22.11 Ellis 157.12 Ibid.13 Strong, Simon. Shining Path: terror and Revolution in Peru. New York: times, 1992. Print. Pg. 267.14 “Coca Cultivation Declining in Colombia but on the Rise in Peru, UN Agency Reports.” UN

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News Centre. United Nations, 22 June 2010. Web. 18 Aug. 2010. <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=35096&Cr=&Cr1=>.15 Romero, Simon. “Coca Production Makes a Comeback in Peru.” Breaking News, World News & Multimedia. The New York times, 13 June 2010. Web. 18 Aug. 2010. <http://www.ny-times.com/2010/06/14/world/americas/14peru.html?partner=rss&emc=rss>.16 Velez, Patricia, and Emily Schmall. “Peru Ar-rests Shining Path Leader, two Killed: Report.” The New York times. Reuters, 13 Oct. 2010. Web. 17 Oct. 2010. <http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2010/10/13/world/international-us-peru-guerrilla.html?partner=rss&emc=rss>.17 “Cabecillas De Sendero Luminoso Se Dispu-tarían El Control Del Alto Huallaga.” Noticias Perú. El Comercio, 1 May 2010. Web. 22 Aug. 2010. <http://elcomercio.pe/noticia/470289/cabecillas-sendero-luminoso-se-disputarian-con-trol-alto-huallaga>. 18 Velez, Patricia, and terry Wade. “Peru’s Garcia Shuffles Cabinet Before Elections.” The New York times. Reuters, 14 Sept. 2010. Web. 15 Sept. 2010. <http://www.nytimes.com/reu-ters/2010/09/14/world/international-uk-peru-politics.html?partner=rss&emc=rss>.

Matthew Klumpp is in his second year with the Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy, hailing from Haymarket, Virginia. He graduated with a Bachelor’s Degree from UVa in May 2010, with majors in foreign affairs and Spanish. Matthew first became interested in Peru’s strategic importance for the United States after studying in Lima, Peru, where he spent a week hiking in the Andes.

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North Korean Dynastic Succession: The Past Begets an Uncertain Future

by José Cárdenas and Eric Kimpton

On September 21, 2010, the North Korean government announced an impending meeting of the Worker’s

Party—the first meeting of the dominant state party since 1980. One week later, on September 28, Kim Jong-il commissioned his son, Kim Jong-un, a four star general and appointed him to the Worker’s Party Central Committee. Although Kim Jong-il remains the “dear leader” of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Kim Jong-un’s eventual succession will have tangible implications for the United States, South Korea, and the rest of the world. Although we are hesitant to assess the projected effects with complete confidence, by looking at succession models previously enacted in North Korea, Cuba, Syria, Egypt, and Nicaragua, we can forecast conditioned implications and areas of con-cern.

Models of Succession

North KoreaForecasting the future requires a look at the past. The designation of Kim Jong-un as ‘heir apparent’ begins a structural process resem-bling what Kim Jong-il experienced when he succeeded his father Kim Il-sung. Kim Jong-il was appointed ‘heir apparent’ in 1980, and his credibility and power were gradually established over the course of 14 years.

In the spirit of “seongun,” or “military-first” policy, Kim Jong-il was commissioned “supreme commander of the armed forces” before assuming power.1 In April 1993, he

was also named Chairman of the National Defense Commission.2 Similarly, Kim Jong-un was commissioned a four-star general and granted significant influence within the military. Swiss-educated and hidden from the public eye for much of his life, the ‘heir ap-parent’ has no military background or train-ing.3 Replication of Kim Jong-il’s military-concentrated succession process will prove critical for Kim Jong-un’s credibility.

Cubatemporarily assuming power in 2006 dur-ing his brother’s illness, Raul Castro became President of Cuba on February 24, 2008. The end of Fidel’s 49-year reign produced uncertainty and speculation over the future direction of Cuban policy. Recent reforms expanding Cuban citizens’ rights to own personal cell phones, to farm private land, and to open small businesses preceded a Sep-tember 13, 2010 decree that 500,000 state workers would be removed from the federal payroll by 2011.4 Since his ascension to the presidency, Raul has maintained his brother’s comprehensive political framework and advisors while introducing policies empha-sizing gradual economic and social reform. Although these reforms have generated some optimism, “other actions…[have] ensured the continued power of Cuba’s old guard,”5 and the reforms have been characterized as the gradual implementation of experimental “trial balloons.”6

SyriaBashar al-Assad rose to power in Syria fol-

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lowing his father’s death in 2000.7 A trained ophthalmologist, he most likely would have remained in the shadows of the bureaucracy if not for his older brother Basil’s death in 1994.8 Following his brother’s death, Bashar rushed to attend the state military academy at Homs in order to complete his training.9 Bashar came to power completely unknown and on the tide of economic and social reform that never materialized. Following the initial release of a dubious number of political prisoners as well as some intellectual uprising, Syria again seemed to revert back to the hard-line politics of the recently deceased Hafez al-Assad.10 Most Middle East ana-lysts agree that “Syria under Bashar has been about preservation of the status quo at any price” and do not see any real change from the Syria of his father.11 Bashar al-Assad ascended from obscurity to become a some-what weak and feeble heir to the iron-fist rule of his father and has pursued self-preser-vation in lieu of reform or change.12

EgyptThough doubts about his democratic le-gitimacy exist, Hosni Mubarak has ruled Egypt quasi-democratically since 1981. The upcoming elections in 2011 mark the first time that Hosni Mubarak may not be “fit enough” to run for reelection.13 Hosni’s son Gamal has emerged over the last few years as a potential presidential candidate. As recently as 2006, Gamal asserted that he “had no desire or [wishes] to nominate [himself ]” for Egypt’s presidency.14 However, a newly formed poster campaign promoting Gamal Mubarak as the next presidential candidate and loudening political rumblings of dynas-tic succession tell a different story.15 Gamal Mubarak cultivated much of his rising politi-cal support on the backs of an increasingly

powerful “new guard,” which advocates neo-liberal economic reform and whose policies conflict with the “old guard” pro-state elite and military.16 Gamal Mubarak exists in the middle between two polar opposites of Egyp-tian politics and as of now, no definitive path exists for his succession17.

NicaraguaFollowing a bloody conflict between warring factions within Nicaragua and elements of the U.S. in the late 1920s and early 1930s, General Anastasio Somoza Garcia propelled himself to power.18 Over a 42 year period of rule, the Somoza family used “control of the National Guard, manipulation of the Lib-eral Party and the image of a close alliance with the U.S.” to maintain and “perpetuate” their state control.19 Anastasio Somoza was assassinated in 1956, but his sons Luis and Anastasio Somoza Debayle continued their father’s regime until the late 1970s. Nicara-gua under the Somoza dynasty served as the launching pad for the 1961 Bay of Pigs inva-sion and existed as one of the overtly author-itarian anti-communist regimes supported by the U.S. during the Cold War. The Somoza family eventually lost power in the late 1970s following their mishandling of the Managua earthquake in 1971.20

Evaluation Criteria: Potential Future Path-waysInherent to a discussion of the potential ramifications of dynastic succession in North Korea, is acknowledgment of uncertainty. Resolution of this liminal moment’s uncer-tainty is contingent upon knowledge of the absolute level of authority Kim Jong-un will receive relative to his father’s inner circle of advisors. The promotion of Kim Kyong-hui and Choe Ryong-hae, Kim Jong-il’s sister

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and trusted adviser, respectively, to high government posts suggests that Kim Jong-il has surrounded his son with his most loyal advisors.21 Such an inner circle may mitigate Kim Jong-un’s ability to exert power inde-pendent of his father. Successfully forecasting the outcome of the succes-sion also de-pends upon knowledge of the time period dividing Kim Jong-un’s com-missioning and his official confirmation as head of state. Kim Jong-il’s ascension to pow-er was prefaced by 14 years of incremental training and credibility manipulation. If Kim Jong-un’s ‘grooming’ period is relatively long, he may be able to establish credibility before assuming power. In this case, after succes-sion he could focus on substantive policy and not symbolic actions. If his ‘grooming’ period is relatively short, he will be forced to cultivate credibility and foster trust while ruling the country. His focus will necessarily be restricted to symbolic actions that cater to the approval of his father’s inner circle. Kim Jong-il’s questionable health following a stroke in 2008 suggests that this ‘grooming’ period will likely be relatively short. As such, we project that Kim Jong-un will travel down one of three behavioral pathways upon succeeding the “dear leader:”• Continue his father’s economic and diplo-matic policies and serve as a substitute head of state. • Intensify his father’s current economic and diplomatic policies and attempt to gain both domestic and international credibility

and the trust of his father’s advisors.• Reform his father’s current economic and diplomatic policies, utilizing his Swiss educa-tion to induce liberal reform while main-taining or intensifying previous rhetoric to appease his father’s party base.

As noted by a senior U.S. diplomat, Kim Jong-un “must quickly win the allegiance of the varied

factions including the military. If he fails to do this before his father dies there is the pos-sibility of instability.” The necessity to secure this allegiance could force him to pursue “military adventurism.”22 Reports have at-tributed responsibility for the Cheonan inci-dent and a 2009 cyber attack against South Korea to Kim Jong-un, perhaps initiating a calculated policy of credibility manipula-tion.23

Implications: United States, South Korea, and the World

What should we expect from the United States, South Korea, and the rest of the world in light of the potential behavioral pathways Kim Jong-un may pursue? We expect that these three groups will react somewhat simi-larly depending on Kim Jong-un’s behavior.

