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ExecutiveSummaryAttheendofWorldWarII,theUnitedStatesandtheSovietUniontransformedfromalliesintoadversariesandtheColdWarbegan—agrimconfrontationthatlastednearlyhalfacentury.AftertheColdWar,theU.S.–Russianrelationshipwasbynomeansanalliance,butwasrelativelycooperativeuntilthepastfewyears.UnderRussianpresidentVladimirPutin,anewchillhasdescended,andtodaythereistalkthatweareenteringanotherColdWar.ThisessayexaminesanearliererainU.S.–Russianaffairs,whenpresidentsFranklinDelanoRooseveltandHarryS.TrumanmanagedAmerica’srelationshipwiththeSovietUnion,whichessentiallymeantdealingwiththeSovietpremier,JosephStalin.Thecontentsofthatrelationship—howitevolved,howitdisintegrated,andhowAmericanleaders—reactedisthesubjectofthisessay.GiventheunsettledstateofU.S.–Russianrelationstodayandthemanysubplotsthatshapecurrentpolicy,thispapermakesnoattempttoapplyhistoricallessonstothemanagementofcontemporaryproblems;theseareleftforthereadertoinfer.Rather,weexamineanearlier,thoughnotnecessarilysimpler,erainwhichtheU.S.–Russianrelationshipunderwentdramaticchange.

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Introduction

RussiahasbeenuneasyinitsencounterswiththeWestforathousandyears.ThedistinguishedAmericanscholarofRussiancultureJamesH.Billington1observesthatlittlehas“disturbedRussiansmore[overthecenturies]thanthenatureoftheirrelationshiptotheWest.”2Historically,RussiahasswungbetweenembracingandrejectingWesterncultureandvalues,feelingalternatelysuperiortoandhumiliatedbythepowerandprogressoftheWestandopeningandshuttingthedoorstoengagement,alliance,andconflict.StephenKotkin3findsacyclicalnatureinRussia’sencounterswiththeWest:“RussiangovernmentshavegenerallyoscillatedbetweenseekingclosertieswiththeWestandrecoilinginfuryatperceivedslights,withneithertendencyabletoprevailpermanently.”4Seldomisaclear-cutstanceadopted;someblendofconfrontationandcooperationhasbeentheperpetualnorm.Asidefrompurelygeopoliticalconsiderations,RussiahasfoundreasontoopposetheWestonideologicalgrounds,whetherbefore,during,andaftertheCommunistera.Historically,RussianshavenurturedasenseofspecialdestinyandembracedideologiesflatteringtothenotionofRussiansuperiorityinstateandculture;thispenchantremainstruetoday.5ARussianstatevauntingitspreeminencewouldnotbeamajorchallengetoAmericaninterestsifRussiaweremerelyamarginalplayeringlobalaffairs.ButRussiaisatremendousnationstretchingfromAtlantictoPacific,anaggressive

1JamesH.BillingtonretiredasLibrarianofCongressafteralmostthirtyyearsandtaughthistoryatHarvardandPrinceton.2JamesH.Billington,TheIconandtheAxe:AnInterpretiveHistoryofRussianCulture(NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,1966),p.78.3StephenKotkin,aprofessoratPrincetonandseniorfellowattheHooverInstitutionatStanford,isworkingonamulti-volumereappraisalofStalin.Thefirstvolume,Stalin:ParadoxesofPower(1878-1928),waspublishedbyPenguinPressin2014.Thesecond,Stalin:WaitingforHitler(1929-1941),waspublishedbyPenguinPressin2017.Athirdvolumeisinprogress.3JamesH.Billington,TheIconandtheAxe:AnInterpretiveHistoryofRussianCulture(NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,1966),p.78.4StephenKotkin,“Russia’sPerpetualGeopolitics:PutinReturnstotheHistoricalPattern,”ForeignAffairs(May/June2016),p.4.5ForbackgroundontheroleofideologyincontemporaryRussianaffairs,seeFionaHillandCliffordG.Gaddy,Mr.Putin:OperativeintheKremlin(WashingtonD.C.:BrookingsInstitutionPress,2013);CharlesClover,BlackWind,WhiteSnow:TheRiseofRussia’sNewNationalism(NewHaven,Conn.:YaleUniversityPress,2016);andSvetlanaAlexievich,SecondhandTime:TheLastoftheSoviets,translatedbyBelaShayevich(NewYork:RandomHouse,2016).

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playerinworldaffairs,and,critically,astatewithformidablemilitaryprowess.6FDRrealizedandworkedwiththesecapabilitiesduringWorldWarII;HarryTrumancopedwiththemafterwards.U.S.–RussianRelationsBeforetheSecondWorldWar

ItisanimportantbuteasilyoverlookedthatwhileAmericanandRussianinterestshavedivergedfrequentlyinthefirsthundred-and-thirty-sevenyearsoftherelationship,andwhilehardnegotiationsonvitalissuesmayoftenhaveseemedendless,twoimportantprinciplesinU.S.–Russiannegotiationsemergedovertime.First,dealsintheinterestsofAmericacouldbestruck,oftenonAmerica’sterms,althoughtheprocesswastortuous.Andsecond,oncedealswerestruck,Russiatendedtohonoritscommitments.Theserulesofthumbcanbeseeninareviewofthefollowingencounters.AmericanRelationswithTsaristRussiaAtthedirectionoftheContinentalCongressin1781,FrancisDanaledthefirstAmericanmissiontoRussia,seekingsupportforAmerica’swarofindependence.Danawasunsuccessfulinsecuringformalcommitments,butbypursuinganexistinginterpretationofneutrality,CatherinetheGreat’sgovernmenttacitlysupportedtheAmericancause.7Thiswasnoactofidealism,butacoldcalculationofhowAmericanmighthelpRussiageopolitically.6Today’sRussiandouble-eagleflag(resurrectedfromthetsaristera)fliesoverthelargestcontiguousterritoryintheworld—acountryspanningeleventimezonesandover135languages(aboutafourthofwhichhavesomestatusinofficialbusiness),peopledby185ethnicgroups(thoughroughlyeightypercentareethnicallyRussian).Russia’spopulationof145millionwasinsteepdeclineduringthe1990stomid2000s,buthasexperiencedanuncertainrecoverysince2009.AlthoughbyworldstandardsRussiahasaweakeconomy,basedlargelyonoilandnaturalgas,itispowerfulmilitarilyandAmerica’sonlypeercompetitorinnuclearweapons—alegacyoftheColdWar.7In1780,CatherinetheGreatinitiatedtheLeagueofArmedNeutralitytoprovideacounterweighttoBritishpowerandtoprotectRussiancommercefromtheBritishwartimepolicyofunlimitedsearchofneutralshippingforFrenchcontraband.FrancisDanawasunderinstructionstoseekRussianrecognitionoftherebellionandtogainAmericanadmittanceintotheLeague.FredKaplanwrites:“Dana’sownmissionwentpoorly.TheFrenchminister,underinstructionsfromParis,playedadoublegame.HeopenlyadvocatedthattheRussiancourtacceptDana’scredentials.BehindthesceneshediscouragedRussiafromrecognitionof,letalonealliancewith,theUnitedStates.Catherinealsohadgametoplay.SheneededtomaintainheralliancewithFrance,keepPrussiaatbay,andmaintainabalanceagainstBritishnavalpower,whichwasdamagingneutralcommerce.ThiswasnotapropitioustimefortheinitiationofrelationsbetweenRussiaandAmerica.”FredKaplan,JohnQuincyAdams:AmericanVisionary(NewYork,NY:Harper,2014),p.49.Thus,themostCatherinecoulddowastacitlysupporttheAmericans.

