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TRANSCRIPT
CHAYfER III
FACTORS IN ARMS DISPERSAL
64
South Asia is comprised of a rich mosaic of pluralism, its national societies are
deeply divided vertically and laterally by linguistic, ethnic, cultural, caste and
religious cleavages. A salient feature of recent developments in South Asia has been
the frequent occurrence of incidents of political violence, which result from conflicts
between ethnic communities, religious groups or caste groups. Small arms dispersal
. is a significant contributing factor in this situation. Arms dispersal is only one part of
the overall arms acquisition. Availability of modern weapons, communication systems
and financiers have made it easier for political violence to thrive. Political violence
is characterised by the use of small arms. The grey market, which supplies them, is
much too large and dispersed to make any meaningful action feasible. 1
Earl ier, the hand guns made of poor materials were not capable of withstanding
substantial pressure of the government. Later on more Sophisticated small arms were
manufactured. Comparedto the bolt-action short range rifles, heavy machine pistols
and bulky cases of TNT, the violent groups of today uses smaller, automatic, long
range sniper rifles with night sights: pocket pen pistols, and small compact, brief-case
sized explosive packs to cause massive destruction to life and property. 2 Modern
arms and ammunition also enable a rebel to cause much more damage single-handedly
in a single strike than what could have been caused by a group of people previously.
The flow of sophisticated weapons and ammunition is assured through open purchases
in various arms bazaars. No arms license is heeded, as it was. Weapons meant for
Mujahideen during the Afghan Crisis made en route to South Asia. Narco-terrorism
IS on the rise. Drug-mafia supply arms and money to the violent groups. Also, various
foreign assistance increase the intensity of political viQlen~. So we find that there are
Times of India (New Delhi), 3 February 1992.
2 Maj. General Virinder Uberoy, Combating Terrorism (New Delhi, 1992). pp.51-52.
65
four factors in arms dispersal to South Asian region which escalates violence. These
factors are the following:
ARMS BAZAARS·
The question of political violence is closely linked to the procurement of
weapons. Once violence begins, sophisticated weapons considerably increase its level
and intensity. 3 Today, these small arms are easily available from the international
open arms bazaars. Anybody can go and purchase these arms and ammunition against
cash payment. Due to these open markets arms are flooded in South Asia and there
is the easy accessibility of arms to the militant groups.
Anns Bazaars in Pakistan
During the Afghan war and in its aftermath Pakistan has been turned into one
vast ammunition dump. Many of the weapons, meant for the Afgh~n warring factions,
were siphoned off along the way because the Afghari pipeline was "extremely badly
organised and poorly thought out" to the point that it leaked "profusely and virtually
ruptured". 4 As a result, AK-47 assault rifles and automatic of various brands,
rockets, explosives and anti-tank weapons are available in the booming open air
weapons marts of Peshawar and its suburbs, North Western Frontier Province
(NWFP)5 in general and in some locations inside Baluchistan. The tribal areas of
NWFP and Baluchistan have traditionally been involved in arms manufacture since the
3
4
5
Anthony Sampson, The Arms Bazaar: The Companies, The Dealers, the Bribes: From Vickers to Lockheed (London, 1977), p.24.
Christopher Smith, "Light Weapons - The Forgotten Dimension of the International Arms Trade", Brassey's Defence Yearbook, 1994 (London), p.280.
The name of NWFP is changed recently to Pakhtunkhwa but the new name is not used in the chapters.
66
early years of the 20th century ... but the Afgha':1 war brought radical changes, in the
quality and quantity of the arms and ammunition produced in these areas, in their
trade and their broader implications. 6 The arms markets are controlled by tribal
chieftains. In NWFP, arms, mainly from Saudi Arabia, China, Egypt and Turkey, are
plentifully available. Now-a-day, mainly the arms are of Turkish origin and AK-47
is seen all over because it is easy to handle such weapons.7 With the sharp increase
in quality and quantity of small arms, the prices reduced significantly which became
helpful to the buyers. Because of the abundance of stockpiles in the province,
Kalashnikoves are down from Rs 35,000 to Rs 12,000 apiece.8 These markets
operate beyond the control of the Pakistani authorities. Anyone with purchasing power
can obtain any weapon system.
In Pakistan, arms bazaars are located at Darra Adam Khel which is supposedly
the biggest open arms market in the world.9 It is fifty kilometers south of the
Pakistani frontier city of Peshawar. "Buying a gun is not such a problem in Pakistan.
All it needs is a short trip from Peshawar down the scenic and historic highway to
Kohat, through the Afridi country that once saw so much bloodshed between the
proud, unrelenting tribes and the invading British armies. Midway through, just before
the bend in the highway climbing steeply on the Sikh Kamar (the Sikh Hill) ... lies the
6
7
8
9
A.K.M. Abdus Sabur, "Pakistan: Ethnic Conflict and the Question of National Integration", BlISS journal (Dhaka), voUl, no.4, qctober 1990, p.507.
Interview with Dr.Chris Smith, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London, in London, 23 July 1996.
Mohammad Riaz, "Black to Business", Newsline (Karachi), vol. I. no.2. May 1990. p.39.
Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story (Lahore, 1992), p.135.
67
shanty town of Darra Adam Khel". 10
The Darra area is mainly governed by tribal laws where Pakistan authorities
have no control. "A police post short of the town warns the visitor that he is entering
tribal region at his own risk, governed not by Pakistani laws bllt by age old tribal laws
and Pakhtunwali, the Pathan code of conduct, honour and vengeance." 11 No one
really seems to be sure when the arms trade at Darra began in so systematic a fashion.
But it is widely known that in both the World Wars the British had recruited large
number of Pathan artisans to work in ordnance factories and with combat units,
repairing and servicing weapons. Their skills' have come down the geQerations. 12
Traditionally, these tribals were selling only the moSt popular hand guns and
rifles. It was famous at that time as Darra-made. But as the Soviets entered
Afghanistan, along with the subcontinent politics they also changed the fate of Darra.
The markets were suddenly started flooding with better and good quality small arms.
The sellers and manufacturers sell every lethal weapon any individual or private army
could ask for as openly as shoes and toileteries would be sold elsewhere in the
world. 13 "There are 100 to 300 arms dealers in Darra where there are about 100
shops. Day in and day out, rebels, since the Afghanistan civil war, slip across the
borders in groups of two or three and head for Darra to buy guns. Each gun is sewn
into a tight-fitting muslin bag. Then ail the guns are sewn together into another muslin
10
11
12
13
Shekhar Gupta, wDarra Adam Khel: Anus for the Asking", India Today (New Delhi), vol. 14, no.14, 31 July 1989, p.58.
ibid, p.58.
ibid, p.60.
ibid, p. 58.
68
bag and passed to the right places. "14
Arms of different varieties are available at Darra. Kalashnikovs of all makes,
local and foreign, still in its shipping grease, and for a surcharge of extra thousand
rupees, the ones with folding butts that makes them convenient to hide under a blanket
or inside a loose kurta. "In 1980, the cost of an AK-47 was $1500, but with the glut
of weapons brought about by the war it has plummeted to $750 by 1987. "15 For
fortified targets, the rocket-propelled grenade launchers, RPG-7 are also plentily \
available. One street in the bazaar could provide enough anti-aircraft guns to equip
a light air-defence regiment. 16 The dreaded mUlti-barrel rocket-launcher, popularly I
known as Stalin's organ, an entire ack-ack gun, a shoulder-fired antitank missile,
deadly mines of all shapes and applications, mine-sweeping equipment boxes of
gelatine along with detonators by the gross, the esoteric; sniper's rifles for
assassinations, drum magazines, I<.alikov, sophisticated gas masks for chemical
warfare and landing wheels off a shot-down MiG - useful for making a smooth-riding
on cart have been available there. l7 "But the more favoured weapon here is the
Chinese-made BM-I rocket launcher which is cheaper, lighter and easier to handle
besides being freely available as the Chinese had supplied far too many of these to the
Mujahideen. "18
14
IS
16
17
18
New York Times, 14 April 1981.
Yousafand Adkin, n.9, p.135.
Gupta, n.l0, p.59.
P.J.O. Rourke, "The Afghan Trail", Sunday (Calcutta), vol.l6, no.38, 20-26 August 1989, p.84.
Gupta, n.lO, p.59.
69
Also, the enormous volumes of 'junk' discarded following the catastrophic
blast in Pakistan's Ojheri ammunition dump outside Rawalpindi trickled into the Darra
market, upsetting old equations. 19 Though th~ Ojheri ammunitions were damaged
and written off, the Darra experts, in repairing arms, shape up these again into the
deadly weapon. In this arms bazaar no one asks the buyer's name, address or
intentions, what matters is the bulge in the pocket.
Further, guns are freely for sale in Karachi's bazaars where as little as Rs
12,000 buys a Kalashnikov rifle, Rs 25,000 a rocket launcher and less than Rs 40,000
a machine gun.20 In the Karachi underworld it is even possible to rent a I
Kalashnikov by the hour for a few pounds. 21 Sohrab Goth, an Afghan-dominated
Karachi slum, is one of the biggest dens of arms. The smugglers' den is Bara bazaar
in Sohrab Goth where they openly trade in contraband arms like AK-47 rifles, rocket
launchers etc.22
"Some sources also maintain that Gulistan in Pishin along with the Surkhab
camp in the Pir Alizai jungle form the biggest arms and drugs market. People can buy
any kind of arms from here with total impunity undeterred by the law-enforcing
agencies."23 Also, the Quetta-Chaman road, the Chagai district, the Girdi jungle,
the towns of Landi Kotal and Miram Shah are the major areas of arms production.24
19
20
21
22
23
24
ibid, p.61.
Financial Times (London), 7 April 1988.
Observer Magazine (London), 13 November 1988.
Ameneh'Azam Ali, "Pakistan: EdlInc Strife". l"aia Today. vol. 12. 110.1, 1-15 January 1987, p.95.
Mohammad Riaz, n.8. p.39.
Times of India, 24 August 1994.
70
These flourishing arms bazaars were assisted by the anarchic conditions in the region
and the drug production and smuggling activities.
Recently, Sind emerged as one of the world's largest underground arms
market.25 Prior to Afghan war gun was unknown to Sind campuses. At present, it
is a part of campus life. Fire arms are plentily available. This market is mostly
dominated by the students and young politiCal activists.
The extent to which buying and selling is taking place can be gauged from the
prevailing price of one of the hottest selling commodities today: Kalashnikovs. As the
world's most unusual arms bazaar lies in Pakistan, it is frequented by the
subcontinent's various extremist and violent groups.
Arms Markets in India
In recent years, India has been witnessing a vertical rise of weapons mart at
various places inspite of strong vigil by the law and order authority and police
personnel.. The factors leading towards the opening up of underground and open air
market are many. Firstly, the Afghan war and its aftermath resulted in the selling of
weapons to the dealers inside Indi~. Pakistan acts as a medium to sell those'weapons.
Secondly, the weapons shop gives a good amount of money to the seller. As the
violence takes place, there increases the demand for weapons. Last but not the least,
the neighbouring countries, in order to create terror and violence, supply large volume
of light weapons to the arms bazaars. And, drug barons also play an important role
jn using carriers to transport weapons.
In India, Bihar has always had a very active small armS culture. In general the
people of Bihar have a fascination for guns and mostly the middle-class men own light
25 The Hindu (Madras), 14 September 1990.
71
weapons with or without licence. Earlier, conflicts and wars in this region have been
important sources of light weapons. "Amongst the small arms circulating in Bihar are
several type of weapons from the Second World War period such as the Thompson
sub-machine gun and the Sten MK4 - local people probably picked up weapons
abandoned during the Japanese offensive. Chinese copies of the Soviet SKS rifle, the
Type 56 Carbine and the Type 56 Light Machine Gun - a copy of the Soviet RDP -
are available as are Papapscha (PPSch-41) 9mm sub-machine guns. "26 Further, the
Bangladesh War of 1971 resulted in the transfer of light weapons to Bihar. Even
American-made weapons made en route to the extremist elements of Bihar. 27
Of late, Bihar is known for the increased use of local-made weapons of
appalling quality which are available in various arms factories and weapons shops.
There have been both legal and illegal factories. Munger district of Bihar has India's
largest illegal arms cottage industry.28 There is a State-owned ordnance factory
which makes weapons of various types and designs. Besides, workers from such
factories provide expertise in making weapons. Even after their retirement, the
workers, with the acquired skill, go back to their native places an~ make arms and
explosives and sell it off. Even skilled persons train the unemployed ones so that they
engage themselves in making arms and earn money. Mini-gun factories have been
located at the near-by places of Munger. The- places are Barde village, Sankarpur
Mahuli, Suturkhana and Gauripur.29
26
27
28
29
Chris Smith, The Diffusion of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Pakistan and Northern India (London, 1993), pp.34-35.
Interview with a Police Officer of Buxar, Bihar, 13 September 1996.
Ranjit Bhushan, ·Caste Bullets Ricochet. .. ·, Outlook, vol.3, no.15, 9 April 1997, p.8.
Interview widl a Police Officer of BliXar, Bihar, 13 September 1996.
72
The pla~s like Mokama, Begusarai, Biharsharif, Nalanda, Betia town, Giridih
and Gaya are famous for the easy availability of weapons. 30 According to a local
person of Patna, in the places like Ranchi, Jamshedpur and Purnia, one can easily get
country-made weapons against direct cash payment. The colloquially known katta
(pistol type) is widely used and available in all local arms bazaars and factories.
Blacksmiths and machine shops make such weapons with their skill. The steering pipe
of vehicles, bicycle rods, and the tractor hood-pipes are used to make katta and other
rifles. Kattas are "designed as a cut-off Enfield 7.62 and have machined barrels made
from alloy-steel. Also, .303 kattas are produced. "31 In katta, made up of steering
pipe, usually .315 ammunition and the hard spring of the watch are used. 32
In addition, the arms and ammunition of various brands have been available
there. The foreign-made weapons like AK-47, AK-56, 9mm pistol and automatic
carbine are available at high prices. Also, country-made .303 pistol, .38 revolvers,
12 bore big rifles, .45 gun, .22 rifles, Mauser and Sten gun are available. Duplicate
guns and rifles are also made by arms factories with a larger accuracy. The Hatia
place of Ranchi is famous for such weapons. 33 Besides selling weapons, the traders
rent out the arms for immediate and short-term use. The charge depends upon the
urgency and usually varies from Rs 200 to more than thousand rupees. This charge
also depends on the quality of the weapon to be rented out. 34
30 Interview with a Press Reporter of Jamshedpur in Jl!Jllshedpur. 17 September 1996.
31 Chris Smith. n.26. p.33.
32 Interview with a Press Reporter in Jamshedpur. 17 September 1996.
33 ibid.
34 Interview with a local person atPatna. 14 September 1996.
73
Explosives and crude bombs are also available in local arms markets. Giridih
area is famous for hand grenades and Falitc?5 bomb. These bombs are made up of
Lal Sada Masala powder (mixture of potash and soda) and stuffed in a larda (Pan
Masala) container or any container of around same size. 36 This has an explosive
capacity ranging from 2 to 4 metres. Further, making of cartridges for guns is very
easy for them. They make powder from Arhar plant then add sulphur, potash and
ranga (from iron) to it. Then within two to three minutes make cartridges and use for·
guns.37
The price rate of small arms vary from one place to aflother. The factory rate
also is cheaper than the other places.
Table 3.1
Price List of Small Anus in Bihar
Types of Arms Factory Rate Other Places -
Katta Rs 400 to Rs 500 Rs 1000
Rifle Rs 800 to Rs 1000 Rs 1800 to Rs 2000
Revolver Rs 2000 to Rs 2500 Rs 3000 to Rs 4000
Ammunition for .303 Rs 80 to Rs 100 Almost same at the and for .315 rifle factory rate.
Source: Information gathered from a Police Officer of Bihar, 13 September 1996.
35
36
37
In case of FaLita bomb. it's uppe'r cap is removed by one's teeth and is thrown. This explodes and kills people.
Interview with a Press Reporter of Janlshedpur in Jamshedpur, 17 September 1996.
Interview with a local person at Patna, 14 September 1996.
74
Kalashnikov rifles are also available at various places of Bihar. AK-47 costs
around Rs 80,000. 38 Besides Kalashnikovs, US-made Lama pistols are also used.
As the violent groups are unable to afford the high cost of such pistol, these pistols
are usually gifted to them by underworld mafia. 39
In India, Tamil Nadu is the cheapest place to buy arms such as the Ak-47.40
The seeming transformation of the industrial city of Coimbatore into a major, weapon
manufacturing base is a clear indication of the inroads of Tamil militants in Tamil
Nadu. First evidence of this came in June 1989 when, with the state under President's
rule, the security forces raided an arm manufacturing unit at A varampalayam in
Coimbatore, run by the activists of a breakaway faction of the Dravida Kazhagam who
were staunch supporters of Tamil militant groups.41 The Tamil militants also
preferred this place only because of the availability of skilled technical labour capable
of doing precision work .
• :!.- The militants have converted nine~districts of Tamil'Nadu -into bases for"war
supplies. They are Co i mbatore , Periyar (Erode), Salem, Dharmapuri, Tiruchi,
Thanjavut, Pudukottai, Madurai and Ramanathapuram. The arms manufacturing
factories in Coimbatore churn out thousands of grenades and detonators a day. "The
task cut out for Coimbatore was manufacturing guns and grenades and getting spares
38
39
40
41
Jnterview with a Press Reporter in Jamsbedpur, 17-September 1996.
ibid.
B. Muralidhar Reddy, "A Close Call", Frontline (Madras), vol.8, no.3, 2-15 February 1991, p.30.
V.Padmanabban, "LITE: The Arms Base", Frontline, vol.8, 110.17,17-30 August 1991, p.1IO.
75
for AK-47 assault rifles n. 42 Tamil militants also set up an automatic unit at
Ganapathy in Comibatore under Gowrishankar apart from three manually operated
units in the na~e of Ravichandran.43 Coimbatore has also been a transit point for
coordinating the dispersal of arms to the coast via Tiruchi and to liaise with new hide
outs set up in Mysore and Bangalore. Further,. Tiruchi has been the main source of
detonators which come from licensed local dealers in explosives, who obtain the
components from multinational companies like ICI India Ltd. at its Gomia factory in
Bihar. 44 Also, various explosive inputs come from Erode, Salem, Dharmapuri and
North Arcot. Various missiles like Arul-89 and Arul-90 are manufactured in ordinary
factory units.
Further, the Tamil extremist groups openly sell arms at Muthuppettai town.45
Here also they impart training in the use of these arms where the security forces
cannot reach easily. Whenever the militants face security danger they hide the box full
of arms and ammunition in swamps. In Tamil Nadu, L TIE of Sri Lanka, Punjab
extremists and ULFA militants are regular customers.
In the north-eastern part of India many local arms bazaars are operating.
Blackmarkets are particularly thriving in Dimapur of Nagaland, Shillong, Hojai town
of Assam and Moreh. Earlier, Dimapur was serving only .38 market but by 1987
much larger selection of weapons were available.46 The M-16 became available at
42
43
44
4S
46
Vincent D. Souza, "Tracking the Tigers", The Week (Kerala), vol. 9, 00.34, 18 August 1991, p.33.
ibid, p.34.
ibid, p.33.
India Speaks (New Dellii), vol.3, no.31, July 1990, p.19.
Tara Kartha, Role of Light Weapons in Militancy - The Cqse of Assam (New Delhi, 1996), p.9.
76
Rs 40,000 while theAK Chinese copy (M-22) was quite expensive, that is, Rs 1.5
lakh; a Sterling was available for between Rs 65-70,000.47 The Hojai township, on
the other hanq, has been dominated by Muslim immigrants where arms bazaar
reportedly coexits with a thriving perfume industry.48
Now the leading industrial city of Uttar Pradesh, Kanpur, is being flooded by
arms manufactured in the factories of Pakistan. It is learnt that these weapons have
been stocked in various godowns for weapons from which militants buy arms and -
disperse it to other extremist groups. Such weapons are reportedly stored in
Chauraganj, Basonganj, Colonelganj, Chakeri and Railbazar.49 Weapnos of the
lower calibre as well as the Indian Sten gun (Sub machine gun 9mm carbine) were
freely available in Kanpur. Besides, grenades of Indian-make were available for Rs
500 a piece while the .32 sold for Rs 15,000 or less. 50
Further, intelligence sources revealed that a veritable arms bazaar is operating
in Saharanpur, Bulandshahar, Muzaffarnagar and Meerut of Uttar Pradesh. 51 The
arms are smuggled from aqross Rajasthan, Gujarat and to some extent the Punjab
border. From there they are distributed among arms vendors. The arms from these
bazaars are being transported to as far as the north-eastern India and Kashmir. The
popular 9mm pistol costs about Rs 25,000 and a box of 10 pistols anything between
Rs 2 to 2.5 lakh. 52 The Kalashnikov assault rifles are available in Kairana, Baghpat,
47 ibid.