• Should Kim Jong-un continue his father’s policies, the United States would continue to treat North Korea with caution and further move to leverage South Korea against its neighbor. South Korea, however, maintains a more than amicable relationship with the North, and as such, would likely treat

With a considerably lengthy ‘grooming’ period, the power transition between North Korea’s

“dear leader” and his son could be smooth, but if forced and hasty, a serious and potentially

devastating power struggle could emerge.

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a substitute head of state similarly to Kim Jong-il. The rest of the world would most likely continue their current plans of action, upholding the status quo.

• Should Kim Jong-un intensify his father’s policies in an effort to gain the support and trust of the military and party elite, the United States would move to undermine the young leader and work to damage his cred-ibility. Given Kim Jong-un’s rapid ascension to power, harsh UN resolutions or increased trade embargos could successfully convince military and party elites that the leader lacks the charisma and necessary will to lead the country. We expect South Korea would fol-low the United States, potentially ramping up any covert, counterintelligence, or subver-sive operations that they currently operate in North Korea. South Korea’s current interna-tional allies would most likely continue to follow the United States’ example while Iran, China, and others would intensify their sup-port for the North Korean regime.

• Should Kim Jong-un reform North Korea, first economically and eventually socially, the United States could potentially find itself with an ally. However, we must make a strong caveat pertaining to the amount of power the young leader would actually have and the number of unilateral decisions he could actually make. Although Kim Jong-un will clearly not be able to reform North Ko-rean policies immediately upon succession, history has shown us that abject poverty and increasingly negative economic conditions could eventually lead to measured change. Pending Kim Jong-un’s level of power and re-lationship with the ruling elites, South Korea could either move to support and strengthen ties with him or could isolate and move

against him in an effort to undermine North Korea as a whole. A reformist Kim Jong-un would most likely be met with initial skepti-cism and measured reaction by the rest of the world.

ConclusionAlthough we cannot predict the future with confidence, we can look to previous examples of modern dynastic succession as potential models that may materialize after the passing of North Korea’s “dear leader.” Julian Borger perfectly sums up the real problems for the Kim Jong clan and the reason for the ram-pant speculation and media coverage when he notes that “the moment of succession is also a moment of supreme vulnerability for despotic families, and unless it is man-aged supremely and ruthlessly well, other claimants on power, like the ruling party or the army, will make their own grab for supremacy.”24 The true litmus test for Kim Jong-un’s reign as “dear leader”-in-waiting rests most heavily upon how soon and under what conditions Kim Jong-il relinquishes his role as head of state. With a considerably lengthy ‘grooming’ period, the power transi-tion between North Korea’s “dear leader” and his son could be smooth, but if forced and hasty, a serious and potentially devastating power struggle could emerge. Pending both the uncertain time frame and conditions of Kim Jong-un’s ascension to power, we expect the United States, South Korea and the rest of the world to react accordingly.

Endnotes1 Sung-ki, Jung. “N. Korea Seeks to Bolster Military-First Policy.” The Korea times. 29 Sept. 2010. Web. 02 Oct. 2010. 2 “Leadership Succession.” North Korea: A Country Study. Ed. Andrea M. Savada. Washing-

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ton, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1993. Print3 McDonald, Mark. “North Korea Sets Date for Leadership Gathering.” The New York times. 21 Sept. 2010. Web. 03 Oct. 2010.4 Llana, Sara M. “Cuba Move to Cut 500,000 Government Jobs Is Biggest Change in Decades.” The Christian Science Monitor. 14 Sept. 2010. Web. 01 Oct. 2010. 5 McKinley, Jr., James C. “At Cuba Helm, Castro Brother Stays the Course.” The New York times. 25 Feb. 2008. Web. 01 Oct. 2010. 6 Llana, Sara M. “Cuba Move to Cut 500,000 Government Jobs Is Biggest Change in Decades.” 7 BBC NEWS. “Profile: Syria’s Bashar Al-Assad.” BBC News - Home. 10 Mar. 2005. Web. 04 Oct. 2010. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2579331.stm>. 8 Ibid9 Ibid10 Zisser, Eyal. “Does Bashar Al-Assad Rule Syria?” Middle East Quarterly Winter X.1 (2003): 15-23. Middle East Forum. Middle East Quarterly, 2003. Web. 04 Oct. 2010. <http://www.meforum.org/517/does-bashar-al-assad-rule-syria>. 11 Ibid12 Ibid13 Khalaf, Roula. “Egyptians Seize Opportunity to Stir Things up.” Financial times. 27 Sept. 2010. Web. 04 Oct. 2010. <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b44d902e-ca4d-11df-a860-00144fea-b49a.html>. 14 Middle East Online. “Gamal: I Have No Desire to Run for President.” Middle East Online. 28 Mar. 2006. Web. 04 Oct. 2010. <http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/egypt/?id=16096>. 15 Haaretz. “New Poster Campaign Backs Gamal Mubarak for Egyptian Presidency.” Israel News - Haaretz Israeli News Source. Haaretz, 22 Sept. 2010. Web. 04 Oct. 2010. <http://www.haaretz.com/news/international/new-poster-campaign-backs-gamal-mubarak-for-egyptian-

presidency-1.309522>. 16 Roll, Stephan. “Gamal Mubarak and the Discord in Egypt’s Ruling Elite.” Arab Reform Bulletin. Carnegie Endowment for Inter-national Peace, 1 Sept. 2010. Web. 04 Oct. 2010. <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/arb/?fa=show&article=41490>. 17 Ibid18 Wiarda, Howard J and Harvey F. Kline. Latin American Politics and Development. Boulder: Westview Press, 2007. 19 Ibid 20 Ibid21 McDonald, Mark, and Martin Fackler. “North Koreans Bolster Power of Ruler’s Kin.” The New York times. 28 Sept. 2010. Web. 01 Oct. 2010.22 “North Korea Leadership: ‘My Happy Days at School with North Korea’s Future Leader’”telegraph.co.uk. 26 Sept. 2010. Web. 01 Oct. 2010. 23 Kim, Duyeo. “Kim Jong-un On the Suc-cession Fast-track.” Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. 28 Sept. 2010. Web. 04 Oct. 2010. <http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/policy/northkorea/articles/kim_jong-un_succes-sion_fast_track_updated/>. 24 Borger, Julian. “The trouble with Being a Dictator’s Son.” Julian Borger’s Global Security Blog. The Guardian, 28 Sept. 2010. Web. 04 Oct. 2010. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/julian-borger-global-security-blog/2010/sep/27/korea-dictatorship-heir>.

Eric Kimpton was born in Seaford, Delaware, and is a second year Masters candidate at the Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy. He is interested in American foreign policy, specifically with regards to narcotics traf-ficking in Latin America and the Middle East.José Cárdenas is from Arlington, Virginia by way of Quito, Ecuador and Syracuse, New York.

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Bypassing Politics: Education as a Powerful yet Neutral Development Solution

by Melina Schoppa, Rachel Smith, and Erin Boehmer

During the summer of 2010, a team of University of Virginia students set out to continue the ongoing

Water and Health in Limpopo (WHIL) proj-ect with the aim to improve water access in rural South Africa. Working collaboratively with students from the University of Venda in South Africa, we designed a community engagement plan to supplement the simulta-neous construction of a slow-sand water filter by our colleagues, a fourth year engineering Capstone team. Before we arrived in Lim-popo, our community engagement strategy was loosely defined. We were not sure what methods would work best for the rural vil-lages with which the WHIL project has part-nered since 2008. After extensive research, we tentatively planned to engage the youth in these communities by teaching water health and hygiene in primary schools.

Our initial confusion was due to the lack of resources about what we should do when ap-proaching a community engagement project. We had read many articles by students and professors outlining the mistakes that well-intentioned but inexperienced students could make. We might fall into the trap of propos-ing a “Western” solution for a “third world” problem, or, even worse, alienating com-munity members by not properly requesting, receiving, and integrating their feedback. We wanted to avoid these common mistakes, but were unsure what was actually acceptable. Through our experience, we found that edu-cation was an effective and politically neutral solution that allowed us to form strong ties to the community despite unforeseen leader-ship changes. Projects like ours will be more likely to avoid these pitfalls if they focus on engaging the community in an arena that is

José is a second year Masters candidate at the Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy. He enjoys spending his limited free time discussing the intricacies of American foreign policy, specifically with regards to counter-ter-rorism, asymmetric warfare and counterintel-ligence in the Middle East and Asia.

Eric and José are the co-founders of Week in Review, a student-run foreign policy discussion forum at the Frank Batten School.

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free of these types of political tension.

Community Partnership Through EducationAfter arriving in Limpopo, we worked with our student partners from the University of Venda to put the finishing touches on the lesson plans we had written for the Clean Water Camp. We chose topics like general water hygiene, different filtration methods, and clean water storage, among others. The children met our curriculum with great interest and enthusiasm. During the focus groups that we held to assess the results of the program, one mother explained how her daughter had “begun taking a bucket of water with her when she used the bathroom so she could wash her hands afterward…. which she never did before the camp.”1

It was quickly apparent that working through the village school system was a healthy way to build trust and partnership with the com-munity. The strength of our relationships with the teachers, students, and community members was successful because we entered these communities as facilitators of learn-ing, rather than as authoritative figures. The parents’ stories about their children’s changed hygiene practices proved to us that educat-ing children was an effective way of spread-ing the information to parents and elders. During the focus groups, parents made it clear that they found clean water education beneficial for their children. The adults were also able to give us critical feedback on the program, suggesting that we include lessons on traffic safety and extend the program to adults.