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Afterwinningindependence,AmericaestablishedformaldiplomatictieswithRussiain1807,and—exceptforabriefinterregnumfrom1917to1933—hasmaintaineduninterrupteddiplomaticrelations,nomatterhowfraughtthetimes.RussiaofferedtohelpmediateanendtotheWarof1812ontermsacceptabletotheUnitedStates,butwithdrewwhenBritaindeclinedRussianinvolvement.Severaldecadeslater,RussiarefusedtojoinBritainandFranceintheireffortstoimposeanegotiatedsettlementfavorabletotheSouthintheAmericanCivilWar.Foritspart,AmericaadoptedapolicyofneutralityfavoringRussiaintheCrimeanWarof1853to1856.WashingtonsuppliedRussiawithnavalshipsandweaponsduringtheRusso–TurkishWartwodecadeslaterandwasthefirstforeignpowertorecognizethenewprovisionalRussiangovernmentwhenthelasttsar,NicholasII,abdicatedinMarch1917.WhentheUnitedStatesenteredWorldWarIamonthlateronthesideoftheEntentepowers,itbecameformallyalliedwithRussia,albeitbriefly,untiltheBolshevikrevolutioninOctoberendedthealliance.AlthoughAmericaatthetimeofindependencewasgeographicallyremotefromRussia,theirproximitychangedasAmericaexpandedwestwardandRussiaeastward.8By1812,RussiahadestablishedasoutherntradingbaseatFortRoss,northofSpanishSanFrancisco,andsoonthreatenedtoappropriatevaststretchesofSpanishlandintheAmericanfarwest.In1821,theRussianimperialgovernmentproclaimedRussiansovereigntyovermuchoftheAmericanPacificNorthwest.Theedictsoughttoclosetheregiontoforeignships(includingAmerican)andestablishaRussianmonopolyonhunting,fishing,andtrade.ThisRussiandemarchewasamongthecatalyststhatledPresidentJamesMadisontoannouncetheMonroeDoctrinein1823—adoctrinedraftedbyhissecretaryofstate,JohnQuincyAdams,America’smostexperienceddiplomatinRussianaffairs.98TheTreatyofPariswithGreatBritaindefinedAmerica’soriginalbordersontheeasternseaboard,quiteremotefromRussia.Overthenextcentury,however,Americapursuedapolicyofcontinentalexpansionthroughpurchasesofterritory,coercivediplomacy,andsometimesforce.ContinentalexpansionbroughtitsbordersclosertoRussia.AsforRussianexpansion,RussianadventurershadfirstventuredintotheSiberianwastelandsintheearly1600’s,initiallyinpursuitoffursandthenatthedirectionofthetsaristgovernmentasitextendeditsimperialreach.By1639,RussianvanguardshadreachedthePacificOcean.PetertheGreatadoptedthetitleofEmperorofAllRussiain1721andsponsoredanumberofexpeditionstomapthefarreachesoftheeasternempireandpreparethewayforRussiancolonization.Bytheearly18thcentury,theRussianempireextendedintotheNewWorld.9AyoungJohnQuincyAdamsaccompaniedhisfathertoParis,thenwentwithFrancisDanafromParistoSt.Petersburgin1781withhisfather’spermission.Hewasfourteenyearsold,butspokeFrenchfluently,whichDanadidnot,andthuscouldserveasinterpreterattheCourtofCatherinetheGreat,whereFrenchwasthecommonlanguage.JohnQuincyAdamsbecameAmerica’sfirstministertoRussia

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Threeyearsofhardnegotiationsfrom1821to1824resultedinthewithdrawaloftheRussianedict,tobesupersededbytheU.S.–RussianConventionof1824,ratifiedin1825asthefirstformaltreaty10ofthethousandsofformalandinformalagreements,bilateralandmultilateral,thattheU.S.andRussiawouldenter.Thepartiesconcludedtheirfirstcommercialtreatyin1832,formallyblessingad-hocpracticesthathaddevelopedoveryearsofincreasingtrade.In1867,theUnitedStatespurchasedAlaskafromRussia,apropositionthathadbeendiscussedinformallyandsporadicallysincethe1850s,butdelayeduntilaftertheCivilWar.11ThispurchaseobviatedapotentiallydangeroussourceoftensionbymovingtheU.S.–Russianbordertothewatersofthearcticfarnorth.Bythelate19thcentury,RussiawascompetingwithEuropeanpowersandJapanforinfluenceintheAsianpowervacuumleftbythecrumblingChineseempire.ThiseracoincidedwithAmerica’semergenceasaPacificandAtlanticpower.Followingthe1898Spanish–Americanwar,theUnitedStatesmaintainedbasesinthePhilippinesandGuamtoserveitscommercialinterestsinthePacificAsiaregion.In1899,theUnitedStatesannouncedanopen-doorpolicytowardsChina,assertingAmerica’srighttocommercialaccessontermsequalwiththoseofotherpowers.Russiadidnotopposethisassertion.TheRussianimperialgovernmentwasfacingagrowingpowerinitsfareast:Japan,infusedbytheMeijiRestoration(1868)withanewvitalitybroughtaboutinpartbytheAmericanpenetrationofAsiain1853,whenCommodoreMatthewPerrysailedfourwarshipsintoTokyoBay,endingtwohundredyearsofJapaneseisolation.Japan’sgrowingpowerthreatenedRussia’seasternfrontiers,foreshadowingsimilarconcernsinWorldWarII,andcametoaheadintheRusso–JapaneseWarof1904–1905.Soundlydefeated,RussiaacceptedthegoodofficesofPresidentTheodoreRoosevelttonegotiatepeace.ThetermswereviewedbytheJapanesepublicas(1809–1814)andsecretaryofstate(1817–1825)beforebecomingpresident.HewastheintellectualpowerbehindtheMonroedoctrineandisconsideredAmerica’sgreatestsecretaryofstatebymany.AdamsisenjoyingaresurrectiontodayasaleadingAmericanstrategicthinker;see,forinstance,CharlesN.Edel,NationBuilder:JohnQuincyAdamsandtheGrandStrategyfortheRepublic(Cambridge,Mass:HarvardUniversityPress,2014).10OfficeoftheHistorian,U.S.DepartmentofState,Washington,D.C.http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/85739.htm11TsaristRussiafounditselfindifficultfinancialcircumstancesfollowingtheCrimeanWarof1853–1856andfearedthatitmightloseAlaskatoBritain(whichwasanchoredinBritishColumbiainthePacificNorthwest)ifanotherwarbrokeout.Thetsar’sgovernmentbegantodiscusssaleofAlaskatotheUnitedStatesin1857.NegotiationseventuallyculminatedinatreatyratifiedbytheSenateinMarch1867.TheUnitedStatespurchasedAlaskafor$7.2million(about$123milliontoday),orroughlytwocentsanacre.

