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JulyAugust 2013 Air & Space Power Journal| 39

Feature

The Next Lightweight Fighter

Not Your Grandfathers Combat AircraftCol Michael W. Pietrucha, USAF

SEC. 220. UNMANNED ADVANCED CAPABILITY COMBAT AIRCRAFT AND

GROUND COMBAT VEHICLES.

(a) GOAL.It shall be a goal o the Armed Forces to achieve the eld-

ing o unmanned, remotely controlled technology such that

(1) by 2010, one-third o the aircrat in the operational deep strike

orce aircrat feet are unmanned; and(2) by 2015, one-third o the operational ground combat vehicles

are unmanned.

Public Law 106-398, 30 October 2000

National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2001

Acasual survey of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV)

would show that various countries have pursued a dizzying

variety of such possible weapons systems, starting in World

War I and continuing today. Reconnaissance variants have a long and

effective history, but no autonomous UCAV is close to becoming opera-


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Pietrucha The Next Lightweight Fighter

Feature

tional. The value o these aircrat remains a subject o much debate,

and although UCAVs clearly are not ready to replace manned strike

aircrat, the exact role they will ulll is less clear.1 Almost any discus-

sion o the subject treats them as aircrat that happen to have a combatrole. Although technically correct, this view misses the larger picture.

UCAVs are nothing o the sort; rather, they are combat aircrat that

happen to fy without aircrews on board. As such, UCAVs may represent

a partial solution to the increasing expense and dwindling numbers o

modern ghter aircrat in service o the United States.

In 1971 the Air Force started its last lightweight ghter program,

which produced the F-16 Fighting Falcon and (eventually) the F-18.

With the F-16 and F-15, the service settled on a high/low mix o air-crat to replace Vietnam-era ghters. It procured more than 1,000 F-15s

and F-15Es and more than twice that number o F-16s. The Air Force

wanted the F-22 Raptor and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter to ollow a similar

high/low strategy, but both programs have seen their total size shrink,

and the Joint Strike Fighter may suer rom deense cuts. Given spi-

raling costs, the time is right to consider a new program. The next

lightweight ghter should be small, maneuverable, and relatively inex-

pensive, having a combat radius similar to that o its heavier breth-renbut it need not have a crew on board. The aircrats dierent de-

sign constraints will distinguish it rom a ghter, and it wont do

everything we expect o the latter. Intelligently designed, a UCAV can

become a orce multiplier.

A Force Multiplier, Not a Replacement

The UCAV will not replace the manned ghter aircratwe cannotbuild a control system to replicate the sensing and processing ability o

trained aircrews. Nevertheless, UCAVs may play a valuable role as a

supplementary system. Not remotely piloted aircrat, they will operate

semiautonomously, serving as literal wingmen o limited capabilities.

We can build the technology to fy an aircrat and execute prepro-

grammed routines. The brains o the operation will remain the


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nearby human, who needs only to tell the UCAV what to do and

(mostly) orget about it.

Design

For this purpose, the generic UCAV is designed in response to a set

o requirements. Since it will not do the same thing as a manned

ghter, it need not have identical capabilities. Gold-plating the system

will raise the cost o the aircrat and likely destroy any reasonable ar-

gument or incorporating it into service. Thus, the Air Force must limit

requirements to the ollowing:

Autonomous ight; navigation (including instrument approach

and terrain ollowing); identication, riend or oe; and communi-

cations.

Small size.

High maneuverability (up to 7 gs).

F-16-like combat radius.

High subsonic speed, service ceiling of at least 30,000 feet. Internal and external payload.

Reduced radar and infrared signature (not necessarily low ob-servable).

Modular avionics t.

Short takeoff and landing (STOL).

Capability of interfacing with tactical networks.