48 ibid.
49 India Speaks, vol.3, no.IB, I May 1990, p.27.
50 Kartha, n.46, pp.9-1O.
51 The Pioneer, 2 May 1997.
52 ibid.
77
Bulandshahar a.nd Khurja which cost around Rs 35,000 to 40,'000 per rifle. 53
Arms Bazaar in Other Places
There have been clandestine shipment of arms and ammunition from open arms
market of Singapore, Thailand, and China. The case of Singapore became evident
when the militants were nabbed by the Indian navy and coastguard in the 10 nautical
miles east of Karaikol coast in Pondicherry in 1991. The seized ship had a stockpile
of explosive materials which make up the lethal devices that the L TIE has now
become notorious for. "The inventory of items seizeq by the 'Q' branch of the Tamil
Nadu police included loads of nails and studs, 26 cases of 1.5 volt battery cells, 24
cans of fine aluminium powder, 24 bottles of sulphur, two bottles of potassium nitrate
and two bottles of activated charcoal from the boat. A combination of these provides
the trade mark 'Improvised Explosive Devices' of the LTIE".54 Also, a precious
diary and incriminating documents were seized from the ship. "The diary was a
veritable inventory of all the arms and ammunition smuggled by the vessel since
March 21, 1991. The list of articles included Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs) and
RPG to conventional weapons such as rifles and stocks of explosives" .55
In Thailand, Bangkok and Chantaburi province are famous arms bazaars. 56
AK-47s are said to Cost just over $20 apiece in these arms marketS as compared to
more than $400 in the international market. Hand grenades are available for as low
53
54
55
56
ibid.
The Hindu (Gurg;lon), 17 November 1991.
ibid, 11 November 1991.
S; Satyanarayall, "The Anus Bazaar: Skeletons in the Thai Anny's Clipboard", Frontline, vol.ll, llo.2, 15-28 January 1994, p.53.
78
as Rs 7. 57 Chiang Mai of Thailand is also reportedly famous for supplying rocket
launchers and anti aircraft shoulder launched missiles to the north-east militants. 58
"Kashmir and P.unjab militants have been attempting to source weapons from Thailand
in recent times. The Thai-Cambodian border, where arms are available freely, is also
bel ieved to have been visited by Tamil separatist guerrillas from Sri Lanka". 59
Further, in China, Peking and Mah Fong village are famous for their huge
arms bazaars.60 Combat aircraft, armoured vehicles (mainly tanks) and light arms,
-including the Chinese version of AK-47 automatic rifles, are plentily available there.
Rebel" forces visit these places for the easy availability of arms.
Intelligence reports also indicated that the militants use ships that bring in arms
from the arms markets of Jakarta, Indonesia.61
A List of Small Anus Generally Used in Political Violence
The violent groups are known to possess an assortment of weapons which they
purchase from the open arms bazaars. The array of the weapons the militants purchase
from these arms bazaars are the following:-
57
58
59
60
61
ibid. p.56.
Kartha. 11.46. p.15.
Satyanarayan, 11.56. p.56.
David Bonavia. "China: Cheap and Deadly". Far Eastern Economic Review (Hongkong). vol. 136, no.21. 21 May 1987. p.33.
T.S. Subramanian, "Sri Lanka: The Unsung Heroes". Frontline. 15-28 Apri11989, p. 103.
• AK-47 • AK-54 • AK-56 • AK-74 • Thompson Sub-machine gun • Sten Sub-machine gun • Ml Carbine • Uzi Firearms .' M52 Pistol • Makarov Pistol • Tokarev (TT-33) Pistol • RGD-5 Anti-personnel Hand Grenade • SAM-7 Strela (Arrow) • M-26 Grenade • RGP-7 Portable Rocket Launcher • M-20 Pistol • G-4 LMG • G-3 Machine Gun • G-2 Machine Gun • M -46 Grenade • M-16 Rifle • M-21 Rifle • M-22 Rifle • 12 bore gun • 32 Revolver • 22 Country-made Pistol • Self Loading Rifle • Airgun • G-l Rifle • 9mm Pistol • 455 Revolver • M-9 Rifle • M-ll Rifle ,. T -56 Assault Rifle • AR-15 Automatic Rifle • AR-16 Automatic Rifle
-- '--AKSU-74-Sub-machirteGun-
• RPG-2 • RPG-7 • HE-36 Hand-made Grenade. • Dragunov Rifles and Explosives • Pasilon 200 a mortar. • RDX, Petn and Semtex Plastic Explosives
79
• Chinese BM-1 Rocket Launcher • 30 Pistol • Kenpro KT-zz frequency Synthesiser used for
internal communication • Multibarrel Rocket Launcher otherwise known as
Stalin's Organ • Ack-ack gun • Kalikov • Sophisticated gas masks for Chemical warfare • Arul-89 missile • Arul-90 missile.
80
"The mainstay of the militants is, of course, the AK-47 rifle, which is light,
handy and automatic firearm with a foldable butt and a fantastic rate of fire. It is a
three-in-one weapon as it can be used as a rifle, a carbine and a machine gun. "62
Table 3.2
Approximate.Price of Different Small Anns
Anns Kalashnikoy Rifle (Russian) Kalashnikov Rifle (Chinese) Kalashnikov Rifle (local remake) RPG-7 Rocket Launcher Anti-aircraft Gun Stalir.'s Organ Multibarrel Rocket Launcher Chinese BM-l Rocket Launcher Anti-Personnel mines (per dozen) Anti-tank mines (per dozen) -Kalashnikov Bullets (local per hundred)-' Kalashnikov Bullets (Soviet per hundred) Sten Gun Hand Grenade Rockets
62 Times of India, 10 February 1992.
Rupees 13,000 10,000 3,000
20,000 45,000 55,000 28,000
1,000 5,000
--60 90
12,000 1,400 3,800
Incendiary Bomb Explosive Charges 30 pistol 9mm Ammunition 30mm Ammunition G-3 rifle G-3 Ammunition Dragunov AR-15 RDX Mine Sweeping Equipment Gas mask
81
3,500 3,500 7,000
15 8
7,000 27
1,00,000 30 to 40 thousand
80 thousand to 2 lakhs per kg. 10,000
500 A right vision goggle which has a range about 50 metres 41akh
Source: India Today, vol.14, no.14, 31 July 1989, p.60. Mainstream (New Delhi), vo1.26, no.39, 9 July 1988, p.32.
Besides this "a newspaper in London published a 'rate card' in 1987, listing
weapons easily purchasable in Pakistan's border areas. The Pakistan prices, it should
be noted, are about 50 per cent lower than those prevailing internationally. "63 The
'rate card' is elaborated in the following Table.
63 Akhbar-e-Watan (London), 28 January - 4 Febniary 1987, p.16, quoted in Raja Anwar, The Tragedy of Afghanistan: A First Hand Account (London, 1988), p.241.
Table 3.3
Rate of Small Anns in Pakistan Rupees
Arms
T & T mine Kalashnikov tracer bullet Anti-aircraft bullet (Egyptian-made) Rocket launcher shell American Rifle Chinese Rifle Russian Rifle Sten gun (Russian) 30 bore Anti-tank rocket launcher Kalashnikov Ak-47 Rifle G-3 Automatic Rifle 7.62mm automatic weapons
Source: Mentioned in Footnote no. 63.
82
Rate
50 30
150 300
5,000 18,000 22,000
3,500 25,000
15,000 to 16,000 13,000 to 25,000
23,000
As arms are plentifully available at will, it creates social and political turmoil
in the region as a whole. Itposes a great threat to civil and political order of the
country as the militants use these arms against the governmental. authority. Martin
Luther King rightly said: "by our readiness to allow arms to be purchased at will and
fired at whim~ we have created an atmosphere in which violence and hatred have
become popular pastimes". 64
THE MUJAHIDEEN FACTOR
The Soviet military intervention m Afghanistan and the Soviet military
presence across the sensitive Khyber Pass aggravated the South Asia's security
problems. Afghanistan, once one of the world's most isolated, untouched societies,
64 Martin Luther King, quoted ill M.H. Askari, "Pakistan's Security and Drugs/ Anus Mafia", Strategic Digest (New Delhi), yoU7, 110.12, December 1987, p.2304.
83
was brutally transformed by the Soviet intervention into a superpower military testing
ground.65 The Soviet intervention lent greater legitimacy to the "xenophobic
Afghans" by giving them the role of fighters for the liberation of their homeland and
foreign occupation. Then a resistance movement by the Mujahideen or "Holy
Warriors" began building up in the name of Islam and national sovereignty against the
then Soviet troops and Soviet supported Afghanistan government. Furthermore, it
invited US response in the form of massive aid to the Afghan Mujahideen in terms of
sophisticated arms and money. "Based on the doctrine of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC)
American policy aimed first through clandestine arms shipment, at keeping the
invading Soviet army from occupying the whole country and then at making the cost
of just holding on so high that the Soviets would decide to bring their forces
home".66 The US aid to the Afghan Mujahideen channelised through Pakistan and
Pakistan was inexorably drawn into the vortex of Afghan crisis. This trauma emanated
from both the huge inflow of Afghan refugees into Pakistan and Kalashnikov culture
of the gun-totting Mujahideen that affected large parts of the territory. In subsequent
years the rapidly changing scenario in Afghanistan loomed large over the South Asian
horizon. And, in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 the Mujahideen
organisation were freed to push the countries of South Asia down the steep slope
toward political violence by dispersing their small arms to various militant
organisations.
Before we delve into the discussion of dispersal of arms to the Mujahideen and
later on by the Mujahideen groups to the various areas in South Asia, we must know
65
66
Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh. eds .• Low Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency. and Antiterrorism in the Eighties (New York. 1988). p. 183.
Shah M. Tarzi. "Politics of the Afghan Resistance Movement". Asian Survey. voI.3l, no.6. June 1991. p.492.
84
the historical backdrop of the conflict.
~oricalBackdrop
Afghanistan was encompassed by the then Sov~et Union on the North, by a
narrow strip of Chinese territory on the North-East, by Iran on the West, by Pakistan
on the South and Pakistan occupied portion of India on the South-East. Further, the
Baluch-inhabited areas of Pakistan and Iran separate the southernmost part of that
land-locked country from the Arabian sea. During the 1930s and 1940s Afghanistan
lay in one of the more peaceful corners of world politics or at least, not right in the
middle of a crisis region. 67 This state of affairs changed very soon after the end of
the Second World War, with the beginning of the East-West conflict, dominated by
the rivalry between the then Soviet Union and the United States.68
The Afghan polity "has been torn by endemic tensions between the largest
ethnic group, the Pashtuns, and a variety of conquered ethnic minorities. The Pashtuns
have been increasingly unable to assert the position of unchallengeable dominance to
which they feel entitled as the 'true' Afghans. Non-pashtuns constituted at least 35 per
cent of the population of Afghanistan prior to the Soviet occupation - possibly as much
as 45 per cent - and their relative strength has grown in the wake of large-scale
Pashtun refugee. movement to Pakistan. "69 During the decades immediately
preceding the establishment of Communist rule in 1978, the politicised Afghan elites
consisted of three distinct groups: Western-oriented intellectual, who made up the
largest segment; Soviet - oriented communist factions; and Islamic fundamentalist
67
68
69
Gunter Knabe, "The 'Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan", Central Asian Survey (Oxford), vol. 7, .nos:2-3, 1988, p.134.
ibid.
Klare and Kombluh,eds., n.65, p.185.
85
elements with Moslem Brotherhood links in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. 70
None of these groups had substantial independent organisational networks in the
countryside and they were all depending on alliances with local tribes and ethnic
leaders who held the real power.
Until its destruction in 1973 the monarchy had provided the role focus of
political legitimacy and authority in Afghanistan for more than three centuries. In
1973, the monarch, Zahir Shah, was dethroned in a bloodless coup led by Mohammad
Daoud, his cousin and former Prime Minister with the aid of the small but well
organised group of Parachami communists.71 Daoud declared Afghanistan a republic
and pronounced himself President. The next five years saw successful PDPA
penetration of the ranks of the civil service and military. The erstwhile Soviet Union
increased aid to the new republic and Afghan army officers were sent for training in
Moscow. Under Soviet guidance the Khalq and Parcham factions of the PDPA
reunited in 1977. On 27 April 1978, PDPA-Ied elements of the Army and Air force
launched a coup d'etat, killing Daoud and establishing a one-party state, the
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (ORA). With the overthrow of the Daoud
government Afghanistan set foot on a new and crucial phase of its history. In the
wake of the Saur72 revolution, a progressive, leftist and secular government was
established in Kabul under the veteran revolutionary leader Noor Mohammad Taraki,
leader of the Khalq faction of the PDPA. After assuming power Taraki immediately
70
71
72
ibid.
The People's Democratic PaI1Y of Afghanistan (PDPA) was founded in 1965 by a small band of dedicated Marxists including Taraki and Kannal. The PDPA fell to bickering as members of its two factions, the Khalq or People's group and the Parcham or banner group"' failed to get along. The Kbalqis are generally uneducated Pashtu- speaking people from rural areas while the Parcham is come from the Persian speaking urban elite.
'Saur' refers to the mondl in the Afghan Calender, April, by Western reckoning, in which dIe coup occured.
86
proclaimed that the policy of the new regime would be Afghan nationalism, social and
economic justice under Islam, and non-alignment in foreign-policy.73 Hence he
introduced a radical programme of agrarian, economic and socio-political reforms
which have brought the Afghan sOCiety out of the darkness of pre-feudal backwardness
to the light of modernisation and progress.
But the radical reforms earned the wrath of the religious bigotry, tribal
parochialism, rural oligarchy and feudal aristocracy. Further, the forces of
conservatism were mortally hit by such reforms. The counter-revolutionary elements
fled the country sought refuge abroad, particularly in Pakistan and, with
encouragement, aid and training from several countries began armed incursions from
their sanctuaries into Afghanistan. Hundreds of members of the rival Parcham faction
were rounded up and jailed. Some were shot. Armed resistance to the new'
government began within a few months. Afghan farmers and villagers bitterly objected
to government 'reforms', including efforts to confiscate land and change Islamic
marriage customs. And the foreign involvement in support of counter-revolutionary
movement intensified. Further, the government's problems were compounded by the
schisms within the revolutionary front.
Outright political violence came in March 1979 when thousands of soldiers and
civilians rose up against the government. "Nooristan was the first province to revolt,
followed by Hazarajat Badakhsan, Paktiya, Nangarhar, Kapisa, Uruzgon, Parwan,
Bagdghiz, Bulkh, Ghazni and Farah. In Herat thirty Russian advisers and their
families were brutally murdured and hundreds of Khalqis and Parchamis were
assassinated in the rural areas. "74 By September 1979, 30,000 people were in jail
73
74
Tahir Amin, "Afghan Resistance: Past. Present and Future". Asian Survey. vo1.24, no.4, April 1984, p.379.
ibid. p.380.
87
and 12,000 had been executed. In September 1979, Hafizullah Amin, leader of the
oppressed Parcham faction of the PDPA, staged a successful counter-coup against the
Khalq government.· Taraki was executed.
Mujahideen forces won a great victory over the government's forces in
October 1979, some 150 miles south-east of Kabul. With the People's Republic on the
point of collapse, 85,000 Soviet troops were sent to Afghanistan on 27 December
1979.75 Within a few months the Soviet troops were boosted to 1,15,000. Following
the intervention Moscow installed Babrak Karmal, former Afghan ambassador to
Czechoslovakia, as the new President.
The Soviet intervention was unacceptable to many of the Afghan society. It
provoked countrywide resistance which had four centers - the traditional elite, the
religious class, the fundamentalist, and nationalist groups in the rural areas. Though
the Islamic resistance to the Afghan government began long before the Soviet
intervention of December 1979 and even before the communist coup of April 1978,
the Soviet intervention lent greater legitimacy to the opposition groups, the
Mujahideens, by giving them the role of fighters for the liberation of their homeland
from foreign intervention.
The ripple effect of this intervention in Afghanistan was felt in the coming
years, not only in that region but also in the relationship between the then Soviet
Union and the US, thereby increased the intensity of the Coid War. This Afghanistan
experience provided a unique case study of what happens when American low
intensity warfare doctrine and Soviet counter-insurgency strategy meet in a third world
sitting. 76·
75
76
Allen K. Jones, US Conunittee Report for Refugees on "Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Will They Go Home Again?" (New York), December 1982, p.3.
Klare and Kombluh, eds., n.65, p.183.
88
As the resistance to the then Soviet intervention was led by the Mujahideens
so we must know 'who are the Mujahideens'?
Mujahideen Organisation
The resistance in Afghanistan is led by a large number of local groups, large
and small, active on scattered warfronts inside the country often isolated from each
other. There is no homogeneous military structure in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan,
village is the base for any military organisation. In a village the people have lived
together and know each other's habits. Loyalties forged are very deep, so it is rare
that a government can infiltrate such a system. The dependence is totally on an
efficient leader within the tribe. Panjshir, Mazar and Herat are three examples of this
area in which the villages are engaged in resistance movement.77 These voluntary
recruited resistance fighters are known as Mujahideen or "Holy Warriors".
Mujahideens are the armed resistance men who have enrolled permanently for
the whole of Afghanistan.78 But in a traditional-bound country like Afghanistan it
is very difficult to organise along those lines, for here the people have always lived
free and away from the government's influence. As the war developed, the
Mujahideen crossed the boundaries of villages, districts and provinces and tried their
best to form organisation around regional bases. Many of the Mujahideen groups are
affiliated to Afghan parties based in exile in Pakistan and Iran. The leading political
parties have their headquarters in Peshawar.
77
78
There have been two forms of resistance in Afghanistan: one is spontaneous,
Mohamma4 Es' Haq, "The Present Situation in Afghanistan". Central Asian Survey, vol. 6, no. 1, 1987, pp. 125-26.
Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (Cambridge, 1986), p. 172.
89
unorganised and uncoordinated; the other is organised into certain established
groups.79 The unorganised form of resistance draws on primordial loyalties - family,
kinship, subtribe, tribe and region. The organised resistance, on the other hand, draws
on the educated middle class for its leadership and seeks support from ethnic groups
as well as across ethnic lines. The active members of the resistance are always
organised.
The Mujahideens have combined into two major alliances: Islamic
fundamentalists and moderate nationalists or traditionalists. The Islamic
fundamentalists want basic changes in the old institutions under which they lived, by
force if need be. Others, the traditionalists, essentially want to bring back the
institution overthrown by the then Soviets.
The schisJIls within the Mujahideen groups reflect the myriad divisions
characterising the'Afghan society which consists of a number of major linguistic and
ethnic groups. BlIt since the Mujahideen believes in the justice of their cause, the
general moral within these resistance groups is always high. They, further, realise that
the 'Jihad' or 'Holy War' in Afghanistan like any other war of liberation would be a
military-political eqgagement. So after several attempts all the parties, irrespective of
internal rife and petty ambitions, were able to form a coalition to fight against the
Soviet interventionists. Seven major parties formed a coalition. According to agreed
constitution each party would retain its independent activities but try and coordinate
them with the rest. And with this began the genesis of arms transfer to the Mujahideen
rebel group and the concomitant dispersal of these arms within the South Asian
subcontinent.
79 AmiD, D.73, p.380.
90
Arms Shipment to the Mujahideen
Initially the Mujahideen fought the War in the conventional and primitive tribal
style. They were loosely organised and highly armed with old British Enfield Rifles
and German submachine guns of the Second World War period and a few AK-47s,
captured from Government troops. However, with the passage of time, the arrival of
sophisticated weapons, and the training of substantial number of guerrillas, they have
become refined in their tactics. The new weapons mainly came from three sources:
some were captured from the enemy through capture or defection; arms provided by
foreign countries and; arms purchased from local arms markets. Though the first and
the second source turned out to be the consistent of all, the foreign assistance became
important for the resistance to survive.
