experience with short notice (snri) and unannounced (ui ... · so informs ssm of inspector arrival...

Experience with short notice (SNRI) and unannounced (UI) inspections in Sweden

Elisabeth André TurlindAnd

Göran DahlinSection of Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM)

ContentsSwedish facilities and fuel cycleAdditional Protocol in SwedenIntegrated Safeguards in SwedenExperiencesSummaryElisabeth André Turlind and Göran Dahlin, SSM, ESARDA/INMM Oct 20112

Swedish RadiationSafety Authority,SSM.

270 employee,9 in safeguards.

DG Ministry of Environment

Elisabeth André Turlind and Göran Dahlin, SSM, ESARDA/INMM Oct 20113

Facilities and Material in Sweden10 NPP (LWR)1 central intermediate storage for spent fuel, (25 000 FA), Clab

1 LEU Fuel fabrication plant (900 t/year), Westinghouse1 research facility, Studsvik1 uranium recovery facility, Ranstad


Facilities and Material (cont.)~25 minor facilities1 control rod fabrication facility, Westinghouse1 Zr-tube fabrication facility, Sandviken2 closed down NPP, Barsebäck 1-2Encapsulation plant, Clink ~year 2027Geological repository, Forsmark ~year 2027Depleted, Natural, LEU, HEU (~1 kg),Pu (~3 kg) and Th (~2,5 t)Elisabeth André Turlind and Göran Dahlin, SSM, ESARDA/INMM Oct 20115

Fuel cycle in Sweden


Import UF6, FA

Export FA, rodsControl rodsZr-tubesGraphite

FINAL REPOSITORY

Safeguards history in Sweden1972 Trilateral agreement IAEA – US – Sweden

-May 1972 first IAEA inspection in Sweden

1974 SKI responsible for Swedish SSAC1975 IAEA Agreement (INFCIRC/234)1995 Sweden joins EU – Euratom Treaty

IAEA Agreement INFCIRC/234 => INFCIRC/193

1994-6 Field trials under 93+2



Sweden during the SSS and 93+2Increased use of SSAC– Inspections by national inspectors– Exchange of surveillance media– Common review at SKI HQ with IAEA inspectors

Expanded declarationIncreased information flow– Weekly ICRs– Weekly production plans for the FFP

Unannounced inspectionsRemote monitoringEnvironmental sampling

9

Safeguards history (cont.)

1998 The Additional Protocol (AP) signed2004 AP enters into force2005 The new Euratom safeguards regulation2008 New SKI regulation (SKIFS 2008:1, now SSMFS 2008:3)2009 Integrated Safeguards (IS) in Sweden


IS approach in Sweden

NPP - SNRI with 24 h notice (at least 2-3 per year for 10 NPP tot)- PIV (pre- and post-PIV)

Clab and Research facility (Studsvik)- UI (at least 1 per facility and year)- PIV


IS appraoch (cont.)

LEU Fuel Fabrication facility (Westinghouse)- SNRI with 24 h notice (at least 1 per year ,48 h retention

time)- COM at least 3 SNRI per year- Mailbox system- PIV


IS approach (cont.)

Barsebäck and Uranium recovery facility (Ranstad)- PIV (DIV)

Minor facilities- 1 PIV (at 1 facility every 4-6 years)

Also:CA when necessary – 2 h or 24 h notice


Preparations for ISMeetings with IAEA and European CommissionInformation to the facilitiesMeeting with the Ministry of EnvironmentSetting up the SSM organisation


IS organisationSSM participates in all IAEA inspections/CAsSSM Point of ContactSSM Site representative– SSM receives all information necessesary– SSM compiles the information in AP format– SSM forwards declarations to IAEA and/or EU-COM



IS organisation at SSMOne communication line for all inspection/CA noticesNotice received in two mobiles, a dedicated email address and a faxOne inspector on alert every week

16

IS organisation for UI at Clab and Studsvik

IAEA inspectors informs IAEA HQ before entering the security gateIAEA HQ sends urgent fax to SSMIAEA arrives at security gateGuard checks IAEA documentation and contacts the facility Safeguard Office, SOSO informs SSM of inspector arrival

SSM contacts IAEA HQ for confirmationElisabeth André Turlind and Göran Dahlin, SSM, ESARDA/INMM Oct 201117

IS organisation for UI at Clab and Studsvik (cont’d)

SSM inspector leaves immediately– Time to Studsvik ~ 2 hours– Time to Clab ~ 4-5 hours

Clab have two prepared blank access cards for use by IAEA for smooth accessIAEA enters the facility within 2 hoursIAEA gets requested documentationIf needed IAEA can freeze the situation by applying sealsVerification activities can start when SSM arrivesElisabeth André Turlind and Göran Dahlin, SSM, ESARDA/INMM Oct 201118

Experiences34 CA/SNRI/UI so farGood (on the whole, improving as more experience is gained)Facilities well informedSite definition for Clab had to be changedSSM organize prepardeness for UI/SNRI- one week at a time, ~6 month ahead- dedicated telephone/number, fax and e-mail- SSM participates in all IAEA inspections/CAs


Experiences (cntd)Some details failed- Training- Information/Communication- Procedures not clear- Inspector competence in the beginning- Access problems(new areas, people and snow)- Sometimes to optimistic plan by IAEA for CA- Fuel fabrication - Mailbox problems- UI on a national holiday- SNRI during core loading = problems


Summary

Good preparations/information/training necessaryImportant with inspector knowledge on ISVital with a proper organization – preparednessSite definition importantCommunication/information vitalFewer inspections can be a risk


Thank you for your attention!


experience with short notice (snri) and unannounced (ui ... · so informs ssm of inspector arrival...

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