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Explaining the Emergence of New Parties

Cynical Citizens and the rise of populism

André Krouwel and Onno Bosch

Department of Political ScienceVrije Universiteit Amsterdam

Paper prepared for the workshopKwaliteit van het leven en politieke attitudes.

Methodologische vraagstukken en empirische analyses.at the Politicologenetmaal 2004 in Antwerpen, Mai 27 and 28 2004.

First draft, 11-May-04, 19 pages including this page. Please do not quote without permission.

Krouwel and Bosch Explaining the Emergence of New Parties

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Summary

This paper examines three causal explanations for the emergence and electoral success of neo-populist parties. Atthe macro level we test the hypothesis that systemic features (electoral thresholds and the proportionality of theelectoral system) influence the opportunities for new political parties to emerge. Furthermore, we test the hypothesisthat ideological convergence of the major mainstream parties creates the ideological space and strategic opportunitiesfor the emergence of new parties. Finally we assess the effect of voter turnout and electoral volatility on theemergence of new political parties. The empirical analyses show that the systemic features and the ideologicalconvergence of mainstream parties can only explain a small proportion of the new parties that emerge.Importantly, this systemic approach can not explain the appearance of the majority of new political parties.Alternatively, we develop a theory for the materialisation of populist parties by incorporating the level of politicalcynicism among the electorate into the model. As populist ideology and strategies tap into the two dimensions ofpolitical cynicism (distrust in the motivations and competence of the traditional elite and efficacy) we assume thatthis approach is better able to explain the emergence of new neo-populist parties. Finally we develop a typology ofvoters and their likelihood to vote for new parties and political ‘outsiders’ (particularly populists).

Int roduc t ion

In recent years political scientists have increasingly taken interest in the emergence of new political parties.As a consequence a small body of literature regarding the formation and electoral success of new partieshas emerged (Hug 2000; Ignazi 1996; Lucardie 2000; Rochon 1985). Due to their sheer diversity inorganisation, ideology and electoral appeal, a comprehensive general theory explaining the emergence ofnew political parties, their electoral success and modes of competition is still lacking. This paper aims tocontribute to the understanding of how and why new political parties emerge by developing acomprehensive explanatory model. First we conduct a comparative analysis at the systemic level, testingthe hypothesis that two systemic features in particular, electoral thresholds and disproportional electoralsystems, influence the likelihood of the emergence of new political parties. In addition we test thehypothesis that convergence of the traditional mainstream parties provides ideological space andopportunities for new parties. Finally we assess the effect of voter turnout and electoral volatility on theemergence of new political parties.

These analyses can only generically explain part of the materialisation of new political competitors, butnot the emergence of specific types of political parties. In an attempt to explain the emergence of aspecific new party-type, namely neo-populist parties we analyse the micro level, testing the conventionalassumption that the rise of populist parties is caused by popular disillusionment with the traditionalmainstream parties. We use the concept of political cynicism in order to tap popular disillusionmentbecause political cynicism incorporates a distrust in the competence of the ruling elite (to represent and servethe people) as well as distrust towards the motivations and intentions of the ruling elites. Secondly, cynicalvoters do have a sense of internal and external efficacy and thus feel competent and able to influence theprocess of political decision-making.

The rise of neo-populism in Europe

In 2002 the Netherlands experienced a parliamentary election that was unprecedented in many ways. Anew political movement (LPF) was able to attract the support of 17 percent of the votes (and 26 seats in


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parliament) even though the leader of the party, Pim Fortuyn, had been assassinated shortly before theelections. Although the 2002-election was certainly not the first time that new political parties emerged inthe Netherlands (Buelens 1997; Rochon 1985), this election did mean the largest electoral victory of a newpolitical party in Dutch political history, and also the largest defeat of a coalition-government (Praag2003). Many observers of Dutch politics attributed Fortuyn’s success to his media performances, hisjarring criticism of the ruling parties or the fact that the media focussed heavily on Fortuyn’s personality(Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2003: 90). Despite the fact that some specific factors (such as personality or the a-typical Purple Coalition) may have played a role in the unprecedented rise of Fortuyn and the LPF, we arenot content with such an idiosyncratic explanation. The Netherlands is not the only political system thathas witnessed the emergence of new political parties. Italy has seen the rise of the Berlusconi’s ForzaItalia, which became the largest party in its first contested elections (Hopkin and Paolucci 1999) and hasbeen the pivot party of two right-wing coalition governments.

