Explaining the European Union’s Eastern Enlargement

EC/EU Objectives

Promote domestic economic and political reforms in Eastern Europe

Promote international stability and peaceful resolution of conflicts

Goals remained constant, but means have varied

Widening vs. Deepening

France: deepening favored over widening Great Britain: deepening favored over

widening Germany: deepening and widening

France

Why deepening?– Contain Germany within a political union

Why not widening?– Enlargement would shift balance of power in favor of

Germany– Reduce France’s benefits from the CAP– Not as vulnerable to consequences of instability

Policies– Monetary union (and political union?)– Slow down enlargement

Great Britain

Why widening?– Widening would make deepening more difficult

Why not deepening?– Reluctance to give up sovereignty

Policies– Stay out of EMU– Support enlargement to the East

Germany

Why deepening?– Bind present and future governments to

(Western) Europe– Win French support for German unification

Why widening?– Promote stability in Eastern Europe

Policies– EMU and enlargement

What’s Being Explained

Decision to enlarge to the East– 1993 Copenhagen European Council accepts

enlargement contingent on political and economic reforms

Timing of the decision to enlarge Reconsideration of the enlargement strategy

at December 1999 Helsinki European Council

Enlargement Strategy

July 1997: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia judged to have met political and economic conditions

Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria did not meet the economic conditions. Slovakia did not meet political conditions

Membership negotiations open with the five front-runners in March 1998

Three Explanations

Liberalism (liberal intergovernmentalism)– Economic interests

Sociological institutionalism– Identity and norms

Geopolitics– Promoting stability in Eastern Europe– Maintaining relative influence within the EU

Liberalism

Policymaking dominated by sectoral interests Logic

– Those who would benefit most from increased economic interdependence should favor it

Liberalism’s Predictions

Limited concessions Those bordering Eastern Europe should

favor enlargement

Empirical Support for Liberalism

Explains – opposition to enlargement– trade and cooperation agreements and Europe

Agreements

Does not explain– Shift in favor of membership in 1993– 1999 decision to open up negotiations with those

excluded in 1997

Sociological Institutionalism (SI)

Identity and norms explain– Enlargement– Conditionality

Logic– Becoming a member of an organization means

adopting the collective identity of the organization

EU: adopt liberal values and norms

Predictions of SI

Accession conditions reflect the EU’s liberal values and norms

Countries selected for accession talks should– Match EU members– Be different from those not invited to talks

Empirical Support for SI, I

Explains– Accession conditions does reflect the EU’s liberal

values and norms The new members do share the EU’s collective identity

– 1997 decision to open accession talks with the five frontrunners

Different from those not invited

Empirical Support for SI, II

Does not explain– Shift in policy in 1993– 1999 decision to open talks with the other five

associates

Geopolitics

Geopolitical considerations– Need to promote stability in Eastern Europe– Maintain influence and power in the EU

These considerations explain– Decision to enlarge as well as its timing– Conditions attached to membership– Reconsideration of enlargement strategy in 1999

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: High threat Favor deeper/costlier engagements with Eastern Europe

Hypothesis 2: States whose influence will increase will favor enlargement, those whose influence will decrease will oppose it

Hypothesis 3: Major geopolitical events that reveal new information shifts in preferences and policies

Before 1993

Threat low enough that concerns about influence within EC predominated

– France: favors deepening over widening (bind Germany)– Great Britain: favors widening over deepening (weaken

supranational aspects)– Germany: favors both (stability and self-binding)

Difference between France and Germany is consistent with hypothesis 1: threat higher for Germany

All three positions consistent with hypothesis 2

The Decision to Enlarge

New information– Rise of protectionist pressures in Eastern Europe– Conflicts on the Balkans, particularly Bosnia-

Herzegovina

Increases threat of instability, which changes the calculus, particularly France’s– Membership offered to promote and lock in

reforms and provide stability (hypotheses 1 & 3)

Kosovo and the Shift in Enlargement Strategy

Italy, Sweden, and Denmark argued in 1997 that strategy would create dangerous political divisions

Argument rejected: limited intake would reduce costs (EU reforms)

Kosovo crisis: threat reassessed Countries kept out would become disillusioned, reforms

might be reversed 1999 Helsinki European Council: accession negotiations

would begin with Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania (and Malta)

Evidence consistent with hypotheses 1 & 3

Summary of Findings

Support for hypotheses 1 and 3:– France supports enlargement as result of increased threat to

stability after break-up of Yugoslavia (also Eastern European protectionism)

– Shift in enlargement strategy after Kosovo: increased threat Support for hypothesis 2:

– French position on enlargement driven in large part by desire to maintain influence in EU, constrain Germany

– British position: enlargement will weaken supranational aspects

– German position: consistent with hypotheses 1 & 2