We found that it was both feasible and legiti-mate to extend the program beyond just wa-ter health, as it is observed that “the failures

of the post-apartheid education system have left many poor blacks unable to compete in an economy where accountants, engineers and managers are in high demand.”2 Based on this feedback, we have decided to recali-brate our project goals to focus on expand-ing the curriculum to reach both children and adults throughout the community. By addressing the problem of water health and working with community members to reas-sess their needs, we can both target a crucial problem and build leadership and problem-solving skills within the community. This will result in a more sustainable solution and less reliance on external aid.

Education is a concern not only for com-munity members but also for policymakers worldwide. Prominent organizations such as the United Nations have put education in the developing world high on the interna-tional agenda. “Achieving Universal Primary School Education” is the second of eight Millennium Development Goals that the UN has pledged to achieve by 2015.3 In ad-dition, countless NGOs in South Africa and elsewhere have prioritized education as a goal to create a better future.

Beyond PoliticsOne of the major obstacles our team faced as Westerners was our unfamiliarity with the local political system in the villages. Chiefs govern the two villages with the advice of a few knowledgeable and trusted elders. About once a week, the chief and village elders hold a community meeting to discuss issues and problems in their community. This was where our team were to present our project ideas. In the first village, the chief supported the WHIL project, so we anticipated mini-mal setbacks. However, when we arrived to

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meet with the other community, we found that the previous authority figure was no longer in power; shortly before our arrival, his brother had taken over as chief. The transition was not an amicable one; villag-ers refrained from speaking the name of the former authority figure. The filter site for our project was in close proximity to the former chief ’s home; this seemed to discourage the new chief from supporting our project. Al-though the WHIL project had spent several years establishing close ties to this village, our work was immediately challenged by the new village leadership. Unfortunately, we could not break ground on the slow-sand filter without the new chief ’s approval.

This roadblock made our plans for commu-nity engagement all the more vital. Without the unwavering support of everyone in the community, there was little chance that the plans for the slow-sand filter could go ahead. Luckily, the principals and some teachers from the villages’ primary schools were eager to meet with us to discuss the Clean Water Camp. The teachers selected students for the program and organized a location for the Camp to take place. Despite nationwide school closings during the World Cup, all of the selected students attended Camp ses-sions.

At the end of the two week long Camp, we held a Clean Water Fair to give students an opportunity to show parents and commu-nity members what they had learned. Stu-dents presented their ideas for solving water problem in the community to the Chiefs from both villages and respected community elders. Despite the political upheaval in the community, this education program acted as a powerful mechanism that neutrally gar-

nered support from all corners of the com-munity. Furthermore, we observed that the education program allowed us to have direct communication with students and parents alike in a setting virtually free of political de-bate and rivalries. This allowed us to be open with community members and gain a better understanding of their needs, concerns, and knowledge of the project.

ConclusionWhile researching similar past projects, we found that many student-led construction endeavors – particularly those involving wa-ter purification – focus on physical solutions, like building a water filter. Though creation of physical structures may be necessary for the project to succeed, such goals do not operate independent of education and com-munity capacity. Community members need a way to obtain a sufficient supply of clean water, but in order to ensure the solution is sustainable they also need to understand how the system functions, why it is necessary, and what their roles are within that system. Education, in this way, is a crucial element in community engagement projects because it serves to keep the community engaged. The WHIL project recognizes this and has incor-porated education throughout its involve-ment with the communities.

However, the power of education is by no means a panacea to these types of concerns. It is impossible to implement a successful intervention strategy using only education when a host of other resource needs exist. For instance, although we experienced great success teaching about clean water practices, actual progress toward these practices would be impossible without technological access to clean water. The construction of the water

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Endnotes1 Focus group interviews. 17 June 2010. 2 Dugger, Celia. 26 September 2010. Wage Laws Squeeze South Africa’s Poor. Retrieved 26 September 2010, from,http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/world/africa/27safrica.html?_r=2&pagewanted=1&ref=world. 3 United Nations. Millennium Development Goals. http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/edu-cation.shtml.

Erin Boehmer is a second year Systems Engi-neering and Computer Science (BS) student. She is currently interning with Willowtree Apps, and is eager to devise a way to use smart technologies to advance the cause of develop-ment and related issues.

Melina Schoppa is a second year in the Col-lege of Arts and Sciences. She is interested in Global Development and politics. Melina will be continuing her research in South Africa and is planning a trip this Spring.

Rachel Smith is second year Biomedical En-gineering student involved in Engineering Students Without Boarders. She is eager to com-bine knowledge from her technical field with her on-ground experiences to better understand how to apply engineering to developing world situations.

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the European Union currently faces a political dilemma that national, political, and legal institutions seem

neither willing nor able to address. On the one hand, member states face aging popula-tions, stagnating economies, and increas-ing budget deficits, and are in need of less expensive labor from outside of the EU zone. However, right-wing protectionist political movements within several member states are making liberal immigration policies politi-cally unattainable.1

European immigration policy became a politically volatile issue after the fall of the Soviet Union. Immigration is seen as a mat-ter of national government security; conse-quently, supranational EU institutions do not have authority over immigration policies. This situation exists even though free move-ment of persons within the EU zone was one of the primary goals of the 1987 Single European Act, which proposed “four free-doms” of movement: goods, capital, services, and labor.2 If the European Union is to be taken seriously as a single polity with defined borders and shared security objectives, and not just a free trade and monetary zone, then it must grant authority over immigration policies to supranational institutions.

The European Court of Justice (ECJ), the EU’s highest court, has not acquired the same legal authority in immigration issues and disputes as it has in a variety of other politically salient areas. Several scholars cast

doubts on the ability of the ECJ to achieve “integration through law,” particularly in matters concerning immigration.3 Yet due to the ECJ’s stated mission of promoting “an ever closer union,” as well as several activist interpretations of ECJ ‘supremacy’ and ‘di-rect effect,’ the court has acquired a position “as a staunch protector and promoter of the individual in the European Union, forging a stronger link between the polity and the person than the political decision-making bodies and the member states themselves had ever managed to do.”4

The ECJ, drawing from its legacy of acquir-ing institutional power at the expense of member states’ courts, can and should act as a catalyst toward a more liberal and expan-sive immigration policy for the European Union. The Court has a unique institutional ability to bolster its own credibility through case law. It continues to promote suprana-tional protection of rights, and it also has the potential to quell xenophobic politi-cal movements through promotion of the Single European Act’s “four freedoms.” Due to these characteristics, the judicial arm of the European Union should take seriously the goal of harmonizing EU member states’ immigration laws on the Community level by advancing standing to sue and the right to ‘free movement’ to non-EU citizens.

Intergovernmentalist ControlHistorically, the intergovernmentalist ap-proach to institutions as agents of member

The European Court of Justice: A Mechanism for Rethinking Immigration Policy in the European Union

by Patrick Martin

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states appears to have outweighed efforts on the part of supranational actors to consoli-date immigration policy on the “Communi-ty” level. Intergovernmentalists claim that the European Court of Justice is simply applying treaties, provisions, and rules formulated by the member states in the European Council.5 The Maastricht treaty’s provision to include immigration and asylum within a ‘third pil-lar’ of Justice and Home Affairs provides an example of this claim. In 1997, the Amster-dam treaty, which lifted immigration policy in ‘title IV’ to Community-level policy, was shielded from judicial review by the ECJ when the Court was denied jurisdiction over immigration issues aimed at “safeguarding international security.”6 Furthermore, cur-rently the ECJ can only review rulings on title IV of the Amsterdam treaty through requests from courts of ‘last instance’ in member states.7

The intergovernmentalist hold on immigra-tion policy has intensified after the rise in security issues following 9/11 and the growth of xenophobic political parties throughout much of Europe. While there have been efforts to expand the Schengen open-border area, immigration has become inextricably linked to Europe-wide security. However, European Court of Justice case law and institutional capacity suggests that the Court could secure greater freedom of movement for non-EU citizens by linking immigration issues with human rights concerns.

A Case Law of RightsThe ECJ has amassed a significant case law history, capitalizing on the highly techni-cal aspect of the law to carve its own realm of power. The Court adopted ‘supremacy’ over national courts, so its rulings on a

particular ‘rights’ claim take precedent over the laws of member states.10 The principle of direct effect allows individual litigants to appeal directly to the ECJ if they believe that a member state is violating any EU treaty protecting free trade and exchange across Europe.11 The European Court of Justice has used these self-delegated powers to promote several Community-level protections on the freedom of labor movement and to uphold the goal of “an ever closer union.” In the De-meril case, the Court ruled that the wife of a turkish national contracted to work in West Germany was allowed a temporary visa to remain in West Germany with her husband. The ruling was based on an ‘Association Agreement’ between the former European Economic Community and outside coun-tries, which has been used by the Court as a “quasi-legal framework for supranational immigration policy.”12 The Levin (1982) and Kempf (1986) rulings, which stated that the concept of a worker must be uniform and thus supranational to exclude member states’ discretion, show even more promise for the rights of immigrants as ‘workers.’ The ECJ could use these rulings to address inconsis-tent immigration policies across member states in future immigration cases.