Not only parties commonly labelled ‘populist’ have emerged in European party systems. Ireland has seena new party, the Progressive Democrats, gaining nearly 12 percent of the vote in the 1987-election andparticipating regularly in government since. Since the second World War several hundreds of politicalorganisations have tried to gain parliamentary representation across Europe (seehttp://www.politicalresources.net/). This large number of parties, their diversity in organisational format,ideological and electoral appeal necessitates categorisation. Deschouwer (2004: 1-2) distinguishes betweenthree groups of new parties on the basis of their genetic origin. Almost all European party systems sawthe emergence of Green parties in the late 1980’s or early 1990’s, which obtained governmental status inBelgium, Germany, France, Italy and Finland. The second group consists of regionalist parties, whichemerged in Italy, Belgium, Spain and Britain and participated in government in Belgium, Italy and Spain.The third group consists of new radical right parties, yet according to Deschouwer this group is veryheterogeneous in its composition. We agree that this is a too broad categorisation and wish to distinguishbetween radical rightwing (xenophobic) parties and neo-populist party organisations. The latter of thesecategories has our special attention, as we will not only attempt to explain the general emergence of newpolitical parties, but seek to understand the appearance of specific types of new political organisations, inparticular neo-populist parties.

General explanations of the emergence of new parties

In the literature on the emergence of new parties, roughly three approaches can be distinguished. First, aninstitutional-formal approach in which authors focus on systemic features such as electoral laws andthresholds, requirements for registration or public party finance (Harmel and Robertson 1985; Hug 2000).Secondly, a sociological approach which focuses on the transformation of cleavage structures or changesin the value-orientation of citizens (Inglehart 1997; Lipset and Rokkan 1967) in an attempt to explainpatterns of voting and other forms of political (non)participation. A third approach, focussing on thepolitical opportunity structure, seeks the explanation for the emergence of new parties in more immediateand temporal developments within party systems, often looking at the level of polarisation or convergenceof political parties.

As an example from the latter approach, Pennings and Keman (2003) suggest that decreasing partycompetition, especially with respect to the decline of ideological distinctiveness of political parties, mayhave been conducive to the success of the Fortuyn movement. The rationale underlying this reasoning isvery straightforward. The ideological convergence between the main parties creates room to manoeuvrefor new parties on the wings of the party system, and makes it harder for voters to distinguish between


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the offered alternatives (Pennings and Keman 2003: 53). This increases the likelihood that voters willprefer a newcomer instead of the main established parties who have become look-alikes. Using data onrelative emphasis of issues in party manifesto’s, Pennings and Keman claim that “there has beenconsiderable convergence between 1977 and 2003 in terms of left and right” of the main political parties(Pennings and Keman 2003: 56). This convergence makes the established parties more vulnerable tonewcomers and challengers. Analysing a second dimension of ideological polarisation, Pennings andKeman draw the conclusion that the main parties since 1977 have made a simultaneous move towardsmore conservative profiles, making Dutch parties less distinguishable to the electorate. The combinationof the collective move towards conservatism and the decreasing left-right distances has led to theobfuscation of differences between political parties, in turn leading to the rise in electoral volatility whichwas a necessary though not sufficient condition for the success of the Fortuyn movement.

The problem with this approach is that it only explains new political parties at the fringes of the politicalspectrum (where an ‘ideological space’ is created), while the emergence of more moderate and centristpolitical parties can not be explicated. It is therefore that we seek to combine the three approaches, inwhich the systemic-institutional factors will first be used for a ‘blanket’ analysis of the emergence ofpolitical parties. Thereafter we will analyse to what extent more temporal aspects (such as the level ofideological convergence or polarisation) can explain the pattern of emergence of more radical andextremist political competitors. We will also assess the effect of voter turnout and electoral volatility onthe emergence of new parties. Finally, in order to increase the explanatory power of our new model, wewill include the level of political cynicism in order to explain the emergence of specific types of politicalparties (in particular neo-populist parties).

A systemic approach: thresholds and disproportionality

From a systemic point of view it can be argued that more or less formal institutional characteristics of aparty system exert influence on the chances for new parties to emerge. If, for some reason, electoraloutcomes have little or no meaning for the fate of political parties, new challenger parties may seize theopportunity to make an electoral appeal. The newly emerging parties could thus be seen as a response tolimited party competition. Katz and Mair, clearly state that limited party competition can create a windowof opportunity for the emergence of new parties: “One particular rallying cry, which seems common tomany new parties and which seems particularly effective in mobilizing support is their demand to 'breakthe mould' of established parties [...] The cartel parties are often unwittingly providing precisely theammunition with which the new protesters of the right can more effectively wage their wars” (Katz andMair 1995: 24).

Bartolini (1999; 2000) identifies both systemic factors (vulnerability and contestability) and factors relatedto the political opportunity structure as determinants of the nature and level of party competition. On asystemic level, vulnerability, refers to the expected change that results from elections. The level ofvulnerability is influenced by the proportionality of the electoral system. Proportionality of the electoralsystem indicates the extent to which the dispersion of the popular vote relates to the allocation of seats inparliament, and subsequently the power constellation in parliament and government. Proportional systemsincrease the possibilities of new political parties to enter parliament (if no effective electoral thresholdexists). In a disproportional system people tend not to vote for small parties, because they know that avote for a small party is likely to be ‘wasted’ (Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 2001: 323).