The need to take o, fy, navigate, land, and communicate provides

the backbone or an aircrat that can unction without having to con-

stantly tie up a human operator. I the airrame stays small, we can

place a number o them in conned spaces, especially on board a vari-

ety o sea-basing options. Furthermore, smaller airrames lend them-

selves to relatively easy transport in signicant numbers via airlit,


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thereby shortening deployment time. Finally, adversaries will nd

such aircraft more difcult to detect and successfully engage. High ma-

neuverability directly correlates to survivability against a variety o

threats. I we assume that this UCAV will operate extensively (possibly

primarily) with manned aircrat, then it must have range similar to the

F-16s, possibly calling or an air-reueling capability. To keep up with

strike aircrat, the UCAV must operate at high subsonic speed.2

We can partially attain signature reduction in a variety o spectra

with small size, airrame shaping, and design. Since a number o UCAV

missions will not demand stealth, most production airrames need not

utilize expensive radar-absorbent coatings. Similarly, the aircrat mustcarry some payload internally to minimize drag and signature; it must

also carry external ordnance and uel.

The modular avionics t is essential to maximize fexibility and con-

trol cost. Some UCAVs will carry advanced (and expensive) sensors

and communications, but not all missions call or a ull kit. In light o

the historically high loss rates or remotely piloted platorms, the ba-

sic airrame design will permit the deletion or addition o capabilities,minimizing the cost o losing an airrame. For example, it might in-

clude space or a system (black box and antenna array) carried only as

necessary.

STOL capability will assist operations from small airelds or the

deck o a ship (not only carriers but perhaps also specially tted am-

phibious ships) and allow recovery on damaged runways. Finally,

since the UCAV primarily operates in conjunction with manned com-bat assets, it must plug and play into any tactical data links available.

Expanding urther into conjecture, this article discusses what the

UCAV might bring to the ght i the Air Force could launch the pro-

gram in a short time rame. Accordingly, it incorporates a notional pa-

per written at Air Command and Sta College in the year 2020:


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Development and Employment o the F-40 Warhawk II:

Looking Back rom 2020

Given the need or a lightweight ghter, the Deense Advanced Re-search Projects Agency developed a prototype UCAV or use by both the

Air Force and Navy, producing a small ghter aircrat available in three

congurations. The F-40A, the basic airrame, does not utilize radar-

absorbent materials (a cost-reduction measure), gaining its small signa-

ture by means o shaping and composite materials.3 Many of the F-40As

design eatures were intended to support a fexible, modular congura-

tion. The basic aircrat is equipped with antenna mounts and space or

radar-warning gear, a sel-protection system with expendables, satellitecommunications, optical communications, and a tactical data-link pack-

age. Internal payload is located in two internal bays, each sized to carry

a GBU-32 (v) 1/B 1,000-pound Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) or

a our-pack o GBU-39/B.4 There are two external, uselage-mounted, re-

movable hardpoints capable of holding AGM-84s, AGM-88s, or equiva-

lent weapons or external uel tanks.5 Combat payload, exclusive o

mounted sensors and internal uel, weighs 3,400 pounds.

Identical in most respects to the A model, the F-40B does use radar-

absorbent materials, urther reducing its radar cross section. The B

model has no external hardpoints. The F-40Can F-40B with a more

powerul engineeatures higher perormance, making it suitable or

use with the F-22. The act that the B and C models cannot carry exter-

nal uel limits their range, but all variants can permit air reueling via

the boom on KC-135, KC-46, and KC-10 tankers; the A model also has a

probe or probe-and-drogue reueling, the rst aircrat since the F-100

equipped with both.6

The basic airrame allows the platorm to unction as a reusable

cruise missile, weapon caddy, or reconnaissance package roughly

equivalent to the early Model 147 Firebee drones employed over Viet-

nam (although enjoying much more precise navigation). Shorn o

much equipment, it lacks even a camera to assist with recovering the


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aircrat by remote control (although it can accommodate one); more-

over, even though it has space or sel-protection and radar-warning

gear, none is permanently installed. As a result, the most expensive

parts o the system are the engine and the navigation/control package,making the cost o a usable (although limited) aircrat as low as pos-

sible. Additional combat capabilities can be added to the airrame in

modular ashion, including any or all o the ollowing: a basic direction-

only radar-warning receiver oranadvanced radar-warning/electronic-

support-measures package, cha and fares, orward-looking day/night

television or landing under manual control, a orward-looking-inrared

camera, and advanced ground-mapping radar.7

The payload bays remain available or sensors, uel, or weapons.The UCAV could carry additional weapons on external hardpoints, but

