failed states - rotberg

8/4/2019 Failed States - Rotberg

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by Hohert I, RotbcrgLu{:'ing ;11/f()uac!" E nablius; D om ocracy. The Tiihulotion: SOli/hell!J r,'" :; (J .n,. ' U C ) ' ) (2 ()('))"c '.It1C! "Y(",J;: \ ",.}Pe(jc~'keeping and Pence Enforcement in ;1/rica.' Methods 0/ ConflictPrevention (lOOO)Creating Peace in Sr i lunl.a: Civil IVaI' and Reconciliat ion (1999)Burma: Prospects/or (J DC/IIocmlic Future (1998)iVor and Peace In SOllthem IIji-iea: Crimes, Drugs, Armies, Trade (1998)Haiti Renewed: Polit ical and Economic Prospects (1997)Vigilance and Vengeance: NGOs Preventing Ethnic Conflict in DividedSocieties (1996)From Massacres (0 Gellocide: The Media, Public Policy, andHumanitarian Crises (1 ()%)

State Failure andState Weakness in a

! Time of TerrorIII

Robert 1 . RotbergEditor

WORLD PEACE FOUNDATIONCambridge, Massachusetts

BROOKINGS INS'flTUTION PRESSWashington, D.C


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Cl!APTEE ONE

Failed States, Collapsed States,Weak States: Causes and Indicators

I\

ROBERT 1.ROTBERG

Nation-states fail because they are convulsed by infernal violence and canno longer del iver posi tive po li tica l goods to their inhabi tants. Their govern-ments lose leg it imacy, and the very nature of the part icu lar nation-sta te i tsel fbecomes i llegi timate in the eyes and in the h~rts of a growing plural ity of itscitizens.

The rise and fall of nation-stales is not new, but in a modern era when na-tiona! states constitute the building blocks of legitimate world order the violentdisintegration and palpable weakness of selected African, Asian, Oceanic, andLatin American states threaten the very foundation of that system. Internationalorganizations and big powers consequently find themselves sucked disconcert-ingly into a maelst rom of anomie internal confl ic t and messy humani tarianrelief. Desirable international norms such as stabi li ty and predictabi li ty thusbecome dif ficu lt to ach ieve when so many of the globe 's newer nation-stateswaver precariously between weakness and failure, with some truly failing, oreven col lapsing . In a t ime of terror, moreover, appreciat ing the nature of andresponding to the dynamics of nation-state failure have become central tocriti-cal policy debates. How best tostrengthen weak states and prevent state failurearc among the urgent questions of the twenty ..f irst century.

This book examines con temporary cases of nat ion-state co llapse and fai l-ure.' It establishes clear criteria for distinguishing collapse and failure fromgeneric weakness or apparent distress, and collapse from failure. It further ana-lyzes the nature of state weakness and advances reasons wh y some weak states


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sitar iIll!, n rthe e n vi ro nm ent al c ommon s. -lllgclhcr, I ll IS b un dl e o f p' l li i I t; 11 gO( \ ( i : "roughly 1;111k ordered, csiah lishcs a set of criteria ;lCCOlillllg I f) IVl liCh ! llOdt' Jl ln at io n- sru tc x m av bejudged slrong, weak, or f a i l e d _

Strong stales -obviously pe rform w ell ac ro ss the se c ate gorie s ;jnd w ith rc -speer 10 each, s ep ara te ly . W e ak s ta te s show a mixed profile, fuliltllng expects-nons in some areas and performing poorly in others. The more poorly w eaks la te s p erf orm , c ri te ri on b y c ri te ri on , the w eaker they become, am: thc morethat weakness tends to e dg e t ow ard failure, h en c e t he s ub c at eg or y of weaknessth at i s terflledji:Jiling. Many fai le d s ta te s f lu nk e ac h of the t es ts o ll tl i n e d a bo ~ e.B ut th ey need no t flu nk all of the m to fail o ve ra ll , p ar ti cu la rl y s in ce satisfyingth e s ec uri ty g oo d w eig hs v ery he av ily ) and h ig h l ev el s of i nte rn al v io le nc e a rca ss oc ia te d d ir ec tl y w it h failure and the propensity 10 fail. Y et, v io le nc e a lo nedoc s not c ondition failure, and [he absenc e of violenc e docs no t n eces sar il yi mp ly th at th e s ta te in q ue stio n is no t f a il e d, It is nec ess ary to judge the exte nt tow hi ch a n e nti re f ai li ng or fa ile d p ro file is less or more than its c om po ne nt p ar ts ,