The enforcement of rights is a key politi-cal mechanism for legal spillover. Through direct effect, EU nationals and potentially non-EU workers and migrants have judi-cially enforceable free movement rights at the supranational level. Judges have also given themselves a large amount of “discretionary authority” through the doctrine of suprem-acy. Therefore, there is legal justification to suggest a further outflow of rights for immi-grants and workers.13

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Normative Spillover EffectsIn addition to case law that contains suf-ficient precedent to propose future improve-ments in immigrant rights, the ECJ has capitalized on a mutually beneficial relation-ship with national courts. This cooperation has enhanced the power and prestige of the two systems and lead to a convergence on human rights and other issues through a pro-cess of ‘normative spillover.’14 The process involves multiple parties, each with a shared interest in bolstering human rights. The national courts assert that their baseline hu-man rights standards are far more protective than the rights ensured through the “demo-cratic deficit” of Community institutions. The ECJ will be more likely to match or even further the human rights standards of particular member-states in order to uphold the concept of the EU as a single politi-cal entity. This reciprocal process compels concerned actors like human rights organiza-tions to take on cases and contribute to the dialogue on human rights for immigrants. This engagement provides greater access for individuals to assert free movement claims.

The embedded liberal-democratic norms of Western Europe drive this process. There is a political movement between adversaries – the ECJ and the national courts – to assert that their own body of laws – Community or national – is more true to this tradition.15

This jostle for political legitimacy can be seen in the Handelsgesellschaft case (1970), which ruled that general principles of Com-munity law arise from the liberal-democratic constitutional principles of member states’ constitutions.16

Looking Ahead through the ECJWhat is truly promising about the pro-rights

ECJ history is that greater access for individ-ual litigants could be used as an effective tool to push the European political climate away from sectarian nationalist movements and toward a supranational identity of citizenship in the Community. The Court should not be viewed as an impediment to EU security interests. Rather, the Court is a mechanism of soft power that can support for rule of law and peaceful conflict resolution. Most im-portantly, the ECJ can be a tool to promote greater freedom of movement of capital and goods into and out of the European Union.

Endnotes1 Guiraudon, Virginie. “Drawing the EU’s Borders: Immigration Policy.” The State of the European Union. Vol. 7: With US or Against US? European trends in American Perspective. Ed. Nicolas Jabko and Craig Parsons. Oxford UK: University of Oxford Press, 2005. 3352 Givens, terry and Leudtke, Adam. “EU Im-migration Policy: From Intergovernmentalism to Reluctant Harmonization.” The State of the European Union. Vol. 6, Law, Politics, and Soci-ety. Ed. tanja A Borzel and Rachel A. Cichowski. Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, 2003, 291-310.3 Guiraudon, Virginie. “Drawing the EU’s Borders: Immigration Policy.” The State of the European Union. Vol. 7: With US or Against US? European trends in American Perspective. Ed. Nicolas Jabko and Craig Parsons. Oxford UK: University of Oxford Press, 2005. 333-3354 Ibid.5 Mattli, Walter and Slaughter, Anne- Marie. “Revisiting the European Court of Justice”. International Organization 1998. 1806 Guiraudon, Virginie. “Drawing the EU’s Borders: Immigration Policy.” The State of the European Union. Vol. 7: With US or Against US? European trends in American Perspective. Ed. Nicolas Jabko and Craig Parsons. Oxford

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UK: University of Oxford Press, 2005. 3337 Ibid. 3348 Ibid. 3359 Keohane, Robert O. and Hoffman, Stanley. “The New European Community: Decisionmak-ing and Institutional Change”. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1991.10 Flaminio Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585 (6/64)11 Van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration [1963] ECR 1. 12 Givens, terry and Leudtke, Adam. “EU Im-migration Policy: From Intergovernmentalism to Reluctant Harmonization.” The State of the European Union. Vol. 6, Law, Politics, and Soci-ety. Ed. tanja A Borzel and Rachel A. Cichowski. Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, 2003, 291-310.13 Givens, terry and Leudtke, Adam. “EU Im-migration Policy: From Intergovernmentalism to Reluctant Harmonization.” The State of the European Union. Vol. 6, Law, Politics, and Soci-ety. Ed. tanja A Borzel and Rachel A. Cichowski. Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, 2003, 291-310.14 Rittberger, Bethold and Schimmelfennig, Frank. „The Constitutionalization of the Euro-pean Union: Explaining the Parliamentarization and Institutionalization of Human Rights.“ The State of the European Union. Vol. 8: Making History: European Integration and Institu-tional Change at Fifty. Ed. Sophie Meunier and Kathleen R. McNamara. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007, 213-229.15 Ibid.16 Internationalle Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr. 17/70.

Patrick Martin is a fourth year from Farming-ton, Connecticut majoring in Foreign Affairs and Political Philosophy, Policy, and Law. Since interning with Lawyers Without Borders, Patrick has developed an interest in interna-

tional and human rights law. Upon graduation in the spring of 2011, he hopes to attend law school and continue studies in these fields.

28 DOMEStIC

A common complaint about Congress, typically voiced by conservatives, is that term limits should exist for

our representatives. Proponents of term limits argue that the longer politicians stay in Washington, the more easily they can be swayed by special interests and forget about the welfare of their constituents.

Laws imposing term limits currently exist for fifteen state legislatures, the first of which were enacted in 1990.1 Voters have passed amendments establishing term limits for their state representatives with wide margins of variation. Only six states set a definitive time limit for their legislators. The other states simply limit the number of consecutive years an individual can serve as a state legisla-tor in one chamber, which allows a person to bounce between the upper and lower houses of a legislature throughout his or her career.

Although advocates make convincing argu-ments about limiting terms, they mistakenly blame legislative unresponsiveness on a lack of term limits, instead of the real cause. to address the problem of perceived unre-sponsiveness of long-serving members of Congress, policy makers need to increase the number of competitive elections. This solu-tion will increase the number of well-qual-ified, moderate representatives in Congress who are willing to reach across party lines to pass sound public policies.

There is no objective way to measure whether a three-term representative is more or less ef-fective than a ten-term representative. If any-thing, longer-serving members of Congress

could use their seniority on congressional committees to better help their constituents. Because term limits penalize effective and ineffective representatives equally, increas-ing the number of competitive districts will reduce the number of ideologues in any given district who vote for subpar candidates, simply because of party loyalty.

In 2008, when a number of Republican-held seats were contested in a Democratic wave year, only 64 House members won their rac-es with 55 percent of the vote or less.2 The low number of close House races signifies that the vast majority of the country consists of landslide districts, where one party (or person) easily wins elections. Someone from a 70 percent Democratic district and another person from a 70 percent Republican district have little incentive to work together on many policy issues. They and their constitu-ents hold different views of how the world should work.

Imagine if a district had an even partisan split. Then, politicians would lack a partisan electoral majority and their success would be indicative of personal accomplishments and campaign savvy, rather than party ties. In addition, having competitive districts would lessen political grandstanding and increase representatives’ incentives to be effective in office in order to be reelected. If representa-tives knew that they must piece together coalitions at election time, they might avoid skewering the opposition and catering solely to their partisans in their daily duties.

term LimitsThe Wrong Remedy for Career Politicians

by Michael Karlik

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The fact that politicians have a partisan incentive to avoid working with ideologically dissimilar elected officials often is accompa-nied by the complaint that there are too few moderate politicians. Moderates who work with the opposite party are seen as the key to compromise (and as traitors by their own partisans). Redistricting reform could po-tentially install more moderates in office, as candidates who hold extremely progressive or conservative views could be unpalatable to an evenly-split district.

However, moderate candidates need mod-erate voters to elect them. Despite all of the people who complain about career politicians, the status quo, and the political discourse, it remains an important fact that only about half of the voting-age population, on average, actually shows up on election day

to express their preferences. From 1946 to 2000, voter turnout in federal elections was approximately 56 percent in presidential-year elections and 39 percent for midterm elec-tions.3 Although the dynamics are different for each race (some congressional districts can see single-digit turnout while competi-tive districts may bring out 80-plus percent of voters), a minority of American voters elects the majority of congressional represen-tatives.

An additional benefit of having more com-petitive elections is that voter turnout would likely increase. If elections were decided by closer margins, people would assume that their vote is more likely to make a differ-ence. Candidates would also have a greater incentive to spend more time responding to the concerns of their supporters to win their

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vote. Theoretically, if moderate citizens, typi-cally assumed to be independents or nonvot-ers, voted in greater numbers, the type of politician elected could change. The more people who have electoral input, the more likely a representative will reflect a district’s makeup.

Implementing competitive districts will be difficult because 50 different sets of actors draw district boundaries. Legislatures that hold the sole power to draw district lines attempt to protect incumbents by minimiz-ing competitive districts. Gerrymandering is not just a congressional-level phenomenon. In 2007, when the entire Virginia General Assembly was up for reelection, 68 out of 100 House seats did not field candidates from both major parties; neither did 23 out of 40 Senate seats. In 2003 there were 69 non-competitive House seats and 22 non-competitive Senate seats. In 2005, there were 61 non-competitive House seats.4

Moreover, in 2008, of the ten Virginia congressional districts in which incumbents ran, eight (from both parties) were reelected with over 55 percent of the vote. Because state legislators are frequently candidates for congressional office, excessive partisanship at the state level could roll into federal politics.

It is true that some landslide districts cannot be avoided. Just as it offends some to gerry-mander an oddly-shaped district for parti-san purposes, it is not always best to slice through cities and neighborhoods for the sake of electoral competitiveness. One must also not forget that there are already scores of legislators in progressive, moderate, and con-servative districts who accurately reflect their constituents. So, not every “career politician”

is a corruption case waiting to happen. In fact, politicians in non-competitive districts may spend less time campaigning and more time legislating if they did not have to plead for their job every two years.

If career politicians are the bane of voters’ existence, then augmenting the number of competitive districts will separate the truly effective politicians from those who win based on party support alone in November.

