fall 2013, volume 15 · )hknly mvv[ihss nhtlz david glickstein editor, grant coordinator +h]pk pz h...

$: Fall 2013, Volume 15 · )HKNLY MVV[IHSS NHTLZ David Glickstein Editor, Grant Coordinator +H]PK PZ H ZLUPVY THQVYPUN PU 7VSP[PJHS :JPLUJL 4\ZPJ 7LYMVYTHUJL HUK Latin. Within political$
Fall 2013, Volume 15

Dear Reader,

It is with great pleasure that we present the Fall 2013 edition of the Journal VM�<UKLYNYHK\H[L�0U[LYUH[PVUHS�:[\KPLZ��6\Y�LKP[VYPHS�Z[Hќ�Z[YP]LK�[V�SVJH[L�[OL�TVZ[�JVTWLSSPUN�HYN\TLU[Z�HTVUN�H�WSL[OVYH�VM�PTWYLZZP]L��ZVWOPZ[PJH[LK��HUK�LUNHNPUN�Z\ITPZZPVUZ��6\Y�ÄUHS�ZLSLJ[PVU�YLÅLJ[Z�IV[O�our goal to showcase the world’s premier undergraduate research and our mission to explore the depth and breadth of International Studies.

;OL�WYVK\J[PVU�VM�[OPZ�LKP[PVU�PZ�[OL�YLZ\S[�VM�HU�L_JLW[PVUHS�LKP[VYPHS�Z[Hќ�and the widespread support of the L&S Honors Program and the Coddon -HTPS`�-V\UKH[PVU��(KKP[PVUHSS �̀�P[�PZ�[OL�MY\P[�VM�V]LY�H�KLJHKL»Z�^VY[O�VM�^VYR�MYVT�U\TLYV\Z�<>�Z[\KLU[Z�HUK�MHJ\S[ �̀�;V�HSS�[OVZL�[OH[�OH]L�contributed to the journal both this year and in years past, we would like [V�VќLY�V\Y�TVZ[�ZPUJLYL�[OHURZ�

;OL�ZL]LU�Z\ITPZZPVUZ�^L�OH]L�ZLSLJ[LK�PUJS\KL�YLZLHYJO�MYVT�HJYVZZ�[OL�NSVIL��;VNL[OLY��[OL`�JVTWYPZL�VUL�VM�V\Y�TVZ[�KP]LYZL�LKP[PVUZ�[V�KH[L��(Z�`V\�YLHK��^L�OVWL�`V\�ÄUK�[OH[�[OPZ�ZLTLZ[LY»Z�LKP[PVU�VM�1<0:�PZ�HZ�L_JLW[PVUHS�HZ�^L�ILSPL]L�P[�PZ�

Alex Reed and Sophia Jones Editors-In-Chief

Journal of Undergraduate International Studies

Letter from the Editors

32013Fall

;OL�]PL^Z�L_WYLZZLK�PU�1<0:�HYL�[OVZL�VM�[OL�H\[OVYZ�HSVUL��HUK�KV�UV[�L_WYLZZ�HU�LKP[VYPHS�consensus. The authors are responsible for all information contained in articles. The editors KV�UV[�HZZ\TL�YLZWVUZPIPSP[`�MVY�[OL�]HSPKP[`�VM�[OL�MHJ[Z�L_WYLZZLK�PU�[OL�HY[PJSLZ�

JUIS is published bi-annually and its contents are copyrighted and cannot be reproduced or re-written in any way without written permission.

The Journal of Undergraduate International Studies would like to acknowledge its founder HUK�ÄYZ[�LKP[VY�PU�JOPLM��+H]PK�*VKKVU��;OL�ÄYZ[�[^V�PZZ\LZ�VM�[OPZ�QV\YUHS�^LYL�W\ISPZOLK�^P[O�[OL�NLULYV\Z�Z\WWVY[�VM�[OL�<UP]LYZP[`�VM�>PZJVUZPU�4HKPZVU�3LHKLYZOPW�;Y\Z[�HUK�continued publication is made possible through the Coddon Family Foundation. Additional Z\WWVY[�PZ�WYV]PKLK�I`�[OL�<UP]LYZP[`�VM�>PZJVUZPU�4HKPZVU�*VSSLNL�VM�3L[[LYZ�HUK�:JPLUJLZ�/VUVYZ�7YVNYHT��[OL�6ѝJL�VM�[OL�=PJL�7YV]VZ[�MVY�;LHJOPUN�HUK�3LHYUPUN��[OL�+LWHY[TLU[�VM�7VSP[PJHS�:JPLUJL��[OL�.SVIHS�:[\KPLZ�7YVNYHT��7\ISPJH[PVUZ�*VTTP[[LL��HUK�[OL�<UP]LYZP[`�VM�>PZJVUZPU�4HKPZVU�3PIYHY`�:`Z[LT�

;OL�JV]LY�WOV[VNYHWO�^HZ�[HRLU�I`�2LSSPHUU�)SHaLR��<UP]LYZP[`�VM�>PZJVUZPU�4HKPZVU�

Don't Look Down. I saw a poster in a Norwegian train station that described Norway as "unspoiled, uncrowded, unequaled." I could not agree more, especially after hiking two hours [V�HYYP]L�H[�[OPZ�]PL^�VM�7YLPRLZ[VSLU�Z�PTWYLZZP]L��TL[LY�KYVW��


For questions, comments, or feedback write to:

[email protected]

http://juis.global.wisc.edu/

JUIS4

Journal Staff

Alex ReedEditor-in-Chief

Alex, originally from New Jersey, is a Q\UPVY�W\YZ\PUN�H�))(�PU�-PUHUJL�HUK�HU�honors degree in Political Science. His interests lie in international economics, international political economy, foreign KPYLJ[�PU]LZ[TLU[��HUK�LJVUVTPJ�KL]LSVWTLU[��0U�:WYPUN��OL�^PSS�OH]L�[V�ZH`�NVVKI`L�[V�4HKPZVU��HUK�1<0:��ILMVYL�OL�[YH]LSZ�[V�+LUTHYR�[V�Z[\K`�H[�*VWLUOHNLU�)\ZPULZZ�:JOVVS��/PZ�MH]VYP[L�HJ[P]P[PLZ�PUJS\KL�NVSÄUN��ZHPSPUN��HUK�^H[JOPUN�)HKNLY�MVV[IHSS�

Sophia JonesEditor-in-Chief

Sophia Jones is a senior completing her undergraduate degree in Communication (Y[Z�HUK�(Y[�/PZ[VY`�H[�[OL�<UP]LYZP[`�VM�>PZJVUZPU�4HKPZVU��^OLYL�ZOL�^PSS�NYHK\H[L�PU��:OL�^VYRZ�H[�>:<4��the local studet radio station as their >LIZP[L�HUK�:VJPHS�4LKPH�+PYLJ[VY�HUK�PZ�[OL�.HSSLY`�*VVYKPUH[VY�MVY�[OL�6]LY[\YL�Center for the Arts. In her spare time in 4HKPZVU��ZOL�JV�OVZ[Z�[OL�^LLRS`�YHKPV�ZOV^�,S�4VUKL�,�4\ZP]��H�^VYSK�T\ZPJ�WYVNYHT�VU�>:<4� ��-4�4HKPZVU�Student Radio. Outside of school, she enjoys practicing yoga, reading, and cooking.

Samantha Jorgensen Editor, Social Media Coordinator

Samantha is a junior majoring in Political Science with a focus in international relations and global security. Her main area of interest is Latin America, LZWLJPHSS`�)YHaPS��HUK�ZOL�PZ�WSHUUPUN�VU�studying abroad there next year. She also studies Portuguese and hopes to VUL�KH`�ÄUK�H�JHYLLY�^OLYL�ZOL�JHU�\[PSPaL�[OL�SHUN\HNL��0U�OLY�MYLL�[PTL�ZOL�enjoys baking, reading, and attending )HKNLY�MVV[IHSS�NHTLZ�

David GlicksteinEditor, Grant Coordinator

+H]PK�PZ�H�ZLUPVY�THQVYPUN�PU�7VSP[PJHS�:JPLUJL��4\ZPJ�7LYMVYTHUJL��HUK�Latin. Within political science, he has a particular fascination with nuclear policy, terrorism, and the Israeli-Palestinian JVUÅPJ[��<WVU�NYHK\H[PVU��OL�OVWLZ�[V�continue his studies on these topics. )LZPKLZ�OH]PUN�H�WHZZPVU�MVY�WVSP[PJZ�HUK�PU[LYUH[PVUHS�HќHPYZ��OL�PZ�HU�HK]VJH[L�MVY�classical music and frequently attends the symphony and other concerts.

Sarah KvithyllEditor

Sarah is a senior majoring in Political :JPLUJL�^P[O�H�JLY[PÄJH[L�PU�(MYPJHU�

Studies. She has spent time studying JVUÅPJ[�YLZVS\[PVU�HUK�KLTVJYH[PaH[PVU�PU�0ZYHLS�HUK�:V\[O�(MYPJH��YLZWLJ[P]LS �̀�(M[LY�ZOL�NYHK\H[LZ�PU�4H`��ZOL�^V\SK�SPRL�[V�TV]L�[V�>HZOPUN[VU�+*�[V�^VYR�^P[O�KLTVJYH[PaPUN�JV\U[YPLZ�[V�PTWYV]L�[OL�X\HSP[`�VM�[OLPY�LSLJ[PVUZ�and reduce corruption within their NV]LYUTLU[Z��0U�OLY�MYLL�[PTL��ZOL�enjoys listening to good music and ^H[JOPUN�TV]PLZ�

Grace LeppanenEditor

Grace is a sophomore and has not decided on a major. She plans to attend law school.

Daniel ThomasEditor

+HUPLS��H�ZVWOVTVYL�MYVT�+LU]LY��Colorado, is pursuing a degree in International Studies, with a focus on global security. Interested in Russian culture and politics, he will spend the spring semester interning at the United :[H[LZ�,TIHZZ`�PU�4VZJV^��9\ZZPH��0U�his free time, he enjoys skiing, cycling, and coaching debate.

Elizabeth StephensEditor

,SPaHIL[O�:[LWOLUZ�PZ�H�MYLZOTHU��


52013Fall

undecided in her major. She is most PU[LYLZ[LK�PU�^VYRPUN�PU�[OL�ÄLSK�VM�QV\YUHSPZT�VY�Z[\K`PUN�JYLH[P]L�^YP[PUN�or English. Outside of school she enjoys running, writing, and spending time with family and friends. She hopes to study abroad in England as a junior or senior.

Emily PankenEditor

Emily, a freshman from White Plains, New York is undecided in her major. Her main interests include journalism and international relations with a JVUJLU[YH[PVU�PU�4PKKSL�,HZ[LYU�HќHPYZ��She hopes to study abroad in Israel her junior year and further explore the Israeli-7HSLZ[PUPHU�JVUÅPJ[�HUK�WLHJL�WYVJLZZ��<WVU�NYHK\H[PVU�ZOL�^V\SK�SV]L�[V�^VYR�at a news station either as a foreign news correspondent or a producer of a news show.

Hannah KitslaarEditor

Hannah is a freshman from Green )H`��>PZJVUZPU��W\YZ\PUN�THQVYZ�PU�International Studies with a focus in global security, legal studies, and Russian. She will begin the Russian Flagship Program at the start of the :WYPUN��ZLTLZ[LY��0U�JVOLYLUJL�with the program, she will spend six

^LLRZ�Z[\K`PUN�H[�3VTVUVZV]�4VZJV^�:[H[L�<UP]LYZP[`�PU�[OL�Z\TTLY�VM�2015 as a prerequisite to the capstone academic year of study at St. Petersburg :[H[L�<UP]LYZP[`��(U�LU[O\ZPHZ[�VM�foreign languages and national security, she hopes to pursue a career in the Intelligence Community after graduation. Outside of class she enjoys exploring all [OH[�[OL�JP[`�VM�4HKPZVU�OHZ�[V�VќLY�

Ainsley NelsonEditor

(PUZSL`�PZ�H�MYLZOTHU�H[�[OL�<UP]LYZP[`�VM�>PZJVUZPU�4HKPZVU�HUK�OHZ�UV[�`L[�decided on her major. She is interested in international studies and learning foreign languages. Her free time is spent hanging out with friends, reading, dancing, eating, or listening to music. She is from Door County, Wisconsin and spends her summers working in area restaurants.

Yi JiangEditor, Layout Designer

Yi is a freshman majoring in Political Science, focusing on international relations, economics, and history, with particular interest in international KL]LSVWTLU[�JVUJLYUPUN�NSVIHS�WV]LY[`�HUK�OLHS[O�PULX\P[`��ZWLJPÄJHSS`�PU�Asia. She is also studying French

HUK�4HUKHYPU�*OPULZL��>OLU�ZOL�OHZ�ZWHYL�[PTL��ZOL�LUQV`Z�JYLH[P]L�writing, painting, reading, wandering outside, and pursuing graphic design. In the future she plans on attending NYHK\H[L�ZJOVVS�HUK�^VYRPUN�[V�KL]LSVW�Z\Z[HPUHISL�ZVS\[PVUZ�[V�Y\YHS�WV]LY[`��


JUIS6


72013Fall

pages 8-18 ��)\`PUN�3LNP[PTHJ`!�7\ISPJ�.VVKZ��3LNP[PTHJ`�:WPSSV]LY��HUK�[OL� Recruitment of Lashkar-e-Taiba by Brian Yost

pages 19-30 ��+LSLNH[PVU�MYVT�9LNPVUHS�[V�.SVIHS!�(:,(5�HUK�[OL�<5�PU�*VUÅPJ[�� 0U[LY]LU[PVU� by Audrye Wong

pages 31-41 3. Turkey and the Post-Cold War Politics of Energy by Michael Goldstein

pages 42-51 ��;OL�-LIY\HY`��0UJPKLU[!�(U�,JVUVTPJ�7LYZWLJ[P]L�VU�[OL�� +LJVSVUPaH[PVU�VM�;HP^HU� by James Meresman

pages 52-55 ��<UKPќLYLU[PH[LK�*P[PaLUZOPW�MVY�(SS��HUK�(SS�-VY�6UL�<UP[LK�0UKPH by Nina Assadi

pages 56-71 ��;HYNL[PUN�+PќLYLU[�9VV[�*H\ZLZ!�(U�(UHS`ZPZ�VM�7VSPJPLZ�*\YIPUN�� Witchcraft Accusations in Ghana by Dorien Venhoeven

pages 72-79 ��;OL�)\ZOLOY�+LSH`Z!�+PK�[OL�0YHUPHUZ�(IHUKVU�;OLPY�-PUHUJPHS�� Obligations? by Matthew Michaelides

Table of Contents

Fall 2013, Volume 15

JUIS8

OL�WYL]HPSPUN�SP[LYH[\YL�VU�Z[H[LSLZZ�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ�VM[LU�H[[YPI\[LZ�YLILS�NYV\W�MVYTH[PVU�HUK�YLJY\P[TLU[�[V�̧ NYLLK�VY�̧ NYPL]HUJL�¹�̂ OPSL�H[[YPI\[PUN�[OL�[LYYVYPZT�[V�YLSH[P]L�KLWYP]H[PVU�VY�H�̧ J\S[\YL�VM�]PVSLUJL�¹�)`�HUHSàPUN�3HZROHY�L�;HPIH� �3HZORHY�� H�NYV\W� [OH[� MHPSZ� [V� Ä[� L_JS\ZP]LS`� PU[V� [OL� ¸YLILS�NYV\W¹�VY�¸[LYYVYPZ[�NYV\W¹�[H_VUVT �̀�[OPZ�WHWLY�WVZP[Z�O`WV[OLZLZ�VU�[OL�JH\ZHS�TLJOHUPZT�VM�3HZORHY�

YLJY\P[TLU[��;OPZ�WHWLY�\[PSPaLZ�LTWPYPJHS�L]PKLUJL�VU�3HZORHY�TPSP[HU[Z�[V�HYN\L�[OL�JLU[YHSP[`�VM�W\ISPJ�NVVKZ�WYV]PZPVU�HUK�[OL�SLNP[PTHJ`�ZWPSSV]LY�PU�YLJY\P[TLU[��-\Y[OLYTVYL��P[�HYN\LZ�[OH[�[OLZL�O`WV[OLZLZ�JHU�IL�]HSPKS`�HWWSPLK�[V�H�NLVWVSP[PJHSS`�ZPNUPÄJHU[�Z\IZL[�VM�V[OLY�[LYYVYPZ[�NYV\WZ�

The popular perception that the JVSSHWZL�VM�[OL�:V]PL[�<UPVU�THYRLK�HU�L_WSVZPVU�VM�]PVSLUJL�I`�UVU�Z[H[L�HJ[VYZ��ZWLJPÄJHSS`�PUZ\YNLU[�HUK�[LYYVYPZ[�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ��PUP[PH[LK�JVUZPKLYHISL�HJHKLTPJ�PU[LYLZ[�PU�[OLZL�JVUÅPJ[Z�HUK�their participants. Empirical analysis has generated many possible theories L_WSHPUPUN�Ô`�PUKP]PK\HSZ�[HRL�\W�arms against powerful and weak states HSPRL��6\[�VM�JVUÅPJ[PUN�HJJV\U[Z�VM�]PVSLUJL�HYPZLZ�[OL�NYLLK�NYPL]HUJL�KLIH[L��ÔL[OLY�NYPL]HUJLZ�HYPZPUN�from injustices perpetrated by the state induce the formation of rebel groups HUK�TV[P]H[L�WHY[PJPWH[PVU�^P[OPU�them or whether the many material VWWVY[\UP[PLZ�JP]PS�^HYZ�IYPUN�H[[YHJ[�SLZZ�scrupulous groups and participants.1

>OPSL�HWWSPJHISL�[V�PUZ\YNLUJPLZ�ZLPaPUN�[LYYP[VY �̀�YLJY\P[PUN�TLTILYZ��HUK�ÄNO[PUN�Z[H[L�MVYJLZ�PU�[OLPY�YLZWLJ[P]L�JV\U[YPLZ��

[OL�]HZ[�THQVYP[`�VM�[OLZL�[OLVYPLZ�MHPS�to apply to insurgent groups operating in and recruiting out of one state, while engaging in irregular warfare and terrorist

attacks in another. Lashkar-e-Taiba �3HZORHY��H�7HRPZ[HUP�TPSP[HU[�NYV\W�ÄNO[PUN�MVY�[OL�ZLJLZZPVU�VM�0UKPHU�2HZOTPY�HUK�1HTT\��L_LTWSPÄLZ�[OPZ�type of categorically ambiguous group. Exhibiting many of the characteristics of both insurgent and terrorist groups, 3HZORHY�MHPSZ�[V�ULH[S`�Ä[�PU[V�[OL�

WYL]HPSPUN�[OLVYL[PJHS�MYHTL^VYRZ�VM�either insurgent or terrorist recruitment.

This paper attempts to rectify this gap in the literature by examining

the institutions and membership of 3HZORHY��\[PSPaPUN�YLJLU[�LTWPYPJHS�KH[H�NH[OLYLK�VU�TVYL�[OHU� ��Lashkar militants.2 Drawing upon these empirics this paper both challenges [OL�HWWSPJHIPSP[`�VM�WYL]HPSPUN�[OLVYPLZ�VM�terrorist recruitment, and illustrates the geographic and educational similarity

Buying Legitimacy:

T

by Brian Yost

Brian Yost. )YPHU�@VZ[�PZ�H�ZLUPVY�H[�5VY[O^LZ[LYU�<UP]LYZP[`�Z[\K`PUN�7VSP[PJHS�:JPLUJL��,JVUVTPJZ��and International Studies with a concentration in Issues in International Security. This paper was written in 7YVMLZZVY�(UH�(YQVUH�Z�=PVSLU[�9LILSZ�ZLTPUHY�HUK�OL�^V\SK�SPRL�[V�[OHUR�OLY�MVY�OLY�Z\WWVY[�HUK�N\PKHUJL�

Public Goods, Legitimacy Spillover, and the Recruitment of Lashkar-e-Taiba

"Exhibiting many of the characteristics of both

insurgent and terrorist groups, Lashkar fails to

ULH[S`�Ä[�PU[V�[OL�WYL]HPSPUN�[OLVYL[PJHS�MYHTL^VYRZ�of either insurgent or terrorist recruitment. "

92013Fall

by Brian Yost

among Lashkar’s membership. Lashkar’s PUZ[P[\[PVUZ�HUK�WYV]PZPVU�VM�W\ISPJ�NVVKZ�act as key causal factors in recruitment. ;OL�ÄYZ[�ZLJ[PVU�ZL[Z�MVY[O�ZVTL�IHZPJ�KLÄUP[PVUZ�YLSL]HU[�[V�[OL�KPZJ\ZZPVU�VM�terrorism and insurgency, it then details the background of Lashkar. Introduced PU�[OL�ZLJVUK�ZLJ[PVU�PZ�KLZJYPW[P]L�statistics of Lashkar recruitment that refute much of the current literature on terrorist recruitment. The third section, argues that Lashkar’s successful JYLH[PVU�VM�JP]PS�ZVJPL[`�PUZ[P[\[PVUZ�HUK�WYV]PZPVU�VM�W\ISPJ�NVVKZ�HSSV^Z�MVY�the recruitment of Pakistanis into the NYV\W��;OL�MV\Y[O�ZLJ[PVU�WYV]PKLZ�some empirics that support my theory of Lashkar recruitment and details the limitations of this theory and of the LTWPYPJHS�L]PKLUJL��;OL�ÄM[O�ZLJ[PVU�JVUJS\KLZ�I`�PSS\Z[YH[PUN�[OL�YLSL]HUJL�VM�this analysis to the study of terrorist and rebel group recruitment.

0��+LÄUP[PVUZ�HUK�[OL�Background of Lashkar-e-Taiba

;V�H�JLY[HPU�L_[LU[��JH[LNVYPaPUN�the militant nature of Lashkar becomes TVYL�H�ZLTHU[PJ�X\LZ[PVU�VM�KLÄUP[PVUZ�[OHU�H�Z\IZ[HU[P]L�KLIH[L��;OL�ZPTPSHY�[HJ[PJZ��TV[P]H[PVUZ��HUK�Z[Y\J[\YLZ�VM�many insurgent and terrorist groups, JV\WSLK�^P[O�TLKPH�UHYYH[P]LZ�[OH[�apply labels of terrorism more for their connation rather than their academic HJJ\YHJ �̀�THRL�[OL�JH[LNVYPaH[PVU�VM�Lashkar complicated. John Lynn in

Battle: A History of Combat and Culture, argues terrorism and insurgency exist VU�[OL�ZHTL�WYVNYLZZPVU�VM�]PVSLUJL�HUK�VYNHUPaH[PVU��HUK�[OL�SL]LS�VM�TH[LYPHS�HUK�O\THU�YLZV\YJLZ�H]HPSHISL�[V�[OL�group determines the nature of its ]PVSLUJL�HUK�[O\Z�P[Z�JSHZZPÄJH[PVU��

This paper focuses on the KLÄUP[PVU�of insurgency from James Fearon and +H]PK�3HP[PU»Z�,[OUPJP[ �̀�0UZ\YNLUJ �̀�HUK�*P]PS�>HY"�¸PUZ\YNLUJ`�PZ�H�[LJOUVSVN`�VM�TPSP[HY`�JVUÅPJ[�JOHYHJ[LYPaLK�I`�small, lightly armed bands practicing N\LYPSSH�^HYMHYL�MYVT�H�Y\YHS�IHZL�HYLH�¹5 Other accounts of insurgency stress the PTWVY[HUJL�VM�YLILS�NV]LYUHUJL��^P[O�AHJOHYPHO�4HTWPSS`�HYN\PUN�[OL�JLU[YHSP[`�VM�YLILSZ�HZ�JV\U[LYZ[H[L�ZV]LYLPNUZ� HUK�(UH�(YQVUH�LTWOHZPaPUN�[OL�YVSL�VM�YLILS�PUZ[P[\[PVUZ�PU�JP]PS�^HY��)Y\JL�/VќTHU� in Inside Terrorism, KLÄULZ�terrorism as the “deliberate creation and L_WSVP[H[PVU�VM�MLHY�[OYV\NO�]PVSLUJL�VY�[OL�[OYLH[�VM�]PVSLUJL�PU�[OL�W\YZ\P[�VM�WVSP[PJHS�JOHUNL�¹�3ÙU�I\PSKZ�\WVU�[OPZ�KLÄUP[PVU�[V�PUJS\KL�[OL�PUK\JLTLU[�VM�outrage in the target audience as an additional goal of terrorism. Alexander 3LL�JOHYHJ[LYPaLZ�[LYYVYPZ[�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ�HZ�LUNHNPUN�PU�]PVSLUJL��ÔPJO�WYPVYP[PaLZ�[OL�PUK\JPUN�VM�H�WZ`JOVSVNPJHS�LќLJ[�V]LY�HU�PTTLKPH[L�TPSP[HY`�NHPU�10 Thus [OL�SP[LYH[\YL�WYPTHYPS`�KPќLYLU[PH[LZ�insurgent and terrorist groups by examining the goal-orientation of the NYV\W»Z�]PVSLUJL��:Ù[OLZPaPUN�[OLZL�KLÄUP[PVUZ�JSHZZPÄLZ�H�[LYYVYPZ[�NYV\W�HZ�VUL�LUNHNPUN�PU�]PVSLUJL�MVY�[OL�

purpose of political change through the mechanism of inducing psychological LќLJ[��LP[OLY�MLHY�VY�V\[YHNL��UV[�through tactical military gain. The background and methods of Lashkar will illustrate how placing Lashkar into Z\JO�ULH[S`�KLSPULH[LK�JH[LNVYPLZ�WYV]LZ�challenging.

Following the instigation of the TVZ[�YLJLU[�MHJL�VM�[OL�2HZOTPY�JVUÅPJ[�I`�[OL�1HTT\�HUK�2HZOTPY�3PILYH[PVU�-YVU[��123-��PU�� 4HYRHa�+HH^H[�^HS�0YZOHK��HU�VYNHUPaH[PVU�SLK�I`�/HÄa�4\OHTTHK�:HLLK�HUK�WYVWHNH[PUN�scriptualist Sunni Islam, established Lashkar as its militant wing to engage 0UKPHU�ZLJ\YP[`�MVYJLZ�PU�2HZOTPY��-V\Y�Lashkar military compounds train recruits in guerilla warfare and combat tactics, signaling the insurgent and [LYYVYPZ[�UH[\YL�VM�[OL�VYNHUPaH[PVU»Z�strategy for eliminating the Indian military WYLZLUJL�PU�2HZOTPY�11 Tariq Ali argues [OL�7HRPZ[HUP�(YT`�WYV]PKLK�JYP[PJHS�support in the founding of Lashkar, to the extent that a counterfactual absence of Pakistani state patronage would OH]L�WYLJS\KLK�[OL�LZ[HISPZOTLU[�VM�[OL�VYNHUPaH[PVU�12 Additionally, Ashley ;LSSPZ�PU�;OL�4LUHJL�[OH[�PZ�3HZORHY�L�;HPIH�HYN\LZ�[OH[�L]LU�MVSSV^PUN�the initiation of the US War on Terror PU��[OL�7HRPZ[HUP�0U[LY�:LY]PJLZ�0U[LSSPNLUJL�OHZ�THPU[HPULK�L_[LUZP]L��though increasingly clandestine, support of Lashkar in the form of safe OH]LUZ��[YHPUPUN��LX\PWTLU[��HUK��TVZ[�critically, funding. He also asserts the

Buying Legitimacy: Public Goods, Legitimacy Spillover, and the Recruitment of Lashkar-e-Taiba / Brian Yost

JUIS10

external patronage of Lashkar goes far beyond that of the Pakistani Army HUK�0:0"�;LSSPZ�HYN\LZ�3HZORHY�YHPZLZ�funds from businesses, transnational VYNHUPaLK�JYPTL�NYV\WZ��HUK�0ZSHTPJ�NGOs and charities.13 Stephen Tankel HZZLY[Z�3HZORHY�J\YYLU[S`�KLYP]LZ�T\JO�of its funding from the remittances of the Pakistani diaspora and wealthy :HSHÄZ[Z�PU�[OL�7LYZPHU�.\SM�� Leaked <:�KPWSVTH[PJ�JHISLZ�VќLY�Z\WWVY[�[V�[OLZL�HYN\TLU[Z"�+LJSHU�>LSZO�UV[LZ�Saudi front companies and charitable UL[^VYRZ�OH]L�SH\UKLYLK�Z\IZ[HU[PHS�funds to Lashkar, and Saudi donors ^LYL�[OL�¸TVZ[�ZPNUPÄJHU[�ZV\YJL�of funding to Sunni terrorist groups ^VYSK^PKL�¹15 These transnational actors may be playing a growing role in funding 3HZORHY"�;HURLS�HYN\LZ�[OL�PUP[PH[PVU�of the U.S. War on Terror in 2002 OHZ�ZL]LYLS`�JVUZ[YHPULK�7HRPZ[HU»Z�HIPSP[`�HUK�YLZVS]L�[V�Z\WWVY[�[LYYVYPZ[�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ��MVYJPUN�3HZORHY�[V�ZLLR�funding elsewhere.��

This substantial patronage, coupled with Lashkar’s strict hierarchical leadership and militaristic discipline and precision, has propelled Lashkar [V�[OL�aLUP[O�VM�2HZOTPY�TPSP[HUJ �̀�6M[LU�JOHYHJ[LYPaLK�HZ�VUL�VM�[OL�TVZ[�powerful militant groups in South Asia,�� Lashkar has carried out terrorist attacks and paramilitary raids on Indian military WLYZVUULS�HUK�JP]PSPHUZ�HSPRL��;OV\NO�these attacks had historically been JVUÄULK�[V�0UKPHU�2HZOTPY�HUK�1HTT\��Lashkar has more recently stepped up attacks in major Indian cities, including [OL��4\TIHP�[LYYVYPZ[�H[[HJRZ�^OLYL��3HZORHY�N\UTLU�RPSSLK�TVYL�[OHU��JP]PSPHUZ�HUK�YHPZLK�[LUZPVUZ�IL[^LLU�

0UKPH�HUK�7HRPZ[HU�[V�HSHYTPUN�SL]LSZ�� Lashkar more commonly engages in guerilla attacks against Indian security MVYJLZ�PU�2HZOTPY�HUK�PUKPZJYPTPUH[L�]PVSLUJL�HNHPUZ[�UVU�4\ZSPTZ�PU�2HZOTPY��Lashkar, by massacring Hindu and :PRO�]PSSHNLYZ�PU�YLTV[L�OPSS�]PSSHNLZ�HUK�L_LJ\[PUN�OPNO�WYVÄSL�HUK�^LSS�WSHUULK�H[[HJRZ�VU�TPSP[HY`�IHZLZ�HUK�JVU]V`Z��TH_PTPaLZ�[OL�W\ISPJP[`�VM�P[Z�H[[HJRZ�and generates a climate of fear within 2HZOTPY�HUK�1HTT\�� )`�JYLH[PUN�a climate of fear and insecurity, while simultaneously raising the costs of Indian NV]LYUHUJL��3HZORHY�PZ�H[[LTW[PUN�[V�YLTV]L�[OL�0UKPHU�TPSP[HY`�HUK�JP]PSPHU�WYLZLUJL�PU�2HZOTPY�HUK�1HTT\�HUK�facilitate the Pakistani annexation of the region. This strategy illustrates the KPѝJ\S[`�PU�JSHZZPM`PUN�3HZORHY�HZ�HU�VYNHUPaH[PVU"�3HZORHY»Z�Z[YH[LN`�PUJS\KLZ�IV[O�[OL�\ZL�VM�[LYYVYPZT!�PUK\JPUN�political change by mechanisms of fear VY�V\[YHNL��HUK�PUZ\YNLU[�[HJ[PJZ!�N\LYPSSH�warfare to make the Indian presence in 2HZOTPY�[VV�JVZ[S`�[V�THPU[HPU��3HZORHY�HZ�HU�VYNHUPaH[PVU�PZ�UV[�LU[PYLS`�[LYYVYPZ[�or insurgent and thereby necessitates further study to understand its recruitment and the recruitment of similar groups.

II. Literature on Terrorist Recruitment

The material weakness of terrorist and insurgent groups and their susceptibility to defection makes the nature and quality of membership critical.20 This centrality of membership HUK�YLJY\P[TLU[�[V�]PVSLU[�JVUÅPJ[�THRLZ�the study of recruitment particularly ZHSPLU[�PU�\UKLYZ[HUKPUN�]PVSLU[�NYV\WZ�

and understanding the factors that WYLKPJ[�JVUÅPJ[�[V�\S[PTH[LS`�WYL]LU[�further bloodshed. This paper aims to show that institutions and networks VM�3HZORHY�PU�7HRPZ[HU�OH]L�H�JH\ZHS�LќLJ[�VU�YLJY\P[TLU[��-PN\YLZ��HUK��WYV]PKL�KH[H�VU�[OL�LK\JH[PVU��OVTL�WYV]PUJLZ��HUK�YLJY\P[TLU[�JOHUULSZ�VM� ��3HZORHY�TPSP[HU[Z�21�)LMVYL�PUJVYWVYH[PUN�[OLZL�KLZJYPW[P]L�Z[H[PZ[PJZ�into this analysis, outlined below are common hypotheses on terrorist and rebel recruitment.

Scholars often trace the origins of terrorist groups and subsequently their YLJY\P[TLU[�[V�[OL�WZ`JOVSVNPJHS�LќLJ[�VM�YLSH[P]L�KLWYP]H[PVU��*HYVSPUL�APLTRL�in The Same Light as Slavery: Building

a Global Antiterrorist Consensus argues NSVIHSPaH[PVU�VWLUZ�\W�T\JO�VM�[OL�world’s populace to images of wealth and prosperity that these people will UL]LY�L_WLYPLUJL��:OL�HYN\LZ�THU`�VM�[OLZL�PUKP]PK\HSZ�WLYJLP]L�[OLTZLS]LZ�HZ�oppressed, and combatting this “culture VM�]PVSLUJL¹�PU�7HRPZ[HU�^PSS�[HRL�KLÄUPUN�the national role of Islam and creating H�\UPM`PUN�UH[PVUHS�]PZPVU�[OYV\NO�[OPZ�KLÄUP[PVU�22

The literature also focuses on the opportunity costs of participation, arguing participants join based on H�YH[PVUHS�HZZLZZTLU[�VM�PUJLU[P]LZ�of joining and opportunity costs of engaging in insurgent or terrorist ]PVSLUJL��*VUJVYKHU[S �̀�YLJY\P[TLU[�JHU�IL�WYLKPJ[LK�I`�PUKP]PK\HSZ�^P[O�YLK\JLK�VWWVY[\UP[`�JVZ[Z�YLSH[P]L�[V�V[OLYZ�^OV�LUNHNL�PU�]PVSLUJL�HZ�H�means of rent-seeking. Eleonora Nilleson HUK�7OPSPW�=LY^PTW�HYN\L�YLK\JLK�VWWVY[\UP[`�JVZ[Z�VM�]PVSLUJL�I`�TLHUZ�


112013Fall

of reduced crop output increases rebel recruitment.23

3LL�ZÙ[OLZPaLZ�LSLTLU[Z�MYVT�[OL�[^V�WYL]PV\Z�MYHTL^VYRZ��HYN\PUN�that there exists a set socioeconomic threshold, below which member’s wealth and education preclude the necessary SL]LS�VM�LK\JH[PVU�[V�LUNHNL�PU�WVSP[PJHS�HJ[P]PZT�VY�]PVSLUJL��(IV]L�[OPZ�[OYLZOVSK��3LL�HYN\LZ��PUKP]PK\HSZ�^PSS�weigh the opportunity costs of engaging PU�WVSP[PJHS�]PVSLUJL�HUK�\S[PTH[LS`�[OVZL�ÔV�L_WLYPLUJL�LJVUVTPJ�KLWYP]H[PVU�YLSH[P]L�[V�[OL�V[OLY�TLTILYZ�VM�[OPZ�informed group will engage in political ]PVSLUJL�VY�[LYYVYPZT��

Finally, media outlets and certain authors often propagate the hypothesis that there exists a link between Islam and terrorism, thus implying that an PUKP]PK\HS»Z�YLSPNPVZP[`�VY�SHJR�[OLYLVM�JH\ZHSS`�PUÅ\LUJLZ�[OLPY�WHY[PJPWH[PVU�PU�H�[LYYVYPZ[�NYV\W��/PZ[VYPHU�)LYUHYK�Lewis, in linking the historical role of Islam and Islamic fundamentalism to modern Islamic terrorism lends

credence to hypotheses that religious YHKPJHSPaH[PVU�PUK\JLZ�WHY[PJPWH[PVU�PU�terrorism.25 Appeals to religion would [OLYLMVYL�IL�LќLJ[P]L�PU�YLJY\P[TLU[�HUK�TVYL�YLSPNPV\Z�PUKP]PK\HSZ�^V\SK�OH]L�H�ZPNUPÄJHU[S`�OPNOLY�SPRLSPOVVK�VM�QVPUPUN�Islamic terrorist groups.2

Contrasting Descriptive Statistics

These four theories of terrorist and rebel recruitment fail to accurately explain participation in Lashkar. Though [OLZL�HYN\TLU[Z�VќLY�MVY[O�THU`�\ZLM\S�TL[OVKZ�VM�JVUJLP]PUN�[LYYVYPZT��[OL`�do not match the empirics of Lashkar recruitment and therefore lose some L_[LYUHS�]HSPKP[`�HZ�[OLVYPLZ�HWWSPJHISL�[V�the broad spectrum of terrorist and rebel YLJY\P[TLU[��;OLZL�LTWPYPJZ�KPZWYV]L�[OLZL�[OLVYPLZ�HZ�L_[LYUHSS`�]HSPK�PU�regards to Lashkar and terrorist groups with a symbiotic or complementary YLSH[PVUZOPW�^P[O�[OLPY�OVZ[�Z[H[L"�[OV\NO�[OPZ�WHWLY�JOHYHJ[LYPaLZ�3HZORHY�HZ�H�terrorist group, Lashkar does exhibit

many of the traits of both an insurgent group and a terrorist group, and thus these authors would argue against the applicability of their frameworks [V�3HZORHY��UV[�[OL�PU]HSPKP[`�VM�[OLPY�theories. These empirics demonstrate [OLZL�[OLVYPLZ�T\Z[�IL�M\Y[OLY�KL]LSVWLK�[V�LUJVTWHZZ�[OL�]HZ[�THQVYP[`�VM�JHZLZ�they wish to explain.

(�JVTWHYPZVU�VM�ÄN\YL��HUK�Z[H[PZ[PJZ�VU�[OL�LK\JH[PVU�SL]LSZ�VM�7HRPZ[HUP�THSLZ�JOHSSLUNL�[OL�]HSPKP[`�of Ziemke’s and opportunity cost HYN\TLU[Z"�[OL�TLTILYZ�VM�3HZORHY�WVZZLZZ�H�ZPNUPÄJHU[S`�OPNOLY�SL]LS�VM�secular education than the Pakistani THSL�WVW\SH[PVU�VU�H]LYHNL�� Were YLSH[P]L�KLWYP]H[PVU�H�JVTWLSSPUN�[OLVY`�of terrorist recruitment, in this case why would the less educated members of 7HRPZ[HUP�ZVJPL[ �̀�ÔV�OH]L�ZLLU�ML^LY�VM�[OL�MY\P[Z�VM�NSVIHSPaH[PVU��[HRL�\W�HYTZ��9LSH[P]L�KLWYP]H[PVU�HSZV�MHPSZ�[V�L_WSHPU�[OL�ÄUKPUNZ�VM�ÄN\YL��"�[OL�]HZ[�THQVYP[`�VM�3HZORHY�ÄNO[LYZ�HYL�MYVT�the Punjab region of Pakistan, not from 0UKPHU�2HZOTPY��0M�PUKP]PK\HSZ�L_WLYPLUJLK�YLSH[P]L�KLWYP]H[PVU��[OL`�^V\SK�VM[LU�lash out at those they deem culpable of [OL�KLWYP]H[PVU��;OPZ�[OLVY`�JV\SK�Ä[�^P[O�ÄNO[LYZ�MYVT�0UKPHU�2HZOTPY�YLILSSPUN�IHZLK�VU�KLWYP]H[PVU�IHZLK�NYPL]HUJLZ��but it fails to explain the geographic trends of Lashkar membership. Ziemke HYN\LZ�7HRPZ[HU»Z��HUK�[OLYLMVYL�3HZORHY»Z��¸J\S[\YL�VM�]PVSLUJL�JHU�IL�KPTPUPZOLK�I`�KLÄUPUN�[OL�UH[PVUHS�YVSL�VM�0ZSHT"¹�� ironically, it is one of the more compelling national Islamic ]PZPVUZ��3HZORHY»Z�NVHS�VM�H�NYLH[LY�0ZSHTPJ�7HRPZ[HU�JVU[HPUPUN�2HZOTPY�HUK�


FIGURE 1.

JUIS12

1HTT\��[OH[�M\LSZ�T\JO�VM�[OL�]PVSLUJL�in the region. The arguments focused on the opportunity costs of participants ZPTPSHYS`�MHPS�[V�L_WSHPU�[OL�LTWPYPJZ"�[OL�JHKYLZ�VM�3HZORHY�OH]L�HJOPL]LK�OPNOLY�SL]LSZ�VM�LK\JH[PVU�[OHU�[OL�NYLH[LY�Pakistani male population.� �This higher SL]LS�VM�LK\JH[PVU�LX\H[LZ�[V�OPNOLY�opportunity costs associated with joining H�[LYYVYPZ[�VY�PUZ\YNLU[�NYV\W��/H]PUN�demonstrated that the membership VM�3HZORHY�OH]L�OPNOLY�VWWVY[\UP[`�JVHZ[�[OHU�[OL�H]LYHNL�UVUJVTIH[HU[��opportunity cost-based theories of recruitment cannot explain the empirics of Lashkar.

Lee presents a more complex theory of terrorist recruitment, but his postulation of a socioeconomic MYHTL^VYR�KLYP]LK�MYVT�HU�PUMVYTH[PVUHS�asymmetry between social classes does UV[�YLÅLJ[�[OL�LTWPYPJZ�VM�7HRPZ[HUP�ZVJPL[`�HUK�SPRLS`�T\JO�VM�[OL�NSVIHSPaLK�world. The informational asymmetries [OH[�3LL�HZZLY[Z�WYL]LU[�T\JO�VM�a society from engaging in political HJ[P]PZT�HUK�]PVSLUJL�L_PZ[�VUS`�HZ�HU�anachronism of Lee’s case study. Lee

tests his hypotheses with data from LHYS`�UPUL[LLU[O�JLU[\Y`�)LUNHS��H�JHZL�UV[�YLWYLZLU[H[P]L�VM�[OL�LќLJ[Z�VM�TVKLYU�NSVIHSPaH[PVU�HUK�[LJOUVSVN`�on communication and propaganda.30 In the Pakistani case, Tankel argues

[OL�NV]LYUTLU[�OHZ�L_WVZLK�7HRPZ[HUP�youths to intense propaganda about [OL�2HZOTPY�PZZ\L�HUK�TPSP[HYPZT�31 The 7HRPZ[HUP�NV]LYUTLU[�ZH[\YH[LZ�[OL�JV\U[Y`»Z�[LSL]PZPVU�Z[H[PVUZ�^P[O�PTHNLZ�VM�0UKPHU�ZVSKPLYZ�HZZH\S[PUN�2HZOTPYP�JP[PaLUZ�HUK�KPZZLTPUH[LZ�Z[VYPLZ�VM�the murder, rape, and immolation of 2HZOTPYPZ�I`�0UKPHUZ�32 Recent polls Z\WWVY[�[OPZ�UV[PVU��UV[PUN�[OH[��

WLYJLU[�VM�7HRPZ[HU�ILSPL]LZ�[OL�2HZOTPY�ZP[\H[PVU�YLTHPUZ�H�WYVISLT�HUK�� WLYJLU[�]PL^�[OL�7HRPZ[HUP�(YT`�HZ�WVZP[P]LS`�PUÅ\LUJPUN�[OL�JV\U[Y �̀33 We can assume the great majority, if not the entirety, of the Pakistani population possess the information necessary to LUNHNL�PU�WVSP[PJHS�HJ[P]PZT�VY�[LYYVYPZT��The lack of an informational asymmetry reduces Lee’s argument to a basic opportunity cost model of terrorist recruitment, one which the empirics of Lashkar membership refute.

Finally, it is thought that religiosity and Islamic fundamentalism predict participation in Islamic terror groups. (NHPU��^OH[�PZ�HU�PU[\P[P]LS`�JVTWLSSPUN�theory does not stand up to additional scrutiny with Lashkar empirics. One

would expect Lashkar recruits to be more religious than the general populace and, by using religious education as a proxy for religiosity, the empirics challenge this hypothesis. Lashkar YLJY\P[Z�KV�UV[�L_OPIP[�OPNO�SL]LSZ�VM�MVYTHS�YLSPNPV\Z�[YHPUPUN�YLSH[P]L�[V�other Pakistanis. Fewer than 5 percent VM�3HZORHY�JHKYLZ�OH]L�H[[HPULK�H�ZHUHK��¸H�MVYTHS�JLY[PÄJH[L�ZPNUPM`PUN�


" Lashkar acts within the boundaries of a

sovereign state and does not seek to supplant

the institutions of the state; rather, it provides

supplementary public goods in areas of inadequate

or nonexistent state provision of public goods."

FIGURE 2.

132013Fall

JVTWSL[PVU�VM�H�KLÄULK�YLSPNPV\Z�J\YYPJ\S\T¹��HUK�LHJO�OHK�VUS`�ZWLU[�fewer than three years at a madrasa, on H]LYHNL�� Though religious education cannot irreproachably proxy for religious fundamentalism, these empirics SLHK�VUL�[V�ILSPL]L�[OL�WYLKPJ[PVU�VM�Lashkar recruitment requires more than O`WV[OLZLZ�VM�SL]LSZ�VM�YLSPNPVZP[`�HUK�religious fundamentalism.

III. A Theory of Lashkar Recruitment

;OPZ�HY[PJSL�HYN\LZ�PUKP]PK\HS�interaction with Lashkar through L_WVZ\YL�[V�W\ISPJ�NVVKZ�WYV]PKLK�by the group increases the likelihood VM�HU�PUKP]PK\HS»Z�WHY[PJPWH[PVU�PU�3HZORHY��0U[LYHJ[PVU�^P[O�[OL�NYV\W�]PH�P[Z�PUZ[P[\[PVUZ�WYV]LZ�[V�IL�JLU[YHS"�Lashkar recruits by means of its institutions and pre-existing social networks, enhanced by legitimacy NHPULK�[OYV\NO�[OL�WYV]PZPVU�VM�W\ISPJ�NVVKZ��*V\U[LYPU[\P[P]LS �̀�this argument discounts the role VM!�PUKP]PK\HS�PKLVSVN �̀�Z\WWVY[�MVY�2HZOTPYP�SPILYH[PVU��VWWVY[\UP[`�JVZ[Z��HUK�ZLSLJ[P]L�PUJLU[P]LZ�MVY�QVPUPUN�[OL�NYV\W��)\PSKPUN�VU�[OL�[OLVYL[PJHS�framework of Arjona, who argues the UH[\YL�VM�YLILS�NV]LYUHUJL�PU�HU�HYLH�WYLKPJ[Z�YLJY\P[TLU[�SL]LSZ�35�KPќLYLUJLZ�in Lashkar’s situation from a classic PUZ\YNLUJ`�ULJLZZP[H[L�H�KPќLYLU[�HWWYVHJO�HUK�[OLYLMVYL�H�KPќLYLU[�theory of recruitment. Lashkar acts ^P[OPU�[OL�IV\UKHYPLZ�VM�H�ZV]LYLPNU�state and does not seek to supplant [OL�PUZ[P[\[PVUZ�VM�[OL�Z[H[L"�YH[OLY��P[�WYV]PKLZ�Z\WWSLTLU[HY`�W\ISPJ�NVVKZ�PU�areas of inadequate or nonexistent state

WYV]PZPVU�VM�W\ISPJ�NVVKZ��(KKP[PVUHSS �̀�Lashkar coopts or mimics many of the networks used by the state in military YLJY\P[TLU["�0�HZZLY[�[OH[�3HZORHY�membership more resembles the make-up of the Pakistani army than it KVLZ�H�NYV\W�VM�[OVZL�HNNYPL]LK�I`�[OL�NV]LYUTLU[��0U�[OL�MVSSV^PUN�ZLJ[PVU��I will illustrate the centrality of public NVVKZ�WYV]PZPVU�HUK�ZVJPHS�UL[^VYRZ�with empirics from Lashkar recruitment and literature describing Lashkar PUZ[P[\[PVUZ�HUK�VYNHUPaH[PVU�PU�7HRPZ[HU�

Provision of Public Goods

3HZORHY�LUNHNLZ�PU�H�]HYPL[`�VM�ZVJPHS�HUK�WVSP[PJHS�HJ[P]P[PLZ�IL`VUK�those directly related to execution of [LYYVYPZ[�HUK�N\LYPSSH�H[[HJRZ�PU�2HZOTPY��Jammu and greater India. Lashkar, PUJS\KPUN�P[Z�\TIYLSSH�VYNHUPaH[PVU�4+0��OHZ�KL]LSVWLK�PUZ[P[\[PVUZ�PU�7HRPZ[HU�KL]V[LK�[V�[OL�WYV]PZPVU�VM�[OL�W\ISPJ�goods the state fails to adequately Z\WWS �̀�;OL�HS�+H^H�4LKPJHS�4PZZPVU��HU�VYNHUPaH[PVU�\UKLY�[OL�KPYLJ[�OPLYHYJOPJHS�JVU[YVS�VM�:HLLK��[OL�4+0��HUK�3HZORHY��OHZ�WYV]PKLK�TLKPJH[PVU��JOLJR�\WZ�and, in many cases, medical camps and OVZWP[HSZ�PU�HYLHZ�VM�7HRPZ[HU�PU�ZL]LYL�ULLK�VM�OLHS[O�ZLY]PJLZ��:WLJPÄJ�[V�rural areas, where the absence of the state can be felt more saliently, Lashkar VWLYH[LZ�HTI\SHUJL�ZLY]PJLZ��TVIPSL�clinics, and blood banks.�� Unlike many THQVY�0ZSHTPJ�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ�HZZVJPH[LK�^P[O�[LYYVYPZT��4+0��HUK�I`�[YHUZP[P]P[`�Lashkar, operate both religious and ZLJ\SHY�ZJOVVSZ"�I`��4+0»Z�ZJOVVS�Z`Z[LT�JVUZPZ[LK�VM��ZJOVVSZ�educating more than 15,000 students. These schools, currently operating

during a time of systemic decline in Pakistani public education, propagate the Lashkar interpretation of Jihad HUK�[OL�2HZOTPY�JVUÅPJ[�PU�H�ZLJ\SHY�setting.��

;OL�WYV]PZPVU�VM�W\ISPJ�NVVKZ�induces participation in Lashkar through multiple, complementary mechanisms. Though the schools primarily attempt to prepare their students to become WYVK\J[P]L�TLTILYZ�VM�7HRPZ[HUP�ZVJPL[ �̀�[OL�PU[LUZL�WYVWHNHUKH�[V�^OPJO�4+0�schools expose their students shapes [OLPY�]PL^�VM�[OL�2HZOTPY�JVUÅPJ[�HUK�VM�[OL�UH[PVUHS�]PZPVU�VM�7HRPZ[HU��;OPZ�process, independent of religious LK\JH[PVU�VY�YHKPJHSPaH[PVU��TH`�HJ[�HZ�H�MVYTH[P]L�L_WLYPLUJL�PU�[OLZL�PUKP]PK\HSZ»�SP]LZ�HUK�JH\ZL�WHY[PJPWH[PVU�PU�3HZORHY"�anecdotally, this hypothesis is in line ^P[O�[OL�ZLJVUKHY`�PU[LU[�VM�[OL�4+0�school system. Saeed Athar, Lashkar’s WYV]PUJPHS�JOPLM�VM�)HSVJOPZ[HU��PSS\Z[YH[LZ�this intent, arguing “Children are like JSLHU�ISHJRIVHYKZ�¶�^OH[L]LY�`V\�^YP[L�^PSS�SLH]L�H�THYR�VU�[OLT�MVYL]LY�� -YVT�[OL�HIV]L�TLJOHUPZT��0�WYV]PKL�T`�ÄYZ[�O`WV[OLZPZ!

Hypothesis 1: If an individual has

received secular education from an MDI

or Lashkar-sponsored school, he will

have a higher chance of participating in

Lashkar terrorism.

;OL�WYV]PZPVU�VM�W\ISPJ�NVVKZ�also generates a sense of legitimacy surrounding Lashkar and concurrently ZW\YZ�YLJY\P[TLU[��0U�KL]LSVWPUN�OLHS[O�HUK�LK\JH[PVU�ZLY]PJLZ��3HZORHY�WYV]PKLZ�[OL�[LJOUPJHS�ZLY]PJLZ�[OH[�JVUZ[P[\[L�WHY[�VM�[OL�


JUIS14

VYNHUPaH[PVUZ�ULJLZZHY`�[V�NV]LYU�H�JP]PSPHU�WVW\SHJL�� In reference to [OL�NV]LYUHUJL�Z[Y\J[\YL�VM�[LYYP[VYPHS�PUZ\YNLU[�NYV\WZ��4HTWPSS`�JSHZZPÄLZ�[OLZL�[LJOUPJHS�ZLY]PJLZ�HZ�H�JH\ZHS�factor in the formation of counterstate ZV]LYLPNU[ �̀�� Lashkar’s symbiotic relationship with the state precludes any formation of a counterstate, I\[�[OL�TLJOHUPZTZ�PU]VS]LK�PU�[OPZ�MVYTH[PVU�HYL�Z[PSS�H[�^VYR"�PU�[OL�SPNO[�VM�PUHKLX\H[L�7HRPZ[HUP�Z[H[L�WYV]PZPVU�VM�W\ISPJ�NVVKZ��[OL�[LJOUPJHS�ZLY]PJLZ�SLNP[PTH[L�3HZORHY�HZ�HU�VYNHUPaH[PVU�and, through this, legitimate Lashkar’s use of force to annex Pakistan, an HZWLJ[�VM�SLNP[PTHJ`�YLZLY]LK�MVY�ZV]LYLPNU�Z[H[LZ��0M�PUKP]PK\HSZ�JVTL�[V�]PL^�3HZORHY�HZ�H�SLNP[PTH[L�HJ[VY�within the state, garnering what could be WLYJLP]LK�HZ�H�KLNYLL�VM�ZV]LYLPNU[`�VY�H\[OVYP[ �̀�[OLZL�PUKP]PK\HSZ�^PSS�WLYJLP]L�3HZORHY»Z�TPSP[HU[�HJ[P]P[PLZ�HZ�SLNP[PTH[L��I`�[OL�TLJOHUPZT�SLNP[PTHJ`�ZWPSSV]LY��In this well-documented psychological phenomenon,��HU�PUKP]PK\HS»Z�ILSPLMZ�VM�legitimacy, concerning one section of HU�VYNHUPaH[PVU�¸ZWPSSV]LY�¹�JH\ZLZ�[OL�PUKP]PK\HS�[V�]PL^�V[OLY�ZLJ[PVUZ�VM�[OL�VYNHUPaH[PVU�HZ�SLNP[PTH[L�� From this JVUJLW[��Z[LTZ�H�ZLJVUK�O`WV[OLZPZ!