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However, the argument could also be reversed: highly disproportional systems limit the likelihood thatelectoral shifts make a difference for the allocations of seats. This limits the level of party competition andincreases the likelihood that new political parties emerge. The lack of competition between the establishedparties can trigger the emergence of new political competitors.

Harmel and Robertson indeed find that the systemic factors that might inhibit new party success do notinhibit new party formation. “Ironically, those systems that have produced the largest number of newparties are least likely to reward those parties with votes and seats” (Harmel and Robertson 1985: 517).Their findings foster the paradoxical expectation that limited party competition in terms of contestabilityand vulnerability creates barriers for the entry into parliament of new political parties while at the sametime it increases the likelihood of new party emergence. Harmel and Robertson therefore suggest to thinkof new parties as falling into two categories: contender parties which have the perception that they can beelectoral successful and promoter parties who realise that their chances of electoral success are not very highbut who want to bring attention to a particular issue or cause. In the light of the relation between partycompetition and the emergence of new political parties, it makes sense to study both the emergence of newparties and their electoral success. However, in this paper we merely focus on the frequency of emergenceof new parties.

Empirical analysis of systemic factors

Since the purpose of this part of our analysis is to determine to what extent systemic features exert aninfluence on the likelihood of the emergence of new parties, we adopt a rather broad definition of newpolitical parties disregarding their ideological content or electoral strategies. Any genuinely neworganisation that appoints, for the first time, candidates at a general election to the system’s representativeassembly will be considered a new party1.

Table 1 Electoral thresholds and the emergence of new parties

Effective Electoral Threshold

Low High Total

No new parties 63 % (51) 65 % (11) 63 % (62)

One or more newparties

37 % (30) 35 % (6) 37 % (36)

Total 100 % (81) 100 % (17) 100 % (98)

Table displays occurrence of new political parties in systems with low or highelectoral thresholds, where thresholds below the average (5.40) in the dataset areconsidered ‘low’. Percentages are calculated per column, figures in parentheses areabsolute numbers of observations (elections).

Table 1 shows that our expectations regarding the influence of electoral thresholds on the emergence ofnew political parties are not confirmed by the data. There is no distinctive pattern indicating a relationbetween the electoral threshold and the emergence of new parties. The data presented do not allow for a

1 The proposed systemic explanation does not allow for a selection of new parties on – for example – the basisof their electoral strategy, as this would lead to a confusion of explanatory and dependent factors.


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confirmation of either of the two mechanisms described above. Although the limitation of partycompetition resulting from high thresholds does not seem to produce more new parties it cannot bestated either that high thresholds constrain the emergence of newcomers.Another formal-institutional feature likely to limit party competition and foster popular dissatisfactionwith the competition is the disproportionality between the votes gained by parties and the seats attributedto them.

Table 2 Vote-seat disproportionality and the emergence of new political parties

Disproportionality

Low High Total

No new parties 70 % (44) 56 % (23) 64 % (67)


30 % (19) 44 % (18) 36 % (37)

Total 100 % (63) 100 % (41) 100 % (104)

Table displays occurrence of new political parties in systems with low or high vote-seat disproportionality, where disproportionality below the average (5.46) in thedataset is considered ‘low’. Percentages are calculated per column, figures inparentheses are absolute numbers of observations (elections).

More proportional electoral systems do not lead to significantly more new political parties thandisproportional systems. In fact, the data on the emergence of new political parties in relation to vote-seatdisproportionality confirms the expectation that new parties are more likely to emerge in party systemswith disproportional electoral systems where electoral competition may be more limited. The table showsthat the emergence of one or more new political parties is more likely in systems with highdisproportionality. These systems have seen the emergence of new parties in 44 percent of the elections,against 30 percent in elections with more proportional electoral systems. It seems as if a limitation of partycompetition does create an incentive for new parties to emerge, although the data presented here do notaccount for all new parties.

Political opportunity structure: convergence and polarisation

Apparently a systemic analysis can not provide us with a satisfactory explanation for the emergence ofnew political parties. Therefore we shall complement the systemic analysis here with data relating to thepolitical opportunity structure, especially with regard to the level of ideological polarisation between theparties.

Katz and Mair claim that “parties need not be in competition for survival in the same way they oncecompeted to determine policy. [...] It is in this sense that the conditions become ideal for the formation ofa cartel, in which all parties share in resources and in which all survive” (Katz and Mair 1995: 16). Thecartel model describes the interpenetration of parties and the state and the increasing collusion andcooperation between competitors (Krouwel 2004). Bartolini also underlines that party collusion is rationalparty behaviour: “in perfect electoral competition parties are supposed to converge toward the medianvoter and in the end their offers will be exactly the same. (...) [T]he closer we approach perfect


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competition, the more likely it is that collusion would be a rational behaviour for parties” (Bartolini 2000:34). The decline in party distinctiveness diminishes competition by limiting decidability, the extent to whichvoters can distinguish party differences. A lack of visible distinctiveness of parties makes the decision ofthe voter difficult, or even meaningless. It can also lead to voters seeking (new and more radical) partiesthat can be distinguished ideologically or programmatically. We therefore expect convergence among themain political parties to increase the chances for the emergence of new political parties.