external weapons compromise stealthiness and reduce the combat ra-

dius. Internal payloads include

air-to-ground munitions, such as GBU-32s, GBU-39s/-40s, SUU-64/B

canisters;8

air-to-air munitions, currently AIM-120Ds;

air-droppable sensors, including sonobuoys;

a 1,600-pound fuel tank;

decoys (ADM-160 miniature air-launched decoy [MALD]) or ex-pendable jamming packages (MALD-J);

standoff/escort jamming or other electronic warfare packages;

special sensor packages, including a laser radar, radar, hyperspec-

tral sensors, or photoreconnaissance;

collection packages, including air-sampling tools;

resupply pallets (aided by the Global Positioning System and para-chute retarded);

specialized signals-intelligence avionics;

a communications relay package;


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advanced self-protection, including towed decoys and additional

expendables (cha/fares); and

a directed-energy pallet (in development).

Some weapons are too large to t inside, so the platorm must carry

them externally. It can accommodate both the AGM-88 high-speed anti-

radiation missile and AGM-84L Harpoon II in pairs although the

weight of the AGM-84L requires empty payload bays, at least at take-

o.9 The aircrat cannot carry especially heavy weapons.

Mixing payloads permits tailoring of the UCAVs for the mission in

question. That is, a long-range mission might carry a single GBU-32

and uel; a poststrike reconnaissance pass in a high-threat area mightcarry a photo pallet as well as an advanced sel-protection package.

Two identical bays oer more utility than one larger bay. A modular

system design allows the services to minimize the expense o losing an

airrame yet provide or multirole capability.

Lightweight Fighter Missions

Unlike the lightweight ghter o 1971, the F-40 has a very limited air-to-

air role. No variant o the F-40 possesses an air-to-air radar. All variants

can carry the AIM-120D advanced medium-range air-to-air missile, but

they are simply missile caddies. Pairing a single F-40C with an F-22 in-

creases the total missile loadout rom eight to 12; the Raptor perorms

all target-detection and missile-guidance unctions. This limitation is

not as severe as it seems and may (in the uture) provide a highly val-

ued capability to other platorms. Block 20 aircrat will be able to inter-

ace with Aegis ships, as will ollow-on blocks with E-2D aircrat, thus

extending the outer boundary against air-breathing threats.10

The interchangeability o the F-40A proved quite valuableparticu-

larly during the initial production run, which did not supply enough

aircraft to go around. On several occasions, land-based F-40As

launched, completed their mission, and recovered aboard a US aircrat

carrier; thus, they could replace lost F-40s without wasting a sortie


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on a erry fight.11 Ferry reconnaissance missions became common-

place during the Hamadan crisis, when aircraft that launched from

eastern Turkey overfew Iran and recovered on board the carrier in the

Persian Gul (and the reverse).

The F-40 ound its key niche in counterland or antisurace opera-

tions. As a combat aircrat, it acts either as an autonomous asset or as

a orce multiplier and is commonly assigned to manned aircrat, re-

erred to as consorts. Control methods vary with the complexity o

the mission, but no control mode in the UCAV allows remote pilotage

(except or takeo and landing). All variants have three control modes.

Mode A (autonomous control). The simplest orm o control orthe F-40 is autonomous control, enhanced with an in-fight report and

retasking ability, similar to that o a tactical Tomahawk. As in any

modeexcept or emergency landingthe vehicle itsel handles basic

fight operations, including terrain and threat avoidance. Useul or

servicing xed targets, this system can be retasked i the target moves.

The Warhawk has two control loopsone or threat avoidance and one

or uel management. Autonomous operations have the advantage o

very tight emissions control, immunity to communications interrup-

tion, and ease o planning, but their fexibility remains limited. Inter-

diction, critical resupply, and various reconnaissance missions use

mode A; F-40s fy most o the high-speed tactical-reconnaissance mis-

sions on the air tasking order.

Mode B (cooperative). A simpler version o the semiautonomous

operations mode (mode C), this mode allows the F-40 to perorm sim-

ple cooperative operations whereby one o a number o UCAVs tied to-

gether via data link will react to conditions encountered by the others.One autonomous F-40 dropping bombs might be followed by another

dropping unattended sensors. I the rst UCAV becomes engaged, the

second will replot the route to avoid the threat. I the rst UCAV is de-

stroyed, the second one may abort the mission, returning with key in-

ormation about the loss. Cooperative mode also includes automatic

collision avoidancenot a eature o autonomous mode.