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gratuitouslyfavorabletotheRussians,whohadbeenbadlybeaten(thoughreportsofthesettlementsparkedanti-AmericanriotsinTokyo,12RooseveltwontheNobelpeaceprizeforhisefforts).WhenNicholasIImountedtheRussianthronein1894,GroverClevelandwaspresidentoftheUnitedStates;FranklinRooseveltandHarryTrumanwereolderchildren;theUnitedStateswasatthemarginsofworldaffairs;JosephStalin(né JosephJughashvili)wasshyofhissixteenthbirthday;13and“Russia’sdouble-headedeaglenestedacrossagreaterexpansethanthatofanyotherstate,beforeorsince.”14WhilerelationsbeforetheBolshevikrevolutionwerebasedmainlyonmutualadvantageandnoninterference,15thisinformalfootingwouldsoonchange.WorldWarIandthePostwarYearsIn1914,Europeendedacenturyofpeaceandstumbledintowar.ImperialRussiajoinedtheEntentepowersfightingPrussiaandtheAustro–Hungarianempire.Inearly1917,undermountingdomesticbacklashagainstahighlyunpopularwar,TsarNicholasIIabdicated,endingthreehundredyearsofimperialtsaristrule.16TheUnitedStatesbecamethefirstforeignpowertorecognizeRussia’snewprovisionalgovernment,fightingasanallyofRussiainWorldWarIuntiltheBolsheviksseizedpower.InthecontextoftheconflictwithGermanyanditsalliesandabloodycivilwarraginginRussia,AmericajoinedtheBritish,French,andJapaneseinlandingtroopsatseveralnorthernRussianportstopreventtheirfallingintoGermanhands.This12TheodoreRoosevelt’sdaughter,Alice,wastouringAsiawithhernewhusbandwhentheTreatyofPortsmouthwassigned.ShereportedtoherfatherthatshehadheardofriotsinTokyobyJapanesefeelingtheyhadbeenhumiliatedandcheatedafterone-and-a-halfyearsofmilitaryvictories,andthatAmericawastoblame.SeeEdmundMorris,TheodoreRex(NewYork,NY:RandomHouse,2001),p,417.13StalinwasbornasJosephVissarionovichDjhugashviliinruralGeorgiaintheRussianempirein1879.Headoptedtherevolutionaryname‘“Koba’”in1899whenhejoinedtheSocialDemocraticWorker’sParty,andtheBolshevikname‘“Stalin’Stalin”in1913.14StevenKotkin,Stalin,Vol.I,ParadoxesofPower,1878-1928(NewYork:PenguinPress,2014),p.1.15JohnLewisGaddis,TheLongPeace:InquiriesintotheHistoryoftheColdWar(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1987),p.6.16Tsaristinstitutionshadtheirrootsinthe14thcenturyintheGrandDuchyofMoscow,whichhadinheritedthecultureandlegitimacyoftheKievanRus’.Bythe16thcentury,Moscowhadbecomethedominantcity–stateinRussiaandin1548,IvanIV(theTerrible)adoptedthetitleofTsarofalltheRussians.TheRomanovdynastywasfoundedbyTsarMichaelin1613aftertheso-called“timeoftroubles”—aperiodwhenruleinRussiawasdisputed.In1721,PeterI(theGreat)declaredhimselfemperorofRussia,aswellastsar.Fromthebeginning,tsarswereautocraticrulers.TheRomanovdynastylastuntiltheRussianrevolutionin1917.

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movewasnotintendedtooverthrowtheBolshevikregime,aswelcomeasthatoutcomemayhavebeen.Thepracticaleffect,however,wastoalignBritain,France,America,andJapanwiththeWhiteRussianforces(formertsaristsandothers)whoweretheBolsheviks’enemy.AfterthreeyearsofabrutalcivilwarthatleftRussiainruins,theBolsheviks,whohadestablishedwhattheycalleda‘disciplinedwarcommunism‘intheirranks,prevailed,creatingtheUnionofSovietSocialistRepublics(USSR)in1922.17Inthepost–WorldWarIyears,WesternoppositiontoBolshevikrulestemmedlargelyfromMoscow’sespousalandactivesupportofworldrevolution.Bythe1920s,however,theSovietshadplacedworldrevolutiononthebackburner,focusinginsteadonconsolidatingthepositionofthecommunistpartyinRussiaandconvertingRussiaintoamodern,industrialpower.InGermany,meanwhile,anagingmilitaryhero,PaulvonHindenberg,presidedoverthegovernmentoftheconservativeWeimarRepublic.ThehumiliatingtermsoftheVersaillesTreatyandonsetofaworldwideeconomiccrisisradicalizedtheGermansandpavedthewayforAdolfHitlertoascendtothechancelleryinJanuary1933.Onceinoffice,Hitlerquicklyeliminatedoppositionandwithinayear,aidedbyHindenberg’sdeathinAugust1934,securedabsolutepowerforhimselfandtheNationalSocialistparty.IntheU.S.,atroughlythesametime,FranklinD.RoosevelttookthepresidentialoathofofficeinanAmericareelingfromtheGreatDepression.FDR’searlyprioritieswerealmostentirelydomesticasherolledoutthefast-pacedfirsthundreddaysoftheNewDeal;whateverforeignpolicieshepursuedwerelargelyinservicetoendingtheAmericaneconomiccrisis.Roosevelt’srecognitionoftheSovietUnioninNovember1933,wasbutoneelementinabroadefforttostabilizeconditionsabroadinordertoachieveeconomicrecoveryathome.PerhapsinfluencedbyGeorgeKennan’snegativeassessment,manyhistorianshavecharacterizedFDRashopelesslynaïveandidealistic,bothinrecognizingRussiain1933and,afterJune1941,pursuinganalliancewithStalin.18Recentscholarshiptendstorejectthisview.FDRwasanastuteandwilystatesmancapableofpursuingmultiple,oftencontradictory,policiesatthesametimeand,whileremainingconstanttoimportantgoals,adjustinghistacticsandstrategyasnecessary.Heonce17InDecember1922,delegatesfromtheRussianSovietFederativeSocialistRepublic(SFSR),theTranscaucasianSFSR,theUkrainianSFSR,andtheRussianSFSRsignedatreatycreatingtheUnionofSovietSocialistRepublics(USSR).Thistreatywastranslatedintoaconstitutionin1924.TheUSSRexisteduntilitsdissolutionin1991.18GeorgeKennanwrotethatRoosevelt’sforeignpolicywasthatof“averysuperficialman,ignorant,dilettantish,severelylimitedinintellectualhorizon.”SeeWarrenF.Kimball,TheJuggler:FranklinRooseveltasWartimeStatesman(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,1991).

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describedhimselfajuggler—anaptcharacterizationforanimblepolitician.19RooseveltunderstoodthatpastattemptstoisolateifnotdestroytheBolshevikhadfailed,andthatglobalstabilityrequiredthattheU.S.andRussiamaintainaworkingrelationshipanddegreeofcooperation,howeverdifficultthatmightbe.RooseveltthussoughtameetingofthemindswithJosephStalin.TheWartimeGrandAlliance

ManyAmericanfiguresfigureprominentlyinthehistoryofWorldWarII,butnonemoresothanFDR.RooseveltusedhisskillsasamasterpoliticiantoleadtheU.S.outofisolationismandintotheGrandAlliancethatdefeatedGermanyandJapan.Duringhisunequaledfourtermsinoffice,FDRcreatedmanyfeaturesofthemodernpresidencyandAmericansecurityestablishment,andwithhisvisionofsecurityinapostwarworld,builtaframeworkofinstitutionsthatremainattheheartofgeopoliticstoday.Mostcritically,RooseveltsetthestageforthereintegrationoftheAllies’twogreatenemies,GermanyandJapan,intothecommunityofnations.RooseveltpresidedoverthegreatestmilitarybuildupinAmerica’shistory,oftenpersonallysettingthegoalsandpaceofmobilization,andpursuedthecreationanddeliveryofnuclearweapons.Thesethingswerenotdecidedinisolation,ofcourse,butneitherwasFDRcaptivetoadviserprioritiesandideas;hewasfirmlyincontrol,intellectuallyandadministratively,andthecreativerootsofimportantpoliciesanddepartureswereoftenhis.20InRoosevelt’sestimation,anecessaryconditionforinternationalstabilitywascooperationandcompromiseamongthegreatpowersonthegreatsecurityissues—thekindsofproblemsthathadyieldedtwoworldwarsin25years.Toadvancethiscooperation,Rooseveltbeganin1939,onlyninedaysafterChurchillhadjoinedPrimeMinisterNevilleChamberlain’scabinetasFirstLordoftheAdmiralty,bycultivatingacloserelationshipwiththefutureBritishwartimeprimeministerWinstonChurchill.Althoughtheseleadersdifferedonmanyvitalissues—forexample,thefutureofcolonialism—theU.S.andBritainbecameclosealliesinarelationshipthatoutlivedthewar.FDRchampionedtheRepublicofChinaasan19Roosevelt,speakingtoanaudienceinMay1942,calledhimselfajugglerwhoneverlethisrighthandknowwhathislefthandwasdoing.20SinceFDRdidnotkeepadiaryorlivetowritehismemoirsorrecordoralhistoriesofhismajorpolicydecisions,werelyuponhiscorrespondence,briefrecordsfromthearchives,andthememoriesofassociatesforourunderstandingofhismotives.ThesesourceshavebeenskillfullyinterpretedinworkslikeKimball,TheJuggler:FranklinRooseveltasWartimeStatesman;EricLarrabee,Commander-in-Chief:FranklinDelanoRoosevelt,HisLieutenants,andTheirWar(NewYork:ATouchstoneBook,1987);TownsendHoopesandDouglasBrinkley,FDRandtheCreationoftheU.N.(NewHaven,Conn:YaleUniversityPress,1997;andDavidStafford,RooseveltandChurchill:MenofSecrets(Woodstock:TheOverlookPress,2000).