Empirical analysis of opportunity structure as an explanation

In order to test this expectation we created a measure of convergence of political parties on thedimensions of left versus right and progressive versus conservative. This measure is based on data fromthe Manifesto Research Group (MRG). The manifesto research group approaches the ideological profileof political parties through the content of the party manifestos. In the manifesto research project eachstatement in a manifesto is classified into one of 54 categories, distinguishing between positive andnegative references to the topic. This allows the researchers to calculate the percentage of statementsreferring to that category. The categories are distinguished by direction and topic, allowing for a detailedaccount of the relative emphasis a party puts on different topics.Grouping the topics that could be labelled ‘left’ and ‘right’ and deducting the percentage of left emphasesfrom the percentage of right emphases results in a left-right scale that theoretically ranges from –100(party manifesto consists for 100% of references to left issues) to +100 (party manifesto consists for100% of references to right issues). In a similar fashion a scale is calculated to measure changes on theprogressive-conservative dimension of political polarisation. The range of the two summed up scales forthe main political parties, having at least five per cent of the votes, is then compared between elections todetermine the occurrence of convergence or divergence among the main parties. We assume that votersperceive party competition to be largely determined by these main parties.Table 3 indicates that new political parties are more likely to emerge if there is convergence among themain political parties. 29 Per cent of the elections in which parties polarised compared to the previouselections displayed the emergence of new political parties. This percentage is 42 per cent for electionswhere the main parties converged programmatically. It should be noted though, that when we look atappendix 1 there is no clear pattern of the type of new party (in terms of their ideological andprogrammatic position) emerges, while we would expect the new parties emerging as a response toconvergence to be situated at the fringes of a party system.

Table 3 Convergence of main parties and the emergence of new political parties

Ideological polarisation

Polarisation Convergence Total

No new parties 71 % (36) 58 % (21) 66 % (57)


29 % (15) 42 % (15) 34 % (30)

Total 100 % (51) 100 % (36) 100 % (87)

Table displays occurrence of new political parties in systems with divergence andthose with convergence, compared to previous elections. Percentages arecalculated per column, italics are absolute numbers of observations.


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A sociological approach: changes within the electorate

Having explored the explanatory power of the systemic approach and the influence of the politicalopportunity structure on the emergence of new parties we now focus on a more sociological approach. Bylooking at what Bartolini labels availability we consider the ability and willingness of voters to switchbetween parties. The Downsian approach of voters as rational actors that choose a policy alternative thatbest matches their preferences (Downs 1957) is somewhat beneath the actual political reality. Voters donot always switch between parties if they do not agree with its current policy position. The willingness ofvoters to switch between parties is affected by the way the voters are encapsulated by party organisationsand the identification they have with a party. The ‘available voter’, defined as a voter who is willing toreview and eventually change his party preference, may provide an incentive for new political parties toemerge.Obviously, if it is clear that no (or few) voters are willing to change their party preference, there is hardlyany incentive for new political parties to emerge. Even a promoter party, that wants to bring attention to aparticular issue or cause without necessarily aiming for electoral success, is unlikely to achieve its goals if itis on forehand clear the party will have no electoral success. Promoter parties do not have representationas their primary goal, but they nevertheless need a certain level of electoral support if they want to drawattention to their cause. It is therefore to be expected that electoral volatility will favour the emergence ofnew political parties. Electoral volatility, especially between party-blocs, indicates discontent of voters withthe political parties in power and thereby the availability of those voters. At the same time switchingbetween parties is not the only option for a discontent voter. The real exit-option consists of abstention. Itis therefore expected that the combination of electoral volatility and low turnout rates indicate populardiscontent with the current (main) parties, favouring the emergence of new political parties.Again, the Netherlands provides a telling example of the influence the combination of declining turnoutrates and increasing volatility (both total and between blocs) have on the emergence of new politicalparties. The 1994 elections saw the emergence of two new parties together gaining eight seats, at a timeturnout rates declined and volatility between blocs increased. As Pennings and Keman argue too,competition in the Netherlands in the 1990s was limited in several aspects. The cabinets preceding the2002 elections comprised parties from the left and the right side of the political spectrum, which hadpreviously excluded each other as coalition partners (Pennings and Keman 2003: 52). This makes a strongcase for the expectation that new political parties emerge as a response to limited party competition andthat discontent voters see two real options: abstention, or voting for a new political party.It should be noted however, that the relation between electoral volatility and the emergence of newpolitical parties is not quite as straightforward as outlined above. It is to some extent tautological in naturebecause the choice of a voter to switch to a new party increases volatility, while volatility is alsoconsidered to indicate discontent and availability of voters, which in turn creates opportunities for newpolitical parties. At the same time we argue that the conditions for ‘effective’ competition require at leastmoderate electoral volatility because a complete lack thereof would take away an important incentive forparty responsiveness to the electorate. A party would have no reason to be responsive if the voter’s loyaltywere unconditional.