Strong s tate s u nq ue sti on ab ly c on tro l th eir te rrito rie s an d d eliv er a fu ll ra ngea nd a h ig h q ua lity of p olitic al g oo ds to th eir c itiz en s. T he y p erfo rm w ell ac co rd -i ng to in di ca to rs li ke GD P per capita, the U ND P Human Development Index,T ra ns pa re nc y In te rn ati on al 's C or ru pti on P erc ep ti on In de x, a nd F re ed om House'sFreedom of the World Report, S trong states offe r high leve ls of security fromp oli tic al a nd c rim in al v io le nc e, e ns ure p olitic al fre ed or~ a nd c iv il l~ be rtic s, an dc re ate e nv iro nm en ts c on du civ e to th e g ro wth o f e co no mic o pp ortu nrty , T he ru leof law pre vails. Judge s arc indepe ndent. R oad ne tw orks are w ell m aintaine ~.T el ep ho ne s w ork . S nail m ai l an d e -m ail b oth a rriv e q uic kly . S cho ol s, unrversr-t ic s, a nd s tu de nts f lo uri sh , H os pi ta ls a nd c li ni cs s erv e p ati en ts effectively. And soon. Ov er al l, s tr on g s ta te s arc places of e nv iab le p ea ce an d order,

Weak s ta le s i nc lu de a broad c ontinuum of states that arc: inherently weakbe cause of geographical, p hy sic al, o r fu nd am en ta l e co no mi c c on strai nts ; b as i-cally s tr on g, b ut te mp or ar ily o r s it ua ti on all y weak because o f i nte rn al a nta go -n is ms , m an ag em en t fla ws , g re ed , d es po tis m, o r e xte rn al attac ks ; an d a m ix tu reof the tw o. W eak states typically harbor e thnic , religious, linguist ic, or otheri nte rc om mu nal te ns io ns th at h av e n ot y et, o r n ot y et th oro ug hly , b ec om e o ve rtlyv io le nt . U rb an cr im e ra tes te nd to be higher a nd in cre asin g. I n w ea k s ta te s) th eability (0p ro vi de a de qu ate m ea su re s o f o th er polit ical goods is diminished ord im in is hi ng . P hy sic al in fras tru ctu ra l nc tw ork s h av e d ete ri ora te d, S ch oo ls an dh os pi ta ls s ho w signs of n eg le ct) p artic ularly o uts id e th e m ai n c itie s. G DP percapita and othe r c ritical e conom ic indic ators have falle n or arc fallm g, SOJl1~-. . I- f- 1 ' .0 ['0 a re emb arr as si ng ly h I/ i'l l an d esim es dram aticallv: !ev(' ;; (I vena C01!UPIn, 0 0 , '_ < 0_ . " , . ' _

caialiflg. Weak s("I'._,,-: Ih,: dly honor rule of law p re ce pts III the b re ac h. T he ylnr:!:;:: c ivi l so c ie ty . \\ ',,:11- ::1;,1,':; n re o f' ic n r ul ed (k~P()IS, e le cte d o r n ot.

There is a s pe c ia l ( "I eg o! y of weak s ta te , a s e xp lo le d In Erin Jenne's chap-IeI'. That is the seemingly strong c as e , a lw a ys an a uto nac y, th at rig id ly controlsd is se nt a nd i,; secure hu t ilt the same time p ro vid es v ery fe w p oli tic al g oo ds . Ine xtrem e cases, suc h as N orth Korea, the regime permits its people to starve.Cambodia under Po! P ot a ls o qu ali fie s, a s d oc s c on te mp orary B ela rus , Iraq,and, p os sib ly , L ib ya. A cro ss re ce nt l im es , t he li st o f s la te s [ hat are fu nd am en -t al ly we ak bu t a pp ea r s tro ng is e ve n m ore e xte ns iv e.