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emerginggreatpowerandattemptedtobolsteritschairman,ChiangKai-shek.AlthoughleeryofFrance,RooseveltdidnotopposeBritain’sdesirerequestforaseatatthegreat-powertableforafutureFreeFranceandtolerateddealingwithamanhedetested,CharlesdeGaulle.ButwhatRooseveltsawashisgreatestchallengewasestablishingastableandlastingrelationshipwiththepowerfulSovietUnionanditsdictator,JosephStalin.Stalin’sPrewarPoliciesBefore,during,andimmediatelyafterWorldWarII,StalinwasatthecenterofanyinteractionswithRussia.Forovertwentyyears,StalinhaddominatedSovietpoliticallife(alongevitysoontobematchedbyPutininafutureRussia).Stalindictateddomesticpolicyandsetthetoneforforeignpolicy,reservingallmajordecisionsforhimself;clearly,heheldthekeytoAmericanforeignpolicyobjectivesintheUSSR.UponreachingthetopoftheSoviethierarchyintheearly1920s,Stalinstilllackedtheabsolutepowershewouldlateracquire.InitiallyhefacedtheproblemofremovingpoliticalrivalssuchasTrotsky,whichhedidatfirstbyconstantpoliticalmaneuveringandintrigue(purgesandassassinationswouldcomelater).21In1922,LeninsponsoredStalin’sappointmentasgeneralsecretary,butsoonchangedhismindandtriedtoblockStalinfromsucceedinghim.LenindiedinJanuary1924;bytheendofthe1920s,Stalinwasacknowledgedasthevozhd,theunquestionedRussianleaderandLenin’strueheir.22Stalin’smanycriticstendtoportrayhiminblack-and-whiteterms,asanunprincipled,paranoid,self-absorbed,isolated,vindictiveautocratwhowasintractablyhostiletotheWestandideologicallycommittedtoitsdestruction,evenashecutshrewddealstoachievehisendsovertime.Inthisview,negotiatingwithStalinwasnaïve.Currentscholarship,however,challengessimpleassessments.Stalinwasindeedabrutal,cruelleaderandatruebelieverinCommunistideology.Atthesametime,hewasaskilledpoliticianwhocouldadapttocircumstancesandmakedealsthatsatisfiedtheobjectivesofbothparties.AsourceofperplexitytoAmericanleadersinthe1930swaswhetherStalinwassimplyanunprincipledopportunistandrigidideologue,oracalculatingactorseekingtosecureRussia’s

21LeonTrotsky(1879–1940)wasaleadingBolshevikrevolutionaryandoneofthesevenmembersoftheoriginalPolitburoin1917.HeandStalindifferedonmanymatters,andStalinviewedhimasamajorcompetitortosucceedLenin.StalinsucceededinisolatingandtheneliminatingTrotsky.In1927,TrotskywasexpelledfromtheCommunistpartyandexiled,firstinKazakhstanandthenoutsidetheSovietUnion.AfterlivinginTurkeyandParis,TrotskytraveledtoMexicoin1937.FearingthatTrotskywasplottinghisoverthrow,StalinorderedhimassassinatedinAugust1940.22SimonSebagMontefiore,Stalin:TheCourtoftheRedTsar(NewYork:VintageBooks,2003),p.45.

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interestsinahostileworld.FDRfavoredthelatterviewandadjustedhisstrategyandtacticsaccordingly.Thesedevelopmentstookplaceamiddarkeningworldaffairs.HitlercametopowerinJanuary1933andquicklycrushedopposition,achievedabsolutecontrolathome,andbuiltapowerfulmilitaryforadventuresabroad,assertingaGermanyunshackledfromtherestraintsoftheTreatyofVersailles.23MussoliniinvadedEthiopiain1935,theSpanishCivilWareruptedin1936(withRussiaandGermanyonoppositesides),andJapaninvadedChinain1937.Itwascleartoanyobserverthattheworldwasracingtowardwar.Withinthiscascadeofthreats,StalindesperatelysoughttimeforRussiatobuildindustrialandmilitarystrength.Intheearly1930s,StalinsawthreeprincipaldangersfacingtheSovietUnion:afascistGermanyseekingtoexpandeastward,acapitalistBritainintentondestroyingcommunism,andanaggressiveJapanastrideSovietterritoryintheFarEast.Meanwhile,Americawasamajorconcern.Stalinadoptedpoliciestoaddresstheseproblemssimultaneously.24HisfirstmovewasdétentewithGermany.SoonafterHitlerbecamechancellor,StalinbegansendingpersonalemissariesquietlytoBerlintoinquireprivatelyintoformingaRusso–GermanallianceagainstBritainandFrance.Hitlerwasunreceptive.SolongasWesterndemocraciescontinuedtoappeasehim,HitlerchosetoexpandGermanpowerslowlybyassertivediplomacy,backedbythethreatofforce,ratherthandirectconfrontation.AlliancewithStalinmightprovokeBritainandFranceandwasthusdetrimentaltoGermaninterests.25WithhisearlyfailuretowooHitler,Stalinshiftedtactics.Stillpursuingadditionaltimetogainmuscle,StalintiltedawayfromGermanyand,in1934,RussiajoinedtheLeagueofNations.Thefollowingyear,RussianegotiateddefensivemilitaryallianceswithFranceandCzechoslovakia,andfrom1936to1939,RussiasupportedtheRepublicansintheSpanishCivilWar.26Changingtacticsathirdtimeinlate1938,StalinreengagedGermanyintheaftermathoftheMunichAgreement,aBritishcapitulationthatmayhaveconvinced23ForanilluminatingaccountoftheTreatyofVersaillesanditsreceptionbytheGermans,seeMargaretMacmillan,Paris1919:SixMonthsthatChangedtheWorld(NewYork:RandomHouse,2001).24ThediscussioninthispaperofStalin’sprewarmaneuveringdrawsheavilyonthefollowingsources.AdamB.Ulam,ExpansionandCoexistence:SovietForeignPolicy,1917-73,2ndedition(NewYork,NY:Holt,RinehartandWinston,1974);SimonSebagMontefiore,Stalin:CourtoftheRedTsar(NewYork,NY:VintageBooks,2003);andStephenKotkin,Stalin:WaitingforHitler,1929-1941(NewYork,NY:PenguinPress,2017).25Montefiore,Stalin:TheCourtoftheRedTsar,pp.302-303.26AdamB.Ulam,ExpansionandCoexistence,pp.209-279.