Empirical analysis of the sociological model: turnout and volatility

The results that have been outlined in the previous sections above suggest that the emergence of newpolitical parties is linked to decreasing levels of party competition. From this finding it is a small step tothe suggestion that new parties are a response to growing discontent among the electorate with thefunctioning of parties and party systems. Below, we draw some preliminary conclusions on the relation


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between changing electoral behaviour – more specifically increasing electoral volatility and decliningturnout rates – and the advent of new political parties.

Table 4 Volatility, turnout and the number of new political parties

New political parties

Total number In parliament

Electoral volatility .46 .41

Electoral turnout -.23 - . 17

Reported figures are correlations between the volatility / turnout and the number of new parties inan election year. Bold figures indicate that the significance level (t) is below one percent; Italicfigures indicate that the significance level (t) is below five percent.

Introducing the level of electoral volatility in a regression model would suggest a causal relation that canempirically not exist because electoral volatility results from the elections while the formation of newpolitical parties precedes them, necessitating the introduction of a time lag. But considering the pace atwhich politics change, a possible time lag of several years (one election period) is not feasible. The data onnew parties, turnout and volatility are therefore be compared for the same election year in order to allowfor some conclusions on the relation between the indicators of voting behaviour and the number of newparties, without claiming that these figures indicate a direct causal relation.Indeed there is a strong significant correlation between the level of electoral volatility and the number ofnew political parties. This is partly due to the somewhat tautological relation between volatility and newpolitical parties. A successful new political party will always cause increasing electoral volatility sincepeople vote for a party that did not exist before. But considering the fact that many new parties generallyhave only very limited electoral success, the overall results are indicative.Electoral turnout on the other hand does not appear to be similarly linked to the emergence and successof new political parties. The correlation is less high and so is the significance of the results. This isconfirmed by table 5, which shows that the likelihood of the emergence of new political parties is onlyslightly different between systems displaying low and high turnout rates.

Table 5 Electoral turnout and the emergence of new political parties

Electoral Turnout

Low High Total

No new parties 60 % (29) 68 % (38) 64 % (67)


40 % (19) 32 % (18) 36 % (37)

Total 100 % (48) 100 % (56) 100 % (104)

Table displays occurrence of new political parties in systems with low or highelectoral turnout, where turnouts below the average (84.36) in the dataset areconsidered ‘low’. Percentages are calculated per column, figures in parentheses areabsolute numbers of observations (elections).


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Although we have to be aware that decreasing turnout rates are widespread across Europe and need notbe directly related to the emergence of new political parties, we would like to stress that dissatisfied voters(with the traditional parties) have several options. The most likely is an exit-option, yet new partiesprovide another feasible option for discontent voters that previously abstained to return into theelectorate. Voters re-entering the electorate by voting for a new party would weaken the statisticalrelationship between electoral turnout and the emergence of new political parties. This reciprocal relationbetween turnout rates and the emergence of new parties should be kept in mind while reading table 5.However, we expect the key to understanding the emergence of new parties to be found in both thenature of the discontent of citizens and the alternative appeal that new parties bring into the party system.

Explaining the emergence of new parties

In the previous sections we have tried to explain the emergence of new political parties by means of threeapproaches, which can to some extent be linked in a ‘blanket’ explanation of the emergence of newpolitical parties in general. Some of the expectations have indeed been confirmed by the empirical data,but the results fail to provide a comprehensive explanation of the phenomenon of new political parties.The combined analysis of systemic factors, the evolving political opportunity structure and sociologicalchanges performed is able to explain only a very modest part of the emergence of new parties in Europebetween 1970 and 2000.

Table 6 Regression models of convergence, disproportionality and threshold onthe number of new political parties

Number of newpolitical parties

Effective threshold -.16

Vote-seat disproportionality .13

Convergence main parties -.06

Electoral volatility .39

Electoral turnout -.21

N 82

Adjusted R2 .21

Durbin-Watson 1.96

Reported figures are standardised regression coefficients between the variables and the number ofnew parties. Bold figures indicate that the significance level (t) is below five percent;

Table 6 shows the regression analysis of the five variables introduced in previous sections and the numberof new political parties. The main findings are that this model can only explain 21 per cent of the variationand most effects are statistically insignificant. However, since we do not generalise these findings to awider population, the other results are important in developing an explanatory model for the emergenceof new parties in Europe.