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Failed and (":ollapsed StatesFailed s ta te s a re te ns e, d ee pl y c on fl ic te d, d an ge ro us , a nd c on te ste d b itte rly

b y w ar ri ng f ac ti on s. In most failed S late s, g ov ern me nt tro op s b attl e a rm ed re --v ol ts l ed by on e or more r iv al s. O c ca si on al ly , th e o ff ic ia l a uth or iti es in a failedstate face tw o or m ore insurgenc ies, varieties of civil unrest, different degree sof com munal disc ontent, and a ple thora of disse nt direc ted a t the state and atg ro up s w ithi n th e s ta te "It i s n ot the ab so lu te in te ns ity o f v io le nc e th at id en tifie s a fa ile d s ta te . R ath er.

it i s th e e nd ur in g character of thaI viole nce (as in A ngola, Burundi, and.theS ud an ), th e fa ct that much of the v io le nc e is d ire cte d a gai ns t the existing gpv~ernrnent orregime, an d the in flam ed c harac te r o f tile p oliti ca l or geographicaldemands fOf share d pow er or autonom y that rationalize or justify that violencein th e m in ds o f th e m ain in su rg en ts .

T he c iv il w ars th at c harac te riz e fa ile d s tate s u su al ly s te m fro m or h av e r oo tsi n e t hn i c, religious, linguistic, or other inte rc om munal e nm ity. T he fe ar oftbeother that drives so much ethnic conflict stimulates and fuels hostilities be -tw ee n regilhes and subordinate and less favored groups. A varice also propelsthat antagonism , e spec ially w he n gree d is m agnified by dre am s of loot fromdiscoveries of ue w, conte ste d, s ourc es of resourc e w ealth, like petrole um de-p os its , d ia mo nd f ie ld s, o th er m in er al s, or timber.

There is ,IlO fail ed s tate w ith ou t d is ha rm on ie s b etw ee n c om mu nitie s, Yet,t he s imple fact that m any w eak nation-stales inc lude haves and have-nots, andt ha t s om e of t he n ew er Slates c on ta in a h ete ro ge ne ol ls a rr ay of ethnic, religious.an d lin gu is tic in te re sts , is m ore a c on trib uto r to th an a ro ot c au se o f n ati on-s ta tef ai lu re . S la te f ai lu re cannot be a sc ri be d p rima ri ly to the inability to build na -tions from a congeries of g ro up s of el i v e rse b a ckg rou nd s . No r should it be as -c ri be d b al dl y to t he oppr ess ion of m in or iti es b y a ma jo ri ty , a lt ho ug h s uc h b ru -talities are ofte n a m ajor in gre die nt o f th e i mp uls e to ward failure.

In contrast to s tro ng s tate s, fail ed s ta le s c an no t control their borders. Theylose a ut ho ri ty Ov er s e ct io ns o ft er ri to ry . Often, the expression of official poweris limited to n capital city an d one or more ethnically specific zones. Plausibly,the extent ora state 's failure c an be m eas ure d by how m uc h of its ge ographical

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c xp an s i s g en uin el y cOlltrolled (especially ariel dink) by ' Ihe offlcl;1i gli\'CITIm cn t. H ow n om in al or c on te ste d IS th e Cell\I;11 gov crn ru cm 's sw ay ov er pcripheral towns and rural roads and '>'i


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. .1' vc r 'IS th ey ;i\w ay:; do w he n tlie p rim c polity (k;appcars.subslaic aC]lOfSItoo. 'Slol.l 'l"ll 'L' 'I('I,"IS '.'< lin ed c on trol ov er reg ion s an d sllbrcglOllsn ... , W'lI" ore S 01 , 1." < . " . ' r, ,lose, [' .ratc built up their own local security appar,,''Ill in winl lnd becn a na IO[]-S, , 1~ ~~ cs a n d r :l cc ;w ni s'm s, s an ct io nc d mm k~ fs a nd other trad;J,lg ;m;Hlr~crnlt~r;II~'i;~~:l

.rablished 'HI a tt en ua te d f or m of m te rn at lO na l r c a uo ns . y (C .even e s , . , , '. "" . I' Is C;lI1 assume the tra ppin gs of a new quas:i ll e gi timat e and un re cog nw .:d , WM oro: , '. S alilar I' the old n orth o fs ta t;~ s uc h a s th e internationally unrecogmzed ~ om'! 1 an c m _ , .. , .' li. t I'tlic collap,;cd s ta te i nt o warlord Ilcldoms,~ :~; :J~ t< : il l~ : :: )~ t r~~~~~~ :~~ ;' !: ;~~ ;~~d~ r , anomi e behav i or , and th e ~ i nl d ~ of,a;l~:~~chic mentality a nd e nl re pr cn eu ri 3\ e nd ca vo rs ~ c sp ecw ll y gun dm (rug r:

'1 1 . I ' ('ITn) networks of tel r or.tickin,'tli'lt are com p3 11 ) e W It 1 ex ern: . ' . . d '1' iikistanc- . III NlgefJ3 an aJI IN on e of th ese designations is tcnmna, ,_e )anO I1, .,.' , d-d j' . II e and are now w eak. A fgh an lstan an d Sierra Leon e gra urecovere rom co aps, '. . I fr bei strong1 f' '11 7imb'lbwe is moving rapid Y rom ierng :ated from colla pser to


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weakness and the Possih ility of FailureCui: apscd and [nilcd d es ig na te t he c on s eq ue n ce s ofa p ro ce ss o f d ec ay at rhc

n ation -state lev el, T he capacity of those nation,states to pe rform posit iv cly forth eir citizen s h as atroph ied. B ut, as the Leb anese and T ajikislan i cases show ,that atrophy is neither inevitable nor the result of happenstance, For a state tofail is not that ea sy. Crossing from w eakness in to failure t ak es w il l as well asn egle ct. T hu s, w ea k n atio n-s ta te s n ee d not tip in to failure . W hich ones do andw hic h on es do not is th e fo cu s of the third se ction of th is book.

T here arc sev enll in terestin g ca ses th at indeed test th e pre cision of the dis-t in ct io n b et we en w ea kn es s and failure:

Sri Lanka has been em broiled in a b itter an d destructiv e c iv il w ar for nine"teen years. As much as 15 percent of its total land mass has at times in the lastde ca de b ee n c on tro lle d b y th e r eb el L ib er ation T ig ers of T am il E ee la m (LTTE),a T am il s ep ar at is t i ns ur ge nc y. Additionally, th e LTTE w it h r el at iv e irnpunityhas been able to a ssassina te prim e m in isters, b om b preside nts, ki 110fT rivalT am ils, an d in 2001, ev en destroy the nation's civil air terminal and main airforce b ase. B ut, as in capa ble as th e Sin hala"dom in ated gov ern men ts of the is-land have been of putting down the LFfE reb ellion , so the nation-state ha sremained merely weak (or f ra gm en te d, a s J en ne 's chapter posits), never closeto tipping over in to failure , For 80 percent of Sri Lankans, the govcmmentperform s reason ab ly w ell. The roads are m ain tain ed an d sch ools and h ospitalsfun ction, to som e lim ited extent even in the war-tom north and cast. Sincethe early 1990s, too, Sri Lanka has exhibited robust le ve ls of e con om icgro wth . T he a uth ority of s uc ce ss iv e g ov er nm en ts e xte nds se cu re ly to th e S in ha la -speaking 80 percent of the country, and into the reca ptu red T am il area s. Forthe se reasons, de spite a conSUnl i ! lg i n te rn al con f 1i ct f ou nd ed o n intense m aj or . .ity-rninority u is cr im in ati on a nd depriv ation and on pronoun ced eth nic an d reli-gious differen ces, Sri L )H ~I(;\projects au thority th roughout m uch of th e coun ..try, has suffered no loss of legitimacy among Sinhala, and has successfullye sc a pe d f ai lu re ,Indonesia is a no th er c as e 0f w ea kn es s a vo id in g fa ilu re d es pite w id es pr ea din se cu ri ty . A s the w orld's largest M uslim n ation, its far-flung archipelago h ar . .bors separatist wars in A cch in the west and in Papua (formerly Iria n Jaya) inth e east, plu s large p oc ke ts o f Mu sl im -Ch ri st ia n conflict in Amboll and theMaluku islands, M uslim ..C hristian h ostility in n orth ern Su law esi, a nd ethn icxenoph obic ou tbu rsts in K a 1im anta n. G iven all 0 f t he se c on fl ic tu a l s it ua ti on s ,none of which has bec01l le l es s h i t t cr s in c e t he e n d o f t he S oe h ar to lt li ct at or sh ip ,it would be casy to COliC lu dc th at j n don ex m w as approaching failu re, Y c t, asi\1icl!ac] Mailcvs c1l,!p1('r ;Irgucs f()!ccli.ll1y, only the insurgents in Aceh and