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Similarly, when paired with a manned aircrat, the F-40 can take ac-

tion based on what its consorts or the other UCAVs are doing. In most

cases, cooperative actions are merely the result o simple i/then state-

ments: ithreat radar illuminates the parent aircrat, then the F-40 willperorm Y action (anything rom launching decoys to attacking the ra-

dar directly). This simple scheme mimics the actions o intelligent ma-

chines but involves no direct human control, simply actions rom a

preplanned menu.

Mode C (semiautonomous control). The versatile semiautono-

mous control permits easier integration with the remainder o the

joint orce. Without it the Air Force might not have procured the air-

crat. In semiautonomous mode (also reerred to as the wingman

mode), the F-40 is electronically tethered to a combat unit, which

serves as the critical man in the loop or targeting and weapons em-

ploymenttypically an aircrat, vessel, or ground unit. The manned

unit supplies target identication, prioritization, assignment, and

weapons allocation, thus clearing the autonomous weapon hurdle

that has bedeviled weapons developers or decades.

The F-40 may receive updates and commands requently or inre-quently, and control can switch rom one asset to another. No more

than one unit may control any given UCAV although a single unit can

control multiple F-40s. In short, under mode C the F-40 requently acts

as a literal wingman with no judgment, capable o ollowing limited in-

structions.

Because the F-40 is not remotely piloted, mission commands are

simple and easily integrated. It receives assignments o hostile air or

surace tracks or attack, along with data on other UCAVs working in

the same area. Other tasks may be assigned via simple commands, and

the F-40 takes action based on its programming and the current pic-

ture provided via data link (see the gure below or primary com-

mands used by the FB-22). Sensors on the F-40 usually integrate with

those o the consort via data link


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Figure. Extract from notional Technical Order 1FB-22-34-1-1, Weapons Employ-

ment Manual, FB-22 Aircraft


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Combat Employment: Close Air Support

The rst combat employment o the X-45A occurred ater the devastat-

ing Arabian quake in Somalia, which has almost no inrastructure and

suers rom ongoing clan warare. The United States deployed orces

to assist in security and logistics support to United Nations relie e-

orts in that country, particularly around the regional capital o Bendir

Kassim, which the quake had virtually leveled. A joint task orce based

in Djibouti stood up to direct the relie eort, exercising airborne com-

mand and control via E-8C aircrat.

The US Air Force lited elements o an Army Stryker brigade combat

team (SBCT) into Djibouti, rom which they drove 300 miles along the

coast road to what was let o the regional capital. Shorn o organic ar-

tillery so it could deploy rapidly, the SBCT relied instead on a squad-

ron o 24 F-40As airlited into Djibouti rom war-reserve storage at the

US air base at Incirlik, Turkey. Intererence rom warlords became

routine, and the F-40s rotated to serve as on-orbit assets or responsive

joint res.

The initial use o UCAVs occurred on the second day ater arrival o

leading elements o the SBCT in Bendir Kassim. Uploaded with a mixof general-purpose (GBU-32 JDAMs) and antiarmor (CBU-97) muni-tions, the F-40s orbited in unthreatened airspace 10 miles o the coast.

At 0900 hours, the brigade sta called the orbiting E-8 aircrat and re-

quested retaskable close air support against a ortied building provid-

ing cover or militiamen ring on relie personnel.12 The E-8 released a

pair o F-40s to a close-air-support orbit. Ater they arrived over the

city, a terminal attack controller established communications, desig-

nated the target, selected munitions, and keyed attack into the hand-

set. Shortly thereafter two JDAMs hit the building, which collapsed in

a cloud o powdered concrete and dust. The F-40s, still with hal o

their ordnance on board, then returned to their orbit.