The systemic factors of our model (electoral thresholds and proportionality) do not stand the statisticaltest. Confirming our hypothesis that thresholds form a barrier to the emergence of new parties, this factor


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displays a negative relation with the number of new political parties: new parties are more likely appear insystems with low thresholds. The hypothesis that high thresholds limit party competition and therebyfoster the emergence of new parties does not seem to hold. Disproportionality shows a positive relationwith the number of new political parties, confirming the hypothesis that new parties emerge indisproportional systems where vulnerability is relatively low, while disproving the idea that moreproportional systems will lead to a larger number of new parties. The opportunity structure-model alsohas to be rejected. In the regression analysis the effect of convergence negative (while cross-tabulation intable seemed to show some positive effect). The sociological model seems to be the only model standingthe empirical test: electoral volatility is the only statistically significant factor in this model. This leads usagain to the conclusion that we need to expand our model in the direction of electoral choice of citizens.Understanding the motivations of voters that switch their support to a new party and the appeal thatthese new parties bring into the system is crucial in an explanatory model for the emergence of newparties. Below we attempt to formulate such a new explanatory model by linking specific political attitudesof citizens to the specific appeals of the various new types of political parties.

Political cynicism and the emergence of populist parties

As was shown in the analyses above, the three approaches above can only partly explain the pattern andfrequency of the emergence of new political parties in European party systems. Moreover, these ‘blanket’explanations are even less capable of explaining the emergence of specific types of political parties, inparticular populist parties.

Defining political cynicism

Political cynicism is a multi-dimensional concept (Baloyra 1979/1999; Citrin and Elkins 1999[1975]; Citrinand Luks 2000; Citrin and Muste 1999; Erber and Lau 1990; Litt 1963). Departing from the idea thatpolitical trust is the opposite of political cynicism (Citrin and Muste 1999), we argue that political cynicismconsists of two elements: a deep distrust in the motivations or intentions and competence of the politicalelite combined with a strong belief in one’s own political efficacy.First and foremost political cynicism refers to distrust in political institutions and power-holders (Citrinand Green 1986; Craig 1993). Cynics believe that most people but especially members of the elite aremotivated in their actions only by selfishness and they question the sincerity of people's motives andactions. The concept of political cynicism can be traced back to the Greek Republic, where political‘cynics’ claimed that all governments are corrupt. In their eyes, this made the political leadershipillegitimate and incompetent, and thus cynics concluded that the rulers did not represent them. Cynics seethe political elite as standing against the people, not as representatives of the people. Cynical citizensconsider the political elite as a separate body of self-interested actors that do what they want withoutregard for the general (or national) interest or the interests of the people. At best the traditional politicalelite will act for the good of society if it does not conflict with their own self-interest or continuates theircontrol of office.However, next to this deep distrust in the motivations and competences of the elite, cynics also belief intheir own competence to influence and intervene in the political process. This latter conviction that onecan influence the political elite or even ‘vote the rascals out’, and that one is able to make sound politicaljudgements for themselves differentiates the cynic from the alienated citizen. Alienated and cynicalcitizens share the opinion that the political elite can not be trusted to act in the interest of the people andthat the elite is not competent to solve the problems that the people face, but the alienated believe that


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they can not change this situation. Cynics, on the other hand, do believe that they can change theirpolitical fortune by participating in the political system or by supporting anti-establishment politicians.

The trust factor of cynicism

Trust is relational, meaning that in trusting somebody else or a collective body or institution, a personmakes him- or herself vulnerable to others. In that sense trust is not unconditional, because only a foolwould trust every individual, all collectives and all institutions. Most people trust only specific individuals,certain collective bodies and institutions in certain specific social domains (Levi and Stoker 2000). Trust isalso relative, not totally dichotomous. Only seldom will we encounter people who trust a politician, apolitical party or a political institution for the full hundred percent. Citizens have a certain level of trust inspecific political actors, collectives and institutions, mainly based on prior experiences with them. Thismeans that the level of trust can change over time, depending on the encounters and experiences citizenshave with politicians, collective intermediary organisations and institutions. The ‘trustworthiness’ ofpersons, groups and institutions thus depends on specific attributes that they possess which assures thetrusters that they will not be betrayed.These attributes can be divided into two categories. The first category of attributes refers to theperformance of individuals, collectives or institutions in accordance with the normative expectations heldby the public (Miller and Listhaug 1999; Miller 1974a). This moral dimension taps into the judgementsabout integrity of the trusted as perceived by the truster (Citrin and Muste 1999): is the actor committedto act in the interest of the truster, is the actor motivated by the interests of the truster rather than his orher own interest, is the actor reliable in terms of keeping its promise and being predictable and consistentin its behaviour. The second category of attributes bear on the judgements and evaluations ofcompetence of the actors. On this dimension of competence trust is dependent on whether the trusted isseen as capable of acting and doing a certain thing (that has been promised to the trusters), and whetherthe actor is perceived as efficient, effective, able, skilful and productive in bringing about the policies andthe results that the trusters expect. In sum, the trust-factor within cynicism has two dimensions: a moraldimension and a dimension of competence. Next to these, cynicism also incorporates a two-dimensionalefficacy-factor.