P ap ua w alll l() :;c cc dc a nd ;He contesling the xt atc, . . """" , .. 0/ ;place wl!hcli the sl.II(' !lot,.,' , . " I lit "uCLlI o th er b attle s t ak e } ~ j h i, " "g,.IInst It. f hey do 1101 t! "" I.' . . . ; ; i X ~ 're so urc e" o f1 he s ta le J!l the way that the '1 ' IIC,IIC1I tie u ne gn ty a n ~ . ,. .. . . ., " '. . .. : . ~ , : ~ ; ' .I " .. re cnc ur m g, but low-level .. ,,", .":oocs. In Arch and P'lPU'j II' . .. ,- e , W f ,Zimbabwe lucks in order 10" I . ec ge 0 I te abyss offailure. All, . jorn t te ranks ofral led stat .', . 1 .nal Insurgent movement dirccred : . I ' , es IS a WI( espread inter-. . c agamst t r e g o ve rn! ' '1 '1particularly ifthe politic I' d '. . nent. lal could com e. . ca


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, ". 1 IIWI\VC(:11. "...... " ,'" I Chi istiall conuuuurucs 'urizcd internal dissidence, almost" ", Y'I ! "i ve n v e ry lirnitec (t(.,(, ". ' .. -ietyeX"v is e o f w e ak ne ss . cr , -' " . 'I" ages w it hi n H ai ti an soc.. ", 'I /,\IlstlC c eav" , tn o in te rn al e th nic , rc l: gIO\lS, 01, Ill" f I" . (Tc la ss es , a nd o fv rn ul at to s )e", . I he majoruy 0 t h upp;: ", , - 'f . _ 'cccpt


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. ! Jl ! ~- -- :, _ \ V1 ~L t! gfI 's oj 'll'lVC1 (UIIIIW 1I1~1\(le'" I ,.,' Ih e c ha ll en ge s a nd n pp ort Ul !1 II" ',', , 1' t cs ! () \v ;m l L li lu re ,In!! collapse" .. "'lrO!lt.'J:r , (II S II c.. . " ! ',\ s\;t\c rCl1\i.ins \ \ leaK, bC,coll\c~ S ",' ,11 t l ' I " "II'cilP) of /\l'nc,1 ~)(llI\h 01.1 ic, " ('S')CCld Y ,,!, t, , , 'The c o lo f1 I ,t \ e [f o rs well: ill,lIlY, '," ,'.'". in ste ;](1 of s ix or scv en larg u, 'I" '\'It!VC territories ' ' , " 1Sab at 'a a s f or ty ,c !f ', ht ,J( milliS I, i" I 'I'C,',[lS of iluthority muc h e ar li er diH." '\ t Inns el tIC . , I"ones and t he a by sr n: d l al urc (: ~ Il t J't I'S ]101 !1Ossible 10 prcdlct IllS'llgcrnt u " , Im uc h m ore thoroughly (0 an HH, ", '. 1hrgelv on the b asis o f co lolliac en tu ry 's c an did at es f or f ail ur e solely or ever , , ~ .mistreatrnent, ' ,.' \0 de 110y t he r es ul ts of m as si ve s ur ve ys ot,

Nor is il po ss I bl e s uc c es sf u ll y, ,1, , 1;'( et a l a na ly zc d e thniC wrn, ", t )fcr.llCt (,l1lttle, ,.S y' ," "1 "conflict an d state colLlp"c, 0 I f II ' 1\'IIJSCS in 40 years and 243 parlld, '\ lwo 12 u co , , , I' 1'$leading to collapse, IIlC u. ". , 1('


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.. \"\V[~ll~" l;Ulit.-Uldl UiVC,\dlU UCdl.,,,U ~n~l\~1 ,J!I~~i ll 1 I1CcyC\ u J n w: ;( (I IIl(l 1, ' ',II ,.1"" 'J'lI1dly down t h ei r h ( Ju1cv: l lr i S in

"\ 'OUl \-hllyolthc.,;ele;j(:I:,tt\vCL - I,\ sln;\l 'IS 1 t) ,\",' ".. I ' '," n f' H f(l(cl"n CXCllr:;IOI1S. ;JII( pul. ' .' !ccrcommCIl,I,1 illlUd ( bmotorcades, (Oilllll,lll( ',. ( 'Il'r'j')(')r'ts "n(] ships and 0111 I "I' IITCllCY HI, ,." ' ' ,t he ir f ac e: ; prominently Oil 11C OC,) U " '. I t ranhs in publ ic p l i l e C S ,oversIze p 10 og j.I., , " I', " 1'1' t riseS J)recij)itouslv because, J' J ' t , '~ t he l ev el d vro cnce I " ' T he t hir ; lilt 11 01 I, , I' , il 'II' tile st'lte' ca n b e c on sid ere d c ru m-" , ']' , " IlrI)' It CIVI W" "o f' sk l nJ 1 ls il es , h o su rues, oro< , " , , fall the probability offailure rises, Not