The first authorisation for aid to the Mujahideen came in a secret finding of
the then US President Mr. Carter. "The external flow of covert arms began as a
trickle in those first months following the Soviet incursion, but by October 1980 the
Carter administrati~n and key Muslim States committed themselves to a substantial
increase in aid levels. The arms' passage through several hands can obscure or erase
the supplier countries of origin especially when that is the very aim of covert
operations. Arms passed out in Mujahideen camps are usually said to have come from
defectors when in reality at least some of them have moved through the pipeline
established for such clandestine purposes. "80 The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
of the USA was assigned to carry out the covert mission, its first of this nature and
magnitude since the Angolan civil war. 81 The main sources of supply were the
USA, China, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Britain and many other countries all of which have
80 Carl Bernstein, Quoted in Grant M. Farr and John G. Merriam, eds., Afghan Resistance: The Politics of Survival (Boulder, USA, 1987), p.73.
81 . New York Times, 16 February 1980.
91
funded or provided sophisticated infantry weapons, mainly small arms, mines and
ammunition.
In the beginning, the US government was broadly divided into two camps with
respect to the purpose of the covert aid programme: those who view aid as part of a
two track policy in which the US simultaneously pursues a Soviet force withdrawal
through a negotiated settlement, and others who discount the possibility of a
withdrawal but support unlimited weapons aid for its own sake as a means of raising
the costs of the occupation.82 To start with, the OS provided financial assistance of
about $30million for the purchase of Soviet-style weapons manufactured in Egypt and
China. 83 During the period from 1980 to 1986 the US orchestrated an expanding
multilateral programme of some $1.2billion in weapons aid to the resistance involving
at least $750million in Congressional CIA appropriations together with additional
helps from China, Saudi Arabia, ~gypt and others. 84
For the first five years, the US provided the guerrillas with weapons designed
and manufactured by the erstwhile Soviet Union or other East Bloc countries so they
could deny that the US was supplying such assistance.85 Further, West German
newspaper 'Frankfurter Rundschau' reported that "in purchasing weapons the CIA
takes particular care to see that the arms sent into the DRA are of Soviet-make or
high-quality imitations of arms manufactured in the Warsaw Treaty states. Purchases
of Soviet arms are intended to confirm the Western allegation that the anti-Afghan
82
83
84
85
Klare and Kombluh, eds., 0.65, p.200.
Chicago Tribune, 22 July 1981, quoted in Rasul Bakhsh Rais. Afghanistan'S Uncenain Transition after the Cold War (Karachi, 1994), p.213.
New York Times, 15 February 1980.
New York Times, 18 April 1988.
92
actions are undertaken by insurgents who manage to get hold of arms in action against
the Afghan troops and not by gangs armed and trained in neighbouring Pakistan". 86
This policy of relying exclusively on Soviet-model weaponry reflected the dominant
influence of relatively moderate CIA element led by then Deputy Director John
McMahon, who emphasised the importance of "plausible deniability" of American
involvement. 87
During the first few years the US supplied AK-47 Kalashnikovs, RPG-7
anti-tank guns, ground-to-air missile launchers,sophisticated land mines and portable
heat seeking SAM-7 missiles. These all were of Soviet model. But the .turning point
came in 1986 with the arrival of larger amounts of sophisticated weapons under a
covert CIA programme. The Mujahideen got British-made Blowpipe, the American
made Red Eye portable anti-aircraft rocket sets, American M-l assault rifles and
Stinger missiles. By March 1986, amid growing emphasis on the Reagan doctrine as
a central theme of the President's foreign policy, it was decided at an inter-agency
meeting to provide Stingers for insurgents in Afghanistan and Angola along with
upgraded aid for the Nicaraguan Contras and the resistance in Cambodia.88 Unlike
the Blowpipe, which is guided with radio controls, the Stinger is a 'fire and forget'
weapon that automatically homes in on its target. The Stinger's kill probabilities made
it a dangerous weapon. It changed the course of war by restoring Mujahideen's morale
which was badly hurt by the Mi-24 'Hind' gunships. The US Senator Dennis
86
87
88
Frankfurter Rundschau (West German), quoted in D. Borisov, "Who is Behind the Afghan Counter-Revolution", International Affairs, no. 1, January 1982, p.42.
KJare and Kornbluh, eds., n.65, p.20!.
Washington Post, 5 March 1986.
93
DeConcini described it as "the ultimate terrorist weapon ... 89 During the latter part
of 1986 some 1,000 stingers, the first of many shipments, were turned over to the
Mujahideen. Majority of which directed to Hekmatyar's Islamic Party.90
The Stinger decision reflected a broader escalation of American involvement
- in Afghanistan that culminated in the leap from $470 million in the 1986 CIA budget
to $630million in 1987.91 American fund earmarked for the Afghan conflict was
deposited in a secret Swiss bank account which was also used as a source of funds for - -
weapons aid to Nicaragua and Angola. 92 The CIA drew on this Swiss account for
purchases of Soviet-model weaponry from China, Israel and international arms
dealers. The Bakhtar News Agency of Kabul reported that under a secret agreement
signed between the CIA and the Israeli intelligence service, Mossad, Afghan counter
revolutionaries are to receive the weapons captured by Israeli invaders during the
aggression against Lebanon. 93 Further, it is said that the US had paid Israel $35
million for a variety of Soviet-model weaponry captured in the 1982 Lebanon
fighting. 94
The US was training Afghan guerrillas in the use of chemical weapons. The
CIA is reported to be training about 100 Mujahideens per month in arms smuggling
89
90
91
92
93
94
Dennis Dee:oncini , quoted in William D. Hartung, "US Weapons at War", A World Policy Pap.er Specwl Report, Prepared by the Arms Trade Resource Centre of the World Policy InstItute, 1995, p.17.
Chris Smith, ri..26, p. 7.
Washington Post, 3 December 1986.
ibid.
V .Stepanov," Afghanistan on the Path of Revolutionary Change". International Affairs. May 1984. pp.30-31.
Klare and Kombluh, eds, n.65. p.203.
94
and use. 95 Media reports often claimed that the US provided more than $230milJion
or more every year, regarding material and financial help and also for training the
fighters. 96 The Washington Post of 8 May 1987 reported that the CIA has spent $3
billon on arms and ammunition for Afghan rebels - half of it put up by the American
taxpayers. It was their secret arms procurement branch that was kept busy. Further,
the Mujahideen had contacts with private manufacturers. The rebel groups had offered
$5million to Mr. Dominick Spadea of the Camden County in the US for 10,000
weapons. 97
Moreover, the high-ranking representatives of the administration, military
personnel and Congressmen often visiting Pakistan were doing their efforts towards
stoking up the war against the Afghan people and fanning enmity and hatred against
the DRA and the then Soviet Union. Under the cover of CIA sponsored seminars,
conferences,symposia and ordinary meetings,. American representatives have been
trying to boost the morale of the battered bandits, assuring them of invariable US
.r.:" .. supportand urge them. to escalate the undeclared war-. 1:here is·ahost of anti-Afghan
organisations, like the "Freedom House" or "Freedom Research Foundation",
established and functioning in the USA under CIA auspices. 98
Hence there seems little doubt that a considerable portion of the military aid,
making its way into Afghanistan Mujahideen, has been procured by American help.
95
96
97
98
Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modem War: The Afghan and Falklands Conflict, Vol.lII, (Boulder, 1990), p.65.
Patriot (N~w Delhi), 24 September 1991.
New York Times, 5 January 1986.
Vsevolod Semyonov, nTl}e Creeping Aggression Against Afghanistan~, internationnlAjJairs, llo.lO, October 1986, pp. 66-67.
95
China effected major arms supplies to the Afghan rebels both immediately
through its common border with Afghanistan called the "Wakhan Corridor" and via
Pakistan. In January 1980, US Defence Secretary, Harold Brown, then visiting China,
obtained an agreement with their government which permitted overflight of Chinese
territory fo~ planes carrying arms destined for the resistance. 99 Further, the US
Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, during his visit to China, agreed to supply US
small arms to China for their subsequent delivery to the counter -revolutionary gangs
in Afghanistan. 100 If the-border between Pak-istanand Afghanistan were closed, the
Chinese would take over the transhipment of weapons - permitting planes to unload
in China and providing Chinese personnel to carry the cargo across the rugged
Chinese-Afghan frontier. 101 ,
Chinese weapons, particularly rockets and anti-aircraft guns, were available'to
the Mujahideen in large quantities which got confirmed in a seizure of weapons during
the clashes with guerrillas in the suburbs of Kabul in early 1985. A letter from the
Central Committee of the Afghan Communist Party to its Chinese counterpart said that
China had supplied the rebels with mortars, recoilless guns, RPG anti-tank rocket
launchers, anti-aircraft weapons,SAM-7s artillery rockets, and other kinds of war
technology.102 Further, China supplied around 2000 heavy machine guns, 1000
anti-tank rockets, and nearly half a million rounds of ammunition to the rebels through
99
100
101
102
Carl Bernstein, "Antis for Afghanistan", The New Republic (Washington), vol. 185, 18 July 1981, p.9.
Borisov, n.86, p.38.
Bemstein, 11.99, p.9.
Louis Eales, "Afghan Protest to China", Jane's Defence Weekly (Surrey), vol.3, 110.7.16 February 1985, p. 249.
96
the Pakistani army.103 Besides. China was supplying its own copies of Soviet
designed weaponry: AK-47 automatic rifles. 12.7 and 14.5mm anti-aircraft machine
guns, 107 and 122mm rocket launchers-. mortars. and anti-tank and anti-personnel
mines.104 More effective than the heavier costlier equipment from the West.
Chinese arms supplement the Soviet weapons captured by resistance fighters and the
fact that in most cases the parts and ammunition for both types is similar and
interchangeable. 105
Apart from arming the Mujahideens with modern weapons, China set up some
training bases in the province of Xinjing. Also, China had set up training camps in
South Sinkiang where rebel recruits were trained in the use of SAM-7s.106 "Peking
maintains close contacts with the pro-Chinese groupings Shole Jawid and Sorha and
with reactionary organisation Moslem Brothers. After undergoing special training in
China many members of these groupings were smuggled into Afghanistan for
committing acts of terrorism and sabotage." 107 Furthermore. China was reported
to have 300 advisors working in Pakistan. 108 A Chinese team imparted training to
the Pakistani instructors which lasted for eight weeks and was unique in that the
103
104
105
106
107
108
Husain Haqqani.· Afghanistan: Deadly Winter Games·, Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), vol. 127, no.6, 14 February 1985, p.24.
Scott R. Mc Michael, Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan (London, 1991). p.29.
Haqqani, n.l03, p.24.
Times of India, 3 November 1984.
The Truth About Afghanistan: Documents. Facts.Eyewitness Reports, compiled by V. Ashitkov, K. Gevorkyan, A. Polonsky, V. Svetozarov (Moscow, 1981), p.1l3.
Cordesman and Wagner, n.95, p.57.
97
'Chinese brought an attractive young woman as their weapon-training interpreter. 109
Saudi. Arabia undertook the major financial role. The Saudis, who bankroll
much of Pakistan's military budget, have kept a firm hand on the Pakistanis pushing
them - at the US urging - to keep their border open for the transfer of weapons. 110
Saudi aid included 300 anti-tank rocket launchers, 1000 light anti-tank rockets, 10,000
machine guns, heavy guns and mortars (purchased from China) and 20,000 boxes of
ammunition. 111 The Saudi funds earmarked for the Afghan conflict had been
deposited in a secret Swiss bank account. In the beginning Saudi Arabia provided
about $30 million each for the purchase of Soviet-style weapons manufactured in
Egypt and China. 112 The Saudis, reportedly, contributed $525million for
Afghanistan in 1985 and 1986. 113 Further, the orthodox wahabi groups in Saudi
Arabia supplemented the US governmental aid effort by a significant separate pipeline.
Equally important was the support rendered by Egypt. It provided training for
the Afghan guerrillas and served as the major source of arms - supplying weapons
obtained from the erstwhile Soviet Union during the years of Egyptian-Soviet
friendship and tons of replicated Soviet armaments, turned out in the factories on the
outskirt of Cairo. 114 In February 1 ~80, the Egyptian Defence Minister boasted that
his country was training as well as sending arms to the Afghans in guerrilla
109
110
111
112
113
114
Yousaf and Adkin, n.9, p.89.
Bernstein, n. 99, p. 9.
Cordesman and Wagner, n.95, p.57.
Carl Bernstein, 'US Weapons for Afghanistan", Chicago Tribune, 22 July 1981.
Washington Post, 20 June 1986.
Bemstein, 0.99. Also see New York Times, 14 February 1980.
98
warfare. 115 Confirmation of Egypt's such role was provided by the then President
of Egypt, Anwar Sadat. In an interview to the US NBC Television Company he
imprudently disclosed the fact that for the previous twenty one months the USA had
been making secret payments for Egypt's military supplies to the Afghan-counter
revolutionaries, US planes had been used to deliver Soviet models at Egyptian
plants. 116 He told "the US sent me airplanes and told me, 'please open your stores
for us so that we can give the Afghanis the armaments they need to fight', and I gave
the armaments." 117 He also said that Egypt is determined to double its assistance
until the glorious Afghans regain their liberty and establish their national system with
their own full will.llB Although more sophisticated weapons including the
surface-to-air missiles were supplied, the weapons clearly remain in the small arms
category. Egypt also had projects under the Arab Military Industry Organisation
(AMIO) and was capable of manufacturing increasingly sophisticated weapons some
of which were finding their way into the hands of the Afghan resistance. 119 The
CIA also procured, via Egypt, large amounts of Technovar anti-personnel mines
originally produced in ltaly.120 Egyptian arms also came through Pakistan's North
Western Frontier Province (NWFP).
115
116
117
118
119
120
Washington Post. 14 February 1980.
Borisov. n.86. p.42.
San Francisco Chronicle, 24 September 1981. p.ll.
.New York Times. 28 December 1980.
Grant M. Farr and John G. Merriam. eds .• Afghan Resistance: The Politics of Survival (USA. 1987). p.84.
Mark L. Urban. War in Afghanistan (London. 1988). p.187.
99
Further, it is also believed that the countries like West European nations, Iran,
Israel, Libya, North Korea, Turkey and Japan were also involved in the dispersal of
arms to rival factions in Afghanistan. Britain was supplying sophisticated
surface-to-air missiles to the Afghan. rebels in collaboration with the US, the cost and
scope of which would make it one of the biggest covert arms trade in recent
decades. 121 Britain's supply of Blowpipe anti-aircraft missile increased the
Mujahideen's war capability. In 1984, Britain had extended £18million to the Afghan
counter-revolutionaries. 122· Further, speaking before the Afghan refugees and local
poputation of Nassir Bagh in the environs of Peshawar the then British Prime
Minister,Ms Margaret Thatcher, confirmed the intentions of the British government
to maintain its aid to the Afghan counter- revolutionaries. She promised that London
would allocate £2,000,000 in addition to the previously allotted £5,800,000 for their
needs. Seeking to boost the morale of the counter-revolutionaries, Thatcher stated that
Britain would not be satisfied until Afghanistan was free. 123
It was also said that Pakistan had been feverishly shopping for sophisticated
but comparatively light weapons from some West European countries particularly Italy
and West Germany. Arms industry circles in London were agog with suggestions that
the then Zia administration - probably with American support and consent - was
exploring the possibility of making a secret deal with Italy for purchase of military
equipment and weapons especially 'ground-to-ground' and 'ground-to-air' missiles and
other modern firing weaponry. And it is said that a considerable part of this
. consignment would be delivered through Islamabad to the Afghan rebels operating
121
122
123
Indian Express (New Delhi), 18 June 1987.
Kabul News Times, 27 February 1983.
Borisov, n.86, pAO.
100
from Pakistan. 124 West Germany also extended £60million aid to the Afghan
counter-revolutionaries. The prestige weapon of 1981/82 was the Heckler and Koch
G3 of West German design. 125 West German leaders including the erstwhile
Chancellor Helmut Kohl invariably made a point of demonstrating their solidarity with
bandit chiefs visiting that country. West German citizens illegally penetrate into
Afghanistan together with mercenary bands to conduct subversive activities against its
government.
Besides, some weapons destined primarily for the Khomeinist Shiite groups
entered Afghanistan from Iran. Also, several private organisations, sympathetic to the
Mujahideen cause, raised funds from various countries, more from the Middle-Eastern
countries, and purchased weapons in the international arms market for the
Mujahideen. There have been recurring stories that the USA has used Turkey as an
offshore supplier. The CIA purchased 60,000 rifles, 8,000 light machine guns and
over 100 million rounds of ammunition form Turkey albeit from obsolete stocks and
in appalling conditions. 126 It was, also, reported that France and Sweden provided
funding, supplies, and personnel (France only) for medical support to the
resistence. 127 In addition, the rebels used bullhorns, supplied by Japan, to unnerve
the troops when they had them surrounded. 128
124
125
126
127
128
Ahmed Malik, "And Now Italian Arms for Pakistan", Democratic World (New Dellii), vol. 15, no. 22, 1 June 1986, p.8.
John Fullerton, The Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan (London, 1984), p.77.
Chris Smith, n.26. p.6.
Me Michael, n.104, p.30.
ibid. p.33.
101
Even though it is seven years since Moscow withdrew its troops from
Afghanistan, 'the war in this benighted country drags on because of continued external ,
support by way of cash and miliwy supplies to the combatants.' Rich Arab countries
and Central Asian countries are replacing the US as financiers. The rebel groups are
also recruiting volunteers from Arab countries to fulfill their dream of an Islamic
State. "The 'Islamic victory, in turn, is attracting new funds through a 'shadowy
network; of wealthy Arab donors. These private backers are now bankrolling specific
battles and supporting an influx of non-Afghan Muslim volunteers ready to martyr
themselves for the rebel cause." 129 Further, the Mujahideen also gained from the
recent Gulf War. Deliveries of the weapons commenced earlier the month of
September 1991 and the bulk of it was delivered to the Mujahideen. "Soviet-made
T -62 tanks and other weaponry captured by the allied forces from the Iraqis during
. the Gulf War has been gifted to the Afghan Mujahideen .... It icludes apart from the
tanks, four barrel ZK-l, anti-aircraft guns, 120 M.Vc and 130mm artillery prices and
hand guns. ,,130
Hence Mujahideen's military capabilities has substantially improved with the
. inflow of sophisticated weapons from a number of sources. They now possess various
quality of weapons like individual weapons, heavy weapons and collective weapons.
(See Appendix III). Substantial quantities of these arms a~d ammunition came in via
Pakistan from various outside backers, notably the US, China, West European and
Gulf countries. Here, it is pertinent to discuss Pakistan's middleman role in regulating
the deliveries of arms to the Mujahideen group.
129 The HiruJu (Madras) • 3 December 1991.
130 Times of lruJia. 24 September 1991.
102
Pakistan's Middleman Role
Pakistan assumed a crucial role in the Afghan civil war. The 1,200 mile border
Pakistan shares with Afghanistan appeared to be increasingly vulnerable to Pakistan
and Soviet intervention. Claimed to be a key actor in the area, Pakistan extended
protection to the Mujahideen fighters, let them organise on its territory and allowed
foreign-supplied weapons to cross into Afghanistan. Situated in strategic place,
Pakistan was the beneficiary of generous attention. Without Pakistan their could have
been no Afghan resistance movement. 131
Pakistan's championing of the resistance struggle was due to geo-strategic and
domestic imperatives. The first objective was the removal of Soviet forces from
Afghanistan. There was deep concern that Moscow, through material support, would
escalate ethnic separatist movements in Pakistan's Baluchistan and the NWFP. The
second goal was the early return of Afghan refugees for the exiles might have an
undesirable impact on their economy and society. Third, the involvement of Pakistan
contributed to regime survival by helping to neutralise General Zia-UI-Haq's critics.
Fourth, Zia being a staunch anti-Communist, intended to use the war and Pakistan's
role as a frontline state to defend Islam against Soviet-sponsored Communism. Fifthly,
there was the desire on the part of Pakistan to block the revival of Afghan nationalism
and gain recognition of the international boundary.132 Last but not the least,
Pakistan knew that it would profit enormously in terms of money and arms by being
a major conduit.
131
132
Marvin G. Weinbawll. Pakistan and Afghanistan: Resistance and Reconstruction (Boulder, USA, 1994). p.ll.
ibid. pp.ll-I3.