The efficacy-factor of cynicism

In the literature there is a consensus that trust and efficacy are distinct concepts (Citrin and Green 1986;Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990; Miller 1974b; Robinson and Shaver 1999). Political efficacy in general refersto the belief that citizens can have an influence on the political process (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller1954). Balch (1974) distinguishes an internal and an external component of efficacy (see also Craig andMaggiotto 1981). The internal component taps the belief in one’s own competence to understand andparticipate in politics. Internal efficacy signifies that people believe that they can influence the politicalprocess because they are able to make sound political judgements for themselves and are able and justifiedin voicing these opinions and acting upon them. The external component relates to the conviction thatpeople can evaluate the actions and motivations of the political elite and, crucially, that one can influencethe political elite and change their course of action. External efficacy means that people believe thatgovernmental authorities and institutions will be responsive to citizens demands and wishes. Thus, similarto the trust-factor, we consider the efficacy-factor of political cynicism also as a two-dimensionalphenomenon.


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Political distrust (or cynicism) and the rise of populism

The literature on the effects of political trust has come up with several, sometimes contradictory, findings(for an overview see Levi and Stoker 2000). In terms of trust, the literature distinguishes betweenincumbent-oriented and system-oriented types of (dis)trust. Political distrust is detrimental for society andthe polity if it is focussed on the entire system, but on distrust of individual actors, collectives orinstitutions the findings are disputed. Most authors conclude that trust-judgements are partisan andoriented towards incumbent actors. That is, people trust the government less when they didn’t vote forthe particular current power holders. Furthermore, trust evaluations are influenced by the dissatisfactionwith the current policies and performance, as well as the evaluation of the leader qualities of theincumbents.

In line with our argument of the link between cynicism and the rise of populism, the literature also findsan empirical link between a combination of political distrust with efficacy and participation (Craig andMaggiotto 1981; Luks and Citrin 1997; Miller 1974b; Tarrow 2000). Certain types of political activism arelinked to political distrust. An important finding is that distrust of specific authorities can become generaland this long-held generalised distrust of government can become an independent determinant of politicalattitudes and activities (Easton 1975; Sigelman, Sigelman, and Walkosc 1992). This shows that trust (andcynicism) is conditional and relative, as well as subject to change over time. It also suggests that (dis)trustcan be used in the mobilisation of voters, which – as we argue below – is precisely what populist actorsdo. Evidence from the USA furthermore suggests that distrusting citizens are more likely to vote an anti-incumbent and that distrust becomes particularly consequential for voting when one of the candidatesemphasizes anti-government themes. Those who evaluate the incumbent government as untrustworthywill more likely participate in the election when they have the option to vote for an “outsider” candidate(Luks and Citrin 1997). Populist politicians and their electoral organisations are ‘political outsiders’ inseveral ways: they can not be easily placed into the traditional party families in terms of their ideology andgenetic origin, they are not part of the political establishment or even actively excluded from any formalpower. This fits with our explanatory model for the rise of populism.

We expect populism to arise in a situation where the incumbent government is distrusted by a substantialnumber of citizens that nevertheless feel politically competent (have political efficacy) to voice theirdisapproval and dissent. A populist political entrepreneur taps precisely this combination of politicalefficacy among voters and their distrust and dissatisfaction with the incumbent elite, as well as the distrustin the intermediary collectives (particularly political parties) and the institutions that the incumbent eliteutilise (Craig 1993; Hayward 1996a, 1996b; Kitschelt 2002; Linz 2002; Norris 1999). Populists presentthemselves as outsiders that can oust the incumbent elite, sweep the institutions clean of corruption andincompetence and deliver what the people really want.

However, populist not only passively tap existing levels of distrust in combination with efficacy. Becauseof its anti-establishment stance and its rhetoric against the institutions of representative democracy,populist mobilisation also boosts the level of distrust and thereby creates a dynamic process in which theexisting institutional framework loses its legitimacy (in terms of mass support). Populists feed the idea thatthe incumbent elite is incompetent and untrustworthy and that ‘the people’ are competent to dosomething about it: namely vote the populist into office. In order to clarify this point we will devote somewords to the ideology and strategy of populist actors.