Fiteen minutes later, the E-8C detected a column o vehicles head-

ing towards the city rom a suspect area. Using a Navy Fire Scout al-

ready in the area, the E-8C crew identied the vehicles as the ubiqui-


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tous Arican technicalslight trucks armed with heavy weaponsand

declared the convoy hostile in accordance with the rules o engage-

ment. This time, the E-8C crew pulled all our F-40As out o orbit and

tasked them to attack the column. The E-8 continuously updated theposition o the individual vehicles, and the Warhawks executed a near-

simultaneous attack against the entire length o the convoy. Despite a

hail o small-arms re, the UCAVs remained largely undamaged, each

one dropping a single CBU-103 canister. Each o the canisters dispensed

40 independently targeted skeets that tracked the hot metal o the ve-

hicle engines and red explosively orged slugs. A scant 10 seconds

later, the entire column consisted o immobile wrecks, some vehicles

hit by as many as three slugs. Two empty UCAVs returned home auto-matically; the two with JDAMs returned to orbit for their remaining on-

station time, which proved uneventul. This early demonstration o

repower limited the exposure o US troops to hostile re and signi-

cantly augmented the repower available to the brigade commander.

Arrival o the USSAbraham Lincoln a week later added another squad-

ron o F-40As to the stock o aircrat, along with F-18E/F aircrat and a

number o helicopters. In this operation, multiple units employed the

UCAVsinitially a tactical air control party, then a tactical command

and control element, and much later an F-18 rom theAbraham Lin-

coln. In most cases, these units provided only target identication, des-

ignation, and weapons selectionthe F-40 handled course corrections,

attack prole, and weapons employment.

Small Wingmen

In combat, F-40s have served primarily as small wingmen. The dras-

tic reduction in the size o both Air Force and Navy combat aviationdrove development o the F-40 to stretch the capabilities o the more

advanced ghters by tethering the UCAV to manned aircrat. Eorts

to lighten Army brigades spurred additional momentum within the

Department o Deense; specically, the loss o organic artillery sup-

port drove an airborne solution to provide res or light ground orces.

The F-40s design made it compatible with a wide array o platorms


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that give it instructions with a minimal increase in the crews work-

load. F-40s employed in this manner retain the man in the loop or

critical decisions.

Counterland and countersurace operations became the logical mis-

sion o choice or tethered F-40s. Typically, our to six F-40s accompany

a fight o our manned ghters, the UCAVs oering extra weapons, an

expanded sensor array, and capability to attack geographically distrib-

uted aiming points simultaneously. F-40s also supply both lethal and

nonlethal suppression o enemy air deenses and are the weapon o

choice or attacking located surace-to-air-missile batteries. Warhawks

typically assume the dangerous poststrike reconnaissance mission.

Platorms other than ghter aircrat have made good use o the F-40.

Realizing the potential o having a survivable, ast-moving jet under di-

rection, users drastically increased in number. The Longbow Apache(AH-64E), originally built to designate targets for other aircraft usingthe Longbow radar, became the airborne forward air controller of

choice or Army aviation brigades. The Apache/Warhawk combination

oered unmatched capability or all-weather close air support. B-1 and

B-52 bombers also use the F-40 as escort; however, because o the lat-

ters limited range, the bombers join up with their Warhawks en route.

Some aircrat innovatively employ the F-40 as an airborne scout.

Terrain blockage and curvature o the earth prevent low-altitude or dis-

tant aircrat rom looking into the next valley directly. Consequently,

many a reconnaissance mission or package commander let the F-40

take a peek in advance. RC-135s eectively and regularly allow it to

serve as an extension o their sensor arrays. EA-18G crews adopted this

same concept by utilizing F-40s or lethal suppression o enemy air de-

enses but nd them invaluable or providing look-through or their

own jamming.13 Strike aircrat operating at low altitude oten direct an

F-40 to pop up or a look around. Similarly, platorms fying over a

weather deck have used this UCAV to investigate below the weather.

Surace combatants, particularly those operating close in the litto-

rals, have turned to F-40s as surrogate sensors, allowing those vessels


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to remain under strict emissions control and look beyond the horizon.

Using the F-40 or weapons employment allows the location o the par-

ent ship to remain uncompromised.

Air-to-air squadrons, though, did not readily accept the F-40. Despitethe promise o extra missiles, the crews pointed out (correctly) that be-

cause Warhawks cannot fy either extremely high or supersonically,

the advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles launched rom those

platorms lacked a running start and could not match the range o

ghter-launched weapons. Deensive counterair missions partially al-

leviated this problem by placing the F-40 combat air patrol much

closer to the threat although this tactic was o little use oensively.