Hypothesis 2: If an individual or his

MHTPS`�OHZ�ILULÄ[[LK�MYVT�3HZORHY�VY�MDI’s provision of public goods, he will

be more likely to participate in Lashkar

terrorism.

Additionally, because legitimacy ZWPSSV]LY�WVZP[PVUZ�[OL�TPSP[HU[�HJ[PVUZ�VM�and membership in Lashkar as legitimate HZ�Z[H[L�TPSP[HY`�HJ[PVUZ�HUK�ZLY]PJL��

the same mechanisms that contribute to military recruitment will contribute to Lashkar recruitment. These include HYLHZ�VM�OLH]`�TPSP[HY`�YLJY\P[TLU[�and propaganda as well as areas ^P[O�OPZ[VYPJHSS`�OPNO�SL]LSZ�VM�TPSP[HY`�ZLY]PJL��;OPZ�WHWLY�VWLYH[PVUHSPaL�[OLZL�TLJOHUPZTZ�HZ!

Hypothesis 3a: If an individual lives

in an area with high military recruitment,

he will be more likely to participate in

Lashkar terrorism.

Hypothesis 3b: If an individual has

friends or family members who serve

or have served in the military, he will

be more likely to participate in Lashkar

terrorism.

Finally following the aforementioned YLHZVUPUN��JVTLZ�[OL�MVSSV^PUN�PU[\P[P]L�O`WV[OLZPZ!

Hypothesis 4: If an individual

has friends or family who participate

in Lashkar, he will be more likely to

participate in Lashkar terrorism.

IV. Applying Empirical Evidence

Recent breakthroughs in compiling [OL�IPVNYHWOPLZ�VM�3HZORHY�JHKYLZ�OH]L�allowed for unprecedented analysis into the background and characteristics of those who choose to engage in Lashkar [LYYVYPZT��;OPZ�LTWPYPJHS�L]PKLUJL��in its limited capacity, supports the hypotheses of the proposed theory. Figure 2 illustrates the geographic JVTTVUHS[PLZ�VM�[OL�3HZORHY�JHKYLZ"�[OL�]HZ[�THQVYP[`�VM�3HZORHY�YLJY\P[Z�OHPS�UV[�MYVT�2HZOTPY�VY�1HTT\��I\[�YH[OLY�from the Punjab region of Pakistan. Congruent to these hypotheses, 3HZORHY�HUK�4+0�VWLYH[L�[OL�THQVYP[`�VM�[OLPY�VѝJLZ�HUK�PUZ[P[\[PVUZ�PU�[OL�Punjab region.�� The recent study by the Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point concurs, noting that Lashkar has KL]LSVWLK�PUMYHZ[Y\J[\YL�PU�7\UQHI�H[�OPNOLY�SL]LSZ�[OHU�HU`�V[OLY�YLNPVU�PU�Pakistan.�� The saturation of Lashkar institutions in Punjab increases the SPRLSPOVVK�YLSH[P]L�[V�V[OLY�YLNPVUZ�[OH[�P[Z�PUOHIP[HU[Z�OH]L�H[[LUKLK�3HZORHY�HUK�4+0�HѝSPH[LK�ZJOVVSZ�HUK�ILULÄ[[LK�


FIGURE 3.

152013Fall

MYVT�3HZORHY�HUK�4+0»Z�WYV]PZPVU�VM�W\ISPJ�NVVKZ��;OPZ�YLSH[PVUZOPW�[LU[H[P]LS`�supports hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2.

-\Y[OLYTVYL��4HYPHT�(IV\�AHOHI�HYN\LZ�[OL�ZVJPVSVNPJHS�WYVÄSL�VM�3HZORHY�recruits bare a remarkable similarity to [OVZL�VM�UVU�JVTTPZZPVULK�VѝJLYZ�PU�the Pakistani Army. The areas of high recruitment by the Pakistani Army also ZOHYL�JVUZPKLYHISL�V]LYSHW�I`�[OL�HYLHZ�from which Lashkar recruits many of its membership.�� These congruencies support hypothesis 3a and hypothesis 3b, with the “dynamics of the Indo-7HRPZ[HU�ZLJ\YP[`�JVTWL[P[PVU¹�[OH[�Christine Fair argues contributes to Lashkar recruitment also contributing to Army recruitment,� making the mechanism of recruitment for both similar.

-PUHSS �̀�ÄN\YL��PSS\Z[YH[LZ�[OL�MLHZPIPSP[`�VM�O`WV[OLZPZ��ZOV^PUN�that 25 percent of Lashkar members in this sample were recruited by family members or friends. Though [OPZ�YLSH[PVUZOPW�ZLLTZ�VI]PV\Z��P[�PZ�important to note the role of social networks in recruitment. Furthermore, this relationship shows the centrality of personal relationships in terrorist recruitment.

Caveats and Limitations

This theoretical framework is not ^P[OV\[�P[Z�JH]LH[Z��[OL�WYPTHY`�VUL�ILPUN�[OL�ZHTWSL�VM�LTWPYPJHS�L]PKLUJL��Rassler et al compiled this data MYVT�[OL�IPVNYHWOPLZ�VM� ��3HZORHY�militants translated from Urdu-language publications published by Lashkar and P[Z�HZZVJPH[LK�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ"�VUL�JHUUV[�HZZ\TL�[OPZ�ZHTWSL�PZ�YLWYLZLU[H[P]L�VM�

Lashkar as a whole.50 Without random sampling and regression analysis of the Pakistani population and the TLTILYZ�VM�3HZORHY��UV�JVUJS\ZP]L�L]PKLUJL�Z\WWVY[PUN�VY�YLM\[PUN�[OPZ�HYN\TLU[�L_PZ[Z��;OPZ�KH[H�WYV]PKLZ�a useful starting point for the crafting of a framework to be tested later, and MVY�JOHSSLUNPUN�[OL�WYL]PV\Z�[OLVYPLZ�of Lashkar and terrorist recruitment. ;OL�ZLJVUK�THQVY�JH]LH[�JVUJLYUZ�WVZZPIPSP[`�VM�IPHZ�PU�[OL�ZHTWSL"�9HZZSLY�et al compiled these biographies from publications produced and disseminated I`�3HZORHY"51 thus, there exists the possibility that Lashkar manipulated the biographies for its own purposes.The direction of this bias would be the VWWVZP[L�VM�^OH[�OHZ�ILLU�VIZLY]LK"�had Lashkar manipulated these IPVNYHWOPLZ��[OL�VYNHUPaH[PVU�^V\SK�OH]L�LTWOHZPaLK�[OL�YVSL�VM�2HZOTPY�UH[PVUHSZ�in the struggle. Publishing that a higher WLYJLU[HNL�VM�[OL�3HZORHY�ÄNO[LYZ�OHPSLK�MYVT�2HZOTPY�^V\SK�Z\WWVY[�[OL�NYV\W»Z�JLU[YHS�JSHPT�[OH[�2HZOTPYPZ�^HU[�[V�IL�liberated from India and absorbed into H�NYLH[LY�7HRPZ[HU��;OL�Z[\K`�VIZLY]LZ�little, if no, bias in the direction that one would assume it to be. Thus research incorporating the geographical empirics of this study can disregard the possibility of systematic bias in this characteristic VM�[OL�ÄNO[LYZ�

A possible limitation of this theory is the narrow scope to which the theory may apply. The relationship of Lashkar [V�[OL�7HRPZ[HUP�Z[H[L��[OL�VYNHUPaH[PVU»Z�L_[LUZP]L�ZVJPHS�PUZ[P[\[PVUZ��HUK�Lashkar’s use of terrorist and insurgent tactics positions Lashkar as a special

case of terrorism and therefore terrorist recruitment. Though the theory here KL]LSVWLK�[V�L_WSHPU�[OL�YLJY\P[TLU[�VM�3HZORHY�JHUUV[�IL�NLULYHSPaLK�[V�[OL�]HZ[�ZWLJ[Y\T�VM�[LYYVYPZ[�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ�that operate throughout the world, this theory can be applied to a small, `L[�NLVWVSP[PJHSS`�ZPNUPÄJHU[��Z\IZL[�VM�[LYYVYPZ[�NYV\WZ��;LYYVYPZ[�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ�[OH[�WYV]PKL�Z\IZ[HU[PHS�W\ISPJ�NVVKZ�[V�their host societies while maintaining a Z`TIPV[PJ�VY��H[�[OL�]LY`�SLHZ[��HTPJHISL�YLSH[PVUZOPW�^P[O�[OLPY�OVZ[�Z[H[LZ�OH]L�LTLYNLK�HZ�H�]LY`�ZLYPV\Z�PU[LYUH[PVUHS�WYVISLT��,SP�)LYTHU�HUK�+H]PK�3HP[PU�HYN\L�[OL�WYV]PZPVU�VM�W\ISPJ�NVVKZ�HSSV^Z�YLSPNPV\Z�[LYYVYPZ[�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ�[V�WYL]LU[�KLMLJ[PVU�HUK�[OLYLMVYL�TH_PTPaL�[OL�SL[OHSP[`�VM�[OL�NYV\W»Z�actions.52�)LYTHU�HUK�3HP[PU�OPNOSPNO[�[OL�WYV]PZPVU�VM�W\ISPJ�NVVKZ�I`�/HTHZ��[OL�;HSPIHU��HUK�/LaIVSSHO��VYNHUPaH[PVUZ�that share many characteristics with Lashkar in terms of institutional KL]LSVWTLU[�HUK�YLSH[PVUZOPWZ�[V�[OLPY�host states. In arguing that terrorist VYNHUPaH[PVUZ�MVSSV^�H�JS\I�MYHTL^VYR��[OL`�HZZLY[�[OH[�[OL�ZHJYPÄJLZ�[OLZL�groups require to attain the club goods M\UKHTLU[HSS`�KLÄULZ�[OL�TLTILYZOPW��HUK�[OLYLMVYL�[OL�YLJY\P[TLU[��VM�[OL�VYNHUPaH[PVU�53��)LYTHU�HUK�3HP[PU»Z�[OLVY`�KVLZ�UV[��OV^L]LY��HJJV\U[�for situations where the attainability of goods does not depend on membership PU�[OL�JS\I"�[OLPY�[OLVY`�KVLZ�UV[�L_WSHPU�why Pakistanis join Lashkar when they ILULÄ[�MYVT�3HZORHY�W\ISPJ�NVVKZ��YLNHYKSLZZ�VM�[OLPY�Z[H[\Z�PU�[OL�¸JS\I�¹�;OPZ�WHWLY�Z�[OLVY`�JHU�IL�HWWSPLK�[V�NYV\WZ�^OVZL�WYV]PZPVU�VM�NVVKZ�KVLZ�


JUIS16

Insurgency, and Civil War,” The American Political Science Review, 97, (2003): 75.

6. Zachariah Mampilly, Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).

7. Ana Arjona, “Recruitment in Civil War: An Institutionalist Approach,” Unpublished paper, Northwestern University, 2013.

��)Y\JL�/VќTHU��0UZPKL�;LYYVYPZT��5L^�@VYR!�Columbia University Press, 2006), 40.

9. John Lynn, “Fear and Outrage as Terrorists’ Goals,” Parameters, 43, (2012): 51-62.

10. Alexander Lee, “Who Becomes a Terrorist: Poverty, Education, and the Origins of Political Violence,” World Politics, 62, (2011): 205.

��@VNPUKLY�:PRHUK��¸0ZSHTPZ[�4PSP[HUJ`�PU�2HZOTPY!�;OL�*HZL�VM�3HZORHY�L�;HPIH�¹�PU�;OL�Practice of War: Production, Reproduction, and Communication of Armed Violence, LK��(WHYUH�9HV��4PJOHLS�)VSSPN��HUK�4VUPRH�)�JR��5L^�@VYR!�)LYNOHOU�)VVRZ��216-219.

12. Tariq Ali, The Clash of Fundamentalisms: *Y\ZHKLZ��1POHKZ��HUK�4VKLYUP[`��5L^�@VYR!�Verso, 2003), 199.

��(ZOSL`�;LSSPZ��¸;OL�4LUHJL�[OH[�PZ�3HZORHY�L�Taiba,” Carnegie Endowment for International 7LHJL�7VSPJ`�6\[SVVR��

��:[LWOLU�;HURLS��¸3HZORHY�L�;HPIH��7HZ[�Operations and Future Prospects,” New America Foundation, National Security Studies Program Policy Paper, 2011.

��+LJSHU�>HSZO��¸>PRP3LHRZ�*HISLZ�7VY[YH`�Saudi Arabia as a Cash Machine for Terrorists,” The Guardian, December 5, 2010, accessed on May 21, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/05/^PRPSLHRZ�JHISLZ�ZH\KP�[LYYVYPZ[�M\UKPUN

��;HURLS��¸3HZORHY�L�;HPIH�¹��

17. Many scholars and media sources propagate [OPZ�ILSPLM��-VY�L_HTWSLZ�ZLL�;HURLS��Storming the World Stage, 2011, 1; 4HYR�4HaaL[[P��¸<�:��0U[LSSPNLUJL�-VJ\ZLZ�VU�7HRPZ[HUP�.YV\WZ�¹�;OL�5L^�@VYR�Times, November 28, 2008, accessed on May 25, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/29/world/asia/29intel.html.

��:[LWOLU�;HURLS��:[VYTPUN�[OL�>VYSK�:[HNL��5L^�@VYR!�*VS\TIPH�<UP]LYZP[`�7YLZZ��2011), 1.

� ��¸3HZORHY�L�;VPIH��º(YT`�VM�[OL�7\YL�»¹�Southeast Asia Terrorism Portal, 2001, accessed 25 May 2013. http://www.satp.VYN�ZH[WVYN[W�JV\U[YPLZ�PUKPH�Z[H[LZ�QHUKR�

UV[�MVSSV^�[OL�¸JS\I�TVKLS�¹�THRPUN�the implications of the theory critical to understanding the recruitment within this NYV^PUN�JH[LNVY`�VM�PUZ[P[\[PVUHSS`�HJ[P]L�[LYYVYPZ[�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ��

V. Conclusion� ;OL�LTWPYPJHS�L]PKLUJL�MYVT�

the Lashkar case illustrates the role VM�W\ISPJ�NVVKZ�WYV]PZPVU�PU�[LYYVYPZ[�YLJY\P[TLU[��;OV\NO�KL]LSVWLK�^P[O�Lashkar as its ideal-type, this theory explains the recruitment patterns of other terrorist groups with substantial W\ISPJ�NVVKZ�WYV]PZPVU�HUK�HTPJHISL�relationships with their host states. ;OL�LK\JH[PVU�SL]LSZ��NLVNYHWOPJ�concentration, and sociological similarity VM�3HZORHY�TPSP[HU[Z�[V�TPSP[HY`�VѝJLYZ�support the argument that Lashkar’s WYV]PZPVU�VM�W\ISPJ�NVVKZ�MHJPSP[H[LZ�P[Z�recruitment through direct and indirect mechanisms. Direct methods include the YVSL�VM�MVYTH[P]L�LK\JH[PVU�VU�ZOHWPUN�VUL»Z�]PL^Z�VM�3HZORHY�[LYYVYPZT��Examination of the indirect mechanisms VM�3HZORHY»Z�W\ISPJ�NVVKZ�WYV]PZPVU�JOHSSLUNLZ�[OL�WYL]HPSPUN�HZZ\TW[PVU�that the psychological phenomenon of YLSH[P]L�KLWYP]H[PVU�TV[P]H[LZ�[LYYVYPZT��and supports increased study into the YVSL�VM�SLNP[PTHJ`�ZWPSSV]LY�PU�[OL�JVU[L_[�VM�[LYYVYPZ[�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ��;OL�[LU[H[P]L�support of the theory outlined in section ��WYV]PKLZ�TV[P]H[PVU�MVY�M\Y[OLY�Z[\K`�of the role of public goods in terrorist YLJY\P[TLU[��ZWLJPÄJHSS`�PU�[OL�3HZORHY�context. Theories of recruitment based VU�YLSH[P]L�KLWYP]H[PVU��VWWVY[\UP[`�costs, socioeconomic thresholds, and religious fundamentalism do not predict

terrorism in the Lashkar context and cannot be applied to many terrorist VYNHUPaH[PVUZ��;OL�WYV]PZPVU�VM�W\ISPJ�NVVKZ�I`�[LYYVYPZ[�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ�KVLZ�WYV]PKL�T\S[PWSL�LTWPYPJHSS`�Z\WWVY[LK�mechanisms for terrorist recruitment, ^P[O�[OVZL�KPYLJ[S`�ILULÄ[[PUN�MYVT�[OL�public goods and those experiencing SLNP[PTHJ`�ZWPSSV]LY�TVYL�SPRLS`�[V�participate in terrorism. These results HYN\L�[OH[��PU�YLMLYLUJL�[V�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ�[OH[�WYV]PKL�W\ISPJ�NVVKZ�HUK�VWLYH[L�PU�L_[LYUHS�TPSP[HY`�JVUÅPJ[Z��[OL�WYV_PTP[`�and intensity of public goods, social institutions, and military recruitment predict participation in terrorist VYNHUPaH[PVUZ��;OPZ�[OLVY`�WYV]PKLZ�an array of implications for further research and policy-making, most notably supporting the argument that counterterrorism requires strengthening and legitimating weak states, while JVTWL[PUN�^P[O�[LYYVYPZ[�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ�PU�WYV]PKPUN�T\JO�ULLKLK�W\ISPJ�NVVKZ�[V�local populations.��

Endnotes 1. For a discussion of the greed-grievance

debate in reference of rebel recruitment, see Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein, “Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War,” American Journal of Political Science, 52, (2008): 436-455.

��+H]PK�9HZZSLY�L[�HS��¸;OL�-PNO[LYZ�VM�3HZORHY�e-Taiba: Recruitment, Training, Deployment, and Death,” Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point Occasional Paper Series, 2013.

3. John Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture (Boulder: Westview Press, 2003), 324-325.

4. Lynn argues that terrorism exists as a fourth stage, preceding guerrilla, mobile, and positional warfare on the three staged MYHTL^VYR�VM�YL]VS\[PVUHY`�]PVSLUJL�VYPNPUHSS`�developed by Mao Zedong.

5. James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity,


172013Fall

[LYYVYPZ[FV\[Ä[Z�SHZORHYFLF[VPIH�O[T

20. Eli Berman and David Laitan, “Religion, Terrorism, and Public Goods: Testing the *S\I�4VKLS�¹�5),9�>VYRPUN�7HWLY��5V��13725, 2008

��9HZZSLY�L[�HS��¸;OL�-PNO[LYZ�VM�3HZORHY�L�Taiba,” 2013.

��*HYVSPUL�APLTRL��¸7LYJLP]LK�6WWYLZZPVU�and Relative Deprivation: Social Factors Contributing to Terrorism,” in The Same Light as Slavery: Building a Global Antiterrorist Consensus, ed. Joseph McMillan (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2006).

23. They argue that, in the case of Burundi, reduced rainfall contributes to reduced opportunities and therefore lower opportunity costs of joining a rebellion. Eleonora Nilleson and Philip Verwimp, “Grievance, Commodity Prices, and Rainfall: A Village Level of Rebel Recruitment in Burundi,” MICROCON 9LZLHYJO�>VYRPUN�7HWLY��

24. Lee, “Who Becomes a Terrorist,” 2011.

25. Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam: Holy >HY�HUK�<UOVS`�;LYYVY��5L^�@VYR!�9HUKVT�/V\ZL�;YHKL�7HWLYIHJRZ��

26. For examples of media-driven and common non-academic explanations of Islamic terrorism, see Philip Blond and Adrian Pabst, “The Roots of Islamic Terrorism,” The New @VYR�;PTLZ��1\S`��HJJLZZLK�on May 25, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/27/opinion/27iht-edpabst.html; Wes Barret, “Report Shows Terror Recruitment in U.S. Still a Problem,” Fox News, July 27, 2011, accessed on May 25, 2013, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/07/27/report-shows-terror-recruitment-in-us-still-problem/.

��9HZZSLY�L[�HS��¸;OL�-PNO[LYZ�VM�3HZORHY�L�Taiba,” 2013, 13.

��APLTRL��¸7LYJLP]LK�6WWYLZZPVU�HUK�9LSH[P]L�Deprivation,” 2006, 160.

� ��9HZZSLY�L[�HS��¸;OL�-PNO[LYZ�VM�3HZORHY�L�Taiba,” 2013, 16-17.

30. Lee, “Who Becomes a Terrorist,” 2011.

��;HURLS��:[VYTPUN�[OL�>VYSK�:[HNL��

��4HYPHT�(IV\�AHOHI��¸º0�:OHSS�IL�>HP[PUN�MVY�@V\�H[�[OL�+VVY�VM�7HYHKPZL»!�;OL�7HRPZ[HUP�4HY[`YZ�VM�3HZORHY�L�;HPIH��(YT`�VM�[OL�Pure),” in The Practice of War” Production, Reproduction and Communication of Armed Violence, ed. Arpana Rao, Michael Bollig, HUK�4VUPRH�)�JR��5L^�@VYR!�)LYNOHOU�

)VVRZ��

33. “On Eve of Elections, A Dismal Public 4VVK�PU�7HRPZ[HU�¹�7L^�9LZLHYJO�.SVIHS�Attitudes Project, May 7, 2013, accessed on May 23, 2013, http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/05/07/on-eve-of-elections-a-KPZTHS�W\ISPJ�TVVK�PU�WHRPZ[HU��


35. Arjona, “Recruitment in Civil War,” 2013.

��;HURLS��¸3HZORHY�L�;HPIH�¹��

��;LSSPZ��¸;OL�4LUHJL�[OH[�PZ�3HZORHY�L�;HPIH�¹�2010, 12.

��;HURLS��:[VYTPUN�[OL�>VYSK�:[HNL��

39. Ibid.

��;PTV[O`�>PJROHT�*YV^SL �̀�¸;OL�9PZL��HUK�Sometimes Fall) of Guerrilla Governments in Latin America,” Sociological Forum, 2, (1987): 473-499.

41. Mampilly, Rebel Rulers, 2011, 61-63.

42. The classical formulation of state sovereignty is that of Max Weber: “[the] state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. See Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, edited by Hans Heinrich Gerth and Charles Wright Mills (Abingdon: Routledge, 1948), 78.

43. For additional resources detailing legitimacy spillover, see Stanislav D. Dobrev, Salih ALRP�6aKLTPY�HUK�(SILY[�*��;LV��¸;OL�Ecological Interdependence of Emergent HUK�,Z[HISPZOLK�6YNHUPaH[PVUHS�7VW\SH[PVUZ!�Legitimacy Transfer, Violation by Comparison, HUK�<UZ[HISL�0KLU[P[PLZ�¹�6YNHUPaH[PVU�Science, 17, (2006): 577-597; Jeroen .��2\PSTHU�HUK�1PHV[HV�3P��¸.YHKLZ�VM�Membership and Legitimacy Spillovers: -VYLPNU�)HURZ�PU�:OHUNOHP�� ¹�Academy of Management Journal, 52, (2009): 229-245.

��;H[PHUH�2VZ[V]H�HUK�:YPSH[H�AHOLLY��¸6YNHUPaH[PVUHS�3LNP[PTHJ`�\UKLY�*VUKP[PVUZ�of Complexity: The Case of Multinational Enterpris,.” The Academy of Management Review, 42, (1999):75.

��:PRHUK��¸0ZSHTPZ[�4PSP[HUJ`�PU�2HZOTPY��219.


47. Abou Zahab, “Door of Paridise,” 2007, 139.

��9HZZSLY�L[�HS��¸;OL�-PNO[LYZ�VM�3HZORHY�L�

Taiba,” 2013, 11

� ��*OYPZ[PUL�-HPY��¸4PSP[HU[�9LJY\P[TLU[�PU�7HRPZ[HU!�Implications for Al Qaeda and Other 6YNHUPaH[PVUZ�¹�:[\KPLZ�PU�*VUÅPJ[�HUK�Terrorism, 27, (2004): 490.

��9HZZSLY�L[�HS��¸;OL�-PNO[LYZ�VM�3HZORHY�L�Taiba,” 2013.

51. Ibid

52. Berman and Laitan, “Religion, Terrorism, and Public Goods,” 2008.

53. Ibid.

54. See Berman and Laitan, “Religion, Terrorism, and Public Goods,” 2008, and Richard A. Couto, “The Politics of Terrorism: Power, Legitimacy, and Violence,” Integral Review, 6, (2010): 63-81, for similar implications of public goods and legitimation arguments regarding terrorism, respectively.

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Power, Legitimacy, and Violence.” Integral Review, 6, (2010): 63-81.

+VIYL]��:[HUPZSH]�+��6aKLTPY��:HSPO�ALRP�HUK Teo, Albert C. “The Ecological Interdependence of Emergent and �� ,Z[HISPZOLK�6YNHUPaH[PVUHS�7VW\SH[PVUZ!� Legitimacy Transfer, Violation by Comparison, and Unstable Identities.” Organization Science, 17, (2006): 577- 597.

Fair, Christine. “Militant Recruitment in �� 7HRPZ[HU!�0TWSPJH[PVUZ�MVY�(S�8HLKH�HUK�� 6[OLY�6YNHUPaH[PVUZ�¹�:[\KPLZ�PU�*VUÅPJ[� and Terrorism, 27, (2004): 489-504.

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2VZ[V]H��;H[PHUH�HUK�AHOLLY��:YPSH[H�� ¸6YNHUPaH[PVUHS�3LNP[PTHJ`�\UKLY� Conditions of Complexity: The Case of Multinational Enterprise.” The Academy of Management Review, 42, (1999):64- 81.

2\PSTHU��1LYVLU�.��HUK�3P��1PH[HV��¸.YHKLZ�VM� Membership and Legitimacy Spillovers: �� -VYLPNU�)HURZ�PU�:OHUNOHP�� 1935.” Academy of Management Journal, 52, (2009): 229-245.

¸3HZORHY�L�;VPIH��º(YT`�VM�[OL�7\YL�»¹� Southeast Asia Terrorism Portal, 2001, accessed 25 May 2013. http://www. satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/�� Z[H[LZ�QHUKR�[LYYVYPZ[FV\[Ä[Z�SHZORHYFLF toiba.htm.

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Lewis, Bernard. The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror.�5L^�@VYR!�9HUKVT�� /V\ZL�;YHKL�7HWLYIHJRZ��

Lynn, John. Battle: A History of Combat and Culture. Boulder: Westview Press, 2003.

Lynn, John. “Fear and Outrage as Terrorists’ Goals.” Parameters, 43, (2012): 51-62.

Mampilly, Zachariah. Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011.

4HaaL[[P��4HYR��¸<�:��0U[LSSPNLUJL�-VJ\ZLZ�� VU�7HRPZ[HUP�.YV\WZ�¹�The New York Times, November 28, 2008, accessed on May 25, 2013. http://www.nytimes. com/2008/11/29/world/asia/29intel. html.

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:PRHUK��@VNPUKLY��̧ 0ZSHTPZ[�4PSP[HUJ`�PU�2HZOTPY!�� ;OL�*HZL�VM�3HZORHY�L�;HPIH�¹ In The Practice of War: Production, Reproduction, and Communication of Armed Violence, edited by Aparna �� 9HV��4PJOHLS�)VSSPN��HUK�4VUPRH�)�JR�� 5L^�@VYR!�)LYNOHOU�)VVRZ�� 2007.

;HURLS��:[LWOLU��¸3HZORHY�L�;HPIH��7HZ[ Operations and Future Prospects.” New America Foundation, National Security Studies Program Policy Paper, 2011a.

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;LSSPZ��(ZOSL �̀�¸;OL�4LUHJL�[OH[�PZ�3HZORHY�L Taiba.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Outlook, 2010. >HSZO��+LJSHU��¸>PRP3LHRZ�*HISLZ�7VY[YH` Saudi Arabia as a Cash Machine for Terrorists.” The Guardian, December 5, 2010, accessed on May 21, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/�� ^VYSK��KLJ��^PRPSLHRZ�JHISLZ� saudi-terrorist-funding.

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>PJROHT�*YV^SL �̀�;PTV[O �̀�¸;OL�9PZL��HUK Sometimes Fall) of Guerrilla Governments in Latin America.” Sociological Forum, 2, (1987): 473-499.

APLTRL��*HYVSPUL��¸7LYJLP]LK�6WWYLZZPVU�HUK� Relative Deprivation: Social Factors Contributing to Terrorism.” In the Same Light as Slavery: Building a Global Antiterrorist Consensus, edited by Joseph McMillan, Washington: National Defense University Press, 2006.


192013Fall

OL�(ZZVJPH[PVU�VM�:V\[OLHZ[�(ZPHU�5H[PVUZ��(:,(5��PZ�VM[LU�KLYPKLK�HZ�H�[VV[OSLZZ�[HSR�ZOVW�PUJHWHISL�VM�THUHNPUN�YLNPVUHS�JVUÅPJ[Z��I\[�PU[LY]LU[PVUZ�PU�*HTIVKPH�HUK�,HZ[�;PTVY�Z\NNLZ[�that ASEAN has been able to demand international action and use the UN to further its own PU[LYLZ[Z��>OLU�SPTP[LK�I`�YLZV\YJLZ�VY�KP]PKLK�I`�OL[LYVNLULV\Z�PU[LYLZ[Z��(:,(5�Z[H[LZ�OH]L�

HSZV�KPYLJ[S`�KLSLNH[LK�JVUÅPJ[�PU[LY]LU[PVU�[OYV\NO�[OL�<UP[LK�5H[PVUZ��<5��([�[OL�ZHTL�[PTL��(:,(5�OHZ�H[[LTW[LK�[V�TPUPTPaL�SVZZ�VM�JVU[YVS�I`�SL]LYHNPUN�[OL�.LULYHS�(ZZLTIS`�HZ�HU�PUZ[P[\[PVUHS�JOLJR�HUK�IHSHUJL��>OPSL�[OL�<5�YLTHPUZ�KVTPUHU[��YLNPVUHS�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ�W\YZ\L�JVTWSLTLU[HY`�YLSH[PVUZOPWZ�HUK�KLSLNH[PVU�JHU�occur in both directions.

IntroductionAs attention turns to regional

VYNHUPaH[PVUZ�HZ�HU�HS[LYUH[P]L�TLJOHUPZT�VM�KLHSPUN�^P[O�ZWLJPÄJ�JVUÅPJ[Z�HUK�PZZ\LZ��[OL�(ZZVJPH[PVU�VM�:V\[OLHZ[�(ZPHU�5H[PVUZ��(:,(5��PZ�VM[LU�KLYPKLK�HZ�\UHISL�[V�LќLJ[P]LS`�THUHNL�JVUÅPJ[Z�PU�P[Z�VÛ�IHJR`HYK��PU�JVU[YHZ[�[V�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ�Z\JO�HZ�[OL�(MYPJHU�<UPVU��(<��ÔPJO��[VNL[OLY�^P[O�[OL�UN, recently sent peacekeeping troops to Darfur. A scholarly consensus has attributed such inaction to the colonial past of Southeast Asian member states, the resultant fundamental principles of UH[PVUHS�ZV]LYLPNU[`�HUK�UVU�PU[LYMLYLUJL��HZ�^LSS�HZ�[OL�¸(:,(5�>H`¹�VM�consensus based decision making. For L_HTWSL��HS[OV\NO�(ZPH�HJJV\U[LK�MVY��

WLYJLU[�VM�HYTLK�JVUÅPJ[�PU�[OL�WLYPVK�� T\S[PSH[LYHS�WLHJLRLLWPUN�operations in the region constituted just ��WLYJLU[��[OL�JVYYLZWVUKPUN�ÄN\YLZ�MVY�,\YVWL�^LYL��WLYJLU[�HUK��WLYJLU[�YLZWLJ[P]LS`��1

Indeed, post-Cold War multilateral peacekeeping operations in Southeast (ZPH�OH]L�ILLU�YHYL��LZZLU[PHSS`�SPTP[LK�[V�*HTIVKPH�PU�[OL�LHYS`�� Z�HUK�,HZ[�;PTVY�ZPUJL�� ([�[OL�ZHTL�[PTL��(:,(5�HZ�H�YLNPVUHS�VYNHUPaH[PVU�HJ[LK�KPќLYLU[S`�PU�LHJO�JHZL��0[�HJ[P]LS`�lobbied on Cambodia through the UN and formulated a peace process, but KLJSPULK�[OL�VWWVY[\UP[`�MVY�H�JVSSLJ[P]L�PUP[PH[P]L�HNHPUZ[�[OL�H[YVJP[PLZ�PU�,HZ[�;PTVY��SLH]PUN�(\Z[YHSPH�[V�[HRL�[OL�lead. How then can one explain the dynamic between the UN and regional

VYNHUPaH[PVUZ�Z\JO�HZ�(:,(5�PU�JVUÅPJ[�PU[LY]LU[PVU�¶�\UKLY�ÔH[�JVUKP[PVUZ�do they work together, what form does collaboration take, and when KVLZ�H�YLNPVUHS�VYNHUPaH[PVU�ZLLR�<5�PU]VS]LTLU[&�/V^�T\JO�PUP[PH[P]L�KVLZ�H�YLNPVUHS�VYNHUPaH[PVU�OH]L�HZ�HU�HJ[VY��]LYZ\Z�HZ�H�MVY\T��VY�YLZV\YJL&�Applying the theoretical framework of principal-agent theory, when and why ^V\SK�(:,(5�KLSLNH[L�YLNPVUHS�JVUÅPJ[�management to the UN, and under what circumstances might states delegate to (:,(5�]LYZ\Z�[OL�<5&

This paper seeks to go beyond the \Z\HS�YLNPVU�IHZLK�NLULYHSPaH[PVUZ�[V�KL]LSVW�H�TVYL�U\HUJLK�WLYZWLJ[P]L�VM�the relationships between international HUK�YLNPVUHS�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ�PU�PZZ\LZ�VM�JVUÅPJ[�THUHNLTLU[�HUK�WLHJLRLLWPUN��

Delegation from Regional to Global:

by Audrye Wong

Audrye Wong. Audrye is a Junior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in >HZOPUN[VU�+*��:OL�NYL^�\W�PU�:PUNHWVYL�HUK�YLJLU[S`�NYHK\H[LK�MYVT�7YPUJL[VU�<UP]LYZP[ �̀�ÔLYL�ZOL�THQVYLK�PU�7\ISPJ�HUK�0U[LYUH[PVUHS�(ќHPYZ�H[�[OL�>VVKYV^�>PSZVU�:JOVVS��/LY�YLZLHYJO�PU[LYLZ[Z�SPL�PU�international relations and security studies, with a focus on political and security issues in East Asia.

(:,(5�HUK�[OL�<5�PU�*VUÅPJ[�0U[LY]LU[PVU

T

JUIS20

While there has been considerable analysis of regional actors directly engaged in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, such as the AU and the Economic Community of >LZ[�(MYPJHU�:[H[LZ��,*6>(:��[OL�UH[\YL�VM�(:,(5�PU]VS]LTLU[�YLTHPUZ�understudied. Although ASEAN has UV[�`L[�KL]LSVWLK�[OL�JHWHJP[`�[V�ÄLSK�its own regional peacekeeping force, it remains important to understand P[Z�KPќLYPUN�Z[HUJLZ�¶�HUK�\UKLYS`PUN�TV[P]H[PVUZ�¶�VU�LUNHNPUN�[OL�<5�VY�other actors, to formulate an international YLZWVUZL�[V^HYK�H�YLNPVUHS�JVUÅPJ[��HZ�^LSS�HZ�HU`�L]LU[\HS�KLWSV`TLU[�VM�a peacekeeping operation. There has also been little explicit comparison of Cambodia and East Timor cases. In place VM�[OL�VM[�JP[LK�NLULYHSPaH[PVU�[OH[�(:,(5�has been the prime upholder of non-PU[LY]LU[PVU�UVYTZ��[OPZ�WHWLY�OVWLZ�[V�explore its nuanced machinations within the international community in tackling YLNPVUHS�JVUÅPJ[Z�HUK�JOHSSLUNL�[OL�UV[PVU�that ASEAN is an inconsequential regional institution – in fact, at times it has been an important regional actor using the UN HZ�H�YLZV\YJL�[V�HJOPL]L�P[Z�VIQLJ[P]LZ�

*VU]LU[PVUHSS �̀�[OL�PU[LYHJ[PVU�processes between the UN and regional HJ[VYZ�PZ�TVKLSLK�HZ�H�]LY[PJHS�OPLYHYJO �̀�PU�^OPJO�YLNPVUHS�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ�HYL�subordinate to the UN, which chooses to subcontract or outsource certain peacekeeping operations to the former. (Y[PJSL�=000�VM�[OL�<5�*OHY[LY�SLH]LZ�YVVT�MVY�[OL�PU]VS]LTLU[�VM�YLNPVUHS�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ�PU�THPU[HPUPUN�¸PU[LYUH[PVUHS�WLHJL�HUK�ZLJ\YP[ �̀¹�I\[�JVUKP[PVULK�VU�[OL�MVSSV^PUN!��P��[OL�HJ[P]P[PLZ�HYL�

“consistent with the Purposes and 7YPUJPWSLZ�VM�[OL�<UP[LK�5H[PVUZ¹"��PP��no enforcement action shall be taken ¸^P[OV\[�[OL�H\[OVYPaH[PVU�VM�[OL�:LJ\YP[`�*V\UJPS¹��HS[OV\NO�YLNPVUHS�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ�are encouraged to contribute to the ¸WHJPÄJ�ZL[[SLTLU[�VM�KPZW\[LZ¹�"�HUK��PPP��the Security Council must “at all times be RLW[�M\SS`�PUMVYTLK�VM�HJ[P]P[PLZ�\UKLY[HRLU�or in contemplation under regional HYYHUNLTLU[Z�VY�I`�YLNPVUHS�HNLUJPLZ�¹2 ;O\Z��[OLZL�SLNHS�WYV]PZPVUZ�LTWOHZPaL�the centrality of the UN and the Security Council in determining and responding to threats to international peace and ZLJ\YP[ �̀�HZ�SHPK�V\[�PU�*OHW[LY�=00�

;OL�� (NLUKH�MVY�7LHJL�document, written under then-UN :LJYL[HY`�.LULYHS�)V\[YVZ�)V\[YVZ�Ghali, acknowledged the potential of YLNPVUHS�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ�PU�JVU[YPI\[PUN�[V�JVUÅPJ[�THUHNLTLU[�HUK�WLHJLRLLWPUN�that could “not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus HUK�KLTVJYH[PaH[PVU�PU�PU[LYUH[PVUHS�HќHPYZ�¹3 Although, he reiterated that the “primacy of the UN…must be YLZWLJ[LK�¹�[O\Z�THPU[HPUPUN�H�[VW�KV^U�KLSLNH[PVU�VM�JVUÅPJ[�THUHNLTLU[�[HZRZ�I`�[OL�<5�[V�YLNPVUHS�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ��To reduce agent slack, he outlined key principles of UN-regional cooperation PU�OPZ�� :\WWSLTLU[�HZ�H�Y\SLZ�IHZLK��HS[OV\NO�HKTP[[LKS`�]HN\L��MVYT�of delegation, including the need for agreed mechanisms for consultation HUK�H�JSLHYS`�KLÄULK�KP]PZPVU�VM�SHIVY��Areas of coordination would range from diplomatic consultations to mutual operational support and deployment of

ÄLSK�TPZZPVUZ��

(S[LYUH[P]LS �̀�NSVIHS�YLNPVUHS�cooperation could also be based on OVYPaVU[HS�WHY[ULYZOPW��;OPZ�TVKLS�YLJVNUPaLZ�[OH[�YLNPVUHS�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ�JHU�acquire greater agency as an actor in the international arena, complementing the role of the UN in maintaining international WLHJL�HUK�ZLJ\YP[ �̀�:VTL�OH]L�M\Y[OLY�suggested that the subordination of YLNPVUHS�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ�[V�[OL�<5�PZ�becoming outdated in the face of an LTLYNPUN�¸YLNPVUHS�T\S[PSH[LYHSPZT�¹�Amidst an increasingly post-Westphalian SVNPJ�[OH[�TV]LZ�[V^HYK�[OL�WVVSPUN�VM�ZV]LYLPNU[PLZ��¸YLNPVUZ¹�ILJVTL�[OL�TVZ[�YLSL]HU[�HJ[VYZ��VI[HPUPUN�SLNP[PTHJ`�HUK�authority as )Q�YU�/L[[UL�HUK�-YLKYPR�:�KLYIH\T�UV[L�MYVT�¸ILSV^�HUK�^P[OPU¹�Z[H[LZ�HUK�JP]PS�ZVJPL[PLZ�5 Thus, regions VY�YLNPVUHS�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ�JV\SK�HSZV�HJ[�HZ�H�WYPUJPWHS!�KLSLNH[PUN�[HZRZ�[V�[OLPY�appointed agent, the UN. Although [OPZ�YL]LYZLZ�[OL�JVU]LU[PVUHS�TVKLS�VM�interaction, this paper argues that ASEAN has managed to play the role of the WYPUJPWHS��HSILP[�^P[O�]HY`PUN�KLNYLLZ�VM�success.

Why might regional institutions seek to cooperate with or delegate tasks to their international counterparts? The TVZ[�VI]PV\Z�TV[P]H[PVUZ�HYL�[OL�NHPUZ�MYVT�ZWLJPHSPaH[PVU�HUK�KP]PZPVU�VM�SHIVY"�JVUÅPJ[�THUHNLTLU[�VY�PU[LY]LU[PVU�]PH�H�WLHJLRLLWPUN�MVYJL�PZ�SPRLS`�[V�incur high costs that member states are unwilling to bear, and delegation to [OL�<5�WYV]PKLZ�ULLKLK�YLZV\YJLZ�HUK�L_WLY[PZL��:JOVSHYZ�OH]L�HSZV�WYVWVZLK�that delegation by state actors to an PU[LYUH[PVUHS�VYNHUPaH[PVU��06��JHU�IYPUN�

+LSLNH[PVU�MYVT�9LNPVUHS�[V�.SVIHS!�(:,(5�HUK�[OL�<5�PU�*VUÅPJ[�0U[LY]LU[PVU��(\KY`L�>VUN

212013Fall

ZL]LYHS�ILULÄ[Z��PUJS\KPUN!�THUHNPUN�policy externalities through information WYV]PZPVU�HUK�SV^LYLK�[YHUZHJ[PVU�JVZ[Z��LUHISPUN�JVSSLJ[P]L�KLJPZPVU�THRPUN�]PH�HU�HNLUKH�ZL[[PUN�06��YLZVS]PUN�disputes through arbitration, enhancing the credibility of long-term policies, and JYLH[PUN�H�WVSPJ`�IPHZ�LќLJ[�[OH[�¸SVJRZ�PU¹�preferred domestic agendas through an PU[LYUH[PVUHS�SL]LS�HNYLLTLU[��/V^L]LY��in the presence of heterogeneous preferences, or great power states, delegation to a third-party agent becomes less likely.� Using this broad framework of principal-agent theory, [OPZ�WHWLY�^PSS�HUHSàL�[OL�KÙHTPJZ�VM�ASEAN-UN collaboration in the cases of Cambodia and East Timor and the nature of their roles as principal and agent.

Cambodia: An Activist ASEAN� ;OL�*HTIVKPHU�JVUÅPJ[�^HZ�ZWHYRLK�ÔLU� =PL[UHT� PU]HKLK� *HTIVKPH� PU�+LJLTILY� � �� V]LY[OYV^PUN�7VS� 7V[»Z�2OTLY� 9V\NL� YLNPTL� HUK� PUZ[HSSPUN� H�UL^� /HUVP�IHJRLK� NV]LYUTLU[!� [OL�7LVWSL»Z�9LW\ISPJ� VM� 2HTW\JOLH� �792��From the start, ASEAN ��OHK�]VJHSS`�HUK�MVYJLM\SS`� VWWVZLK�=PL[UHT»Z� PU]HZPVU� HZ�H�]PVSH[PVU�VM�*HTIVKPH»Z�ZV]LYLPNU[`�HUK�self-determination. A statement issued in 1HU\HY`�� K\YPUN� [OL�:WLJPHS�(:,(5�-VYLPNU�4PUPZ[LYZ�4LL[PUN� JHSSLK� MVY� [OL�immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cambodia and requested the UN Security Council to take immediate steps to end the conflict.� Subsequent joint statements and communiqués into the � ��Z�JVU[PU\LK�[V�YLP[LYH[L�[OL�*HTIVKPHU�people’s right to self-determination and KLTHUK� [OL�^P[OKYH^HS� VM� =PL[UHTLZL�

troops. This swift response was all the TVYL� YLTHYRHISL� NP]LU� [OL� SHJR� VM� HU`�MVYTHS� JVUÅPJ[� WYL]LU[PVU�� JVU[HPUTLU[��or resolution roles delineated by the still-embryonic association, particularly toward non-member states. ASEAN states shared fears of an expansionist :V]PL[�IHJRLK�=PL[UHT�[OH[�JV\SK�ZWYLHK�the communist threat to the region.10 +LZWP[L� �VY�WLYOHWZ�ILJH\ZL�VM�� [OL� SHJR�VM�H�^LSS�PUZ[P[\[PVUHSPaLK�ZLJYL[HYPH[�� [OLPY�JVU]LYNLU[� PU[LYLZ[Z�TVIPSPaLK� H� \UP[LK�response.� .P]LU� [OL� JVU[L_[� VM� [OL�*VSK�>HY��the UN Security Council predictably met ^P[O� Z[HSLTH[L� V]LY� HU`� YLZWVUZL�� ;OL�:V]PL[� <UPVU� ]L[VLK� YLZVS\[PVUZ� HNHPUZ[�P[Z�=PL[UHTLZL�HSS �̀�ÔPSL�*OPUH�JVU[PU\LK�[V� Z\WWVY[� [OL� WYL]PV\Z� 2OTLY� 9V\NL�YLNPTL� HUK� LUNHNLK� PU� IVYKLY� JVUÅPJ[Z�^P[O�=PL[UHT��(Z�[OL� PZZ\L�TV]LK�[V� [OL�UN General Assembly, ASEAN stepped in as the leading actor, successfully shaping the international community’s ]PL^�VM� HUK� YLZWVUZL� [V� [OL�*HTIVKPHU�JVUÅPJ[� �VU� (:,(5»Z� KLZPYLK� [LYTZ�� 0U�5V]LTILY�� [OL�<5�.LULYHS�(ZZLTIS`�adopted an ASEAN draft resolution that had been tabled by the Security Council in January, as well as another ASEAN-ZWVUZVYLK� YLZVS\[PVU� PU� 6J[VILY� � ��calling for an international conference on the Cambodian issue. The declaration issued at this ASEAN-initiated, UN-sponsored 0U[LYUH[PVUHS�*VUMLYLUJL� VU�2HTW\JOLH��0*2��ÔPJO�[VVR�WSHJL�PU�1\S`�� ^HZ�then endorsed by the UN and, as stated by 4\[OPHO�(SHNHWWH�constituted “the basis for PU[LYUH[PVUHS�JVUZPKLYH[PVU�VM�[OL�JVUÅPJ[�¹11 Why did ASEAN turn to the UN? 0TWSLTLU[PUN� H� JVTWYLOLUZP]L� WLHJL�ZL[[SLTLU[� HZ� P[� LU]PZPVULK� ^HZ� ^LSS�

beyond ASEAN’s limited capabilities – after HSS�� [OL�VYNHUPaH[PVU�^HZ�IHYLS`�H�KLJHKL�VSK�� 3HJRPUN� H� JVSSLJ[P]L� ZLSM�KLMLUZL�arrangement as well as adequate military JHWHIPSP[PLZ� [V� YLZWVUK� [V� =PL[UHTLZL�HNNYLZZPVU� �PUJS\KPUN� PUJ\YZPVUZ� PU[V�;OHP�[LYYP[VY`��JVSSLJ[P]L�KPWSVTHJ`�HUK�\S[PTH[LS`�PU[LY]LU[PVU�[OYV\NO�[OL�<5�^HZ�[OL�ILZ[�way for ASEAN member-states to address the Cambodian issue. The UN umbrella ^V\SK� WYV]PKL�T\JO�ULLKLK� L_WLY[PZL�and resources for peacekeeping as well HZ� LSLJ[VYHS� Z\WLY]PZPVU�� 0UKLLK�� MYVT�-LIY\HY`� � �� [V� :LW[LTILY� � �� [OL�UN Transitional Administration of Cambodia �<5;(*�� KLWSV`LK� �� WLYZVUULS� H[�H� JVZ[� VM� V]LY� �� IPSSPVU�� HUK� (:,(5�TLTILY�Z[H[LZ� ^LYL� ¸YLSPL]LK¹� [V� YLS`�on UN assistance.12 ASEAN’s diplomatic SVII`PUN�WYV]PKLK�]HS\HISL� PUMVYTH[PVU�[V�other actors, got the General Assembly to HKVW[�ZWVUZVYLK�YLZVS\[PVUZ��HUK�[OL�0*2�KLJSHYH[PVU� WYV]PKLK� HU� PUZ[P[\[PVUHSPaLK�global mechanism to monitor compliance at SV^LY�[YHUZHJ[PVU�JVZ[Z��-VY�V]LY�H�KLJHKL��[OL�<5�ZLY]LK�HZ�HU� PTWVY[HU[� MVY\T�MVY�JVUZ\S[H[PVUZ�VU� [OL�*HTIVKPHU�JVUÅPJ["�¸ZO\[[SL� KPWSVTHJ`¹� K\YPUN� PU[YH�(:,(5�meetings as well as with extra-regional actors generated critical momentum and sustained political will among the international community to participate in YLZVS]PUN�[OL�JYPZPZ�13

� 4VYLV]LY�� [V� [OL� =PL[UHTLZL�� [OL�Association was far from an impartial party, and they were unwilling to accept any ASEAN-dictated terms.�� The UN’s high degree of agent autonomy, with an established bureaucracy and the Security Council’s powerful mandate, also empowered it to induce an equilibrium solution between the ASEAN-backed


JUIS22

*VHSP[PVU� .V]LYUTLU[� VM� +LTVJYH[PJ�2HTW\JOLH15�HUK�[OL�=PL[UHTLZL�PUZ[HSSLK�792� YLNPTL� �HUK�I`� L_[LUZPVU�� IL[^LLU�(:,(5�HUK�=PL[UHT��+LZWP[L�HU�PU[LUZP]L�Å\YY`�VM�(:,(5�KYP]LU�KPWSVTHJ`�[OYV\NO�[OL�1HRHY[H�0UMVYTHS�4LL[PUNZ��104Z��[OL�ÄYZ[�7HYPZ�WLHJL�JVUMLYLUJL�PU�� OHK�LUKLK�in a deadlock. Following this setback, the three major powers in the Security Council ¶�[OL�<UP[LK�:[H[LZ��*OPUH�HUK�[OL�:V]PL[�<UPVU�¶�^PLSKLK�[OLPY�PUKP]PK\HS��HZ�^LSS�HZ�QVPU[�SL]LYHNL�[V�W\ZO�MVY�H�JVTWYLOLUZP]L�WVSP[PJHS�ZL[[SLTLU[��-YVT�� KPYLJ[�PU]VS]LTLU[�HUK�JVVWLYH[PVU�IL[^LLU�[OL�7LYTHULU[�-P]L�VM�[OL�<5�:LJ\YP[`�*V\UJPS�^HZ�RL`�PU�V]LYJVTPUN�VIZ[HJSLZ��Z\JO�HZ�KPZ[Y\Z[� HTVUN� [OL� 2OTLY� MHJ[PVUZ� HUK�=PL[UHT��]LYPM`PUN�=PL[UHTLZL�^P[OKYH^HS��that had stalled the peace process and [OL�MVYTH[PVU�VM�H�[YHUZP[PVU�NV]LYUTLU[�� After a series of meetings, the Paris Peace (NYLLTLU[Z�ZPNULK�VU��6J[VILY�� LUKVYZLK�HU�V]LYHYJOPUN�THUKH[L�MVY�[OL�UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia �<5;(*��;O\Z��JLKPUN�[OL�KYP]LY»Z�ZLH[�[V�[OL�<5�^HZ�JYP[PJHS� PU�WYV]PKPUN�H�UL\[YHS�WVSP[PJHS�MYHTL^VYR�MVY�[OL�792�HUK�2OTLY�factions to come to the table and accept a negotiated settlement. At the same time, these political breakthroughs contrasted with and undermined ASEAN’s original hardline position, and ASEAN was compelled to TVKLYH[L�P[Z�Z[HUJL�[V�H]VPK�MHSSPUN�V\[�VM�line. Delegation to the UN, a much more WV^LYM\S� HNLU[�� PUL]P[HIS`� LU[HPSLK� ZVTL�loss of principal control, and the Security *V\UJPS»Z�HJ[PVUZ�HSZV�Z[YVUNS`� PUÅ\LUJLK�the Association’s positions. ASEAN’s attempts at an intermediary role were only successful under the aegis of the UN.