103
Pakistan from the outset sought to orchestrate much of the conduct of the
Afghan war. Pakistan's involvement in the Afghanistan civil war began with the
Communist coup of April 1978. Further, Pakistan was subjected to pressure from a
number of countries to support Afghan violence and act as a conduit for material to
the resistance movement. An important role was assigned by the CIA of the USA to
Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (lSI). It's work was to liaison with Afghan
resistance groups and funnelling arms supplies to them as well as for coordination of
the armed units of the resistance in Afghanistan territory. The CIA deposited funds
each month in the lSI-controlled bank account. This money was used for Party offices,
construction and maintenance of warehouses, puschase of rations and clothes,
transport and allowance and salaries for leaders and officials respectively. 133
"Arms deliveries to Afghan mercenaries are directed by a special Coordinating
Committee of the Council led by Mr. Brezezinski and approved by President Carter.
The arms are channelled through Pakistan. This is the most important effort of its
kind ... since the operation that aided the mercenaries fighting against the Afghan
people. "134
The CIA arranged regular airlifts of Afghanistan-bound weapons to Pakistan
where the arms were distributed by the lSI Directorate in close cooperation with the
CIA station in Islamabad. The CIA also arranged for the arms to be shipped via Oman
to Karachi 135 and loaded into heavy trucks which. carried them to Afghan frontier.
The first ship carrying arms and ammunitioh for Peshawar arrived in Karachi from
Britain in June 1979. These weapons, mostly Soviet-made, were bought by the CIA
133
134
135
Yousaf and Adkin, n.9, p.106.
The Undeclared War: Imperialism vs. Afghanistan, cited in L. Humanite (Moscow, 1980), 18 February 1980, p.5l.
Smith, n.26, p.5.
104
for the Mujahideen in the open market. At Karachi port authority accounts were
settled in cash, manifests were merely labelled 'defence stores' and customs officials
were not involved. For this reason, nobody really knew how much weaponry was
imported during the 1980s, although one estimate speculated that the US covert
programme provided more than 4,00,000 Kalashnikov rifles up until mid-1991. 136
Further, lSI continued to send trucks fun of weapons to the Hizb-i-Islami forces in
Gardez. It also established a few 2,000 to 2,500 strong army units manned by
veterans of the Afghan army equipped with tanks, artillery and combat vehicles. 137
Some fifty five border bases were located just inside Pakistan to assist an easy
flow of weapons. Most of them were clustered around the main entry points near
Parachinar and Chaman, north-west of Quetta. There were six main routes leading
into Afghanistan - starting in the north from Chitral a high route led to the Panjsher
valley, Faizabad and the northern provinces; from Parachinar (the Parrot's Beak) via
Ali Khel into Logar provinces which was the busiest route through which 40 per cent
of supplies passed; from Miram Sha~ via Zhawar again into Logar provinces; from
Quetta to Chaman to Kandahar and nearby provinces; through Girzi jungle and;
through Iran. Apart from Karachi to Quetta there was one main pipeline via
Rawalpindi and Peshawar to the border. 138
Weapons, thus, poured steadily. Arms reached Pakistan by both ship and
aircraft and were then trucked under military supervision to the border areas. At the
frontier, weapons were recorded as they entered Afghanistan. 139 Next, these arms
136
137
138
139
D.C. Isby, quoted in Smit11, 11.26, pp.8-9.
Y ossef Bodansky, "Borders and Alignments Begin to Change in Central Asia", Defence and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy (London), vol.20, lIos.7-8, July-August 1992, p.IS.
Yousaf and Adkin, n.9, pp. 109-1 10.
Edward Girardet, Ajghnistan: The Soviet War (London, 1983), p.67.
105
were distributed among the Mujahideen's armies and units on Afghan territory. "They
are delivered by caravans of as many as 600 camels, groups of two or three camels,
donkeys, small Toyotas crossing into the country over the mountains or smuggled in
over open roads." 140 The animals used were camels, horses and mules. Camels
were helpful for arid lands and long routes. Both Afghan and Argentine horses were
employed for long distance, strategic carrier of supplies from the border to the
operational bases. Also Chinese mules were used to transfer the mortar, the heavy
machine guns or the Single Barrel Rocket Launcher (SBRL) and its ammunition to the
actual firing point, or very close to it. 141
With the passage of time, the weapons supplied via Pakistan increased in
numbers and sophistication. In March 1985, the Reagan administration arrived at a
decision to sharply intensify US covert action as a means of allowing the Mujahideen
to defeat the Soviets. CIA's task was to purchase arms and equipment and arrange I
their transportation to Pakistan; provide funds for the purchase of vehicles and
transportation inside Afghanistan and Pakistan; train Pakistani intructors on modern
and sophisticated weapons; provide satellite photographs and maps for lSI's
operational planning; provide radio equipment and training. 142 As the arms
dispersal became more in numbers, large depots were located in Pakistan, by far the
largest at Ojhri camp, a military installation on the outskirts of Rawalpindi. At
Rawalpinidi, Pakistan "had a fleet of 200 vehicles, mostly five - or ten -ton trucks
with false and frequently changed number plates, with which to move the weapons
further down the pipeline. All the boxes had to be brought to the camp from the
140 Alexander Prokhanoy, "Afghanistan", lnternntional Affairs, no.8, August 1988, p.l?
141 Yousaf and Adkin, n.9, p.109.
142 Yousaf and Adkin, n~ 9, pp.95-96.
106
railway station to be separated, checked and stored in the warehouse." 143 In one
estimate, at least 80 per cent of all arms and ammunition used in Afghanistan passed
through the warehouse at Ojhri.l44
Further, Pakistan allows training facilities for the Mujahideen rebel - a similar
role is being played in the context of Punjab and Kashmir - in camps set up on its soil
where experts from the USA, Britain, France, Egypt, China, Pakistan, Iran, and other
countries train rebels in guerrilla warfare. The training was based on the principle of
'mission-oriented'. Once a mission had been decided and a commander selected, then
the team would be responsible for the training of that commander and his
Mujahideen. 145 There were more than 300 American instructors alone in these
camps.146 They provided training to Pakistan's Army instructors. In the case of
new weapons, particularly anti-aircraft weapons, American trainers ran courses for
Pakistani instructors; they then trained the Mujahideen. 147 Chinese instructors were
taking an active part in training terrorist bands on Pakistani territory who were later
sent to Afghanistan to conduct subversive operations. The US, British and Chinese
instructors were training over 70,000 men for operations against Afghanistan. 148
" According to a report by Pravda, there are interventionist training centres in
the areas of Peshawar, near the towns of Miram Sahn, Bannu, Chitral Parachinar,
Kohat and Yasin in the NWFP, near Queta, Pishin and Nushki in Baluchistan and
143
144
145
146
147
148
ibid, p.l00.
ibid, p.lOl.
ibid, pp.114-116.
Stepanov, 0.93, p.30.
Yousafaod Adkill. u.9, p.116.
The Truth About Afghanistan: Decuments Facts. Eyewimess Repons. n.102, p.122.
107
elsewhere" .149 Besides, training centres were also set up at Badjaur-Momand
region, Warsak, Job etc. The Afghan authorities said there were 110 training camps
for rebels in Pakistan: even conservative estimates tell that about 70 such camps were
functioning. 150 Furthermore, a Mobile Training Team (MIT) was established by
Pakistan to provide syllabus and training aids. 151
As a consequence, special teams and crews were trained in the use of light as
well as heavy weapons. Some factions trained mine warfare, demolition and explosive
experts. They also provided ideological and literacy training. Massoud established
special groups to operate the more sophisticated weaponry and he deveJoped his own
training programmes in Panjshir valley with indigenous experts. 152 Also, "an ex
ORA Army Colonel, who reportedly, had received commando training in Great
Britain and the Soviet Union and had worked with the US Special Forces in Vietnam,
established an excellent training camp in Pakistan. He offered fOllr to six weeks
courses for upto 400 trainees at a time." 153 On an average between 4000 to 5200
Afghans were being trained in Pakistan every year in the technique of guerrilla
warfare. 154 And, from 1984, through 1987, over 80,000 Mujahideen went through
Pakistani training camps. 155
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
Perala Ratnam, Afghnistan's Uncertain Future (New Delhi, 1981). p.73.
Times of India. 3 November 1984.
Yousaf and Adkin. n.9, p.1l7.
Me Michael, n.104. p.37.
ibid. pp.36-37.
Patriot, 18 January 1980.
Yousaf and Adkill, n.9, pp.28-29.
108
Moreover, China took the help of Pakistan in channelling military hardwares.
China was also reported to be supplying to Pakistan military equipment, small arms,
automatic rifles, grenade launchers, and air defence missiles for rebel groups fighting
inside Afghanistan. China was. also reported to be flying cargo planes into Pakistan
on a regular basis. 156 The weapons, ammunition and equipment are delivered to
the Mujahideensfrom China to Pakistan by the sea Tianjin to Karachi and then along
the Karakoram highway to the Pakistani border. 157
The Pakistani authorities not only permitted foreign aids for the Mujahideen
to be channelled through Pakistan, but also organised their distribution to them. In due
course, the arms, channelled through Pakistan for the Mujahideen, started dispersing
to the adjoining areas of South Asian countries, thereby increased the potentiality of
political violence.
Impact Upon Pakistan
For Pakistan, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan presented a unique
opportunity to closely lirlk itself with the foreign countries in order to get massive
doses of military and economic aid. But Pakistan's security environment worsen~ and
became more complex. Pakistan now faces the socio-economic and political strains,
being caused by the presence of a large number of Afghan refugees on its territory.
There have been frequent references to Pakistan's "Kalashnikov Culture", an
intensification of violence in the society imported by the Afghans. And, the frequency
of the acts of political violence and terrorism within Pakistan has accelerated to an
alarrr.ing level.
156 Times of India, 4 January 1980.
157 The Daily Telegraph (London), 5 January 1980.
109
Afghan refugees constitute a potentially destabilising nation within Pakistan.
As the population of Afghanistan is mostly rural, conservative, and strongly Islamic,
. the communist government's policies met with stiff opposition in the countryside,
particularly among the Nuristanis and the Pushtuns of eastern and southern
Afghanistan. 158
A very small number of these refugees, estimated by the Government of Pakistan at around 1500, fled Afghanistan between 1973 to 1978 as political exiles from Daoud regime. The vast majority, however, entered Pakistan in consequence of the coup d'etat on 27-28 April 1978, the subsequent Soviet invasion in late December of 1979, and the estimated escalation of hostilities between the Soviet-controlled Kabul Government and resistance fighters. The bulk of these refugees live in official refugee camps located in NWFP and Baluchistan, both bordering Afghanistan. Several newer camps have been opened in the Punjab. Significant numbers of Afghan refugees also live outside refugee camps, either in the villages or the cities of Pakistan. The largest number of non-camp refugees are found in the city of Peshawar, located less than 40km from the Afghan border. 159
Most of the refugees belong to the Pushtun tribes who comprise the majority
in Afghanistan. Other groups represented in the refugee population are the Tajiks,
Uzbeks, Turkomans, Badakshanis, Hazaras and Nuristanis. In one estimate, roughly
one-quarter are adult males; the remaining three quarters are women, children and
elderly males. 160
Because of the presence of Afghan refuge~s on Pakistani soil and the
continuing resistance inside Afghanistan, Pakistan was being drawn to the edge of
political violence. Refugees are regularly blamed for civil disord~r. The Pakistani
police accused the refugees of involvement in 75 per cent of the crimes committed in
158 Jones, n.75, p.2.
159 Farr and Merriam, eds., n.119, pp.160-63.
160 Jones, n.75, p.5.
110
the NWFP during 1991. 161 The refugees over the years developed vested interests.
They got absolute freedom to move freely. With their free movement and because of
their eagerness for money they started a traffic in arms. An increasing number of
Afghans stationed in Pakistan were getting equipped with sophisticated arms out of the
supplies meant for the rebels. Most of the Afghan refugees ask for arms rather than
food.162 The refugees upset the existing sectarian and ethnic balance in Pakistan.
US weapons sqpplied to Afghan Mujahideen are being freely used by the leaders of
the Mohajir movement and Afghans in Karachi and Hyderabad. 163 The armed
Afghans lead to civil war with the Punjab is and the Sindhis on one side, and the
Pathan, both Pakistani and Afghan, on the other. 164 Violent ethnic conflicts in the
metropolitan areas of the Sindh were blamed on the refugees. 165 Further, in the
Kurram agency, the refugees outnumbered the locals and in the sectarian clashes over
200 died. 166
Further, the agents of Afghan Intelligence Service, KHAD, have been
extremely active in creating riots in refugee villages and generating antagonism
between the refugees and locals. They come into Pakistan in the guise of refugees
with the object of spying and creating tensions. KHAD works in close collaboration
with KGB, the Russian intelligence agency. Also, both are responsible for periodic
161
162
163
164
165
166
Aziz Siddiqui, The Herald (Karachi), vol.23, no.5, May 1992, p. 40a.
The Hindu, 23 January 1983.
Patriot, 10 November 19S6.
P.B. SiqIta, "The Afghan Problem", IDSA Journal (New Dellii), vo1.16, no.2, ~tober-December 1983, p.127.
Aftab A.Kazi, "Ethnic Nationalism and Super-Powers in South Asia: Sindhis and Baluchis', Journal of Asian and African Affairs q ... ondon), voU, no.l, July 1989, p.7.
The Muslim (Pakistan), 29 July 1987.
111
bomb blasts in areas of civilian concentration. "More air raids take place now than
before. Bombs are planted by KGB agents in public places, especially Peshawar,
where a large number of refugees are living. "167
The illegal sale and spread of weapons throughout Pakistan was also linked to
the Afghans. The Afghan rulers continuously supplied arms to certain tribes in
Pakistani territory 'with a view to establish a sympathetic tribal militia. Further, since
both Pakistani officials involved as well as Afghan leaders served as conduit for the
weapon supplies to the resistance groups, it was alleged that much of these arms are
siphoned off by them and sold on the black market for personal profit. The local arms
industry, already formidable, also grew to keep pace with the demands of the
Mujahideen.
"The arms supplied by the US to the rebels might find their way to illegal
markets like Sohrab Goth market in the outskirts of Karachi in Pakistan which sparked
off ethnic riots and civil violence. It now appears that 'Bara' market in Pakistan have
reached a saturation point." 168 While accusing the CIA of gross mismanagement
of the arms pipeline to Mujahideen, the US Congressmen emphasised that 40 per cent
of ttie total arms aid is siphoned off along the way by corrupt officials, Afghan leaders
and Mujahideen" .169 By some estimates about a quarter of the arms from the US,
Saudi Arabia and China were thought to have been diverted for use by Pakistani
167
168
169
I
Mohammad Es' Haq, n.77, p.129.
Syed Ziaullah, "The Afghan Accord - Dangerous Implications", Democratic World, YoLI7, no.17, 24 April 1988, p.lO.
Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Impact of the Afghan War on Pakistan". Strategic Digest, yo1.l8, 110.4, April 1988, p.533.
112
secessionists, bandits and others. 170 More than ever, with more small arms in
circulation, Pakistanis were using weapons to settle differences.
Further, the Afghans had long been active in the heroin trade which escalated
during the Afghan war. Opium grown in Afghanistan was typically brought into
Pakistan by trucks and mules returning from trips carrying CIA-purchased arms into
Afghanistan. 171 The guns that accompanied the explosion of drugs added to the
social destabilization of Pakistan. Refugees were also accused of deep involvement in
transnational arms and drugs trafficking.
Thus the anarchy of the Afghan conflict threatens to engulf Pakistan where
arms are plentiful and political violence and riots are now commonplace.
Repercussions on India
The arms and ammunition, reportedly being shipped across Pakistani-rugged
frontier with Afghanistan, did not necessarily find their way to Afghanistan. A large
part of the weapons found its way into the hands of the anti-India violent groups
operating from Pakistan. The India-Pakistan border from Kashmir to Kutch is as
porous as it has always been. A grim reality facing India is the backwash of the
Afghan conflict, represented by weapons getting through to terrorist groups in
India. In Even the Indian terrorists are being given training -in the use of these
weapons in camps outside Peshawar.
The weapons, acquired by the Mujahideen from foreign countries, have found
their way into the hands of the Punjab terrorists. After the arms reach the Pakistan
170
171
172
"Silent Voices # 1", a Report by the Refugee Council in association with the British Agencies Afghan Groups, cited in Weinbawll, n.131, p.64.
WeinbauIll, n.131, p.65.
Times of India, 3 February 1992.
113
border, couriers are responsible for delivering the cache to Punjab. Sikh militants
fighting in the Punjab region have large quantities of Chinese-type-56 assault rifles of
the kind that were supplied in large numbers to the Afghan war by the CIA, indicating
a likely spill over of the Afghan pipeline into this conflict as wel1. l73 There are
already reports of the Stinger missiles and rockets supplied by the US to Mujahideen
, being used in strife-torn Punjab. Also, numerous weapons recovered from the
Khalistani extremists which bore the Chinese and Russian marking, the same as the
weapons with the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. It is generally felt that the rockets,
rocket launchers and AK-47 rifles, that the Punjab militants have acquired, might have
come from the Afghan refugees. Mujahideen with their huge stockpile of arms may
introduce an entirely new element to the Punjab tangle. 174 In the training bases for
the Mujahideen also Khalistani Commando Force (KCF) activists get training.
There is also the increasing role of Afghan Mujahideen in the other parts of
India. The Afghans are believed to be training Kashmiris from the valley. They are
also sending arms and ammunition to the terrorists and brainwashing them with
anti-India Islamic fundamentalism. Afghan Mujahideens are better trained in
sop~isticated arms and guerrilla warfare than the Kashmiri militants to suit Pakistan's
purposes in Jammu & Kashmir. Afghans because of their complexion and appearance
can easily pass off as Kashmiris which factor, apart from the factor of their intensive
tra:ining and easy availability, may be the primary reason for Pakistan's preference for
them. 175 Pakistan's plans to smuggle in 10,000 armed subversives acquires
considerable significance when viewed from the angle that the plan could well be to
173
174
175
Hartung, n.89, p.18.
Ash Narain Roy. "Soviet Pull-Out: Itllplicatioll'> for the Region", Link (New Delhi), vol. 30.no.39, 1 May 1988, p.19.
Blitz (Bombay), 7 July 1990.
114
infiltrate Afghans posing as Kashmiris, in batches, on a large scale. 176 Dr.
Najibullah, the then President of Afghanistan, made a pointed reference that a close
linkage is now being knitted between the Kashmiri terrorists and a section of Afghan
Mujahideen through the good offices of Pakistan. 177
Further, many Afghan resistance leaders including officials of the interim
governinent, had for some time been hinting at a readiness to give direct military
assistance to an armed struggle inside Kashmir. 178 At a Jama'at-i-Islami sponsored
conference on Kashmir in Lahore in January 1993, a Jama'at leader boasted that his
party had sent' 35,000 Mujahideen to fight in Kashmir. He claimed to the
embarrassment of government officials in attendance that these Mujahideens had
earlier been engaged in the Afghan jehad. 179 Moreover, Pakistan's lSI acts as a co
ordinator of any links among the Afghan Mujahideen and violent groups in Kashmir.
It is learnt that the arms meant for the Afghan Mujahideen are now getting
dispersed to the violent groups within India. This dispersal of arms intensifies the
tension of political violence inside the country. Thus the rush of more diffusion of
small arms to the rebels, though it is through Pakistan, is fraught with grave
consequences.
A perusal of the above description shows that South Asia, more particularly
Pakistan and India, is the worst affected area in this context. Since the Soviet
intervention large quantities of small arms and ammunition have flooded in South
Asia, which are available against cash payment or for services rendered.- Here,
176
177
178
179
ibid.
NationaL Herald (New Delhi), 6 September 1990.
Frontier Post (Lahore), 4 February 1990.
Newsline (Karachi), February 1993. p.86.
115
Mujahideen embarked upon a course of action which resulted in the horizontal
proliferation of weapons in South Asia. Thus the Mujahideen is very much responsible
in dispersing small arms and training facilities to the various secessionist movements
in the adjoining areas inside the region which sparks off intra-state and inter-sate
political violence.
THE DRUG MAFIA
South Asia is a major region where drug production, trafficking, violence and
terrorism go hand in hand. In South Asia, drugs have permeated every layer of society
and increasingly the social and political structures are getting dominated by the drug
mafia. The unique geographical frontiers of this subcontinent is very much prone to
subversion. The long open border, both on the East and West, provides an unlimited
scope to the drug mafia to carryon its nefarious operation rather freely. Drug
trafficking is a transnational phenomenon, for their operations involve transactions that
regularly flow across national boundaries thereby posing severe threat to national and
international security. The drug cartels keep on changing their entry points. For
instance, when Punjab of India was fenced, the carriers shifted to the border areas of
Rajasthan and Gujarat. For them distance is not a matter of concern.