Endnotes1 Legislative term Limits: An Overview, Jen-nie Drage Bowser, National Conference of State Legislatures, 20 September 2010< http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=14849>. 2 “Election Results: House of Representatives”, The New York times, 9 December 2008, 19Sep-tember 2010 < http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/results/house/votes.html>.3 Charles Stewart, III, Analyzing Congress: The New Institutionalism in American Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2001) 166.

4 Kenneth S. Stroupe, Jr., “Gerrymandering’s Long History In Virginia: Will This Decade Mark The End?” The Virginia News Letter, 13 February 2009.

Michael Karlik is a fourth-year student from Fairfax, Virginia. He is studying government, history, and public policy at the University of Virginia.

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Combating Recall FatigueImproving the Recall Notification System

by Nia Harrison

When was the last time you paid attention to a product recall? If you are like most consumers, the

answer is rarely. Not only are there too many recalls to keep track of, but even consumers who know they have a recalled product do not think anything bad will happen. Many government regulators and consumer experts are concerned about this “recall fatigue” and are calling for reform.

Consumer Recall FatigueThe Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) announces countless recalls every week involving the 15,000 consumer prod-ucts the agency oversees.1 From 2000-2009, CPSC announced an average 400 recalls per year.2 During September 2010 alone, CPSC announced 36 recalls on its website involving varied products such as toys, electric lawn-mowers, rugs, and jewelry.3 Several other government agencies also have recall author-ity over products, including the Food and Drug Administration, the National High-way traffic Safety Administration, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the Envi-ronmental Protection Agency. With so many recalls occurring every day, it is no wonder that consumers lack the time and motivation to pay attention.

Research finds rampant evidence of con-sumer recall fatigue, which can cause harm to consumers. A study by the USDA found that 12% of Americans who knew they bought recalled food ate it anyway, and a 2009 Rutgers study found that only 60% of people ever check for recalled food at home.4

Generally, consumers are more likely to act on recalls if they involve relatively expen-sive products, like cars, or perceive an im-mediate health or safety threat. Car owners are the most responsive, returning 73% of recalled cars, but consumers return only 30% of everyday consumer goods.5 In several instances, consumers continue to eat and get sick from recalled food after highly publi-cized recalls, like Peter Pan peanut butter in 2007. Until consumers start paying attention to recall announcements, they run the risk of being unnecessarily harmed by recalled products.

Reform or FlounderThe current recall notification system is unorganized. CPSC tracks recalls on its website and allows consumers to search this database by month and year, product type,

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product category, product description, the associated hazard, and manufacture area. This system requires consumers to look at announcements on a regular basis, and search the database for each of the hundreds of products they own. In September 2009, CPSC launched the CPSC 2.0 initiative to help raise consumer awareness of recalls.6 This initiative includes a blog, twitter ac-count, Flickr channel, Youtube channel, Smartphone application, and a recall widget. Furthermore, CPSC partnered in 2003 with five other federal health and safety regulatory agencies to initiate www.recalls.gov, a “one-stop shop” for all federal product recalls.7 While these efforts may raise awareness, they do not help consumers sort through the nu-merous recalls in any meaningful way.

Many experts recognize the need for a new recall notification system and are calling for reform. Some, like human ecology profes-sor William Hallman, say a more effective system would directly notify consumers who have purchased a particular product.8 For instance, Costco is able to track its custom-ers’ purchases through their store cards and call those who have purchased a recalled item the same day the recall is announced. This has led to return rates of 90%, in some cases. Direct notification on a large scale, however, would present privacy issues. Moreover, it would be hard to track purchases made with cash.

The Danny Keysar Child Product Safety Notification Act, enacted in 2008, requires manufacturers of durable children’s products to provide registration forms to consumers and maintain a database of registrants.9 In the event of a recall, this database must be used to notify the registrants. The act also

requires CPSC to study whether this registra-tion system should be required for manufac-turers of other children’s products. Although registration forms may be effective for a select number and type of products, they

would not be effective on a large scale. Con-sumers are not likely to take the time and effort to fill out a registration form for every product they purchase. The products they are most likely to fill out a form for – those that are expensive – are already the products with the highest recall effectiveness.

Risk-Based NotificationThe most promising proposal to reform the recall notification system is to assign a risk level to each recall. Much like the Homeland Security Advisory System, recalls would be coded as high, medium, or low risk. Signal-ing which recalls present a high risk of harm would motivate consumers to pay attention to the most important announcements. This system would not only help consumers sort through announcements quickly, but also help them recognize the need to react to those that are most pressing.

Opponents may argue that this coding system could pose new problems. First, what factors should the regulatory agency use to evaluate the risk each recall poses? Ideally, CPSC could identify a set of objective factors

With so many recalls occur-ring every day, it is no won-der that consumers lack the time and motivation to pay

attention.

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that can be applied to all recalls. Realisti-cally, however, CPSC may need to exercise a fair amount of discretion due to the variety of circumstances, hazards, and products involved. Second, if CPSC codes a large portion of recalls as high risk, consumers may still be too overwhelmed to pay atten-tion. This will likely not happen, however, because manufacturers initiate many recalls as a precautionary measure rather than out of realized dangers. Thus, many recalls would be coded as low risk. Third, consumers may purposely ignore recalls coded as low risk. While this does pose a significant threat, it is not a departure from the present situation in which consumers ignore almost all recalls.

A Call to ChangeCPSC drastically needs to reform the current recall notification system, or consumers will continue using unsafe products. Currently, there are simply too many recalls to which consumers need to pay attention. CPSC should immediately take steps to organize re-call announcements by risk level. If this new system succeeds, then other federal regula-tory agencies with recall authority should follow CPSC’s steps. Failure to adopt this risk-based notification system will further harm the very people these regulatory agen-cies aim to protect.

Endnotes1 Government Accountability Office. “Consum-er Product Safety Commission: Better Informa-tion and Planning Would Strengthen CPSC’s Oversight of Imported Goods.” Aug. 2009. 3 Oct. 2010 <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09803.pdf>.2 Calculated using data in the Consumer Prod-uct Safety Commission’s Annual Reports from 2000-2003 and 2009, as well as the Consumer

Product Safety Commission’s Annual Perfor-mance and Accountability Reports from 2004-2008. See http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/pubs/reports.html.3 “September 2010 Recalls and Product Safety News.” Consumer Product Safety Commission. Sept. 2010. 3 Oct. 2010 <http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/prerel/prerelsep10.html>.4 Layton, Lyndsey. “Officials Worry About Consumers Lost Among the Recalls.” 2 July 2010. 3 Oct. 2010 <http://www.washington-post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/01/AR2010070106504_2.html?sid= St2010081804766>.5 Ibid.6 “2009 Performance and Accountability Re-port.” Consumer Product Safety Commission. Nov. 2009. 3 Oct. 2010 <http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/pubs/reports/2009par.pdf>.7 Ibid.8 Layton, Lyndsey. “Officials Worry About Consumers Lost Among the Recalls.” 2 July 2010. 3 Oct. 2010 <http://www.washington-post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/01/AR2010070106504_2.html?sid= St2010081804766>.9 Lee, Margaret. “Consumer Product Safety Im-provement Act of 2008: P.L. 110-314.” Congres-sional Research Service. 22 Sept. 2008.

Nia Harrison, from Hampton, Virginia, earned a Bachelor of Arts in Economics and Psychology in 2010 and is now a Masters can-didate at the Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy. She is interested in domestic social policy and worked on consumer product safety issues this past summer at the Govern-ment Accountability Office in Washington, D.C.

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Drilling in the ANWRPossible or a Bad Idea?

by Mary Ortiz

the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) has been hotly debated in American politics for the last 40

years.1 However, the question of whether or not to drill in this highly contested area has only recently come to the forefront of American politics in the last twenty years. The issue became particularly salient follow-ing the terrorist attacks of September 11th and the Iraq War, because certain groups saw domestic drilling as a solution to America’s dependence on foreign oil. to address this, President Bush and his supporters in Con-gress made several unsuccessful attempts to pass legislation that would open a particular section of ANWR, known as area 1002, to oil exploration and production.2 Despite the substantial rise in gas prices, mainly in 2008, and the increased rhetoric by pro-ponents in Washington, domestic drilling in ANWR never became a viable option to address American dependence on for-eign oil due to general disagreement over

whether the economic benefits would out-weigh the social and environmental costs of opening area 1002 to domestic drilling.

BackgroundIn 1952, an executive order established the Arctic Wildlife Range to preserve “unique wildlife, wilderness and recreational values.”3

This order paved the way for future legisla-tion to protect the area. In 1980, the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) expanded the protected land by 18 million acres into the current Arctic National Wildlife Refuge.4 The ANILCA also protected the area from future develop-ment and set aside a portion of the refuge as a wilderness area. Section 1002 of the Act provided for a continuing “analysis of the impacts of oil and gas exploration, devel-opment, and production,” while authoriz-ing “exploratory activity within the coastal plain” that would not hurt the wildlife, fish, and other resources in a specific area of the

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refuge.5 Known as the “1002 area” in future legislation and debates, this piece of land lies on the northern edge of ANWR and covers about 1.5 million acres that the Department of the Interior claims has enormous oil and gas potential.6 Because the Act stipulates under section 1003 that “production of oil and gas… is prohibited…until authorized by an Act of Congress,”7 area 1002 became a hot issue in oil and domestic politics.