While all ASEAN members were signatories to the Paris Agreements, recognition of Southeast Asia’s stake in the process was PUJYLHZPUNS`� NP]LU� [V� PUKP]PK\HS� JV\U[YPLZ�that displayed more moderate positions. For instance, Jakarta was made co-chair of the Paris peace conferences and participated in Security Council discussions VU� VWLYH[PVUHSPaPUN� [OL� <5� ZL[[SLTLU[�framework. In this sense, many would argue [OH[� (:,(5� JLKLK� PUP[ PH[ P]L� [V� [OL�highly autonomous and influential UN Security Council in a classic illustration of agent slippage. After all, scholars OH]L� JVU]LU[PVUHSS`� HYN\LK� [OH[� [OL� YVSL�of great power interests was crucial for L]LU[\HS�JVUÅPJ[�ZL[[SLTLU[�� Alagappa in 9LNPVUHSPZT�HUK� [OL�8\LZ[� MVY�:LJ\YP[`!�(:,(5�HUK�[OL�*HTIVKPHU�*VUÅPJ[� noted [OH[�(:,(5�^HZ�TVZ[�LќLJ[P]L�PU�JVUÅPJ[�JVU[HPUTLU[��I\[�UV[�JVUÅPJ[�[LYTPUH[PVU��since it played a marginal role in the 7HYPZ� 7LHJL�*VUMLYLUJLZ� HUK� L]LU[\HS�peacekeeping operations.�� It was only the thawing of the Cold War and other changes exogenous to ASEAN’s role that allowed concrete progress in a peace process after � �� 0U�MHJ[��[OLYL�HSZV�HWWLHYZ�[V�OH]L�been a re-delegation of tasks from the UN to ASEAN in what Alagappa called a “de MHJ[V�KP]PZPVU�VM�SHIVY�¹� While the Security *V\UJPS�OHTTLYLK�V\[�[OL�JVTWYLOLUZP]L�framework agreement, ASEAN had the ZTHSSLY�YLZWVUZPIPSP[`�VM�VYNHUPaPUN�[OL�104Z��Z[PSS�\UKLY�[OL�H\[OVYP[`�VM�[OL�7HYPZ�7LHJL�Conference interim committee), which MVJ\ZLK�VU�HJOPL]PUN�UH[PVUHS�YLJVUJPSPH[PVU�and the formation of the Supreme National Council.20 � -VY�HSS�P[Z�KPWSVTH[PJ�HJ[P]PZT��(:,(5�

as a regional grouping was ultimately subject [V�L_[YH�YLNPVUHS�KLJPZPVUZ�PTWSLTLU[LK�]PH�the UN Security Council. This suggests [OL� YLSH[P]LS`� SV^� H\[VUVT`� VM� YLNPVUHS�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ�^P[OPU�H�]LY[PJHS�OPLYHYJO`�VM�competence and power, with the UN as a global institution at the apex. Yet, this paper would argue that this does not necessarily imply that upward delegation was a futile choice for ASEAN. In fact, awareness of its own minimal clout spurred the Association to reach out to the UN and the international community as a source of political authority HUK� WV^LY�� (:,(5�^HZ�TVZ[� LMMLJ[P]L�as a mediator and source of information, PKLHZ��HUK� PUP[PH[P]LZ�VU�OV^�[V�KLHS�^P[O�[OL�*HTIVKPHU� PZZ\L� ¶� [OL� OLH]`� SPM[PUN�had to be left to the great powers. For a regional body such as ASEAN to act as HU� LќLJ[P]L� WSH`LY�� P[� ULLKLK� [V� YLS`� VU�HU�PU[LYUH[PVUHSPaH[PVU�Z[YH[LN`�PU�VYKLY�[V�bandwagon with the resources of external powers and elicit a solution. Delegation to a more powerful and autonomous agent was hence the necessary and - deliberate - choice. While it was broader geopolitical changes that ignited the Cambodian issue and enabled the deployment of UNTAC in � ��(:,(5�HZ� [OL�WYPUJPWHS� HNLU[� KPK�not entirely lose its control – it still sought to shape the scope of UN responses. :PUJL�[OL�� Z��P[�OHK�ILLU�PUZ[Y\TLU[HS�PU� PUZ[P[\[PVUHSPaPUN� P[Z� JVUJLYUZ�^P[O� [OL�JVUÅPJ[�THUHNLTLU[�WYVJLZZ��(:,(5�KPK�not merely seek to spotlight the Cambodian issue on the UN’s agenda, but also to HJ[P]LS`� PU[LYUH[PVUHSPaL� [OL� JVUÅPJ[� HZ� H�TLHUZ�[V�TVIPSPaL�̂ PKLZWYLHK�Z\WWVY[�HUK�make the “cost of dominance in Cambodia \UILHYHIS`� OPNO� MVY� /HUVP�¹� \ZPUN�^OH[�


232013Fall

(SHNHWWH� [LYTZ� ¸JVLYJP]L� KPWSVTHJ �̀¹21 In particular, using the General Assembly mechanism as a sort of institutional check HUK�IHSHUJL�HNHPUZ[�[OL�L]LU[\HS�KLJPZPVUZ�by the UN Security Council, the Association sought to frame the debate according to its own terms, lobby major powers, deny KPWSVTH[PJ�YLJVNUP[PVU�VM�[OL�=PL[UHTLZL�PUZ[HSSLK�792�NV]LYUTLU[��HUK�JVUZVSPKH[L�Z\WWVY[�MVY�2OTLY�YLZPZ[HUJL�MVYJLZ�22

Controlled delegation to the UN was a means for ASEAN to lock-in its preferred policies and interests. For example, the 0*2�KLJSHYH[PVU�LZZLU[PHSS`�HY[PJ\SH[LK�[OL�Association’s principles on the Cambodian people’s right to self-determination and its NVHSZ� MVY� [OL�^P[OKYH^HS� VM� =PL[UHTLZL�forces. It also incorporated ASEAN’s WYVWVZHS� MVY� H� JVTWYLOLUZP]L� WLHJL�settlement, including a ceasefire by all WHY[PLZ�� HYYHUNLTLU[Z� [V� WYL]LU[� HYTLK�2HTW\JOLHU� MHJ[PVUZ� MYVT� KPZY\W[PUN�

or controlling election outcomes, a UN peacekeeping force to ensure law and order, and the holding of free elections \UKLY� <5� Z\WLY]PZPVU�23 Similarly, the priorities outlined through the Jakarta

4LL[PUNZ� HUK�T\S[PWSL�(:,(5�WYVWVZHSZ�^LYL�\S[PTH[LS`�YLÅLJ[LK�PU�[OL�7HYPZ�7LHJL�(NYLLTLU[Z� VM� � �� ;OPZ� PUJS\KLK� [OL�PTWSLTLU[H[PVU�VM�H�JLHZLÄYL��H�[YHUZP[PVUHS�JVHSP[PVU�PU]VS]PUN�HSS�MV\Y�WVSP[PJHS�MHJ[PVUZ��HZ�^LSS�HZ�<5�V]LYZPNO[�VM�KLTVIPSPaH[PVU��Z\WLY]PZPVU�VM�HKTPUPZ[YH[P]L�Z[Y\J[\YLZ��HUK�the administration of national elections.��

In addition, the formation of the *VHSP[PVU� .V]LYUTLU[� VM� +LTVJYH[PJ�2HTW\JOLH�̂ HZ�HU�(:,(5�KYP]LU�PUP[PH[P]L��(S[OV\NO� [OL� [OYLL� 2OTLY� YLZPZ[HUJL�groups were operating independently and essentially agreed to a marriage of JVU]LUPLUJL��Z\JO�JVVYKPUH[PVU�ZLY]LK�[V�present to the international community a SLNP[PTH[L�YLWYLZLU[H[P]L�MVY�[OL�*HTIVKPHU�people that was capable of replacing the 792�NV]LYUTLU[�25 ASEAN was also able [V� WVSP[PJPaL�*HTIVKPH»Z� ZLH[� H[� [OL�<5��normally a purely rubber-stamping process. 4VIPSPaPUN�V[OLY�;OPYK�>VYSK�Z[H[LZ� PU�[OL�

General Assembly, using the rhetoric of non-PU[LY]LU[PVU�� P[� Z\JJLZZM\SS`� JHTWHPNULK�L]LY`�`LHY� [V�THPU[HPU� [OL�2OTLY�9V\NL�¶�UV^�JHSSLK�[OL�+LTVJYH[PJ�2HTW\JOLH��+2�� ¶� HZ� [OL�*HTIVKPHU� YLWYLZLU[H[P]L�

at the UN, which was unprecedented for HU�V]LY[OYVÛ�NV]LYUTLU[�� This was an PTWVY[HU[�Z[LW�PU�PZVSH[PUN�[OL�=PL[UHTLZL�PUZ[HSSLK� 792� YLNPTL� HUK� KLU`PUN� P[Z�internal and external consolidation of WV^LY�� 0[�^HZ� HSZV� YLTHYRHISL� NP]LU� [OL�NLUVJPKHS� HJ[P]P[PLZ�VM� [OL�2OTLY�9V\NL��which lent an undeniable humanitarian Q\Z[PÄJH[PVU�MVY�=PL[UHT»Z�PU[LY]LU[PVU� While ASEAN was unable to fully control UN actions or alter the conflict dynamics, it was successful in restructuring [OL� [LYTZ� \UKLY� ÔPJO� L]LU[\HS� WLHJL�WYVJLZZ�ULNV[PH[PVU�HUK�JVUÅPJ[�ZL[[SLTLU[�[VVR�WSHJL��0U�LќLJ[��(:,(5�̂ HZ�\ZPUN�[OL�global reach of the UN as an instrument to WYVT\SNH[L� P[Z� ]PL^Z�HUK� PU[LYLZ[Z� PU� [OL�JVUÅPJ[��HZ�̂ LSS�HZ�SLNP[PTPaL�P[Z�VÛ�NVHSZ�� ;OPZ�^HZ�PU�MHJ[�H�SHYNLY�ZJHSL�YLÅLJ[PVU�VM�how ASEAN member-states were using the YLNPVUHS�(ZZVJPH[PVU�[V�HTWSPM`�[OLPY�]VPJLZ�on the international stage, enabling ASEAN to function as a coherent actor with the ability to delegate. At the same time, the SLNHS�HUK�WVSP[PJHS�JHWHJP[PLZ�VM�[OL�<5��HUK�the Security Council in particular) enabled it to respond as an independent actor.

East Timor: A Stymied ASEAN� 0U�+LJLTILY�� 0UKVULZPH�PU]HKLK�East Timor in the wake of Portugal’s ^P[OKYH^HS� K\YPUN� [OL� KLJVSVUPaH[PVU�process. This was condemned by the UN Security Council and General Assembly, but UV�JVUJYL[L�HJ[PVU�^HZ�[HRLU�\U[PS�� ÔLU�0UKVULZPH�HUK�7VY[\NHS�ÄUHSS`�ZPNULK�[OL��4H`�HNYLLTLU[Z��LU[Y\Z[PUN�[OL�<5�[V�JVUK\J[�H�̧ WVW\SHY�JVUZ\S[H[PVU¹�MVY�[OL�,HZ[�;PTVYLZL� [V�]V[L�IL[^LLU� PUKLWLUKLUJL�HUK�H\[VUVT`�HZ�HU�0UKVULZPHU�WYV]PUJL��


“For a regional body such as ASEAN to act

HZ�HU�LɈLJ[P]L�WSH`LY��P[�ULLKLK�[V�YLS`�VU�an internationalization strategy in order to

bandwagon with the resources of external

powers and elicit a solution. Delegation to a

more powerful and autonomous agent was hence

the necessary – and deliberate – choice.”

JUIS24

(M[LY� [OL� V]LYÔLSTPUN� ]V[L� PU� MH]VY� VM�independence, pro-integration militias with the support of Indonesian armed forces carried out a retaliatory terror JHTWHPNU�� SLHKPUN� [V�THZZ� ]PVSLUJL� HUK�internal displacement. Ultimately, a Security *V\UJPS�9LZVS\[PVU�VU��:LW[LTILY�� H\[OVYPaLK� H�T\S[PUH[PVUHS� O\THUP[HYPHU�PU[LY]LU[PVU�MVYJL��05;,9-,;��[V�,HZ[�;PTVY��led by Australia. Subsequently, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor �<5;(,;��^HZ�LZ[HISPZOLK�VU��6J[VILY�� HZ�H�WLHJLRLLWPUN�MVYJL�YLZWVUZPISL�for the administration of East Timor during the transitional period.��

� ;YHKP[PVUHSS �̀� ZJOVSHYZ�OH]L�JSHZZPÄLK�[OL� (ZZVJPH[PVU� HZ� H� WHZZP]L� I`Z[HUKLY�PU� [OL� ,HZ[� ;PTVY� JYPZPZ�� WHYHSàLK� I`� H�ÄYT� HKOLYLUJL� [V� [OL� YLNPVUHS� UVYTZ� VM�ZV]LYLPNU[`� HUK�UVU�PU[LYMLYLUJL�� WHY[� VM�the “ASEAN Way."� According to Alan Dupont, ASEAN countries saw the Chapter =00� THUKH[L� NP]LU� [V� 05;,9-,;� HUK�<5;(,;�HZ�̧ H�ZSHW�PU�[OL�MHJL¹�[V�0UKVULZPH��which had not yet formally ceded its claim [V�ZV]LYLPNU[`�V]LY�,HZ[�;PTVY�H[�[OL�[PTL�of deployment. They feared that such action would set an unwanted precedent for >LZ[LYU�PU[LY]LU[PVU�PU�[OL�PU[LYUHS�HќHPYZ�of other member-states.30� /V^L]LY�� [OPZ�JVUZ[Y\J[P]PZ[� HYN\TLU[� MHSSZ� HWHY[�ÔLU�^L�JVUZPKLY�(:,(5»Z�WYL]PV\Z�YLHKPULZZ�[V�TLKKSL�PU�[OL�*HTIVKPHU�JVUÅPJ[��/V^�then can we explain the Association’s apparent inaction, and why did it not play HZ�HJ[P]L�H�WYPUJPWHS�YVSL�PU�KLSLNH[PUN�[V�[OL�UN? ASEAN’s suppression of the East Timor issue had begun well before the

YLMLYLUK\T�HUK�<5�LUKVYZLK�PU[LY]LU[PVU�PU�� 0U�[OL�LHYS`�� Z�¶�HUK�PUKLLK�ZPUJL�[OL�� Z�¶�(:,(5»Z�THPU�VIQLJ[P]L�^HZ� [V� KL�PU[LYUH[PVUHSPaL� [OL� JVUMSPJ[��;OPZ� LU[HPSLK� ]PNVYV\Z� KPWSVTHJ`� H[� [OL�UN to keep the issue off the agenda. ASEAN member-states tabled annual TV[PVUZ��WVZ[WVULK�YLSL]HU[�KLIH[LZ��HUK�lobbied Western powers to downgrade UNCHR resolutions to weaker, non-binding chairman’s statements. They JVUZPZ[LU[S`� ]V[LK� ^P[O� 0UKVULZPH� PU�the UN General Assembly, or at most HIZ[HPULK��HZ�:PUNHWVYL�KPK� PU�� HUK�� 31��([�[OL�(ZPH�,\YVWL�4LL[PUN��(ZPH�Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, [OL�(:,(5�9LNPVUHS�-VY\T��HUK�H�� ASEAN informal summit, the Association successfully condemned and blocked attempts by the EU and Portugal to discuss the East Timor issue, threatening a suspension of dialogue and membership.32

Such support from Jakarta’s neighbors stemmed from the historical specter of communism that preoccupied the region PU�[OL�� Z�¶�PU�[OH[�JVU[L_[��0UKVULZPHU�annexation of East Timor was seen as [OL� ILZ[�^H`� [V� WYL]LU[� [OL� LTLYNLUJL�VM� HU� PUKLWLUKLU[� Z[H[L� �HUK� H� IHZL� MVY�JVTT\UPZ[� Z\I]LYZPVU�� \UKLY� [OL� SLM[�leaning FRETILIN guerillas. ASEAN’s stout KLMLUZL� VM� 0UKVULZPH»Z� OLH]`�OHUKLK�actions stood in stark contrast to the opposition by other Third World countries.33 Continued internal conflicts and social \UYLZ[� PU[V� [OL� � �Z� YHPZLK� JVUJLYUZ�that East Timor separatism would trigger H� ¸)HSRHUPaH[PVU¹� VM� 0UKVULZPH� HSVUNZPKL�YLM\NLL� ZWPSSV]LYZ�� As a result, ASEAN

Z[H[LZ� ZV\NO[� [V� WYLZLY]L� WVSP[PJHS� HUK�socioeconomic stability in the region by WYL]LU[PUN�,HZ[�;PTVYLZL�PUKLWLUKLUJL�� ;OH[�[OL�,HZ[�;PTVY�JVUÅPJ[�PU]VS]LK�Indonesia also complicated the regional response. One of the main reasons behind (:,(5»Z� JYLH[PVU� PU� � �� OHK� ILLU� [V�promote reconciliation with Jakarta in a regional community framework, following [OL� SH[[LY»Z� ]PVSLU[� ¸2VUMYVU[HZP¹� WVSPJ`�toward its neighbors.35 In contrast, neither =PL[UHT�UVY�*HTIVKPH�^HZ�H�TLTILY�VM�(:,(5�K\YPUN� [OL�*HTIVKPHU�JVUÅPJ[� PU�[OL�� Z�HUK�LHYS`�� Z��-\Y[OLYTVYL��HZ�ASEAN’s largest member-state, Indonesia, KPK� UV[� OLZP[H[L� [V� ^PLSK� P[Z� JSV\[� ]PH�PZZ\L� SPURHNL� HUK� [OL� TVIPSPaH[PVU� VM�transnational politico-business networks, placing economic and political pressure VU�ULPNOIVYPUN�NV]LYUTLU[Z��-VY�L_HTWSL��the Philippines, which was highly reliant on Indonesian mediation to handle the 4PUKHUHV�4\ZSPT�PUZ\YNLUJ`�PU�[OL�ZV\[O��JH]LK� [V� 1HRHY[H»Z� KLTHUKZ� [V� IHU� H�planned conference by the Timorese YLZPZ[HUJL�PU�� ;OHPSHUK�HUK�4HSH`ZPH�IV[O� [VVR� ZPTPSHY� Z[LWZ� PU� WYL]LU[PUN�TLL[PUNZ� I`� WYV�PUKLWLUKLUJL� HJ[P]PZ[Z�HUK� JP]PS� ZVJPL[`� NYV\WZ�� This lack of impartiality greatly hindered any sort of LќLJ[P]L�(:,(5�YLZWVUZL�[V�[OL�ZP[\H[PVU�in East Timor, and certainly inhibited HU`� PU[LY]LU[PVU� VY� KLSLNH[PVU� VM� JVUÅPJ[�resolution to the UN.� (:,(5�Z�WHYHS`ZPZ�L]LU[\HSS`�SLK�ZVTL�member-states to directly seek out the UN HZ�HU�HS[LYUH[P]L�]LU\L�MVY�HJ[PVU��JH[HSàLK�I`�[OL�ÅHNYHU[�]PVSLUJL�I`�WYV�0UKVULZPHU�TPSP[PHZ�HM[LY�[OL�� IHSSV[�YLZ\S[Z�PU�,HZ[�


252013Fall

Timor. This was also facilitated by external JOHUNLZ� PU� [OL� NLVWVSP[PJHS� LU]PYVUTLU[��WYV]PKPUN�(:,(5�Z[H[LZ�^P[O�TVYL� YVVT�[V�THUL\]LY��+\YPUN�[OL�*VSK�>HY��>LZ[LYU�powers such as the US and Australia had been equally complicit in muting any international response to East Timor ILJH\ZL� VM� 0UKVULZPH»Z� Z[YH[LNPJ� ]HS\L�as a pro-Western, anti-Communist ally in Southeast Asia.�� As the communist threat L]HWVYH[LK�PU�[OL�� Z��HUK�W\ISPJ�VWPUPVU�NYL^�PU�MH]VY�VM�,HZ[�;PTVY�PUKLWLUKLUJL��HZ�H�YLZ\S[�VM�TLKPH�HUK�5.6�JV]LYHNL�� [OLYL�^HZ�YLK\JLK�PUJLU[P]L�[V�THPU[HPU�H�1HRHY[H�ÄYZ[�WVSPJ �̀�(TPKZ[� [OPZ� JVU]LYNLUJL�VM� WYLMLYLUJLZ��ASEAN countr ies quickly spoke in MH]VY� VM� [OL� IHSSV[� V\[JVTL� Z\WWVY[PUN�,HZ[� ;PTVY� PUKLWLUKLUJL�� ,]LU� ILMVYL�>LZ[LYU�JV\U[YPLZ��4HSH`ZPH�HUK�;OHPSHUK�were the first to publicly offer troops MVY� HU� PU[LYUH[PVUHS� PU[LY]LU[PVU� MVYJL��with Singapore and the Philippines soon following suit.�� That this occurred despite ]VPJLK� [OYLH[Z� MYVT� 0UKVULZPH� ¶� -VYLPNU�4PUPZ[LY� (SH[HZ� ^HYULK�� ¸+V� UV[� [HSR�about peacekeeping…unless you want [V� ZOVV[� `V\Y�^H`� PU[V� ,HZ[� ;PTVY¹�� – suggests that ASEAN was not completely opposed to the ideas of humanitarian PU[LY]LU[PVU�VY�PU[LYUH[PVUHS�WLHJLRLLWPUN��but rather had been stymied by Jakarta’s I\SS`PUN� PUÅ\LUJL��(S[OV\NO� HUHS`Z[Z�� SPRL�Jürgen Haacke, pointed out that ASEAN NV]LYUTLU[Z�^V\SK�UV[�OH]L�WHY[PJPWH[LK�in INTERFET “had it not been for Jakarta’s explicit consent,"�� other Western countries ZPTPSHYS`� LTWOHZPaLK� [OL� PTWVY[HUJL� VM�obtaining Indonesian assent, in UN Security Council meetings and elsewhere.��

� )LJH\ZL�(:,(5�SHJRLK�[OL�JHWHJP[`�

to marshal a multilateral peacekeeping force, immediate and direct delegation to [OL�<5�^HZ�[OL�TVZ[�LѝJPLU[�JOVPJL��5V[�only was ASEAN unable to compel Jakarta to accept a Southeast Asian-led force in East Timor, ASEAN member-states were also aware that they quite simply lacked sufficient experience and resources.�� Their contributions to INTERFET ultimately KLWLUKLK�\WVU�ÄUHUJPHS�HZZPZ[HUJL�MYVT�NYLH[� WV^LYZ"� (\Z[YHSPH� HSYLHK`� IVYL� H�ZPNUPÄJHU[� WVY[PVU� VM�TPZZPVU� JVZ[Z�� HUK�H��TPSSPVU�05;,9-,;�;Y\Z[�-\UK�^HZ�LZ[HISPZOLK� [V� JV]LY� KL]LSVWPUN� JV\U[Y`�expenses, with Japan contributing 100 million USD. Infantry units as well as critical communications, and intelligence support came from other Western powers such as [OL�<:��<2��*HUHKH��HUK�-YHUJL�� For the UN and international community, entrusting (:,(5� [V� VYNHUPaL� VY� VWLYH[PVUHSPaL�T\S[PSH[LYHS� PU[LY]LU[PVU�^HZ� ZJHYJLS`� H�feasible option, especially when ASEAN 9LNPVUHS�-VY\T�OHK�MHPSLK�[V�L]LU�KPZJ\ZZ�the East Timor issue on its annual agenda. Acknowledging this reality, Southeast Asian states such as Singapore and the Philippines immediately highlighted at Security Council meetings the need for international assistance through the UN, rather than calling for an ASEAN-led HS[LYUH[P]L��

Indeed, a change in Indonesia’s WVZP[PVU�̂ HZ�HJOPL]LK�UV[�[OYV\NO�(:,(5�but through pressure from UN-linked PUZ[P[\[PVUHS�TLJOHUPZTZ��;OL�� (ZPHU�-PUHUJPHS�*YPZPZ�OHK�KL]HZ[H[LK�0UKVULZPH»Z�economy and left it dependent on Western ÄZJHS� KVUVYZ�� VWLUPUN� YVVT� MVY� JVLYJP]L�SL]LYHNL� VU� [OL� ,HZ[� ;PTVY� PZZ\L�� ;OL�0U[LYUH[PVUHS�4VUL[HY`� -\UK� HUK�>VYSK�

)HUR�MYVaL�SVHUZ�HUK�HPK�WHJRHNLZ��^OPSL�the US and EU threatened to suspend military assistance and impose an arms embargo, unless Indonesia accepted a MVYLPNU� PU[LY]LU[PVU� MVYJL�� ;OL� YLSH[P]L�power endowed to the UN Security *V\UJPS� HSSV^LK� P[� [V� HJ[� HZ� HU� LќLJ[P]L�agent in enforcing a multilateral solution of O\THUP[HYPHU�PU[LY]LU[PVU��;OL�H\[OVYP[`�VM�[OL�<5�\TIYLSSH�M\Y[OLY�WYV]PKLK�JYLKPISL�ZOLS[LY� MVY� PUKP]PK\HS� (:,(5� Z[H[LZ� [V�HK]VJH[L� MVY� ,HZ[� ;PTVY� WLHJLRLLWPUN�against Jakarta’s desires. Interest ingly, after Indonesian VѝJPHSZ�IV^LK�[V�L_[YH�YLNPVUHS�WYLZZ\YL��they quickly sought to boost ASEAN WHY[PJPWH[PVU� ¶� H� WYL[LUZL� VM� ]VS\U[HY`�KLSLNH[PVU� [V� [OL� YLNPVUHS� VYNHUPaH[PVU��HZ� P[Z� WYLMLYYLK� HNLU[�� -VYLPNU�4PUPZ[LY�Ali Alatas arranged for his well-respected ;OHP�JV\U[LYWHY[��:\YPU�7P[Z\^HU��^OV�̂ HZ�also chair of the Standing Committee of ASEAN), to meet with General Wiranto, the Indonesian military commander, on �� :LW[LTILY� � �� HUK� VI[HPU� OPZ�agreement for deployment of ASEAN troops as part of INTERFET. On the same day, Indonesian president Habibie formally YLX\LZ[LK� OLSW� PU� VYNHUPaPUN� HU�(:,(5�military contribution.��

� *SLHYS �̀�KLZWP[L�P[Z�SV^�PUZ[P[\[PVUHSPaLK�capacity, ASEAN still retained an important legitimating role. As a regional body that counted Indonesia as a member, it lent credibility to domestic nationalistic ZLU[PTLU[� HNHPUZ[� MVYLPNU� PU[LY]LU[PVU�in East Timor, still seen as Indonesian [LYYP[VY �̀�(�<5�LUKVYZLK�ZVS\[PVU��I`�]PY[\L�of Security Council and Western power, JHYYPLK�PTWLYPHSPZ[�V]LY[VULZ��I\[�LUZ\YPUN�(:,(5� PU]VS]LTLU[� JV\SK� WYV]PKL� H�


JUIS26

]LULLY�VM�:V\[OLHZ[�(ZPHU�VÛLYZOPW��HZ�well as Jakarta’s willing consent. On its part, the UN also attempted to acknowledge regional preferences. While Australia took the lead in INTERFET, ASEAN was not relegated to the bylines. The Deputy *VTTHUKLY�^HZ� H� ;OHP�4HQVY�.LULYHS��HUK� (:,(5� YLWYLZLU[LK� ZSPNO[S`� V]LY� H�X\HY[LY� VM� [OL� � ��WLYZVUULS� KLWSV`LK�PU� :LW[LTILY� � �� In a compromise, Filipino Lieutenant-General Jaime de los Santos was also appointed to lead UNTAET with an Australian deputy, while the next commander was also from Thailand. Thus, L]LU� PM� H� YLNPVUHS� VYNHUPaH[PVU� YLTHPUZ�PULќLJ[P]L� VY� Z\IVYKPUH[L� [V� [OL�<5�SLK�OPLYHYJO`�VM�KLJPZPVU�THRPUN�HUK�JVUÅPJ[�PU[LY]LU[PVU��P[Z�̂ PSSPUN�PU]VS]LTLU[�YLTHPUZ�a potential source of legitimacy for action by the international community. All the same, ASEAN members constantly wrestled with the secondary role and the challenge that this posed to [OL�VYNHUPaH[PVU»Z�SLNP[PTHJ`�HZ�[OL�KYP]LY�for regional action. Tensions between [OL� YLNPVUHS� HUK� PU[LYUH[PVUHS� SL]LSZ�^LYL�L]PKLU[� PU�:V\[OLHZ[�(ZPHU� YLZWVUZLZ� [V�the Australian-led, UN-sanctioned forces, especially under perceptions that Australia saw itself as the deputy to the United States PU� WVSPJPUN� [OL� YLNPVU��4HSH`ZPHU�+LW\[`�7YPTL�4PUPZ[LY�(IK\SSHO�)HKH^P�JV\U[LYLK�by saying, “we do not wish to see any country appointing itself the protector or SLHKLY�MVY�[OPZ�YLNPVU�¹�ÔPSL�H�;OHP�MVYLPNU�WVSPJ`THRLY�HSZV�LTWOHZPaLK�[OH[�(:,(5�“must play the primary role in Southeast Asia."50

While scholars such as Lee Jones

OH]L� JSHPTLK� HJ[P]L� :V\[OLHZ[� (ZPHU�PU[LY]LU[PVU� PU� [OL� ,HZ[� ;PTVY� JVUMSPJ[��these were not always as an ASEAN bloc. INTERFET and UNTAET contributions ^LYL� \UKLY� PUKP]PK\HS� JV\U[Y`� ÅHNZ�� HUK�SPTP[LK� [V� [OL�THQVY�TLTILY�Z[H[LZ� �HUK�founding members), namely Thailand, the 7OPSPWWPULZ�� :PUNHWVYL�� HUK�4HSH`ZPH�� 0U�H�YL]LHSPUN�YLTHYR��9VKVSMV�:L]LYPUV��[OL�ASEAN Secretary-General at that time, ZHPK�[OH[�[OL�HIZLUJL�VM�JVSSLJ[P]L�(:,(5�peacekeeping is “not so much because of its policy of non-interference as because of P[Z�TLTILY�Z[H[LZ»�H]LYZPVU�[V�PU]LZ[PUN�[OL�Association with any kind of supranational WV^LY�� WHY[PJ\SHYS`� VUL� PU]VS]PUN�TPSP[HY`�force."51 Southeast Asian states remain wary of delegating too much institutional power to ASEAN that may infringe upon their own national interests in the future. )LJH\ZL�[OL`�JVU[PU\L�[V�]PL^�T\S[PSH[LYHS�PUZ[P[\[PVUZ�HZ�H�YLZV\YJL�[V�IL�ZLSLJ[P]LS`�LTWSV`LK��YH[OLY�[OHU�H�ILULÄJPHS�HJ[VY�PU�P[Z�VÛ�YPNO[��VYNHUPaH[PVUHS�ZVSPKHYP[`�OHZ�been limited.� 4VYLV]LY��VUL�THQVY�JOHUNL�IL[^LLU�[OL�LHYSPLY�=PL[UHTLZL�*HTIVKPHU�JVUÅPJ[�HUK� [OL� ,HZ[� ;PTVY� PU[LY]LU[PVU� ^HZ�the expansion of ASEAN to include the 0UKVJOPUH� JV\U[YPLZ�=PL[UHT��*HTIVKPH��3HVZ�� HUK�4`HUTHY� PU� [OL� � �Z�� ;OPZ�increased the heterogeneity of member-state preferences, particularly as the Association had sought to speed their inclusion through a low bar of accession, KLZWP[L� ZPNUPÄJHU[� LJVUVTPJ� KPќLYLUJLZ�HUK�JYP[PJPZTZ�VM�O\THU�YPNO[Z�]PVSH[PVUZ�PU�[OL�*34=�JV\U[YPLZ��>PKLULK�TLTILYZOPW�[O\Z� SLK� [V�KP]LYNPUN�WVSPJPLZ� HUK� M\Y[OLY�

HJJLU[\H[LK� PU[YH�(:,(5� KP]PZPVUZ� VU�OV^�[V�YLZWVUK�[V�KL]LSVWTLU[Z� PU�,HZ[�;PTVY�� 0U� MHJ[��VIZLY]LYZ�OH]L�Z\NNLZ[LK�that ASEAN leaders were initially most concerned with the potential impacts on the Association’s unity, instead of the unfolding humanitarian crisis.52 While the ;OHP� +LW\[`� -VYLPNU�4PUPZ[LY� KLJSHYLK�that, “the time has come to show that we JHU�ZVS]L�[OL�YLNPVU»Z�WYVISLTZ�V\YZLS]LZ�with the cooperation of countries outside [OL�YLNPVU�¹�V[OLY�(:,(5�TLTILYZ�Z\JO�HZ� =PL[UHT� HUK� )\YTH� KPZWSH`LK� SP[[SL�LU[O\ZPHZT� HUK� Z[YVUNS`� KPZHWWYV]LK�VM� HU`� L_[LYUHS� PU[LY]LU[PVU�52 During a Security Council meeting on September 11, � ��Z[H[LTLU[Z�I`�*HTIVKPH�HUK�3HVZ�contrasted with declarations by Singapore and the Philippines regarding international assistance in Indonesia.��

A parallel can be drawn with the ASEAN YLZWVUZL�̂ OLU�*HTIVKPH�HNHPU�MHJLK�JP]PS�^HY�IL[^LLU�YP]HS�WVSP[PJHS�MHJ[PVUZ�PU�� In this case, the Association became the delegated agent. The major powers – the European Union, Japan, and especially the United States – had little stomach for M\Y[OLY�ÄYZ[�OHUK�PU[LY]LU[PVU�HUK�WYLZZ\YLK�(:,(5�[V�HJ[��;OPZ�^HZ�H� YL]LYZL�VM� [OL�ZP[\H[PVU� PU� [OL�� Z�ÔLU�(:,(5�OHK�SVIIPLK�MVY�NSVIHS�PU]VS]LTLU[��)LJH\ZL�P[Z�WYL]PV\Z�Z\JJLZZ�PU�[OL�*HTIVKPHU�JHZL�had been the core of the Association’s claim to manage regional order, ASEAN had little choice but to respond to its Western WHY[ULYZ�PU�VYKLY�[V�WYLZLY]L�P[Z�YLW\[H[PVU�and credibility as a regional body, especially PU�[OL�^HRL�VM�PU[LYUH[PVUHS�V\[JY`�V]LY�P[Z�KLJPZPVU� [V� HKTP[� O\THU� YPNO[Z� ]PVSH[VY�


272013Fall

4`HUTHY�HZ�H�TLTILY��(U�(:,(5�;YVPRH��consisting of the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, was appointed to seek a diplomatic solution [V�[OL�JYPZPZ��)\[�H�Z\Z[HPULK�YLZWVUZL�̂ HZ�UV^� MHY�TVYL� KPѝJ\S[� PU� [OL� SH[L� � �Z��HM[LY�=PL[UHT�QVPULK�HZ�TLTILY� PU�� HUK�3HVZ�HUK�4`HUTHY�^LYL�HKTP[[LK�PU�� ;OL�JP]PS�^HY�PU�*HTIVKPH�LќLJ[P]LS`�pitted the ASEAN-backed FUNCINPEC HNHPUZ[� [OL� =PL[UHT�IHJRLK�**7�� 0U[YH�(:,(5�KP]PZPVUZ��̂ P[O�[OL�UL^LY�TLTILYZ�less disposed to continued diplomatic PU[LY]LU[PVU�� SLK� [V� H� ZVTLÔH[� IPaHYYL�compromise. Cambodia was admitted to (:,(5�PU�� ^P[O�P[Z�MVYTHS�HKTPZZPVU�ceremony postponed until after certain conditions were met, including the holding of free and fair elections, and formation VM� H� ZLUH[L�� 4VYLV]LY�� 0UKVULZPH� ^HZ�also struggling with international pressure on the East Timor conflict. Using the rhetoric of non-interference, it increasingly VWWVZLK� M\Y[OLY� (:,(5� PU]VS]LTLU[�in the Cambodian issue.55 As member-states sought to protect their own national interests and limit institutional mandates ÔLU� [OL`� ^LYL� UV� SVUNLY� JVUK\JP]L�for the former, delegation to the regional association declined markedly.

Conclusion� ;OL�KLSLNH[PVU�VM�JVUÅPJ[�YLZVS\[PVU�VY�peacekeeping operations to a multilateral institution is most likely to occur when Z[H[L�WYLMLYLUJLZ�HYL�JSVZLS`�HSPNULK��)\[�contrary to the UN Charter’s top-down model of delegation, in which the UN decides to subcontract certain tasks to

YLNPVUHS� VYNHUPaH[PVUZ�� [OL� KÙHTPJZ� VM�[OL� PU[LY]LU[PVUZ� PU�*HTIVKPH� HUK� ,HZ[�Timor suggest that ASEAN has also been able to bring issues to the global SL]LS�HUK�KLTHUK� PU[LYUH[PVUHS�HJ[PVU�]PH�the UN. When member-states’ interests are homogeneous, ASEAN has been a JVOLZP]L� YLNPVUHS� HJ[VY�� LќLJ[P]LS`� \ZPUN�[OL�<5�HZ�H�NSVIHS�SL]LS�YLZV\YJL�[V�M\Y[OLY�P[Z�VÛ� PU[LYLZ[Z��IL� P[� PU[LY]LU[PVU� PU� [OL�*HTIVKPHU�JVUÅPJ[�VY�PUP[PHS�UVU�PU[LY]LU[PVU�in East Timor. Expanded membership and heterogeneous state interests has limited (:,(5�PUP[PH[LK�KLSLNH[PVU� PU� [OL�� Z��When Southeast Asian states were willing to take action against a fellow ASEAN member – Indonesia – despite stymied HJ[PVU�H[�[OL�YLNPVUHS�SL]LS��[OL`�HSZV�JOVZL�[V�Z\WWVY[�PU[LY]LU[PVU�KPYLJ[S`�[OYV\NO�[OL�UN, particularly when great power interests became more aligned. Delegation to the UN and its Security *V\UJPS�^HZ�\Z\HSS`�\UH]VPKHISL�ILJH\ZL�of ASEAN’s limited clout and resources, making ASEAN highly reliant on extra-regional actors for concrete action. As a mechanism of control, ASEAN sought [V� SL]LYHNL� [OL�.LULYHS� (ZZLTIS`� HZ� HU�PUZ[P[\[PVUHS�JOLJR�HUK�IHSHUJL��)\[�ÔLU�WYLMLYLUJLZ�KP]LYNL��HZ�PU�[OL�*HTIVKPHU�case, the more powerful UN Security Council has been able to act as an autonomous HNLU[��)`�]PY[\L�VM�[OL�(ZZVJPH[PVU»Z�YLSH[P]L�SHJR� VM� PUZ[P[\[PVUHSPaH[PVU� HUK� JVSSLJ[P]L�capacity, ASEAN still remains largely Z\IVYKPUH[L�[V�[OL�<5�HZ�HU�PU[LY]LU[PVUPZ[�HJ[VY��/V^L]LY��KLSLNH[PVU�ÅV^Z�JHU�VJJ\Y�in both directions, and ASEAN has also assumed the role of principal.

Interestingly, there also appears to be an element of mutual legitimation between the international and regional VYNHUPaH[PVUZ��<5�PU]VS]LTLU[�SLU[�WV^LYM\S�international legitimacy and support to (:,(5»Z�PU[LY]LU[PVUPZ[�NVHSZ�PU�*HTIVKPH��as well as enhanced the Association’s YLW\[H[PVU� HZ� H� YLNPVUHS� PUZ[P[\[PVU�� ,]LU�when Western powers and the UN took the SLHK�PU�PU[LY]LUPUN�PU�,HZ[�;PTVY��(:,(5»Z�WYLZLUJL� ZLY]LK� [V� ¸YLNPVUHSPaL¹� HUK��OLUJL��SLNP[PTPaL�[OLPY�HJ[PVUZ��L]LU�PM�VU�H�Z\WLYÄJPHS� SL]LS��<S[PTH[LS �̀� [OL� [^V� [`WLZ�of institutions are complementary - while preferences may not always be aligned, and the UN remains dominant, sustained regional-international interactions help to safeguard international peace and security, as so optimistically stated in the UN Charter.

Endnotes1. )LSPUKH�/LSTRL��;OL�(IZLUJL�VM�(:,(5!�

7LHJLRLLWPUN�PU�:V\[OLHZ[�(ZPH��7HJPÄJ�News, (Jan/Feb 2009): 4-6.

2. United Nations, Chapter VIII: Regional Arrangements. http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter8.shtml (accessed Dec 28, 2012).

3. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: 7YL]LU[P]L�+PWSVTHJ �̀�7LHJLTHRPUN�HUK�7LHJL�RLLWPUN��(��:��<UP[LK�Nations: United Nations, 1992).

4. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the UN. A/50/60-S/1995/1, (United Nations, United Nations, 1995).

��)Q�YU�/L[[UL�HUK�-YLKYPR�:�KLYIH\T��;OL�<5�HUK�9LNPVUHS�6YNHUPaH[PVUZ�PU�.SVIHS�Security: Competing or Complementary 3VNPJZ&�.SVIHS�.V]LYUHUJL��!��1\S�:LW�2006): 227-232.


JUIS28

��+HYYLU�.��/H^RPUZ��+H]PK�(��3HRL��+HUPLS�3��5PLSZVU��HUK�4PJOHLS�1��;PLYUL �̀�+LSLNH[PVU�under anarchy: states, international VYNHUPaH[PVUZ��HUK�WYPUJPWHS�HNLU[�[OLVY �̀�In Delegation and Agency in International 6YNHUPaH[PVUZ��LKP[LK�I`�+HYYLU�.��/H^RPUZ��+H]PK�(��3HRL��+HUPLS�3��5PLSZVU�HUK�4PJOHLS�1��;PLYUL �̀��5L^�@VYR!�*HTIYPKNL�<UP]LYZP[`�Press, 2006).

7. At that time, ASEAN member-states comprised: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, :PUNHWVYL��HUK�;OHPSHUK��[OL�Ä]L�MV\UKPUN�members). Brunei joined in 1984.

��(:,(5��1VPU[�:[H[LTLU[��:WLJPHS�4LL[PUN�VM�ASEAN Foreign Ministers on the Current Political Development in the Southeast Asian 9LNPVU��)HUNRVR��1HU\HY`�� (:,(5�+VJ\TLU[Z��)HUNRVR!�4PUPZ[Y`�VM�-VYLPNU�(ќHPYZ��

��4LS`�*HIHSSLYV�(U[OVU �̀�(:,(5�HUK�[OL�*HTIVKPHU�*VUÅPJ[!�;LZ[PUN�[OL�3PTP[Z�VM�[OL�(:,(5�>H �̀�0U�9LNPVUHS�ZLJ\YP[`�PU�Southeast Asia: beyond the ASEAN way, by Mely Caballero Anthony (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), 83-112.

��3LL�1VULZ��*HTIVKPH!�9LWYLZLU[H[PVU��9LM\NLLZ�HUK�9LILSZ��0U�(:,(5��Sovereignty and Intervention in Southeast Asia, by Lee Jones, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012b), 75-91.

��4\[OPHO�(SHNHWWH��9LNPVUHSPZT�HUK�the Quest for Security: ASEAN and the *HTIVKPHU�*VUÅPJ[��1V\YUHS�VM�0U[LYUH[PVUHS�(ќHPYZ��!�� !��

��3LL�1VULZ��*HTIVKPH!�-YVT�*VSK�>HY�[V�*VUKP[PVUHSP[ �̀�0U�(:,(5��:V]LYLPNU[`�HUK�Intervention in Southeast Asia, by Lee Jones, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012a): 128-149.

��(U[OVU �̀�(:,(5�HUK�[OL�*HTIVKPHU�*VUÅPJ[!�;LZ[PUN�[OL�3PTP[Z�VM�[OL�(:,(5�>H �̀��

��(SHNHWWH��9LNPVUHSPZT�HUK�[OL�8\LZ[�MVY�Security: ASEAN and the Cambodian *VUÅPJ[��

��;OPZ�^HZ�H�WVSP[PJHS�JVHSP[PVU�VM�[OL�[OYLL�2OTLY�YLZPZ[HUJL�NYV\WZ!�7VS�7V[»Z�2OTLY�9V\NL��7YPUJL�5VYVKVT�:POHUV\R»Z�5H[PVUHS�<UP[LK�Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), HUK�MVYTLY�7YPTL�4PUPZ[LY�:VU�:HUU»Z�2OTLY�7LVWSL»Z�5H[PVUHS�3PILYH[PVU�-YVU[��2753-��

��(U[OVU �̀�(:,(5�HUK�[OL�*HTIVKPHU�*VUÅPJ[!�;LZ[PUN�[OL�3PTP[Z�VM�[OL�(:,(5�

>H �̀��"�HUK�(SHNHWWH��9LNPVUHSPZT�and the Quest for Security: ASEAN and the *HTIVKPHU�*VUÅPJ[��

��4PJOHLS�3LPMLY��;OL�(:,(5�7LHJL�7YVJLZZ!�(�*H[LNVY`�4PZ[HRL��7HJPÄJ�9L]PL^��!��(1999): 25-38.


19. Ibid., 439-467.

20. The SNC, comprised of both government and resistance party representatives would serve HZ�[OL�VѝJPHS�*HTIVKPHU�KLJPZPVU�THRPUN�body under UNTAC.


22. Ibid.

��(U[OVU �̀�(:,(5�HUK�[OL�*HTIVKPHU�*VUÅPJ[!�;LZ[PUN�[OL�3PTP[Z�VM�[OL�(:,(5�>H �̀��

24. United Nations. UNTAC Cambodia - )HJRNYV\UK��:\TTHY`��O[[W!��^^ �̂\U�VYN�LU�WLHJLRLLWPUN�TPZZPVUZ�WHZ[�\U[HJIHJRNY��O[TS��HJJLZZLK�+LJLTILY�29, 2012).

��(SHNHWWH��9LNPVUHSPZT�HUK�[OL�8\LZ[�MVY�Security: ASEAN and the Cambodian *VUÅPJ[�� "�HUK�3LL�1VULZ��*HTIVKPH!�9LWYLZLU[H[PVU��9LM\NLLZ�HUK�9LILSZ��0U�(:,(5��:V]LYLPNU[`�HUK�Intervention in Southeast Asia, by Lee Jones, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012b), 75-91.

��3LL�1VULZ��(:,(5�PU[LY]LU[PVU�PU�*HTIVKPH!�MYVT�*VSK�>HY�[V�JVUKP[PVUHSP[ �̀�;OL�7HJPÄJ�Review 20:4 (Nov 2007): 523-550.

��0HU�/\YK��(�N\PKL�[V�[OL�Z[\K`�VM�PU[LYUH[PVUHS�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ��0U�0U[LYUH[PVUHS�6YNHUPaH[PVUZ��I`�0HU�/\YK��5L^�@VYR!�*HTIYPKNL�University Press, 2012), 15-36.

��0HU�4HY[PU��HUK�(SL_HUKLY�4H`LY��9PLJRO��;OL�United Nations and East Timor: from self- KL[LYTPUH[PVU�[V�Z[H[L��I\PSKPUN��0U[LYUH[PVUHS�7LHJLRLLWPUN��!��1HU��!��"�and United Nations. UNTAET. http://www.\U�VYN�LU�WLHJLRLLWPUN�TPZZPVUZ�WHZ[�etimor/UntaetB.htm (accessed Jan 12, 2012).

29. Amitav Acharya. Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order. (London:

9V\[SLKNL�� "�HUK�+LYLR�4J+V\NHSS��9LNPVUHS�0UZ[P[\[PVUZ�HUK�:LJ\YP[`!�0TWSPJH[PVUZ�VM�[OL�� ,HZ[�;PTVY�*YPZPZ��0U�Non-traditional Security Issues in Southeast (ZPH��LKP[LK�I`�(��;HU�HUK�1�+�2��)V\[PU��(Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2001), 166-196.

��(SHU�+\WVU[��(:,(5�Z�9LZWVUZL�[V�[OL�,HZ[�;PTVY�*YPZPZ��(\Z[YHSPHU�1V\YUHS�VM�0U[LYUH[PVUHS�(ќHPYZ��!��1\S��!��170.

��1HTLZ�*V[[VU��(NHPUZ[�[OL�.YHPU!�;OL�,HZ[�;PTVY�0U[LY]LU[PVU��:\Y]P]HS��!��!�127-142.

32. Bilveer Singh, East Timor, Indonesia and the >VYSK!�4`[OZ�HUK�9LHSP[PLZ��2\HSH�3\TW\Y!�(+79�*VUZ\S[�� "�HUK�3LL�1VULZ��,HZ[�;PTVY!�0U[LYKLWLUKLUJL�HUK�0U[LY]LU[PVU��In ASEAN, Sovereignty and Intervention in Southeast Asia, by Lee Jones, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012c), 150-179.

��3LL�1VULZ��(:,(5�HUK�;OPYK�>VYSK�*VSVUPHSPZT��0U�(:,(5��:V]LYLPNU[`�HUK�Intervention in Southeast Asia, by Lee Jones, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012d), 58-74.

��+\WVU[��(:,(5�Z�9LZWVUZL�[V�[OL�,HZ[�;PTVY�*YPZPZ��

��+\WVU[��(:,(5�Z�9LZWVUZL�[V�[OL�,HZ[�;PTVY�*YPZPZ��;OL�0UKVULZPHU�4HSH`ZPHU�º*VUMYVU[H[PVU»�MYVT�� was a period of extensive political and armed violence by Indonesia to oppose the formation of the Federation of Malaysia, comprising Malaya, Singapore, and the North Borneo territories. (Source: http://ZL�HZPH�JVTTLTVYH[PVU�NV]�H\�IHJRNYV\UK�to-indonesian-confrontation/causes-and-description.php accessed 31 Dec 2012)

��1VULZ��,HZ[�;PTVY!�0U[LYKLWLUKLUJL�HUK�0U[LY]LU[PVU��

��*V[[VU��(NHPUZ[�[OL�.YHPU!�;OL�,HZ[�;PTVY�0U[LY]LU[PVU��

38. Ibid.

� ��;OPZ�^HZ�HKKP[PVUHSS`�JH[HS`aLK�I`�[OL�:HU[H�*Y\a�THZZHJYL�PU�5V]LTILY�� PU�^OPJO�0UKVULZPHU�MVYJLZ�RPSSLK�HUK�^V\UKLK�hundreds of unarmed East Timor civilians during a demonstration in Dili.

��1VULZ��,HZ[�;PTVY!�0U[LYKLWLUKLUJL�HUK�0U[LY]LU[PVU��

41. Ali Alatas. The Pebble in the Shoe: The +PWSVTH[PJ�:[Y\NNSL�MVY�,HZ[�;PTVY��1HRHY[H!�


292013Fall

(RZHYH�2HY\UPH��

��1�YNLU�/HHJRL��(:,(5�Z�+PWSVTH[PJ�HUK�Security Culture: Origins, Development and 7YVZWLJ[Z��3VUKVU!�9V\[SLKNL*\YaVU��2003).

��<UP[LK�5H[PVUZ�:LJ\YP[`�*V\UJPS��:�7=��UN Democracy, September 11, 1999.

44. None of the Southeast Asian countries had WYPVY�L_WLYPLUJL�PU�WLHJLRLLWPUN��WLHJL�enforcement or humanitarian action, with the exception of Malaysia, which had sent troops to the UN operation in Bosnia.

��+\WVU[��(:,(5�Z�9LZWVUZL�[V�[OL�,HZ[�;PTVY�*YPZPZ��

��<UP[LK�5H[PVUZ�:LJ\YP[`�*V\UJPS��:�7=��¹�September 11, 1999

��5PJOVSHZ�>OLLSLY��HUK�;PT�+\UUL��,HZ[�;PTVY�HUK�[OL�5L^�/\THUP[HYPHU�0U[LY]LU[PVU��0U[LYUH[PVUHS�(ќHPYZ��6J[��!��

��)Y\JL�*OLLZTHU��;OHPSHUK�7YLZZLK�[V�[HRL�;PTVY�9LPUZ��;OL�(\Z[YHSPHU�-PUHUJPHS�9L]PL �̂�October 15, 1999.

� ��+\WVU[��(:,(5�Z�9LZWVUZL�[V�[OL�,HZ[�;PTVY�*YPZPZ��

��6_MVYK�(UHS`[PJH��;PTVY�;LUZPVUZ��OxResearch Daily Brief Service, October 20, 1999.

51. Rodolfo Severino.,Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the Former ASEAN Secretary-General. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006).

��6_MVYK�(UHS`[PJH��;PTVY�;LUZPVUZ��6J[VILY�20, 1999.

��7L[LY�(SMVYK��-LLISL�YLZWVUZL�THRLZ�TVJRLY`�VM�(:,(5�JSHPTZ�[V�ZVSPKHYP[ �̀�;OL�Australian, September 16, 1999.

��<UP[LK�5H[PVUZ�:LJ\YP[`�*V\UJPS��:�7=��September 11, 1999.

��3LL�1VULZ��,HZ[�;PTVY!�0U[LYKLWLUKLUJL�HUK�0U[LY]LU[PVU��

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;HU��:LL�:LUN��(:,(5��[OL�<UP[LK�5H[PVUZ�and the Security of Southeast Asia: 7YVISLTZ��7YVZWLLJ[Z�HUK�7HYHKV_� In The United Nations and the Regions: Third World Report on Regional Integration, edited by Philippe De Lombaerde and Tania Felicio

Francis Baert, 157-165. Springer, 2012.

United Nations. Chapter VIII: Regional Arrangements. http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter8.shtml (accessed Dec 28, 2012).

<UP[LK�5H[PVUZ�:LJ\YP[`�*V\UJPS��:�7=��UN Democracy. Sep 11, 1999. http://www.undemocracy.com/securitycouncil/meeting_4043 (accessed Dec 31, 2012).

United Nations. UNTAC Cambodia - Background (Summary). http://www.un.org/en/WLHJLRLLWPUN�TPZZPVUZ�WHZ[�\U[HJIHJRNY��html (accessed 12 29, 2012).

UNTAET. O[[W!��^^ �̂\U�VYN�LU�WLHJLRLLWPUN�missions/past/etimor/UntaetB.htm (accessed Jan 12, 2012).

>OLLSLY��5PJOVSHZ��HUK�;PT�+\UUL��,HZ[�Timor and the New Humanitarian 0U[LY]LU[PVU��0U[LYUH[PVUHS�(ќHPYZ, Oct 2001: 805-827.