Any remaining objections vanished when a young F-22 weapons o-cer realized that the F-40s AIM-120, although shorter ranged for thetypical nose-to-nose engagement, was longer ranged or any action in

which the consort had to shoot o-boresight because o its deensive or

neutral posture. The F-40 could aord to point at the enemy when its

consort could not; AIM-120s shot from hot Warhawks wasted no en -ergy making a turn to line up on target.

Black OperationsGranted, regular orces employed the UCAV in roles ormerly lled

by manned ghters, but the special operations community took to

the F-40B like ducks to water. The F-40s gave this community two ca-

pabilities it had lacked entirely: a means o covert resupply and a path-

nder aircrat. Equipped with parachute-retarded supply pallets, War-

hawks can resupply special operations orces yet minimize the chance

o detection. A single UCAV can deliver 1,600 pounds o cargo in two

pallets although long-range missions cut this gure in hal because othe need to carry extra uel.14 Normally conducted with MC-130s andMV-22s, Pathnder missions send F-40Bs along a planned ight routeto survey the radar environment and help ingressing aircrat avoid de-

tection.15 UCAVs fying such a mission oten carry a our-pack o


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GBU-39 bombs or reactive suppression. Additionally, F-40s can pre-

survey designated landing zones in advance.

The Department o Deense is not the sole user o the F-40B, but ex-

act numbers and operators remain unconrmed. Supposedly, the Cen-tral Intelligence Agency operates these aircrat, and both the Drug En-

orcement Administration and Immigration and Customs Enorcement

have been known to borrow Warhawks for surveillance. One of therare payloads is a sampling pallet, used to take air samples along a

specied route o fight. Unconrmed rumor has it that such a payload

has played a role in monitoring chemical weapons production and the

Iranian nuclear-enrichment program.

Rapid Deployment and Sea Basing

The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corpsthe F-40s primary operatorscan use the A and B models interchangeably although each service has

its own appropriately marked jets.16 Since all F-40s can fy rom an

aircrat carrier, it is not unusual to see a USAF aircrat doing so. Even

F-40Cs have operated rom fattopsa rare occurrence that involves a

small Air Force maintenance detachment on board the carrier. Block

20 aircrat will be able to operate oWasp-class amphibious carriers,eectively doubling the number o hulls that can accommodate

UCAVs. Successul tests have taken place on the USSEssex (LHD-2) us-ing a portable ski ramp or launch rather than the feet carriers cata-

pults. Arrested landings remain the only means or recovery, utilizing

a bolt-on three-wire arresting kit derived rom the Air Forces mobile

aircrat arresting systems. These systems permit smaller fattops to op-

erate ast jets, but the launch and recovery o UCAVs interrupt normal

helicopter and vertical and/or short takeo landing and operations.Current Navy and Marine Corps concepts call for a number of em-

ployment options since the Navy preers to use tactical Tomahawk

missiles rather than autonomous F-40s during high-intensity opera-

tions. Typically, F-40s fy a preplanned route to a pickup point where

another aircrat (oten rom the same carrier), a nearby ship (includ-


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ing submarines and littoral combat ships), or a orward air controller

directs semiautonomous operations.17 Operations from amphibiouscarriers allow the delivery o F-40s into holding orbits where they re-

main until called upon by Marine forces ashore.The F-40A remains rapidly deployable: a single C-17 sortie can carry

four crated UCAVs, and the C-5M can carry six. F-40s at lighter launchweights can take o rom airelds as short as 3,000 eet. Clearly, short

elds and sea basing signicantly increase the basing opportunities.

F-40s are stored in transportable congurations at a number o locations

worldwide, more than hal o the Air Forces UCAVs remaining in their

crates, stored with support equipment and munitions stocks ashore

and on maritime pre-positioning ships. Many of the overseas crate-hawks reside at Air Force bases that also operate combat aircrat.