In 1987, the Department of the Interior recommended that Congress open ANWR to drilling and exploration to boost domestic oil production. Although a Senate committee approved leasing the land in 1989, Congress tabled the idea after the Exxon Valdez oil spill a few days later because of the adverse public reaction.8

With the election of President George W. Bush in 2000, the nation’s energy policy shifted towards a noticeably more pro-oil, pro-industry position. As a result, many environmentalists believed that his admin-istration’s close ties to the energy and auto industries adversely influenced the adminis-tration’s decisions. According to author Paul Roberts, “the Bush energy policy [focused] mainly on increasing energy production both at home and abroad,” while not trying to hurt the economy, his allies or conservative base.9 According to President Bush, the oil reserves in the country were dangerously low, so his administration saw ANWR as a means for growth of the domestic energy sector. Therefore, promoting ANWR aided his goal of reducing “America’s reliance on foreign oil through increased conservation and ef-ficiency, improved infrastructure, and in-creased exploration.”10 Congress continued to debate ANWR and whether or not there

should be development of some kind allowed in the refuge.

The terrorist attacks of September 11th provided the President with a new avenue to further his political agenda. A month after the attacks, he told reporters: “The less dependent we are on foreign sources of crude oil, the more secure we are at home.”11 He framed the issue as a matter of national security, directly linking the United State’s dependence on foreign oil to its vulnerability. Even though President Bush and his sup-porters believed that increased domestic oil production would help America reduce its dependence on the Middle East and improve stability in the region, the Senate refused to pass legislation containing ANWR provisions in 2001 and 2002.

All of President Bush’s legislation that in-cluded ANWR provisions in 2005 and 2006 failed to pass through Congress. In his budget for fiscal year 2008, President Bush stated his continued support for “authorizing limited exploration and development on the coastal plain of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge.”12 Again, however, the two houses of Congress could not agree on a proposal to open ANWR,13 but as gas prices rose, open-ing ANWR became a more prevalent idea. Even though President Bush had opened the Gulf of Mexico to further exploration in 2006 and permitted further offshore drill-ing in new areas in 2008, his administra-tion sought to open portions of ANWR for drilling. He used the high gas prices to urge Congress to take action when he said that “they will need to explain why $4-a-gallon gasoline is not enough incentive for them to act.”14 Despite his threat, his policy was not popular with the Democratic majority who

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saw it as furthering a pro-oil energy policy. Thus, Congress refused to open ANWR.

Potential Effects of Opening ANWRThroughout his presidency, President Bush pushed for opening area 1002 in the refuge for exploration, citing that oil and natural gas from this region would help the United States limit imports of foreign oil. However, how much independence the US would actually gain from opening the refuge is questionable. According to USGS’s “Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, 1002 Area, Petro-leum Assessment, 1998, Including Economic Analysis,” the total amount of technically recoverable oil is about 7.7 billion barrels of oil (BBO) with about 80 percent of the oil present occurring near already existing infra-structures.15 In the resource cases conducted, ANWR production would peak at 780,000 barrels per day in 2027, with cumulative oil production with the opening of ANWR being between 1.9 to 4.3 billion barrels between 2018 and 2030.16 In 2007, Ameri-cans consumed 20,680,000 billion barrels of oil per day (bbl/day), more than any other country and about 37 percent more than the next country, China.17 ANWR peak pro-duction would not even satisfy one twen-tieth of America’s domestic consumption in a single day. Also, according to Roberts, the US now has less than 2 percent of the world’s in-ground reserves, so the assertion that opening ANWR would enable Ameri-cans to gain independence from foreign oil is further misguided. Americans consume a quarter of the world’s reserves, thus ANWR would make little difference in the amount of oil imported from foreign nations.18 The supposed economic benefits of drilling in ANWR would not place a large enough dent in America’s oil imports.

In the current political environment, there has been a radical shift away from pro-oil policies of the Bush Administration towards a less oil-friendly stance. Even before his election in 2008, President Barack Obama stated, “I strongly reject drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge because it would irreversibly damage a protected national wildlife refuge without creating sufficient oil supplies to meaningfully affect the global market price or have a discernable impact on U.S. energy security.”19 The USGS data cited above supports President Obama’s assertion regarding the viability of the possible oil re-serves in the ANWR. Currently, the Obama administration is open to directional drilling in area 1002, as long as the environment and the wildlife living in the area are not ad-versely affected. However, President Obama also believes that there needs to be stronger regulation on oil drilling in general.20 Other federal agencies are revisiting management of the refuge as well. As of September 2010, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service ANWR office has begun a Comprehensive Conser-vation Plan (CCP) to reevaluate the refuge, possibly giving the area a wilderness designa-tion. This designation would effectively close the refuge to any future drilling and develop-ment, with which some senators disagree. The service will not release the CCP until April 2012, but if the service does decide to designate the refuge as a wilderness area, the debate about drilling may hit a major road-block.21

today, an agreement opening area 1002 to drilling is highly improbable. Even if a shift in Congressional power following the 2010 midterm elections results in reconsidering drilling in ANWR, President Obama will

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probably veto any meaningful legislation on the matter. Also, the possibility of explora-tion and drilling can be questioned environ-mentally and economically; the costs of drill-ing far outweigh the benefits. Constructing pipelines to move the oil would devastate the environment in ANWR and intrude into ar-eas formally undisturbed. Economically, the refuge would provide some economic relief: “the potential ANWR oil recovered would have a value between $125 and $350 billion (in 1998 dollars).”22 The problem, however, is that the possible oil that could be profit-ably extracted would not provide enough oil and natural gas to achieve any degree of ener-gy independence over the long-term. Recent events such as the recent British Petroleum (BP) oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico show the costs and dangers of drilling in delicate areas. Furthermore, the economic damage acci-dents cause also stir anti-drilling sentiments within the American public. Pictures of oil-covered animals appeal to the American psyche and oil spills promote higher public saliency against drilling. Thus, Congress will have to carefully watch their image to main-tain legitimacy in the eyes of constituents, since public opinion has a huge impact on Congressional action.

The refuge stands a symbol of American independence from foreign oil, but at what cost? One can assume the major hope for area 1002 is the discovery of a large reserve somewhere nearby, or perhaps, that the area itself contains more oil than the experts have calculated. In considering the data given, it is clear there would not be enough oil to sustain long-term oil production. Compar-ing the facts in Figure 2 with the level of daily consumption, the refuge would only provide a temporary bandage for the growing

problem of foreign dependency and decreas-ing levels of global oil supplies. The envi-ronmental impact of drilling and refining oil and natural gas would have repercussions for the habitat and the ecosystem surround-ing the area. Given all the factors, it remains doubtful that legislation opening the refuge will pass in the near future. If the CCP deter-mines that area 1002 is a wilderness area, the question of drilling in ANWR will probably be shelved for a long period of time.

ConclusionAlthough ANWR has been in the political discourse for the last 40 years, the debate only intensified in the 1990s and 2000s. Despite linking ANWR to the American national security, the Bush administration failed to convince Congress to open ANWR to drilling. Although Obama may allow for directional drilling, drilling in ANWR may still take years to begin, and events like the recent BP Deepwater Horizon oil rig accident in April 2010 threaten to derail any attempts in the near future. Drilling in ANWR may never be seen as a viable solu-tion to America’s production woes, and until both houses of Congress and the President agree, the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge will remain off-limits to oil and natural gas exploration and production.

Endnotes1 Shogren, Elizabeth. “For 30 Years, a Political Battle Over Oil and ANWR : NPR.” NPR : Na-tional Public Radio : News & Analysis, World, US, Music & Arts : NPR. 10 Nov. 2005. Web. 13 Apr. 2010.2 Concurrent Resolution on the Budget FY 2006: Committee Print to Accompany S. Con. Res. 18 together with Additional Views and Mi-nority Views, S. Res., 109th Cong., U.S. G.P.O.

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34 (2005). 3 Seaton, Fred A. “Public Land Order 2214.” 6 Dec. 1960. Web. 13 Apr. 2010. http://library.fws.gov/Pubs7/ANWR_plo.pdf.4 Lieland, Barbara t. Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR): Review, Controversies and Legislation. New York: Nova Science, 2006. Print. Page 27.5 United States. 96th Congress. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act: December 2, 1980.Http://library.fws.gov/Pubs7/anilcabits.pdf. Web. 13 Apr. 20106 United States. Department of the Interior. U.S. Geological Survey. Arctic Nation Wildlife Refuge, 1002 Area, Petroleum Assessment, 1998, Including Economic Analysis. Print.7 United States. 96th Congress. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act: December 2, 1980.Http://library.fws.gov/Pubs7/anilcabits.pdf. Web. 13 Apr. 20108 Washington, Philip S. “Reaction to Alaska Spill Derails Bill to Allow Oil Drilling in Ref-uge.” The New York times12 Apr. 1989. Web. 13 Apr. 2010.9 Roberts, Paul. The End of Oil: on the Edge of a Perilous New World. Boston: Houghton Mif-flin, 2004. Print. Page 298.10 “President Bush Commends House Commit-tees for Energy Progress.” Welcome to the White House. 17 July 2001. Web. 23 Apr. 2010. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/re-leases/2001/07/20010717-6.html.11 Ibid.12 “Budget of the United States Government, FY 2008.” The White House. Web. 27 Apr. 2010.13 United States. Arctic National Wildlife Ref-uge (ANWR): Legislative Actions in the 110th Congress. By M. L. Corn and Elizabeth A. Rob-erts. CRS Report for Congress. 10 July 2008. Web. 19 Apr. 2010.14 Stolberg, Sheryl G. “Bush Calls for End to Ban on Offshore Oil Drilling.” The New York