312013Fall

his paper will address the role that the energy trade has played in shaping Turkish Foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. The role of energy is most notable in two arenas of WVSPJ`!�YLSH[PVUZ�PU�[OL�*H\JHZ\Z�HUK�^P[O�[OL�,\YVWLHU�<UPVU��,<��,HJO�HYLUH�PZ�THYRLK�^P[O�P[Z�VÛ�ZPNUPÄJHU[�JOHSSLUNLZ�HUK�WVSPJ`�U\HUJL��;\YRL`»Z�,<�HJJLZZPVU�OVWLZ�HUK�P[Z�

competition with Russia in the energy market are inherently tied to the issue of Eurasian relations, while KLIH[LZ�V]LY�;\YRL`»Z�YVSL�HZ�HU�¸LULYN`�O\I¹�IYPUN�ZLYPV\Z�X\LZ[PVUZ�[V�P[Z�YLSH[PVUZOPW�^P[O�[OL�,<��

-\Y[OLYTVYL��[OL�LќLJ[Z�VM�<:�WVSPJ`�OH]L�ZOHWLK�;\YRPZO�WVSPJ`�PU�IV[O�VM�[OLZL�HYLUHZ��WYV]PKPUN�HU�outside force to ensure that Turkey is not the sole player in the rich energy markets of the Eurasian region. Turkey has undoubtedly shown that it is willing to emerge as a major participant in the region and engage the surrounding resource rich countries in what can be KLZJYPILK�HZ�¸VPS�WVSP[PJZ�¹1 The end of the Cold War and the collapse of [OL�:V]PL[�<UPVU�THYR�HU�PTWVY[HU[�transition phase for Turkey’s role in the Eurasian energy market. Fiona Hill in ¸*HZWPHU�*VU\UKY\T!�7PWLSPULZ�HUK�Energy Networks," ÄUKZ�[OH[�;\YRL`»Z�THPU�VIQLJ[P]LZ�ZPUJL�[OL�LHYS`�� »Z��HUK�PU�[OL�^HRL�VM�[OL�<::9�Z�JVSSHWZL�OH]L�ILLU�¸[V�ZLJ\YL�UL^�LULYN`�supplies, and to establish [Turkey] as [OL�[YHUZP[�JV\U[Y`�MVY�LULYN`�ÅV^Z�MYVT�

the Caspian to consumer markets in ,\YVWL�¹2 This two-pronged approach marks the beginning of Turkey’s KLZPYL�[V�THRL�ZPNUPÄJHU[�MVYH`Z�PU[V�the Eurasian energy market in the modern era for a number of reasons. ;OL�ÄYZ[�YLHZVU�PZ�[OL�LTLYNLUJL�VM�[OL�5L^S`�0UKLWLUKLU[�:[H[LZ��50:��after the collapse of the USSR, which JYLH[LK�ZPNUPÄJHU[S`�SHYNLY�U\TILY�VM�parties to deal with in terms of energy HNYLLTLU[��4HU`�PU�;\YRL`�^LYL�X\P[L�hopeful that the cultural ties between [OLTZLS]LZ�HUK�[OL�50:�JV\SK�IL�[OL�IHJRIVUL�MVY�MH]VYHISL�YLSH[PVUZ��/V^L]LY��[OL�LTLYNLUJL�VM�[OL�50:�marks a turning point in Russian-Turkish relations, and Turkey soon found itself in direct competition with the Russian -LKLYH[PVU�MVY�ZWOLYLZ�VM�PUÅ\LUJL�V]LY�[OL�*H\JHZ\Z�HUK�*LU[YHS�(ZPH�3 Turkish policy in the initial stages was

JOHYHJ[LYPaLK�I`�H�aLYV�Z\T�HWWYVHJO��meaning theoretically a larger Turkish YVSL�PU�[OL�LULYN`�THYRL[�PUL]P[HIS`�TLHU[�H�TPUPTPaH[PVU�VM�[OL�9\ZZPHU�ZWOLYL�VM�PUÅ\LUJL��;OLYLMVYL��9\ZZPHU�competition from the outset was \UH]VPKHISL��;OL�KLNYLL�[V�ÔPJO�;\YRL`�and Russia would cooperate in the coming years has been shaped by both ULJLZZP[`�HUK�T\[\HS�LJVUVTPJ�ILULÄ[��This cooperation will be elaborated upon in depth later.

Turkey's Policy Motives and Energy Objectives

One cannot address Turkey’s forays with the NIS without addressing the KLIH[L�V]LY�;\YRL`»Z�WVSPJ`�TV[P]LZ��;OLYL�HYL�ZPNUPÄJHU[�X\LZ[PVUZ�HZ�[V�ÔL[OLY�VY�UV[�;\YRL`»Z�HZZLY[P]LULZZ�represents an emerging trend of 5LV�6[[VTHU�ILOH]PVY�PU�;\YRPZO�

Michael Goldstein. 4PJOHLS�.VSKZ[LPU�PZ�H�:LUPVY�H[�;\M[Z�<UP]LYZP[`�THQVYPUN�PU�0U[LYUH[PVUHS�9LSH[PVUZ�^P[O�H�MVJ\Z�VU�[OL�4PKKSL�,HZ[��(M[LY�NYHK\H[PVU�PU��4PJOHLS�^PSS�IL�H[[LUKPUN�6ѝJLY�Candidate School for the U.S. Army.

T

Turkey and the Post-Cold War Politics of Energyby Michael Goldstein

JUIS32

policy, or a pursuance of cooperation and agreement on the basis of T\[\HS�LJVUVTPJ�ILULÄ[��;OL�[Y\L�JOHYHJ[LYPaH[PVU�VM�;\YRPZO�WVSPJ`�PU�this region is perhaps a moderation of [OLZL�[^V�]PL^Z��`L[�[OLYL�HYL�JHTWZ�within Turkey that fall on both sides of the argument. Whereas the traditional 2LTHSPZ[�LSP[LZ��VM[LU�MV\UK�PU�[OL�military establishment, are strong non-imperialists and would denounce any

2HaOHRZ[HU�HUK�;\YRTLUPZ[HU��;\YRL`»Z�THPU�VIQLJ[P]L�PU�W\YZ\PUN�LULYN`�agreements with these countries in recent years has been to ensure that the primary route for the export of oil from [OL�*HZWPHU�PZ�[OYV\NO�V]LYSHUK�WPWLSPULZ�PU�;\YRL`��VPS�^PSS�L]LU[\HSS`�LUK�\W�PU�[OL�4LKP[LYYHULHU�WVY[�VM�*LÒHU�� Turkey stressed this route for security YLHZVUZ��`L[�;\YRL`�Z�TV[P]H[PVUZ�HUK�preferences for this route are far more numerous. First, there are many in the Turkish policy establishment that YLJVNUPaL�[OL�TPUPTPaLK�YVSL�VM�5VY[O�([SHU[PJ�;YLH[`�6YNHUPaH[PVU��5(;6��in aligning Turkey with the West since the collapse of the USSR.� If Turkey becomes a major component in the

safety and security of oil exports in the region, then it is in the interest of major importers such as the United States, [V�WYV[LJ[�[OLPY�PU]LZ[TLU[Z��:LLPUN�the increased role of Turkey in oil exportation through a Ceyhan pipeline, the relationship between Turkey and the US did in fact become an area for mutual cooperation. Turkey and the US MVYTHSPaLK�H�¸Z[YH[LNPJ�LULYN`�HSSPHUJL¹�PU�� [V�¸WYVTV[L�LULYN`�KP]LYZP[`�HUK�ZLJ\YP[ �̀�KL]LSVW�*HZWPHU�YLZV\YJLZ¯transport oil and gas through Turkey…HUK�MHJPSP[H[L�PU[LYUH[PVUHS�PU]LZ[TLU[�¹�according to Hill.� Second, beyond the VI]PV\Z�LJVUVTPJ�ILULÄ[Z�MVY�;\YRPZO�construction companies and industry LTWSV`LLZ��V]LYSHUK�VPS�YV\[LZ��ÔPJO�LUK�\W�H[�H�)SHJR�:LH�WVY[��T\Z[�WHZZ�[OYV\NO�[OL�)VZWOVY\Z��-PUHUJPHSS �̀�[OPZ�PZ�HU�\UH[[YHJ[P]L�VW[PVU�MVY�;\YRPZO�WVSPJ �̀�HZ�[HYPќZ�HUK�[H_H[PVU�VU�ZOPWZ�WHZZPUN�[OYV\NO�[OL�)VZWOVY\Z�HYL�SPTP[LK�HUK�JVU[YVSSLK�I`�[OL�� 4VU[YL\_�*VU]LU[PVU� Culturally, the )VZWOVYV\Z�YLWYLZLU[Z�HU�PTWVY[HU[�issue for the elites of Istanbul, who OVSK�[OL�Z[YHP[Z�HZ�H�ZPNUPÄJHU[�WHY[�VM�Turkish cultural identity. The idea of [OL�Z[YHP[Z�ILJVTPUN�HU�V]LYWVW\SH[LK�shipping route represents an anathema for many in the Turkish elite. This is best exhibited by the protests of 2000 V]LY�HU�V]LYZPaLK�9VTHUPHU�MYLPNO[LY»Z�attempt to pass through the straits. ;OL�JVU[YV]LYZ`�^HZ�YLZVS]LK�[OYV\NO�negotiations with the Romanian Foreign 4PUPZ[Y �̀�`L[�[OL�TH[[LY�VM�[OL�)VZWOVY\Z�as a shipping route still remains a contentious issue.10

;OLYL�HYL�ZPNUPÄJHU[�X\LZ[PVUZ�HZ�[V�ÔL[OLY�VY�not Turkey’s assertiveness represents an emerging

trend of Neo-Ottoman behavior in Turkish policy, or

a pursuance of cooperation and agreement on the

IHZPZ�VM�T\[\HS�LJVUVTPJ�ILULÄ[�

policy that is reminiscent of an Ottoman SLNHJ �̀�[OLYL�HYL�H�ZPNUPÄJHU[�U\TILY�VM�HK]VJH[LZ�W\ZOPUN�H�\UPX\LS`�;\YRPZO�]LYZPVU�VM�H�,\YHZPHU�PKLU[P[ �̀�ÄUKZ�[OH[�the proponents of an increased Turkish role in Eurasia fall on both the left and right sides of domestic politics.� While THU`�YPNO[�^PUNLYZ�HK]VJH[L�H�,\YHZPHU�identity based on the cultural ties of the Turkic peoples, many left wingers and Islamic fundamentalists push a new identity that is essentially anti-Western, HUK�VM[LU[PTLZ�HK]VJH[LZ�0ZSHTPJ�[PLZ�5 It appears as though neither Turkish approach to the NIS has been fully embraced, neither Neo-Ottomanism UVY�JVTWSL[L�2LTHSPZ[�PZVSH[PVU��HUK�instead slow and careful progression

JOHYHJ[LYPaLZ�;\YRL`�Z�LUNHNLTLU[��,ULYN`�HNYLLTLU[Z�OH]L�ILLU�ZVTL�VM�[OL�TVZ[�L]PKLU[�HYLHZ�VM�JVVWLYH[PVU�and negotiation for Turkey in Eurasia.

/V^�OH]L�LULYN`�HNYLLTLU[Z�HUK�projects shaped Turkey’s policies in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and has ¸VPS�KPWSVTHJ`¹�ILLU�LP[OLY�H�WVZP[P]L�or limiting factor for policy decisions? The areas of most notable concern are ;\YRL`»Z�ULNV[PH[PVUZ�^P[O�(aLYIHPQHU��

;\YRL`�HUK�[OL�7VZ[�*VSK�>HY�7VSP[PJZ�VM�,ULYN`��4PJOHLS�.VSKZ[LPU

332013Fall

The BTC PipelineThus, the best option in the eyes

of Turkish policy makers was a pipeline [OH[�OHK�[OL�WVY[�VM�*LÒHU�HZ�P[Z�ÄUHS�KLZ[PUH[PVU��0U�� P[�^HZ�KLJPKLK�[OH[�the pipeline would be routed through Georgia and became known as the )HR\�;IPSPZP�*LÒHU��);*��WPWLSPUL�11 Throughout its planning stages and JVUZ[Y\J[PVU�[OL�);*�WPWLSPUL�^HZ�MHJLK�^P[O�ZL]LYHS�JOHSSLUNLZ��9\ZZPH�opposed the early stages of the process. ;OL�¸ULHY�HIYVHK�WVSPJ`¹�Z[YLZZLK�PU�4VZJV �̂�HZ�4LSPOH�(S[\UPZPR�WVPU[Z�V\[� ¸LTWOHZPaLK�9\ZZPH»Z�]P[HS�WVSP[PJHS��LJVUVTPJ��HUK�TPSP[HY`�PU[LYLZ[Z¹�PU�[OL�*H\JHZ\Z��;OL�9\ZZPHU�ÄYT�3\RVPS�^HZ�TV[P]H[LK�I`�ÄUHUJPHS�PUJLU[P]LZ��0U�� [OL�7YLZPKLU[�VM�3\RVPS�HZ�well as the minister of fuel and energy ]PZP[LK�)HR\�[V�ULNV[PH[L�H�9\ZZPHU�YVSL�PU�*HZWPHU�VPS�KLHSZ��;OPZ�]PZP[�resulted in the allocation of 10 percent VM�(aLYIHPQHUP�ZOHYLZ�[V�3\RVPS��ÔPSL�;\YRPZO�ZOHYLZ�VUS`�HJOPL]LK�H�TH_PT\T�SL]LS�VM��WLYJLU[�12

Iran and Russia also backed their positions by disputing the legal status of the Caspian Sea. The Caspian during );*�JVUZ[Y\J[PVU�^HZ�LZZLU[PHSS`�KP]PKLK�under a non-spoken agreement of [LYYP[VYPHS�ZV]LYLPNU[ �̀13 Iran and Russia opposed many of the agreements and held a number of territorial disputes in [OL�*HZWPHU��[OV\NO�I`�� 9\ZZPH�mostly backed away from its opposing Z[HUJL�VU�[OL�);*��HUK�0YHU�^HZ�SLM[�as the largest opponent of the plan.�� 0YHU��ÔV�OVSKZ�ZPNUPÄJHU[�PU[LYLZ[�VM�its own in being the sole exporter of YLNPVUHS�VPS��^HZ�LќLJ[P]LS`�JV\U[LYLK�

by the support of the US and the EU to TV]L�MVY^HYK�VU�[OL�);*�WPWLSPUL�15 The WPWLSPUL�HSZV�MHJLK�ZPNUPÄJHU[�JOHSSLUNLZ�due to high construction costs matched with unstable oil prices.�� Instability JH\ZLK�I`�YLNPVUHS�JVUÅPJ[�^HZ�HSZV�H�major issue, yet the Turks insist, mostly to appease US concerns, that routing oil through a NATO country is the most Z[HISL�VW[PVU��/V^L]LY��;\YRL`�^HZ�UV[�without its own problems of instability PU�[LYTZ�VM�[OL�2\YKPZ[HU�>VYRLYZ�7HY[`��722��ÔV�OHK�JVTTP[[LK�[LYYVYPZ[�HJ[Z�before on Turkish oil pipelines. Although after the capture of Abdullah Ocalan in � ��[OL�2\YKPZO�JVUJLYUZ�^LYL�SHYNLS`�V]LYJVTL��

Construction began in 2002 on the );*�WPWLSPUL�HUK�[OL�WPWLSPUL�ILJHTL�M\UJ[PVUHS�PU�� Through the HJX\PZP[PVU�VM�[OL�);*�WPWLSPUL��;\YRL`�showcased its determination to become HU�¸,HZ[�>LZ[�LULYN`�JVYYPKVY�¹�HZ�^LSS�HZ�P[Z�]PHIPSP[`�HUK�Z[HIPSP[`�HZ�HU�LULYN`�source, garnering US support. US Z\WWVY[�MVY�[OL�);*�WPWLSPUL�^HZ�JYP[PJHS��especially in countering the political TV[P]H[PVUZ�VM�0YHU�[V�OH]L�H�WPWLSPUL�of Caspian oil routed through Iranian territory.

Iran and the US: Energy Oppositions

Although the ability of the Turks to negotiate with the US on this issue is particularly encouraging, it remains problematic that the Turks are unable [V�NHPU�ZPNUPÄJHU[�SL]LYHNL�PU�SVII`PUN�HNHPUZ[�[OL�0YHUPHUZ�MVY�[OL�);*�^P[OV\[�the backing of the US. This is perhaps VUL�VM�[OL�ÄYZ[�THQVY�SPTP[H[PVUZ�HUK�

challenges to Turkey’s role to become a major energy hub. Economically, there is a general consensus that Iran represents [OL�JOLHWLZ[�HUK�TVZ[�]PHISL�SVUN�[LYT�option to route oil from the Caspian.� >OPSL�[OL�HK]VJH[LZ�VM�[OL�);*�WPWLSPUL�highlighted the security of the pipeline operating in a NATO country’s territory, many industry experts also note that an Iranian pipeline would represent a YLSH[P]LS`�ZLJ\YL�VW[PVU�20 Seemingly, the Turkish position in lobbying for Caspian VPS�YLSPLZ�OLH]PS`�VU�<:�IHJRPUN��0M�<:�opposition against the Iranians shifts in [OL�M\[\YL��[OLU�;\YRL`�Z�HZZLY[P]LULZZ�PU�the oil sector may become problematic.

��;OLYL�PZ�WYPVY�L]PKLUJL�[OH[�[OL�US is willing to lift economic sanctions VU�0YHU��0U�� ÔLU�[OL�9\ZZPHU�JVTWHU`�.HaWYVT�^HZ�KL]LSVWPUN�ZL]LYHS�VPS�ÄLSKZ�PU�ZV\[OLYU�0YHU��[OL�US decided not to impose sanctions VU�.HaWYVT��;OPZ�^HZ�PU�KPYLJ[�JVU[YHKPJ[PVU�[V�[OL�� SH^�YLX\PYPUN�ZHUJ[PVUZ�VU�JVTWHUPLZ�[OH[�PU]LZ[LK�V]LY��IPSSPVU�PU�0YHUPHU�WL[YVSL\T�industries.21 There has also been instances of countries disregarding the possible penalties for cooperation ^P[O�0YHU��0U�� ;\YRTLUPZ[HU��2HaOHRZ[HU��HUK�0YHU�HUUV\UJLK�WSHUZ�[V�JVUZ[Y\J[�H�WPWLSPUL�MYVT�2HaOHRZ[HU�to the Persian Gulf. The US company ,__VU4VIPS�SVIIPLK�[OL�<:�NV]LYUTLU[�for permission to participate in the construction of an Iranian pipeline from Neka to Tehran.22 If US opposition to Iran erodes in the future, and there is H�YHWWYVJOLTLU[��[OPZ�JV\SK�ZL]LYLS`�\UKLYTPUL�;\YRL`»Z�HK]HU[HNL�PU�ILPUN�H�major player in Caspian oil.

;\YRL`�HUK�[OL�7VZ[�*VSK�>HY�7VSP[PJZ�VM�,ULYN`��4PJHOLS�.VSKZ[LPU

JUIS34

There are instances of cooperation IL[^LLU�0YHU�HUK�;\YRL`�V]LY�LULYN`�issues, yet those occurrences seem to IL�OLH]PS`�PUÅ\LUJLK�I`�[OL�WVZP[PVU�of the United States. Iran, holding the world’s second largest natural gas YLZLY]LZ��YLWYLZLU[Z�H�]PHISL�VW[PVU�MVY�;\YRL`�PU�P[Z�KLZPYL�[V�KP]LYZPM`�ZV\YJLZ�of natural gas.23 Plans to construct a natural gas pipeline from Iran to Turkey were strongly opposed by the US in � ��;OL�<:�HSZV�VWWVZLK�;\YRPZO�plans to import natural gas from Turkmenistan routed through Iranian territories. Although these deals went MVY^HYK�^P[OV\[�[OL�HWWYV]HS�VM�[OL�US, this could represent a pattern in Turkish-US relations.�� While Turkey’s THUL\]LYHIPSP[`�VU�THU`�VPS�PZZ\LZ�is seemingly dependent on the US MVY�Z\WWVY[��[OLYL�PZ�HSZV�ZPNUPÄJHU[�opposition by the US to any Turkish LќVY[Z�VM�JVVWLYH[PVU�^P[O�0YHU��>O`�is the US willing to allow non-Turkish cooperation with Iran, yet opposes THU`�;\YRPZO�LќVY[Z�MVY�LJVUVTPJ�cooperation? Seemingly, the answer is a geo-strategic one. If Turkey is HISL�[V�ZPNUPÄJHU[S`�KP]LYZPM`�P[Z�LULYN`�WVY[MVSPV��WLYOHWZ�[OL�<:�YPZRZ�OH]PUN�;\YRL`�KL]LSVW�[VV�T\JO�VM�H�YVSL�PU�the Caspian energy trade. Hill notes that “Although Turkey is central to US Caspian policy, its energy needs, geographic position, and regional YLSH[PVUZ�WVPU[�[V�H�KPќLYLU[�ZL[�VM�partners from US preferences in future LULYN`�JHSJ\SH[PVUZ�¹25 US embargoes and sanctions stem primarily from its opposition to the Iranian Nuclear WYVNYHT��)LJH\ZL�[OL�0YHUPHU�YLZVS]L�VU�

possessing a nuclear weapon is strong, and there is unwillingness on the US side [V�ULNV[PH[L��[OL�<:�PZ�IV\UK�[V�OH]L�Z[YVUN�LќLJ[Z�VU�;\YRPZO�LULYN`�WVSPJ`�for years to come.��

Russian Energy Politics ;OL�9\ZZPHU�VWWVZP[PVU�[V�[OL�);*�

pipeline in its early planning stages represents a pattern of relations in the Caucasus that from the end of the *VSK�>HY�\U[PS�� ^HZ�THYRLK�I`�KPZHNYLLTLU[��9\ZZPHU�VIQLJ[P]LZ�H[�[OPZ�WVPU[�^LYL�KLÄULK�PU�[OL�ULHY�abroad policy." Seeing the Caucasus as an area in which it was essential to WYVTV[L�[OLTZLS]LZ��[OL�UL^�9\ZZPHU�NV]LYUTLU[�ZV\NO[�[V�VWWVZL�HU`�;\YRPZO�LќVY[Z�[V�L_WHUK�;\YRL`�Z�ZWOLYL�VM�PUÅ\LUJL��(JJVYKPUN�[V�;HUYPZL]LY��;\YRL`»Z�VIQLJ[P]LZ�PU�[OL�LHYS`�WVZ[�:V]PL[�LYH�^LYL�KLÄULK�I`�a desire to “solidify the newly gained independence of the Caucasian states…and to become a major actor in the region to secure economic and security ILULÄ[Z��0U�VYKLY�[V�M\SS`�JHWP[HSPaL�VU�UL^�ÄUHUJPHS�VWWVY[\UP[PLZ�;\YRL`�SVVRLK�[V�[OL�);*�WPWLSPUL�HUK�V[OLY�energy deals with Caucus countries. (�TV]L�[V�KP]LYZPM`�;\YRPZO�ZV\YJLZ�VM�energy would mean less reliance on Russian oil and gas. Good relations with the states of the Caucasus would also mean an expansion of Turkish allies in the direction of Russia, thereby creating H�¸I\ќLY�aVUL¹�VM�Z[H[LZ�IL[^LLU�9\ZZPH�HUK�;\YRL �̀�0U�HKKP[PVU�[V�[OL�LHYS`�YP]HSY`�V]LY�[OL�);*�WPWLSPUL�HUK�[OL�PZZ\LZ�regarding the Caspian, the Russians HJJ\ZLK�[OL�;\YRPZO�NV]LYUTLU[�

[OYV\NOV\[�[OL�� Z�VM�Z\WWVY[PUN�[OL�rebels in Chechnya through “clandestine HJ[P]P[PLZ�¹��0U�YL[\YU��[OLYL�^LYL�HJJ\ZH[PVUZ�I`�[OL�;\YRPZO�NV]LYUTLU[��especially under the Ciller administration, [OH[�4VZJV^�^HZ�Z\WWVY[PUN�[OL�722��These accusations were perhaps not unfounded, as Russia allowed the meeting of the “International Congress VM�2\YKPZO�6YNHUPaH[PVUZ�¹�PU�^OPJO�[OL�722�^HZ�HU�HJ[P]L�WHY[PJPWHU[�� Despite the signing of agreements in � ��HUK�� IL[^LLU�4VZJV^�HUK�Ankara to cooperate on matters of [LYYVYPZT�WYL]LU[PVU��[OL�9\ZZPHUZ�KPK�UV[OPUN�[V�WYL]LU[�722�SVII`PUN�HUK�participation in politics.

;OL�`LHY�� THYRZ�H�[\YUPUN�point, in which Russian-Turkish cooperation began to increase, based on T\[\HSS`�ILULÄJPHS�LJVUVTPJ�YLSH[PVUZ��(�5V]LTILY�� TLL[PUN�VM�[OL�;\YRPZO�Russian Joint Economic Council was the starting point for a number of natural gas agreements between Turkey and Russia. The most important agreement VM�[OLZL�[HSRZ�^HZ�[OL�)S\L�:[YLHT�natural gas project, which established plans to build underwater pipelines in [OL�)SHJR�:LH��;OL�)S\L�:[YLHT�7PWLSPUL�was completed in 2003 and became fully operational in 2010. Furthermore, [OL�� TLL[PUN�THYRLK�H�ZLYPLZ�VM�JVVWLYH[P]L�HNYLLTLU[Z�V]LY�[OL�);*�pipeline in which the two countries, ;HUYPZL]LY�UV[LZ��HNYLLK�[V�¸HIZ[HPU�from actions likely to harm each other’s economic interests or threaten...territorial PU[LNYP[ �̀¹� As a result, Turkey promised to hire a number of Russian companies PU�VYKLY�[V�I\PSK�[OL�);*��HUK�3\RVPS�


352013Fall

L_WYLZZLK�PU[LYLZ[�PU�OH]PUN�H�Z[HRL�PU�the pipeline.

:PUJL�� [OL�9\ZZPHU�;\YRPZO�relationship has largely been based VU�T\[\HS�LJVUVTPJ�ILULÄ[��+LZWP[L�the modest gains Turkey has made in the Caucasus, projection of political PUÅ\LUJL�PU�[OPZ�YLNPVU�Z[PSS�YLTHPUZ�H�¸aLYV�Z\T�NHTL�¹�0U�[OPZ�[`WL�VM�LU]PYVUTLU[��LZWLJPHSS`�ÔLU�[OL�relationship is based on economic PUJLU[P]LZ��M\[\YL�JVVWLYH[PVU�IL[^LLU�the Russians and the Turks remains extremely fragile. Unilateral decisions HZ�ZLLU�PU�[OL�� 9\ZZPHU�ÄUHUJPHS�JYPZPZ��PU�ÔPJO�9\ZZPH�KL]HS\LK�[OL�ruble, caused Turkish businesses to Z\ќLY��HUK�WYPJLZ�VM�;\YRPZO�NVVKZ�PU�[OL�Caucasus to increase dramatically.30 A relationship based strictly on economics is subject to extreme change in the L]LU[�VM�H�KVÛ[\YU�VY�KLWYLZZPVU��-\Y[OLYTVYL��L]LU�[^V�KLJHKLZ�HM[LY�the collapse of the USSR, a period in which Turkey made it one of their main NVHSZ�[V�KP]LYZPM`�[OLPY�LULYN`�WVY[MVSPV��the majority of energy imports still largely JVTL�MYVT�9\ZZPH��;\YRL`�PU��PTWVY[LK� ��WLYJLU[�VM�[OLPY�VPS�HUK� ��percent of their natural gas, both of which were disproportionately made up of Russian imports.31 A reliance on Russian energy not only constrains Turkish policy decisions towards LUNHNPUN�4VZJV �̂�I\[�HSZV�YLK\JLZ�[OL�HIPSP[`�VM�;\YRL`�[V�WYVQLJ[�PUÅ\LUJL�PU�the Caucasus.

;OYV\NOV\[�[OL�� »Z��;\YRL`�^HZ�only able to make modest gains in the Caucasus, largely due to their reliance on Russian energy as well as the *H\JHZ\Z�Z�¸\U^PSSPUNULZZ�[V�JVUZPKLY�

;\YRL`�[OLPY�ºUL^�IPN�IYV[OLY�»¹32 Despite the strong rhetoric in Turkey to present itself as the regional protector for the NIS, there were serious limitations in ;\YRL`�Z�HIPSP[`�[V�WYVQLJ[�LJVUVTPJ�HUK�WVSP[PJHS�PUÅ\LUJL�V]LY�[OL�*H\JHZ\Z�33 Turkey was limited by the simple unwillingness of the Caucasus to accept HUV[OLY�¸IPN�IYV[OLY¹�OH]PUN�ZLLU�the failure and collapse of the USSR. (SZV��;\YRL`�MHPSLK�[V�THRL�ZPNUPÄJHU[�PUYVHKZ�WVSP[PJHSS`�PU�HYLHZ�ÔLYL�:V]PL[�[PLZ�OHK�WYL]PV\ZS`�ILLU�ZV�Z[YVUN�� 0U�MHJ[��[OL�YP]HSY`�IL[^LLU�;\YRL`�HUK�9\ZZPH�OHK�[OL�LќLJ[�VM�Z[YLUN[OLUPUN�ties between NIS states, to ensure their stable economic trade.35 Since the end of the Cold War the countries of the NIS had made more progress diplomatically together then Turkey, which failed to represent itself as a model for the NIS. Turkey’s initial approach after the collapse of the USSR was to represent P[ZLSM�HZ�H�]PHISL�HUK�Z\JJLZZM\S�economic model, an option which was largely supported by the United States, who was worried about the increased WVSP[PJHS�PUÅ\LUJL�VM�0YHU��/V^L]LY��the Turkish policies in the Caucasus cannot be considered an outright failure, and success can be seen in a number of areas. Turkey saw modest success PU�PUJYLHZPUN�[PLZ�^P[O�2HaHROZ[HU��(aLYIHPQHU��HUK�[OL�U\TLYV\Z�JV\U[YPLZ�^P[O�ÔPJO�P[�OVSKZ�WYVÄ[HISL��HSILP[�fragile, energy agreements. In the coming years, Russia and Turkey may face a serious challenge to their YLSH[PVUZOPW��HZ�[OLPY�aLYV�Z\T�,\YHZPHU�JVUULJ[PVU�TH`�HSZV�JHYY`�V]LY�PU[V�[OLPY�alliance with the EU.

Turkey as a European Energy Hub

Turkey’s hopes of EU accession are largely intertwined with their goal to ILJVTL�HU�¸LULYN`�O\I¹�VY�[YHUZP[�WVPU[�to connect Eastern energy pipelines HUK�UL[^VYRZ�^P[O�[OL�>LZ[��/V^L]LY��it should be noted that there is a large KPќLYLUJL�IL[^LLU�;\YRPZO�LULYN`�¸[YHUZP[¹�ILOH]PVY�HUK�¸IYVRLYHNL¹�ILOH]PVY��HZ�UV[LK�I` Ali Tekin and Paul Andrew Williams in Geo-Politics of the

Euro-Asia Energy Nexus.�� As an energy transit country Turkey would refrain from imposing exorbitant fees and duties for transporting energy from the ,HZ[�[V�,<�UH[PVUZ��ÔPSL�¸IYVRLYHNL¹�ILOH]PVY�^PSS�LU[HPS�;\YRL`�¸JHWP[HSPaPUN�on its transit position to obtain parochial YLU[�ZLLRPUN�HK]HU[HNLZ�¹�� If Turkey hopes to represent itself as a country with European interests at heart, it would of course assume the former position, WYV]PKPUN�HU�VW[PVU�MVY�,\YVWLHU�LULYN`�that carries less political baggage than the current pipelines, which pass [OYV\NO�)LSHY\Z�HUK�<RYHPUL��

Turkey is put in a unique position [V�WYV]PKL�HUV[OLY�H]LU\L�I`�ÔPJO�[OL�,<�JHU�YLJLP]L�P[Z�YLX\PYLK�LULYN`�YLZV\YJLZ��:PUJL��ÔLU�9\ZZPH�J\[�Vќ�NHZ�Z\WWSPLZ�[V�,\YVWL�K\L�[V�a pricing dispute with Ukraine, the EU OHZ�ILLU�SVVRPUN�[V�KP]LYZPM`�P[Z�ZV\YJLZ�of energy.�� France, Germany, and Italy ILSPL]L�[OL�KPZW\[LZ�^P[O�9\ZZPH�JHU�IL�ZVS]LK�^P[O�[OL�JVUZ[Y\J[PVU�VM�WPWLSPULZ�[OH[�I`WHZZ�)LSHY\Z�HUK�<RYHPUL��;OL�newly inducted EU states are willing to turn away from Russian energy in H�TV]L�[V^HYKZ�NYLH[LY�HZZVJPH[PVU�with Europe and a disassociation with


JUIS36

[OLPY�MVYTLY�:V]PL[�WHY[ULYZ��)V[O�VM�[OLZL�V\[SVVRZ�^VYR�[V�[OL�HK]HU[HNL�of Turkey in increasing its ties to the EU. Geographically, Turkey is in the perfect position to emerge as a European energy hub, and economically Turkey OHZ�[OL�PUMYHZ[Y\J[\YL�HUK�KL]LSVWLK�economy necessary to begin such a large project. The Nabucco pipeline project is at the head of Turkey’s hopes to be an energy transit hub.

The Nabucco ProjectThe Nabucco project is a proposed

gas pipeline, which will run from the eastern Turkish border with Iran and .LVYNPH�[V�)H\TNHY[LU��(\Z[YPH�� As H�ÔVSL��[OL�WYVQLJ[�Z�TPZZPVU�PZ�[V�KP]LYZPM`�,\YVWLHU�LULYN`�ZV\YJLZ�H^H`�MYVT�9\ZZPH��I\[�[OLYL�HYL�ZL]LYHS�V[OLY�NVHSZ�KLÄULK�I`�[OL�JVUZVY[P\T�PU�charge of the pipeline. The Naabucco project aims to increase supply, security, and prominence for the parties PU]VS]LK�� The Nabucco pipeline is ZLLU�I`�THU`�HZ�HU�HS[LYUH[P]L�[V�[OL�.HaWYVT�:V\[O�:[YLHT�WYVQLJ[��ÔPJO�^V\SK�VUS`�ZLY]L�[V�PUJYLHZL�,<�YLSPHUJL�VU�9\ZZPHU�UH[\YHS�NHZ��:LLPUN�[OL�);*�pipeline as the beginning of an “erosion VM�9\ZZPHU�SL]LYHNL�¹�9\ZZPH�OVWLZ�[V�WYL]LU[�[OL�JVUZ[Y\J[PVU�VM�[OL�5HI\JJV�project, which has emerged as a major political concern for the future of the project.�� Russia has used disputes V]LY�[OL�SLNHS�Z[H[\Z�VM�[OL�*HZWPHU��HUK�ÔL[OLY�P[�PZ�JVUZPKLYLK�H�¸:LH¹�VY�H�¸3HRL¹�HJJVYKPUN�[V�PU[LYUH[PVUHS�SH �̂�;OPZ�OHZ�SHYNLS`�WYL]LU[LK�[OL�building of Trans-Caspian pipelines, which are essential to future phases of the Nabucco project.�� Furthermore, the

��:V\[O�6ZZL[PH�^HY�OPNOSPNO[LK�[OL�YLSH[P]L�PUZ[HIPSP[`�VM�[OL�*H\JHZ\Z�HUK�the willingness of Russia to still engage in the ongoing regional ethnic disputes. >OPSL�[OL�.LVYNPHU�9\ZZPHU�JVUÅPJ[�KPK�UV[�HќLJ[�[OL�Z\WWS`�VM�UH[\YHS�NHZ�ZPNUPÄJHU[S �̀�P[�Z[PSS�LTWOHZPaLK�[OL�YLSH[P]LS`�MYHNPSL�LU]PYVUTLU[�[OH[�L_PZ[Z�in much of the Caucasus.��)LJH\ZL�of the risks associated with a project so large, the Nabucco pipeline requires ZPNUPÄJHU[�NV]LYUTLU[HS�JVTTP[TLU[Z�regarding credit.��:PUJL�[OL��JVUÅPJ[��THU`�NV]LYUTLU[Z�PU�[OL�YLNPVU�HYL�OLZP[HU[�[V�NP]L�Z\JO�HZZ\YHUJLZ��HU�VIZ[HJSL�[OH[�;\YRL`�T\Z[�V]LYJVTL�

Turkey also faces obstacles in meeting adequate supply for the Nabucco pipeline. The planners of the WYVQLJ[�OH]L�THKL�P[�WHY[�VM�[OLPY�TPZZPVU�statement as Tekins and Williams state UV[�¸[V�L_JS\KL�HU`�Z\WWS`�ZV\YJLZ�¹�� /V^L]LY��[OL�JOVVZPUN�VM�Z\WWSPLYZ�PZ�of geopolitical consideration for Turkey. ,]LU�[OV\NO�[OLYL�HYL�KV\I[Z�HZ�[V�ÔL[OLY�VY�UV[�P[�^PSS�IL�HISL�[V�WYV]PKL�an adequate supply of gas in surplus [V�P[Z�HSYLHK`�THZZP]L�L_WVY[�WVY[MVSPV��Iran has emerged as a potential supplier MVY�[OL�WYVQLJ[��/V^L]LY��[OL�PUJS\ZPVU�of Iran in the project would be met with protest by the US, and perhaps the EU

UH[PVUZ��ÔPJO�OH]L�HSPNULK�^P[O�[OL�<:�in opposition to Iran’s nuclear program.� The US would far prefer the inclusion of [OL�UVY[OLYU�0YHXP�VPS�ÄLSKZ�\UKLY�2\YKPZO�control as a major source for the project, yet this poses political challenges on both the Turkish and Iraqi side. The Iraqi JLU[YHS�NV]LYUTLU[��ÔPJO�KVLZ�UV[�M\SS`�YLJVNUPaL�[OL�UVY[OLYU�H\[VUVTV\Z�2\YKPZO�YLNPVU��^V\SK�WYLMLY�[OH[�[OL�NHZ�IL�ZV\YJLK�MYVT�VPS�ÄLSKZ�V[OLY�[OHU�[OVZL�PU�2PYR\R��HZ�[OL�UVY[OLYU�ÄLSKZ�HYL�a source of constant tension between )HNOKHK�HUK�[OL�2\YKZ�50 Although the (2�WHY[`�HKTPUPZ[YH[PVU�\UKLY�,YKVNHU�has seen rather peaceful relations with [OL�2\YKZ�VM�UVY[OLYU�0YHX��[OLYL�PZ�Z[PSS�NYLH[�OLZP[HUJ`�[V�PUJS\KL�[OL�2\YKZ�in the Nabucco project at the expense VM�[OL�JLU[YHS�0YHXP�NV]LYUTLU[�51 ;OL�:OHO�+LUPa�UH[\YHS�NHZ�ÄLSK�PU�(aLYIHPQHU�PZ�HSZV�H�WVZZPISL�WYVZWLJ[�for supply to the Nabucco pipeline, but shaky relations between Turkey and (aLYIHPQHU�ILNPUUPUN�PU�� YLNHYKPUN�[OL�(YTLUPHU�(aLYP�JVUÅPJ[��OH]L�brought doubts to the willingness of (aLYIHPQHU�[V�Z\WWVY[�H�;\YRPZO�JLU[LYLK�energy project.52

;\YRL`»Z�THUL\]LYHIPSP[`�VU�[OL�5HI\JJV�WYVQLJ[�PZ�ZL]LYLS`�SPTP[LK�I`�P[Z�HIPSP[`�[V�YLZVS]L�JVUÅPJ[Z�[OH[�WVZL�Z\JO�


"The debate over potential supply and

security issues still rages and many are

skeptical as to whether construction

on the pipeline will ever begin. "

372013Fall

great stumbling blocks. The prospects VM�;\YRL`�YLZVS]PUN�[OL�KPZW\[LZ�V]LY�the Caspian are low, and seemingly, it would be in Turkey’s best interest not to PU]VS]L�P[ZLSM�PU�HU�PU[LYUH[PVUHS�KPZW\[L��;\YRL`�ULLKZ�[V�WYV]L�[OH[�[OL�YLSH[P]L�security risks of the Caucasus are low, PU�HKKP[PVU�[V�JVU]PUJPUN�[OL�,<�[OH[�[OLYL�PZ�ZPNUPÄJHU[�LUV\NO�Z\WWS`�[V�meet the energy needs of Europe. It has been generally established that a KP]LYZPÄJH[PVU�VM�,\YVWLHU�LULYN`�^V\SK�IL�H�WVZP[P]L�Z[LW�MVY�[OL�,<��7H]LS�)HL]�HUK�0UKYH�6]LYSHUK�LTWOHZPaL�[OH[�¸SPILYHSPaH[PVU�TH`�HWWLHY�[V�IL�HU�economically sounder policy, as its main thrust goes in the direction of creating a real market for natural gas in the EU in place of the system of non-transparent IPSH[LYHS�KLHSZ�HUK�Ä_LK�WYPJLZ�¹53 /V^L]LY��PU�VYKLY�MVY�;\YRL`�[V�JHWP[HSPaL�VU�[OPZ�TV]L�[V^HYKZ�KP]LYZPÄJH[PVU��P[�must present the Nabucco project as a TVYL�MH]VYHISL�VW[PVU�[OHU�[OL�:V\[O�Stream project, which has the strength VM�WYV]PKPUN�N\HYHU[LLK�ZV\YJLZ�HUK�H�Z[YVUNLY�IHJRPUN�ILJH\ZL�VM�.HaWYVT»Z�prominence in the energy industry.�� It remains to be seen which project will take center stage, as construction on the Nabucco pipeline was scheduled to begin in 2010, yet no construction has [HRLU�WSHJL��;OL�KLIH[L�V]LY�WV[LU[PHS�supply and security issues still rages and many are skeptical as to whether JVUZ[Y\J[PVU�VU�[OL�WPWLSPUL�^PSS�L]LY�begin.

Competing Policy Objectives

The United States also plays an important role in Turkey’s current

relations with the EU. While Turkish hopes of EU accession are assisted by the United States, Russia hopes to counter the United States through PTWYV]LK�YLSH[PVUZ�^P[O�[OL�,<�55 This represents an important dichotomy that places Turkey in the middle of a Å\YY`�VM�JVTWL[PUN�WVSPJ`�VIQLJ[P]LZ��0[�should be noted that the US and the EU agree with the need for European LULYN`�KP]LYZPÄJH[PVU��;OL�(TLYPJHU�WLYZWLJ[P]L�VWWVZLZ�[OL�LUSHYNLTLU[�of the Iranian energy industry because of the Iranian nuclear program, and KPZH]V^Z�9\ZZPHU�Z\WWS`�MVY�[OL�Nabucco program from a pragmatic geopolitical standpoint. American Z\WWVY[�MVY�[OL�);*�WPWLSPUL�^HZ�JYP[PJHS��and if one accepts the premise that the building of the Nabucco pipeline YLWYLZLU[Z�H�WVZP[P]L�Z[LW�PU�JSVZLY�associations for Turkey with the EU, then US support for the Nabucco project will be an important element. An expanding natural gas industry and [OL�NSVIHS�LJVUVTPJ�KV^U[\YU�PU��both raise questions as to whether the US will fully support the project. Richard 4VYUPUNZ[HY�HUK�:LUH[VY�+PJR�3\NHY�did attend the signing ceremony of the 5HI\JJV�WYVQLJ[�PU�� I\[�[OPZ�PZ�only a minor sign of encouragement in a series of possible sources of tension between the US and Turkey. Turkey and [OL�<:�OH]L�ILLU�H[�VKKZ�PU�YLJLU[�years due to Turkey’s growing hostile relationship with Israel because of the SLHKLYZOPW�VM�[OL�(2�WHY[ �̀�HZ�^LSS�HZ�[OL�HTIP]HSLUJL�PU�(URHYH�[V^HYKZ�0YHUPHU�nuclear ambitions. Since the Nabucco project relies on Iran as a potential supplier, there could be consequences


MVY�;\YRL`�Z�YLSH[PVUZOPW�^P[O�[OL�<:��;OL�<:�^V\SK�WYLMLY�4PKKSL�,HZ[LYU�VY�Caspian sources of gas for the Nabucco project.�� Turkey will need to weigh the consequences of confrontation with [OL�<:�V]LY�[OPZ�PZZ\L�^P[O�P[Z�LULYN`�relationship with Russia and Iran.

Those in Turkey who continue to hope for EU accession place great emphasis on Turkey’s ability to represent P[ZLSM�HZ�HU�HS[LYUH[P]L�LULYN`�VW[PVU�MVY�,\YVWL��/V^L]LY��[OL�WLVWSL�^OV�HZJYPIL�[V�[OL�[YHKP[PVUHSPZ[�2LTHSPZ[�mindset of insularity, note that EU membership, while theoretically attainable under closer inspection, may not be the preferable option. There HYL�ZVTL�JHSSZ�HTVUN�2LTHSPZ[Z�MVY�H�¸WYP]PSLNLK�WHY[ULYZOPW¹�,<�YLSH[PVUZOPW�with Turkey in terms of energy, which would entail essentially the same ILULÄ[Z�;\YRL`�OVSKZ�UV^�\UKLY�[OL�Customs Union. Those in Ankara who subscribe to the same school of [OV\NO[�LZ[HISPZOLK�\UKLY�[OL�6aHS�administration feel as though increased economic ties between the EU and Turkey would only help Turkey’s chances for membership. Essentially, Tekin and >PSSPHTZ�Z\TTHYPaL�[OL�[^V�JVTWL[PUN�ZJOVVSZ�VM�[OV\NO[�HZ�¸HZZ\T�PUN��Turkey’s energy role to be simply an HS[LYUH[P]L�[YHUZP[�YV\[L�MVY�Z\WWSPLZ�UV[�controlled by Russia, while the other one interprets it as an important contribution to European energy security through [OL�JV\U[Y`»Z�HJJLZZPVU�[V�[OL�,<�¹�� 6]LYHSS��PU�[OL�J\YYLU[�H[TVZWOLYL��Turkish hopes for full membership in the EU are dim. The rejection of Turkey’s ,<�OVWLZ�PU� ��H[�[OL�3\_LTIV\YN�Summit still holds resonance in the

JUIS38


minds of many elites in Ankara.� ;\YRL`»Z�ULNH[P]L�YLSH[PVUZ�^P[O�[OL�,<�can be traced back to Luxembourg, which marks an important turning point for serious anti-European sentiments in Turkey.�� Although accession into the EU *\Z[VTZ�<UPVU�PU�� YLWYLZLU[Z�HU�LUJV\YHNPUN�Z[LW��[OL�OPZ[VY`�VM�YLI\ќLK�attempts at membership combined with the current atmosphere in both Turkey and EU are not promising. Two thirds of .LYTHU�HUK�-YLUJO�JP[PaLUZ�VWWVZL�HU�LUSHYNLTLU[�VM�[OL�,<��,]LU�[OV\NO�[OL�THQVYP[`�VM�;\YRPZO�JP[PaLUZ�Z\WWVY[�EU membership�� there are questions HZ�[V�[OL�J\S[\YHS�ZPNUPÄJHUJL�VM�Turkey’s accession into the EU, as well as hesitancy on the part of the EU to accept a country with an Islamic cultural background.��

Turkey's Hopes For EU Accession

Turkey’s hopes to emerge as an ¸LULYN`�O\I¹�MVY�[OL�,<�PZ�YLÅLJ[LK�PU�[OL�¸IYPKNL�[OLVY �̀¹�PU�ÔPJO�;\YRL`�becomes an important mediator IL[^LLU�,HZ[�HUK�>LZ[�WYV]PKPUN�IV[O�a material and diplomatic bridge. The bridge theory has been a common theme in Turkish politics, because VM�;\YRL`�Z�NLVWVSP[PJHS�HK]HU[HNL��;OVZL�ÔV�KLZPYL�[V�JHWP[HSPaL�VU�[OPZ�PUUH[L�Z[YH[LNPJ�ILULÄ[�JP[L�PUJYLHZLK�cooperation and integration as the primary route for success. This has been H�JVYULYZ[VUL�VM�(OTL[�+H]\[VNS\»Z�foreign policy, and as a result Turkey has ZLLU�ZPNUPÄJHU[�Z[YPKLZ�PU�JVVWLYH[PVU�HUK�PU[LNYH[PVU�^P[O�ZL]LYHS�YLNPVUHS�actors such as Russia and Iran.�� Turkey

OHZ�LZZLU[PHSS`�ZV\NO[�H�UVYTHSPaH[PVU�VM�relations, Israel perhaps being the largest L_JLW[PVU��ILJH\ZL�VM�+H]\[VNS\»Z�WVSPJPLZ��/V^L]LY��ILJH\ZL�VM�[OL�ZPNUPÄJHU[�JOHSSLUNLZ�;\YRL`�MHJLZ��its relationship to the EU still hangs in the balance. At this point, the leading ZJOVVS�VM�[OV\NO[�PU�;\YRL`�LTWOHZPaLZ�[OH[�[OL�WYPTHY`�^H`�[V�HJOPL]L�,\YVWLHU�PU[LNYH[PVU�PZ�[V�\ZL�;\YRL`�Z�NLVWVSP[PJHS�HK]HU[HNL��HUK�LTIYHJL�[OL�bridge theory.��

4\T[Ha�:V`ZHS�OPNOSPNO[Z�[OL�biggest challenge to this theory in stating [OH[�¸MVY�Z\JO�H�YVSL�[V�IL�JVU]PUJPUN�HUK�LќLJ[P]L��[OL�LZZLU[PHS�YLX\PYLTLU[�is a political and ideological neutrality [V^HYKZ�KPќLYLU[�^VYSKZ��UHTLS`�[OL�Western or European nations on the VUL�ZPKL�HUK�[OL�(ZPHU�VY�4PKKSL�,HZ[LYU�JV\U[YPLZ�VU�[OL�V[OLY�¹�� Ideologically, for the bridge theory to hold, Turkey’s own culture, which PZ�OLH]PS`�[PS[LK�[V^HYKZ�[OL�>LZ[LYU�ideals of secularism since the days of 2LTHSPZT��T\Z[�LTIYHJL�[OL�,HZ[�ZV�as to not present itself as a tool for the WYVTV[PVU�VM�>LZ[LYU�]HS\LZ�� While the secularism and Western orientation of Turkey is arguably changing towards a more Islamic direction under the Erdogan administration and the politics VM�[OL�(2�WHY[ �̀�P[�PZ�\USPRLS`�[OH[�JSVZL�[V� ��`LHYZ�VM�H�ZLJ\SHY�MV\UKH[PVU�will be shaken by the administration VM�H�ZPUNSL�WHY[ �̀��0U�[OPZ�LU]PYVUTLU[��THU`�HK]VJH[LZ�VM�[OL�IYPKNL�[OLVY`�LTWOHZPaL�[OL�ULLK�MVY�PUJYLHZLK�economic integration with Europe in a TV]L�[V^HYKZ�NYLH[LY�PUZ[P[\[PVUHS�[PLZ�HUK�LJVUVTPJ�SPILYHSPaH[PVU�� The need

for Turkey to emerge as an energy hub is one of the most crucial elements of this theory. An integrationist theory is H�MHY�JY`�MYVT�[OL�¸aLYV�Z\T¹�H[[P[\KLZ�[OH[�JOHYHJ[LYPaLK�[OL�2LTHSPZ[�MVYLPNU�WVSPJPLZ�VM�[OL�WHZ[��ÔPJO�]PL^LK�JVVWLYH[P]L�NHPUZ�HZ�L_HJ[S`�[OH[�ÔPJO�is lost by Turkey.�� Perhaps those who ascribe to the tenets of the bridge theory HUK�P[Z�N\PKPUN�WYPUJPWSLZ�]PL^�LULYN`�policy as a primary route, despite its historic limitations in the Caspian and Caucasus regions.

ConclusionWhat do Turkey’s energy policies

since the end of the Cold War tell us about the future of its foreign policy? Furthermore, what does Turkey’s energy policy tell us about its interactions with [OYLL�VM�P[Z�SHYNLZ[�WVSP[PJHS�JVUJLYUZ!�Russia, Iran, and the US? In terms of Russia, Turkish energy policies OH]L�ZLLU�[OL�NYLH[LZ[�SPTP[H[PVUZ��but perhaps also the greatest gains. *VTWL[P[PVU�V]LY�[OL�*HZWPHU�HUK�50:�JOHYHJ[LYPaLK�[OL�LHYS`�PU[LYHJ[PVUZ�between Russia and Turkey, but [OLPY�YLSH[PVUZOPW�ZSV^S`�TV]LK�[V�cooperation. The main theme in European energy politics today is the ULLK�MVY�LULYN`�KP]LYZPÄJH[PVU��ÔPJO�PU�THU`�JHZLZ�TLHUZ�H�KP]LYZPÄJH[PVU�HUK�exploration of options at the expense of Russia. Turkey has a constantly growing economy, and Russia is its largest trading partner. In this framework, 9\ZZPH�Z\WWSPLZ��WLYJLU[�VM�;\YRL`»Z�natural gas, and 23 percent of its oil. ;\YRL`»Z�OVWLZ�MVY�KP]LYZPÄJH[PVU�T\Z[�be balanced with the need to meet its

392013Fall

energy requirements.� �)LJH\ZL�VM�[OL�\U^PSSPUNULZZ�VM�;\YRL`�[V�ZHJYPÄJL�P[Z�LULYN`�YLX\PYLTLU[Z�HUK�[OL�YLSH[P]L�willingness of Russia to manipulate the energy market for political gains, it is in Turkey’s best interest to seek cooperation with Russia rather than JVUÅPJ[��>P[OPU�[OPZ�LU]PYVUTLU[��HZ�THU`�L_WLY[Z�OH]L�PUKPJH[LK��P[�PZ�foreseeable that both the South Stream and the Nabucco pipeline may be built, MVY�[OL`�HYL�UV[�T\[\HSS`�L_JS\ZP]L�WYVQLJ[Z��(S[OV\NO�[OLYL�HYL�ZPNUPÄJHU[�questions as to whether there would be substantial supply for both pipelines to operate at full capacity, this would be a preferable option as compared to outright competition with Russia and .HaWYVT�� This must be reconciled with [OL�KLZPYL�VM�[OL�,<�[V�ZLLR�HS[LYUH[P]L�LULYN`�H]LU\LZ�HZ�^LSS��HUK�WVSPJ`�makers in Ankara must decide whether European integration through the use VM�LULYN`�H]LU\LZ�PZ�H�]PHISL�VW[PVU��Energy security and EU integration HYL�UV[�LU[PYLS`�JVUÅPJ[PUN�PKLHZ��I\[�they certainly do not complement one another. Turkey has shown willingness PU�[OL�WHZ[�[V�MVYLNV�HYLHZ�VM�JVUÅPJ[�with Russia for the sake of economic cooperation, and it is foreseeable that it may do so again.