Training and Maintenance

Flight training or the F-40 occurs almost entirely by simulationa

rst among major weapons systems. Since there is no pilot to train,

the presence of the actual aircraft remains largely unnecessary. Mostunits have built-in sotware that allows them to train on simulated

weapons that have the look and eel o Warhawk employment, obvi-ating the need or the real platorm.18 Units capable o employing F-40s

regularly practice with the simulations; some never conduct a tactical

training mission without them. Normally, large numbers o the UCAVs

appear only in large orce exercises at Nellis AFB or Naval Air Station

Fallon, Nevada.

Simulation allows most o the Air Forces F-40s to remain in storage

(hence, the term cratehawks).19 When these aircrat rst reached the

eld, everyone expected that all o them would stay in storage untilneededa notion that proved unsatisactory or two reasons. First, be-

cause their maintenance crews received insucient experience with

real-world fight operations, the Warhawks reliability rates were lower

than expected. Second, joint terminal attack controllers elt uncom-

ortable with pure simulation because the F-40s never showed up in


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training. Consequently, they rarely employed the UCAVseven in

simulation.

The Air Force corrected both problems rapidly and did so in a ash-

ion that permitted it to kill two birds with one stone. At every base thathas a squadron capable o employing F-40s, at least three fy daily op-

erations.20 Because these aircrat see heavy use when they exercise

with ground orces, joint terminal attack controllers become accus-

tomed to their air support. Most training still makes use of simulatedweapons; thus, F-40s are oten reloaded in fight, giving the appear-

ance o a larger number than are actually fying.21 These UCAVs rou-

tinely participate in live munitions drops at Nellis and Fallon, and both

Combat Archer (an air-to-air weapons system evaluation program) atTyndall AFB, Florida, and Combat Hammer (an air-to-ground weaponssystem evaluation program) at Hill AFB, Utah, routinely drop (orshoot) live weapons rom F-40s under semiautonomous control.

By any standard, the F-40 program has been a resounding success,

giving the United States a fexible, lightweight ghter at relatively low

cost, and adding to the joint orce a number o capabilities that did not

exist prior to the Warhawks initial operational capability. One can

gauge the programs success by examining the prolieration o imita-tors: Russian, Chinese, and French manuacturers are all pursuing sim-

ilar programs.22

Te View in 2013

No one can realistically assume that UCAVs will replace manned

combat aircrat anytime soon, public law notwithstanding. The fexibil-

ity inherent in having a pilot in the environment remains the singlemost important aspect o combat aviation writ large, and replacement

o human aircrews is not in sight. Similarly, the remote-pilotage model

used by the MQ-1 and MQ-9 is suitable only for uncontested airspace.Nevertheless, we could expand the capabilities o manned aircrat

even to the extent o replacing them on the air tasking order when ap-


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propriate and reserving manned combat aircrat or those times when

we need them. The United States has done so or more than 40 years,

rst with the Firebee drones in Vietnam and much later with Toma-

hawks and air-launched cruise missiles. Like the Firebee, the UCAV isdesigned to come back and do it again, and its assigned tasks are rela-

tively simpledespite their importance. Given our scal challenges,

the uture threat environment, and the possibilities inherent in mis-

sionized UCAVs, they seem an obvious candidate or a major weapons

program.

Notes

1. Notably, arguments that avored purchasing the Predator and Reaper because theywould reduce the risk to pilots have turned out to be nonsense because the aircrat can op-erate eectively only in environments without air deense.

2. This act poses a design problem or operations with the F-22, which can super-cruisethat is, cruise in excess of Mach 1 without using afterburners. Given the small sizeo the Raptor buy, most UCAVs will be employed with and by platorms that cannot (andneed not) match the Raptors perormance.

3. The F-40 is an entirely notional system, discussed here solely to allow a usable reer-ence point.

4. The weapons bay size (about 20 inches wide, 20 inches deep, and 150 inches long) alsoaccommodates a number of other weapons, from the AIM-120D to the CBU-87/-89/-103. Aour-pack o small-diameter bombs on a BRU-61 is 143 x 16 x 16 inches.

5. Because o the F-40s limited takeo weight, the external hardpoints serve primarily tocarry weapons too large to t in the internal bay and, consequently, are rarely installed.

6. The tankers are equipped with a short-range communications link that provides fight-control data to the F-40 or reueling.