times - Breaking News, World News & Multi-media. 19 June 2008. Web. 13 Apr. 2010.15 United States. Department of the Interior. U.S. Geological Survey. Arctic Nation Wildlife Refuge, 1002 Area, Petroleum Assessment, 1998, Including Economic Analysis. Print.16 “EIA - Analysis of Crude Oil Production in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge - Results.” Energy Information Administration - EIA - Offi-cial Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government. May 2008. Web. 13 Apr. 2010.17 “Oil Consumption (most Recent) by Coun-try.” NationMaster - World Statistics, Country Comparisons. CIA World Factbooks 2003-2008, 18 Dec. 2008. Web. 29 Apr. 2010.18 Roberts, Paul. The End of Oil: on the Edge of a Perilous New World. Boston: Houghton Mif-flin, 2004. Print. Page 299.19 “Presidential Candidates views on ANWR – The Democrats.” ANWR.org. Web 13 April 2010. 20 Hebert, H. J. “White House Open to Direc-tional Drilling in ANWR: Oil Adn.com.” Alaska News, Jobs and Advertising from the Anchorage Daily News Anchorage, Mat-Su Valley, Kenai Peninsula. 16 Mar. 2009. Web. 30 Apr. 2010.21 “US States Fish and Wildlife Service Opens Comprehensive Conservation Plan on ANWR.” ANWAR.org. May 2008. Web. 13 April 2010. 22 “EIA – Potential Oil Production from the Coastal Plain of the Arctic National Wildlife Ref-uge: Update Assessment.” Energy Information Administration - EIA - Official Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government. May 2008. Web. 13 Apr. 2010.

Mary Ortiz is a fourth year from Manassas, Virginia majoring in History and Foreign Af-fairs. She will be graduating in the spring and looks forward to pursuing a career in intelli-gence or a non-governmental organization.

39REGIONAL

the Chesapeake Bay, the third largest estuary in the world, has high nutri-ent pollution levels that harm water

quality. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has labeled many sections of the Bay and its tributaries “impaired.” Key threats to water quality include excess sediment and nutrient loadings, specifically nitrogen (N) and phosphorous (P). Excess nitrogen and phosphorus nutrients result in eutro-phication, or the increase of organic matter within an ecosystem. This increase leads to hypoxia as decaying matter on the seafloor depletes oxygen. The process of improv-ing Chesapeake Bay water quality has been challenged by the continuing conversion of farmland to urban and suburban develop-ment1, which increases population pressure and the expensive investments required to achieve significant and sustained nutrient re-ductions. In-stream treatments promote new technologies placed in the water to reduce nutrient pollution. These treatments either remove nutrients from the water column or increase the capacity of the ecological system to accommodate higher nutrient loads. Algal turf scrubbers and oyster aquaculture are the most popular in-stream treatments.

Algal turf scrubbers are cultured communi-ties of attached or benthic algae that can

1 Even though agricultural runoff is a huge contributor to high nutrient levels, development of urban and suburban areas does not necessarily solve the problem. Less porous tarmac surfaces decreases the amount of water absorbed by the environment and increases the volume of runoff during heavy rains.

be used to scrub nutrients from marine, estuarine and fresh waters. Algae are able to sequester nutrients and can later be harvested for use as biofuels or fertilizers. HydroMen-tia, Inc. has done studies in Florida using large-scale AtS treatments to determine how effectively AtS removes nitrogen and phosphorous. Other studies have focused on smaller-scale use, specifically for the Chesa-peake Bay and its tributaries.

Filter feeding organisms, such as Eastern Oysters, Crassostrea virginica, and other shellfish remove nutrients from the Bay through digestion and biodeposition. Fil-tering up to 50 gallons of water per day, Eastern Oysters feed on algae and other organic material suspended in the water. While feeding, the oysters ingest nitrogen and phosphorous and later use these nutri-ents to build shell and muscle tissue. Many consider oyster aquaculture to be an ideal means to generate credits in a nutrient trad-ing system or systems in which sources can buy pollution ‘credits’ from those harvesting oysters, because the removed nutrients can be accurately measured when the oysters are harvested. Unlike other filter feeders, oysters continue to ingest excess nutrients and expel them as biodeposits at the same rate even when they are not feeding. On average, it takes 3,750 oysters to remove the nitrogen pollution generated by one person. The cost and effectiveness of oyster aquaculture var-ies over time and space due to factors such as temperature, salinity, and disease. Figure 1 shows maps of where oyster aquaculture would be most effectively implemented in

In-Stream technologies and Nutrient trading Systems: Lowering the Cost of a Cleaner Bay

by Sean Callahan, Ruth Schaap and Grace Stuntz

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the Chesapeake Bay. two separate court cases, Friends of Pinto Creek v. United States EPA and Arkansas v. Oklahoma,have addressed the legality of these technologies under the Clean Water Act. Based on interviews with state envi-ronmental officials, we conclude that the use of in-stream technologies in impaired waterways, and thus the incorporation of these treatments into Chesapeake Bay nutri-ent trading systems, is potentially legal. Incor-porating these treatments into current trading schemes would encourage their widespread application.

Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia have implemented benchmark-and-credit nutrient trading systems. West Virginia is develop-ing a similar system for future implementa-tion. These programs are designed to satisfy Clean Water Act requirement; they aim to improve surface water quality by controlling the amount of direct pollutant discharge and runoff that enters waterways. Current nutri-ent trading systems involve trade between point sources (sources, like wastewater treat-ment plants, that discharge pollutants from a pipe). In some systems, nonpoint sources (i.e. farms or ranges of land from which dis-charge flows) can sell credits to point sources. In these cases equivalency measures, such as trading and retirement ratios, are utilized to reduce the uncertainty of nonpoint source emission reductions.

How can these in-stream technologies be

incorporated into nutrient trading systems? Options include (1) using in-stream tech-nologies as nonpoint source best manage-ment practices; (2) allowing point sources to sponsor or utilize in-stream technologies to meet National Pollution Discharge Elimina-tion System (NPDES) permit requirements; or (3) encouraging businesses, environmental groups, and citizens to use in-stream treat-ments to generate pollution abatement cred-its that they could then sell to point sources.

Because the first option would subject in-stream treatments to trading ratios used

in current trading programs, the latter two options ensure more accurate measure-ment of nutrient removal from in-stream technologies. These options would allow for the integration of in-stream treatments into current trading systems; however, current Chesapeake Bay nutrient trading systems are ineffective and should be reformed to reduce nutrient pollution in the Bay at a lower cost.

Currently, Virginia, Maryland and Pennsyl-vania have benchmark-and-credit systems. These systems suffer from low market vol-ume due to high transaction costs and un-certainty in discharge reductions. Although the benchmark-and-credit systems already established in the Chesapeake Bay are in ac-cordance with the Clean Water Act, cap-and-trade policies have the potential to achieve the same water quality goals at a lower cost. North Carolina established a cap-and-trade system in the tar-Pamlico River basin that serves as a best practice model in reforming Chesapeake Bay trading policies.

The process of improving Chesapeake Bay water quality has been challenged by the continuing

conversion of farmland to urban and suburban development...

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Implementing a cap-and-trade system would require significant reform of established state-level nutrient trading policies. In the short term, the Chesapeake Bay tributary states should shift to a regional trading system to increase market volume. In the long term, the Chesapeake Bay should shift to a regional cap-and-trade nutrient trading system. In both scenarios, nonpoint sources should be allowed to trade with point sourc-es. Regulators should reduce the uncertainty

of nonpoint source pollution reduction by establishing profit incentives, such as lower trading ratios, to nonpoint sources that maintain best management practices and certification. Regulators should also offer to abolish nonpoint source equivalency mea-sures if these sources develop effective pol-lution monitoring systems. In-stream tech-nologies can be incorporated into reformed nutrient trading systems in the ways recom-mended above.

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Endnotes 1 Reay, W. G. (2009). Water Quality within the York River Estuary. Journal of Coastal Research, 57, 23-39.2 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. (2001). Nutrient Criteria technical Guidance Manual: Estuarine and Coastal Marine Waters. Washington, D.C.: United States Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water. Retrieved February 9, 2010 from http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/criteria/nutrient/guidance/marine/index.html3 Adey, W., Luckett, C., Jensen, K. (1993). Phosphorus Removal from Natural Waters Using Controlled Algal Production. Restoration Ecol-ogy, 1(1), 29-39.4 HydroMentia, Inc. (2005). Single Stage Algal turf Scrubbers Present Worth Cost and By-Product Market Analysis. Ocala, Florida: Hydro-Mentria, Inc.5 Mulbry, W., Kangas, P., & Kondrad, S. (2009). toward scrubbing the bay: Nutrient removal using small algal turf scrubbers on Chesapeake Bay tributaries. Ecological Engineering, 36(4), 536-541.6 Newell, R. (2004). Ecosystem Influences of Natural and Cultivated Populations of Suspen-sion-Feeding Bivalve Mollusks: A Review. Journal of Shellfish Review, 23(1), 51-61.7 Stephenson, K., Aultman, S., Metcalfe, t., Miller, A. (2009). An Evaluation of Nutrient Nonpoint Offset trading in Virginia: A Role for Agricultural Nonpoint Sources? Water Resources Resarch, 47, doi:10.1029/2009WR008228. 8 Newell, R. (2004). Ecosystem Influences of Natural and Cultivated Populations of Suspen-sion-Feeding Bivalve Mollusks: A Review. Journal of Shellfish Review, 23(1), 51-61.9 Rheault, R. (2009). Ecosystem Services Pro-vided by Shellfish Aquaculture. East Coast Shellfish Growers Association. Presenta-tion.