The illegal drug production and drug trafficking are linked closely to the illegal
arms trade and international terrorism. Since militants need a lot of money to buy
arms, they find drug smuggling the best way to make money. Side by side, the drug
smugglers sell arms to the extremist groups. "The clandestine arms market and the
drug mafia both travel along the same route and sustain each other in causing havoc
and destruction" .180 This has been amply proved time and again in South Asian
180 Askari, 11.64, p.2304.
116
region which have been the victims of political violence. The drug mafia is very well
organised for this job which would be evident from the following narrative.
Drug Trafficking Network in South Asia
The cultivation and refinement of drugs, enmeshed with drug trafficking, has
profoundly affected the basic social and political structure of South Asian region. The
first group of drug traffickers in a world map were perhaps the Chinese and Arab
traders who carried on the trade of opium some 300 years ago along the Silk Route,
connecting the far eastern Chinese city of Sanghai to Turkish town of Constantinople.
Drug trafficking was not a major concern then. But at the turn of this century it poses
a serious threat.
In the continent of Asia two .major drug production and trafficking routes
operate. The first one is the 'Golden Triangle', comprising of Myanmar, Laos and
Thailand. "The Goldan Triangle is bounded by the Mae Sai and Mekong rivers at the
point where the borders of Laos, Thailand and Myanmar meet, creating a virtually
unpoliced territory of about 75,000 sq. miles .. Here the topographical and climatic
conditions are ideal for the cultivation of opium. "181 "In the 'Golden Triangle',
1,550 tons of opium is produced, with Myanmar accounting for 1,200 tons, Laos for
300 tons and Thailand, for 50 tons. Processing about 450 tons of opium yields 45 tons
of heroin, five tons of which is shipped to Europe and 2.5 tons to the United
States." 182 Of late, businessmen have started calling the 'Golden Triangle' area as
'Golden Quandrangle', a name designed to reflect the fact that one more nation,
181
182
Ravi Shastri, "Insurgency and Drugs: The Deadly Alliance", Strategic Analysis (New Delhi). vo1.l2, no.l. April 1987. p.41.
International Affairs Gues! Club. "Drug Trafficking", Intenzational Affairs. no.l. January 1991, p.106.
117
China, has been added to the Golden Triangle for its notorious role m drug
trafficking. 183
On the other hand, the 'Golden Crescent', which cuts across Pakistan,
Afghanistan and Iran, have been the world's major producing area. The geopolitical
environment of the 'Golden Crescent' is largely similar to that of the 'Golden
Triangle'. "The region has been traditionaly autonomous with a tribal system of
government prevailing in most parts whether it be eastern Afghanistan or western
Pakistan. These tribes have been virtually independent. Opium cultivation and use has
been an ancient custom of the region. Moreover, most poppy growers in the 'Golden
Crescent', as in the 'Golden Triangle', have realised that larger profits are to be made
by refining opium themselves. Thus heroin laboratories have sprung upon both in the
Crescent as they did earlier in the Triangle" .184 Further, this region provides for
60 per cent of the heroin reaching America and 80 per cent of the heroin destined for
Europe. IS5
When the 'Golden Triangle' was the nerve centre of the narcotics trade, it was
also bedevilled by a series of insurgencies. The 'Golden Triangle' connection
grad L1all y weakened in the early 1970s. But quite clearly in the late 1970s there
developed a sudden increase in drug trafficking from the 'Golden Crescent' area. "The
only significimt development in the area in the middle of 1978 - when the reported
spurt in drug trafficking from the Pak-Afghan border started - was the begining of the
Afghan insurgency in the wake of the 'Saur' revolution of April 1978". The aid and
support being extended by various countries to the rebel groups in Afghanistan have
183
184
185
Times of India, 7 March 1994.
Shastri, 11.181, pp.42-43.
S.R. Chowdhuri, "Pakistan's Poppy Politics", PTI Feature. F-625, p.l.
118
been contributing indirectly to the increase in drug trade. It is believed that
"Washington's decision to channel billions of dollars in weapons and financial backing
to the Afghan rebel groups in the 1980s, without close scrutiny of the some of the
Afghan leaders involved, contributed to a climate in which sorne of those l~ders
turned to heroin trafficking." 186 Also, the rebels were harvesting opium that,
according to the rebel commanders and fighters, helps finance their war against troops
of the Soviet and Afghan armies. I87 Moreover, since the Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan and the closure of the westward shipping route, Pakistan and India of
South Asian region have become major transhipment points for Golden Crescent
heroin. I88
The Case of Pakistan
In South Asian region, Pakistan is one of the worst victims of the drug mafia's
operation. The illicit traffic in drugs is Pakistan's most profitable business today. In
Pakistan, the drug mafia are the most formidable force threatening the very roots of
Pakistan society. A new drug culture emerged leaving its deep imprint on the national
fabric. The international drug dealers have turned Pakistan into their main
"laboratory" (for processing their raw ma.terials into heroin).
There were three factors which contributed to this development. Firstly, with
the downfall of the Shah of Iran, heavy penalties were imposed on those engaged in
186
187
188
John F. Bums, "Heroin Scourges Million Pakistanis" ,Afghanistan Forum (East Hampton, New York), vol.23, nos.2-3, March-May 1995. p.2.
New York Tinws. 18 June 1986.
S~stri, n.181, p.50.
119
drug production and sale. 189 Ayatollah Khomeini's ban on narcotics production and
usage compelled Iranian narcotic dealers and middlemen to go underground and
abroad. Many fled to Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Gulf States in search of new
pastures. Their skill and long experiences helped in making narcotics production and
international drug trafficking more worrisome. Their influx into Quetta and Karachi
of Pakistan provided Pakistani drug dealers an access to transnational network. They
also financed the Helmand valley region to become an important opium producing
region during the 1980s and helped to rebuild clandestine smuggling routes through
Iranian Baluchistan-via-Sistan and between the Makran coast and the Gulf ports. 190
Next, "with the continued stalemate on the Afghan warfront, the Pak-Afghan
border region is turning into the world's largest and most accessible heroin and
hashish market" .191 As the Mujahideen organised their holy war from Pakistan,
they looked for the possible source of funding. The rebels then invest in heroin
laborat()ries to increase their revenue to buy weapons. So the Afghanistan-Pakistan
border became the likely spot for large scale drug production. Afghanistan has
traditionally been well-known for poppy cultivation in the region. Opium is grown in
its South-central part around. Kandahar. The eastern and southern provinces of
Afghani$tan are seen as the largest poppy-growing areas. In Afghanistan's Nangarhar
province, bordering Pakistan, a bountiful opium crop is being harvested and the feudal
headmen who in large part control separate insurgent forces also control much of this
189
190
191
Thomas Carney, "High in the Khyber", Rolling Stone (New York), lio. 407, 27 October 1983, p.45.
US CIA Report on "Heroin in Pakistan: Sowing the Wind", reproduced in Friday Times, vol.5, no.25, 26 August ~ I September 1993, p.3.
Ahmed Rashid, "Drug Bazaars", The Herald, vol.2, no.4, April 1990, p. 68.
120
trade. 192 In some areas of Nangarhar province around Jalalabad, it is estimated that
98 per cent of the cultivated land is under poppy.193 According to a report
published in 1996, Afghanistan registered a 33 per cent increase in opium cultivation·
from 29,180 hectares to 38,740 and a 32 per cent increase in opium production from
950 to 1,250 metric tons in 1995. 194 The Afghan war resulted in the influx of three
million refugees which encouraged drug production. Many of the refugees streaming
into Pakistan brought opium seed with them. 195 The region along the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border has long been settled by nomadic tribes, "where due to
a complex combination of factors like the tribal code of honour, inefficiency of
Islamabad's writ over these areas and the generation of high profits that new high
value narcotic substances like heroin bring, the refining process continues without any
disturbance. "196 Thirdly, the United States mainly under the pressure from its
NATO allies began to offer heavy subsidies to Turkey as an inducement for
eradicating poppy cultivation. Until then Turkey has been the major producer of
poppy which in fact was one of its major cash crops.
The net result of these factors was that the drug produced in Iran, Afghanistan
and Turkey began to be pushed into the tribal region along Pakistan's NWFP. The
192
193
194 .
195
196
Times of India, 18 June 1982.
Times (London), 20 May 1994. . International Narcotics Control Strategy (INCS) Report on Afghanistan, US Deparunent of State, Bureau of International Narcotic Matters, lOth Annual Report, Washington DC. 1996.
I
Quoted in PervaiZ Iqbal Cheema, ."Menace of Drug Trafficking in South Asia", a paper presented in an lqternational Seminar on "Ethno-Sectarian Conflicts and Internal Dy~cs of Regional SecuritY in South Asia", organised by the School of Internatio~ Studies. Jawabarlal Nehru University at India International Centre. New Delhi. 2-4 Septem~r 1996, p.4.
New York Times, 31 July 1980.
Aabha Dixit, "Narcotics Plague Pak Society", Prout (New Delhi), vol.3, no.17, 8-14 June 1991, p.32.
121
NWFP is the heartland of the 'Golden Crescent', an opium growing area stretching
across Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. Dozens of small drug markets have sprung up
just inside the tribal belt.
Historically, NWFP areas of Pakistan have been major poppy-growing areas.
The areas are in the Mahaban range of Gadoon-Amazai in Swabi district, Buner, parts
of the Malakand Protected Area, and in the upper side valleys of the Panjkora river
in Dir. With the outlawing of poppy and crop. substitution programmes in Gadoon,
Buner and Malakand, poppy cultivation expanded in Dir, Mardan, Kalam areas north
of the Khyber Pass and Mohmand and emerged in the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FAT A) regions of Bajaur and Khyber. 197 The FAT A areas include Kal
Dhaka, Mansehra and Buner. Cannabis grows wild throughout Pakistan and is
cultivated mainly in"Chitral. 198 The terrain is hilly, and only a fraction of the area
is rain-fed or irrigated so that average productivity for crops other than opium is low.
In addition, the crop is widely used medicinally, and many growers are long
accustomed to deriving as much as two-thirds of their annual cash income from its
sale.
Most of the crop from Afghanistan and Pakistan is refined in the laboratories
set up in Pakistan, and has an estimated potential yield of some 350 tonnes of heroin
a year. 199 Refineries have been set up at various places all over Pakistan. In 1989-
90 it was estimated that around 100 mobile refineries for the conversion of opium to
morphine base and from morphine to heroin were operating particularly in the Khyber
197
198
199
US CIA Report, n.I90, p.5.
US State Department Publication, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, April 1994, p.243.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (London), Background Brief on Trends in International Drug Trafficking, March 1995, p.2.
122
Agency on the Pak-Afghan border. 200
The narcotics is now produced in Baluchistan, Peshawar and Karachi for sale
in the international market. Nushi and Chagai district are concentrated of refining
centres. In the Chagai district of Baluchistan at least 12 refineries were
operating. 201 Dalbandin town of Chagai district is considered the largest trading
point for most of the heroin produced in the border areas of Afghanistan like Wilayat
district in Helmand Valley.202 The Girdi jungle, where the Afghan refugees are
settling, is also mentioned as another major heroin processing and storage point. 203
Other areas detected include Okar Camp, Posti Camp and Barabachah.204 Koh-i
Sol tan at the southern end of Helmand just across the border inside Pakistan had a
complex of heroin laboratories, controlled by Hekmatyar.205 "Another major area
stretches from Anam Bostai to Malik Siah Koh on the border with Iran. In the NWFP,
the main areas of drug cultivation are th~ Golden Area. Bannu Malakand Agency and
Dir and the major heroin laboratories are located in Khyber Agency. "206 Further,
opium production in Pakistan is estimated at 180 tonnes annually and most of the
processing into heroin is taking place in several small factories set up in Tirah area
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
AlisonJamieson, "Global Drug Trafficking", Conflict Studies, no.234, September 1990, p. 10.
NinnaJ Mitra, "The Heroin Highway", Sunday (Calcutta), vo1.l6, no.19, 9-15 April 1989, p.30.
Aabha Dixit, "Narco-Power : Threatening the Very Roots of Pak Society", Strategic Analysis, vo1.14, no.2, May 1991, p.195.
ibid.
ibid.
Alfred W. Mc Coy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Trade, 1991, pA58.
Aabha Dixit, n.202, p.195.
123
of the Khyber district bordering Afghanistan. 207 Moreover, "more than nine-tenths
of the heroin laboratories are found in Landi Kotal at a distance of 16km from the
Afghan border. These laboratories are owned by Pakistani and Afghanistani
tribesmen. "208
Heroin's cheap and easy availability in Pakistan is primarily due to the annual
flood of 1000 metric tons of opium from Afghanistan.209 Most of the heroines
make en route to various drug bazaars inside Pakistan. After the outbreak of the
Afghan war and the influx of Afghan refugees, Baluchistan turned out to be a great
drug bazaar, said Yasin Baloch, former Chairman of the Baluch Students
Organistion.210 Karachi's Sohrab Goth has been famous as a big open air bazaar
for heroin. 211 Besides, the arms bazaar of Landi Kotal,212 Jamrud, Bara Bazaar
and Darra Adam Khel of NWFP are piled high with heroin. In 1988, the wholesale
price of 1kg heroin was Rs 30,000 compared to £20,000 - £30,000 wholesale in
London. 213 The price of a kilo of opium in the later part of 1994 in the Pak
Afghan border cost around £66. In Pakistan, one Kilogram of herotn with 90 per cent
purity fetches about $2,600 and the price shoots up to $60,000 when it crosses the
207
20S
209
210
211
212
213
Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 18 May 1994.
Khaqan Babar, "Pakistan's Narcotics Problems", Journal of Rural Development and Administration (Peshawar), vo1.21 , no.4, Autumn 1989, p.139.
Mohammad Riaz, "Drug Control on Priority", Pakistan an{l Gulf Economist (Karacbi), vo1.8, no.13, 1-7 April 1989,p.l1.
Newsline, May 1993, p.5.
Observer (London), 21 December 1986.
Observer Magazine (London), 13 November 1988.
Financial Times (London), 7 April 1988.
124
Atlantic and reaches the United States.214 Ten Kilos of opium make one kilo of
pure heroin which can sell for £75,000 in London - or more than £6,00,000 in the
street where heroin has 10 per cent purity or less. 215
With its long coastal belt and porous borders with Iran and Afghanistan,
Pakistan's geographical position is ideal for drug trafficking. There are several sea and
land routes through which more than $30billion worth of drugs find its way into
Europe and America.216 "According to an expert estimate quoted in the Bangkok
Post in March 1982, about 1000 tonnes of opium from the 'Golden Crescent' is
smuggled Qut of Pakistan and Afghanistan each year to the world markets. Two third
of this amount originates from Pakistan itself. "217 Sohrab Goth, Shah Faisal
Colony, Natha Khan Goth and Malir have become centres for drug trade.
The Iranian narcotic dealers poured their money for producing poppy in the
Helmand Valley in Afghanistan and made use of the old smuggling routes between
Makran coast, Karachi and the Gulf countries.218 The coast of Makran has become
. a popular route for drug trafficking where drug are transported in small boats from
the coas~1 areas to the high seas, where they are loaded on ships. The port of Karachi
and the surrounding coastal areas has long been used by drug barons to ship big
consignments of heroin to Africa, Europe and the USA. Karachi, the main drug
entrepot in Pakistan is served by main roads coming through Baluchistan via Kalat and
Las Bela and the National Highway through Hyderabad. The heroin comes into
214
215
216
217
218
R.C. Dikshit and Giriraj Shah, Narco Terrorism (New Delhi, 1996), p.60.
Times, 5 November 1994.
Times of India, 1 September 1993.
Times of India, 18 June 1982.
S.R. Chowdhury, 0.185, p.2.
125
Karachi by road in trucks mostly owned by Frontier Pakhtuns and is spread to
warehouses located deep in Pakhtun and Mohajir enclaves in the city.219 There are
two commonly used routes from Karachi. The first is via Red Sea to Yemen and to
southern Europe and the other one is the African route via Somalia and Ethiopia to
Kenya and onwards. 220 Another study reveals that Pakistan's "heroin now flows
to the west by air and sea from Karachi via the Gulf States and Damascus, as well as
via India and Lagos. The trafficking of heroin to Europe was facilitated by Pakistani
hashis smuggling organisations ... 221
In Baluchistan, drug caravans were moving about unhindered, loading their
cargo on to RORO boats for the onward journey to Europe and Asia.222 In NWFP,
the main heroin bazaars in Landi Kotal and Bara link the Khyber Pass opium route
from Afghanistan to the traders of Peshawar, Lahore and Karachi.223 From
Peshawar, the capital of NWFP, "the heroin is taken by road to Islamabad and
Karachi, and sent either overland to Bombay224 or across the water to the Near
East. The final destinations are Europe and the USA. "225 Most of the drugs
reaching Lahore come principally through two routes - Bannu-Kohat-Di Khan
Mianwali-Sargodha-Faisalabad-Bhai Peru and the GT Road - Narang Mandi -
219
220
. 221
222
223
224
225
US CIA Report, n.19O.
POT, Pakistan Series, 7 June 1993 .
Ben Whitakar, Global Connection: The Crisis of Drug Addiction (London, 1987), pp.322-23.
Tara Kartha, "Southern Asia: The Narcotics and Weapons Linkage" in Jasjit Singh, ed., Light Weapons and International Security (New Deihl, 1995), p.76.
Whitaker, n.221, p.323.
The name of Bombay bas been changed to Mumbai but in this study both the names are used.
Observer Magazine, 13 November 1988 ..
126
Kalakhatai - Balkey routes. 226 These are stockpiled in nearby towns and cities like
Bhai Peru, Sheikhpura, and Batapur to await onward shipment across the Indian
border.227
Further, the Balkan land route originating from Afghanistan and Pakistan goes
through Iran, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Another route goes to Western
Europe. It is considered as a key route of illicit supply of heroin to Europe.228 The
disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new Central Asian states
bordering Afghanistan and Iran opened new and lucrative land routes for the
smuggling of heroin into Europe. Through Afghanistan the routes travel via the
Central Asian republics to Ukraine, Russia and onwards. Central Asian republics like
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgez republic and Turkmenistan witnessed increasing poppy
cultivation, thereby slowly sucked into the vortex of Pakistan-based
narco-trafficking. 229 Also, Tajik narcotics industry has expanded through trade
from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.
Many of the supplies are reportedly brought by camel caravans through the
hills and valleys of Baluchistan towards Iran. Other shipments go by dhows to
Karachi, where they are loaded on ocean-going vessels heading for the Europe or the
US; Pakistan International Airlines has been a preferred airline for drug
trafficking. 230 Most of the opium grown in the Khyber Pass is taken over the
border into Afghanistan by Kurdish or Pathan tribesmen; from there a proportion goes
226 Aabha Dixit, 0.196, p.33.
227 US CIA Report, 11.190, p.14.
228 Times of India, 23 March 1994.
229 ibid.
230 New York Times, 7 September 1981.
127
to Iran for domestic consumption, some is taken on to Istanbul by Kurds and some is
loaded on to small boats in the Persian Gulf or the Gulf of Oman and taken to Dubai.
A frequently used transhipment point is Karachi, als~ a stage on the Eastern route to
Hong Kong and Singapore. Of late, Saudi Arabia is also being used as a transit point
for small to medium-sized heroin consignments destined to Nigeria and elsewhere in
Africa and onward to Europe and America from Pakistan. "231 "More than 250
Pakistanis, mostly hailing from NWFP and some Afghan refugees have been caught
in Saudi Arabia carrying heroin. "232 Pakistani drug lords are using Nigerian
couriers to run heroin in Europe, while in Pakistan itself Nigerian citizens top the list
of foreign drug arrestees. 233
In addition, it has been reported that army officers and military institutions
have been involved in the drug trade: The vehicles of the army-controlled National
Logistic Cell (NLC) are used as drug carriers. This has been proved when a heroin
consignment from Karachi was intercepted in 1993. "The consignment duly packed
in shipping containers in Peshawar was reportedly brought to Karachi on NLC trucks
and loaded onto the ship on deep sea" .234 It is also reported that trucks from the
NLC "arriving with CIA arms from Karachi often returned loaded with heroin -
protected by lSI papers from police search. "235 Further, it was reported that the
lSI was using the National Narcotics Board's vehicles to ferry drugs across the border
231
232
233
234
235
US State Deparunent Publication, n.198, p.52.