bling, As national [nun;]]) sccur~tYI'r'lltc~ l)ll; each offers a w ar ni ng s ig n, Abso-"1 fl c t pn:cql lt' Jt c~ 31me, l , ,evcry crvi con I" '" ilian com bat death counts above a cert:lI11l ute o r r el, at iv ,e c n,me rates an d C IV , I 't " ,I ' r t ha t a s oc ie ty is d et er io ra ti ng." 'be failure Hut incy S lOV>. ,number cannot prescn " 11) I'll'to ge th er i s b ec om in g f at al lyand that the glue that binds a new (or an 0 o S ate .>thi n, " , 'd' > th at a stron g state is b ec om in gN .: 'I" d i ea tu r p rov l\ ]c S cert.nn evi enee , ,, 0 sm g C In . li 11 nell into failure, But a judiCIOUS assess-weak or a weak state IS h ear mg pc -F ,,"', ke t 'etherm en t o f t he s ev er al a v a i ! ab le in dic at or s d iS C1 ll ,S tS et ~:1 wlhalSr'nS~:gt~on~;;~I::v~~dane;. ) tifi ble' and qua Ia lve, , 'shou ld provide bo t 1 quan 1 iauie v ".' ! zff irts at preYentlOn c an b e m ou nte d,maneuvers call occur d!l( e (,. c " f f i .ie ntly a dv an ee d fo r p re cis ef 'I ' 1 s ta te s IS IllSU ICThatsaid,researcho n auec , . , h 'fGDPfallsbj, ,.' I'd !t is no t y et c or re ct t o s ug ge st t at I Jtippingpomts to be IHOVll e .! _.j' 'lssJ'ur!f'cS or abuse the human right~ of, t ' 'inoic YC '1 f I'll CI S ( Ism " .X arnoun ma s to " ivil death rates rise more

, d " ,[ ke ,t, t e h ous e , or CIVI Ia n c ttheir subjects by X, sol ItT,S a cas a 'n tip for sure from w eak to fa ilin g tothan X per year, the state m qu~s tlOn WI, , " .t t ha t a ll i s n ot well in thef '1 , d A ll we know is that a ll 0 1 [ ho se actions sugges > f 1.11 e, , , ' ' " , is spre 'lding and the future shape and fate 0 t 1ed ep th s o f R un ta ma , misery , .,' ,s ta te i s a t s er io us risk,

TIl\~ Hand of ManSlate f ai lu re i s l ar ge ly mall m ad e, n ot a cc id en tal ~ InSli,~ution~1 ,flrlag:l.iti~sb'~ll~~, " to hilure but those dehclCllcles USUd y Jarstructural f1aws contnbute , , " ) S it is that leadership errore',' , "f ons of m en (rarely women, , [) .to deC l s I . ons or ac 1,' , cd sh!cs for personal gain; in the con!cllI[lorary era,

across history have destroy . (,' '., 'I' 1'(' in Africa Asia and Oceania-ade 'hi mistakes contmue (0 elO de hag! e po I re s I ',' , ' ,lea ers , p , I' .n of f ai lu re Mo bu tu 's kleptocrallc rule extr,lctcdt ha t a lr ea dy O l; e; ~! ~c~ ) ~ l : ( ; ( ~ ~ l ~ ~ : ~ : h i l ~ [ '()r'the m as s o f h is n at io na l d ep cn de ~lt s:t he n la rl ow 0 ,"dll C ,11. , " ., . 'nded u) in his or his croniesM uch of th e r es ou rc e \ V, 'c ah h o f lila! vast COUnll[~ c, d 101C(l to upliltinv the" !'." l ardly '11lV we a til was cv, , , 0[lo ck ets : o ve r lour (h:;GI( es. ildH " ,," ~ , 'ven

" " < . I" welfare, huddlng IIlfrastructures, or cCongolese people, 1rl1!110\'ltlb [lelr ,', .' '" rily Mobutu's gov-p rov idin g m ore 1 h:\ I'\ rlid im cll tll'Y a mo un ts o t hWll,1I1 sect!, .

ClIlil)Cnf [lClliHHlcd only J ( \ ! 1\ 1 ()hlll u, ,1S I CllUICli


15/15

Now, Ilf1l'.Tvc[, ;I:; 11111

failed states - rotberg

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