Sean Callahan is a second-year Master of Pub-lic Policy student at the Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy at the University of Virginia. He is primarily interested in eco-nomic development policy.

Ruth Schaap is a second year in the Frank Bat-ten School of Leadership & Public Policy and is interested in environmental and energy policy.

Grace Stuntz is an MPP Candidate at UVA’s Frank Batten School of Leadership in Public Policy, with a BS in Biomedical Engineering from UVA as well. She is originally from Alex-andria, VA.

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The Dillon Rule: An Impediment to Local Self-Governance?

by Neal Modi

“All politics is local” is a common expression in politics today. Yet, tip O’Neill was not referring specifically to Virginia when he

stated those words because Virginia is a Dillon Rule state. This means that localities such as the City of Charlottesville can make few decisions without state approval. Unfortunately, the Dillon Rule has limited the authority of municipalities to the extent that they are unable to carry out essential local policies independently. Therefore, given the burdens the Dillon Rule places on Vir-ginia communities, our state government needs to re-evaluate its use.

The Dillon Rule was authored by John Forrest Dillon, an American jurist and law professor who revolutionized the relationship between state and local governments in an 1868 opinion. In that opinion, Dillon stated:

“Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from, the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they can-not exist. As it creates, so may it destroy. If it may destroy, it may abridge and control.”

Although originally a response to local cor-ruption and fiscal irresponsibility, Dillon’s Rule has evolved into a mechanism that forc-es municipalities to operate in the shadow of state governments. At a minimum, it asserts that there is no such thing as an inherent right to local self-government.

Additionally, the large number of U.S. and state court decisions in favor of the Dillon Rule has institutionalized its use. The Su-preme Court has recognized state preemi-

nence in such cases as Merrill v. Monticello (1891) and Hunter v. Pittsburgh (1907), the latter of which upheld the power of the Pennsylvania state legislature to alter or abol-ish, at will, the charters of municipalities.

Specifically in Virginia, the courts have established that local governments can only exercise: “1) those powers that are specifically conferred to them by the Virginia General Assembly, 2) those powers that are necessary or fairly implied from a specific grant of au-thority, and 3) those powers that are essential to the purposes of government.”

Regrettably, the Dillon Rule has been met with little resistance, and even encourage-ment, for over one hundred years. As cities and counties become larger, they require greater action by local officials. Therefore, the Dillon Rule is becoming a serious im-pediment to local governance.

today, the implications of the Dillon Rule are extensive. take for instance counties’ and cities’ needs to raise revenue. Particularly in today’s economy, the possibility of localities altering their tax codes has been mentioned as a policy option to increase municipal revenue streams. However, the Dillon Rule can slow or even prevent this policy change. For example, a few years ago in Norfolk, the city government wanted to reduce the burden of rising real estate values by exempt-ing a portion of homeowner’s property taxes. Yet local officials did not decide the merits of this measure. Instead, state legislators, who likely had no ties with the City of Norfolk,

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were the only officials who could choose whether this tax relief was justified. As Jesse Richardson, a professor in the Department of Urban Affairs and Planning at Virginia tech, put it, “The General Assembly sets out which taxes municipalities may impose, how they may impose them and, in some cases, the tax rate.”

This example raises a critically important question: How efficient, or even democratic, is the Dillon Rule?

As expected, opponents of the Dillon Rule have attacked its use based on the restrictions it places on localities trying to adopt creative, unique and immediate solutions to local problems. In addition, they believe that the Dillon Rule bars local governments from de-livering services in an efficient manner, and forces local governments to hire lobbyists to compel state legislators to allow the locali-ties greater power. Most importantly, they argue that it is a “one-size-fits-all, top-down” approach to government that harms local governments and their constituents.

These complaints are particularly pressing in the twenty-first century. Given the large amount of goods and services that local governments provide to state citizens, those governments cannot afford to be constrained by the state legislature. If a city or county cannot successfully institute a new policy without state approval, many delays can occur in the day-to-day functioning of local government. Although this may have ben-efits, there must be a limit on how much power state legislatures have over municipal governments’ policy decisions. Even more worrisome is the absence of accountability. If state legislators are making the decisions,

why then are local officials being held liable for unpopular or unsuccessful policies?

Fortunately, alternatives to the Dillon Rule exist.Home Rule is a possible solution. Home Rule proscribes that local governments may exercise all authority not specifically prohib-ited by the state’s constitution or statutory law. And so, Home Rule allows communities to solve their own problems, places account-ability and responsibility onto local officials, and enables local citizens to have a direct and instant effect on local governance.

But Home Rule is not without its disad-vantages; some even consider Home Rule to be more troublesome than the Dillon Rule. When comparing two states of similar size over a one-year period (Virginia [Dil-lon Rule] and Ohio [Home Rule]), research shows that there were “a remarkably low number of [court] cases considering the application of Dillon’s Rule, and a far larger number addressing Home Rule.” The im-plication is that when locales adopt numer-ous and diverse policies relating to the same issue, i t leads to more contested cases in state courts. Therefore, Home Rule may be more difficult than initially expected. In fact, Home Rule may create unnecessary and even detrimental competition among cities and counties, which would create instability within the state.

Furthermore, in Virginia, some reports show that the Dillon Rule is not as bad as conventional wisdom may make it appear. According to a Hampton Roads Chamber of Commerce Report, “an average of 60% or more of the jurisdictional authority bills passed favored the municipalities.” Although

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this report should not serve to mitigate the Dillon Rule’s consequences, it may be true that its effects are overstated.

Nevertheless, state-local jurisdiction issues still conflict and tend to fall into one of two major categories: issues that are too large for narrow, local judgments, and issues that are too unique, and thereby require local, tailored solutions. Even courts, the end-of-the-road for such disputes, have had a hard time determining which policies belong to which level of government. Therefore, there must be an agency to bridge the gap. Enter regional governing bodies or regionalism. Regionalism could become an acceptable solution to address issues that are provincial in nature but not state-wide in scope.

Indeed, establishing a new regional level of government would be a paradigm shift in governance, but given the respective ad-vantages and disadvantages of the Home and Dillon Rules, it may have some merit. to establish a regional authority, both the state and municipal levels must be willing to concede some powers, must invest faith and trust into that governing body, and, most importantly, must see that body as legitimate. Luckily, this level of governance is not entirely new. As a state, we have many well-established regional public entities such as regional planning district commissions, regional business development organizations, and regional transportation boards. Overall, Virginia should implement a regional gov-erning system to serve the needs of com-munities efficiently, to prevent state legisla-tors from having complete power over local decision-making, and to maintain some level of continuity and stability.

ConclusionThrough its earliest years, the Dillon Rule controlled corrupt and incompetent local governments. today, the Dillon Rule has led to statewide uniformity on a range of issues, but has sacrificed local autonomy. Mean-while, Home Rule moves authority away from distant and insensitive state govern-ments to local, on-the-scene government entities. However, Home Rule is insufficient because it damages state-wide stability. As a result, instead of completely giving author-ity to the state or to localities, it may be wise to find a middle-ground. Regionalism is this middle-ground. Given the heterogeneity in a state like Virginia, breaking the state into legitimate regional governments is a credible solution to state-local conflict. In the end, doing so may provide an answer to an issue that has implications for every state and local policy.

Endnotes1 Clinton v. Cedar Rapids and the Missouri River Railroad, (24 Iowa 455, 1868)2 http://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/government/about/dillon-rule.htm3 Jesse J. Richardson, Jr. and Robert Puentes, Is Home Rule the Answer? Clarifying the Influence of the Dillon Rule on Growth Management, (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and The Brook-ings Institution Center on Urban and Metropoli-tan Policy, 2003), p. 16. 4 http://www.lwv-fairfax.org/files/lwv-dillon-dtp-99041.pdf5 Jesse J. Richardson, Jr. and Robert Puentes, Is Home Rule the Answer? Clarifying the Influence of the Dillon Rule on Growth Management, (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and The Brook-ings Institution Center on Urban and Metropoli-tan Policy, 2003), p. 18.6 The Hampton Roads Chamber of Commerce,

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task Force on the Dillon Rule, 1999, p. 12-13.

Neal Modi comes to the University of Virginia from sunny Virginia Beach, Virginia. A third-year Political Philosophy, Policy, and Law and Government Double major, he one day wishes to pursue a career in law and public policy. A 2007 graduate of the Sorensen Institute for Political Leadership, Neal has always had an interest in public affairs. Currently, he is an intern at the U.Va. Center for Politics where among other things he contributes to the Crystal Ball.

About the Illustrator

Jason Anderson, of West Chester, Ohio, is a senior at the Washington University in St. Louis. He is majoring in Computer Science. At some point, Jason started drawing on his class notes, a habit which he continues to this day despite graver

academic consequences. He works or has worked for almost every on-campus publication at Washington University, from the daily student newspaper to the

music and sexuality magazines. If he could draw for a living, he definitely would - it beats coding any day.

The Center for Undergraduate Excellence (CUE)

The Center for Undergraduate Excellence advises students regarding undergraduate research opportunities and national scholarships and fellowships. Students are encouraged to visit the Center throughout their undergraduate careers. For more information about the Center, please visit its website at www.virginia.edu/cue or its office at 305 Harrison Institute/Small Special Collections Library.

Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy

The Masters of Public Policy at the Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy has been established to prepare students for careers in both domestic and international policy arenas. The program provides students with the substantive knowledge, analytical skills, and ethical foundation needed for public leadership. The Frank Batten School now offers both an accelerated and a two-year MPP. For more information about the Frank Batten School, please visit its website at http://batten.virginia.edu/ or its office in Varsity Hall.

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