Relations with Iran and the United States are inherently tied together, as long as Iran continues their current U\JSLHY�WYVNYHT��,]LU�\UKLY�[OL�SLHKLYZOPW�VM�[OL�(2�WHY[`�HUK�H�YLSH[P]L�PTWYV]LTLU[�PU�[OLPY�YLSH[PVUZOPWZ�^P[O�Iran, Turkey has faced serious limitations on the supply of energy from its Eastern neighbor. Iran has not only continued

[V�LTIYHJL�H�JVUÅPJ[PUN�Z[HUJL�VU�[OL�status of the Caspian Sea, but also OHZ�MHPSLK�[V�JVTTP[�[V�H�ZPNUPÄJHU[�supply of gas to Turkish projects.��,]LU�if Turkey were able to secure these commitments, there would be serious opposition by the United States, which OHZ�YLTHPULK�[OL�TVZ[�]VJHS�VWWVULU[�[V�[OL�0YHUPHU�U\JSLHY�WYVNYHT��/V^L]LY��Iran represents a real opportunity for ;\YRL`�[V�L_WSVYL�KP]LYZPÄLK�VW[PVUZ�VM�energy supply if they are willing to forego the potential consequences to their YLSH[PVUZOPW�^P[O�[OL�<:��(Z�VM��;\YRL`�HUK�0YHU�OHK�YLHJOLK�ZL]LYHS�agreements regarding the supply of gas to Turkey, but once again, nothing capable of forgoing Turkey’s reliance on Russia for their energy needs.�� Turkey is faced to choose EU accession and their western relationships, or to focus on their Eastern relationships and secure domestic energy to met Turkey’s LULYN`�ULLKZ��/V^L]LY��+H]\[VNS\»Z�policies do not see these two ideas HZ�T\[\HSS`�L_JS\ZP]L��;OYV\NO�OPZ�¸aLYV�Z\T¹�HWWYVHJO��[OL�(2�WHY[`�OHZ�simultaneously placed an emphasis on the formulation of stable relations with all of Turkey’s neighbors, while continuing to place emphasis on the emergence of Turkey as a strong regional actor and major power in the energy transport arena.�� In response to whether or UV[�;\YRL`�^HZ�TV]PUN�H^H`�MYVT�P[Z�Western orientations and alliances, 7YLZPKLU[�.\S�UV[LK�[OH[!

�¸(�JV\U[Y`�Z�KPYLJ[PVU�PZ�KL[LYTPULK�I`�P[Z�]HS\LZ��HUK�UV[�I`�P[Z�YLSH[PVUZ��The Important point is in which direction

;\YRL`�Z�]HS\LZ�KL]LSVW��;OLZL�HYL�KLTVJYH[PJ�]HS\LZ��YLZWLJ[�MVY�SH �̂�equality of men and women, liberal economy and so on. These better show PU�^OPJO�KPYLJ[PVU�;\YRL`�PZ�NVPUN�¹��

There is a strong indication that Turkey is approaching its relationship with Iran carefully and cautiously, yet for the sake of its own regional security and LULYN`�VIQLJ[P]LZ�;\YRL`�OVWLZ�[V�IL�H�mediator in the major issues between the US and Iran.

Since the end of the Cold War, ;\YRL`»Z�YLSH[P]L�Z[HUJL�PU�YLNHYKZ�[V�matters of foreign policy has been ¸YH[PVUHS�YLHSPZT¹�YLJVUJPSLK�^P[O�H�KLZPYL�[V�JHWP[HSPaL�VU�[OL�UL^�VWWVY[\UP[PLZ�brought on by the collapse of a regional YP]HS�� Energy policy has consistently remained one of the cornerstones with ^OPJO�;\YRL`�MVYT\SH[LZ�HU�HZZLY[P]L�regional policy, and it seems likely to remain that way for the coming years. (�M\SS�YL]PZPVU�VM�2LTHSPZ[�[LUKLUJPLZ�seems not only unlikely, but an PTWVZZPIPSP[ �̀�NP]LU�[OL�PU[LNYH[PVU�HUK�JVVWLYH[P]L�YLSH[PVUZOPWZ�;\YRL`�OHZ�formed with other countries. In many cases, energy trade and policy has formed a fundamental part of many of ;\YRL`�Z�YLSH[PVUZOPWZ��,ULYN`�WVSPJPLZ�of course, like many other elements of Turkey’s strategic plans, are not without their limitations. These limitations were highlighted in Turkey’s modest successes in the NIS after the collapse of the USSR. As seen in the limited successes in the Caucasus, the building of pipelines and economic agreements may result in increased cooperation, but


JUIS40

does necessarily mean a rise in Turkish political hegemony. Energy policies are therefore an important factor but cannot IL�[OL�VUS`�H]LU\L�I`�^OPJO�;\YRL`�approaches integration with the EU. If [OL�¸IYPKNL�[OLVY`¹�PZ�M\SS`�LTIYHJLK��energy linkages with Europe must be part of a larger package of increased ties with the EU, both culturally and economically. Popular sentiment for [OL�,<�PU�;\YRL`�PZ�^HUPUN�OV^L]LY��and the current pattern of relations with the EU may in fact remain the status-quo for quite some time. In this atmosphere, the Nabucco pipeline could be an important step towards energy KP]LYZPÄJH[PVU��I\[�KVLZ�UV[�ULJLZZHYPS`�mean increased chances for Turkey’s EU accession. Turkish policy makers face a real challenge in the coming decades, as energy policy and the questions that come with it remain a complicated and ]L_PUN�PZZ\L�HќLJ[PUN�HSS�HYLHZ�VM�;\YRPZO�foreign policy.

Endnotes��(S[\UPZPR��4LSPOH��¸;\YRL`�HUK�[OL�*OHUNPUN�

6PS�4HYRL[¹��W��LKZ�3PII`�9P[[LUILYN��The Political Economy of Turkey in the Post Soviet Era, (Westport Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1998)

2. Hill, Fiona, “Caspian Conundrum: Pipelines HUK�,ULYN`�5L[^VYRZ¹��W��3LVUYL�.��4HY[PU�HUK�+PTP[YPZ�2LYPKPZ��LKZ� The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004) pp.211-239

��(S[\UPZPR��

��;HUYPZL]LY��6R[H �̀�¸;\YRL`�HUK�9\ZZPH�PU�Eurasia”, p.130, Leonre G. Martin and +PTP[YPZ�2LYPKPZ��LKZ��The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), pp.127-155

5. Ibid., 131.

6. Hill, 217.


8. Hill, 218.

9. Ibid., 216.

10. Ibid., 217.

11. Ibid., 226.


13. Hill, 228.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., 229.

16. Ibid., 217.

17. Hill, 231.

��;LRPU��(SP�HUK�7H\S�(UKYL^�>PSSPHTZ��W�� Geo-Politics of the Euro-Asia Energy Nexus, �5L^�@VYR!�7HSNYH]L�4HJTPSSHU��

19. Hill, 232.

20. Ibid.

21. Hill, 232..

22. Ibid., 233.

��;LRPU�HUK�>PSSPHTZ��

24.Hill, 235.

25. Hill, 234.


27. Tanrisever, 137.


29. Ibid., 145.




��,]LYLK��2`SL��¸9LNPVUHSPZT�PU�[OL�4PKKSL�,HZ[�HUK�[OL�*HZL�VM�;\YRL`¹�W�� Geographical Review , Vol. 95, No. 3, New Geographies of the Middle East (Jul., 2005), pp. 463-477

34. Evered, 469.

35. Peimani Hooman, Regional Security and the Future of Central Asia, p. 91, (Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1998)

36. Ibid., 98.



39. Ibid., 149.

40. Ibid., 1.

41. Ibid., 2.

42. Ibid., 155.


44. Ibid., 156.

45. Ibid., 157.

46. Ibid., 158.

47. Ibid., 157.

48. Ibid., 156.

49. Ibid., 159.

50. Ibid., 160.

51. Ibid., 162.

52. Ibid., 161.

��)HL]��7H]LS�2�HUK�0UKYH�6]LYSHUK�¸;OL�:V\[O�Stream Versus Nabucco Pipeline Race: Geopolitical and Economic Irrationales and 7VSP[PJHS�:[HRLZ�PU�4LNH�7YVQLJ[Z¹�W��0U[LYUH[PVUHS�(ќHPYZ� Vol 86, No 5 (September 2010) pp. 1075-1090.

54, Ibid.,1076.



57. Ibid., 166.


� ��,YHSW��([PSH��¸;\YRL`�HUK�[OL�,\YVWLHU�<UPVU¹��W��3LVUYL�.��4HY[PU�HUK�+PTP[YPZ�2LYPKPZ��eds, The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004) pp. 63-82.

60. Ibid., 75.


62. Ibid., 7.

��>PNLU��,PUHY��7PWL�+YLHTZ�6Y�+YLHT�7PWL&�;\YRL`�Z�/VWLZ�VM�)LJVTPUN�HU�,ULYN`�/\I��;OL�4PKKSL�,HZ[�1V\YUHS��=VS��UV��4 (2012): 598-612, http://search.proquest.JVT�LaWYV_ �̀SPIYHY �̀[\M[Z�LK\�KVJ]PL^��72165?accountid=14434

64. Ibid., OL.

��:V`ZHS��4\T[Ha��¸;OL�-\[\YL�VM�;\YRPZO�-VYLPNU�Policy”, p. 38, Leonre G. Martin and Dimitris 2LYPKPZ��LKZ��;OL�-\[\YL�VM�;\YRPZO�-VYLPNU�Policy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), pp. 37-46.

66. Soysal, 39.

67. Wigen, OL.

68. Ibid., OL.

� ��,KPNLY��=VSRHU�:��HUK�0[PY�)HNKHKP��;\YRL`�Russia Energy Relations: Same Old Story, 5L^�(J[VYZ��0UZPNO[�;\YRL`��UV��(2010): 221-236, http://search.proquest.JVT�LaWYV_ �̀SPIYHY �̀[\M[Z�LK\�KVJ]PL^��4733?accountid=14434, OL

70. Ibid., OL.

��>PUYV �̂�.HYL[O��;\YRL`!�(U�,TLYNPUN�,ULYN`�;YHUZP[�:[H[L�HUK�7VZZPISL�,ULYN`�/\I��;OL�International Spectator, Vol 46, no. 3 (2011): � � ��O[[W!��ZLHYJO�WYVX\LZ[�JVT�LaWYV_ �̀


412013Fall

library.tufts.edu/docview/925702379?accountid=14434, OL

��2HYHJHZ\S\��5PS�MLY�HUK�0YLT�(ZRHY�2HYHRPY��0YHU�;\YRL`�9LSH[PVUZ�PU�[OL��Z!�7YHNTH[PJ�9HWWYVJOLTLU[��,NL�(RHKLTPR�)HRPZ�=VS��UV��!�� O[[W!��ZLHYJO�WYVX\LZ[�JVT�LaWYV_ �̀SPIYHY �̀tufts.edu/docview/851883181?accountid=14434, OL

73. Ibid., OL.

74. Ibid., OL.

75. Soysal, 46.

Bibliography(S[\UPZPR��4LSPOH��¸;\YRL`�HUK�[OL�*OHUNPUN�

6PS�4HYRL[¹��LKZ�3PII`�9P[[LUILYN��The Political Economy of Turkey in the Post Soviet Era, (Westport Connecticut:Praeger Publishers, 1998)

)HL]��7H]LS�2�HUK�0UKYH�6]LYSHUK�¸;OL�:V\[O�Stream Versus Nabucco Pipeline Race: Geopolitical and Economic Irrationales and 7VSP[PJHS�:[HRLZ�PU�4LNH�7YVQLJ[Z¹�W��0U[LYUH[PVUHS�(ќHPYZ��Vol 86, No 5 (September 2010)

,KPNLY��=VSRHU�:��HUK�0[PY�)HNKHKP��;\YRL`�9\ZZPH�Energy Relations: Same Old Story, New (J[VYZ� Insight Turkey 12, no. 3 (2010): 221-236, <http://search.proquest.com.LaWYV_ �̀SPIYHY �̀[\M[Z�LK\�KVJ]PL^��3?accountid=14434>

,YHSW��([PSH��¸;\YRL`�HUK�[OL�,\YVWLHU�<UPVU¹��3LUVYL�.��4HY[PU�HUK�+PTP[YPZ�2LYPKPZ��LKZ��;OL�-\[\YL�VM�;\YRPZO�-VYLPNU�7VSPJ`�(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004) pp. 63-82.,]LYLK��2`SL��¸9LNPVUHSPZT�PU�[OL�4PKKSL�,HZ[�HUK�[OL�*HZL�VM�;\YRL`¹��Geographical Review, Vol. 95, No. 3, New Geographies of the Middle East (Jul., 2005), pp. 463-477.

Hill, Fiona, “Caspian Conundrum: Pipelines and ,ULYN`�5L[^VYRZ¹��3LVUYL�.��4HY[PU�HUK�+PTP[YPZ�2LYPKPZ��LKZ��The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004) pp.211-239.

2HYHJHZ\S\��5PS�MLY�HUK�0YLT�(ZRHY�2HYHRPY��0YHU�;\YRL`�9LSH[PVUZ�PU�[OL��Z!�7YHNTH[PJ�9HWWYVJOLTLU[��Ege Akademik Bakis Vol 11, no. 1 (2011): 1399-1407, #O[[W!��ZLHYJO�WYVX\LZ[�JVT�LaWYV_ �̀SPIYHY �̀tufts.edu/docview/851883181?accountid=14434>

Peimani Hooman, Regional Security and the Future of Central Asia, (Connecticut: Praeger


Publishers, 1998).

:V`ZHS��4\T[Ha��¸;OL�-\[\YL�VM�;\YRPZO�-VYLPNU�7VSPJ`¹��3LVUYL�.��4HY[PU�HUK�+PTP[YPZ�2LYPKPZ��eds, The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), pp. 37-46.

;HUYPZL]LY��6R[H �̀�¸;\YRL`�HUK�9\ZZPH�PU�,\YHZPH¹��3LVUYL�.��4HY[PU�HUK�+PTP[YPZ�2LYPKPZ��eds, The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), pp.127-155.

;LRPU��(SP�HUK�7H\S�(UKYL^�>PSSPHTZ��Geo-Politics ofthe Euro-Asia Energy Nexus, �5L^�@VYR!�Palgrave Macmillan, 2011)

>PNLU��,PUHY��7PWL�+YLHTZ�6Y�+YLHT�7PWL&�;\YRL`�Z�/VWLZ�VM�)LJVTPUN�HU�,ULYN`�/\I� The Middle East Journal, Vol 66, no. 4 (2012): 598-612, <http://search.proquest.JVT�LaWYV_ �̀SPIYHY �̀[\M[Z�LK\�KVJ]PL^��72165?accountid=14434>

>PUYV �̂�.HYL[O��;\YRL`!�(U�,TLYNPUN�,ULYN`�;YHUZP[�:[H[L�HUK�7VZZPISL�,ULYN`�/\I��;he International Spectator, Vol 46, no. 3 (2011): � � ��#O[[W!��ZLHYJO�WYVX\LZ[�JVT�LaWYV_ �̀library.tufts.edu/docview/925702379?accountid=14434>

JUIS42

OPZ�WHWLY�L_HTPULZ�H�JY\JPHS�[PTL�PU�[OL�OPZ[VY`�VM�;HP^HU�¶�KLJVSVUPaH[PVU��0[�HKKYLZZLZ�[OL�problems and solutions surrounding Taiwan during Japanese and Chinese rule from an economic WLYZWLJ[P]L��0U�WHY[PJ\SHY��P[�\ZLZ�H�^H[LYZOLK�L]LU[�PU�;HP^HULZL�OPZ[VY`�¶�[OL�-LIY\HY`��0UJPKLU[�¶�HUK�WSHJLZ�[OPZ�L]LU[�PU�[OL�JVU[L_[�VM�;HP^HU»Z�NYV^[O�PU[V�HU�PUKLWLUKLU[�UH[PVU��

6U�-LIY\HY`�� HU�\WYPZPUN�in Taipei, Taiwan quickly spread to the rest of the island and brought yet HUV[OLY�JHZL�VM�H�TLZZ`�KLJVSVUPaH[PVU�process to the forefront of international politics. A mere two years earlier, the Potsdam Declaration was signed by Allied powers, ensuring that once World War II ended, so would Taiwan’s period VM�JVSVUPaH[PVU�\UKLY�1HWHULZL�Y\SL��The Retrocession Day that followed VU�6J[VILY�� VѝJPHSS`�JLKLK�Taiwan to the Republic of China, yet [OL�KH`»Z�JLSLIYH[PVUZ�^V\SK�WYV]PKL�HU�VTPUV\Z�JVU[YHZ[�[V�[OL�]PVSLUJL�HUK�bloodshed that took place only sixteen TVU[OZ�SH[LY��)\[�^OH[�^LU[�^YVUN�^P[O�the transfer of power from the hands of Japanese imperialists to those of the Chinese nationalists? In trying to understand this tumultuous period in Taiwanese history, it is helpful to take HU�LJVUVTPJ�WLYZWLJ[P]L��;OL�JVUÅPJ[�between the Taiwanese population and the Chinese nationalists spurred

H�UL^MV\UK�JVU]LYZH[PVU�JVUJLYUPUN�Taiwanese independence, stemming from immediate economic woes rather than political matters. Furthermore, the economic problems that sparked [OPZ�JVUÅPJ[�KV�UV[�OH]L�VUL�JSLHY�cause or source. Instead, it was a combination of three factors – Japanese short-sightedness, Chinese economic mismanagement, and a postwar context – which sparked the February ��0UJPKLU[��HUK�\S[PTH[LS`�JOHUNLK�the course of Taiwanese history – economically, politically, and socially.

Taiwan's HistoryIn order to understand Taiwan’s

position internationally after World War II, it is helpful to clarify the island’s history. The multitude of the Taiwanese population is made up of Han Chinese immigrants who came to the island ILNPUUPUN�PU�[OL��[O�JLU[\Y �̀�([�[OPZ�time Taiwan was occupied by the Dutch under the administration of the Dutch ,HZ[�0UKPH�*VTWHU �̀�/V^L]LY��[OL�earliest known inhabitants of the island are an aborigine population closely YLSH[LK�[V�[OL�UH[P]LZ�VM�V[OLY�PZSHUKZ�

The February 28 Incident:

by James Meresman

James Meresman. 1HTLZ�4LYLZTHU�PZ�MYVT�/\U[PUN[VU��5L^�@VYR�HUK�H[[LUKLK�OPNO�ZJOVVS�H[�4PS[VU�(JHKLT`�PU�4PS[VU��4HZZHJO\ZL[[Z��/L�PZ�UV^�H�Q\UPVY�H[�>HZOPUN[VU�<UP]LYZP[`�PU�:[��3V\PZ��^OLYL�OL�PZ�W\YZ\PUN�H�KV\ISL�4HQVY�PU�/PZ[VY`�HUK�7VSP[PJHS�:JPLUJL��^P[O�H�4PUVY�PU�>YP[PUN�

An Economic Perspective on the Decolonization of Taiwan

T

“Instead, it was a combination of three factors –

Japanese short-sightedness, Chinese economic

mismanagement, and a postwar context –

which sparked the February 28 Incident, and

ultimately changed the course of Taiwanese

history – economically, politically, and socially.”

432013Fall

in Southeast Asia.1�)L[^LLU��HUK��ÔPSL�*OPUH�^HZ�PU�[OL�[\YTVPS�VM�KÙHZ[PJ�JOHUNL�MYVT�[OL�4PUN�[V�[OL�Qing Dynasty, the Chinese population in Taiwan quadrupled, as mainlanders ÅLK�WVSP[PJHS�KPZVYKLY�2 Taiwan became H�WYLMLJ[\YL�VM�*OPUH»Z�-\QPHU�WYV]PUJL�VM�[OL�8PUN�+ÙHZ[`�PU��HUK�H�M\SS�ÅLKNLK�WYV]PUJL�PU��3 So began the island’s long history of subordination to foreign rule.

0U�� ;HP^HU�ILJHTL�H�1HWHULZL�JVSVU �̀�ÔPJO�P[�YLTHPULK�\U[PS�� when it was ceded to the Republic of China after World War II. Thus, the ;HP^HULZL�OH]L�KLHS[�^P[O�[OYLL�KPќLYLU[�JLU[YHS�NV]LYUTLU[Z�V]LY�[OL�JV\YZL�of their history – the Qing Empire, the Japanese colonial regime, and the Nationalist Chinese nation-state – and HSS�VM�[OLZL�YLNPTLZ�NV]LYULK�MYVT�afar. In short, the Taiwanese population LќLJ[P]LS`�UL]LY�OHK�[OL�VWWVY[\UP[`�[V�NV]LYU�[OLTZLS]LZ��5L]LY[OLSLZZ��HUK�perhaps ironically, as we shall see, the Z\YNL�VM�KLJVSVUPaH[PVU�TV]LTLU[Z�that shook empires around the globe in the 20th century did not animate the JVSVUPaLK�;HP^HULZL�¶�\U[PS�[OL�-LIY\HY`��0UJPKLU[��

Japanese Colonization ;OL�[PTL�VM�1HWHULZL�JVSVUPaH[PVU�

was a period of tremendous economic growth for Taiwan. Economist Samuel Ho explains that Taiwan’s transition

MYVT�H�ULNSLJ[LK�*OPULZL�WYV]PUJL�[V�H�Japanese colony turned the island from an essentially closed economy to an open economy.� At the onset of colonial rule, Taiwan lacked almost any measure VM�TVKLYU�VY�PUK\Z[YPHS�KL]LSVWTLU[��I\[�this quickly changed. Agriculture was by far the most important employer and producer in the economy throughout JVSVUPHS�Y\SL��`L[�V]LY�[PTL�PUK\Z[Y`�HUK�modern infrastructure also began to play a crucial role.

)LNPUUPUN�PU�� [OL�1HWHULZL�THKL�THQVY�PTWYV]LTLU[Z�PU�ZHUP[H[PVU�HUK�OLHS[O�JHYL��-VY�PUZ[HUJL��PU�� .V]LYUVY�.LULYHS�2VKHTH�.LU[HYH�took great pride in the fact that the PZSHUK�OHK��KVJ[VYZ�[YHPULK�PU�Western medicine.5 Education through primary and technical schools became ^PKLS`�H]HPSHISL��HUK�[OL�1HWHULZL�began to create a foundation for sustained economic growth. They \UPÄLK�TLHZ\YLTLU[Z�HUK�J\YYLUJ �̀�created postal, banking and telegraph systems, built infrastructure including harbors, railroads, and power plants, HUK�\S[PTH[LS`�KL]LSVWLK�PUK\Z[Y`�in sugar, aluminum, cement, iron, chemicals, textiles, and lumber.� In his comparison of the economic situations in Japanese and French colonies, OPZ[VYPHU�)Y\JL�*\TPUNZ�JHSSZ�;HP^HU�H�TVKLS�MVY�L_WVY[�SLK�KL]LSVWTLU[�� He goes on to describe Japanese rule as TVYL�VM�H�TVKLYUPaH[PVU�LќVY[�[OHU�H�

JVSVUPaH[PVU�LќVY[��;OL�� Z�HUK��Z��L]LU�JVTWHYLK�^P[O�[OL�¸LJVUVTPJ�TPYHJSL¹�VM�;HP^HU�PU�[OL�� Z�HUK��Z��which was Taiwan’s period of greatest material progress, as Japan taught the island how to export and protected the domestic market.�

(Z�LJVUVTPJHSS`�WYVNYLZZP]L�HZ�1HWHULZL�JVSVUPaH[PVU�WYV]LK�[V�IL��there was a catch. In the words of Samuel Ho, by becoming a colony of Japan, Taiwan “traded political independence for stability and economic WYVNYLZZ�¹ �;OL�JVSVUPHS�NV]LYUTLU[»Z�VIQLJ[P]LZ�PU�;HP^HU�^LYL�UV[�VUS`�to found and stimulate an economy, but also to keep economic power in 1HWHULZL�OHUKZ��;OL�NV]LYUTLU[�enacted strict regulations on Taiwan’s economy, encouraging the concentration of economic power in the corporate sector and ensuring that this sector was owned and controlled by Japanese VѝJPHSZ��;OL�-HYTLY»Z�(ZZVJPH[PVU��MVY�L_HTWSL��ÔPJO�^HZ�MV\UKLK�PU�� H[�[OL�PUP[PH[P]L�VM�^LHS[O`�MHYTLYZ�HUK�landlords, soon became an arm of the NV]LYUTLU[��)`�[OL�� Z�[OL�1HWHULZL�had in the Farmer’s Association the type of institution needed to bring ZJPLU[PÄJ�MHYTPUN�[V�;HP^HU��ÔPSL�at the same time maintaining the JLU[YHS�NV]LYUTLU[»Z�Z[HRL�PU�;HP^HU»Z�enormous agricultural sector.10

;OL�NV]LYUTLU[�HSZV�LUJV\YHNLK�Japanese migration to the island, and

The February 28 Incident: An Economic Perspective on the Decolonization of Taiwan / James Meresman

An Economic Perspective on the Decolonization of Taiwan

JUIS44

[OYV\NO�PUZ[P[\[PVUHSPaLK�KPZJYPTPUH[PVU�WYHJ[PJLZ�ZL]LYLS`�SPTP[LK�\W^HYK�mobility for the Taiwanese population.11 The Japanese colonists dominated the economy through state-sanctioned monopolies, and in the end, Japanese NVHSZ�VU�;HP^HU�KPќLYLK�SP[[SL�MYVT�[OVZL�of European imperialists in their own colonies. The island was to become a cheap source of raw materials and SHIVY��HUK�[O\Z�KL]LSVW�HZ�H�JY\JPHS�economic support structure for the Japanese Empire.12 This style of JVSVUPHS�KL]LSVWTLU[��ÔPJO�PUJS\KLK�OPNO�[HYPќZ�[V�WYVTV[L�L_WVY[Z�V]LY�imports and brought wealth from the colonies to the metropole, hearkens back to the Western European system of mercantilism. In fact, during Japanese Y\SL�HIV\[��WLYJLU[�VM�[OL�PZSHUK»Z�exports went to the home islands of Japan’s Empire.13

;O\Z��OPZ[VYPHU�:[L]LU�7OPSSPWZ�JHSSZ�1HWHU»Z�Y\SL�H�¸WYVNYLZZP]L�KLZWV[PZT¹�[OH[�WYVTV[LK�WVSP[PJHS�Z[HIPSP[`�HUK�LJVUVTPJ�KL]LSVWTLU[��yet crushed dissent and maintained a Japanese power structure.�� Similarly, Samuel Ho explains that perhaps the most serious of the intangible costs VM�1HWHULZL�JVSVUPaH[PVU�^HZ�[OH[�P[�WYL]LU[LK�[OL�LTLYNLUJL�VM�H�KÙHTPJ�Taiwanese entrepreneur-capitalist class. Consequently, an element crucial to sustained economic growth was absent in the Taiwanese population, and if Japan suddenly decided to withdraw from Taiwan, economic growth would stall.15 This was, ultimately, what OHWWLULK�PU�� ÔLU�1HWHULZL�

entrepreneurs and capitalists were hastily repatriated from Taiwan, after Japan’s defeat in the war. The Japanese did not put enough economic or political power in the hands of the Taiwanese population, and thus when the Japanese left, so did Taiwan’s wealth and human capital.

The role of the remnants of Japanese colonialism in Taiwan’s economic collapse is succinctly shown by none other than Chen Yi himself, ;HP^HU»Z�.V]LYUVY�.LULYHS�K\YPUN�[OL�-LIY\HY`��0UJPKLU[��6U�+LJLTILY�� Q\Z[�[^V�TVU[OZ�WYPVY�[V�[OL�\WYPZPUN��*OLU�@P�NH]L�H�YHKPV�ZWLLJO�directed to the people of Taiwan. In OPZ�ZWLLJO�OL�YL]PL^Z�[OL�WHZ[�`LHY»Z�accomplishments, and sets out goals MVY�[OL�5L^�@LHY��/L�YLJVNUPaLZ�[OL�need for “economic and psychological YLJVUZ[Y\J[PVU¹�VM�;HP^HU��`L[�OL�ISHTLZ�[OL�WYVISLTZ�VM�;HP^HU�VU�[OL�¸]PJPV\Z�WVSPJPLZ¹�VM�1HWHULZL�PTWLYPHSPZ[Z�¸[V�keep our Taiwan brethren ignorant and YLZ[YPJ[�[OLPY�VWWVY[\UP[`�[V¯HJOPL]L�LSL]H[LK�WVZP[PVUZ�PU�ZVJPL[ �̀¹��/L�NVLZ�VU�[V�KLZJYPIL�OPZ�¸-P]L�@LHY�,JVUVTPJ�9LJVUZ[Y\J[PVU�7SHU�¹�WYVJSHPTPUN�� HZ�[OL�¸7YVK\J[PVU�@LHY¹�MVY�;HP^HU��/L�explains that Chinese rule has instituted equal opportunity and incorporated [OL�;HP^HULZL�PU[V�NV]LYUTLU[��HUK�explains how the Chinese economic WVSPJ`�PZ�KPќLYLU[�MYVT�[OH[�VM�[OL�Japanese, “which was designed only to YVI�WYVÄ[Z�MYVT�[OL�WLVWSL�PU�VYKLY�[V�Z\WWVY[�1HWHULZL�TPSP[HY`�HNNYLZZPVU�¹��

First and foremost, it is telling of the social situation in Taiwan that prior

[V�[OL�-LIY\HY`��0UJPKLU[��.V]LYUVY�.LULYHS�*OLU�@P�PKLU[PÄLK�[OL�MHS[LYPUN�economy as a primary target for NV]LYUTLU[HS�HJ[PVU��;OL�;HP^HULZL�population was clearly distressed from the postwar economic situation, HUK�*OLU�@P�YLJVNUPaLK�[OPZ��4VYL�importantly, though, is the fact that he connects the current economic woes to the past remnants of Japanese rule. Although much of his speech is Chinese nationalist propaganda – as we will see, Chinese administration was just as, if not TVYL�VWWYLZZP]L�[OHU�[OH[�VM�1HWHU��;OL�economic failure in Taiwan after World War II was not caused solely by Chinese TPZTHUHNLTLU[��)V[O�1HWHULZL�HUK�Chinese occupation of Taiwan was L_WSVP[H[P]L��HUK�1HWHU»Z�MHPS\YL�[V�prepare the Taiwanese economy to be ZLSM�Z\ѝJPLU[�KLÄUP[LS`�WSH`LK�H�SHYNL�YVSL�PU�[OL�Z\IZLX\LU[�ÄUHUJPHS�JYPZPZ��*OLU�@P»Z�]PL �̂�[OV\NO�VI]PV\ZS`�IPHZLK�HUK�ZVTLÔH[�TPZSLHKPUN��JVU]L`Z�HU�important aspect of the cause of the rebellion. To make matters worse, this ^HZ�VUS`�[OL�ÄYZ[�VM�[OL�[OYLL�WYPTHY`�causes of the economic downturn that SLK�[V�[OL�-LIY\HY`��0UJPKLU[��

The Chinese Nationalists' Economic Mismanagement

On the surface, the structure of the Chinese nationalists’ economy in ;HP^HU�^HZ�UV[�HSS�[OH[�KPќLYLU[�[OHU�[OL�1HWHULZL�HWWYVHJO��;OL�2\VTPU[HUN�NV]LYUTLU[�VM�[OL�9LW\ISPJ�VM�*OPUH�continued the Japanese legacy of strict state control of the economy. .V]LYUVY�.LULYHS�*OLU�@P»Z�Z`Z[LT�VM�


452013Fall

¸ULJLZZHY`�Z[H[L�ZVJPHSPZT¹�JVUZPZ[LK�VM�monopoly regulations that took control of nearly all Taiwanese corporations.�� 4VYLV]LY��Q\Z[�HZ�[OL�1HWHULZL�OHK�THPU[HPULK�JVU[YVS�VM�OPNO�NV]LYUTLU[HS�HUK�LJVUVTPJ�VѝJLZ��[OL�*OPULZL�nationalists also assumed leadership in Taiwan. Thus, it was not the Taiwanese population in charge of the economy, I\[�¸JHYWL[IHNNPUN¹�THPUSHUKLYZ�ÔV�TPNYH[LK�[V�ÄSS�[OL�]VPK�SLM[�I`�[OL�Japanese.�

<S[PTH[LS �̀�[OL�VUS`�YLHS�KPќLYLUJL�between the structure of the Taiwanese economy before and after Retrocession +H`�^HZ�[OL�JLU[YHS�NV]LYUTLU[»Z�Z[H[LK�]HS\LZ�HUK�WYPUJPWSLZ��1HWHU�Y\SLK�Taiwan as a traditional colony, supporting [OL�,TWPYL�[OH[�^HZ�JLU[YHSPaLK�PU�[OL�TL[YVWVSL��0U�JVU[YHZ[��[OL�2\VTPU[HUN»Z�ideology was grounded in Sun-Yat Sen’s Three Principles of the People, ÔPJO�LTWOHZPaLK�[OL�\UP[`�HUK�nationalism of the Chinese people. In NV]LYUPUN�;HP^HU��[OL�*OPULZL�JHSSLK�[OL�;HP^HULZL�[OLPY�¸IYL[OYLU¹�HUK�implemented their nationalist ideology I`�MH]VYPUN�UH[PVUHS�JHWP[HS�V]LY�WYP]H[L�PU]LZ[TLU[�20�.V]LYUVY�.LULYHS�*OLU�@P�took Sun-Yat Sen’s economic policies seriously, interpreting them to justify OPZ�HKTPUPZ[YH[PVU»Z�PU[LY]LU[PVU�PU�HSS�LJVUVTPJ�HJ[P]P[PLZ�21 He claimed that the purpose of his economic planning was the people’s welfare, and by the end VM�� OPZ�HKTPUPZ[YH[PVU�JVU[YVSSLK�L]LU�TVYL�LJVUVTPJ�HJ[P]P[`�[OHU�[OL�Japanese had.22

,]LU�[OV\NO�[OL�*OPULZL�nationalists’ economic structure in

;HP^HU�KPK�UV[�KPќLY�NYLH[S`�MYVT�[OH[�of the Japanese, economic conditions \UKLY�*OPULZL�Y\SL�UL]LY[OLSLZZ�WS\TTL[LK��;OL�`LHY�VM�� ^HZ�VUL�VM�\UYLSPL]LK�LJVUVTPJ�KPZHZ[LY��Prices rose steadily, production fell, and unemployment among the Taiwanese ILJHTL�H�NYH]L�WYVISLT�23�0U�� ;HP^HU�WYVK\JLK�PU�L_JLZZ�VM��TL[YPJ�[VUZ�VM�Z\NHY"�PU�JVU[YHZ[��PU�� [OL�ÄYZ[�M\SS�JYVWZ�WYVK\JLK�\UKLY�Chinese management yielded only 30,000 metric tons, about the same amount which had been produced in �� ILMVYL�[OL�1HWHULZL�KL]LSVWLK�the industry.��4HU\MHJ[\YPUN�PUK\Z[YPLZ�before the war had employed between ��HUK��;HP^HULZL"�MV\Y[LLU�months after Japan’s surrender, fewer than 5,000 Taiwanese were employed.25 ;OL�JVZ[�VM�MVVKZ[\ќZ��I\PSKPUN�TH[LYPHSZ�HUK�JOLTPJHS�MLY[PSPaLYZ�YVZL��HUK�Taiwanese workers could not meet [OL�YPZPUN�JVZ[�VM�SP]PUN�PU�[OL�JP[PLZ��As a result, many drifted back to their ancestral homes in the countryside, and the small, but prosperous Taiwanese TPKKSL�JSHZZ�ILNHU�[V�]HUPZO��,]LU�public health deteriorated. In middle VM�� MV\Y�JHZLZ�VM�[OL�I\IVUPJ�WSHN\L�^LYL�KPZJV]LYLK��HUK�HZ�Z\TTLY�approached cholera reappeared on the island, a disease which had not been known in epidemic proportions since � � ��

Yet if the economic structure in Taiwan was not dramatically changed HM[LY�[OL�[YHUZMLY�VM�WV^LY�PU�� where was the Republic of China’s

MH\S[�PU�JH\ZPUN�[OPZ�ZL]LYL�LJVUVTPJ�downturn? Corruption among many of the ruling Chinese nationalists was the second primary cause for Taiwan’s economic collapse. In the words of (TLYPJHU�KPWSVTH[�.LVYNL�2LYY��LѝJPLU[�Japanese ownership and management OHK�ILLU�¸YLWSHJLK�V]LYUPNO[�I`�PULѝJPLU[�*OPULZL�VÛLYZOPW�HUK�THUHNLTLU[�¹��)YPILY`�^HZ�WLY]HZP]L�HTVUN�*OPULZL�VѝJPHSZ��HUK�ILJH\ZL�of the political and economic structure, the Taiwanese population was unable to rehabilitate their own small industries and JVTTLYJPHS�LU[LYWYPZLZ��;OL�NV]LYUPUN�mainlanders held the licensing power, controlled transport, and manipulated capital and credit sources.� The ;HP^HULZL�^LYL�V]LYÔLSTLK�I`�[OL�YLK�[HWL�VM�[OL�NV]LYUTLU[HS�I\YLH\JYHJ �̀�ÄUKPUN�[OLTZLS]LZ�H[�[OL�TLYJ`�VM�[OYLL�JVYY\W[�WYPUJPWHS�HNLUJPLZ!�[OL�Finance Commission, the Department of Transport and Communications, and the ;HP^HU�;YHKPUN�)\YLH\�30

Contempt for the ruling class grew as the Taiwanese experienced UH[PVUHSPZ[�JVYY\W[PVU�ÄYZ[�OHUK��YLJHSSPUN�fondly the rule of law under the strict, yet predictable police state of the 1HWHULZL��4HPUSHUK�*OPULZL�H[�HSS�SL]LSZ�^LYL�PU�H�WVZP[PVU�[V�]V[L�[OLTZLS]LZ�salaries, bonuses, and perquisites.31 5L^�L_[YLTLZ�VM�^LHS[O�HUK�WV]LY[`�HWWLHYLK��4LU�HUK�^VTLU�MYVT�Shanghai set unprecedented standards of luxury, and ragged peddlers and beggars became a common sight.32 The Taiwanese joked about passing


JUIS46

[OL�-P]L�7HY[�0TWLYPHS�,_HT��YLMLYYPUN�[V�[OL�Ä]L�[OPUNZ�VѝJPHSZ�JYH]LK!�gold, automobiles, rank, homes, and women.33 They mocked Sun-Yat Sen’s Three Principles, since his face was on the currency that so many VѝJPHSZ�KLTHUKLK�HZ�IYPILZ�� Due [V�[OPZ�NV]LYUTLU[�JVYY\W[PVU��[OL�schism between the Taiwanese and their Chinese nationalist superiors was exacerbated.

([�[OL�ZHTL�[PTL��2\VTPU[HUN�ZVSKPLYZ�SVV[LK�L]LY`�JP[`�Z[YLL[�HUK�Z\I\YIHU�]PSSHNL�\UMVY[\UH[L�LUV\NO�[V�OH]L�H�5H[PVUHSPZ[�(YT`�IHYYHJRZ�VY�encampment nearby. These underpaid and undisciplined conscripts became objects of scorn and contempt among the Taiwanese population in much the ZHTL�^H`�HZ�[OL�NV]LYUTLU[�VѝJPHSZ��(Z�THPUSHUKLYZ�ÅVVKLK�[OL�PZSHUK��[OL`�looted war-damaged buildings and unguarded property.35 It soon became common for the Taiwanese to refer to [OL�1HWHULZL�HZ�L_WSVP[H[P]L�ºKVNZ»��and to the mainland Chinese as greedy and uncultured pigs. The Taiwanese JVTWSHPULK�[OH[�MVY�L]LY`�ZOPWSVHK�VM�commodities that left the ports they YLJLP]LK�PU�YL[\YU�VUS`�H�ZOPWSVHK�VM�greedy mainlanders.�� American diplomat .LVYNL�2LYY�VќLYZ�JV\U[SLZZ�HULJKV[LZ�of atrocities committed by mainlanders upon the Taiwanese population. Yet what becomes clear from these stories is not only the social and political schism in Taiwan at this time, but also a deep-seated corruption among the ruling class. Chinese mainlanders in both high

VѝJPHS�WVZP[PVUZ�HUK�SV^�SL]LS�TPSP[HY`�ranks drained Taiwan of its economic potential through dishonest leadership and maladministration.

General Albert Wedemeyer, a United :[H[LZ�(YT`�JVTTHUKLY�^OV�ZLY]LK�

PU�(ZPH�K\YPUN�>VYSK�>HY�00��WYV]PKLZ�H�JVUKLTUPUN�]PL^�VM�*OPULZL�UH[PVUHSPZ[�Y\SL�PU�[OL�^HRL�VM�[OL�-LIY\HY`��0UJPKLU[��6U�(\N\Z[�� OL�reported to Secretary of State George 4HYZOHSS�VU�[OL�Z[H[L�VM�*OPULZL�Y\SL�PU�Taiwan, and his discussion stresses the Chinese nationalists’ blame in causing the economic ruin and political chaos [OH[�SLK�[V�[OL�-LIY\HY`��0UJPKLU[��/L�L_WSHPUZ�[OL�MVSSV^PUN!

“The Central Government

[of the Republic of China] lost a

ÄUL� VWWVY[\UP[`� [V� PUKPJH[L� [V� [OL�Chinese people and to the world

at large its capability to provide

OVULZ[�HUK�LѝJPLU[�HKTPUPZ[YH[PVU¯Chen [Yi] and his henchmen

ruthlessly, corruptly and avariciously

imposed their regime upon a happy

HUK� HTLUHISL� WVW\SH[PVU¯B[OL�Taiwanese] fear that the Central

Government contemplates bleeding

their island to support the tottering

and corrupt Nanking machine and I

think their fears are well founded.”37

Later in his report, he mentions the abundance of natural resources on the PZSHUK�HUK�[OL�WYL]PV\ZS`�PTWYLZZP]L�record of Taiwan’s commercial production.

>LKLTL`LY»Z�]PL^�PU�OPZ�YLWVY[�is of twofold importance. First, he describes that the Taiwanese population is not distressed due to a lack of independence, but rather primarily because of the economic ruin that has WSHN\LK�[OLPY�JV\U[Y �̀�4VU[OZ�HM[LY�[OL�L]LU[��>LKLTL`LY�PU[LYWYL[LK�[OL�THPU�concern in Taiwan as economic more so than political. Second, he argues that the Taiwanese unrest that was brought to the world stage was a direct result of the incapability of Chinese leadership to sustain the island’s economy. He points to the economic potential of Taiwan as a nation, and denounces the Chinese


¸*OPULZL�THPUSHUKLYZ�PU�IV[O�OPNO�VɉJPHS�positions and low-level military ranks drained

Taiwan of its economic potential through

dishonest leadership and maladministration.”

472013Fall

nationalists for wasting that potential.(UV[OLY�(TLYPJHU�WLYZWLJ[P]L�VM�

[OL�[YV\ISLZ�PU�;HP^HU�PZ�WYV]PKLK�PU�HU�article published in The New York Times VU�4HYJO�� LU[P[SLK�¸-VYTVZHU�Rebellion is Quieted by Chinese .V]LYUVY»Z�7YVTPZLZ�¹�0U�[OL�HY[PJSL��columnist Tillman Durdin describes the [LUZL�ZP[\H[PVU�PU�;HP^HU�V]LY�[OL�^LLR�[OH[�MVSSV^LK�[OL�-LIY\HY`��0UJPKLU[��and corroborates Wedemeyer’s opinion. Referencing the 32 Demands and .V]LYUVY�.LULYHS�*OLU�@P»Z�¸WYVTPZL�[V�VYNHUPaL�H�QVPU[�2\VTPU[HUN�TPSP[HY`�JP]PSPHU�PUX\PY`�IVHYK�[V�PU]LZ[PNH[L�causes of Formosans’ clashes with ºV\[ZPKLYZ»�¹�+\YKPU�H[[LTW[Z�[V�WYV]PKL�information on a still-unclear situation in Taiwan.�� He then goes on to calm the American sentiment that the Taiwanese rebellion may be addressed towards the United States, because America OHK�VќLYLK�HPK�[V�[OL�9LW\ISPJ�VM�*OPUH�through the United Nations Relief and 9LOHIPSP[H[PVU�(KTPUPZ[YH[PVU��<599(��He explains that these fears are unfounded, saying that local assurances indicate that the uprising had no anti-MVYLPNU�TV[P]L��0UZ[LHK��[OL�YLILSSPVU�^HZ�due solely to the economic corruption of [OL�SVJHS�NV]LYUTLU[�PU�;HP^HU!

“Reliable informants said the

open revolt started when Chinese

authorities, who have been

clamping on economic controls,

ZLHYJOLK�MVY�ZT\NNSLK�JPNHYL[[LZ¯[The Taiwanese] labeled the

Chinese administration ‘a corrupt

bureaucracy’ that had strangled

the formerly prosperous island with

monopolistic controls over industry

and commerce.”39

Like General Wedemeyer’s opinion in The China White Papers, Durdin’s analysis of the situation in Taiwan demonstrates two important [OPUNZ�HIV\[�[OL�]PL^Z�JVUJLYUPUN�[OL�\WYPZPUN��-PYZ[��[OL�VYPNPUHS�TV[P]L�VM�[OL�YL]VS[�^HZ�JOPLÅ �̀�PM�UV[�JVTWSL[LS �̀�economic distress. He does not phrase his summary of the situation in words VUL�^V\SK�ÄUK�PU�KLZJYPW[PVUZ�VM�V[OLY�JV\U[YPLZ�\UKLYNVPUN�KLJVSVUPaH[PVU��where political independence and social inferiority were the primary reasons to YL]VS[��:LJVUK��PU�[OL�^LLR�MVSSV^PUN�the incident, Durdin certainly sees the economic distress – at least through Taiwanese eyes – as an immediate result of corruption among the Chinese nationalists.

Though not completely JVTWYLOLUZP]L�HUK�ºMHPY»�[V�[OL�Chinese nationalists, both General >LKLTL`LY�HUK�;̀ SLY�+\YKPU�JVU]L`�HU�understanding of the situation in Taiwan after the uprising that is common among OPZ[VYPHUZ�WHZ[�HUK�WYLZLU[��:WLJPÄJHSS �̀�they see the cause of the economic woes in Taiwan, and thus the ensuing incident, as results of the Chinese 5H[PVUHS�.V]LYUTLU[»Z�MH\S[Z��;OV\NO�[OLZL�]PL^Z�HYL�[OVZL�VM�(TLYPJHUZ�PUZ\SH[LK�MYVT�[OL�JVUÅPJ[��[OL`�HYL�JSVZL�

[V�[OL�L]LU[�PU�[PTL��;OPZ�WLYZWLJ[P]L�PZ�thus crucial to understanding the causes HUK�LќLJ[Z�VM�[OL�-LIY\HY`��0UJPKLU[��Economic mismanagement on the part VM�[OL�2\VTPU[HUN�^HZ�UV[�[OL�VUS`�cause of the uprising, but it was certainly a critical factor.

The Post World War II Context of Taiwan

A third source of Taiwan’s economic downturn can be attributed to the context of the end of World War II. In a sense, this factor made much of the economic causes of the February ��0UJPKLU[�YH[OLY�\UH]VPKHISL��;OL�Chinese nationalists inherited an industrial infrastructure that was worn down from the demands of the 1HWHULZL�^HY�LќVY[�� Allied bombing VM�[OL�PZSHUK�K\YPUN�[OL�^HY�KL]HZ[H[LK�industrial facilities, and to make matters worse, work on repairs of damaged areas ceased upon Japan’s surrender as Japanese technical experts and managers returned home.��:[L]LU�Phillips maintains that “in such a ZP[\H[PVU��HU`�NV]LYUTLU[�^V\SK�OH]L�OHK�H�KPѝJ\S[�[PTL�THUHNPUN�[OL�PZSHUK»Z�YLZV\YJLZ�¹�� It also certainly did not OLSW�[OH[�[OLYL�^HZ�H�KYHTH[PJ�KPќLYLUJL�in the economic power of Japan and the Republic of China while they ruled Taiwan. Since the end of the Sino-1HWHULZL�>HY�PU�� ^OPJO�LUHISLK�Japan to annex Taiwan, the island nation was no longer tied to a chaotic and crumbling China, but became part of an


JUIS48

increasingly powerful and economically KL]LSVWLK�1HWHU�� In contrast, the mainland economy of the Republic VM�*OPUH�Z[Y\NNSLK�OLH]PS`�K\YPUN�P[Z�YLJV]LY`�MYVT�>VYSK�>HY�00��*VSK�War competition with its communist neighbors and expenses in the Second Sino-Japanese War hindered the Republic of China’s ability to support Taiwan’s economy.��

;OL�OVYYPÄJ�LJVUVTPJ�JVUKP[PVUZ�PU�;HP^HU�JHTL�[V�H�OLHK�PU�LHYS`�� 6U�[OL�L]LUPUN�VM�-LIY\HY`��ZP_�WVSPJL�VѝJLYZ�H[[LTW[LK�[V�HYYLZ[�H�^VTHU�selling cigarettes illegally in Taipei. After a policeman struck the woman, an angry JYV^K�NH[OLYLK�HUK�]PVSLUJL�IYVRL�V\[�HM[LY�HU�VѝJLY�ÄYLK�OPZ�^LHWVU��killing a bystander.�� The next day, 2,000 to 3,000 Taiwanese marched to [OL�4VUVWVS`�)\YLH\�/LHKX\HY[LYZ��HUK�O\UKYLKZ�TV]LK�VU�[V�.V]LYUVY�.LULYHS�*OLU�@P»Z�VѝJL��)LZPKLZ�[OL�beating and shooting, what the islanders protested was not political dependence on foreign rule necessarily, but rather \ULTWSV`TLU[��MVVK�ZOVY[HNLZ��PUÅH[PVU��and corruption.�� That afternoon either H�ZVSKPLY�VY�WVSPJL�VѝJLY�ÄYLK�PU[V�[OL�crowd, sparking an island-wide uprising against police, soldiers, bureaucrats, and any mainlander unfortunate enough to be on the streets. It was in the wake VM�[OPZ�KPZHZ[LY�[OH[�THU`�KPќLYLU[�Taiwanese groups used the opportunity JYLH[LK�I`�[OL�[LTWVYHY`�WV^LY�]HJ\\T�to pursue their own agendas, which included the traditional demands of a JVSVUPaLK�WVW\SH[PVU�¶�PUKLWLUKLUJL��self-determination, and the like.��

>P[OPU�H�^LLR�VM�[OL�-LIY\HY`��Incident, there was an immediate outcry against the Chinese nationalist regime. 6U�4HYJO��H�:L[[SLTLU[�*VTTP[[LL�composed of senior economic and professional men on the island, WYLZLU[LK�[V�.V]LYUVY�.LULYHS�*OLU�@P�a petition known as the 32 Demands.�� This list of demands, grouped into six general categories, appealed not for HU�V]LY[OYV^�VM�[OL�*OPULZL�UH[PVUHSPZ[�NV]LYUTLU[��I\[�YH[OLY�H�YLMVYT�VM�their policies. For instance, it insisted [OH[�¸[OL�6ѝJL�VM�.V]LYUVY�.LULYHS�ZOHSS�IL�YLVYNHUPaLK�I`�[OL�:L[[SLTLU[�Committee…so that righteous and able VѝJLYZ�JHU�IL�HWWVPU[LK�¹� Items such as these called for continued Chinese UH[PVUHSPZ[�PU]VS]LTLU[�PU�NV]LYUTLU[��HUK�H�YLTV]HS�VM�[OL�THSHKTPUPZ[YH[PVU�that had contributed to the uprising. The demands also included a reduction in taxes, the reduction of state interference PU�PUK\Z[YPLZ��[OL�HK]LU[�VM�H�*VTTP[[LL�for Inspecting Public Enterprises to WYL]LU[�JVYY\W[PVU��[OL�HIVSP[PVU�VM�[OL�4VUVWVS`�HUK�;YHKPUN�)\YLH\Z��HUK�repayment for lost wealth from exported sugar and food.50 Thus, perhaps Z\YWYPZPUNS �̀�[OL��+LTHUKZ�VќLYLK�more relaxed appeals than may be ZLLU�PU�V[OLY�JV\U[YPLZ»�KLJVSVUPaH[PVU�LќVY[Z��;OL�;HP^HULZL�KLTHUKLK�UV[�H�M\SS�ÅLKNLK�JOHUNL�PU�YLNPTL��I\[�YH[OLY�[OL�YLVYNHUPaH[PVU�VM�NV]LYUTLU[�policies, largely economic, that caused the conditions that led to the February ��0UJPKLU[�

0U�� `LHYZ�HM[LY�[OL�\WYPZPUN��columnist Han Lih-wu published an

article in Taiwan Today, a weekly newspaper based in Taipei, about the interconnectedness of the Taiwanese population, the Chinese nationalists, HUK�[OL�WYL]PV\Z�1HWHULZL�JVSVUPaLYZ��His discussion is remarkably non-WHY[PZHU��HUK�WYV]PKLZ�H�]PL^�VM�[OL�-LIY\HY`��0UJPKLU[�[OH[�WVPU[Z�[V�[OL�complexities and contingencies of the Taiwanese situation. Lih-wu argues [OH[�¸K\L�JYLKP[�ZOV\SK�IL�NP]LU�[V�[OL�1HWHULZL�MVY�[OLPY�HJOPL]LTLU[Z�K\YPUN�their occupation of Taiwan…[because] a general foundation had been well laid in local economy…[and] life was YLN\SH[LK��Z[HISL�HUK�MHPY�¹51 He attributes the ensuing economic downturn on the stresses that World War II brought upon the island. As a result of the war, “Taiwan was at its low ebb when returned to the *OPULZL�UH[PVUHS�MVSK¹�¶�UV[�VUS`�^HZ�the economy’s infrastructure crippled, but the Taiwanese people were used [V�ILPUN�ZLY]PSL�Z\IQLJ[Z�52 The need [V�ÄUK�LUV\NO�[YHPULK�WLYZVUULS�HM[LY�1HWHULZL�^P[OKYH^HS�^HZ�HNNYH]H[LK�I`�[OL�*OPULZL�NV]LYUTLU[»Z�WYVISLTZ�on the mainland, and ultimately, the WYVISLT�VM�NV]LYUPUN�;HP^HU�^HZ�UV[�[VV�T\JO�NV]LYUTLU[�JLU[YHSPaH[PVU��but rather a shortage of people with Z\ѝJPLU[�L_WLYPLUJL�HUK�\UKLYZ[HUKPUN��¸^OPJO�JHTL�^P[O�`LHYZ�VM�ZLY]P[\KL¹�[V�the Japanese.53

Later in the article, Lih-wu speaks rather well of the Chinese nationalists’ LќVY[Z��ZH`PUN�[OH[�^OPSL�[OL�NV]LYUTLU[�had good intentions and honest purposes, “there were bound to be petty opportunists and unscrupulous


492013Fall

WVSP[PJPHUZ�¹�)\[�YLNHYKSLZZ�VM�[OL�]PVSLUJL�HUK�JVUÅPJ[�PU�� ;HP^HU�^HZ�THRPUN�H�X\PJR�YLJV]LY �̀�L]LU�compared to the mainland and other ^HY�HќLJ[LK�HYLHZ�PU�[OL�-HY�,HZ[�� He declares that Taiwan is no longer a JVSVU`�I\[�HU�¸PZSHUK�MVY[YLZZ¹�[OH[�OHZ�forged on through hard times. Just as both the Japanese colonists and the *OPULZL�5H[PVUHS�.V]LYUTLU[�ZL[�;HP^HU�up for economic failure and the ensuing \WYPZPUN��[OLZL�WHY[PLZ��^P[O�[OL�HK]LU[�VM�[OL�UL^�7YV]PUJPHS�.V]LYUTLU[��ZL[�[OL�PZSHUK�\W�[V�ÅV\YPZO��/L�NVLZ�VU�[V�explain that this unlikely and unintended cooperation between the Japanese, Chinese, and Taiwanese laid the foundations for the island to ultimately gain self-rule.55

It is important to take Lih-wu’s JOHYHJ[LYPaH[PVU�VM�;HP^HU�PU�� ^P[O�H�IP[�VM�ZRLW[PJPZT��6U�4H`�� *OHPYTHU�VM�[OL�5H[PVUHS�.V]LYUTLU[�VM�[OL�9LW\ISPJ�VM�*OPUH��*OPHUN�2HP�Shek, declared martial law in Taiwan, ÔPJO�L_[LUKLK�\U[PS�� ;OPZ�period of strict political suppression HUK�WYVZLJ\[PVU�VM�VWWVZP[PVU��YLHS�VY�WLYJLP]LK��[V�[OL�2\VTPU[HUN�^HZ�known as the White Terror. Thus, Lih-wu’s ability to speak out against the 5H[PVUHS�.V]LYUTLU[�^HZ�\UKV\I[LKS`�SPTP[LK��5L]LY[OLSLZZ��OL�VќLYZ�THU`�critical insights into the period of transition from Japanese to Chinese rule PU�;HP^HU��/PZ�HY[PJSL�JVU]L`Z�THU`�VM�[OL�]HYPV\Z�]PL^Z�VU�Ô`�[OL�[YHUZP[PVU�PU�[OL�SH[L�� Z�^HZ�ZV�KPѝJ\S[��/L�THRLZ�JSLHY�[OH[�[OL�-LIY\HY`��Incident was not caused by any single

facet, but was rather a combination of a number of economic contexts – namely, post-World War II economic distress in both mainland China and the island of Taiwan itself, the remnants VM�1HWHU»Z�JVSVUPaH[PVU�[OH[�SPTP[LK�the preparedness of the Taiwanese to YL]P]L�[OLPY�LJVUVT �̀�HUK�[OL�*OPULZL�nationalists’ mismanagement of the island’s economic, political, and societal situation. In fact, concerning the bright economic future of Taiwan, Lih-wu was certainly right. Taiwan’s remarkable KL]LSVWTLU[�PU[V�H�Z\IZ[HU[PHS�,HZ[�Asian economic power would be largely due to international aid – particularly MYVT�[OL�<UP[LK�:[H[LZ�¶�V]LY�[OL�KLJHKLZ�MVSSV^PUN�[OL�-LIY\HY`��Incident. Taiwan’s swift economic KL]LSVWTLU[�HM[LY�[OL�� Z�PZ�RUVÛ�[V�THU`�HZ�[OL�¸;HP^HU�TPYHJSL�¹�)Y\JL�*\TPUNZ�LTWOHZPaLZ�[OH[�[OL�MV\UKH[PVU�for Taiwan’s economic growth in the � ��Z�^HZ�\S[PTH[LS`�LZ[HISPZOLK�PU�[OL�� Z��HNYLLPUN�ÔVSLOLHY[LKS`�^P[O�Lih-wu.��

Conclusion0[�PZ�PTWVY[HU[�[V�YLJVNUPaL�[OL�

MHJ[�[OH[�[HRPUN�H�W\YLS`�LJVUVTPJ�]PL^�VM�[OL�-LIY\HY`��0UJPKLU[�KVLZ�UV[�NP]L�[OL�M\SS�WPJ[\YL�VM�[OL�WYVISLTZ�VM�KLJVSVUPaH[PVU�PU�;HP^HU��;OLYL�HYL�]LY`�ÄUL�SPULZ�HUK�H�NYL`�HYLH�IL[^LLU�economic, social, and political problems VM�[OL�KLJVSVUPaH[PVU�LYH��HUK�VM[LU�P[�PZ�KPѝJ\S[�[V�ZLWHYH[L�VUL�MYVT�[OL�V[OLY��5L]LY[OLSLZZ��[OL�OPZ[VY`�VM�;HP^HU��HZ�^LSS�HZ�[OL�L]LU[Z�Z\YYV\UKPUN�the incident itself seems to point to

economic problems as a crucial factor PU�[OL�-LIY\HY`��0UJPKLU[��.LVYNL�2LYY�NVLZ�ZV�MHY�HZ�[V�ZH`�V\[YPNO[�[OH[�Chen Yi’s economic policies based on ¸5LJLZZHY`�:[H[L�:VJPHSPZT¹�^LYL�[OL�\S[PTH[L�JH\ZLZ�VM�[OL�� YLILSSPVU�� :PTPSHYS �̀�:[L]LU�7OPSSPWZ�ZWLUKZ�T\JO�time discussing the two economic transitions that Taiwan was facing in late � ��!�[OL�TV]LTLU[Z�MYVT�1HWHULZL�[V�*OPULZL�ZVJPL[HS�PUÅ\LUJL��HUK�MYVT�^HY[PTL�TVIPSPaH[PVU�[V�WLHJL[PTL�reconstruction.��4VYLV]LY��WVSP[PJHS�NYPL]HUJLZ��[OV\NO�ÄLYJLS`�WYLZLU[�after the uprising, seem to be much TVYL�Z\I[SL�WYPVY�[V�[OL�L]LU[��;OL�]HZ[�THQVYP[`�VM�[OL�;HP^HULZL�¶�\W�[V��percent – were rural folk who played no role in the uprising. Of the remaining 20 percent, only a fraction played little if any role, and of those who participated, only ZVTL�OHK�ZLYPV\Z�WVSP[PJHS�NYPL]HUJLZ�� In A Tragic Beginning, the authors state [OH[�[OLYL�PZ�UV�JVTWLSSPUN�L]PKLUJL�that the uprising was deliberately VYNHUPaLK�I`�;HP^HULZL�ÔV�WSHUULK�[V�[\YU�;HP^HU�PU[V�H�ZLWHYH[L��ZV]LYLPNU�nation.�� Ultimately, of the problems facing Chen Yi’s administration, none was more serious than the economic crisis.