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Populism as a political ideology

Populism departs from the idea of the sovereignty of the people, in which ‘the people’ are seen as theultimate and only source of legitimation for political power. Departing from this concept, populistideology incorporates two crucial dimensions (see also de Raadt, Hollanders and Krouwel 2004). On thefirst dimension, emphasising the ‘peoples souvereignty’, populists express dissatisfaction with existingmodes of elite-mass intermediation and the desire to abandon the intermediaries that stand betweencitizens and rulers (Kitschelt 2002: 179). Populists are dissatisfied with the ‘horizontal’ guarantees ofconstitutional democracy and want to strengthen the direct ‘vertical’ ties between rulers and ruled. Theynot only perceive the intermediary structures and organisations as standing in the way of the clearexpression of the will of the people, but also as a mechanism through which and unrepresentative,incompetent and corrupt elite is recruited and is able to maintain power. Intermediary institutions such aspolitical parties rob the people of their opportunity to elect their leaders directly or to put issues on thepolitical agenda that concern the real interests of the people. Populists will therefore argue for more directexpressions of the will of the people and more direct forms of allocating political authority and mandates.In addition, populists express a preference for singular leadership rather than collective bodies ofauthoritative decision-making.This preference for singularity of authority and mandate derives from the second dimension of populistideology: the perception of ‘a unified and monistic people’. Populists argue that the traditional elite notonly misrepresent the people, but they also divide and segregate the people by insisting on ‘representing’specific social groups. Populist denounce this divisive pluralist view of the people and present ‘the people’as a unified and monistic entity. The emphasis by the traditional elite on social cleavages divides thepeople among one another and robs them of their opportunity to voice their common interest. Inaddition, populists also claim that the idea of pluralism that the traditional elite put forward is a false one:the traditional elite itself forms a homogeneous unity and is thus neither democratic nor representative. Itmerely uses the divisive and undemocratic intermediary institutions to obstruct the direct expression ofthe will of the sovereign people.

Populism and cynicism

It is now clear to see how the populist ideology can tap into political cynicism and reinforce it: cynicalcitizens combine distrust of political actors, groups and institutions with a sense of political efficacy, whilepopulists argue that the incumbent elite can not be trusted in its commitment and competence to servethe real interests of the people. It is therefore crucial to construct a measurement-tool to tap the two-dimensional concept of political cynicism within the electorate and analyse whether our hypothesis thatcynical voters will vote for populist politicians is correct.

A first step is to distinguish the cynical voter (with a sense of efficacy and distrust of the elite) from otherpossible voter-types. On the basis of our two-dimensional trust factor (trust in the morality of the eliteand its competence) and the two-dimensional efficacy-factor (internal and external efficacy) we candistinguish four basic types of voters. At one end of the scale we can find the ‘confident’, a citizen whotrusts the elite to have moral integrity and competence in running the affairs of the state. In addition, a‘confident’ also believes in his or her own capacity to influence the political decision-making process andin the responsiveness of the elite to the interests and demands of citizens. On the other extreme end ofthe scale we encounter the ‘alienated’ citizen, who has no trust whatsoever in the moral integrity andcompetence of the elite. Furthermore, alienated citizens also believe that they do not have the capability toinfluence the political decision-making process and that they can do nothing to make the elite responsive.


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Two intermediary types are the aforementioned cynic (not trusting the elite but having a sense of efficacy)and the subservient. The subservient citizen trusts the elite to be morally integer and competent to handlethe affairs of the state, but he or she does not feel competent nor able to intervene in the democraticdecision-making process. In table 7 we have summarised these four types of voters.

Table 7 A Typology of Voter-types

Voter type Trust inmorality

Trust incompetence

Internal efficacy Externalefficacy

Confident + + + +

Subservient + + - -

Cynic - - + +

Alienated - - - -

If our model is correct, we will find that voters basically falling into the cynical category to vote forpopulists more frequently than the other types of voters. Alienated citizens will not bother to vote as heyneither feel competent to act, nor expect the elite to be responsive, integer or competent. For them itdoes not matter who controls the state. A subservient will not vote for new parties, and certainly not forpolitical outsiders such as populists, because they are satisfied with the way in which the traditional elitesare conducting their business. Moreover, they do not feel that they can independently judge and act in apolitically relevant manner so a populist will have little appeal to them. Confidents will not vote for apopulist either. Not only are they convinced of the moral integrity of the traditional elite and do not wishto replace them, they also feel that their political evaluations are relevant and that the incumbents will beresponsive and cater their needs.

Conc lus ionIn this paper we have tested several ‘blanket’-explanations for the emergence of political parties. Neithersystemic factors, nor sociological or political opportunity models adequately explain the pattern ofemergence of new political parties across Europe. We suggest a new explanatory model for the emergenceof specific types of political parties. Focussing primarily on populist parties, we incorporated the conceptof political cynicism in our model. We would like to focus the discussion on the definition andmeasurement of political cynicism. Particularly our two-dimensional operationalisation of the twocomponents of cynicism (trust and efficacy) are crucial to our explanatory model for the emergence andsuccess of new parties of the populist type. We would also like to address the issue which indicators(items) in election surveys we can utilize to distinguish between voters on the basis of our four-foldtypology.


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