7. These packages count against the maximum gross takeo weight but do not take upspace in the payload bays. Thus, a ull-up (but empty) UCAV would have all o the add-oncombat capabilities.

8. The SUU-64/B canister allows or dispensing a variety o munitionsrom leafets to

gator mines, sensor-uzed weapons, or combined-eects submunitions.9. The Navy has experimented with carrying two AGM-84s externally, with two empty

uel tanks in the payload bays. This conguration does not exceed the maximum takeoweight and can then be reueled when airborne, eectively doubling the combat radius witha single refueling. Minor software adjustments allowed ight under very heavyweight condi-tions, which adversely aected handling characteristics. In the words o a fight-test engineer,the aircrat fies like a drunken pig when heavily loaded; thereore, naval air training andoperating procedures as well as Air Force instructions prohibit operations below 500 eet.


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10. The present F-40 series operates under the initial Block 10 production conguration.Block 20 aircrat will have an additional control module allowing interace with other airdefense assets (the Patriot, Medium Extended Air Defense System, and Aegis especially).

All Block 10 aircrat will be retrotted.

11. The landing mode, ironically reerred to as the emergency landing mode by the AirForce and the trap mode by the Navy, lets the carrier fy the UCAV on nal approach, re-sulting in near-perect recoveries in most weather conditions.

12. Retaskable close air support missions are issued as ragmentary orders in the air task-ing order with no preplanned recipient and tasked as necessary on the fy, based on theneed or joint res.

13. Smart jamming platorms must be able to look through their own jamming to deter-mine their eect on the victim signalor determine i that signal exists at all. This otenrequires turning o the jammer or very short periods. EA-18G crews use a distant F-40 todetermine the status o both the victim radar and the jamming technique as well as receivesatellite communications data.

14. The cargo pallet itsel weighs 100 pounds empty, including rame, parachute, and airbags. The maximum deliverable cargo weight amounts to 800 pounds on land and 1,000pounds on water, all o which must t within the airly restricted canister dimensions.

15. B-2 Spirit bombers are also known to join up with F-40s launched in-theater, usingthem as both armed pathnders and bomb caddies. The Air Force would have incorporatedsimilar capability into the F-117 had the service not retired it.

16. Because o the dierent engine and the no-service requirement or supercruise, theNavy and Marine Corps did not purchase any F-40Cs although these aircraft remain capableo carrier operations.

17. Primarily, the E-2D and the two-seat F-18F and EA-18G serve as airborne controllersfor multiple UCAVs (the P-3 and P-8 [multimission maritime aircraft] do so as well). F-18Es

rarely control more than a single Warhawk.18. For platforms (such as the RC-135) that did not have such software, Lyton Industriesdeveloped a retrot kit to allow in-fight F-40 simulation.

19. This problem never manifested itself in the Navy and Marine Corps because all F-40sassigned to at-sea ships were ully assembled and ready to go.

20. Aircrat on fight status are rotated among the stock on hand so that all F-40 airramesfy or several periods each year and crews maintain prociency in assembly, disassembly,and maintenance.

21. Because the Federal Aviation Administration remains skeptical about UCAV opera-tions in controlled airspace, most F-40 activity outside the western test ranges occurs whilethey are tethered to a manned aircrat.

22. To be air, the French Dassault Gran Duc program actually predates the F-40, havingbeen a counterpart o the Deense Advanced Research Projects Agencys original UCAV pro-gramthe grandather o the F-40.


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Col Michael W. Pietrucha, USAF

Colonel Pietrucha (BA, Pennsylvania State University; MA, American Military

University) is the individual mobilization augmentee to the PACAF A8/9,

Headquarters Pacic Air Forces, Hickam Field, Hawaii. Commissioned through

the Air Force ROC program in 1988, he has served at Spangdahlem AB, Ger-many; Nellis AFB, Nevada (twice); Royal Air Force Lakenheath, United King-

dom; Langley AFB, Virginia; and the Pentagon. As an electronic warare in-

structor in the F-4G Wild Weasel and later the F-15E, he has amassed 156

combat missions over 10 combat deployments. As an irregular warare opera-

tions ofcer, Colonel Pietrucha has two additional combat deployments in the

company o US Army inantry, combat engineer, and military police units in

Iraq and Aghanistan.

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