In studying the complicated and deep-rooted economic issues that WSHN\LK�;HP^HU�HM[LY�KLJVSVUPaH[PVU��P[�ZOV\SK�IL�LTWOHZPaLK�[OH[�[OLZL�problems did not stem from any one source. Rather, they were the combination of an unsustainable Taiwanese economic infrastructure created by Japanese colonists, Chinese


JUIS50

nationalists’ mismanagement of their newfound territory, and the general economically debilitating post-World War II context. Thus, to focus only on one of [OLZL�JH\ZLZ�KVLZ�UV[�NP]L�H�JVTWSL[L�picture of the situation in Taiwan. Though the Taiwanese often look back ^P[O�UVZ[HSNPH�H[�1HWHULZL�Y\SL��)Y\JL�Cumings’ argument that the Japanese LYH�^HZ�TVYL�TVKLYUPaH[PVU�[OHU�JVSVUPaH[PVU�PZ�H�ZVTL^OH[�Z\WLYÄJPHS�]PL �̂�)V[O�YLNPTLZ�^LYL�L_WSVP[H[P]L�PU�their own manner, and each contributed [V�;HP^HU»Z�LJVUVTPJ�KPZHZ[LY�PU�KPќLYLU[�ways. On the other hand, American WLYZWLJ[P]LZ�MYVT�.LVYNL�2LYY��.LULYHS�Albert Wedemeyer, and columnist Tillman Durdin, insist that Taiwan was a ¸JSLHU�ZSH[L¹�MVY�[OL�*OPULZL�UH[PVUHSPZ[Z��and “under proper management B;HP^HU»ZD�TVKLYU�LJVUVT`�JV\SK�OH]L�been made to generate great surpluses needed in the rehabilitation program for China proper."��;OPZ�]PL �̂�[VV��tends to look at the Taiwanese problem VUS`�H[�H�Z\YMHJL�SL]LS��5LP[OLY�VќLYZ�H�JVTWYLOLUZP]L�\UKLYZ[HUKPUN��HUK�IV[O�omit fundamental aspects of Taiwan’s KLJVSVUPaH[PVU�

The mid-20th century brought ^P[O�P[�H�^H]L�VM�KLJVSVUPaH[PVU�[OH[�WHZZLK�V]LY�ULHYS`�[OL�LU[PYL�NSVIL�HUK�tore down long-established Empires. While economic conditions played a SHYNL�YVSL�PU�KLJVSVUPaH[PVU��THU`�^LYL�sparked by the worldwide emergence of concepts such as human rights and ZLSM�KL[LYTPUH[PVU��;HP^HU�OV^L]LY��^HZ�not a typical case. Instead of political PKLVSVNPLZ�ZW\YYPUN�[OL�YLHSPaH[PVU�VM�

economic oppression, in Taiwan it was the other way around. Although not formally a colony under the Chinese Nationalists, Taiwan experienced the direct consequences of a ruined economy that are characteristic of JVSVUPaH[PVU��;OL�MHJ[�[OH[�[OLZL�economic conditions were at their height WYLJLKPUN�[OL�-LIY\HY`��0UJPKLU[�^HZ�no coincidence – it was the true cause of the uprising. Consequently, it was not until after the uprising that many political demands became public. The forum for political independence, formerly underground, was thus drawn to the surface, and Taiwan’s course of history was permanently altered.

Endnotes1. Phillips, Steven E. Between Assimilation and

Independence: The Taiwanese Encounter Nationalist China, 1945-1950. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2003, 4.

2. Ho, Sam P. S. Economic Development of ;HP^HU�� 5L^�/H]LU!�@HSL�<7��1978, 9.

3. Phillips, 3.

4. Ho, 26.

5. Philips, 18.

6. Ibid., 18.

��*\TPUNZ��)Y\JL��*VSVUPHS�-VYTH[PVUZ�HUK�+LMVYTH[PVUZ!�2VYLH��;HP^HU�HUK�=PL[UHT��+LJVSVUPaH[PVU!�7LYZWLJ[P]LZ�MYVT�5V^�and Then. Ed. Prasenjit Duara. London: Routledge, 2004, 279.

8. Ibid., 287.

9. Ho, 101.

10. Ibid., 63.

11. Ibid., 80.

12. Phillips, 19.

13. Ibid., 19.

14. Ibid., 17.

15. Ho, 102.

��@P��*OLU��(WWLUKP_�)��.V]LYUVY�.LULYHS�*O»LU�0�Z�9HKPV�:WLLJO�VU�+LJLTILY�� (�;YHNPJ�)LNPUUPUN!�;OL�;HP^HU�Uprising of February 28, 1947. By Zehan Lai, Ramon Hawley Myers, and E, Wei. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1991, 201.

��@P��

��2LYY��.LVYNL�/��-VYTVZH�)L[YH`LK��)VZ[VU!�/V\NO[VU�4PўPU��

19. Cumings, 290.

20. Phillips, 65.

21. Lai, Zehan, Ramon Hawley Myers, and E. Wei. A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1991, 84.

22. Ibid., 87.

��2LYY��

24. Ibid., 109.

25. Ibid., 141.

26. Ibid., 141.

27. Ibid., 179.

28. Ibid., 126.

29. Ibid., 140.

30. Ibid., 141.

31. Ibid., 127.

32. Ibid., 141.

33. Ibid., 67.

34. Ibid., 74.

35. Ibid., 98.

36. Ibid., 128.

��>LKLTL`LY��(SILY[�*��-VYTVZH��;OL�*OPUH�White Paper August 1949. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1949, 309.

��+\YKPU��;PSSTHU��-VYTVZHU�9LILSSPVU�0Z�8\PL[LK�)`�*OPULZL�.V]LYUVY�Z�7YVTPZLZ��;OL�5L^�@VYR�;PTLZ��4HY�� !��ProQuest Historical Newspapers. Web. 26 Apr. 2013.

39. Ibid.

40. Lai, 80.

41. Phillips, 65.

42. Ibid., 65.

44. Ibid., 7.

45. Ibid., 32.

46. Ibid., 75.


512013Fall

47. Ibid., 75.

48. Ibid., 76.

� ��2LYY��

50. Ibid., 477.

51. Ibid., 478-9.

��3PO�^\��/HU��(WWLUKP_��/HU�3PO�^\��;HP^HU�;VKH �̀�-VYTVZH�<UKLY�*OPULZL�Nationalist Rule. By Fred Warren. Riggs. New @VYR!�4HJTPSSHU��

53. Ibid., 174.

54. Ibid., 175.

55. Ibid., 175.

56. Ibid., 182.

57. Cumings, 286.

��2LYY��

59. Phillips, 65.

60. Lai, 7.

61. Lai, 80.

Bibliography*\TPUNZ��)Y\JL��*VSVUPHS�-VYTH[PVUZ�HUK�

+LMVYTH[PVUZ!�2VYLH��;HP^HU�HUK�=PL[UHT��Decolonization: Perspectives from Now and Then. Ed. Prasenjit Duara. London: Routledge, 2004.

+\YKPU��;PSSTHU��-VYTVZHU�9LILSSPVU�0Z�8\PL[LK�)`�*OPULZL�.V]LYUVY�Z�7YVTPZLZ��The New York Times 4 Mar. 1947: 14. ProQuest Historical Newspapers. Web. 26 Apr. 2013.

-HUVU��-YHU[a��The Wretched of the Earth. Trans. 9PJOHYK�7OPSJV_��5L^�@VYR!�.YV]L��

Ho, Sam P. S. Economic Development of Taiwan, �� 5L^�/H]LU!�@HSL�<7��

2LYY��.LVYNL�/� Formosa Betrayed. Boston: /V\NO[VU�4PўPU��

Lai, Zehan, Ramon Hawley Myers, and E. Wei. A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of -LIY\HY`�� Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1991.

3PO�^\��/HU��(WWLUKP_��/HU�3PO�^\��;HP^HU�;VKH �̀�Formosa Under Chinese Nationalist Rule. )`�-YLK�>HYYLU��9PNNZ��5L^�@VYR!�Macmillan, 1952.

Phillips, Steven E. Between Assimilation and Independence: The Taiwanese Encounter Nationalist China, 1945-1950. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2003.

:L[[SLTLU[�*VTTP[[LL��(WWLUKP_�(��;OL�;OPY[`�;̂ V�+LTHUKZ��Formosa Betrayed. By George H. Kerr. )VZ[VU!�/V\NO[VU�4PўPU��1965.


>LKLTL`LY��(SILY[�*��-VYTVZH� The China White Paper August 1949. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1949.

@P��*OLU��(WWLUKP_�*��.V]LYUVY�.LULYHS�*OLU�@P�Z�9HKPV�:WLLJO��A Tragic Beginning: The ;HP^HU�<WYPZPUN�VM�-LIY\HY`�� By Zehan Lai, Ramon Hawley Myers, and E, Wei. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1991.

JUIS52

OPZ�HY[PJSL�JVUZPKLYZ�[OL�WYL]HPSPUN�HYN\TLU[�[OH[�KLTVJYHJPLZ�^P[OPU�T\S[P�L[OUPJ�ZVJPL[PLZ��PUJS\KPUN�0UKPH��HYL�THQVYP[HYPHU�NV]LYUTLU[Z��ÔLYL�PUZ[P[\[PVUHSPaLK�KPZJYPTPUH[PVU�ILJVTLZ�SPRLS �̀�and under a partisan state could degenerate into a mobocracy. Examined is the current debate Z\YYV\UKPUN�0UKPHU�7YPTL�4PUPZ[LYPHS�JHUKPKH[L�5HYLUKYH�4VKP��;OPZ�WHWLY�HKKYLZZLZ�[OL�X\LZ[PVU�

VM�ÔL[OLY�VY�UV[�H�/PUK\�UH[PVUHSPZ[�Z\JO�HZ�4VKP�PZ�HU�LSLJ[VYHSS`�]PHISL�JOVPJL�^P[OPU�H�T\S[P�J\S[\YHS��T\S[P�MHP[O��and multi-lingual state such as India.

;OLYL�PZ�H�WYL]HPSPUN�HYN\TLU[�[OH[�democracies within multi-ethnic societies HYL�H[�ILZ[�THQVYP[HYPHU�NV]LYUTLU[Z�PU�ÔPJO�PUZ[P[\[PVUHSPaLK�KPZJYPTPUH[PVU�PZ�SPRLS �̀�>OPSL�ZVTL�L]LU�HYN\L�THQVYP[HYPHU�NV]LYUTLU[Z�JHU�WV[LU[PHSS`�collapse into a mobocracy under a partisan administration, in which the state becomes complicit of mass terror PUÅPJ[LK�\WVU�YLSPNPV\Z�TPUVYP[PLZ�1 India, a nation where majoritarianism remains the norm, regardless of the political party in power, is certainly no exception to this rule. For this reason there is quite a heated debate currently surrounding 0UKPHU�7YPTL�4PUPZ[LYPHS�JHUKPKH[L�5HYLUKYH�4VKP��UHTLS`�V]LY�ÔL[OLY�H�/PUK\�UH[PVUHSPZ[�Z\JO�HZ�4VKP�PZ�L]LU�HU�HWWYVWYPH[L�VY�LSLJ[VYHSS`�]PHISL�choice within a multi-cultural, multi-faith, and multi-lingual state such as India.

This electoral debate emerged MVSSV^PUN�4VKP»Z�YLJLU[�HWWVPU[TLU[�HZ�

OLHK�VM�[OL�)OHYH[P`H�1HUH[H�7HY[`��)17��opposition campaign in the general LSLJ[PVUZ�PU��4VZ[�HYN\TLU[Z�PU�Z\WWVY[�VM�4VKP�OH]L�MVJ\ZLK�VU�OPZ�LJVUVTPJ�HJOPL]LTLU[Z�HZ�*OPLM�4PUPZ[LY�VM�.\QHYH[��/L�OHZ�\UKV\I[LKS`�become the epitome of economic growth following the immense success of the northwestern state of Gujarat during his administration. Therefore the JVU[LU[PV\Z�PZZ\LZ�Z\YYV\UKPUN�4VKP�HYL�JOPLÅ`�WVSP[PJHS��^P[O�THU`�^VYYPLK�that his potential ascendance to a role in national politics challenges the ]LY`�PKLH�VM�HU�0UKPH�PU�ÔPJO�KP]LYZP[`�ZOV\SK�IL�YLJVNUPaLK�2�4HU`�MLHY�[OH[�PM�4VKP�ILJVTLZ�7YPTL�4PUPZ[LY�OL�will employ his position of dominant WV^LY�HUK�PUÅ\LUJL�[V�W\YZ\L�H�WVSPJ`�of assimilation towards religious and SPUN\PZ[PJ�TPUVYP[PLZ��PUZ[LHK�VM�Z[YP]PUN�MVY�W\ISPJ�WVSPJPLZ�[OH[�LTIYHJL�KP]LYZP[`�and integration.

For this reason, this central electoral debate has elicited many important political questions related to the state of 0UKPHU�WVSP[PJZ��PUJS\KPUN�ÔL[OLY!�0UKPH�should follow a French or American model of secularism, what the role of group identities should be, and whether TPUVYP[`�NYV\WZ�ZOV\SK�IL�HќVYKLK�ZWLJPHS�YPNO[Z�HIV]L�[OL�LZ[HISPZOLK�PUKP]PK\HS�YPNO[Z�VM�HSS�JP[PaLUZ��;OLZL�concerns are certainly not unrealistic LP[OLY��HZ�/PUK\�UH[PVUHSPZ[Z�OH]L�HS^H`Z�sought a European style of nationhood predicated upon a notion of uniformity as opposed to integration.3�;O\Z��4VKP»Z�Hindu nationalist platform seems to JVUÅPJ[�^P[O�TVKLYU�0UKPHU�ZLJ\SHYPZT��which was essentially founded on the political compromise that neither the majority nor the minority should feel its YPNO[Z�ILJVTPUN�Z\IZLY]PLU[�[V�HUV[OLY��4VKLYU�0UKPHU�ZLJ\SHYPZT�PUZPZ[Z�[OH[�[OL�NV]LYUTLU[�YLTHPU�LX\HSS`�KPZ[HU[�MYVT�

Undifferentiated Citizenship for All, and All for One United India

by Nina Assadi

Nina Assadi. 5PUH�(ZZHKP�PZ�HU�\UKLYNYHK\H[L�Z[\KLU[�VM�7VSP[PJHS�:JPLUJL�H[�[OL�<UP]LYZP[`�VM�*HSPMVYUPH��)LYRLSL �̀�:OL�PZ�J\YYLU[S`�PU�OLY�MV\Y[O�`LHY�VM�Z[\K �̀�ZWLJPHSPaPUN�PU�PU[LYUH[PVUHS�HUK�JVTWHYH[P]L�WVSP[PJZ��HUK�WSHUZ�[V�H[[LUK�SH^�ZJOVVS�MVSSV^PUN�NYHK\H[PVU�PU�VYKLY�[V�W\YZ\L�OLY�WHZZPVU�for public interest law.

T

532013Fall

by Nina Assadi

all religions. After all, group identities OH]L�ILJVTL�ZV�LU[YLUJOLK�^P[OPU�Indian society, since the time of Partition [OH[�P[�OHZ�ZPUJL�ILLU�[OL�WYL]HPSPUN�notion within national politics to protect group religious identities as paramount [V�LќLJ[P]LS`�NV]LYUPUN�H�KLTVJYH[PJ�India.

.P]LU�[OL�ZPNUPÄJHUJL�VM�NYV\W�identities within India, there is some debate as to whether a Hindu nationalist Z\JO�HZ�4VKP�PZ�L]LU�HU�LSLJ[VYHSS`�]PHISL�JOVPJL�YLNHYKPUN�[OL�\WJVTPUN��NLULYHS�LSLJ[PVUZ��>OPSL�4VKP»Z�Hindu majoritarian platform may succeed PU�NHS]HUPaPUN�H�SHYNL�WVY[PVU�VM�[OL�electorate, it could also PUHK]LY[LU[S`�WVSHYPaL�[OL�nation, and as a result make him an unacceptable candidate for most non-Congress parties.� This issue becomes salient upon further examination of a few fundamental realities of Indian politics. For example, while small communities can largely be ignored by candidates PU�IPWVSHY�LSLJ[PVUZ��HZ�L_LTWSPÄLK�I`�the case of Gujarat, they become far more consequential once electoral contests become multipolar.5 Therefore 4VKP�PZ�SPRLS`�[V�IL�\UZ\JJLZZM\S�PU�Z[H[LZ�[OH[�WYV]PKL�H�THQVYP[`�VM�[OL�seats to the Lok Sabha because

[OLZL�HYL�Z[H[LZ�^OLYL�4\ZSPTZ�OH]L�ILJVTL�LSLJ[VYHSS`�ZPNUPÄJHU[��LP[OLY�because of their numbers or due to the multipolarity of the party system.��.P]LU�these fundamental realities of Indian politics, and the fact that campaign platforms directed towards economic NYV^[O�OH]L�PU]HYPHIS`�YLHJOLK�H�SPTP[LK�WVY[PVU�VM�[OL�V]LYHSS�LSLJ[VYH[L��THU`�HNYLL�[OH[�4VKP»Z�PTWYLZZP]L�YLJVYK�VM�LJVUVTPJ�KL]LSVWTLU[�KVLZ�UV[�VќZL[�[OL�ULLK�[V�PZZ\L�HU�VѝJPHS�HWVSVN`�regarding the riots that occurred under his administration.� Thus, it is becoming PUJYLHZPUNS`�HWWHYLU[�[OH[�4VKP�T\Z[�[HRL�YLZWVUZPIPSP[`�MVY�[OL�]PVSLUJL�[OH[�

occurred during his administration, implement ideological moderation, and establish a multi-party alliance in order to ILJVTL�H�]PHISL�JHUKPKH[L��

Another important political question [OH[�OHZ�LTLYNLK�PU�[OL�^HRL�VM�4VKP»Z�YLJLU[�HWWVPU[TLU[�HZ�OLHK�VM�[OL�)17�opposition campaign is whether India

should follow a French or American model of secularism, with the former HWWYVHJO�WYLTPZLK�VU�H�¸TLS[PUN�WV[¹�theory of assimilation and the latter WYLTPZLK�VU�H�¸ZHSHK�IV^S¹�[OLVY`�VM�integration. Some argue that the French model would force the minority to assimilate within the majority, essentially commanding a type of cultural OLNLTVU`�PU�^OPJO�PUKP]PK\HS�Z\I�identities would no longer be allowed HUK�JP[PaLUZ�^V\SK�PUZ[LHK�IL�MVYJLK�[V�ILJVTL�¸0UKPHU¹�PU�HU�\UKPќLYLU[PH[LK�way. For this reason there has been mounting support for an American model of secularism, which some argue

allows sub-identities to exist HUK�HJOPL]LZ�\UKPќLYLU[PH[LK�JP[PaLUZOPW��while respecting [OL�PUKP]PK\HS�liberties of each JP[PaLU�10 This OHZ�NP]LU�YPZL�[V�the notion that a ¸ZHSHK�IV^S¹�PZ�

better suited for Indian society because P[�JLSLIYH[LZ�KP]LYZP[`�HUK�WYV]PKLZ�ample political space to religious group identities, such as those of Hindus and 4\ZSPTZ�11

Although some scholars would agree that the United States has HJOPL]LK�H�[LYYPÄJ�IHSHUJL�IL[^LLU�

<UKPќLYLU[PH[LK�*P[PaLUZOPW�MVY�(SS��HUK�(SS�MVY�6UL�<UP[LK�0UKPH��5PUH�(ZZHKP

"...Modi must take responsibility for the violence

that occurred during his administration,

implement a good deal of ideological

moderation, and establish a multi-party alliance

in order to become a viable candidate."

JUIS54

allowing minority groups to make social, economic, and political progress, while remaining strong as a nation,12 others point out that, historically speaking, YLSPNPVU�HZ�H�ZVJPHS�PUZ[P[\[PVU�OHZ�UL]LY�been as deeply rooted within the identity VM�(TLYPJHU�JP[PaLUZ�HZ�P[�OHZ�ILLU�MVY�0UKPHU�JP[PaLUZ��-\Y[OLYTVYL��[OLYL�OHZ�UL]LY�L_PZ[LK�HU`�VWLU�OVZ[PSP[`�IL[^LLU�religion and the state as that which currently exists in India. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that implementing H�¸ZHSHK�IV^S¹�[OLVY`�VM�ZLJ\SHYPZT�SPRL�the American model would hardly yield the same results in India as it did in the United States.

For these reasons, India should not attempt to replicate either a French or American model of secularism in order to acquire national purpose and strength, especially when considering the impracticalities associated with implementing either of these models. Instead, any prime ministerial candidate should be inclined towards the traditional Indian model of secularism, in which the state maintains equal distance from HSS�YLSPNPVUZ�I\[�YLZLY]LZ�[OL�YPNO[�[V�PU[LY]LUL�PU�PZZ\LZ�YLNHYKPUN�YLSPNPVU��if either public order or the personal ZLJ\YP[`�VM�PUKP]PK\HSZ�ILJVTLZ�[OYLH[LULK��:\JO�H�TVKLS�ZLY]LZ�[V�YLJVNUPaL�[OL�PUKP]PK\HS»Z�JVUULJ[PVU�^P[O�YLSPNPVU�HZ�\UPX\LS`�KPќLYLU[�MYVT�[OL�PUKP]PK\HS»Z�YLSH[PVUZOPW�[V�[OL�Z[H[L��,Z[HISPZOPUN�H�Z`Z[LT�VM�\UKPќLYLU[PH[LK�JP[PaLUZOPW��PU�ÔPJO�0UKPHU�ZVJPL[`�would not be forced to become either homogeneous or majoritarian, would HSSV^�MVY�JP[PaLUZ�[V�WLYZVUHSS`�PKLU[PM`�with any group and enjoy many sub-

identities, while at the same time VѝJPHSS`�YLJVNUPaPUN�JP[PaLUZ�HZ�LX\HS�HUK�MYLL�PUKP]PK\HSZ�13�)`�KVPUN�ZV��[OL�NV]LYUTLU[�^V\SK�IL�HISL�[V�HZZ\TL�HU�HJ[P]L�YVSL�PU�IYLHRPUN�KVÛ�KLLWS`�rooted religious group identities that OH]L�JH\ZLK�ZVJPHS�HUK�WVSP[PJHS�KP]PZPVUZ�for decades.

For example, the existence of WLYZVUHS�SH^Z�OH]L�SVUN�ILLU�H�OV[S`�contested issue, because of their [LUKLUJ`�[V�WYP]PSLNL�NYV\W�PKLU[P[PLZ�This contradiction is perhaps best PSS\Z[YH[LK�PU�[OL�JHZL�VM�:OHO�)HUV��ÔLYLI`�[OL�Z[H[L�WYP]PSLNLK�OLY�PKLU[P[`�HZ�H�4\ZSPT�^VTHU�V]LY�OLY�PKLU[P[`�HZ�HU�PUKP]PK\HS�0UKPHU�JP[PaLU��This policy seems to contradict India’s uniform JP]PS�JVKL�HUK�[OL�PKLH�VM�H�SPILYHS�democracy, in which group identities are meant to take a secondary role to [OL�WVSP[PJHS�PKLU[P[`�VM�HU�PUKP]PK\HS��;OVZL�PU�MH]VY�VM�HќVYKPUN�ZWLJPHS�YPNO[Z�to minority groups insist that it leads to redistribution from the majority and [OLYLMVYL�PTWYV]LZ�KPZJYPTPUH[PVU��^LSS�[OVZL�HNHPUZ[�HќVYKPUN�ZWLJPHS�YPNO[Z�[V�minority groups argue it creates political tension within the majority community and weakens inter-caste relations.

While the interests of minority groups should be protected, granted they do not infringe upon the rights of PUKP]PK\HSZ�VY�TPUVYP[PLZ�� group rights ZOV\SK�UV[�IL�NP]LU�NYLH[LY�PTWVY[HUJL�V]LY�PUKP]PK\HS�YPNO[Z��0[�PZ�PTWVZZPISL�[V�ignore the political tension that modern Indian secularism has created between [OL�YPNO[Z�VM�PUKP]PK\HSZ�HUK�[OL�YPNO[Z�of minority groups. This is because HќVYKPUN�ZWLJPHS�YPNO[Z�[V�TPUVYP[`�

NYV\WZ�IHZLK�VU�PKLU[P[`�OHZ�ZL]LYHS�ULNH[P]L�PTWSPJH[PVUZ�MVY�0UKPHU�ZVJPL[`�as a whole. First, imposing additional YLZ[YPJ[PVUZ�MVYJLZ�PUKP]PK\HSZ�[V�LP[OLY�HJJLW[�[OL�Z[H[L»Z�KLÄUP[PVU�VM�[OLPY�MHP[O�VY�[V�LќLJ[P]LS`�YLQLJ[�[OLPY�VÛ�WLYZVUHS�religious beliefs. Thereby restrictions promote a discriminatory framework VM�KPќLYLU[PH[LK�JP[PaLUZOPW�IHZLK�WYPTHYPS`�\WVU�HU�PUKP]PK\HS»Z�HZJYPW[P]L�status.15 Second, any such rights should either be extended or denied to all JP[PaLUZ�LX\HSS �̀�V[OLY^PZL�[OL`�ZLY]L�[V�create resentment within the majority community and worsen communal relations.�� Third, minority rights promote further identity entrenchment. Rather [OHU�ÄNO[PUN�[OH[�ÔPJO�HSYLHK`�L_PZ[Z�I`�promoting the introduction of religious quotas, it ignores the fact that caste JHUUV[�IL�JOHUNLK��\USPRL�YLSPNPVU��4\ZSPTZ�PU�0UKPH�OH]L�UV[�L_WLYPLUJLK�the historical context of discrimination [OH[�6)*Z��6[OLY�)HJR^HYK�*SHZZLZ��OH]L�L_WLYPLUJLK��PU�ÔPJO�Z[H[L�WVSPJ`�was legitimately needed to correct for societal bias.��

For these reasons, state welfare programs should not be based upon caste or religious identity, but rather simply targeted towards those in legitimate economic need.�� Therefore, \UKPќLYLU[PH[LK�JP[PaLUZOPW�ZOV\SK�IL�promoted as a tangible way to separate PUKP]PK\HS�HUK�NYV\W�PKLU[P[PLZ�HUK�the state. While some scholars would HYN\L�[OH[�Z\JO�H�WVSPJ`�JV\SK�OH]L�terrible implications on the nation as a whole, including the precipitation of \U[VSK�]PVSLUJL�VU�TPUVYP[PLZ�� such HU�HYN\TLU[�MHPSZ�[V�YLJVNUPaL�[OH[�[OL�


552013Fall

current model of Indian secularism has [OL�ZHTL�WYVWLUZP[`�MVY�JVUÅPJ[�HUK�]PVSLUJL��I`�PUJLU[P]PaPUN�KLLWS`�YVV[LK�religious identities, namely through the existence of personal laws.

Conclusion9LNHYKSLZZ�VM�[OL�WVSHYPaPUN�UH[\YL�

of these important political questions, TVZ[�ZLLT�[V�HNYLL�[OH[�HIV]L�HSS�0UKPH�needs to focus on strengthening the Y\SL�VM�SH �̂�ZV�[OH[�]PVSLUJL�KVLZ�UV[�NV�\UW\UPZOLK�HUK�[OH[�PUZ[P[\[PVUHSPaLK�discrimination comes to an end.20 ;OLYLMVYL�4VKP��OH]PUN�ILLU�ISHTLK�for his complicity in the brutal 2002 Gujarat riots that occurred during his administration, hardly seems an appropriate candidate to carry out this pressing task. Furthermore, it is PTWVY[HU[�[V�YLJVNUPaL�[OH[�[OL�SVUN�[LYT�KL]LSVWTLU[�VM�0UKPH»Z�KLTVJYHJ`�will rest upon its ability to maintain an \U^H]LYPUN�JVTTP[TLU[�[V^HYKZ�JP]PS�SPILY[PLZ��JVUZ[P[\[PVUHS�NV]LYUHUJL��HUK�[OL�\UP]LYZHS�WYPUJPWSLZ�VM�O\THU�YPNO[Z��PUZ[LHK�VM�KL]V[PVU�[V�ZOHYWS`�KP]PKLK�NYV\W�PKLU[P[PLZ�21 Thus, a Hindu UH[PVUHSPZ[�Z\JO�HZ�4VKP�KVLZ�UV[�ZLLT�to be an ideal choice to represent the multi-cultural, multi-faith, and multi-lingual state of modern India.

Endnotes��(UHUK��1H]LK��)`�[OL�4HQVYP[ �̀�-VY�[OL�4HQVYP[ �̀�

The Indian Express (February 28, 2013).

��=HYZOUL �̀�(ZO\[VZO��4VKP�5LLKZ�H�=HQWH`LL��The Indian Express (December 25, 2012).

��=HYZOUL �̀�(ZO\[VZO��>O`�0UKPH�4\Z[�(SSV^�/`WOLUZ��;OL�0UKPHU�,_WYLZZ��-LIY\HY`��2013).

��=HYZOUL �̀�(ZO\[VZO��4VKP�5LLKZ�H�=HQWH`LL��The Indian Express (December 25, 2012).

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

��(UHUK��1H]LK��)`�[OL�4HQVYP[ �̀�-VY�[OL�4HQVYP[ �̀�The Indian Express (February 28, 2013).

��.\W[H��/HYZO��(NHPUZ[�,U[YLUJOLK�0KLU[P[PLZ��The Indian Express (March 08, 2013).

��=HYZOUL �̀�(ZO\[VZO��>O`�0UKPH�4\Z[�(SSV^�/`WOLUZ��;OL�0UKPHU�,_WYLZZ��-LIY\HY`��2013).

12. Ibid.

��.\W[H��/HYZO��(NHPUZ[�,U[YLUJOLK�0KLU[P[PLZ��The Indian Express (March 08, 2013).

��(UHUK��1H]LK��)`�[OL�4HQVYP[ �̀�-VY�[OL�4HQVYP[ �̀�;OL�0UKPHU�,_WYLZZ��-LIY\HY`��2013).

��.\W[H��/HYZO��HUK�9HQLL]�4HU[YP�6UL�=LYZ\Z�.YV\W��;OL�0UKPHU�,_WYLZZ��-LIY\HY`��2013).

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

� ��=HYZOUL �̀�(ZO\[VZO��>O`�0UKPH�4\Z[�(SSV^�/`WOLUZ��;OL�0UKPHU�,_WYLZZ��-LIY\HY`��2013).

��(UHUK��1H]LK��)`�[OL�4HQVYP[ �̀�-VY�[OL�4HQVYP[ �̀�;OL�0UKPHU�,_WYLZZ��-LIY\HY`��2013).

21. Ibid.

Bibliography(UHUK��1H]LK��)`�[OL�4HQVYP[ �̀�-VY�[OL�4HQVYP[ �̀

Editorial. The Indian Express. The Indian Express Ltd., 28 Feb. 2013. Accessed 15 July 2013.

.\W[H��/HYZO��(NHPUZ[�,U[YLUJOLK�0KLU[P[PLZ��Editorial. The Indian Express. The Indian Express Ltd., 08 Mar. 2013. Accessed 15 July 2013.

.\W[H��/HYZO��HUK�9HQLL]�4HU[YP��6UL�=LYZ\Z�.YV\W��,KP[VYPHS��;OL�0UKPHU�,_WYLZZ��The Indian Express Ltd., 13 Feb. 2013. Accessed 15 July 2013.

=HYZOUL �̀�(ZO\[VZO��4VKP�5LLKZ�H�=HQWH`LL��

Editorial. The Indian Express. The Indian Express Ltd., 25 Dec. 2012. Accessed 15 July 2013.

=HYZOUL �̀�(ZO\[VZO��>O`�0UKPH�4\Z[�(SSV^/`WOLUZ��,KP[VYPHS��;OL�0UKPHU�,_WYLZZ��The Indian Express Ltd., 13 Feb. 2013. Accessed 15 July 2013.


JUIS56

hana enjoys a status as one of the role model states of the African continent, due to its Z\Z[HPULK�WVSP[PJHS�Z[HIPSP[ �̀�KLTVJYH[PJ�HK]HUJLTLU[�HUK�O\THU�YPNO[Z�JVUKP[PVUZ��6UL�PZZ\L�[OH[�JVU[PU\LZ�[V�Z[HPU�P[Z�O\THU�YPNO[Z�YLJVYK��OV^L]LY��PZ�[OH[�YLSH[LK�[V�HJJ\ZH[PVUZ�of witchcraft.1�0U�.OHUH��HZ�PU�THU`�V[OLY�(MYPJHU�JV\U[YPLZ��P[�PZ�ILSPL]LK�[OH[�\UMVY[\UH[L�

L]LU[Z�Z\JO�HZ�WYLTH[\YL�KLH[OZ��ZPJRULZZLZ��QVI�MHPS\YLZ��HUK�V[OLYZ�HYL�JH\ZLK�I`�^P[JOLZ!�WLVWSL�^P[O�L]PS�PU[LU[PVUZ�HUK�ZWLJPHS�ZWPYP[\HS�WV^LYZ�2

After such a mishap occurs, PUKP]PK\HSZ��LZWLJPHSS`�^VTLU�^P[O�^LHR�social protection, may be accused.3 The alleged witches are often assaulted and may then be banished to so-called ¸^P[JOLZ»�JHTWZ�¹�;OLYL�PZ�UV�MHPY�trial in which they are able to defend [OLTZLS]LZ�HNHPUZ[�[OL�HJJ\ZH[PVUZ�

In recent times, there has been an increased amount of attention for these human rights abuses in national and international media��I`�NV]LYUTLU[HS�HUK�UVU�NV]LYUTLU[HS�PUZ[P[\[PVUZ5 and in academia.��;OL�ULLK�MVY�PU[LY]LU[PVU�OHZ�ILLU�^PKLS`�YLJVNUPaLK�HUK�THU`�UVU�NV]LYUTLU[HS�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ�HUK�YLSPNPV\Z�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ�OH]L�Z[HY[LK�[V�JVTIH[�[OL�O\THU�YPNO[Z�]PVSH[PVUZ�PU�]HYPV\Z�^H`Z��;OLYL�HYL�HSZV�H�U\TILY�VM�YLJVTTLUKH[PVUZ�[OH[�OH]L�ILLU�THKL�by independent researchers, NGOs and ]HYPV\Z�NV]LYUTLU[HS�PUZ[P[\[PVUZ��I\[�

not yet executed.��;OPZ�HY[PJSL�^PSS�VќLY�HU�PUJS\ZP]L�HUHS`ZPZ�VM�[OLZL�]HY`PUN�LќVY[Z�PU�VYKLY�[V�ZLL�ÔPJO�OHZ�[OL�most potential to curb the problems of human rights abuses in Ghana. In order [V�KV�ZV��P[�^PSS�ÄYZ[�WYV]PKL�HU�V]LY]PL^�of the Ghanaian witchcraft beliefs, the accusations, the witches’ camps, and the human rights accusations. It will then WYLZLU[�H�JH[LNVYPaH[PVU�VM�[OL�[`WLZ�VM�WVSPJ`�[OH[�OH]L�ILLU�YLJVTTLUKLK�and executed so far. This section will also introduce a model by which the KPќLYLU[�RPUKZ�VM�WVSPJ`�JHU�IL�HUHSàLK�IHZLK�VU�[OL�WLYJLP]LK�YVV[�JH\ZL�VM�the problem. Finally, the potential of the KPќLYLU[�WVSPJ`�VW[PVUZ�^PSS�IL�KPZJ\ZZLK�

BackgroundA belief in the existence of a spiritual

world that includes forces of witchcraft is extremely widespread in all layers

of Ghanaian society, “cut[ting] across KP]PZPVUZ�VM�JSHZZ��HNL�HUK�NLUKLY�¹� A Z\Y]L`�I`�[OL�.OHUHPHU�5H[PVUHS�*LU[YL�MVY�*P]PJ�,K\JH[PVU��5**,��MV\UK�[OH[�� WLYJLU[�VM�[OL�PU[LY]PL^LLZ�PU�[OL�5VY[OLYU�YLNPVU�ILSPL]L�[OH[�^P[JOJYHM[�exists. �0[�JHU�IL�KLÄULK�HZ��HJJVYKPUN�[V�[OL�KLÄUP[PVU�VM�,]HUZ�7YP[JOHYK!�“a natural philosophy by which the relations between men and unfortunate L]LU[Z�HYL�L_WSHPULK�B¯D��LTIYHJBPUND�H�Z`Z[LT�VM�]HS\LZ�ÔPJO�YLN\SH[L�O\THU�JVUK\J[�¹10 In Ghana, witches are held responsible for all sorts of disease, KLH[O�HUK�TPZMVY[\UL�PU�[OL�MVYT�VM!�addiction, drunkenness, poor academic performance, insanity, accidents, loss or KLZ[Y\J[PVU�VM�WYVWLY[ �̀�KYV\NO[��ÅVVKZ��ÄYL��ZUHRL�IP[LZ��YLSH[PVUZOPW�MHPS\YLZ��parenting problems, and more.11

>OLUL]LY�Z\JO�HU�\UMVY[\UH[L�L]LU[�VJJ\YZ��THU`�.OHUHPHUZ�ZLLR�

Targeting Different Root Causes:

by Dorien Venhoeven

Dorien Venhoeven. +VYPLU�=LUOVL]LU��IVYU�� PZ�H�YLJLU[�:VJPHS�:JPLUJL�NYHK\H[L�MYVT�[OL�<UP]LYZP[`�*VSSLNL�<[YLJO[�PU�[OL�5L[OLYSHUKZ��:OL�OHZ�ZWLU[�TVYL�[OHU�H�`LHY�PU�.OHUH�HUK�PZ�J\YYLU[S`�SP]PUN�[OLYL��:OL�^V\SK�SPRL�[V�[OHUR�OLY�[OLZPZ�Z\WLY]PZVY��>LSTVL[�)VLUKLY��MVY�OLY�OLSW�VU�[OPZ�submission.

An Analysis of Policies Curbing Witchcraft Accusations in Ghana

G

572013Fall

by Dorien Venhoeven

[V�ÄUK�HU�L_WSHUH[PVU�MVY�[OL�º^O`»�question, as well as answering the ºOV^»��;OL�HU[OYVWVSVNPZ[�,�,��,]HUZ�7YP[JOHYK�NP]LZ�H�WHY[PJ\SHYS`�Ä[[PUN�example of this, in his book on the (aHUKL�WLVWSL�SP]PUN�PU�JLU[YHS�(MYPJH��/L�explains the kind of questions that will IL�HZRLK�PU�[OL�L]LU[�VM�HU�VSK�^VVKLU�shelter collapsing and injuring people ZP[[PUN�\UKLY�P["�

"Now why should these

particular people have been

sitting under this particular

granary at this particular moment

when it collapsed? That it should

collapse is easily intelligible, but

why should it have collapsed

at this particular moment when

these particular people were

sitting beneath it?”12

He acknowledges that the Zande, like the Ghanaians, are aware

of the direct processes that cause the JVUZ[Y\J[PVU�[V�JVSSHWZL��[OL�KLNYHKH[PVU�of the wood). He goes on to explain [OH[�[OPZ�JH\ZHS�TLJOHUPZT�^V\SK�OH]L�Z\ѝJLK�HZ�HU�L_WSHUH[PVU�MVY�TVZ[�,\YVWLHUZ��;OL`�^V\SK�OH]L�H[[YPI\[LK�the fact that these particular people were sitting under it, at this particular [PTL��[V�IHK�S\JR��4VYL�VM[LU�[OL`�^V\SK�UV[�L]LU�IV[OLY�[V�HZR�[OH[�X\LZ[PVU��AHUKL�HUK�.OHUHPHUZ�HSPRL��OV^L]LY��see witchcraft to be that ‘missing link,’ explaining the particulars of a mishap. Suspicions of witchcraft are thus ]LY`�SPRLS`�PU�H�ZVJPL[`�[OH[�OHZ�ILLU�ZVJPHSPaLK�PU[V�[OPZ�RPUK�VM�[OPURPUN�

Once suspicions are raised, they are the subject of continuous gossip and JVU]LYZH[PVU��;OLZL�HYL�SHYNLS`�T\[LK�until consensus is reached among community members, and a public accusation follows.13��)V[O�WLVWSL�^P[O�special spiritual gifts, such as pastors, church leaders and fetish priests,��

and ‘lay’ people, those without special spiritual gifts, take part in the process leading up to an accusation. Lay people TH`�PKLU[PM`�JLY[HPU�[YHP[Z�HUK�ILOH]PVY�that are held to be typical of witches. In Ghana, these traits may include red eyes, light skin, blindness, lameness, old age, displaying extreme anti-social ILOH]PVY��L_JLZZP]L�WV]LY[ �̀�L_JLZZP]L�wealth, and wretchedness.15 Another commonality among the accused is [OLPY�NLUKLY��(S[OV\NO�ZVTL�TLU�OH]L�also been accused and exiled, the great majority of the accused witches are female, due to their inferior social status.�� People without special spiritual powers may also ‘expose’ witches [OYV\NO�KYLHTZ�HUK�YL]LSH[PVUZ��VY�do so because they know that an HSSLNLK�^P[JO�OHZ�NP]LU�H�NPM[�[V�H�person, just before the misfortune occurred.��+YLHTZ�HUK�YL]LSH[PVUZ�VY�[OL�WYLZLU[H[PVU�VM�H�NPM[�TH`�ZLY]L�HZ�legitimate reasons to accuse a person. (JJ\ZH[PVUZ�HYL�THKL�ILJH\ZL�P[�NP]LZ�]PJ[PTZ�WLYJLP]LK�JVU[YVS�V]LY�[OL�ZV\YJL�VM�L]PS�[OH[�[OL`�ILSPL]L�OHZ�JH\ZLK�[OL�misfortune.

Confessions are habitually demanded of accused witches because the confessions are considered necessary for successful healing. In order to exorcise someone of a ^P[JOJYHM[�ZWPYP[��H�]PJ[PT�ÄYZ[�ULLKZ�[V�acknowledge that they are under the PUÅ\LUJL�VM�[OH[�MVYJL�� The confession

;HYNL[PUN�+PќLYLU[�9VV[�*H\ZLZ!�(U�(UHS`ZPZ�VM�7VSPJPLZ�*\YIPUN�>P[JOJYHM[�(JJ\ZH[PVUZ�PU�.OHUH��+VYPLU�=LUOVL]LU

"A belief in the existence of a spiritual world that

includes forces of witchcraft is extremely widespread

in all layers of Ghanian society... A survey by the

Ghanian National Centre for Civic Education (NCCE)

found that 89.37 percent of the interviewees in the

Northern Region believe that witchcraft exists."

JUIS58

is important because if someone has confessed, the community can bring him or her to a witches’ camp, a prayer camp, a witch doctor, or some other kind of person with the power to UL\[YHSPaL�[OL�^P[JO�WV^LYZ��

Human Rights AbusesThere are three kinds of human

rights abuses that are linked to the HJJ\ZH[PVUZ!�]PVSLUJL��L_PSL�[V�[OL�witches’ camps and the lack of a fair [YPHS��=PJ[PTZ�TH`�Z\ќLY�MYVT�VUL�VY�more.