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StalinthatBritainanditsallies,althoughstrongmilitarilywhenonecomparedtheBritishandFrenchforcebalanceatthetimewiththenascentGermanarmy,lackedthewilltostopHitler.27ItwastimetorevisitasecurityrelationshipwithGermany,andthistimeGermanywasreceptive.28TheMolotov–RibbentropPact,concludedinAugust1939andcontainingasecretprotocoltodivideconqueredterritories,formallyalliedMoscowwithBerlin.Stalin’spactwithHitlerlastedoneyear,ninemonths,andtwenty-ninedays.EvidencesuggeststhatStalinenteredintothearrangementcognizantthatHitlercouldturnonRussiaatanytime,but,asheexplainedtohisinnercircle,theobjectwastobuytime:“Ofcourseit’sallagametoseewhocanfoolwhom.IknowwhatHitler’supto.Hethinkshe’soutsmartedme,butactuallyit’sIwho’strickedhim.”29StalindelayedtheinevitableclashwithGermany,butmiscalculatedbadlyastohowmuchtimehepurchased.30InJune1941,withtheGerman–RussianaccordinshredsandGermanforcesadvancingintotheSovietUniononseveralfronts,Stalinfacedanexistentialthreat,bothtotheUSSRandhiscontinuingpower.ItwastimetogetWesternhelp.StalinjoinstheGrandAllianceForthefirstseveraldaysfollowingtheGermaninvasion,Stalinwaspubliclysilentandlargelyoutofsight,leadingmanyscholarstoconcludethat,havinggambledand27Montefiore,Stalin:TheCourtoftheRedTsar,p.303.28InMay1939,Stalinreplacedhisforeignminister,MaximLitvinov(respectedintheWestasahighlyprofessionaldiplomat)withoneofhisclosestassociates,VyacheslavMolotov.ThischangewasaccompaniedbyapurgeofJewsintheforeignministry,amovedesignedtoappealtoHitler.Hitler,havingdecidedsecretlytoinvadePolandbeforetheendof1939,nowwantedtosecurehiseasternflank.Hitlersenthisforeignminister,JoachimvonRibbentrop,onasecretmissiontoMoscowtodiscussaformalGerman–Sovietalliance.BytheearlyhoursofAugust24,1939,atreatywasreadyforsignature,knowntohistoryastheMolotov–RibbentropPact.Thepacthadtwofaces:thepublicwasafairlyconventionalnon-aggressiontreaty;thesecret,wasaprotocoldividingterritoriesofPoland,Romania,Estonia,Latvia,Lithuania,andFinlandintoGermanandSovietspheresofinfluence.Sovietleadersdeniedtheexistenceoftheprotocoluntil1989,onceGorbachevwasinpower.29Montefiore,Stalin:TheCourtoftheRedTsar,p.312.30ThreeofStalin’sfundamentalassumptionswereflawed.Germanmilitaryforceswerenotasweakashethoughtinlate1939(Stalin,likealmosteveryoneatthetime,wasastonishedattheeffectivenessofGermany’sblitzkriegwarfare).Polish,British,andFrenchmilitaryforceswerefarweakerthanStalinimagined,eventhoughtheyweresuperiortoGermanyonpaperinalmostallnumericalindicesofpower.AnditwouldtakelongerthanStalinanticipatedtobuildRussianmilitarystrength,especiallyinlightoftheravagesthatStalin’spurgeofthemilitaryhighcommandhadwrought.

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lost,hesufferedanervousbreakdownandneededtimetopullhimselftogether.31Recentscholarshipbasedoneyewitnessaccountssuggestsanalternativeexplanation:namely,thatStalin,tacticallysurprisedbythesuddenattack,wasanxiousandpessimisticinthefirstfewdaysoffighting,butfullyincontrolofhisfaculties.Heconductedbusinessaroundtheclock,thenwithdrewtohisdachaoutsideMoscow(probablyon29June,aweekaftertheinvasion).Seekingtoconsolidatehispositionanddeflectcriticism,Stalinthreatenedtoresign,knowingtherewasnobodytotakehisplace.Thethreatfrightenedhisassociates,whoknewtherewasnobodycapableofreplacinghim,andrenderedmootanypotentialopposition.ThispermittedStalintotakefullcommandofthewartimegovernmentonhisownterms.TheployofinsincereresignationhadabasisinRussianhistorydatingtoIvanIV,32asStalinwaswellaware.Whateverinterpretationoneaccepts,however,scholarsagreethataftertheinitialshockoftheGermaninvasion,StalinwasclearlyincommandofRussianpolicy.AppealingtotheWest,hefoundareceptiveaudience,firstinBritainandthentheUnitedStates.Churchill,desperateafteraseriesofsetbackssince1939,wouldfamouslycommentthathewouldineffectmakeadealwiththedevilifnecessarytodefeatHitler.33WhenGermanyturnedonRussia,ChurchillimmediatelyrespondedtoStalin’soverturesbyexpressinghiswillingnesstoprovideallassistancepossibletotheRussianresistanceandsendingadelegationtoMoscowtoseekaprovisionalalliancebetweenBritainandRussiaagainsttheAxispowers.AsfortheUnitedStates,sincetakingofficein1933,FDRhadinvolvedhimselfonlysporadicallyinforeignaffairs.AlthoughhehadwatchedadecadeofunfoldingcrisesinEuropeandAsiawithconcernandwasinternationalistbypersuasion,

31Forinstance,AdamB.Ulamwroteinthe1970’s,“WenowknowfromSovietsourcesthatforseveraldays,Stalinwasunabletofunction,sufferingfromnervousprostration.”AHistoryofSovietRussia(NewYork:Holt,RinehartandWinston,1976),p.155.32SeeEdvardRadzinsky,Stalin,translatedfromRussianbyH.T.Williams(NewYork:AnchorBooks,1996),pp.479–490.RadzinskybaseshisaccountontheunpublishedmemoirsofY.Chadayevwho,atthetimeoftheGermaninvasion,wastheadministrativeassistanttotheSovietCouncilofPeople’sCommissarsandtheonlynotetakerthatStalinpermittedatPolitburoandothersensitivemeetings.33Churchill,atonetimeoneofthestaunchestenemiesoftheBolsheviks,wascalledbacktopowerwhenHitlerinvadedPoland,initiallyasfirstlordoftheadmiraltyand,afterHitlerlaunchedhiswesterncampaigninMay1940,asprimeministerofthewartimecoalitiongovernment.ChurchillralliedBritainasthetatteredBritisharmywithdrewfromDunkirk,Francefell,andBritainfacedalonethefullpowerofGermanyintheaerialBattleofBritainandthreatenedinvasionacrosstheEnglishChannel.

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RoosevelthadtocontendwithstrongpacifistsentimentathomeandlargevotingblocsinCongressthatsoughttokeepAmericaoutofEuropeanwars.34AfterwarbrokeoutinEuropein1939,however,FDRinvolvedhimselfincreasinglyinforeignaffairsandinitiatedaconfidentialcorrespondencewithChurchillthatcontinuedthroughoutthewar.35FDRprivatelysharedChurchill’sconvictionthatHitlermustbedefeatedasathreattoWesterncivilizationandsympathizedwithBritain’sdesperatecircumstancesafterDunkirk.ButwithhishandstiedbyatangleofneutralitylawsandbyanantiwarpublicandisolationistCongress,FDRwasconfinedtocreativeschemesofassistancesuchastheDestroyersforBasesAgreementinSeptember1940andthelend–leaseprogramofMarch1941.36WhenGermanyinvadedRussiainJune1941,FDRwascautiousinextendingapromiseofassistance,mindfuloftheneedtopreparealargelyanti-Sovietpublicforthismajorpoliticalturnabout.Rooseveltskillfullyorchestratedtheextensionoflend–leasetoRussiaandbeganaprivatecorrespondencewithStalin,ashehadwithChurchilltwentymonthsearlier.HistoriansnowhaveaccesstothebodyoftheirprivatewrittenexchangesandcantracetheevolutionofFDR’sviewsandwhathesoughtfromthealliance,notonlyinwartime,butbeyond.37ThedecisiveturningpointforU.S.involvementwastheJapaneseattackonPearlHarboronDecember7,1941.AmericadeclaredwarwithJapanonDecember8thandGermanydeclaredwarontheU.S.twodayslater.HadGermanynotdoneso,itisquestionablewhetherAmericawouldhaveenteredtheEuropeanwarsoquicklyoradoptedaglobalstrategyofEuropefirst.