Chowdhuri, n.185, p.3.
US State Deparunent Publication, 11.198,p.lO.
The News (Karachi), 23 September 1994.
Mc Coy, n.205, p.454.
128
into Pakistan for export to the West. 236 The bulk of South-West Asian heorin
bound for Western Europe travels overland from the Afghanistan/Pakistan border in
well armed lorry convoys to Iran, from where it is trans-shipped into container trucks
travelling through Turkey and Central Europe. 237
The traditional methods of narcotics transportation are now replaced with
modern methods of concealment both by sea and air travellers. The soaking of towels
in the personal belongings of a passenger, particularly for heroin, concealment in
toothpaste and shaving cream tubes, layering of false suitcase bottoms, swallowing of
heroin plastic bags, feeling of shoe hills,talcom cans, clothes linings and shoulder
pads, trouser belts, and even the holy books have not been spared in narcotic
transportation. 238 "'The News' of Karachi, in a report, revealed that smugglers in
NWFP and Afghanistan have found in the walnut, a safe carrier of contraband. A
walnut is opened, the kernel is removed and the hollow lS filled with heroin, and then
the two parts of the nut are rejoined with genuine walnuts. Three or four kilos of
filled walnuts can hardly be detected in a sack full of dry fruits". 239
The lSI of Pakistan has been deeply involved in abetting drug trafficking. The
lSI "allowed Afghan resistance groups to trade in nacotics after the cut off in US
assistance and that individual lSI officers participated in the trade, either as part of
236
237
238
239
High Commission of lruJia. LoruJon, A Press Release on Terrorits Activity: The Kashmir Issue, 10 May 1993, p.63.
Foreign aruJ Conunonwealth Office. LoruJon, Background Brief on "Trends in International Drug Trafficking", March 1995, p.2.
M. Toaha Qureshi, "Drug Abuse - A Risk Factor in the National Security", Strategic Digest, voLl7, 110.12, December 1987, p.2311.
Radhakrishna Rao, "Narco-Terrorism, Pakistan's Thriving Business", PTI Feature, F 424, p.3.
129
sanctioned operations or to enrich themselves. "240 Drug trafficking is a big
business in Pakistan and international agencies estimate that drug barons earn about
$2.7billion a year through smuggling and sales in the domestic market. 241
According to one estimate, the Pakistani share of the world narcotics trade is about
120 billion dollars a year. 242 "In August 1992, Pakistan's National Development
Finance Corporation estimated that the black economy of the nation gained 32.5
billion dollars annually from the cultivation,· production and smuggling of illicit
narcotics from the 'Golde~ Crescent'". 243 Hence an exploding trade in heroin and
hashish has brought enormous wealth to the country's drug barons in recent years. In
Peshawar powerful drug mafia frequently deposit money in various banks of Europe
and write to the bank to wire funds to their accounts in Pakistan in order to avoid
moving cash in bulk.
Further, narcotics money fuels the political system, supporting party
organisations and election campaigns, and buying protection for the drug mafia at the
highest political level. Senior military officers were also involved in thriving drug
business. A classified report that the CIA commissioned in 1992 indicated that 13
majors and 2 brigadiers of the Pak Army were involved in narcotics corruption cases
during the martial law period under General Zia-ul-Haq.244 During the 1990 I
election campaigns, Nawaz Sharifs Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (HI) openly embraced
Malik Muhammad Ayub Khan Afridi, also known as Haji Ayub Zakha Khel, Sohail
240 Hindustan Times, 17 September 1994.
241 Times of India. 23 March 1994.
242 Hindustan Times. 17 September 1994.
243 ibid.
244 US CIA Report. 11.190. p.1S.
130
Zia Butt, Haji Iqbal Butt and Aslam Butt, put them in charge of overseeing the
election campaigns and asked them to help finance IJI candidates. They all are reputed
drug barons in Pakistan.245 Recently on 20 April 1995, the Anti-Narcotics Task
Force arrested Munnawar Manj, a Pakistan People's Party Member of National
Assembly from Sheikhpura on the charge of heroin smuggling and suspected linkage
with a powerful network of durg barons. 246
Despite the Soviet withdrawal, the factious groups of Afghanistan still need
money because they are now fighting each other. The villagers hence "have no choice
about growing poppies since they bring ten times' as much money as other
crops. "247 Aid officials and western diplomats in Pakistan believe that the amount
of land under poppy cultivation in Afghanistan has increased by more than 50 per cent
since 1990.248 Such situation penetrates far into Pakistan, distorting the country's
economy and politics.
Thus the establishment of heroin laboratories in Pakistan sparked a productivity
explosion which flooded world markets with relatively inexpensive and high quality
heroin. Also, the international traffickers in Pakistan are well organised and have
close links with smugglers of Western Europe, India, the Gulf States, the USA and
other countries. If this trend continues then Pakistan shall one day have the dubious
distinction of becoming the Panama of the east where the rulers will dance to the tune
245
246
247
248
ibid.
The News, 23 April 1995.
Financial Times (London), 16 June 1993.
Times, 20 May 1994.
131
of the narco mafia.249
India: A Transit Point
During the eighties India emerged as a major transit point for drug traffic. The
reason was obvious. India has been flanked by the world's largest illicit heroin
producing countries. To its West lay the 'Golden Crescent' and to its East lay the
'Golden Triangle'. For the drug mafia, India with its long coastline and vast desert
and forest terrain is a natural stopover. The drug mafia have taken to this route after
the Khomeini regime's crackdown in Iran, strict control of poppy cultivation in
Turkey and the civil war in Afghanistan. Further, the Iran-iraq war contributed
significantly for India being a transit country. 250 Heroin, produced in the Golden
Crescent area, is smuggled all along the ~ ,400 mile border to India, in some cases
along smuggling routes that have existed for more than a thousand years. 251
Narcotics worth Rs 5,000 crore are smuggled ~ia India every year.252
India has become a major transit point of narcotics shipment to the USA and
Europe. In 1986, about 80 per cent of the heroin that hit London came from India but
most of it was produced in Afghanistan and Pakistan.253 Even ~ow India is a transit
country though it does not contribute about 80 percent. Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab
and Kashmir are the main entry points from Pakistan and Afghanistan. The
249
250
251
252
253
Zahid Hussain, "Narco-Power: Pakistan's Paralle1 Government", Strategic Digest, vol. 20, no.6, June 1990, p.2515.
Interview with a Senior Police Officer who was posted on the border, 25 April 1997.
New York Times, 16 March 1986.
Economic Times (New Delhi), 9 May 1993.
New York Tim{!s, 16 March 1986.
132
international border villages of Rajasthan like Sum, Jhinjhinyal, Sogarh, Khiri,
Negdarha, Bamhara, Bali ki Basti, Chauhattan, Khaliphe ki Basti, Umia, Beejota,
Mangolia ki Basti and Devra have become very important in the transhipment of
drugs. 254 The major smuggling routes from Pakistan are Sahiwal (Pakistan) -
Sriganganagar - Churu - Jhujhunu - Sikar - Delhi or Bombay; Sukkar (Pakistan) -
Kishangarh - Ramgarh - Jaisalmar - Jodhpur - Bombay; Kokrapara (Pakistan) -
Munabao - Barmer - Jodhpur - Bombay; and Sahiwal (Pakistan) - Anupgarh - Bikaner
- Sikar - Jaipur - Delhi or Bombay. Another route now is from Peshawar to Lahore
to Amritsar to New Delhi to Bombay.255 Also, the drug is mostly transported in
small country boats called 'Hodas' which sail into Kori Creak of Gujarat and from
there it goes to markets of Gujarat and then to Bombay for export purposes.256 One
more important entrepot of narcotics into India is Karachi. From here it follows the
coastal trade route from Keti Bandar or alternatively from Hyderabad to Badin and
across the Rann of Kutch, or through well-seasoned smuggling tracks over the Thar
desert. 257 It has also been reported that Delhi is being used as a major transit point
by narcotic smugglers for Europe and certain countries in Asia. A well organised
cartel of traffickers first send the carrier to Afghanistan, Pakistan then to Delhi or
Mumbai and from there he would go to Frankfurt, Zurich and then finally reach
London. 258
254
255
256
257
258
Dikshit and Shah, 0.211, p.8t.
Democratic World, vol.t5, 00.35. 31 August 1986. p.8.
Dikshit and Shah. 0.214, p.82.
US CIA Report. 110.190. p.IS.
Times of India, 16 May 1996.
·1
133
It is believed that the drug mafia are operating with the connivance of the lSI
who justify the heroin trade as a means to acquire arms. Recently, a drug cartel,
operating from the state border for the past several years with the active support of
Pakistan's Field Intelligence Unit, a branch of the lSI, has been busted by the Kutch
police. 259 Also, the drug carriers keep on reporting the army personnels of
Pakistan, who are posted on the border, "for the easy transfer of narcotic
substances. 260
Add to this, in India there is cultivation of drugs and production of synthetic
drugs. Drug is cultivated in class one agricultural fields of South Kashmir particularly
in some pockets of Anantnag and Pulwama, districts. 261 There is an alarming rise
in the cultivation of opium and in the smuggling of heroin and brown sugar in Kerala
and Tamil Nadu. Opium is cultivated in Kalrayanmali, Kollimalai, Kumbakkalmalai
in Tamil Nadu and in the Idukki district of Kerala.262 Drugs produced in
Kumbakkalmalai near Munnar reach international markets through two routes. One
is via Manjappatty, Amaravaty, Udumalpet to Coirribatore and the other is through
Vattavada, Kodaikanal and Rameswaram. 263 The airports of Trivandrum and
Madras are now favourite transit points for big time operators specially those who
have an eye on Sri Lankan markets. Sri Lankan Tamils also are responsible for the
rise in the illegal business of drug peddling.
259
260
261
262
263
Times of India, 14 March 1994.
Interview with a SeniQr Police Officer who was posted on the border, 25 April 1997.
India Speaks, vol.2, no.41, 9 October 1989, p.22.
ibid, vol.3, no.38, 18 September 1990. p.23.
ibid.
134
Further, India and Myanmar border 264 border in the north-east has long
been a transit point for drugs. There are large number of indigenous laboratories near
the Indo-Myanmar border and Tahang and Kalemyo in Myanmar are major heroin
producing centres. 265 Also, poppy is cultivated mainly in Shan, Chin and Kaching
areas of Myanmar. Intelligence sources said that heroin from Shan area is smuggled
into Assam through Ledo, Layshi and Homalin areas. 266 Much of the border
between Myanmar and four north-east Indian states of Mizoram, Manipur, Nagaland,
and Arunachal Pradesh pass through deep jungle and hilly terrain which makes
patrolling extremely difficult. "The couriers operate in pairs and cycle down to
Tahang and Kalemyo and bring half kilogram packets of good quality heroin with
brand names like 'Dangerous' and 'Tiger' which are actually imitations of the heroin
produced in the 'Golden Triangle'" .267 The couriers are mostly Mizos of Myanmar
origin and hence can freely enter India and cla,im to be inhabitants of Mizoram. 268
The Narcotics Control Bureau identified five routes of transborder smuggling of
heroin from opium distillation plants in Myammar: Kalamew - Tamu - Moreh .. (Manipur); Kalamew - Tiddim - Chikha - Behlang (Manipur); Kalamew - Tiddim
Champhai (Mizoram); Kalamew -Falam - Farkawn (Mizoram) and; Kalamew - Somra
- Tusom Khullen (Manipur).269 From these town Burmese heroin is couriered to
264
265
266
267
268
269
Myanmar is the new ilame of Bumlli but at some places of this study the old name is also mentioned.
Economic Times, 19 July 1993.
Times of India, 6 April 1994.
Economic Times, 19 July 1993.
ibid.
Narcotic Control Bureau Report, reproduced in The Telegraph, 26 January 1997.
135
Calcutta, New Delhi, Bombay and Siliguri. "A major chunk of Burmese white sugar
passes via Siliguri to a town called Darrang in Nepal and from there to Kathmandu
and foreign destinations" .270
South East Asian heroin is being smuggled in through Thailand and the open
Indo-Nepal border to Mumbai. Some of the seizures in Nepal indicate that people
from Mizoram and Myanmar smuggle drugs into Nepal through the land route
following the 'golden triangle' - Nagaland - West Bengal Kakarvitta (Nepalese entry
point) to Kathmandu. 271 From here, instead of being transhipped directly to its
destination - Europe and US - it is being routed through African countries. 272
Further, Myanmar heroin is now smuggled out of north-east through two routes - one
is through Siliguri in north Bengal to Kathamandu from where American and
European smugglers pick up their consignment and fly to Hong Kong and enter the
US through the West Coast and other is to smuggle it to Bangladesh from where it
goes to the Middle East and then to Europe. 273
Of late, Manipur has developed into a nerve centre for smuggling, a conduit
for the movement of drugs and contraband across the border. The enforcement
agencies point out four major routes through which heroin pours into Manipur from
Myanmar. 274 The oldest and most commonly used route is National Highway
No.39 which passes through Imphal - Pallel - Tengnoupal and stops at Moreh, the
270
271
272
273
274
Indranil Banerjie, "Target: Narco-Terrorism", Sunday, vol.l5, no.23, 1-7 May 1988, p.75.
Narcotics Drug Control and Law Enforcement Unit (NDCLEU), Ministry of Home Affairs, His Maj~sty's Government of ~epal, 1996.
Economic Times, 9 May 1993.
ibid, 19 July 1993.
Arun Irengbanl, "Manipur: Outpost of Drug Corruption", Link, vo1.32, 110.43,3 June 1990, p.5.
136
infamous town of Manipur. The couriers here cross the Lokchao river on the border.
The second route is Tiddim road which enters south Manipur through Behang village
near Boundary Pillar No.64 and comes to Imphal via Churachandpur. The third route
is along the banks of Manipur river through Chingnunghoot and comes to Imphal via
Seron-Sugnu and Mayang Imphal. The fourth route is through the new Somdal village
and comes upto Imphal via Zoupi - Mombi - Chakpikarong - Seron - Churachandpur.
Traffickers are now using new routes since Moreh has attracted much attention world
wide. The latest route is through New Somdal in Ukhrul district in Manipur and Sita,
few kilometres away from Moreh. Drugs are also brought in through Champhai and
Aizawl in Mizoram. Another route recently developed runs via Kalemyo, Thaiwing,
Tiddim Lai, Lintan and Haimul and then passes Rih lake near the international border
before reaching Imphal from where it is distributed to other centres for further journey
to the US and Western Europe. 275 Further, Nagaland has an entrypoint at Noklak
in Mokakchung district. Mor and Sonari c:'_'Nagaland are transit points of Myanmar
heroin. 276 In Arunachal Pradesh, heroin originating in the Myanmar city of
Naryoon comes via Pangsoma pass to India and Ledo is another trading centre for
Myanmar heroin.277 Also, Assam, West Bengal and Mandasaur of Madhya Pradesh
see a marginal increase in trafficking. The drug mafia of India-Myanmar border area
take the advantage of an international law which allows tribals living within the 20km
belt on both sides to travel freely without permits. In addition, the Cox bazaar of
Bangladesh and North Cachar (a corridor which stretches from the Barail Ranges
through the trijunction of Nagaland, Manipur a!ld Assam, and passes through the
275 Dikshit and Shall, 11.214, p.83.
276 ibid.
277 ibid.
137
southern stretches of Meghalaya and into Bangladesh's Sylhet division) have emerged
as the drug markets in recent years.278 These markets are being seen as the major
corridor points for drug carriers. India's north-eastern region, fall prey to this
increasing drug trafficking.
Hence the conduit for drug supply to India continuous unabated (See Appendix
IX) and attempts to plug the 'inflow are conspicuous failures. Also, there are
increasing linkages between drug mafia and various rebel groups. The drug production
and drug trafficking are so rampant that the huge quantities of drugs passing through
South Asian region have had a spill over effect. The drug mafia represent a strong
organisation which has the money and arms to strike whenever and wherever it wants
to. Thus develops 'narco-terrorism' which is very much prevalent in South Asian
region and giving rise to political violence.
Drug Mafia and Dispersal of Small Anns
A spill over effect of such drug trafficking has been the dispersal of small arms
in the South Asian region. There are nexus between drug mafia and violent groups.
Drugs have become an accepted international currency for the financing of unofficial
arms deals throughout the region. The development of the arms trafficker and drug
peddler nexus is further strengthened by the political linkages. South Asia's problem
of narco-terrorism is directly linked to the Afghan war. There are allegations that the
KGB recruited intelligence agents amongst the Afghan drug - traffickers, inducing
them to try to extract weapons from the Mujahideen - especially US Redeye and
Stinger surface-to-air missiles - in exchange for drugs; and that they used parallel
278 Kartha, 0.222, pp.66-67.
138
methods to try to destabilise Pakistan. 279
The violence in Pakistan are mainly the product" of the gun-runners and drug
mafia nexus. The drug culture in Pakistan could not have flourished had it not been
in league with the arms trade that got a tremendous spurt during the Afghan war. The
easy availability of weapons and small arms to the drug mafia has made the culture
of Kalashnikovs take firm root in Pakistan. An illicit drug trafficking also requires
illegal arms protection. This provided incentive to increase illegal arms production in
NWFP and Baluchistan areas of Pakistan. In the market of Peshawar and Landi Kotal,
drug is being openly bartered for ultra modern weapons. 280 The Frontier Province
alone has more than half a million Kalashnikovs, which enables the drug mafia to
maintain entire armies. 281 Dir, a mountain district of NWFP is not only an
'important poppy producer but the district has over "two million guns and other
automatic weapons. 282 In case of Baluchistan it is reported that, the drug barons
there develop nexus with bandits and dacoits in Sindh, who act as middlemen for the
drug lords. Further, the profits from narcotics business funnel into the modern
weaponry business.
Sohrab Goth, a suburb in Karachi, has become an Afghan smugglers' bazaar,
notorious for gun-running and dope peddling. Sohrab Goth is a strategic staging post
on the road that brings both arms and drugs to Karachi - the mafia that controls the
arms bazaar and the drug trade that controls the transporters, land grabbers, the slum
dwellers as well as the gargantuan job market in Karachi. Infact, many small markets
279
280
281
282
Maj. General Uberoy, D.2, p.102.
Radbakrishna Rao, 0.239, p.2.
Patriot, 21 January 1987.
Jasjit Singh, "India's Strategic Environment in Southern Asia", Journal of Strategic Studies (London), vol. 7, 1994, p.ll.
139
sprung up in the tribal areas, where the writ of the Pakistan government law did not
extenrl. 283 Path an tribesmen openly sold drugs side by side with AK-47 and other
weapons. Proliferation of drug laboratories in Pakistan also marked the proliferation
of trade in clandestine arms in the country. The clandestine arms bazaar and drug
mafia is no longer confined to Pakistan. It has also spread to other parts of South
Asia.
India is directly affected by the situation in Afghanistan that has led to
increased drug production coupled with the flow of sophisticated small arms, missiles
and explosives into the hands of terrorists and rebel groups. The lSI uses the huge
profits from drug trafficking to buy weapons for fuelling separatism in India. It is
believed that the lSI is deeply involved with Sikh militants who use Pakistan for
sanctuary and who do use heroin to fund their arms purchases. Drugs and arms link
the Punjab terrorists to the Mujahideen of Afghanistan and their link-men in
Afghanistan. The CIA report has authenticated by stating that the lSI is "deeply
involved with Sikh militants, who use Pakistan for sanctuary and who use heroin to
fund their arms purchases. "284 Pakistani involvement is further corroborated by the
fact that Haji Iqbal Beg, a well known Pakistani drug baron "cooperated with the lSI
in its programme to assist anti-India Sikh insurgents in their violent rebellion against
New Delhi. "285 Moreover, it has been reported that Chaudhry Shaukat Ali Bhatti
who was elected to the Punjab Assembly on the IJI ticket in 1990, and an important
member of the Arian mafia brokered an arms deal for Rs 9 million between Darra
283
284
285
Rashid, n.191, p.68.
US CIA Report. n.19O.
ibid.
140
Adam Khel arms merchants and Sikh militants. 286 Drug peddlers also provide
funds and arms to various violent groups in Jammu and Kashmir and North-east part
of India.