;OL�]PVSLUJL�TVZ[�VM[LU�VJJ\YZ�within the communities in which the HJJ\ZLK�SP]L�HUK�TH`�WYLJLKL�L_PSL�to the witches’ camps. In the course of accusation, alleged witches are sometimes beaten, burned, mutilated or subjected to other kinds of pain.20 This is KVUL�MVY�KPќLYLU[�YLHZVUZ��-PYZ[��]PVSLUJL�may be used to force the accused to confess. For this reason, a woman was ZOV^LYLK�^P[O�RLYVZLUL�HUK�ZL[�VU�ÄYL�in Tema, Greater Accra region in 2010.21 :LJVUK��]PVSLUJL�TH`�HSZV�IL�\ZLK�MVY�KPYLJ[�LSPTPUH[PVU�VM�[OL�WLYJLP]LK�ZV\YJL�VM�[OL�]PJ[PT»Z�Z\ќLYPUN��I`�T\YKLYPUN�[OL�^P[JO��VY�[V�H]LUNL�[OL�Z\ќLYPUN�PUÅPJ[LK�upon one’s community member. In 2012, for example, a group of youths attacked H�JVUNYLNH[PVU�VM�HYV\UK��Z\ZWLJ[LK�witches in the Northern region. The youths claimed that this group of elderly people was responsible for the sudden deaths of a number of young people in the area. The mob searched houses and threw stones at the group of alleged witches.22

(�[OPYK�JH[LNVY`�VM�]PVSLUJL�PZ�[OH[�

of exorcism. This is less common since exorcism is usually left unto outsiders ^P[O�Z\WLYUH[\YHS�WV^LYZ��/V^L]LY��the national media has reported such cases. One example is that of a couple and a student in the Western region, tried in September 2012. The student ^HZ�HJJ\ZLK�VM�OH]PUN�¸PUÅPJ[LK�ZL]LYL�^V\UKZ�VU�[OL�MHJL¹�VM�H��`LHY�VSK�NPYS�whom she suspected of being a witch SP]PUN�PU�OLY�OV\ZL��;OL�� `LHY�VSK�\ZLK�H�RP[JOLU�RUPML�[V�YLTV]L�[OL�^P[JOJYHM[�powers from the child.23 There seems to be little recognition of this type of ]PVSLUJL�PU�[OL�HJHKLTPJ�SP[LYH[\YL�

;OL�ÄYZ[�PUZ[HUJL�VM�O\THU�YPNO[Z�HI\ZL�PZ�[OL�WLYWL[YH[PVU�VM�]PVSLUJL�itself, but in all of these cases, the accused are also faced with a lack of a fair trial. Hearsay and dreams are regarded as proof of a person’s guilt.�� The judgment of a person with powers to ‘see’ witches is considered irrefutable. As illustrated by an address of a chief MYVT�[OL�5VY[OLYU�9LNPVU!�

“All of us in Mamprugu know that

the chief is ancestrally bequeathed with

the powers to see witches and know

them immediately.”25

Eighty percent of the witches’ camp YLZPKLU[Z�PU[LY]PL^LK�I`�[OL�5**,�ZHPK�[OL`�OHK�ILLU�ZLU[�[V�^P[JO�PKLU[PÄLYZ�before settling at the camp.��=PJ[PTZ�OH]L�ULP[OLY�[OL�TLHUZ�UVY�[OL�YPNO[�[V�WYV]L�[OLPY�PUUVJLUJL��

The same apparent arbitrariness is found in the ceremonies that the accused undergo when they are sent to a witches’ camp. The suspect’s

community members may take him or OLY�[V�[OL�JHTW�PU�VYKLY�[V�]LYPM`�[OL�N\PS[�VM�[OL�HJJ\ZLK��VY�[V�OH]L�[OL�accused witch cleansed by people with ZWPYP[\HS�WV^LYZ��;OL�L]LU[Z�[OH[�MVSSV^�[OL�HSSLNLK�^P[JOLZ»�HYYP]HSZ�KPќLY�PU�HSS�VM�[OL�ZL]LU�JHTWZ��0U�NLULYHS��[OL�accused go through a trial by ordeal, a ritual to determine their guilt. The person leading the trial can determine this guilt either through looking at a suspect, through special rituals or through asking the person to confess.��

One often-cited example of those special rituals�� is that of the slaughter of a fowl. A suspect’s guilt is determined I`�[OL�ZHJYPÄJL�VM�H�MV^S�[V�[OL�NVKZ��After the neck is cut, the fowl is left to run about. If it dies facing downwards, [OL�N\PS[�VM�[OL�HJJ\ZLK�PZ�ºWYV]LU�»� A similar ceremony is that of making the accused drink a potentially lethal concoction made of chicken blood and earth,30 while animals are being ZHJYPÄJLK�[V�[OL�NVKZ��;OL�HPT�VM�[OPZ�is to force people to confess. They are told that if they do not confess when they are guilty, the drink will kill them, but that if they are really innocent, the drink ^PSS�UV[�JH\ZL�KLH[O"31��WLYJLU[�VM�[OL�HSSLNLK�^P[JOLZ�PU[LY]PL^LK�I`�[OL�NCCE said they had taken this drink \WVU�HYYP]HS�32

In principle, the alleged witches can go back to their communities after OH]PUN�ILLU�ºJSLHUZLK»��[OLPY�^P[JOJYHM[�force rendered powerless. Nonetheless, the great majority does not return for fear of a continuation of the atrocities, despite his or her powerlessness.33

When the alleged witches come


592013Fall

[V�SP]L�PU�[OL�JHTW��[OL�O\THU�YPNO[Z�]PVSH[PVUZ�YLSH[LK�[V�[OL�L_PSL�HYL�VM�]HYPV\Z�RPUKZ��-PYZ[�VM�HSS��[OL�WYVJLZZ�of exile often means that the alleged ^P[JO�OHZ�[V�SLH]L�TVZ[�VM�OPZ�VY�OLY�property behind.�� Although some families assign the woman a child �\Z\HSS`�H�NYHUKKH\NO[LY��[V�HPK�PU�[OL�KHPS`�JOVYLZ"35 most camp residents lose direct family support. The assumption [OH[�[OL`�HYL�JVTWSL[LS`�J\[�Vќ�MYVT�[OLPY�JVTT\UP[PLZ��OV^L]LY��PZ�PUJVYYLJ[��4VZ[�HYL�Z[PSS�]PZP[LK�I`�MHTPS`�TLTILYZ�HUK�WHY[PJPWH[L�PU�ZVJPHS�L]LU[Z�H[�OVTL��such as funerals.��)\[�[OL�THQVYP[`�VM�[OL�women still feel shamed and excluded. All but one of the alleged witches in the .HTIHNH�JHTW��PU[LY]PL^LK�I`�@HIH�)HKVL��L_WYLZZLK�¸H�WYVMV\UK�ZLUZL�VM�

loss and separation, anger and rejection, combined with a yearning for ongoing MHTPSPHS�JVU[HJ[�¹�� Alleged witches sometimes stay in the camps their whole SP]LZ��6M�[OL�NYV\W�VM�JHTW�PUOHIP[HU[Z�PU[LY]PL^LK�I`�[OL�5**,��WLYJLU[�OHK�ILLU�SP]PUN�PU�[OL�JHTWZ�MVY��[V��years.��

The camps form parts of ordinary ]PSSHNLZ�HUK�HYL�UV[�MLUJLK�Vќ�� Although it is often assumed that there are six camps in the Northern Region,�� [OL�JHTWZ�TLU[PVULK�PU�]HYPV\Z�ZV\YJLZ�PU[YVK\JL�H�ZL]LU[O��2\R\V��.HTIHNH��2WH[PUNH��)VU`HZL��.UHUP��5HSLYPN\�HUK�5HI\SL"�ZLL�ÄN\YL��>OPSL�HU�LPNO[O�JHTW�OHZ�ILLU�PKLU[PÄLK�PU�[OL�)YVUN�(OHMV�YLNPVU��([LI\I\�JHTW��ÄN\YL��4LKPH�ZV\YJLZ�YLWVY[LK�[OH[�P[Z�MVY[`�

nine inhabitants were uniquely from the Northern Region.��

The most recent estimates of the U\TILY�VM�HSSLNLK�^P[JOLZ�SP]PUN�H[�[OL�JHTWZ�HYL�HYV\UK��^VTLU�HUK�500 children.��*HTW�ZWLJPÄJ�U\TILYZ�Å\J[\H[L�OPNOS`�IL[^LLU�KPќLYLU[�ZV\YJLZ��YLJVYKLK�H[�KPќLYLU[�[PTLZ��

4HU`�VIZLY]LYZ�HYL�JVUJLYULK�HIV\[�[OL�WVVY�SP]PUN�JVUKP[PVUZ�[OH[�HYL�HWWHYLU[�PU�[OL�JHTWZ!�TVZ[�OV\ZPUN��HZ�ActionAid notes, consists of “mud huts ^P[O�ÅPTZ`�[OH[JOLK�YVVMZ�¹��;OL�Z\Y]L`�conducted by the NCCE showed that ��WLYJLU[�VM�[OL�^VTLU�PU�[OYLL�VM�[OL�camps felt they lacked basic needs such as housing, food and clothing.�� Some sources also consider the fact that the camp residents are forced to work hard at an elderly age as one of the problems related to the witches’ camps. The 5**,�MV\UK�[OH[�� WLYJLU[�VM�[OL�JHTW�PUOHIP[HU[Z�^LYL�PU]VS]LK�PU�ZVTL�RPUK�VM�PUJVTL�NLULYH[PUN�HJ[P]P[`�Z\JO�HZ�MHYTPUN��ÄZOPUN�VY�[YHKPUN��

)V[O�[OL�SHJR�VM�MHJPSP[PLZ�HUK�[OL�hard labor are problematic, but less ZL]LYL�[OHU�[OL�[OYLL�O\THU�YPNO[Z�HI\ZLZ�TLU[PVULK�ILMVYL!�]PVSLUJL��SHJR�of a fair trial and exile. This distinction PZ�THKL�ILJH\ZL�[OL�ÄYZ[�[OYLL�O\THU�rights abuses distinguish the people in the witches’ camps from those in their host communities. The latter do not face ]PVSLUJL��HYIP[YHY`�[YPHSZ�HUK�IHUPZOTLU[��5VY[OLYU�.OHUH��OV^L]LY��PZ�HU�PTWV]LYPZOLK�YLNPVU�^OLYL�THU`�WLVWSL��including those outside the camps, MHJL�ZPTPSHY�OHYKZOPWZ"��WLYJLU[�of the houses in rural areas of Ghana OH]L�[OH[JOLK�YVVMZ"��WLYJLU[�VM�households rely on a well as a main


FIGURE 1. Locations of the 8 witches' camps.

JUIS60

^H[LY�Z\WWS`�HUK�� WLYJLU[�OH]L�UV�toilet.�� These atrocities are therefore acknowledged, but not considered to be unique to the camp residents.

MethodsNow that the human rights abuses

YLSH[LK�[V�^P[JOJYHM[�HJJ\ZH[PVUZ�OH]L�ILLU�WYLZLU[LK��[OPZ�WHWLY�^PSS�YL]PL^�[OL�KPќLYLU[�RPUKZ�VM�WVSPJ`�[OH[�OH]L�been executed and recommended in VYKLY�[V�ÄUK�V\[�ÔPJO�VUL�OHZ�[OL�most potential to curb the human rights abuses. This section will use YLWVY[Z�MYVT�UVU�NV]LYUTLU[HS�HUK�NV]LYUTLU[HS�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ��TLKPH�reports, conference proceedings and academic articles to examine the types VM�PU[LY]LU[PVUZ��5L_[��P[�^PSS�WYLZLU[�[OL�KPќLYLU[�WVSPJ`�HS[LYUH[P]LZ�[OH[�HYL�H]HPSHISL��^P[O�[OL�[`WLZ�VM�PU[LY]LU[PVUZ�grouped together according to the four KPќLYLU[�YVV[�JH\ZLZ�[OL`�HYL�[HYNL[PUN��Finally, the potential to curb the human YPNO[Z�]PVSH[PVUZ�^PSS�IL�KPZJ\ZZLK�MVY�LHJO�VM�[OL�WVSPJ`�HS[LYUH[P]LZ��

Types of Policy(�ÄYZ[�HUHS`ZPZ�

VM�[OL�KPќLYLU[�PU[LY]LU[PVUZ�[OH[�OH]L�ILLU�WYVWVZLK�ZOV^Z�[OH[�LќVY[Z�HYL�KPYLJ[LK�H[�]LY`�KPќLYLU[�roots of the human rights abuses. Some PU[LY]LU[PVUZ�[Y`�[V�soothe the pain of the WVVY�SP]PUN�JVUKP[PVUZ�in the camps, while others attempt to

eliminate the belief in witchcraft and stop HJJ\ZH[PVUZ�PU�[OH[�^H �̀�;OL�KPќLYLU[�WVSPJ`�HS[LYUH[P]LZ�^PSS�[O\Z�IL�WYLZLU[LK�according to the source of the problem they are targeting. A model has been KL]LSVWLK�PU�VYKLY�[V�JSHYPM`��ZLL�-PN\YL�2).

4VZ[�L_WLY[Z�HNYLL�[OH[�[OL�HSSLNLK�^P[JOLZ�SP]L�PU�HIVTPUHISL�circumstances.��4HU`�VM�[OL�PU[LY]LU[PVUZ�WYVWVZLK�I`�[OL�Z[H[L��5.6Z��JVTT\UP[`�IHZLK�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ��*)6Z��YLZLHYJOLYZ�HUK�QV\YUHSPZ[Z�OH]L�[OLYLMVYL�MVJ\ZLK�VU�HTLSPVYH[PUN�[OL�WVVY�SP]PUN�JPYJ\TZ[HUJLZ�PU�[OL�JHTWZ��;OPZ�^PSS�IL�JHSSLK�PU[LY]LU[PVU�SL]LS��0[�JHU�IL�YLNHYKLK�HZ�º[OL�[PW�VM�[OL�PJLILYN�»�VY�[OL�TVZ[�]PZPISL�manifestation of the problem. It is therefore on top of the triangle in Figure 2.

6[OLYZ��OV^L]LY��KV�UV[�ZLL�[OL�SP]PUN�JPYJ\TZ[HUJLZ�PU�[OL�JHTWZ�[V�IL�[OL�THPU�WYVISLT��I\[�]PL^�[OL�TLYL�existence of the camps as the root

problem. If the camps were eliminated, [OLYL�^V\SK�IL�UV�JOHUJL�VM�IHK�SP]PUN�conditions and other human rights abuses within them. The policy proposed by this group is therefore the closure of the camps. This will be referred to as PU[LY]LU[PVU�SL]LS��YLWYLZLU[LK�I`�[OL�second layer in Figure 2.

A third type of policy claims that if there were no accusations of witchcraft, camps would no longer be ULJLZZHY`�HUK�O\THU�YPNO[Z�]PVSH[PVUZ�in the camps would thus also cease. It takes accusations to be the root of the problem. This will be considered PU[LY]LU[PVU�SL]LS��[OPYK�SH`LY�VM�[OL�triangle).

A fourth kind of policy is that ÔPJO�Z[YP]LZ�[V�HUUPOPSH[L�[OL�ILSPLM�in witchcraft. The underlying line of thought is that there would not be any accusations or human rights abuses if there were no witchcraft belief. This will IL�JHSSLK�PU[LY]LU[PVU�SL]LS��IV[[VT�layer of the triangle).

0U[LY]LU[PVU�SL]LS��! Policies

addressing human rights

violations in the camps

Almost all NGOs, *)6Z��YLZLHYJOLYZ�HUK�journalists recommend raising the standards of SP]PUN�PU�[OL�JHTWZ�� This SL]LS�VM�PU[LY]LU[PVU�^HZ�[OL�earliest to be implemented and is still the one in which [OL�TVZ[�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ�HYL�PU]VS]LK��;OL�[`WLZ�VM�PU[LY]LU[PVUZ�[OH[�ÅV^�MYVT�this logic can be grouped into three categories.


-0.<9,��;OL�KPɈLYLU[�SL]LSZ�VM�PU[LY]LU[PVU�H[�ÔPJO�WVSPJPLZ�[HRL�WSHJL�

612013Fall

;OL�ÄYZ[�HYL�[OL�KPYLJ[�SP]LSPOVVK�PTWYV]LTLU[Z��[OL�ZLJVUK�HYL�PUKPYLJ[�SP]LSPOVVK�PTWYV]LTLU[�[OYV\NO�MLTHSL�empowerment and the third is the reintegration of women into their own communities.

;OL�LHYSPLZ[�PU[LY]LU[PVU�PU�[OL�witches’ camps was that of the 7YLZI`[LYPHU�*O\YJO�VM�.OHUH��9L]LYLUK�7�@��(UHUL��[OL�ÄYZ[�KPZ[YPJ[�WHZ[VY��asked his congregations to donate used JSV[OLZ�PU�[OL�LHYS`�� Z��;OL�WYVNYHT�^HZ�L_WHUKLK�PU�[OL�ZL]LU[PLZ�[OYV\NO�[OL�LќVY[Z�VM�9L]LYLUK�,�2��6ZLP��who established the Local Council of *O\YJOLZ�H[�.HTIHNH�HUK�HK]VJH[LK�MVY�[OL�/VTL�[V�YLJLP]L�TVU[OS`�YH[PVUZ�VM�THPaL�HUK�VPS�MYVT�[OL�*H[OVSPJ�9LSPLM�:LY]PJL��

;OL�ZLJVUK�OHSM�VM�[OL�� Z�through the 2000s was marked by the establishment of many more NGOs that [VVR�WHY[�PU�[OL�PTWYV]LTLU[�VM�SP]PUN�JVUKP[PVUZ�PU�[OL�JHTW��:PUJL�� H[�SLHZ[�ZP_�5.6Z�OH]L�Z[HY[LK�WYVNYHTZ�Z[YP]PUN�[V�KPYLJ[S`�HTLSPVYH[L�[OL�situations in which the alleged witches SP]L��;OPZ�Z\KKLU�\WZ\YNL�JV\SK�IL�YLSH[LK�[V�H�WHY[PJ\SHYS`�ZL]LYL�V\[IYLHR�VM�*LYLIYV�ZWPUHS�TLUPUNP[PZ��*:4��PU�� ^OPJO�SLK�[V�H�NYLH[�U\TILY�VM�witchcraft accusations and exiles.50 0U[LY]LU[PVUZ�PUJS\KL�[OL�PU[YVK\J[PVU�VM�PUJVTL�NLULYH[PUN�HJ[P]P[PLZ�Z\JO�as shea butter production and poultry rearing,51 the construction of new housing, boreholes, and toilets and [OL�WYV]PZPVU�VM�JVYU�TPSSZ��LK\JH[PVU�for children, clothes, health insurance, insecticide-treated bed nets, and others.52�4VZ[�VM�[OLZL�5.6Z�VWLYH[L�from a human rights framework53 and

tend to focus on the most essential ULLKZ��MVY�[OL�PUP[PH[P]LZ�[OH[�HYL�TVZ[�VM[LU�\UKLY[HRLU�HYL�[OL�WYV]PZPVU�VM�water sources and food, and of sources of income.

A second type of policy at the ÄYZ[�SL]LS�VM�PU[LY]LU[PVU�PZ�[OH[�VM�PUKPYLJ[�SP]LSPOVVK�PTWYV]LTLU[��UHTLS`�through the empowerment of the alleged witches. Since the late 2000s, there has been a shift in focus from [OL�IHYL�Z\Y]P]HS�VM�[OL�V\[JHZ[Z�[V�their empowerment. Instead of just M\SÄSSPUN�[OLPY�TH[LYPHS�ULLKZ��5.6Z�started to implement programs that HPT�[V�NP]L�HSSLNLK�^P[JOLZ��LZWLJPHSS`�[OL�^VTLU��TVYL�ZLSM�JVUÄKLUJL�[V�VYNHUPaL�[OLTZLS]LZ�HUK�[V�OH]L�H�Z[YVUN�JVSSLJ[P]L�]VPJL��6YNHUPaH[PVUZ�supporting this often operate within a NLUKLY�MYHTL^VYR��;OL�LќVY[Z�HPTLK�H[�empowerment include the establishment of a network of alleged witches called Ti-NI\I[HIH��TLHUPUN�ºSL[»Z�Z\WWVY[�LHJO�other’ in the local Dagbani language). ;OYV\NO�[OPZ�UL[^VYR��TLTILYZ�OH]L�been able to register for the National Health Insurance scheme and to obtain MVVK�HPK�^P[OV\[�[OL�PU[LY]LU[PVU�VM�HU�NGO.�� Similarly, literacy and awareness groups were set up in the Gnani and 2\R\V�JHTWZ55�HUK�^VTLU�VYNHUPaLK�a march through Tamale, the regional capital, in December 2011.�� During this demonstration, they tried to raise awareness for the rights of accused women.

The last type of policy at the ÄYZ[�SL]LS�VM�PU[LY]LU[PVU�PZ�[OL�HPT�[V�reintegrate the alleged witches into their communities. The reasoning behind this is that the problem goes deeper than

TH[LYPHS�ULLKZ"�[OL�HJJ\ZLK�ZOV\SK�also regain unrestrained access to their families, their property and their social position. The Go Home Project, which still exists today, has long been one of the leading actors in the struggle against accusation-related human rights abuses. It aids in the reconciliatory process between the alleged witch and the community and presents the host community with some material support when it agrees to take the accused back. It aims to let accused ^VTLU�LUQV`�H�TLHUPUNM\S�SPML�HZ�HJ[P]L�members of their communities again. )L[^LLU�� HUK��P[�Z\JJLLKLK�PU�YLPU[LNYH[PUN�HU�H]LYHNL�VM�[OPY[`�UPUL�HSSLNLK�^P[JOLZ�WLY�`LHY��)L[^LLU��HUK��OV^L]LY��[OL�H]LYHNL�KYVWWLK�[V�HU�HUU\HS�ZL]LU�^P[JOLZ�� This, according to the director of the WYVNYHT��4Y��5NV[H��^HZ�SHYNLS`�K\L�[V�lack of funding.

9LPU[LNYH[PVU�PZ�JVTWSL_��4HU`�VM�[OL�YL[\YULLZ�OH]L�ILLU�H^H`�MYVT�[OLPY�JVTT\UP[PLZ�MVY�ZL]LYHS�`LHYZ��ZVTL�L]LU�\W�[V�[OPY[`�`LHYZ��;OLPY�huts are often degraded and their roles ^P[OPU�[OL�JVTT\UP[PLZ�OH]L�JOHUNLK�� :\JJLZZM\S�YLPU[LNYH[PVU�OHZ�UV[�WYV]LU�[V�IL�LHZ`"�(J[PVU(PK�MV\UK�[OH[�VM�HSS�the alleged witches that returned, forty percent had to return to the camp again within one year.� Earlier, the Commission VU�/\THU�9PNO[Z�HUK�(KTPUZ[YH[P]L�1\Z[PJL��*/9(1��YLWVY[LK��¸[OL�JHZL�VM�H�^VTHU�^OV�YL[\YULK�[V�OLY�]PSSHNL�HUK�was found dead the following morning...her body burnt. Another old woman had OLY�LHY�JOVWWLK�Vќ�^P[O�H�J\[SHZZ�VU�OLY�YL[\YU�OVTL�¹��


JUIS62


addressing the witches' camps

(S[OV\NO�UV�TLHZ\YLZ�OH]L�ILLU�taken that would lead to the actual closure of the camps, the Ghanaian 4PUPZ[Y`�VM�>VTLU�HUK�*OPSKYLU»Z�(ќHPYZ��46>(*��OHZ�THKL�Z\JO�WYVWVZHSZ��A sharp debate emerged in the media from 2011 onwards, as a response to a statement by the ministry’s Deputy 4PUPZ[LY��4Z��/HPQH�/H^H\�)V`H�.HYPIH��She said that “the incarceration and JVUÄULTLU[�VM�^VTLU�PU[V�JHTWZ�by society and community members, JVUZ[P[\[LK�NYVZZ�]PVSH[PVUZ�VM�[OLPY�O\THU�YPNO[Z��MYLLKVTZ�HUK��^HZ��HNHPUZ[�[OL�<UP[LK�5H[PVUZ�*VU]LU[PVU�on the Elimination of All forms of +PZJYPTPUH[PVU�HNHPUZ[�>VTLU��VM��^OPJO�.OHUH�PZ�ZPNUH[VY �̀¹�� She does not refer to the human rights abuses PU�[OL�JHTWZ��PU[LY]LU[PVU�SL]LS��VY�[OL�HJJ\ZH[PVUZ�P[ZLSM��PU[LY]LU[PVU�SL]LS��HZ�[OL�OLHY[�VM�[OL�WYVISLT��:OL�]PL^Z�[OL�¸PUJHYJLYH[PVU�HUK�JVUÄULTLU[�¹�VY�[OL�L_PZ[LUJL�VM�[OL�JHTWZ�[OLTZLS]LZ��HZ�[OL�WYVISLT�[OH[�ZOV\SK�IL�ZVS]LK��*VUZLX\LU[S �̀�[OL�(J[PVU(PK�UL^Z�YLWVY[�Z[H[LZ�¸46>(*�in collaboration with other stakeholders is working assiduously to disband all ¸^P[JOLZ¹�JHTWZ�PU�.OHUH�¹�� According [V�]HYPV\Z�5.6Z��[OL�TPUPZ[LY�HSZV�mentioned a timeframe in which the JHTWZ�^LYL�[V�IL�JSVZL"!�LHYS`��was to be the deadline.��

0[�PZ�[OPZ�HKKP[PVU�[OH[�WYV]VRLK�NGOs and camp residents to respond. =HYPV\Z�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ�L_WYLZZLK�an opinion similar to that of the

Southern Sector Yough and Women’s ,TWV^LYTLU[�5L[^VYR��:6:@>,5��^OPJO�Z[H[LK�[OH[�P[�¸YL]LHSZ�H�SHJR�VM�understanding of how deeply engrained the beliefs are in those communities and [OL�KPѝJ\S[PLZ�ILPUN�MHJLK�[V�LUJV\YHNL�them to accept accused ‘witches’ back OVTL�¹�� The NGOs expressed that they are not against disbanding the camps PU�NLULYHS��I\[�[OH[�[OL`�ILSPL]L�[OL`�should not be closed on the short term. The alleged witches agreed with that opinion.��

;OL�4PUPZ[Y`�JVUZLX\LU[S`�HNYLLK�to the fact that disbandment should IL�NYHK\HS�HUK�[OH[�ZLUZP[PaH[PVU�LќVY[Z�ZOV\SK�IL�WHYHTV\U[�� One and a half year later NGOs note that [OL�NV]LYUTLU[�OHZ�KVUL�]LY`�SP[[SL�[V�TV]L�[V^HYKZ�JSVZ\YL�VM�[OL�JHTWZ�� (S[OV\NO�5.6Z�OH]L�JVU[PU\LK�[V�reintegrate accused witches, new HYYP]HSZ�OH]L�LX\HSS`�JVTL��


addressing the accusations

All of those arguing against immediate disbandment of the camps in fact demand a guarantee of security for the alleged witches. They would support the closure of the camps, but only if accused witches no longer face the risk VM�ILPUN�L_PSLK��HZZH\S[LK�VY�Z[PNTH[PaLK��;OL`�[O\Z�JHSS�VU�JVTT\UP[PLZ�[V�ÄUK�HS[LYUH[P]L�^H`Z�[V�KLHS�^P[O�Z\ZWPJPVUZ�VM�^P[JOJYHM[��;OL�WVSPJPLZ�ÅV^PUN�MYVT�[OPZ�HYN\TLU[�MVYT�H�[OPYK�SL]LS�VM�PU[LY]LU[PVU��

(�]LY`�LHYS`�L_HTWSL�VM�WVSPJ`�aimed at stopping accusations can be

found in the colonial laws prohibiting the anti-witchcraft cults. Anti-witchcraft cults are cults led by priests who ZVS]L�TPZMVY[\ULZ�� The cause they most commonly found for people’s THYP[HS��ÄUHUJPHS��PTTPNYH[PVU�VY�physical troubles, was witchcraft, which therefore led to frequent accusations. In an attempt to curb accusations, colonial legislation outlawed the TV]LTLU[Z�PU�� ;OPZ�KPK�UV[�WYV]L�LќLJ[P]L��OV^L]LY��ILJH\ZL�adherents of the cults resorted to secret worship of the god of the anti-^P[JOJYHM[�TV]LTLU[��*VUZLX\LU[S �̀�the law was soon adapted to allow for ]VS\U[HY`�JVUMLZZPVUZ�HUK�JSLHUZPUN�VM�witchcraft.��

Another type of program, which HPTZ�[V�[HJRSL�[OL�WYVISLT�H[�[OL�SL]LS�VM�accusations, is that of raising awareness VM�^VTLU»Z�YPNO[Z�HUK�VќLYPUN�HS[LYUH[P]L�ways of dealing with suspicions of ^P[JOJYHM[��6YNHUPaH[PVUZ�WYVTV[L�[OPZ�awareness through workshops on health, human rights and welfare of the HNLK��ZLUZP[PaH[PVU�[YHPUPUN�MVY�5.6�Z[Hќ��educational programs, photo exhibitions VU�[OL�SP]LZ�VM�^VTLU�PU�[OL�JHTWZ�� and the SOSYWEN documentary [P[SLK�¸>OH[�0�<ZLK�;V�2UV^!�;OL�9VHK�[V�.OHUH»Z�º>P[JOLZ»�*HTWZ�¹�Simultaneously, a book was published that compiled the best essays on witchcraft accusations, written by some of the students that had participated in the educational program.�� A number VM�5.6Z��*)6Z�HUK�^VTLU»Z�NYV\WZ�OH]L�HSZV�JVTL�[VNL[OLY�[V�MVYT�[OL�Anti-Witchcraft Allegiation Campaign


632013Fall

Coalition. Their aim is to “make witchcraft accusations issues a national issue and get legislators/policymakers [V�Z\WWVY[�[OL�JHTWHPNU¹�� through posters, radio jingles and radio drama in three Northern districts.��


addressing the witchcraft belief

Lastly, some NGOs and researchers YLJVTTLUK�PTWYV]PUN�OLHS[OJHYL�and education as a solution to the human rights abuses.�� These kinds of recommendations are often framed PU�]LY`�NLULYHS�[LYTZ��UV[�L_WSHPUPUN�L_HJ[S`�OV^�HU�HK]HUJL�PU�OLHS[OJHYL�or education would reduce the number of accusation-related human rights abuses. What they actually attempt to KV��OV^L]LY��PZ�[V�KLJYLHZL�[OL�ILSPLM�in witchcraft by substituting the logic of THNPJ�^P[O�H�ZJPLU[PÄJ�SVNPJ��<S[PTH[LS �̀�[OL`�Z[YP]L�[V�JVU]PUJL�WLVWSL�VM�[OL�MHSSHJ`�VM�^P[JOJYHM[��6[OLYZ�KV�UV[�L]LU�WYVWVZL�HU�HS[LYUH[P]L�SVNPJ��I\[�ZPTWS`�recommend making people understand [OH[�^P[JOJYHM[�PZ�Z\WLYZ[P[PV\Z��4LUZHO�Adinkrah, for example, proposes “the Ghanaian authorities should mount H�THZZP]L�HNNYLZZP]L�W\ISPJ�ZLY]PJL�campaign […] to educate the Ghanaian public about the fallacy of witchcraft ILSPLMZ�HUK�HJJ\ZH[PVUZ�¹��

)LJH\ZL�[OL�JVYYLSH[PVU�IL[^LLU�HU�HK]HUJL�PU�OLHS[OJHYL�HUK�H�KLJYLHZL�PU�accusation-related human rights abuses is often so unclear, this article will suggest three possible logics behind it. -PYZ[S �̀�HK]HUJLK�OLHS[OJHYL�^V\SK�IYPUN�down the number of early deaths, which

would consequently reduce the number of mishaps in need of a supernatural explanation, such as witchcraft. Secondly, better and more widespread knowledge on common causes of death renders inexplicable deaths explicable. Thirdly, an increase in medical RUV^SLKNL�VќLYZ�H�IL[[LY�\UKLYZ[HUKPUN�of mental disorders,�� which would replace the need for a supernatural L_WSHUH[PVU�MVY�ºHZVJPHS»�ILOH]PVY�I`�‘witches’. An example can be found in a documentary made by SOSYWEN, PU�^OPJO�VUL�VM�[OL�Z[Hќ�TLTILYZ�VM�[OL�.OHUH�/LHS[O�:LY]PJL��./:��KVLZ�H�presentation for a group of middle-aged women in order to make them aware of the medical reasons for their potentially ºHZVJPHS»�ILOH]PVY��/L�L_WSHPUZ!�

“The period even before the

menopause what we call the

pre-menopausal era, you will

go through a lot of tension, you

sweat a lot (and) you complain

(about) a lot of very little things,

`V\�ZOV\[�H[�`V\Y�JOPSKYLU¯sometimes you will say things

and they will happen. In the same

way, if a relative of yours has

been accused, send the person

for medical check-up, it is most

likely that this person is having a

medical condition that makes him

or her behave in such a manner

that people will call (them) a

witch.”��

What these three correlations illustrate is the fact that there are two

JVUKP[PVUZ�[OH[�ULLK�[V�IL�ZH[PZÄLK�before a person can be branded a witch. First of all, there needs to IL�H�JVUK\JP]L�LU]PYVUTLU[�MVY�[OL�accusation. This is a long-term condition that makes certain people more ]\SULYHISL�[V�^P[JOJYHM[�HJJ\ZH[PVUZ�[OHU�V[OLYZ��TVZ[S`�ILJH\ZL�[OL`�KP]LYNL�from what is normal or expected of their age group, gender or general status as a community member.� �/V^L]LY��[OLZL�JVUKP[PVUZ�HSVUL�HYL�UV[�Z\ѝJPLU[�[V�make an accusation. It takes a spark to transform it into an accusation. This spark may take the form of a mishap of some kind. The last mechanism, WLY[HPUPUN�[V�[OL�HZVJPHS�ILOH]PVY�[OH[�may be displayed by some alleged ^P[JOLZ��[HRLZ�H^H`�[OL�ºJVUK\JP]L�LU]PYVUTLU[»"�7LVWSL�HYL�VќLYLK�H�ZJPLU[PÄJ�L_WSHUH[PVU�MVY�[OL�HIUVYTHS�ILOH]PVY�[OL`�^PSS�UV[�ULLK�[V�YLZVY[�to magical explanations anymore. The ÄYZ[�[^V�TLJOHUPZTZ�YLSH[L�UV[�[V�[OL�JVUK\JP]L�LU]PYVUTLU[�I\[�[V�[OL�ZWHYR��Fewer early deaths mean fewer mishaps for which a scapegoat must be sought. Similarly, if people know that a certain disease causes a death, there will be no need for a magical explanation anymore. The spark is thereby eliminated.

Note that these policies rely on the HZZ\TW[PVU�[OH[�ZJPLU[PÄJ�HUK�THNPJHS�L_WSHUH[PVUZ�MVY�JLY[HPU�L]LU[Z�HYL�T\[\HSS`�L_JS\ZP]L��4VYLV]LY��P[�PZ�[HRLU�for granted that, if people are presented ^P[O�H�JOVPJL�IL[^LLU�ZJPLU[PÄJ�HUK�magical logic, they will doubtlessly JOVVZL�[OL�ZJPLU[PÄJ��[OLYLI`�abandoning their belief in witchcraft.


JUIS64

Apart from the recommendation of HK]HUJLK�OLHS[OJHYL��PU[LY]LU[PVU�SL]LS��HSZV�JHSSZ�MVY�PTWYV]LK�LK\JH[PVU��(KPURYHO��MVY�L_HTWSL��ZH`Z�[OH[!�¸MVYTHS�LK\JH[PVU�TH`�OH]L�[OL�WV[LU[PHS�VM�LYHKPJH[PUN�Z\JO�B^P[JOJYHM[D�ILSPLMZ¹�MVY�¸PSSP[LYHJ`�TH`�OH]L�JVU[YPI\[LK�[V�^P[JOJYHM[�ILSPLMZ�¹�� Adinkrah does UV[�JSHYPM`�OV^�H�OPNOLY�SL]LS�VY�TVYL�widespread education will lead to a decrease in the human rights abuses related to witchcraft accusations. A possible explanation is that educated WLVWSL�HYL�TVYL�SPRLS`�[V�YLWVY[�]PVSLUJL�and exile to the police and will therefore IL�SLZZ�]\SULYHISL��(UV[OLY�L_WSHUH[PVU�is again the assumption that education trains people in a certain mode of [OPURPUN�[OH[�PZ�ILSPL]LK�[V�IL�UVU�compatible with magical explanations.

DiscussionNow that the logic behind the

KPќLYLU[�PU[LY]LU[PVU�SL]LSZ�OHZ�ILLU�JSHYPÄLK��P[�JHU�IL�JVU[YHZ[LK�^P[O�some of what is already known about the nature of witchcraft beliefs and the related human rights abuses. In doing so, it becomes clear that certain kinds of policy are based on assumptions that OH]L�ILLU�WYV]LU�[V�IL�^YVUN��

:[HY[PUN�^P[O�PU[LY]LU[PVU�SL]LS��eradicating the belief in witchcraft, it is WVZZPISL�[V�ÄUK�[^V�THQVY�ÅH^Z�PU�[OL�assumptions on which these types of WVSPJ`�PU[LY]LU[PVUZ�YLZ[��(�WVSPJ`�VM�[OPZ�RPUK�HZZ\TLZ�[OH[�ZJPLU[PÄJ�HUHSVN`�HUK�THNPJHS�HUHSVN`�HYL�T\[\HSS`�L_JS\ZP]L��0[�assumes that the problem lies in the fact [OH[�WLVWSL�SHJR�ZJPLU[PÄJ�L_WSHUH[PVUZ�for certain mishaps. It supposes that, ÔLU�WLVWSL�HYL�WYV]PKLK�^P[O�ZJPLU[PÄJ�

explanations, in the form of more education and medical knowledge, they will gladly accept it and abandon their old belief system. This assumption fails [V�YLJVNUPaL�[OH[�ZJPLU[PÄJ�HUHSVN`�HUK�THNPJHS�HUHSVN`�HUZ^LY�[^V�KPќLYLU[�questions and can therefore co-exist. A ZJPLU[PÄJ�L_WSHUH[PVU�KVLZ�UV[�LSPTPUH[L�the need for a magical explanation. ,]LY�ZPUJL�,]HUZ�7YP[JOHYK�� HU[OYVWVSVNPZ[Z�OH]L�\UKLYZ[VVK�[OH[�[OL�ZJPLU[PÄJ�L_WSHUH[PVU�HUZ^LYZ�[OL�‘how’ of a misfortune. The magical explanation answers the ‘why.’ It is not enough just to know the disease that RPSSLK�ZVTLVUL"�THU`�.OHUHPHUZ�^HU[�to know why it had to be this person that MLSS�]PJ[PT�[V�[OH[�WHY[PJ\SHY�KPZLHZL�H[�[OH[�WHY[PJ\SHY�[PTL��,]HUZ�7YP[JOHYK�JHSSZ�[OLZL�[OL�\UP]LYZHS�HUK�[OL�WHY[PJ\SHY�explanations.��

<UKLYZ[HUKPUN�[OPZ�PU]HYPHIS`�leads to the conclusion that policy aimed at replacing magical analogy I`�ZJPLU[PÄJ�HUHSVN`�^V\SK�IL�M\[PSL"�more widespread medical knowledge will not lead to the abandonment of the ^P[JOJYHM[�ILSPLM�ILJH\ZL�[OL�ZJPLU[PÄJ�complements the magical instead of Z\IZ[P[\[PUN�P[��,]LU�PM�WLVWSL�^LYL�WLYMLJ[S`�H^HYL�VM�[OL�¸OV^¹�MVY�L_HTWSL�how malaria kills people-and could be HIZVS\[LS`�Z\YL�[OH[�[OPZ�PZ�[OL�ZJPLU[PÄJ�cause of someone’s death, a witch could Z[PSS�IL�HJJ\ZLK�VM�OH]PUN�JH\ZLK�P[��:PTPSHYS �̀�PTWYV]LK�LK\JH[PVU�TH`�HSZV�THRL�Z[\KLU[Z�TVYL�H^HYL�VM�ZJPLU[PÄJ�explanations, but does not eliminate the need for magical explanations either.

;OLYL�TH`�IL�VUL�JHZL��OV^L]LY��where science has more of a chance

at substituting magical analogy. In the cases discussed so far, the reason why a ‘witch’ is accused is because of some \UMVY[\UH[L�L]LU[�[OH[�OHZ�OHWWLULK�[V�[OL�]PJ[PT��[OL�ZWHYR��<Z\HSS`�[OL�]PJ[PT�VY�VUL�VM�[OL�]PJ[PT»Z�YLSH[P]LZ�THRLZ�[OL�HJJ\ZH[PVU�VM�^P[JOJYHM[��/V^L]LY��PU�[OL�JHZL�ÔLYL�ZJPLUJL�PZ�\ZLK�[V�NP]L�HU�HS[LYUH[P]L�L_WSHUH[PVU�MVY�HZVJPHS�ILOH]PVY��UV�OHYT�OHZ�ILLU�KVUL�yet. It merely displays people’s fears VU�JVTT\UP[`�TLTILYZ�ÔV�ILOH]L�HIUVYTHSS �̀�;OL�Z[HRLZ�MVY�ILSPL]PUN�[OH[�HIUVYTHS�ILOH]PVY�PZ�K\L�[V�H�TLU[HS�illness or aging process are therefore less high.

;OL�ZLJVUK�ÅH^�PU�[OL�HZZ\TW[PVUZ�VM�WVSPJ`�H[�PU[LY]LU[PVU�SL]LS��PZ�[OL�fact that no distinction is being made between accusations and belief.�� It fails [V�YLHSPaL�[OH[�[OLZL�HYL�[^V�PUKLWLUKLU[�concepts and that the belief can continue to exist without forcibly causing O\THU�YPNO[Z�]PVSH[PVUZ��0[�PZ�[OL�^H`�in which people handle suspicions of ^P[JOJYHM[�[OH[�WVZLZ�[OL�WYVISLT"�[OLZL�actions are not inherent in the belief. The European history of witchcraft also illustrates that belief and accusations are [^V�PUKLWLUKLU[�[OPUNZ��,]LU�[OV\NO��PU�[OL��[O�JLU[\Y`�[OL�HJJ\ZH[PVUZ�VM�witchcraft had stopped, the writings of many great intellectuals such as Isaac 5L^[VU�HUK�9VILY[�)V`SL�KLTVUZ[YH[L�[OH[�[OL`�JVU[PU\LK�[V�ILSPL]L�PU�[OL�existence of witchcraft.�� There is L]PKLUJL�VM�[OL�ZHTL�[HRPUN�WSHJL�in contemporary Western societies. :[VWWPUN�[OL�]PVSLUJL�KVLZ�UV[�YLX\PYL�uprooting a belief. The accusations and the belief should therefore be considered


652013Fall

as separate.(UV[OLY�ÅH^�JHU�IL�MV\UK�PU�[OL�

HZZ\TW[PVUZ�VM�WVSPJPLZ�H[�PU[LY]LU[PVU�SL]LS��ÔPJO�Z\WWVY[�[OL�JSVZ\YL�VM�[OL�camps. The proposal to close the camps rests on the supposition that the camps are inherently bad, or that they are the cause of the problem. This is also YLÅLJ[LK�PU�[OL�Z[H[LTLU[�VM�[OL�KLW\[`�TPUPZ[LY�VM�>VTLU�HUK�*OPSKYLU»Z�(ќHPYZ�4Z��/HPQH�/H^H\�)V`H�.HYPIH, regarding ¸[OL�PUJHYJLYH[PVU�HUK�JVUÄULTLU[�VM�women into camps."�� Although there is no doubt that certain human rights HI\ZLZ��Z\JO�HZ�[OL�SHJR�VM�H�MHPY�[YPHS�and the means used to make an alleged witch confess) are taking place in the camps, the camps as institutions do not constitute the problem. It is incorrect [V�]PL^�[OL�JHTWZ�HZ�ºWYPZVUZ��,]LU�[OV\NO�ZVTL�OH]L�HZZ\TLK�[OH[�JHTW�YLZPKLU[Z�OH]L�UV�MYLLKVT�VM�TV]LTLU[�and experience forced labor, these JSHPTZ�OH]L�JVU[PU\HSS`�WYV]LU�MHSZL�� WLYJLU[�VM�[OL�HSSLNLK�^P[JOLZ�PU�the camps stated, for example, that [OL`�^LYL�MYLL�[V�]PZP[�[OLPY�YLSH[P]LZ�� 0[�^V\SK�IL�TVYL�HJJ\YH[L�[V�]PL^�[OL�JHTWZ�HZ�ºZHML�OH]LUZ�»�;OL`�JVUZ[P[\[L�a refuge for many alleged witches. After HSS��[OL�5**,�OHZ�MV\UK�[OH[��WLYJLU[�of the people in the camps went there out of free will, because of fear of further HJJ\ZH[PVUZ�HUK�VM�Z[PNTH[PaH[PVU�� 4VYLV]LY�� WLYJLU[�VM�[OL�JHTW�residents want the camps to be maintained.��

+L]PZPUN�HU�PUJS\ZP]L��SVUN�[LYT�WSHU��ÔPJO�ÄUHSS`�HYYP]LZ�H[�[OL�JSVZ\YL�VM�[OL�JHTWZ��HZ�ZVTL�5.6Z�OH]L�proposed, seems a good solution.

/V^L]LY��[OL�ÄUHS�VIQLJ[P]L�ZOV\SK�not be to close the camps, but to halt L_PSL�HUK�]PVSLUJL�YLSH[LK�[V�^P[JOJYHM[�accusations. After all, the closure of the camps only means the disappearance of HU�PUZ[P[\[PVU"�P[�KPZYLNHYKZ�[OL�WYVISLT�[OH[�[OL�JHTWZ�[YPLK�[V�ZVS]L!�[HRPUN�JHYL�of abandoned alleged witches. When L_PSL�HUK�]PVSLUJL�Z[VW��OV^L]LY��JHTWZ�would close naturally, because they would no longer be needed.

Now that the defects in the HZZ\TW[PVUZ�VM�WVSPJ`�H[�PU[LY]LU[PVU�SL]LS��HUK��OH]L�ILLU�WVPU[LK�V\[��this article will look at the policies at PU[LY]LU[PVU�SL]LS��!�PTWYV]PUN�[OL�SP]PUN�conditions in the camps. Rationally, taking care of the camp residents is not NVPUN�[V�JVU[YPI\[L�[V�[OL�ÄUHS�NVHS�VM�stopping the human rights abuses. It is not a structural solution to the problem. /V^L]LY��VUL�JHUUV[�H[[LTW[�[V�WYL]LU[�UL^�JHZLZ�VM�]PVSLUJL�HUK�IHUPZOTLU[��while neglecting the fate of those who OH]L�HSYLHK`�\UKLYNVUL�H[YVJP[PLZ�HUK�HYL�SP]PUN�PU�H�^P[JOLZ»�JHTW��

All three types of policy at PU[LY]LU[PVU�SL]LS��PTWYV]PUN�SP]PUN�JVUKP[PVUZ��YLPU[LNYH[PVU and empowerment) are indispensable in ZLY]PUN�[OL�ULLKZ�VM�[OL�JHTW�YLZPKLU[Z��(KLX\H[L�SP]PUN�JVUKP[PVUZ�HYL�ULJLZZHY`�HZ�[OL�LHYSPLZ[�YLZWVUZL�[V�L_PSL"�[OL�accused need protection, shelter and food.

/V^L]LY��[OL�Z[H`�H[�[OL�JHTW�KVLZ�not need to be a permanent solution. )V[O�[OL�HSSLNLK�^P[JO�HUK�OPZ�VY�OLY�JVTT\UP[`�OH]L�H�Z[HRL�PU�YLPU[LNYH[PVU�ÔLU�[LUZPVUZ�OH]L�KLJYLHZLK��;OL�

alleged witch has a chance to be reunited with his or her family, to retake his or her place in the community and UV[�[V�IL�Z[PNTH[PaLK�HU`�SVUNLY��-VY�[OL�JVTT\UP[ �̀�P[�WYV]LZ�[OH[�WLVWSL�JHU�really be ‘exorcised’ from witchcraft. It ZL[Z�HU�L_HTWSL�[OH[�JV\SK�IL�ILULÄJPHS�to future accused witches, because [OL�JVTT\UP[`�TPNO[�OH]L�YLHSPaLK�[OH[�people can be welcomed back without fear of new witchcraft practices.

Empowerment is particularly PTWVY[HU[�PU�[OL�SVUN�[LYT��/H]PUN�ZLSM�JVUÄKLUJL�HUK�ILPUN�YLHK`�[V�Z[HUK�\W�MVY�VUL»Z�YPNO[Z�TH`�WYV]L�\ZLM\S�whether people stay at the camp or are reintegrated into their communities. In the camps, as has been shown ILMVYL��HSSLNLK�^P[JOLZ�OH]L�MVYTLK�UL[^VYRZ�^P[O�H�Z[YVUN�JVSSLJ[P]L�]VPJL�� When reintegrated, more empowered ^VTLU�TPNO[�IL�SLZZ�]\SULYHISL�[V�new witchcraft accusations since one characteristic of alleged witches is their weak social protection. It should be UV[LK��OV^L]LY��[OH[�P[�OHZ�HSZV�ILLU�VIZLY]LK�[OH[�^VTLU�ÔV�KP]LY[�[VV�much from gender standards form HUV[OLY�NYV\W�[OH[�PZ�]\SULYHISL�[V�accusations. � If women are thus so LTWV^LYLK�[OH[�[OL`�Z[HY[�SP]PUN�]LY`�independently from men, they risk being HJJ\ZLK�HNHPU��Q\Z[�[OYV\NO�H�KPќLYLU[�mechanism.

;OL�ÄYZ[�SL]LS�VM�PU[LY]LU[PVU�PZ�[OL�oldest and the one in which the largest U\TILY�VM�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ�HYL�PU]VS]LK��This may be explained by the fact that the problem, as well as the results of PU[LY]LU[PVUZ��HYL�[OL�TVZ[�]PZPISL�HUK�


JUIS66

L]LU�[OL�TVZ[�[HUNPISL�H[�[OPZ�SL]LS��The needs of the group can be easily Z\Y]L`LK��HUK�ZPUJL�[OVZL�HYL�SHYNLS`�material needs, they are also more easily ZVS]LK�[OHU�[OL�WYVISLTZ�MV\UK�H[�V[OLY�SL]LSZ�VM�PU[LY]LU[PVU��-\Y[OLYTVYL��[OL�LќLJ[Z�VM�HU�PU[LY]LU[PVU�HYL�LHZPS`�PU]LZ[PNH[LK�ILJH\ZL�HSS�L_PSLK�^P[JOLZ�SP]L�PU�NLVNYHWOPJHSS`�KLTHYJH[LK�HYLHZ��\USPRL�[OL�LќLJ[Z�VM�LK\JH[PVUHS�campaigns that are aimed at large and spatially scattered audiences. The U\TILY�VM�ILULÄJPHYPLZ�JHU�HSZV�IL�accurately measured. All of this is of particular importance to those NGOs dependent on funding agencies that demand measurable outputs.

/V^L]LY��VUL�ZOV\SK�IL�JHYLM\S�not to focus too much on policy with highly measurable outcomes. A healthy IHSHUJL�IL[^LLU�SL]LS��HUK�SL]LS��HPTLK�H[�[OL�HJJ\ZH[PVUZ��ZOV\SK�always be maintained for two reasons. -PYZ[��PU[LY]LU[PVU�SL]LS��[HYNL[Z�VUS`�the ‘symptoms’, but not the root cause. When nothing is being done about the accusations, which form the root of the problem, alleged witches will continue to be assaulted and exiled. Second, WVSPJ`�H[�[OL�ÄYZ[�SL]LS�VM�PU[LY]LU[PVU�VUS`�JHW[\YLZ�H�MYHJ[PVU�VM�[OL�]PJ[PTZ��(M[LY�HSS��H�U\TILY�VM�]PJ[PTZ�HYL�HZZH\S[LK�PU�[OLPY�JVTT\UP[PLZ��I\[�UL]LY�SP]L�PU�witches’ camps. Identifying this group of accused witches who remain in their OVTL�JVTT\UP[PLZ��OV^L]LY��PZ�T\JO�harder because they are often unknown �\USLZZ�]PJ[PTZ�YLWVY[�[V�[OL�WVSPJL��HUK�KPZWLYZLK�V]LY�SHYNL�HYLHZ��;OPZ�THRLZ�P[�KPѝJ\S[�[V�KYH^�JVUJS\ZPVUZ�VU�[OL�extent of the problem and the success VM�PU[LY]LU[PVUZ�

(�ÄUHS�HZWLJ[�VM�[OL�ÄYZ[�PU[LY]LU[PVU�SL]LS�PZ�[OL�HI\UKHUJL�VM�MHP[O�IHZLK�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ��([�SLHZ[�MV\Y�VYNHUPaH[PVUZ��PUJS\KPUN�[OL�7YLZI`[LYPHU�Church of Ghana, the Catholic Relief :LY]PJL��[OL�(ZZLTISPLZ�VM�.VK�HUK�[OL�*OYPZ[PHU�-LSSV^ZOPW�6\[YLHJO�OH]L�YLSPNPV\Z�IHJRNYV\UKZ�HUK�HYL�VY�OH]L�been working to stop human-rights abuses in the camps through direct SP]LSPOVVK�PTWYV]LTLU[�VY�YLPU[LNYH[PVU� � /V^L]LY��[OL`�HYL�UV[�VWLYH[PUN�VU�HU`�V[OLY�SL]LS�VM�PU[LY]LU[PVU��*O\YJOLZ�KV�UV[�LUNHNL�PU�HK]VJHJ �̀�HUK�[OL`�do not support projects that actually take a stance against human rights HJJ\ZH[PVUZ��L]LU�[OV\NO�[OL`�TPNO[�IL�well positioned to do so. �

It is possible to draw a number of conclusions concerning the preferred SL]LS�VM�PU[LY]LU[PVU�MYVT�[OL�WYLJLKPUN�sections. First of all, policy should IL�WYL]LU[P]L�YH[OLY�[OHU�MVJ\ZLK�VU�symptoms of the problem. Its primary goal should not be to ameliorate the SP]PUN�Z[HUKHYKZ�PU�[OL�^P[JOLZ»�JHTWZ��PU[LY]LU[PVU�SL]LS��I\[�[V�WYL]LU[�alleged witches from being assaulted VY�IHUPZOLK�PU�[OL�ÄYZ[�WSHJL��:LJVUK��policy-makers should understand that JHTWZ�HYL�ZHML�OH]LUZ�HUK�UV[�WYPZVUZ��(S[OV\NO�[OL�JHTWZ�KV�UV[�HS^H`Z�VќLY�adequate facilities, the alleged witches H[�SLHZ[�YLJLP]L�WYV[LJ[PVU�MYVT�]PVSLUJL�HUK�HYL�WYV]PKLK�^P[O�IHZPJ�ULJLZZP[PLZ��The fact that the camps exist is not the root of the problem and closing the JHTWZ��PU[LY]LU[PVU�SL]LS��^PSS�[OLYLMVYL�UV[�WYL]LU[�L_PSL�HUK�]PVSLUJL��;OPYK��one should distinguish between the accusations and the belief. Although the

accusations stem from a certain belief, [OL�]PVSLUJL�HUK�L_PSL�HYL�UV[�PUOLYLU[�in the belief. The belief can exist without these harmful practices. Therefore, it is not necessary to try to demonstrate the fallacy of the belief or to try to replace THNPJHS�HUHSVN`�I`�ZJPLU[PÄJ�HUHSVN`��IV[O�PU[LY]LU[PVU�SL]LS��

)HZLK�VU�[OLZL�JVUJS\ZPVUZ��PU[LY]LU[PVU�SL]LS��OHZ�[OL�TVZ[�potential to stop human rights related to witchcraft accusations. If these policies work, the occurrences of exile and ]PVSLUJL�^PSS�KPTPUPZO�HUK�[OL�ULLK�MVY�the camps will be gradually reduced. This means that the need for supply of basic needs, empowerment of camp residents and reintegration will become SLZZ�YLSL]HU[�HUK�[OH[�JHTWZ�^PSS�UV[�need to be closed, they will naturally cease to exist. As long as the harmful practices related to accusations are stopped, the belief can continue to exist harmlessly.

As has been shown before, there HYL�KPќLYLU[�[`WLZ�VM�WVSPJPLZ�HPTLK�H[�[OL�HJJ\ZH[PVUZ��PU[LY]LU[PVU�SL]LS��!�law, raising awareness of women’s rights HUK�VќLYPUN�HS[LYUH[P]L�^H`Z�VM�KLHSPUN�with suspicions. The last two seem to OH]L�[OL�TVZ[�WV[LU[PHS�[V�J\YI�O\THU�YPNO[Z�]PVSH[PVUZ��0M�[OLYL�PZ�VUL�[OPUN�[OH[�YLZLHYJOLYZ�OH]L�HNYLLK�VU��P[�PZ�that “the arms of the law are too short to reach the realm in which witchcraft VWLYH[LZ¹�HZ�Z[H[LK�I`�MVYTLY�*OPLM�Justice of Ghana, Justice Apaloo. � It is simply impossible to bring alleged ^P[JOLZ�[V�JV\Y[�HUK�NP]L�[OLT�H�MHPY�trial. Another purpose of law, to make accusations illegal by law, is also highly


672013Fall

problematic, as has been demonstrated by the example of the prohibition of anti-witchcraft cults by colonial legislation. ;OPZ�SH^�]PY[\HSS`�TLHU[�H�WYVOPIP[PVU�against witchcraft accusations, since [OH[�^HZ�VUL�VM�[OL�THPU�HJ[P]P[PLZ�VM�the anti-witchcraft cults. The fear of accusations greatly increased as a consequence of this law because people felt they were left helpless in the clutches of witches now that they had no way to expose them. �

This example shows that increasing the fear of witchcraft should IL�H]VPKLK��7VSPJ`�ZOV\SK�[OLYLMVYL�IL�THKL�^P[O�[OL�WLYZWLJ[P]L�VM�H�ILSPL]LY�PU�TPUK��<UILSPL]PUN�WVSPJ`�makers cannot assume that they can simply eradicate a belief or practice, ^P[OV\[�VќLYPUN�ILSPL]LYZ�HU�HS[LYUH[P]L�[OL`�OH]L�JVUÄKLUJL�PU��0U�[OL�^VYKZ�VM�;LY�/HHY!�¸0M�P[�PZ�[V�IL�LќLJ[P]L�HUK�SHZ[PUN��BKL]LSVWTLU[D�ZOV\SK�I\PSK�VU�WLVWSL»Z�VÛ�YLZV\YJLZ�¹ � What should be outlawed are not the accusations I\[�[OL�OHYTM\S�WYHJ[PJLZ��L_PSL�HUK�]PVSLUJL��[OH[�HYL�VM[LU�WHY[�VM�P[��0U�MHJ[�such legislation exists already. Article

��VM�[OL�� .OHUPHU�*VUZ[P[\[PVU�states that “all customary practices ÔPJO�KLO\THUPaL�VY�HYL�PUQ\YPV\Z�[V�the physical and mental well-being of a WLYZVU�HYL�WYVOPIP[LK�¹�(K]VJHJ`�MVY�H�more stringent implementation of this SH^�HUK�H�WYVNYHT�[V�LUJV\YHNL�]PJ[PTZ�to report to the authorities thus seems to OH]L�TVYL�WV[LU[PHS�[OHU�H�WYVOPIP[PVU�VM�accusations in general.