34ForadiscussionofRoosevelt’sapproachtoforeignpolicyduringthe1930s,seeRobertDallek,FranklinD.RooseveltandAmericanForeignPolicy,1932-1945(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1979).35ThehistorianWarrenF.Kimballistheeditorofthethree-volumecompletecollectionoftheRoosevelt-Churchillcorrespondence,publishedbyPrincetonUniversityPressin1984.KimballalsoistheauthorofaninterpretivehistoryoftheRoosevelt-Churchillrelationship,ForgedinWar:Roosevelt,Churchill,andtheSecondWorldWar(NewYork:WilliamMorrowandCompany,1997),andofanexcellentanalysisofFDR’swartimediplomacy,TheJuggler:FranklinRooseveltasWartimeStatesman(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,1991).36Byearly1941,FDRprivatelythoughtitinevitablethatAmericanwouldenterthewar,butlackedpublicsupportandhadnowherenearamajorityinCongresstosupportmilitaryinterventioninEurope.FDRapprovedsecretAmerican–British–Canadian(ABC)militarystafftalksinWashington,DC,inearly1941,tookanumberofadministrativemovestoreorganizetheexecutivebranch,andsecuredtheappointmentofkeyofficialswithawartimeroleinmind.America’sinitialposturewastoserveasthe“arsenalofdemocracy,”withthepossibilityoffutureexpansion.37SusanButler,ed.,“MyDearMr.Stalin”:TheCompleteCorrespondenceofFranklinD.RooseveltandJosephV.Stalin(NewHaven,Conn.:YaleUniversityPress,2005).

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WithAmericaengaged,RooseveltformallyjoinedChurchillandStalininaGrandAlliancetodefeatNaziGermany.WhilethethreesideswerealignedjointlyagainstGermany,RussiadidnotjoinwiththeAmericanandBritishinwaragainstJapan.38BesidesthedefeatofGermany,RoosevelthadtwoequallycompellingobjectivesforwhichhesoughtStalin’said.OnewastopersuadetheSovietstoabandontheirnonaggressionpactwithTokyoandhelpdefeatJapan.TheotherwastoobtainandsustainSovietsupportforanewapproachtoglobalsecurityinthepostwarworld.FDR’sVisionofaStablePostwarWorldBypassingthenarrativeofhowtheGrandAllianceactuallyfoughtthewar,includingtensionsamongtheallies,disagreementsontiming,priorities,andstrategy,etc.,thisanalysisfocusesoninteractionsamongthetopleadersandtheirconflictingvisionsofapostwarworld.FDRrevealedhisvisioninanumberofvenues—andwasdeterminedtoenforceit.39HewantedabovealltoensurethatAmericaremainengagedintheworldandnotretreatasithadaftertheFirstWorldWar.AkeytothisvisionwastoanchorAmericanpolicyinarecastvision,withtheU.S.astheleaderoftheinternationalorder.HepreparedAmericanpublicopinionearlyon—forexample,inhisstateoftheunionaddressinJanuary1941,almostayearbeforeAmericaenteredthewar,38SovietandJapanesetroopsclashedfromMaytoSeptember1939inabriefbutbloodyborderwarontheManchurian–Mongolianfrontier.GeorgyZhukov,wholaterwouldleadtheRussianforcesthatdefeatedHitlerontheeasternfront,commandedtheSovietforcesintheFarEastatthetimeandscoredacrushingvictoryovertheJapanese.InSeptember1940,Japansignedatreatyofmutualmilitaryassistance(theTripartitePact)inBerlin.JapanwassignalingtheUnitedStates,neutralatthetime,nottoenterthewarinthePacific.InApril1941,StalinsignedaneutralitypactwithJapan,inwhichbothsidesagreedtoremainneutraliftheotherwereatwarwithotherparties.39Inadditiontootherworksalreadycitedinthispaper,thefollowingwereconsultedtounderstandRoosevelt’swartimediplomacyandhisvisionofthepostwarworld.JamesMacGregorBurns,Roosevelt:TheSoldierofFreedom(NewYork:HarcourtBraceJovanovich,1970);CharlesE.Bohlen,WitnesstoHistory,1929-1969(NewYork:W.W.Norton&Company,1973);W.AverellHarrimanandElieAbel,SpecialEnvoytoChurchillandStalin,1941-1946(NewYork:RandomHouse,1975);FrankFreidel,FranklinD.Roosevelt:ARendezvouswithDestiny(Boston:Little,BrownandCompany,1990);DorisKearnsGoodwin,NoOrdinaryTime(NewYork:SimonandSchuster,1994);MichaelBeschloss,TheConquerors:Roosevelt,TrumanandtheDestructionofHitler’sGermany,1941-1945(NewYork:SimonandSchuster,2002);JeanEdwardSmith,FDR(NewYork:RandomHouse,2007);FromRoosevelttoTruman:Potsdam,Hiroshima,andtheColdWar(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2007);AndrewRoberts,MastersandCommanders(NewYork:Harper,2009);MichaelDobbs,SixMonthsin1945(NewYork:RandomHouse,2012);andRichardMoe,Roosevelt’sSecondAct(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2013).

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thepresidentinvitedAmericanstolookforwardtoapostwarworldfoundedonfourfreedoms:freedomofspeechandexpression,freedomofworship,andfreedomfromwantandfear.Heexplainedthelatterasthefruitof“aworld-widereductionofarmamentstosuchapointandinsuchathoroughfashionthatnonationwillbeinapositiontocommitanactofphysicalaggressionagainstanyneighbor—anywhereintheworld.”40Suchaworld,heargued,requiredAmericanleadership.FDRpromotedthisthemeinanumberofspeeches.ThisvisionwasatoddswithChurchill’s.TheBritishwantedtorecreateapostwarbalance-of-powersecuritysystemmuchlikethatbeforethewar,topreserveBritain’sprivilegedpositioninitsempireandcommonwealth.Churchillenvisionedafunctioningglobalbalanceofpowerwithregionalspheresofinfluencepolicedandrespectedbythebigthree—theUnitedStates,Britain,andtheSovietUnion.ThisagendawascleartoRooseveltandheworkedquietlytocircumventitandreplaceitwithhisown.41InAugust1941,inthewatersoffNewfoundland,RooseveltattendedhisfirstmajorwartimeconferencewithChurchill,armedwithageneralstatementofwaraimsdubbedtheAtlanticCharter,whichlaythefoundationforanewpostwarorganization—theUnitedNations—thatFDRwassurewouldavoidthepitfallsoftheLeagueofNations.FDRalsobroachedhisideaofacouncilofmajorpowersthatwouldpolicetheworldandenforcepeace,anideathatevolvedintotheconceptofthe“fourpolicemen”(theU.S.,Britain,Russia,andChina—aforerunneroftheUNSecurityCouncil).Representativesoftwenty-sixalliednationscametogetherinWashingtoninJanuary1942topledgetheirsupporttotheprinciplesoftheAtlanticCharter.42

40AnnualMessagetoCongressontheStateoftheUnion,January6,1941.http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/pdfs/fftext.pdf.41RooseveltwantedChurchilltodismantletheBritishempirebygrantingindependencetoBritain’scolonies,replacethebalanceofpowerwithafunctioningworldenforcementmechanismcomposedofthemajorpowers,andthinkofspheresofinfluenceasRooseveltdid,thatistosay,as“open”spheresofinfluencesuchasfoundinLatinAmerica.42TheAtlanticChartercontainedeightprinciples:noterritorialaggrandizement,territorialchangesonlywiththeconsentofthepeoplesconcerned,therightsofpeoplestochoosetheformofgovernmentunderwhichtheywilllive,equalaccesstotradeandrawmaterials,cooperationtoimproveworkingconditionsandeconomicstandards,astableandpeacefulpostwarworld,freedomofnavigationonthehighseas,andenforceddisarmamentofaggressors.http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/atlantic.asp.