The most disturbing feature of the drug business in Tamil Nadu and Kerala is
the involvement of the LTTE of Sri Lanka. The LTIE is interested in the drug
business in Kerala for two reasons: firstly, for illegal pipe money i.e. the local
expression for foreign exchange smuggled into the State by the Gulf Malayalees and
secondly, for the availability of large areas for opium cultivation.287 The L TIE
militants buy the Gulf currencies from the Malayalees working in the Arab countries
in exchange of Indian currency to finance their arms purchased abroad. As the LTIE
. and other Sri Lankan Tamil militants need a lot of money to buy arms they find drug
smuggl ing the best way to make money. The L TIE is involved in a large way in
trafficking heroin through Bombay, Turkey, the UK, France, West Germany,
Switzerland, Spain, Italy, Canada and the USA. 288 In 1985, sixty Tamils were
arrested in Rome, Barcelona, Tunis and Paris, accused of smuggling heroin to raise
money for their secessionist guerrillas in Sri Lanka. "289 Sri Lankan Tamils were
responsible for the rise in the illegal business of drug peddling.
Thus the production and processing of narcotic drugs, rampant drug trafficking
and the dispersal of small arms by drug mafia pose a formidable challenge to the
South Asian security. The cultivation and refinement of drugs, enmeshed as it is with
. the ever strengthening linkage with the illegal arms dispersal to various militant
286
287
288
289
ibid.
India Speaks, voI.3, 00.38, 18 September 1990, p.22.
Rohan Gunaratna, War and Peace in Sri Lanka (Sri Lanka, 1987), p.5l.
Whitaker, 0.223, p.325.
141
groups, has profoundly affected the basic structure of South Asian countries. The arms
dispersal by transnational drug 'cartels' have become such a powerful force in South
Asian politics that it has been primarily responsible for the development of the virus
of political violence into a full blown epidemic.
OVERSEAS REMITTANCES
Overseas remittances to various rebel groups within South Asian countries are
major threats to the social and political order of the region. The violent groups require
external resources to carryon their nefarious activities. External support has
frequently been demonstrated as a crucial factor for the survival .of the terrorist
groups. Modern weapons are expensive so the rebel organisations need f~iendly
outside help. The outside country provides financial help, often through voluntary
organisations or emigrants, weapons, trainings, safe sanctuaries and other facilities.
In this respect, the situation in South Asia is relevant where the terrorist groups have
a close relationship with foreign countries and the overseas remittance plays a·
significant role in escalating poi itical violence in the region. Moreover, there has been
a rapid spread and growth of criminal gangs, armed senas, drug mafia, smuggling
gangs, drug peddlers and economic lobbies in the region which have, over the years,
developed an extensive networks of contacts with the bureaucr~ts, government
functionaries at the local levels, politicians and strategically located individuals in the
non-s~te sector. They have international linkages including the foreign intelligence
agencies. 290
290 India, Ministry of Home Affairs. Vohra Committee Report. August 1995. p.4.
142
Overseas Remittance and Arms Dispersal
In India, the violent organisations have developed an excellent rapport with
foreign-based organisations and government. The core of the situation in India is that
the foreign countries are providing funds, sophisticated weapons, safe sanctuaries to
the militants without any hesitation. The violent groups functioning inside India are
"homo-fighters "291 of a kind who have been motivated and sponsored for an armed
struggle from outside. Pakistan is getting more deeply involved in the Punjab and
Kashmir region of India.
The Punjab rebel ~roups of India get substantial support from the foreign-based
organisations. The bulk of weapons with the Punjab militants in mid-1980s were of
much lower quality and lethality as compared to what they were to use since the
Afghan war. Sophisticated weapons are channellised from across the Pakistan border.
Since 1970s Islamabad has been training the Sikh militants as a part of Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto's strategy of "forward strategic depth" and also as a part of his effort to gain
revenge for India's support of an independent Bangladesh. 292 "About Rs 1 crore
had been collected by the militants and their ideologues abroad which had been
channellised for weapons procurement from Pakistan. Of this amount Rs 80 lakhs
worth of weapons had already found" its way from Pakistan via the Gujarat and
Rajasthan sectors. "293 The militants have been independently arranging for their
supplies from Darra-based smugglers. A deal worth Rs 1 crore, struck with Hazi
291
292
293
IlLustrated Weekly of India (Bombay), 3-9 AUgllSt 1991, p.7.
House Republican Research Committee Repon on flPalcistan. Afghanistan and the Export of Terrorism", Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, The New Islamist International, p.6.
Times of India, 24 November 1992.
143
Fazal, a Pakistani smuggler in Darra, was a clear evidence to it. 294 Militants were
given proper and advanced training in preparing and handling of sophisticated arms
and explosives. "There are two Sikh Organisations which are now in operation in
Pakistan: The Watan Dead Company and the Punjab Company .... It is also known
that along with Field Intelligence Unit (FlU), the apex Pakistani intelligence body, the
Inter Services Intelligence (lSI), is also being utilised for the arms training and control
these two companies". 295 Also, training camps are operated in Layalpur, Multan,
Sialkot, Lahore, Kasur and Faisalabad. Narowal Rangers Headquarters; Inspection
Bunglow on the outskirts of Sialkot cantonment; Changamanga Rest House; big house
at Suleiman Headworks near Fortabas Mandi opposite Sri Ganganagar sector of India;
Safe House near Lahore and barracks in Lahore are some of the locations.296 (See
Appendix VII). Duration of training ranged from 2 days to 3 months depending on the
quality of the training to be imparted.
The problem in the state of Punjab has gone much beyond Pakistani
involvement. Sikh communities of the UK, USA, Canada, Germany, New Zealand,
South-East Asia and some other countries are on a regular contact with the ultras of
Punjab and are engaged in providing support to the Punjab violent groups. Sikh
expatriates have formed a variety of international organisations that lobby for the Sikh
cause overseas. Branches of organisations like Babbar Khalsa, Oal Khalsa, National
Council of Khalistan, Sikh Students Federation, Sikh Youth Movement and Oeshmesh
Regiment have been set up. But "most prominent are the World Sikh Organization and
294
295
296
ibid.
Ritu Sarin, "The Pakistan COImectiol1", Sunday, vo1.l5, 110.19, 3-9 April 1988, p.60.
D.P. Shanna, The Punjab Story (Decade of Turmoil) (New Delhi, 1996), pp.271-72.
144
the International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF)." 297Allegedly, the militants, were
being trained by 'Kennie Mennie Services,' a London-based private mercenary
company.298 Sophisticated bomb making techniques and better training for Sikh
terrorists of the Dal Khalsa separatist movement were imparted in the Afghan
Mujahideen camps.299 The Sikh communities abroad provide expertise in weaponry
gained through training in mercenary schools in the US or in the use of electronic
equipment like wireless sets and remote switching for explosives. They also supply
. equipment such as specialised radio-sets, rubber dinghies and heavy-duty bolt cutters
to the militants in Pakistan for use in India. 3OO Over 400 AK-47s were smuggled
from across the border since April 1992. In May 1992 alone Punjab militants managed
to smuggle in 150 AK-47s, 60 revolvers and pistols and eight quantities of explosives.
There are reports about the Babbar Khalsa trying to procure the heat seeking Stinger
missiles which could endanger aircraft movement in the state.301
Pakistan lSI have close ties with Punjab militant groups. The lSI of Pakistan
plays an active role in distributing funds to the violent groups. Surinder Singh
Bhinder, an extremist, frequently visited Pakistan for handing ove~ to the Sikh
extremists, based in Pakistan, the funds collected by Sikh organisations based in West
Europe for the purchase of arms and ammunition.302 The most revealing testimony
297
298
299
300
301
302
US Deparnnent of State, Pattern of GLobaL Terrorism. 1994, Published in April 1995. p.61.
Times of India. 21 March 1993.
House Republican Research Committee Report. n.292. p.6.
Manoj Joshi. "Combating Terrorism in Punjab". Conflict StuLlies (London). no.261. May 1993, p.25.
Times of India. 24 November 1992.
ibid, 16 October 1991.
145
is that of Mohan Inder Singh Sachdev alias Pushpinder Singh, who was affiliated to
ISYF, Canada. 303 The youngman travelled to Nepal, Thailand, the USA, Canada
and Pakistan to scheme and plot against India, collect funds and arrange arms
supplies. Under interrogation he disclosed that a consignment of arms worth US $ 2.5
lakhs was sent to Pakistan by ISYF for onward transhipment to Punjab. He also gave
the details of a quarter million dollars collected in the USA to purchase the most
sophisticated weapoQs from the U.K. Another militant Daljit Shekhon on his arrest
revealed that the ISYF was sending Rs 20,000 to Rs 30,000 Pak currency every
month in the name of Satinder Pal Singh Gill to finance militant activities.304 In
sum total, overseas remittances to Punjab terrorists helped in escalating political
violence.
Next, militancy in Kashmir has been sustained through systematic and
continuous support from abroad. Since the conflict erupted in early 1990, it has
escalated alarmingly. Armed insurgents, who in late 1989 numbered only a few
hundred, are today officially estimated at some 10,000, they are grouped - around an
active hard core of 3500 to 4000.305 Further, since the spring of 1988 when the
first weapons began to cross the Line of Control (LOC), the insurgent arsenals has
progressed through many stages. The years 1989 and 1990 marked broadly the period
of the Kalashnikov and pistol. The weapons were mostly of Chinese origin, in
particular type 56-1 folding stock assault rifles and Chinese copies of the Soviet
Tokarev pistol. 306 Since the spring of 1990, rocket-propelled grenade launchers
303
304
305
306
Mainstream, vo1.26, 00.39, 9 July 1988, p.25.
D.P; Shanna, 0.296, p.273.
Anthooy Davis, "The Conflict io Kaslmlir". Jane's Intelligence Review. vol. 7, 00.1, January 1995, p.4D.
ibid, p.43.
146
were transported into the valley in growing numbers, along with ever greater number
of Type 56 assault rifles. Also, Chinese type 69 (RPG-7 equivalent) and Chinese stick
grenades began to cross the LOC in 1990-91. "The period of 1992-93 was marked by
an influx of weapons, notably Soviet RPD 7.62mm lightmachine guns, and later the
RPK and the PK heavier machine guns. These served to provide with greater
firepower over extended ranges, particularly in ambushes situations. Similarly mines
and improvised explosive devices (lEDs) were being more commonly deployed by
1993 .... Over the last two years, there has been a greater availability of more
sophisticated weapons in the Afghan small arms market. To be seen in Kashmir today.
are the Soviet Dragunov SVD snipers rifle, the 5.54mm AK-74 Kalakov rifle and
AKR Krinkov submachine gun, as well as the rifle mounted BGS-15 40mm grenade
launcher. "307 Insurgent communications have also been upgraded. The introduction
of a range of commercially available walkie-talkies, as well as more sophisticated
frequency-hopping/burst transmission radios, has enabled larger militant factions to
coordinate operations within the valley as well as with other areas. 308
A large number of Kashmiri non-governmental organisations are floated in
Pakistan, the UK, the USA and many other countries. It was reported that Pakistan
had suspended active support for the insurgency -in 1993 when the-US threatened to
add it to the list of countries sponsoring terrorism. But Pakistan then privatised its
Kashmir operations, funneling support to militants through non-governmental
organisations often run by retired army and lSI officials.309 This arrangement
continued for a short period till everything was set right and Pakistan, again, have
307 ibid.
308 ibid.
309 The GUllrdian (London). 17 May 1994.
147
been involved directly in sponsoring terrorism in Kashmir valley.
Non-governmental organisations operated overseas are the Kashmir Human
Rights Forum led by Major retired Umar Hayat; the Jammu and Kashmir Human
Rights Movement, Muzaffarbad, World Kashmir Freedom Movement, UK, the
Kashmir American Council, Washington, and the Kashmir Association of North
America. Apart from campaigning on the issue of human rights, these organisations
indulged in misinformation campaigns. The three extremist organisations assisting
Kashmiri militants have been identified as Jamaat-e-Islami, the Markaz Dawa-AI
Irshad and Harkul-ul-Ansar which during the Afghan war was known as
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. These alI organisations place resources at the dispOSfll of the
. militants. These resources range from weapons to intelligence to money.
It is reported that" some $300 m ill ion worth of foreign currency is brought into
Pak-occupied Kashmir (POK) from West Asia every year. Most of which is used by
Pakistanis in financing the militants .... It is understood that three-fourth of the lSI
budget has been diverted to the cause of militancy in Jammu and Kashmir" .310
Pakistan has been supplying all manner of lethal and sophisticated arms to the militant
groups operating in the Kashmir valley. AK rifles, machine guns, anti-tank and
anti-personnel mines, rocket launchers, grenades and explosives of all kinds of pistols
and most sophisticated 10 SVD Dragunov telescopic s~iper rifles with large amounts
of ammunition and explosives.
Pakistan has offered open sanctuaries to Kashmir terrorists. The members of
terrorist organisations like Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, AI-Umer Mujahideen, Muslim Janbaz
Force and Allah Tigers move about freely in Pakistan. It ~s reported that the Kashmir
Freedom Front (Rawalpindi) has opened an account, Account No.14241, with the
310 Chandra B. Khallduri, "Analysis of the Kashmir Problem and An Approach to Solution", Strategic Analysis, vol.l3, 1l0.6, September 1990, p.64l.
148
Habib Bank, Rawalpindi, to provide financial support to terrorists operating in the
Kashm ir valley. 311
The Pakistani military and lSI have been indulged in training Kashmiri
militants. Among the most crucial activities of the lSI have been to train and
indoctrinate selected leaders from the Kashmir valley. "A large number of youths
from the Kashmir valley and Poonch Sector were given extensive training in the use
of automatic weapons, sabotage and attacks on security forces. "312 Pakistan has set
up about 105 training camps - 48 in Pakistan, 49 in POK and eight on the Pak-Afghan
border - to train militants in the art of subversion as also to indoctrinate them.313
Training is handled entirely by the Pakistan army and the lSI. "At first, the main lSI
camp sites were: an abandoned factory in <;:hattar Ambore near Muzaffarabad; Garhi
Dupatta, 25 kms from Muzaffarabad, nearJhe\um river and; Kucha, some 9 kms from
Chinari and 20 kms from Chakothi area. Nearly, 4,000 Kashmiris were trained in
these facilities in 1991 alone. "314 The main training camps are in Gohat, Larkana,
311
312
313
314
The finances for promoting and sustaining militancy in Kaslmlir come fro~ various bank accounts which have been set up to facilitate deposit of donatiotlS. The sympathisers, thereby, deposit money in such accounts without disclosing dleir identity. Kashmir Fund Account bas been opened it Mausura, Lahore. The JKLF in the UK opened Account No. 192263 in the name of the Kashmir Relief Fund (KRF) at dle Yorkshire Bank, Drake Street, Rocbadaie, UK. The account is being operated by one Qurban Hussain, Chief of KRF. Radio Pakistan appealed to the people of Skardu in POK to deposit money in dle Bank of Pakistan under the name of KRF to help dle families of dle militants killed in the Kashmir valley. Further, at the official level, Pakistan Prime Minis~er's Fund and Punjab Chief Minister's Fund have been set up to assist the militants. The Government of 'Azad kashmir' bas also set up a Kashmir Liberation (:ell to provide monetary support to the liberation of Kas~r. (Source: Ghazanfar Butt, "Pakistan's Money StlStaitlS Militancy in Kashmir", Link, vo1.36, no.2, 22 AugtlSt 1993, p.8).
House Republican Research Committee Report, n.292, p.8.
High Commission of India, London, A Press Release on the "Terrorist Activity: The Kashmir Issue", 10 May 1993, p.66.
House Republican Research Committee Report, n.292, p.12.
149
Sargodha, Auttock, Murree, Sialkot and Lahore. 315 With the passage of time lSI
training camps have been established in Sukur, Tamu, Alahazar, New Saibabad,
Kundri, Digri and Thana Bullakhan area, opposite Barmer and Gujarat area; Aliabad,
Kalamulla, Nakyal, Gulpur, Khuratta and Muzaffarabad in POK. (See Appendix VII).
The New Islamist International estimates that some 20,000 young Kashmiris are
trained and armed by and/or in Pakistan in recent years and virtually all of the
activities of the Islamist groups, short of recruitment are carried out in Pakistani
Kashmiri.316
The patterns of the arms training have been changing. Earlier, the elementary
training for seven to ten days included introduction to AK-47 rifles, Chinese pistols,
rocket launchers, use of Light Machine Guns (LMG) and explosives. Later on,
multiple training programmes dovetailing basic arms training with long duration
specialised schedules have been organised. "There are extended training courses of
two to twelve weeks, incorporating the use of sophisticated heavy weapons, including
rocket launchers, MMG/LMG, AK-47/56174, sniper rifles, mortars, remote control
devices, anti-personnel and anti-tank mines. The operation and control of high
explosives, anti-aircraft guns, heavy machine guns are also included in the schedule,
which has been extended by six months". 317 Further, selected trainees, put through
advanced courses to enable them to use SVD Dragunov Sniper rifles, were sent to the
Afghan border in the Khost area to fight along with the Afghan Mujahideen.318
315
316
317
318
ibid.
ibid, p.ll.
S. Das Gupta, "Gameplan by Pakistan in Kashmir Changing", Prout, vol.4, no.49, 27 February - 5 March 1993. p.36.
Prout, vol.4, no.3l, 17-31 October 1992. pp.18-19.
150
Besides, the Kashmir militant groups developed contacts with overseas militant
groups. The Kashmiri group has naxus with the Tamil militant group, LTTE. The
Kashmiri terrorists travel to Sri Lanka to get the training with LTTE.319
Since the end of the Afghan war, Kashmir has been witnessing the influx of
foreign mercenaries. A large number of foreign mercenaries, being specially trained
in guerrilla warfare armed with sophisticated weapons have been inducted into the
valley to join hands with the local violent groups and step up secessionist activity.
"Foreign guerrillas first joined the Kashmiri conflict in mid-late 1991, and are
believed to have been Afghans loyal to the Hizb-i-Islami (Islamic Party) of Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar .... The first Afghans to arrive appear to have been operating essentially
in an advisory capacity .... Numbers increased markedly in 1992 following the fall of
Nazibullah regime in Kabul. "320 "Afghan terrorists trained by '" CIA instructors
had been smuggled into India with the purpose of organising acts of terrorism
against... members of the Indian Government and foreign diplomatic
representatives. "321 The late summer of 1992 also saw non-Afghan foreigners
moving into Kashmir. It was reported that the town of Sopore" in K~hmir has 500
battle-hardened Afghans and a few Sudanese who are boosting the already high morale
of at least 1500 to 2000 armed militants who walk the streets openly brandishing their
AK-47 Chinese rifles, wireless sets in hands. 322
319
320
321
322
Interview with Dr. Chris Smith in London, 23 July 1996.
Davis, n.305, p.45.
House Republican Research Conllilittee Repon, n.292, p.6.
M.A. Hussain MulIick, "Kashmir Conflict: TIle Cause of Frustrated Economic Take-off in India and Pakistan, a Politico-Economic Assessment", Pakistan Defence Review (Islanlabad), June 1993.
151
Arab volunteers from Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, Algeria
and Kuwait continue to arrive in Peshawar regularly. A special department is run by
Major Amir of the lSI for ensuring their proper entry into Pakistan and prompt
despatches to the right destinations.323 The Service Office, called as Maktaba-i
Khidmat, receives the volunteers and despatches them to various training camps run
by Arab-Afghan militants inside Afghanistan.324 A large number of foreign
mercenaries assemble at Markaz-Dawar, a centre for world wide Islamic
activity.325 The Pakistani lSI is also "channeling these militants through a front
organisation, Markaz Dawat-ul Arshad (MDA), into Kashmir. The MDA has its own
trained cadres operating under the banner of the Lakshar-e-Taiba. 326 In Kashmir
these 'guest militants' attached themselves to various local militant outfits like the AI
Burq, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and Muslimeen Mujahideen".
The following table delineates the presence of mercenaries from various parts
of the world in the Kashmir valley.
323
324
325
326
B.P. Saba, Trans-Border Terrorism: Intemarionalisarion of Kashmir Tangle (New Delhi, 1996), p.142.
ibid.
ibid, p.71.
Times of India, 27 September 1994.