;OL�WVSPJ`�HS[LYUH[P]LZ�^P[O�[OL�most potential seem to be both raising awareness of human rights, and VќLYPUN�HS[LYUH[P]L�^H`Z�VM�KLHSPUN�with suspicions. It is important that JVTT\UP[PLZ�HUK�SLHKLYZ�YLHSPaL�[OH[�]PVSLUJL�HNHPUZ[�HUK�L_PSL�VM�HSSLNLK�witches is against the laws of their country and against the dignity of the man or woman concerned. What is needed is a change in the mentality [V^HYKZ�[OL�WLYJLP]LK�YPNO[Z�VM�‘witches.’ Right now, a person loses all rights when he or she is deemed a witch. ��7VSPJ`�ZOV\SK�Z[YP]L�[V�NL[�JVTT\UP[PLZ�[V�HNYLL�[OH[�L]LU�º^P[JOLZ»�OH]L�IHZPJ�O\THU�YPNO[Z��9H[OLY�[OHU�ZPTWS`�PTWVZPUN�\UP]LYZHS�

human rights, the local understanding of the human rights of alleged witches and [OLPY�\UP]LYZHS�O\THU�YPNO[Z�ZOV\SK�IL�made synonymous. �

Witchcraft is not something of which the existence should simply be acknowledged, but something that KLZLY]LZ�JVUZPKLYH[PVU�ÔLU�SVVRPUN�at the consequences of new policy. If H�JLY[HPU�PU[LY]LU[PVU�TLHUZ�[OH[�P[�^PSS�increase people’s fears of witchcraft, P[�PZ�UV[�ILULÄJPHS��;OL�KVÛZPKL�VM�[OPZ��OV^L]LY��PZ�[OH[�P[�YLX\PYLZ�VUL�[V�[HRL�ZLYPV\ZS`�ILSPL]LYZ»�WLYJLP]LK�ULLK�MVY�JVU[YVS�V]LY�^P[JOJYHM[�[OYV\NO�HJJ\ZH[PVUZ��HUK�LUZ\PUN�L_VYJPZT��Peter Geschiere posits this paradox well PU�ZH`PUN!�

“How can one understand

the thrill and excitement they

[images of witchcraft] promise,

if one’s point of departure is that

they are not real and, therefore,

should be explained away by

reducing them to other terms?

)\[��VU�[OL�V[OLY�OHUK��HѝYTPUN�their reality might mean in

WYHJ[PJL�HѝYTPUN�[OH[�TVUZ[YV\Z�accusations are well-founded.” �

(JJ\ZH[PVUZ�ZLY]L�H�W\YWVZL��(�recommendation that policymakers ÄUK�^H`Z�[V�Z[VW�[OL�]PVSLUJL�HUK�[OL�banishment, but not necessarily the HJJ\ZH[PVUZ�[OLTZLS]LZ��ZLLTZ�Ä[[PUN�PU�[OPZ�ZP[\H[PVU��)LSPL]LYZ�ZOV\SK�IL�WYV]PKLK�^P[O�HS[LYUH[P]LZ�[V�]PVSLUJL��These should be sought within the communities, not outside. It has been shown that legislation made by


"The policy alternatives with the most potential

seem to be both raising awareness of human

YPNO[Z��HUK�VɈLYPUN�HS[LYUH[P]L�^H`Z�VM�KLHSPUN�^P[O�suspicions. It is important that communities and

leaders realize that violence against and exile of

alleged witches is against the laws of their country

and against the dignity of the man or woman

concerned. What is needed is a change in the

mentality towards the perceived rights of 'witches.'"

JUIS68

\UILSPL]LYZ�OHZ�UV[�OHK�[OL�KLZPYLK�LќLJ[��>P[OPU�[OL�JVTT\UP[PLZ��OV^L]LY��VUL�JHU�ÄUK�U\TLYV\Z�L_HTWSLZ�VM�WLVWSL�HUK�PUZ[P[\[PVUZ�PU�ÔPJO�ILSPL]LYZ�OH]L�JVUÄKLUJL�

6UL�HS[LYUH[P]L�WVSPJ`�JV\SK�IL�that employed by a community called 2HSHUKL��JSVZL�[V�:HSHNH�PU�[OL�5VY[OLYU�region of Ghana. Their example is cited as a counterexample to the witches’ camps in the report by the NCCE. 0UZ[LHK�VM�IHUPZOTLU[�HUK�]PVSLUJL��[OL`�VUS`�L_VYJPZL�WLVWSL�UVU]PVSLU[S`�and then treat them as a regular person HNHPU��0M�WLVWSL�HJ[\HSS`�ILSPL]LK�[OH[�harmless exorcism, for example through WYH`LY��JHU�IL�LќLJ[P]L��[OLYL�^V\SK�IL�UV�ULLK�MVY�O\THU�YPNO[Z�]PVSH[PVUZ��Communities who send alleged witches away are already familiar with exorcism and many spiritual leaders are able to exorcise witches peacefully. After [OH[��^P[JOLZ�HYL�ILSPL]LK�[V�OH]L�SVZ[�their powers. If communities would thus trust in their own fetish priests, JOPLMZ�VY�ÔVZVL]LY�PZ�YLZWVUZPISL�MVY�KLSP]LYHUJL��[OLYL�^V\SK�IL�UV�YLHZVU�to fear the alleged witches after this ritual. �;OL�SLHKLYZ�VM�[OL�2HSHUKL�community could thus play a crucial role in changing other communities’ attitudes. It is indispensable that the .OHUHPHU�Z[H[L�HUK�5.6Z�PU]P[L�Z\JO�people to conferences and workshops, in which they address human rights and ^P[JOJYHM[�HJJ\ZH[PVUZ�HUK�[OH[�[OL`�NP]L�them an opportunity to teach others.

(UV[OLY�HS[LYUH[P]L�WVSPJ`�PZ�[OH[�\[PSPaLK�I`�JO\YJO�HUK�TVZX\L�SLHKLYZ��>P[O��WLYJLU[�VM�.OHUHPHUZ�PKLU[PM`PUN�[OLTZLS]LZ�HZ�*OYPZ[PHUZ��

2L`�VWPUPVU�SLHKLYZ�Z\JO�HZ�pastors, traditional religious leaders, traditional political leaders, and others should be employed by NGOs and the state to raise awareness of human rights HUK�[V�VќLY�HS[LYUH[P]L�WYHJ[PJLZ�[V�communities that are known to banish and assault many alleged witches. They could also play a role in educational campaigns for the youth, such as the VUL�VYNHUPaLK�I`�:6:@>,5��PU�ÔPJO�Z[\KLU[Z�HYL�[H\NO[�HUK�SH[LY�PU]P[LK�to participate in an essay competition. The best essays are then compiled in H�IVVR��ÔPJO�JHU�HNHPU�ZLY]L�HZ�H�resource for other students, opinion leaders, communities at large and also HZ�H�^H`�MVY��\UILSPL]PUN��5.6�Z[Hќ��policy-makers and researchers to better understand the belief and the witchcraft practices.

ConclusionThis article has attempted to

HUHSàL�[OL�]HY`PUN�RPUKZ�VM�WVSPJ`�[OH[�aim to curb the human rights abuses related to accusations of witchcraft in .OHUH��WHY[PJ\SHYS`�]PVSLUJL�HUK�L_PSL�[V�witches’ camps. It has found that the PU[LY]LU[PVUZ�HYL�THU �̀�I\[�HSS�[HYNL[�KPќLYLU[�YVV[�JH\ZLZ��(�ÄYZ[�JH[LNVY`�of policy is aimed at reducing the poor SP]PUN�Z[HUKHYKZ�^P[OPU�[OL�^P[JOLZ»�JHTWZ��I`�WYV]PKPUN�MVY�TH[LYPHS�needs, by empowerment, and by the reintegration of camp residents into their home communities. A second JH[LNVY`�]PL^Z�[OL�L_PZ[LUJL�VM�[OL�camps to be the heart of the problem HUK�[O\Z�HK]VJH[LZ�MVY�JSVZ\YL�VM�all camps. A third type of policy

HUK��WLYJLU[�HZ�4\ZSPTZ�100 the church is arguably the most important MVYT�VM�HZZVJPH[PVUHS�SPML��0UKP]PK\HSZ»�religious beliefs shape, to a great extent, [OLPY�TLU[HSP[PLZ�[V^HYKZ�KHPS`�L]LU[Z�101 Churches and mosques are therefore ideally placed to do just that when it comes to witchcraft accusations. )LSPL]LYZ�]VS\U[HYPS`�JVTL�[V�JO\YJO��and one of the reasons might be to be morally educated. Church leaders JHU�[OLYLMVYL�¸WYV]PKL�WLVWSL�^P[O�[OL�moral guidance and inspiration to try HUK�JOHUNL�[OLPY�SP]LZ�MVY�[OL�IL[[LY¹�as stated by Ter Haar.103 In the case of witchcraft beliefs and practices, they can perform harmless exorcisms through prayer and can teach their ILSPL]LYZ�[OH[�[OL�HSSLNLK�^P[JOLZ�HYL�innocent afterwards. Like traditional religious leaders, this stance would not VUS`�ILULÄ[�[OL�HSSLNLK�^P[JOLZ��I\[�would also strengthen the church’s own WVZP[PVU��0M�[OL`�WYV]L�[OH[�[OL�WV^LY�of their God is greater than that of the ^P[JOLZ��HUK�[OH[�HM[LY�KLSP]LYHUJL�I`�a pastor, alleged witches present no danger for the community anymore, they reinforce the power of their God. The Ghanaian pastor Himmans, who ^HZ�PU[LY]PL^LK�I`�;LY�/HHY��NP]LZ�HU�L_HTWSL�VM�Z\JO�H�KVJ[YPUL��0U�OPZ�]PL �̂�¸*OYPZ[PHU�ILSPL]LYZ�B¯D�ZOV\SK�IL�ZV�JVU]PUJLK�VM�[OL�Z\WYLTL�WV^LY�VM�the Holy Spirit that there is no need for [OLT�[V�IL�HMYHPK�VM�L]PS�WV^LYZ�[OH[�JHU�harm them, and they should certainly not retaliate by engaging in acts of ]PVSLUJL�¹��


692013Fall

understands the accusations to be the cause and tries to change the nature of HJJ\ZH[PVUZ�[OYV\NO�HK]VJHJ`�HUK�V[OLY�PU[LY]LU[PVUZ��;OL�MV\Y[O�JH[LNVY`�VM�policy sees the belief in witchcraft to be the root cause and tries to eliminate it by showing the fallacy of the belief and by YLWSHJPUN�P[�^P[O�ZJPLU[PÄJ�RUV^SLKNL�

;OL�WVSPJ`�[OH[�ZLLTZ�[V�OH]L�TVZ[�potential is aimed at the accusations. 0[�[YLH[Z�UV[�Q\Z[�[OL�Z`TW[VTZ��[OL�camps), but the root cause of the WYVISLT��[OL�HJJ\ZH[PVUZ��^P[OV\[�destroying anything that is not in itself OHYTM\S��[OL�ILSPLM��0[�JHW[\YLZ�UV[�Q\Z[�the problem of accusation-related exile I\[�HSZV�[OH[�VM�]PVSLUJL�^P[OPU�[OL�JVTT\UP[PLZ��;OL�]PJ[PTZ�[OH[�HYL�OLSWLK�by such policies are both the alleged witches in the camps and those that OH]L�ILLU�HZZH\S[LK�I\[�OH]L�UL]LY�been banished.

Endnotes1. US Department of State 2011; UNCEDAW

2006; UNHCR 2008.

2. Dovlo 2007.

3. Badoe 2005.

4. E.g. Badoe 2005 & 2010; Igwe 26-01-2013; .5(��"�>OP[HRLY��

5. E.g. ActionAid 2012; NCCE 2010; UNCEDAW 2006.

��(KPURYHO��"�;LY�/HHY��

��.5(��"�(KPURYHO��

8. Ter Haar 2007, p. 6.

9. NCCE 10, p. 61.

10. Evans-Pritchard 1937, p. 63.

11. Dovlo 2007; Actionaid 2012.


��=HU�)LLR��

��(KPURYHO��

��(KPURYHO��"�5**,��

��(KPURYHO��

��(KPURYHO��"�5**,��

18. Ter Haar 2007.

� ��(RYVUN��

20. ActionAid 2012; Round Table Conference 1998; Daily Guide 26-11-2010.

21. Daily Guide 26-11-2010.

22. The Finder 03-10-2012.

23. Ghana News Agency 05-09-2012.

��2NH[SH�L[�HS��

25. Round Table Conference 1998.

26. NCCE 2010, p. xv.


��>OP[HRLY��"�(J[PVU(PK��

29. NCCE 2010.

30. Dovlo 2007; Actionaid 2012.

31. NCCE 2010.

32. NCCE 2010, p. 124.

33. Dovlo 2007.

34. Badoe 2005; Badoe 2010.

35. ActionAid 2012.

36. NCCE 2010.

37. Badoe 2005, p. 42.

38. NCCE 2010, p. 26.

39. ActionAid 2012.

40. ActionAid 2012; Ghanaian Times, 30-11-2011; Wiafe 2011.

41. Daily Graphic 29-06-2000.

42. ActionAid 2012.

43. ActionAid 2012, p. 4.

44. NCCE 2010, p. 105.

45. NCCE 2010, p. 34.

46. Ghana Statistical Service 2008.

��>OP[HRLY��"�(J[PVU(PK��"�:6:@>,5�2011; Igwe 26-01-2013.

48. NCCE 2010; ActionAid 2012; GHP 2011; Hunter 2011.




51. Timara-Tama Project Proposal 2012.

52. GNA 2001; ActionAid 2012; Naatogmah, \URUV^U�`LHY"�/\U[LY��

53. e.g. ActionAid 2012.

54. ActionAid 2012.

55. ActionAid 2009.

56. GNA 10-12-2011.

��5HUNWHHR��

58. General News, 24-05-2012

59. ActionAid 2012

60. Round Table Conference 1998

61. GNA, 07-08-2011

62. GNA, 07-09-2011

63. ActionAid 2012; Hunter, 2011

64. Hunter 2011

65. Ghanaian Times 30-11-2011

66. GHP 2011.

67. General News, 24-05-2012.

68. GNA 09-03-2013.

69. Parish 2011.

70. Gray 2005.

71. GNA 29-10-2010.

72. www.sosywen.org

73. Ziem 2012

74. GNA 29-10-2010.

��(KPURYHO��"�<50*,-��"�

��(KPURYHO��W��

77. MacDougall 2011.

��:6:@>,5�+VJ\TLU[HY`��H[��!��minutes.

79. Geschiere 1997.

��(KPURYHO��W��


82. Dovlo 2007.

83. Ellis 2007.

84. GNA, 07-08-2011, no pagenumbers

85. Dovlo 2007

86. NCCE 2010, p. 42.

87. NCCE 2010, p. 30.

88. NCCE 2010, p 43.

89. ActionAid 2009; ActionAid 2012; GNA 10-

JUIS70

12-2011.

90. Badoe 2005; NCCE 2010; Parish 2000.

91. Round Table Conference 1998; Naatogmah \URUV^U�`LHY�

92. Amenga-Etego, 2006.

93. Dovlo 2007, p. 84.

94. Gray 2005.

95. Ter Haar 2011, p. 8.

��(RYVUN��

97. Ter Haar 2011.

98. Geschiere 1997, p. 21.

99. NCCE 2010.

��*0(�>VYSKMHJ[IVVR�

101. Meyer 1998.

102. Amenga Etego, 2006.

103. Ter Haar 2011, p. 7.

104. Ter Haar 2007, p. 105

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(KPURYHO��4��¸>P[JOJYHM[�HJJ\ZH[PVUZ�HUK�MLTHSL�OVTPJPKL�]PJ[PTPaH[PVU�PU�JVU[LTWVYHY`�Ghana.” Violence Against Women, 10 (2004) pp. 325-356.

(RYVUN��(��¸(�WOLUVTLUVSVN`�VM�^P[JOJYHM[�PU�.OHUH��0U!�;LY�/HHY��.��,K��0THNPUPUN�evil: witchcraft beliefs and accusations in contemporary Africa (2007), pp. 53-66. Trenton: Africa World Press.

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)HKVL��@��¸>OH[�THRLZ�H�^VTHU�H�^P[JO&¹�Feminist Africa 5 (2005): pp. 37-51.

*0(�>VYSK�-HJ[IVVR��^^ �̂JPH�NV]

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;OL�-PUKLY��¸º>P[JOLZ»�PU�[YV\ISL�¹��6J[VILY3) www.ghanaweb.com

Foster, G.M, “Peasant society and the image oflimited goods.” American Anthropologist 67.2 (1965): pp. 293-315.

Geschiere, P.L, The modernity of witchcraft: politics and the occult in postcolonial Africa. (1997) Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.

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charged for subjecting girl to trial by ordeal.” (2012, September 5). www.ghananewsagency.org

.OHUH�5L^Z�(NLUJ �̀�¸:LUZP[PaH[PVU�LќVY[Z�needed ILMVYL�KPZIHUKTLU[�VM�º^P[JOLZ»�JHTWZ�¶�NGO”. (2011, September 7). www.ghananewsagency.org

Ghana News Agency, “Spiritualist, two other assault woman, 71.” (2011, May 2). www.ghananewsagency.org

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Ghana News Agency, “NGO to assist Gnani Witches Home.” (2001). www.ghanweb.com

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GHP, “Govt insists on disbandment of witches’ camps.” (2011). www.ghananewsagency.org

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colonial Ghana, 1908-1927.” Journal of Religion in Africa 35. 2 (2005): pp. 139-158.

/\U[LY��:��¸:6:@>,5�JHSSZ�VU�NV]LYUTLU[�[V�WYVWLYS`�OHUKSL�HќHPYZ�VM�HSSLNLK�^P[JOLZ�camp.” (2011, December 9). www.iamaghanaian.com

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5HUNWHHR��+�.��¸;OL�.HTIHNH�¸^P[JOLZ¹�JVSVU`!�its artistic and other cultural life.” (2007)2\THZP!�2^HTL�5RY\THO�<UP]LYZP[`�VM�Science and Technology.

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:6:@>,5�+VJ\TLU[HY �̀�¸>OH[�0�\ZLK�[V�RUV^!�;OL�YVHK�[V�.OHUH»Z�º^P[JOLZ»�camps.” (2011). www.sosywen.org

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UNHCR, “Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural, including the right to development: Report of the special rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, @HRPU�,Y[�YR�¹��^^ �̂HW�VOJOY�VYN�

Unicef, “Children accused of witchcraft: an anthropological study of contemporary practices in Africa.” (2010). www.unicef.org

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=HU�)LLR��>�(��¸;OL�LZJHSH[PVU�VM�^P[JOJYHM[�accusations.” In Ter Haar , G. (Ed.), Imagining evil: witchcraft beliefs and accusations in contemporary Africa. (2007): pp. 67-92). Trenton: Africa World Press. www.ghanaweb.com

>OP[HRLY��2��¸))*�@V\Y�>VYSK�5V�JV\U[Y`�MVY�VSK�women.” (September 2012) ^^ �̂IIJ�JV�\R

Ziem, J., “Don’t Rushed Disbandment of Witches Camps: DOVVSU, CSOs warn government.” The Advocate. (2012, July 1).

JUIS72

WLYH[PVU�VM�[OL�9\ZZPHU�I\PS[�)\ZOLOY�5\JSLHY�7V^LY�7SHU[�PU�0YHU�^HZ�YLJLU[S`�OHUKLK�V]LY�VMMPJPHSS`�[V�[OL�0YHUPHU�ZPKL��@L[��[OL�Z[Y\NNSL�[V�\UKLYZ[HUK�^O`�P[�[VVR�ZV�SVUN�¶�V]LY��years – to complete the plant remains up for discussion. This article argues that the delays ^LYL�JH\ZLK�I`�H�JVTIPUH[PVU�VM�[^V�MHJ[VYZ!�[OL�KVTPUHUJL�VM�JVTTLYJPHS�PU[LYLZ[Z�PU�

9\ZZPHU�PU]VS]LTLU[�PU�[OL�WYVQLJ[�HUK�0YHUPHU�WH`TLU[�ZOVY[MHSSZ��<ZPUN�VPS�WYPJL�KH[H�HUK�J\YYLU[�L]LU[Z�HZ�WYV_PLZ�MVY�[OL�MPZJHS�OLHS[O�VM�[OL�0YHUPHU�NV]LYUTLU[�I\KNL[��[OPZ�HY[PJSL�KLTVUZ[YH[LZ�H�Z[YVUN�JVYYLSH[PVU�IL[^LLU�[OL�KLSH`Z�HUK�WLYPVKZ�VM�[YV\ISLK�NV]LYUTLU[�MPUHUJLZ�PU�0YHU��

6U�1HU\HY`�� 0YHU�HUK�Russia signed a landmark nuclear cooperation agreement under which 4PU([VT��[OLU�[OL�9\ZZPHU�4PUPZ[Y`�for Atomic Energy, would complete the long-halted construction of the first YLHJ[VY�H[�[OL�)\ZOLOY�5\JSLHY�7V^LY�7SHU[�PU�)\ZOLOY��0YHU��*VUZ[Y\J[PVU�on the plant had started in the � ��Z�I`�:PLTLUZ�*VYW��I\[�OHK�been halted under U.S. pressure on the German contractor following a ZLYPLZ�VM�V]LYK\L�WH`TLU[Z�HM[LY�[OL�0YHUPHU�9L]VS\[PVU�1�;OPZ�VYPNPUHS�� contract called for the plant’s first reactor to be built in 55 months and to be commissioned in 2001.2 Yet, fifteen years later, these plans for the reactor OHK�Z[PSS�UV[�ILLU�YLHSPaLK��6US`�PU�September 2011, after numerous delays, did Atomstroyexport, which

had inherited the contract from the KLM\UJ[�4PU([VT��VMMPJPHSS`�JVUULJ[�the plant to the Iranian national power grid.

4VZ[�HNYLL�[OH[�WYPVY�[V�[OL�February 2005 P5+1 fuel swap agreement, a concerted U.S. effort [V�OHS[�[OL�)\ZOLOY�WYVQLJ[�^HZ�the chief reason for delays. For instance, after a Russian request for manuals and design information for equipment installed by the Germans PU�[OL�� Z��[OL�.LYTHUZ�YLM\ZLK�[V�assist the Russians under Western pressure, particularly from the United States. Similarly, the United States succeeded in encouraging states such HZ�<RYHPUL�HUK�[OL�*aLJO�9LW\ISPJ��^OPJO�V[OLY^PZL�^V\SK�OH]L�Z\WWSPLK�materials and technology for the plant, [V�WYL]LU[�Z\JO�ZHSLZ�[V�0YHU�3

Following the 2005 deal, the U.S. NV]LYUTLU[�ZSV^S`�Z[VWWLK�L_LYJPZPUN�the same pressure to delay or stop the plant that it once did. For example, PU�+LJLTILY��[OL�<UP[LK�:[H[LZ�HWWYV]LK�ZHUJ[PVUZ�VU�0YHU�[OH[�WYV]PKLK�HU�L_JLW[PVU�MVY�[YHKL�YLSH[LK�[V�[OL�JVUZ[Y\J[PVU�VM�[OL�)\ZOLOY�plant.� Furthermore, Stuxnet, the JVTW\[LY�]PY\Z�^PKLS`�ILSPL]LK�[V�OH]L�ILLU�THU\MHJ[\YLK�PU�WHY[�I`�[OL�<UP[LK�:[H[LZ��KPK�UV[�[HYNL[�)\ZOLOY�K\YPUN�P[Z�� H[[HJRZ�VU�[OL�Iranian nuclear program.5 And later, in October 2010, then Secretary of State /PSSHY`�*SPU[VU�HUUV\UJLK�KLJPZP]LS`�[OH[�[OL�WSHU[�^HZ�¸UV[�H�WYVISLT¹�MVY�the White House.�

;OPZ�OHZ�NP]LU�YPZL�[V�H�UL^�KLIH[L�V]LY�[OL�JH\ZL�VM�[OL�KLSH`Z�HM[LY�

O

The Bushehr Delays:

by Matthew Michaelides

Did the Iranians Abandon Their Financial Obligations?

Matthew Michaelides. 4H[[OL^�4PJOHLSPKLZ�PZ�H�Q\UPVY�H[�*VS\TIPH�<UP]LYZP[`�THQVYPUN�PU�Economics and Political Science. The research for this paper was completed this past summer when he Z[\KPLK�9\ZZPHU�MVYLPNU�WVSPJ`�[V^HYKZ�0YHU�HZ�H�YLZLHYJO�HZZPZ[HU[�\UKLY�7YVMLZZVY�2PTILYS`�4HY[LU��/L�would like to thank her for her continued support and guidance.

732013Fall

Did the Iranians Abandon Their Financial Obligations?

��:VTL�OH]L�LTWOHZPaLK�[OL�unique technological aspects of the project in explaining the delays.� In particular, the contract required [OL�9\ZZPHUZ�[V�ZÙ[OLZPaL�[OL�original German construction with the new Russian machinery. Other technical explanations proffered,

which are generally amalgamated in KPMMLYLU[�^H`Z�[V�JV]LY�LHJO�KLSH`�that occurred, relate to funding shortfalls, difficulty in finding qualified subcontractors, and sanctions on 0YHU�[OH[�WYL]LU[LK�[OL�PTWVY[H[PVU�of needed materials.� Still, others OH]L�ZV\NO[�[V�JVUULJ[�[OL�KLSH`Z�PU�different ways to ongoing sanctions and fuel enrichment debates between Iran and the West.

This article offers a different understanding of the delays at the )\ZOLOY�5\JSLHY�7V^LY�7SHU[��0[Z�argument is that more than anything else the delays were caused by H�JVTIPUH[PVU�VM�[^V�MHJ[VYZ!�[OL�dominance of commercial interests PU�9\ZZPHU�PU]VS]LTLU[�PU�[OL�WYVQLJ[�and Iranian payment shortfalls. While H�SHJR�VM�KL[HPSLK�KPYLJ[�L]PKLUJL�MYVT�PUKP]PK\HSZ�HZZVJPH[LK�^P[O�[OL�plant’s construction makes it difficult

[V�L]HS\H[L�ÔH[�HJ[\HSS`�JH\ZLK�[OLZL�KLSH`Z��JPYJ\TZ[HU[PHS�L]PKLUJL�suffices in telling the crux of the story. In particular, the correlation traced in this article between the timing VM�[OL�KLSH`Z�H[�[OL�)\ZOLOY�WSHU[�HUK�L]LU[Z�PUKPJH[P]L�VM�I\KNL[PUN�problems in Iran suggests that

the immediate cause of the delays was Iranian nonpayment. Thus, by placing an important emphasis upon Russian commercial interests, [OPZ�HY[PJSL�ZLY]LZ�HZ�HU�LTWPYPJHS�example of recent literature that HZJYPILZ�JH\ZHS�WV^LY�[V�PUKP]PK\HS�and corporate commercial interests in the determination of Russian foreign policy.10

-YVT�[OL�UVUWH`TLU[�WLYZWLJ[P]L��there are a few important predictions that can be made and that should be reflected in the empirics of this case. First, the delays would be expected to correlate with periods of H�WYLJHYPV\Z�NV]LYUTLU[�I\KNL[�PU�0YHU��9LSH[P]L�JOHUNLZ�PU�PU[LYUH[PVUHS�oil prices are the primary metric used in this study for discerning the OLHS[O�VM�[OL�NV]LYUTLU[�I\KNL[��NP]LU�[OH[�IL[^LLU��VM�0YHUPHU�NV]LYUTLU[�YL]LU\LZ�JVTL�MYVT�VPS�

sales.11 In addition, key decisions by top Iranian officials that demonstrate concern about the health of the 0YHUPHU�NV]LYUTLU[�I\KNL[�ZOV\SK�IL�correlated with periods of delay on the project. Similarly, periods in which the budget is healthy should feature SLZZ�NV]LYUTLU[�WYLVJJ\WH[PVU�^P[O�[OL�OLHS[O�VM�[OL�NV]LYUTLU[�I\KNL[��HUK�JVUZLX\LU[S`�ML^LY�JVU[YV]LYZPHS�measures aimed at decreasing subsidies or increasing taxes.

Second, the Russian contractor ZOV\SK�OH]L�ZSV^S`�W\ZOLK�IHJR�[OL�deadlines and/or slowed construction, and then taken drastic measures such as completely – or nearly completely – halting construction on the plant or postponing construction indefinitely, after continued defiance by the Iranians. The reasoning behind this prediction is that if financial TV[P]H[PVUZ�[Y\S`�KVTPUH[LK�9\ZZPHU�interests in the construction of the plant, then the Russian contractor ZOV\SK�OH]L�ILLU�^PSSPUN�[V�KLHS�^P[O�H�ZSPNO[�PUJVU]LUPLUJL�PU�[OL�payment schedule as long as the management still thought they would IL�WHPK�L]LU[\HSS`��0M��OV^L]LY��[OL`�had serious doubts about whether they would in fact be paid, they should OH]L�WYLMLYYLK�[V�YLHSSVJH[L�[OLPY�energy to other international projects with more consistent financing, leading to a stoppage of progress at )\ZOLOY��

-PN\YL��NP]LZ�KH[H�VU�[OL�WYPJPUN�VM�)9,5;�JY\KL�MYVT�1HU\HY`��to April 2013—the international oil price data that is used in this report.

;OL�)\ZOLOY�+LSH`Z!�+PK�[OL�0YHUPHUZ�(IHUKVU�;OLPY�-PUHUJPHS�6ISPNH[PVUZ&��4H[[OL^�4PJOHLSPKLZ

"While a lack of detailed direct evidence from

individuals associated with the plant’s construction

THRLZ�P[�KPɉJ\S[�[V�L]HS\H[L�ÔH[�HJ[\HSS`�caused these delays, circumstantial evidence

Z\ɉJLZ�PU�[LSSPUN�[OL�JY\_�VM�[OL�Z[VY �̀�

JUIS74

Figure 2 plots each of the key delays in the post-2005 period alongside these prices. The remainder of this HY[PJSL�L_HTPULZ�LHJO�VM�[OL�MP]L�RL`�delays announced by Rosatom in the post-2005 period to demonstrate a connection between Iranian ability-to-WH`�HUK�[OL�WYVNYLZZ�H[�[OL�)\ZOLOY�plant.

Delay 1: September 2006The first delay of the post-2005

WLYPVK�VJJ\YYLK�PU�:LW[LTILY��;OL�WSHU[�OHK�WYL]PV\ZS`�ILLU�expected to be commissioned by

[OL�LUK�VM��"�OV^L]LY��[OL�KLSH`�postponed the construction deadline [V�:LW[LTILY��HUK�[OL�WSHU[»Z�SH\UJO�KH[L�[V�5V]LTILY��([�the time, Atomstroyexport President Sergei Shmatko announced that the delay was the result of “technical KPMMPJ\S[PLZ¹�VM�HU�\UZWLJPMPLK�UH[\YL��

Yet, this delay is well-correlated with the rapid drop in oil prices MYVT��WLY�IHYYLS�[V��that occurred between August and 6J[VILY��>OPSL�[OL�SH[[LY�WYPJL�VM��PZ�Z[PSS�ZPNUPMPJHU[S`�OPNOLY�[OHU�WYL]HPSPUN�VPS�WYPJLZ�Q\Z[�MP]L�VY�[LU�

`LHYZ�LHYSPLY��[OL�LSLJ[PVU�VM�4HOTV\K�Ahmadinejad in June 2005 had also inaugurated a tremendous increase in fiscal spending for which greater oil YL]LU\LZ�^LYL�ULLKLK��0U�WHY[PJ\SHY��MYVT��NV]LYUTLU[�spending rose by a whopping 25 WLYJLU[��ÔPSL�NV]LYUTLU[�ZWLUKPUN�MYVT��^HZ�L]LU�SHYNLY�[OHU�PU��12 This financial V]LY�JVTTP[TLU[�I`�[OL�0YHUPHU�NV]LYUTLU[�OLSWZ�[V�L_WSHPU�OV^�H�ZPaLHISL��WLY�IHYYLS�KYVW�PU�VPS�prices could generate a fiscal crunch.

Delay 2: February 2007 – December 2007;OL�ZLJVUK�KLSH`�H[�[OL�)\ZOLOY�

plant, which occurred from February [V�+LJLTILY��^HZ�\UPX\L��because it was the only delay of the period for which the officially-stated reason was actually payment difficulties. The Russian side claimed that the Iranians were behind on payments, while the Iranians publically KPZHNYLLK�]PNVYV\ZS`��;OL�YLZ\S[PUN�KYHTH�MVYJLK�[OL�KLSH`�VM�[OL�KLSP]LY`�of nuclear fuel that is needed for SH\UJOPUN�[OL�WSHU[�MYVT�4HYJO��\U[PS�+LJLTILY��HM[LY�ÔPJO�time the payment problem was finally YLZVS]LK��

Again, this delay began just as international oil prices were bottoming V\[��[OPZ�[PTL�L]LU�SV^LY�H[��PU�1HU\HY`��0[�HSZV�LUKLK�HM[LY�VPS�prices had risen significantly, easing [OL�WYLZZ\YL�VU�[OL�NV]LYUTLU[�budget.


-0.<9,��;OL�KPɈLYLU[�SL]LSZ�VM�PU[LY]LU[PVU�H[�ÔPJO�WVSPJPLZ�[HRL�WSHJL�

752013Fall

;OL�NV]LYUTLU[»Z�I\KNL[�^VLZ�at this time were also expressed in an important measure taken domestically with regard to oil and NHZ�JVUZ\TW[PVU��0U�4H`��PU�[OL�midst of the payment dispute with 9\ZZPH��[OL�NV]LYUTLU[�MPYZ[�PTWVZLK�an oil and gas rationing system and raised domestic oil and gas prices by 25 percent.13 These measures J\Y[HPSLK�YLSH[P]LS`�SV^�WYPJLK�domestic purchases of oil and gas, HSSV^PUN�[OL�NV]LYUTLU[�[V�ZLSS�[OLZL�commodities at much higher rates internationally.

The timeline of this delay also conforms perfectly to what would be expected of a long, drawn-out delay under the Iranian ability-to-WH`�WLYZWLJ[P]L��9\ZZPH�PUP[PHSS`�responded to this delay only by Z[H[PUN�[OH[�[OL�M\LS�KLSP]LY`�^V\SK�UV[�[HRL�WSHJL�VU�ZJOLK\SL"�OV^L]LY��as the quarrel increased in duration and tensions heightened, Russia

began to pull workers out of Iran by the hundreds, from a peak of ��[V�Q\Z[�H�TLYL��HUK�L]LU�contemplated cancelling the project.�� This step-by-step decision-making by the Russians shows that they were frustrated by an Iranian action. Rather [OHU�HJ[PUN�\WVU�H�WYLJVUJLP]LK�WVSP[PJHS�VIQLJ[P]L�[OH[�^HZ�PZVSH[LK�from the payment dispute, the Russian side was responding to Iranian nonpayment.

Delay 3: November – December 2008

Delay 3, announced in late 5V]LTILY��^HZ�VMMPJPHSS`�explained as the result of arbitrary technical difficulties resulting from the need to incorporate the old German technology.15�)LJH\ZL�VM�[OL�KLSH`��[OL�launch date was pushed back from [OL�LUK�VM��\U[PS�[OL�LUK�VM��

Just prior to the delay, oil prices

OHK�JHZJHKLK�KV^U�MYVT��PU�1\S`��[V�Q\Z[�� PU�+LJLTILY��4VYLV]LY��PU�6J[VILY��[OL�NV]LYUTLU[�OHK�Z\WWVY[LK�an unpopular tax hike in order to make up for the tremendous drop PU�VPS�YL]LU\LZ��>OPSL�[OL�TLHZ\YL�ultimately did not pass due to protests from the merchant class, [OPZ�NV]LYUTLU[�YL�L]HS\H[PVU�VM�P[Z�finances demonstrates that the Iranian NV]LYUTLU[�I\KNL[�MHJLK�ZLYPV\Z�problems at the time.

In an isolated report, Intelligence

6USPUL published an article in +LJLTILY��[OH[�JSHPTLK�[OH[�Saudi Arabia was paying workers at [OL�)\ZOLOY�WSHU[�[V�X\P[�HUK�SLH]L�in an effort to delay progress at the plant.�� With just the one author-less YLWVY[�[V�NV�VMM�VM��4HYR�5��2H[a»Z�assessment is more sensible—that “it’s unclear whether this astounding YLWVY[�PZ�HJJ\YH[L�¹��.P]LU�[OL�OPNO�W\ISPJP[`�VM�[OL�)\ZOLOY�WSHU[�H[�


FIGURE 2

JUIS76

the time, it remains possible that this report was planted by a foreign PU[LSSPNLUJL�VYNHUPaH[PVU�

Delay 4: November 2009In similar style to past delays, Sergei

Shmatko announced that the delay in 5V]LTILY�� ^HZ�HSZV�[OL�YLZ\S[�VM�¸[LJOUPJHS�PZZ\LZ�¹�� This delay pushed the launch date for the plant back MYVT�[OL�LUK�VM�� [V�4HYJO��I`�ÔPJO�[PTL�[OL�WSHU[�OHK�WYL]PV\ZS`�been expected to be operational.�

At a first glance, it may not seem as if the international oil prices seen in 5V]LTILY�� ^V\SK�IL�JVYYLSH[LK�with a fiscal crunch at home. In fact, while one could call the oil prices seen K\YPUN�[OL�THQVYP[`�VM�� ¸Z[HISL�¹�[OL�KLZJYPW[VY�¸Z[HNUHU[¹�PZ�WLYOHWZ�TVYL�HJJ\YH[L��,]LU�[OV\NO�VPS�WYPJLZ�experienced a slight rise through the period, they remained far below the OPNOZ�VM�LHYS`�[V�TPK��ÔPJO�L_JLZZP]L�NV]LYUTLU[�ZWLUKPUN�YLNPTLZ�MYVT��OHK�JVTL�to depend upon. For instance, in 5V]LTILY�� [OL�WYPJL�VM�H�IHYYLS�VM�)9,5;�JY\KL�^HZ��JVTWHYLK�[V��WVZ[LK�PU�1\S`��(�5V]LTILY�� HY[PJSL�from the LA Times duly asserted that ¸VPS�WYPJLZ�HYL�KVÛ¹�PU�H�KLWYLZZLK�LJVUVTPJ�LU]PYVUTLU[�20

(Z�Z\JO��SH[L�� HSZV�ZH^�[OL�OLPNO[LUPUN�VM�H�KLIH[L�V]LY�H�UL^�WSHU�HPTLK�H[�OHS[PUN�NV]LYUTLU[�VPS�and gas subsidies in Iran in an effort

[V�PUJYLHZL�VPS�HUK�NHZ�YL]LU\LZ�MVY�[OL�NV]LYUTLU[��0U�HKKP[PVU�[V�VPS�HUK�NHZ��[OL�0YHUPHU�NV]LYUTLU[�WYV]PKLZ�Z\IZPKPLZ�VU�MVVK��TLKPJPUL��and other basic necessities that in all accounted at their peak for more than 25 percent of the Iranian GDP.21 Oil subsidies, specifically, were so L_JLZZP]L�[OH[�NHZVSPUL�WYPJLZ�PU�0YHU�VM[LU�MLSS�ILSV^��WLY�NHSSVU��The plan called for the elimination of these subsidies to free up oil and natural gas for international export H[�ZL]LYHS�[PTLZ�[OL�KVTLZ[PJ�WYPJL��[OLYLI`�HZZPZ[PUN�[OL�NV]LYUTLU[�in its efforts to balance its budget. In early January 2010, the subsidy reform bill was officially passed by the Iranian Parliament. Thus, the 0YHUPHU�NV]LYUTLU[»Z�MPZJHS�HNLUKH�demonstrates a direct concern with [OL�]PHIPSP[`�VM�[OL�0YHUPHU�I\KNL[��just as the simultaneous delay at the )\ZOLOY�WSHU[�^V\SK�PTWS`��

Delay 5: August – November 2010

On August 13, 2010, Rosatom announced that by August 21, 2010 [OL�MPYZ[�YLHJ[VY�H[�)\ZOLOY�^V\SK�

start being loaded with nuclear fuel, a process which was expected to VUS`�[HRL��KH`Z�22 The reactor was expected to come online by :LW[LTILY��/V^L]LY��[OL�M\LS�was not completely loaded into the YLHJ[VY�\U[PS�5V]LTILY��

The dates for this delay fit international oil prices well. The delay began during a period of stagnant international oil prices – and it ended HM[LY�[OL`�OHK�ILN\U�[V�YPZL��/V^L]LY��most telling about the timing for this delay are two important budgetary L]LU[Z�[OH[�VJJ\YYLK�JVUJ\YYLU[S`��First, in July 2010, Ahmadinejad and OPZ�NV]LYUTLU[�WYVWVZLK�H�ZLJVUK�tax hike that, like the one proposed in 6J[VILY��^HZ�L]LU[\HSS`�ILH[LU�back by angry merchant protests. Later, in early December 2010, the NV]LYUTLU[��SLK�I`�(OTHKPULQHK��hastily initiated the widely unpopular subsidy reform plan passed in January ��HNHPUZ[�[OL�HK]PJL�VM�OPZ�[VW�LJVUVTPJ�HK]PZVYZ�PU�HU�LMMVY[�¸[V�IVVZ[�YL]LU\L�¹25�)V[O�ZOV^�[OL�

WYLVJJ\WH[PVU�VM�[OL�NV]LYUTLU[�^P[O�the budget, indicating that financing [OL�U\JSLHY�WV^LY�WSHU[�^V\SK�OH]L�been increasingly difficult.


;O\Z��[OL�0YHUPHU�NV]LYUTLU[»Z�ÄZJHS�HNLUKH�demonstrates a direct concern with the viability

of the Iranian budget, just as the simultaneous

delay at the Bushehr plant would imply."

772013Fall

Another Delay: February – April 2011

A final delay to the project, which is not noted in Figure 2, occurred in February 2011. At that time, Iran told the IAEA that the delay was the result of a broken pump in the reactor’s cooling system.�� As a result, Iran was forced to unload nuclear fuel from the reactor to fix the cooling system, before reloading the fuel once again. 0U�[OLPY�4H`��YLWVY[��[OL�0(,(�confirmed that the reloading of the plant had been completed in mid-April.��

Yet, the February 2011 delay stands out from the others for a few significant reasons. First, the delay was announced by the Iranian side, rather than the Russian side. This indicates that this particular delay was not an output of Russian foreign WVSPJ`"�YH[OLY��[OL�KLSH`�^HZ�0YHUPHU�state policy.��

Second, the official reason for the KLSH`�^HZ·\USPRL�[OVZL�VM�WYL]PV\Z�KLSH`Z·]LYPMPHISL��HJJ\YH[L��HUK�based on a truly unpredictable ]HYPHISL��0U�HKKP[PVU�[V�THRPUN�[OPZ�delay less suspicious, this also helps to further separate this delay from the others.

As a result, there is little expectation for this delay to conform to the pattern seen in the other delays. The delay was not planned by the Russians, so why would it conform to a theory for Russian foreign policy decision-making? Indeed, the delay came as

)9,5;�JY\KL�WYPJLZ�^LYL�YPZPUN�[V�some of the highest prices seen in years.

It is also worth pointing out some Z\NNLZ[P]L�L]LU[Z�[OH[�VJJ\YYLK�after the delays ran their course. For instance, the plant’s launch only came after international oil prices OHK�Z[HIPSPaLK�H[�[OL��IHYYLS�WYPJLZ�SHZ[�ZLLU�ILMVYL�TPK��This would seem to suggest that real progress on the plant was only possible in years when the Iranian NV]LYUTLU[�I\KNL[�^HZ�YLSH[P]LS`�healthy.� In addition, the subsidy YLMVYT�W\ZOLK�PU�SH[L�� HUK�through 2010 in spite of tremendous political opposition was abandoned in 2012 with little explanation after oil prices rebounded.30�;OPZ�]LYPMPLZ�[OL�link posited in this paper between the 0YHUPHU�NV]LYUTLU[»Z�KLJPZPVUZ�VU�subsidy reform, international oil prices, and the economic health of the Iranian budget.

ConclusionThis study offers a new

interpretation of the delays at the )\ZOLOY�5\JSLHY�7V^LY�7SHU[�PU�the post-2005 period. While the WYL]PV\ZS`�TLU[PVULK�HS[LYUH[P]L�explanations for the delays are purely KLZJYPW[P]L�HUK�SHJR�HU�VIQLJ[P]L�[LZ[��[OPZ�HY[PJSL�KYH^Z�\WVU�X\HU[P[H[P]L�KH[H�L]HS\H[LK�\ZPUN�H�JVUZPZ[LU[�[LZ[�^P[O�H�WYLKPJ[P]L�JHWHIPSP[`�[V�KYH^�its conclusions. The result raises questions about the nature of Russia’s Iran policy and challenges expert

understandings of Russian foreign policy itself.

First, this article demonstrates that analyses asserting that Russian-Iranian relations are based on a Z[YH[LNPJ�MV\UKH[PVU�OH]L�UV�IHZPZ�31 Instead, the finding that the financial benefit of the project to the Russian ZPKL�^HZ�[OL�RL`�TV[P]H[VY�MVY�[OL�plant’s construction suggests that commercial interests underpin the Russian-Iranian relationship. -\Y[OLYTVYL��[OLYL�PZ�SP[[SL�L]PKLUJL�VM�HU`�ZVY[�VM�ºHSSPHUJL»�ILOH]PVY�IL[^LLU�Russia and Iran. Such cannot be the case when cooperation is based upon financial gain and intersecting, rather than parallel, interests.

On a broader scale, one PU[LYWYL[H[PVU�VM�[OPZ�L]PKLUJL�PZ�[OH[�the foreign policy logic of the Russian Z[H[L�OHZ�ZOPM[LK�[V�WYPVYP[PaL�LJVUVTPJ�JVUJLYUZ�V]LY�[OLPY�NLVWVSP[PJHS�counterparts.

@L[��^OPSL�[OPZ�WLYZWLJ[P]L�^V\SK�conform with much of the literature on Russian foreign policy towards Iran – and Russian foreign policy in general – it may not be correct. Realistically speaking, it seems truly W\aaSPUN�[OH[�9\ZZPH�^V\SK�IL�^PSSPUN�to compromise its political orientation towards the Iranian nuclear program based on economic interests. If state economic interests are the basis of the Russian-Iranian relationship, why has bilateral trade remained insignificant to 4VZJV^�H[�H�TLYL��IPSSPVU�WLY�`LHY&

4VYL�SPRLS`��[OL�KVTPUHUJL�


JUIS78

of commercial interests in the JVUZ[Y\J[PVU�VM�[OL�)\ZOLOY�5\JSLHY�Power Plant indicates the presence VM�HZZVJPH[LK�PUKP]PK\HS�PU[LYLZ[Z�PU�the profitability of the plant. High-YHURPUN�L_LJ\[P]LZ�PU�([VTZ[YV`L_WVY[�and parent Rosatom, such as Sergey 2PYPLURV�HUK�:LYNLP�:OTH[RV��SPUR�into a complicated, interconnected patronage network that includes =SHKPTPY�7\[PU�HUK�+TP[Y`�4LK]LKL]��among others.32

Endnotes1. “Bonn Concern Ends Iran Nuclear Pact,” The

5L^�@VYR�;PTLZ��(\N\Z[��

��(U[VU�2OSVWRV]�HUK�(UUH�3\[RV]H��¸;OL�)\ZOLOY�577!�>O`�KPK�P[�[HRL�ZV�SVUN&�¹�Center for Energy and Security Studies, August 21, 2010. http://ceness-russia.org/data/doc/TheBushehrNPP->O`+PK0[;HRL:V3VUN�WKM�

3. Ibid.

4. Cole J.Harvey and Richard Sabatini, “Russia’s 3\RL^HYT�:\WWVY[�MVY�0U[LYUH[PVUHS�:HUJ[PVUZ�Against Iran,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, April 15, 2010. http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/russias-support-sanctions-against-iran/

5. Ralph Langner, Email Communication, July 29, 2013.

6. “Clinton: No problem with Iran Bushehr atomic plant,” Reuters, October 26, 2010.

��;OPZ�PZ�[OL�VѝJPHS�L_WSHUH[PVU�MYVT�([VTZ[YV`L_WVY[�7YLZPKLU[�:LYNLP�:OTH[RV�HUK�OPZ�2YLTSPU�Z\WLYPVYZ��

��(U[VU�2OSVWRV]�HUK�(UUH�3\[RV]H��¸;OL�)\ZOLOY�577!�>O`�KPK�P[�[HRL�ZV�SVUN&¹��Center for Energy and Security Studies, August 21, 2010. http://ceness-russia.org/data/doc/TheBushehrNPP->O`+PK0[;HRL:V3VUN�WKM�

��4HYR�5��2H[a��¸9\ZZPH�HUK�0YHU�¹�4PKKSL�,HZ[�7VSPJ`�� !��-HSS��!��¶��VY�¸9\ZZPH�:LLU�<ZPUN�)\ZOLOY�HZ�º3L]LY»�PU�9LSH[PVUZ�with Iran,” BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, March 28, 2007.

��-VY�L_HTWSL��9H^P�(IKLSHS��¸;OL�7YVÄ[Z�VM�

7V^LY!�*VTTLYJL�HUK�YLHSWVSP[PR�PU�,\YHZPH�¹�Review of International Political Economy 20, UV��1\UL��"�HUK�2PTILYS`�4HY[LU��¸(�New Explanation for Russian Foreign Policy: ;OL�7V^LY�VM�0UMVYTHS�7H[YVUHNL�5L[^VYRZ�¹�PONARS Eurasia (Policy Memo 274), September 2013.

��4VOHTTHK�9LaH�-HYaHULNHU��¸6PS�9L]LU\L�:OVJRZ�HUK�.V]LYUTLU[�:WLUKPUN�)LOH]PVY�PU�0YHU�¹�,ULYN`�,JVUVTPJZ��!��¶�1069, November 2011.

12. Nader Habibi, “Iranian Economy in the Shadow of Economic Sanctions,” Crown Center for Middle East Studies, October 2008.

13. Robert F. Worth, “Iran’s Plan to Phase Out :\IZPKPLZ�)YPUNZ�-YLUaPLK�+LIH[L�¹�;OL�5L^�@VYR�;PTLZ��+LJLTILY��

��(U[VU�2OSVWRV]�HUK�(UUH�3\[RV]H��¸;OL�)\ZOLOY�577!�>O`�KPK�P[�[HRL�ZV�SVUN&�¹�Center for Energy and Security Studies, August 21, 2010. http://ceness-russia.org/data/doc/TheBushehrNPP->O`+PK0[;HRL:V3VUN�WKM

��4HYR�5��2H[a��¸9\ZZPH�HUK�0YHU¹��4PKKSL�,HZ[�7VSPJ`�� !��-HSS��!��¶��

16. “Riyadh Butters Up Russian Experts,” Intelligence Online, December 18, 2008.

��4HYR�5��2H[a��¸:H\KP�9\ZZPHU�9LSH[PVUZ�:PUJL�the Abdullah-Putin Summit,” Middle East Policy 16 (1): 113-120, March 2009.

��4PJOHLS�:JO^PY[a��¸5\JSLHY�7SHU[�)\PS[�MVY�9\ZZPH�PZ�+LSH`LK�¹�;OL�5L^�@VYR�;PTLZ��November 17, 2009.

19. “Russian Energy Minister says all done to complete Bushehr NPP,” Ria Novosti, 5V]LTILY�� "�4PJOHLS�:JO^PY[a��“Nuclear Plant Built for Russia is Delayed,” ;OL�5L^�@VYR�;PTLZ��5V]LTILY��

��9HTPU�4VZ[HNOPT�HUK�1LќYL`�-SLPZOTHU��“Iranians brace for tougher economic times,” Los Angeles Times, November 4, 2009.

��1HOHUNHY�(T\aLNHY��¸0YHU»Z�:\IZPK`�9LMVYT!�RIP,” Middle East Economic Survey, December 17, 2012. http://www.mees.com/en/articles/6519-iran-s-subsidy-reform-rip

22. “Bushehr,” Global Security. Accessed May 23, 2013. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/bushehr.htm

23. Ibid.

24. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic

Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency, November 23, 2010. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2010/gov2010-62.pdf

25. Iran to Cut Oil Subsidies in Energy Reform, IMF Survey Online, September 28, 2010. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2010/int092810a.htm

26. “The Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant,” Nuclear Threat Initiative. Accessed July 3, 2013. www.nti.org/facilities/184/

27. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency, May 24, 2011. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2011/gov2011-29.pdf

28. Some have argued that the delays could have been caused by damage that resulted from the Stuxnet virus, however, this seems \USPRLS`�MVY�H�ML^�YLHZVUZ��-PYZ[��:[\_UL[�experts such as Ralph Langner have concluded that Bushehr was not the target of the virus at all and, second, the February delay came months after Stuxnet was discovered and halted.

29. “Iranians Power Up,” The Sun, September 13, 2011.

��1HOHUNHY�(T\aLNHY��¸0YHU»Z�:\IZPK`�9LMVYT!�RIP”, Middle East Economic Survey, December 17, 2012. http://www.mees.com/en/articles/6519-iran-s-subsidy-reform-rip

31. Matthew Michaelides, “Petrol Patronage: How *YVU`�*HWP[HSPZT�(ќLJ[Z�9\ZZPH»Z�9LSH[PVUZ�with Iran,” Columbia Political Review (Fall 2013).

��2PTILYS`�4HY[LU��¸(�5L^�,_WSHUH[PVU�MVY�Russian Foreign Policy: The Power of Informal 7H[YVUHNL�5L[^VYRZ�¹�765(9:�,\YHZPH�(Policy Memo 274), September 2013.

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The Journal of Undergraduate International Studies, published H[�[OL�<UP]LYZP[`�VM�>PZJVUZPU�4HKPZVU��WYLZLU[Z�H�JVTWPSH[PVU�of essays and photos from undergraduate and postgraduate students from around the world. Publications document a ^PKL�]HYPL[`�VM�ZVJPV�WVSP[PJHS�PZZ\LZ�YHUNPUN�MYVT�PU[LYUH[PVUHS�JVUMSPJ[�HUK�KPWSVTHJ`�[V�LU]PYVUTLU[HS�PZZ\LZ�[V�PU[LYUH[PVUHS�LJVUVTPJZ��4VZ[�PTWVY[HU[S �̀�[OL�1V\YUHS�VM�<UKLYNYHK\H[L�0U[LYUH[PVUHS�:[\KPLZ�PZ�PU[LUKLK�[V�ZLY]L�HZ�H�WSH[MVYT�MVY�NSVIHS�discussion and the open exchange of ideas, in effect, expanding our understanding of global interactions.