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AttheCasablancaconferenceofJanuary1943,RooseveltsecuredChurchill’sconsenttoapolicyofdemandingunconditionalsurrender43fromtheGermansandJapanese.Hispurposewastofacilitatethereintegrationofaxiscountriesintotheinternationalcommunityafterthewarand,throughdemilitarization,preventtheirquickreturntoaggression,ashadhappenedtoGermanyafterWorldWarI.Inthelatesummerandearlyfallof1944,FDRcarefullymonitoreddiscussionsatBrettonWoodsinNewHampshireandDumbartonOaksinWashington,DC,thatcraftedthemajorpostwarinstitutionsfortrade,finance,andsecurity:theInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF),theWorldBank,andtheUnitedNations,withageneralassemblyandsecuritycouncil.TheseinstitutionsoccupiedavitalspaceinFDR’spostwarvision.AsG.JohnIkenberrypointsout,

TheBrettonWoodsagreementswereimportantbecausetheyservedasabasisforbuildingbroadercoalitionsaroundarelativelyopenandmanagedorder.Itwasamiddlepaththatgeneratedsupportfromboththeconservativefreetradersandthenewenthusiastsofeconomicplanning.Itwasagreedthatjustloweringbarrierstotradeandcapitalmovementwasnotenough.Theleadingindustrialstatesmustactivelysuperviseandgovernthesystem.Institutions,rules,andactiveinvolvementofgovernmentswerenecessary.44

FDRbelievedtheUnitedStatesshouldleadthisprocess.Rooseveltdidnotdevelophismulti-dimensionalvisionofthepostwarworldfromwholeclothorbyconveningspecialstudygroupstoadvisehim.Itemergedpiecemeal,beginningwhenhewasassistantsecretaryoftheNavyintheWilsonadministrationduringtheWorldWarI.Realizingthissweepingschemewouldrequirecompromisesandtradeoffs,especiallywithBritainandRussia.FDR’sstrategywastoworkwiththeirleadersthroughbackchannels,largelyoutofsightofthenormaldiplomaticprocess.FDRcouldmaneuverwithChurchillwithinacommonbondoflanguageandculture,buildingarelationshipinwhicheventhemostdelicateactionswerepossible,suchasplacingtroopsunderthecommandofforeignnationals,drawingupandimplementingconcreteplansforcombinedmilitaryoperations,sharinghighlysensitiveintelligence,anddevelopinganuclearbombinacooperative,secret43TheothermajoragreementsreachedatCasablancawerethatthenextstepintheEuropeangroundoffensivewouldbetheinvasionofSicily(OperationHUSKY)andthatthestrategicbombingcampaignagainstGermanywouldbeintensified.44G.JohnIkenberry,AfterVictory:Institutions,StrategicRestraint,andtheRebuildingofOrderAfterMajorWars(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2001),p.190.

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endeavor.IndealingwithChurchill,FDRhadtheupperhand.BritainneededtheUnitedStates,notonlytodefeatHitlerbuttoshoreupitsdecliningeconomicpowerandoffsetradicalnationalistsintheBritishempireseekingindependence.FDRexploitedthesevulnerabilitiesskillfully.DealingswithStalinwerelesscertain.FDRplacedapremiumondevelopingapersonalrelationshipwiththepremierandknewhemustconvinceStalinthattheUSSRwasanequalpartnerintheGrandAllianceandthatSovietinterestswouldberespectedinalliancedecisions.RooseveltwasneversureheunderstoodStalin’spostwarvision,buthetriedendlesslytodrawStalinoutandprovideincentivesforcontinuedcooperationafterGermanywasdefeated.Anoptimistbynature,Rooseveltfeltsufficientincentivescouldbefoundandcouldwork.WarrenKimball,akeenhistorianofwartimediplomacy,drawsadistinctionbetweenthestrategyandtacticsofalliancediplomacy,ononehand,andunderlyingassumptionsontheother.KimballarguesthatFDRwaswillingtoadjusthisstrategyandtacticsasneeded,butremainedsteadfastinhisunderlyingassumptions.45ManyofFDR’scompromisesarewellknown—forinstance,tacitlyacknowledgingtheSovietspheresofinfluenceintheBalticregion,EasternEurope,andtheBalkans.Twoofhisassumptionswereparamount,however,andtheseheneverchanged.Onewasthatwithoutsomethingakintohisvisionofthepostwarworldanditsinstitutions,theworldwouldreverttopowerpoliticsthatcouldeasilyleadtoanotherdevastatingworldwar.ThesecondwasthatitwouldbeimpossibletoachieveastablepostwarsecuritysystemwithoutSovietcooperation,andthismeantengagementwithStalin.InNovember1943,FDRmetStalinforthefirsttime,attheTehranconference,consideredbymanyhistoriansthehighpointoftheGrandAlliance.46Eightmonths45Kimball,TheJuggler,pp.3-5.46FDRandhispartylefttheWhiteHousesecretlyontheeveningofThursday,11November1943togototheEurekaConferenceinTehran.HepausedbrieflyinCairoforconsultationswithChurchillandChiangKai-shek,thenproceededtoTehran,wherehearrivedon25November.FDRwaseagertomeetStalin.HewantedtostrikeupaworkingrelationshipandpersonalbondanddispelStalin’ssuspicionsthattheU.S.andBritainwereganginguponhim.FDRwentwithoutelaboratebriefingbooksorpositionpapers.Theissuesheintendedtodiscussweregeneralandlargelypolitical.Herefusedafixedagenda,wantingtoleaveroomforimprovisation.FDRandStalinmetSunday,28November,priortothefirstplenarysessionlaterthatafternoon.Astheonlyheadofstateatthemeeting,FDRwasinvitedtopreside.Throughoutthediscussionsthenandatlatersessions,FDRencouragedanairofinformality.Whilethepoliticalleadersweremeeting,theAmericanandBritishmilitarychiefsofstaffmetwiththeirSovietcounterparts.FDRdepartedTehranintheearlymorninghoursof2December1943andarrivedbackinWashingtonDCon17December.SamRosenman,FDR’sspeechwriter,latercommented:“IdonotremembereverseeingthePresidentlookmoresatisfiedand

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later,hewasnominatedbytheDemocraticpartyforafourthterm,withSenatorHarryTrumanhisrunningmate.FDRimmediatelyleftforawarconferenceinthePacific,soTrumandidnothaveachancetomeetwithhimuntil18August1943,whentheyhadasemiprivatelunchattheWhiteHouse(Roosevelt’sdaughter,Anna,joinedthempartofthetime),47afterwhichTrumanwentcampaigntrail.Re-electedon7November1944,FDRwasvisiblyillandfrail.48Asvicepresident,TrumanhadonlytwoprivatemeetingswithRoosevelt.Twodaysaftertheinauguration,RooseveltleftfortheYaltaconference,whichoccupiedmostofFebruary.49HeaddressedajointsessionofCongressinMarch,conductedpleasedthanhedidthatmorning.Hebelievedintenselythathehadaccomplishedwhathehadsetouttodo—tobringRussiaintoco-operationwiththeWesternpowersinaformidableorganizationforthemaintenanceofpeace.”RosenmanisquotedinSusanButlerinMyDearMr.Stalin:TheCompleteCorrespondenceofFranklinD.RooseveltandJosephV.Stalin,p.195.ForaninsideraccountofthediscussionsbyFDR’sinterpreteratTehran,seechapternineofCharlesE.Bohlen,WitnesstoHistory:1929-1969(NewYork,NY:W.W.Norton&Company,1973).47Althoughtheconversationattheluncheonwaslargelyontrivialmatters,thisappearstohavebeentheoccasionwhenFDRinformedTruman,ingeneralterms,abouttheManhattanProject.AlthoughtheconventionalwisdomisthatTrumandidnotlearnabouttheatomicbombuntilafterhebecamepresident(basedinpartonTruman’sowncommentsinhismemoirs),thehistorianRobertFerrell,basedonlateroralinterviewsfromTruman’sclosestassociates,writesthatattheluncheon,FDR“alsotoldhisrunningmateabouttheatomicbomb.”SeeRobertH.Ferrell,HarryS.Truman:ALife(Columbia,Mo.:UniversityofMissouriPress,1994),p.172.48ForanilluminatingdiscussionofFDR’sabilitytofunctiondespitehisphysicaldecline,seeJosephLelyveld,HisFinalBattle:TheLastMonthsofFranklinRoosevelt(NewYork,NY:AlfredA.Knopf,2016).49TheYaltaConference(ARGONAUT)tookplaceintheCrimeafrom4to11February1945.WhenFDR,Churchill,andStalinmetatYalta,theendgameofthewarinEuropewasapproaching(SovietforceswereonlyfortymilesfromBerlin).FDRwenttoYaltawithseveralobjectivesforemostinhismind,includingsecuringStalin’ssupportforthepostwarinstitutionsenvisionedbyFDR,andSovietinterventioninthePacificWar.RobertDallekwrites:“Roosevelt,infact,hadacomplicatedstrategyfordealingwiththeRussiansatYalta.HestillintendedtotellStalinnothingabouttheatomicbombuntiltheSovietseffectivelydemonstratedtheirsincereinterestinpostwarcooperation.Further,heintendedtobargainwithStalinabouttheFarEastandtosplitthedifferencesthatremainedfromtheDumbartonOakstalksontheUnitedNations.ButinEasternEuropegenerally,andPolandinparticular,hehadlittlehopeofdeflectingStalinfromhiscourseandwaspreparedtosettleforagreementsaimedmoreatsatisfyingAmericanopinionthanatrescuingtheareafromSovietcontrol.Dallek,FranklinD.RooseveltandAmericanForeignPolicy,1932-1945,opcit,page507.FDRsecuredStalin’spromisetoenterthePacificWarandprovisionalconsenttoFDR’svisionfortheUnitedNations.TheconfereesalsoagreedtothebroadoutlinesofpostwaroccupationofGermany.For