Source:
Table 3.4
Toll of Foreign Mercenaries (January 1991-June 1997)
Country of Origin Arrested Killed
Pakistan/POK 151 219
Afghanistan 12 178
Egypt - 1
Sudan - 5
Yemen - 1
Chechllya - 1
Lebanon 1 -
Bahrain 2 2
Bosq,ia - 1
Saudi Arabia - 3
Algeria - 1
Iran - 1
Turkey - 2
Others 43 149
Total 209 564
152
Times of India, 27 September 1994; Asian Age (Calcutta), 9 September, 1996; Times of India, 3 July 1997.
The above table indicated the arrests of foreign mercenaries and their-killings
in the encounters and the involvement of external actors in the escalation of political
violence in the Kashmir valley. "Interrogation of the captured foreign militants reveals
that they were given and lumpsum payment of Rs 15,000 each when they infiltrated
153
into the valley and they were promised a monthly retainer of Rs 3,000".327 The
former Governor of Kashmir said that the Pakistan's lSI is the Third World's most
powerful terrorist and int~lIigence organisation with 10,000 to 15,000 foreign
mercenaries on its payroll to export terrorism to Kashmir, Central Asian Republics
and Middle East countries.328
Further, the drugs and arms mafia, with active support from Pakistan's lSI,
were involved in Bombay blasts. The lSI which helped arm and organise
Afghanistan's Mujahideen rebels, supplied the eStimated 240 kg of RDX and Semtex
plastic explosives used in the Bombay bomb blasts.329 On the basis of the initial
findings the police officials reported that the new materials used in the blasts were
RDX or MDX and Semtex, a high-intensity explosives manufactured in
Czechoslovakia. 330
The Bombay blast case strongly identified the nexus between the criminals and
anti-national elements on the one hand and bureaucrats, politicians and other
sensitively located individuals on the other. The case of Bombay demonstrated how
the Indian underworld are exploited by the Pakistan lSI and the latter's network in
United Arab Emirates to cause sabotage, subversion and communal tension in various
parts of the country. The investigations have revealed extensive linkages of the
underworld in the various governmental agencies, political circle, business sector and
the film world. The Vohra Committee report on crime-politics nexus identified that
327
328
329
330
ibid.
Times of Inaia, 14 July 1993.
Jefferson Penberthy, "India: Mob Mayhem", Time (London), vo1.l41, no.13, 29 March 1993, p.29.
S. Da~gupta, "Demand for Declaration of Pakistan as Terrorist State", Prout, vol.5, no.4, 17-23 April 1993, pp.34-35.
154
the activities of Dawood Ibrahim and Memon brothers had been growing for many
years before these culminated in the formation of a powerful network; this could not
have happened without the solid backing of government officials.331
In the north-eastern parts of India, money and arms began to flow to the
insurgent groups. The borders with Myanmar, Bangladesh and Nepal are earmarked
with free flow of small arms to the north-easter region. Light weapons are mainly
coming from Myanmar and Bangladesh to the north-eastern part.332 China also
remits funds and supply weapons to the north-east insurgents. 333 Moreover,
Pakistan's lSI has established its bases in many places, particularly in Nepal, to
provide money and material to the insurgent groups. The activities of Muslims are
steadily intensifying 111 Pokhara, Biratnagar, Birtamod, Bhadrapur and
Kakarbhitta. 334 At all these places the lSI has set up various organisations such as
Muslim Volunteer Force, Muslim Liberation Front, Islamic United Liberation Army,
Islamic Movement of India, Islamic Revolutionary Force and Saddam Bahini, to
operate its subversive activities.335 Acting as a linkage among the terrorist
organisations the lSI directs members of all the Muslim terrorist organisations of the
region to supply weapons to these organisations and threatens to stop all assistance to
them if they do not help the Muslim terrorist organisations. The lSI's sphere of
influence stretched across India into Bangladesh as well where several north-east
331
332
333
334
335
India, Ministry of Home Affairs. Vohra COf1ulIittee Report, August 1995, pp.I-5. -
Interview with Dr. Chris Smith in London. 23 July 1996.
Ved Marwah. Presented a Seminar on Terrorism: India's Internal Security. organised by the South Asian Division. School of Intemational Studies. Jawaharlal Nehru University. 8 October 1996. .
Nepal Press Report (Kathmandu, Regmi Researl:h Pvt. Ltd.), no.52/95, 22 March 1995, p.89.
ibid. pp.89-90.
155
insurgent groups like the ULFA, NSCN, ALL Tripura Tiger's Force, Manipur
People's Liberation Army (PLA) were being provided logistic support and even being
trained in camps in the NWFP run by Afghan war veterans. "336
In a ten-page press note, the Border Security Force disclosed that most militant
outfits in the north-east were acquiring sophisticated weapons from Thailand with the
active connivance of Bangladeshi intelligence agencies.337 Further, the lSI of
Pakistan in cooperation with Bangladeshi intelligence transfer large consignment of
weapons from Bangladesh soil into the norht-eastern states.338 Also, Kashmir
youths were being brought to Bangladesh to motivate youth from that country to join
the militant movement in the valley.339
The Naga rebels have their bases in northern and western part of Myanmar.
They procure funds and arms from abroad through Bangladesh. They have established
a permanent liaison post in Bangladesh from where they receive arms consignments
procured from various Kampuchean outfits and shipped in from Thailand.340
Further, according to the sources, the 0.45 gun, an American weapon, had probably
found its way tothe outfit from Thailand through a clandestine arms conduit. Some
of the AK-47 rifles in the armoury of the organisation are believed to have been
obtained from the outlawed National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN).341
Also, the NSCN developed links with the lSI of Pakistan in getting material and
336
337
338
339
340
341
High Commission of India. London, tl.313, p.64.
Times of India, 19 December 1996.
ibid.
ibid.
Times of India, 7 July 1991.
ibid, 23 July 1992.
156
financial support. The Pakistani connection was apparent when a captured militant
(NSCN - Khayo Hurrey) revealed that a Pakistani diplomat had given him $1,700,000
in three instalments as part of a deal to arm the Nagas.342
Pakistan's involvement in arming and funding the PLA of Manipur is also
noticed. "Captured PLA documents state that Pakistan agreed to extend all possible
help which would be channeled via Burma. The Burmese government has agreed to
patronise the Revolutionary Front with all the force under their command to revolt
against the Indian government" .343 Indeed the financial assistance provided by
Pakistan via Dhaka enabled the Manipur insurgents to acquire such weapons as AK-
47s, rocket launchers and RPGs.344
A foreign hand in United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) activities is also
evident. In Bangladesh, a chain of camps in the Chittagong Hill Tracts area
guaranteed entry into Assam through the Cachar and Barrack valley corridors.345
Using Bangladesh as an exit point the ULFA cadres make contacts with arms dealers
of Thailand and as far off as Romania.346 At Cox's Bazaar of Bangladesh, they
happen to meet with various militant outfits. Bangladesh also served as a place of
currency conversion and moving finances out of the country.347 Pakistan's embassy
in Dhaka has apparently been providing arms and funds to the Front. ULFA's links
with Pakistani lSI appear to have been forged almost immediately after securing
342
343
344
345
346
347
Kartha, 11.46, p.15.
House Republican Research Committee Report, 11.286, p.IS.
ibid.
Kartha, n.46, p.14.
ibid.
ibid.
157
access to Bangladesh. Hence "scores of ULFA militants from small towns or villages
in the Brahmaputra valley moved to the somewhat similar environment of camps in
rural Sylhet to, finally, a completely different world of the lSI in Pakistan and, in
some cases, also to Mujahideen camps in Peshawar and areas of Afghanistan under
Mujahideen control. 348 The ULF A cadres were given a complete course with
training manuals, and arms training on rocket launchers, explosives and assault
weapons. Importantly, the selected trainees were taught to be one man demolition
squads, using sabotage and frontal attacks to make full use of limited weaponry. 349
The first batch of about 10 ULFA militants was taken to Pakistan around mid-1991;
in all, about 70 ULFA militants are believed to make the trip to Pakistan in five or
six batches during 1991- 92.350 It is also reported that the Bodo militants, having
proclaimed as their objective the creation of an independent , Bodoland, and having
established contacts with other secessionist elements in the region, seek the help of the
lSI to pursue their objectives. Also, they had two rounds of talks with the ISI.351
Over the last few years, Tamil rebel groups have been a fearful proposition in
Sri Lanka. In order to achieve an independent Tamil Eelam, the LTTE has developed
a significant overseas support structure for fundraising, propaganda activities and
weapon procurement. The Tigers draw support-from an expatriate Sri Lankan Tamil
community larger than 4,50,000, having offices altogether in, thirty eight nations
348
349
350
351
M.S. Prabhakara, "The Foreign Hand: The lSI Nexus in the North-east", Frontline, 11 February 1994, p.27.
Kartha, n.46, p.15.
Prabhakara, Il.348, p.27.
Hilldustan Times, 16 May 1994.
158
drawing an estimated $2 million a month. 352
The Tamil businessmen in Singapore and those running tin business and rubber
plantations in Malayasia provide funds to the L TIE.353 Singapore, strategically
situated on key shipping lanes with a developed banking infrastructure, was a central
hub in the LTIE's weapon-purchasing network. 354 Tiger trading companies were
established in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. Singapore became the favoured market
for the purchase of "dual use" technologies such as computers, electronics, outboard
motors and diving gear. 355 An important L TIE cell was established on th"e
Andaman coast in th Thai town of Trang before it was shifted north to a front
company in Phuket.356 To raise funds, "the LTIE vessels are believed to have
begun shipping timber from Myanmar to Thailand in the 1980s .... Some time after
mid-1990, the contacts resulted in the establishment of an L TIE base at the small
town of Twantay, in the Irrawaddy delta south of Yangoon.357 This base facilitated
the communication and transhipment operations.
The Tamils of the USA, particularly of Boston, funnel money to young Tamils
of Jaffna to demand a separate country.358 There are two main Eelam Associations
in the US: Ilankai Thamil Sangam 111c. (Association of Tamils of Sri Lanka in the
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
Anthony Davis, "Tiger International: Howa Secret Global Network Keeps Sri Lanka's Tamil Guerrilla Organisation Up and Killing", Asia Week (Hong Kong), vo1.22, no.30, 26 July 1996, p.33.
Times of India. 9 June 1991.
Davis, 11.352, p.32.
ibid, p.33.
ibid.
ibid.
Sunday, vo1.l4, 110.24, 3-9 May 1987, p.15.
159
USA) and Eelam Tamil Association of America, who have been able to influence the
Members of State Legislatures in the US to raise voice in support of their cause.359
Further, the World Tamil Eelam Convention, held each year in July, in the USA,
brings together delegates from Canada, UK. Australia, Malayasia, USA, Sri Lanka
and India, particularly Tamil Nadu. 36O
Canada has some 1,40,000 Tamil population and over 85 % live in the Toronto
area. In Canada, officers of the Asian Crime Task Force have calculated the L TTE
pull in around $7,30,000 in a month.361 In Britain, the number of Sri Lankans is
believed to b~ over 50,000 and the majority of them are Tamils.362 Eelam
organisations, operating in the United Kingdom, are many, e.g. The Eelam Research
Organization, General Union of Tamil Students, Sri Lanka Human Rights Movement,
The London Tamil Sangam, The Tamil Co-ordinating Committee Tamil Rights Group,
General Union of Eelam Students (GUES), and Eelam Tamils Association.363 In
Britain, Tamils raise a monthly income of around $3,90,000.364 The LTTE's
international secretariat is in London.
The main pro-LTTE global group, World Tamil Movement, is based in
Paris. 365 Almost 40,000 Sri Lankan Tamils, mostly young people are in
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
Sinha Ratnatunga, Politics of Terrorism: The Sri Lanknn Experience (Australia, 1988), p.292.
ibid, p.279.
Davis, 0.346, p.35.
ibid.
Ratnatuoga, 0.359, p.291.
Davis, n.346, p.35.
ibid, p.33.
160
France. 366 "Those living in France are organised and assist Tamils coming to
France for asylum or employment. There is a Tamil radio programme sponsored by
the French Branch of the Tamil Co-ordinating Committee. It was reported to be
broadcasting once a week between 7 p. m. and 8 p.m. on Thursdays from a private
radio station in Paris". 367
There are some 23,000 Tamils live in Switzerland and extortion seems to have
played a part in LTTE fundraising there.368 According to LITE sources, Tamil
donors are coaxed to part with $40 to $80 each month, estimating a monthly revenues
of $6,60,000.369 Further, the Tamil cause in Australia was enhanced by the
expatriate Tamil Community and Tamil academics in that country. The Australian
Federation of Tamil Associations draws together member association from various
places within Australia and member groups from Fiji, New Zealand and Papua New
Guinea. The Association's main reason for existence is to promote the Tamil cause
and to attempt to get the Australian government to exert international pressure on the
Sri Lankan government. 370 In addition, there are very active Eelam groups in
Norway and Sweden. "Some Sri Lankan Tamils have virtually 'Tamilized' remote
villages of Scandinavia where they live in large families. They too actively ask
respective governments to cut aid to Sri Lanka. "371
366 Ratnatunga, n.359, p.274.
367 ibid, p.288.
368 Davis, n.346, p.35.
369 ibid.
370 Ratnatunga, n.359, p.284.
371 . ibid, p.291.
161
Furthermore, it is believed that India has been a big source of money for the
Tigers. The state of Tamil Nadu has been used by the L TIE to raise money through
a variety of means, especially, ransom, bank robberies and cultural programmes.
This extensive international network and overseas remittances have made
possible for the Tamil rebel groups to travel all over to procure weapons of various
qualities and to obtain militry training. In 1984, one of the LTIE's early weapons
purchases deal was made with an Australian arms dealer. 372 Deals with global arms
dealers were also put together in Hong Kong.373 Also, LTIE's arms network relied
on West Asian and European dealers who could extend their reach to cover South-east
Asia and Pakistan's booming Afghan arms bazaar.374
"Most of the weapons used by the militants were purchased from Singapore,
India, Afghanistan and the Middle East. Soviet made AK-47, T56 Chinese assault
rifles and the Indian-Belgian AK MS a'1d the M16 AI manufactured by the Colt
Company in the United States (believed to have been obtained from Vietnam) were
the commonest weapons used by the militants. Other weapons were G3's (A3 and A4)
British L.I.A.I. (S.L.R.) F.N.F.N.C. 5.56 ~eretta model 12 sub machine guns, A60
(US), Browning 30, Browning 50, H.K. 21, and the 7.62 mag, heavy machine
gun. "375
The arms, having North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Israeli
mark, were shipped to the L TIE via Singapore. "Arms are often bought in Europe,
through Taiwan or Hong Kong-based traders, then shipped to Singapore where bills
372
373
374
375
Davis, 0.346. p.32.
ibid, p.33.
ibid.
Rohan Gunaratna. War and Peace in Sri Lanka, (Sri Lanka, 1987).p,46.
161a
of loading and containers are changed and are· then transferred to smaller boats on
high seas near Sri Lanka. "376 Traditionally fishermen formed an important group
of couriers. Now the L TIE uses the fast-moving boats that covers the distance
between point Calimere and Sri Lanka in less than 30 minutes. L TIE consolidated
itself militarily using Tamil Nadu as a conduit for smuggling arms obtained from
sources abroad.
I n August 1994, an L TIE vessel later identified as M. V. Swanee left the
Ukrainian Black Sea Port of Nikolayev. It carried 50 tons of TNT and 10 tons of
RDX explosives. The consignmeht was arranged by a Dhaka front company, Carlton
Trading. Protected by Sea Tiger speed boats,· its deadly cargo was off-loaded and
transferred to several jungle bases.377 Further, earlier in 1996, the freighter Comex
Joux with weapons, ammunition and explosives on board was intercepted by the
Indian Navy and Orissa-based spy planes of the Aviation Research Centre, a RAW
sister organisation. 378 The arms and a,nmunition were believed to have been
purchased from Cambodia and left the Phuket port for LTIE bases.379
Further, the recent use of surface-to-air missiles by the L TIE created concern
among the authorities of various countries. Indian defence and security agencies traced
the source and origin of such missile as Russian origin, probably procured from
Afghan Mujahideen groups.380 Some other soutces believed that such missiles were
sold by corrupt Cambodian general and transported across the Thai border in late
376 Lanka Guardian (Colombo), vo1.l4, 00.5, I July 1991, p.ll.
377 Davis, 0.346, p.34.
378 ibid, p.35.
379 ibid.
380 Times of India, 6 May 1995.
161b
1994.381 Another source revealed that the L TIE procured these missiles through
unofficial channels from Ukraine. 382 It is also believed that arms manufacturing
plants were set up in Jaffna peninsula.383 The L TIE factory produced 60mm
mortars that could reach a target of 1410 metres.384
For the self-taught in the use of sophisticated weapons, L TIE cadres were sent
abroad. They established linkages with militants as well as liberation movements
throughout the world. They developed contacts "with SWAPO, the Basques, the PLO,
PFLP etc. They also received considerable assistance from Iran and Libya, which
jointly fund over 40 terrorist groups.385 Abu Jihad, Arafat's military hand,
explained to a group of Sri Lankans at a Lebanese training camp that the PLO thought
that 'creating bubbles of anti-imperialism everywhere or wherever possible would
indirectly help their Palestinian's own struggle.386 Tigers carefully cultivated links
with Arab extremist groups in Lebanon and at least 200 Tigers were trained by
Palest.ne splinter groups.387 Norwegian mercenaries also "assisted in the training
of Tiger frogmen in underwater demolition techniques. The Tigers retuflled to Sri
Lanka to teach other fighters whose skills were later displayed in the sinking of a
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
Davis. n.344. p.34.
TitTles of India. 6 May 1995.
Davis. n.346. p.32.
G~naratna. n.375. p.47.
Rohan Gunaratna. Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India 's Intelligence Agencies -(Colombo. 1993). p.409.
M.R. Narayallswamy. Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas (Delhi. 1994). p.98.
Times of India. 3 June 1991.
161c
string of Sri Lankan naval vessels". 388 Furthermore, it has been alleged that the
Indian Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) involved itself in training Tamil militants
at various places inside India. It has also been reported that Tamil Nadu harbours
many rebel camps in which the Tamil militants are undergoing training.
Hence the L TIE exploits large Tamil diaspora in various countries besides
South Asia to obtain funds and supplies for its fighters in Sri Lanka.
Of late, Pakistan has become a hospitab.Ie environment for political violence.
Overseas remittances intensify such violence. Afghan government and its intelligence
agency, KHAD, was sometimes involved. KHAD was involved in dispersing funds
and weapons to such groups only for the reason of Pakistan's involvement in
fomenting civil war in Afghanistan. A lot of weapons are a fall out of the Afghan
war. A large number of sophisticated weapons passed into the hands of the rebel
groups in Sindh and Karachi area. Iran supplies arms to Shias in Pakistan. Secret
camps are run by proclaimed offenders to train people in handling such sophisticated
arms. Sheikh Rashid, the then Information Adviser to the Prime Minister of Pakistan,
attributed the spurt in violence to the Al Zulfiq~, purported a Pakistani- Afghanistan
based terrorist organisation and also to India's RAWand the Afghanistan's KHAD ...
the ItA Wand KHAD have been frequent whipping boys of Pakistan in relation to its
frequently erupting internal situations.389
tn addition to the above ways of overseas remittances to various militant
groups within South Asia, the advent of global communication facilities and the use
of airways significantly contribute to the easy transfer of weapons. The airdropping
388
389
Davis, n.346, pp.33-34.
Maj. Gen. M.L. P1opli. ·Will Siodh go the Bangladesh Ways·. Link (New Delhi). vo1.33, 00.49. 14 July 1991. p.5.
161d
of arms in Purulia, West Bengal, is a clear evi~ence to it. 390
Hence it is evident that the violent groups, basking under the patronage of
foreign countries, have converted their home countries into their fiefdom showing
scant regard for the rights of the local people or for the loss of the land. And,
eventually, they have become the main source of political violence and disorder in the
region.
Thus the above four factors of small arms proliferation stand out with
prominence. Arms bazaars are f10urshing with sophisticated small arms where the
militants frequently visit and buy against direct cash payment. The immediate fall-out
of the Afghanistan civil war was the widespread dispersal of small arl11s and which
makes en route to Pakistan's arms markets. Further; the drug production and
trafficking are linked closely to the diffusion of small arms and terrorism. The drug
bnmafia and militants sustain each other in terms of money an~ security. Moreover,
the factor of overseas remittance is crucial for a terrorist outfit to survive. The
overseas diaspora and organisations provide both financial and material help. These
are the factors which intensify the degree of political violence in the South Asian
region.
390 For Detail See Chapter v.