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miscellaneousbusinessinWashington,andthendepartedMarch30thtorecuperateatWarmSprings,Georgia,wherehediedsuddenlyon12April1945.TrumanTakestheHelmHarryTrumandifferedradicallyfromFDRintemperament,style,andpersonality.50Twodistinctionsareofespecialimportance.First,whileTrumanwascomfortableminglingwithforeignpeersasapoliticalleader,hehadnoforeign-policyexperienceanddidnotstresspersonaldiplomacyasFDRhad.Second,TrumantrustedandusedthestatedepartmentinawaythatRoosevelthadeschewed.Twoofhissecretariesofstateinparticular,DeanAchesonandGeorgeMarshall,werecloseadvisersindealingwithdeteriorationoftherelationshipwiththeUSSRfrompartnershiptohostility.Truman’sunderstandingofRoosevelt’sSovietpolicywasderivedmainlyfromhavinglistenedtoorreadFDR’spublicstatements,notfromprivatediscussions.WhetherFDRshouldhavemadeasubstantialefforttoprepareTrumanismuchdebated,andultimatelyimmaterial.SufficeittosaythatFDRcreatedthemodernpresidency;hehadacompellingvisionofanalternativetobrutebalance-of-powergeopoliticsandadeterminationtoblockthenextworldwar.Trumansharedthoseviews,andnowhehadthehelm.WhenTrumantookoffice,Hitlerwasonthevergeofdefeat—SovietforceshadclosedinonBerlinfromtheeastandAmericanandBritishforceswereenteringGermanyfromthewest.EighteendaysafterFDR’sdeath,Hitler(initiallyeuphoricatthenews)committedsuicideinhisbunker.Germanysurrenderedaweeklater,whenitbecameapparentthattheAmericansandBritishwouldhonortheircommitmenttounconditionalsurrenderandrefuseaseparatepeacethatexcludedRussia.DealingwithoccupyingtheAmericanzoneinalawlessGermanyandhelpingrescueadevastatedandstarvingEuropeawashwithrefugeeswhileendingthebloodbathinthePacificandleadingtheglobalcommunitytoastablepostwarworldbecametheresponsibilityofHarryTruman.TheWar’sEndgameTruman’sfirstpresidentialactionwastoconfirmthattheSanFranciscoconferenceontheUnitedNations,scheduledtooccurintwoweeks,wouldtakeplaceasaninsider’saccountofthediscussionsbyhisinterpreter,ChipBohlen,seechapterelevenofBohlen,WitnesstoHistory,opcit.50SeeRobertJ.Donovan,ConflictandCrisis:ThePresidencyofHarrySTruman,1945-1948(NewYork:W.W.Norton&Company,1977);DavidMcCullough,Truman(NewYork:Simon&Schuster,1992);andAlonzoL.Hamby,ManofthePeople:ALifeofHarryS.Truman(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1995);andA.J.Baime,TheAccidentalPresident:HarryS.TrumanandtheFourMonthsthatChangedtheWorld(Boston,MA:HoughtonMifflinHarcourt,2017).

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planned.ReportedlyshakenbyFDR’spassing,StalinreversedanearlierdecisionnottosendhisforeignministertotheSanFranciscoconference:Molotovwouldattend.Fourdaysafterassumingoffice,TrumanaddressedajointsessionofCongressinwhichhepledgedtocontinueRoosevelt’spolicies.TrumanwaswellrespectedonbothsidesoftheaisleandintimeformedaclosealliancewithArthurVandenberg,therankingRepublicanontheSenateForeignRelationsCommittee(andchairmanthreeyearslaterwhentheRepublicansregainedthemajority),thathelpedsolidifyFDR’spositionthattheUnitedStatesmustremaintakeleadershipinthepostwarworld.51InJuly1945,TrumantraveledtoPotsdamwherehemetwithChurchillandStalintoreachagreementontheoccupationofformerlyNazi-controlledterritories,discusstheprocessfornegotiatingEuropeanpeacetreaties,andconsiderhowtoendthewarinthePacific.StalinconfirmedhispromisethatwhenGermanywasdefeated,RussiawouldshiftforcestotheEast,withdrawfromthenonaggressiontreatywithTokyo,andfightJapan.Trumanrecordedinhisdiaryon18Julythat“Stalin’sluncheonwasamostsatisfactorymeeting.IinvitedhimtocometotheU.S.ToldhimI’dsendthebattleshipMissouriforhimifhe’dcome.HesaidhewantedtocooperatewiththeU.S.inpeaceaswehadcooperatedinwar,butitwouldbeharder.SaidhewasgrosslymisunderstoodinU.S.andIwasmisunderstoodinRussia.”52Bothagreedtheywouldtrytoclearupmisunderstandingsathome.StalinprivatelytoldhisaidesthatTrumanwasnotuptothejobofleadingtheUnitedStates,53butwouldfindovertimethathewassorelymistaken.ThedaybeforethePotsdamConference,thefirstatomicbomb(animplosionplutoniumdevice)wastestedsuccessfullyinthedesertsofNewMexico.EightdayslateratPotsdam,TrumaninformedStaliningeneraltermsaboutthebomb.54TrumanthenjoinedwiththeBritishandChineseinissuinganultimatumtoJapantosurrenderunconditionallyorface“promptandutter”destruction.Tokyoignoredthewarning51SeeLawrenceJ.Haas,HarryandArthur:Truman,Vandenberg,andthePartnershipThatCreatedtheFreeWorld(Lincoln,NE:PotomacBooks,2016);andHendrikMeijer,ArthurVandenberg:TheManintheMiddleoftheAmericanCentury(Chicago,IL:UniversityofChicagoPress,2017).52RobertH.Farrell,HarryS.Truman&theBomb:ADocumentaryHistory(Worland,WY:HighPlainsPublishingCompany,1996),p.30.53SeeMontefiore,Stalin:TheCourtoftheRedTsar,p.498.54FDRhadinsistedattheoutsetoftheManhattanProjectthatthestrictestconditionsofsecrecybeobserved.TheexistenceoftheprogramwasconcealedfromallbutafewmembersofCongress,andeventheywereinformedoftheprograminonlythemostgeneralsense.Truman,withBritishconsent,approachedStalinattheendofasessionatPotsdamandtoldStalininvaguetermsthattheU.S.hadjusttestedanewweaponofenormouspower.

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andon6August1945,anAmericanB-29droppedanatomicbombonHiroshima.Twodayslater,theSovietslaunchedamajoroffensiveagainstJapaneseforcesinManchuria,andon9AugustasecondatomicbombwasdroppedonNagasaki.55Thistrulywasthewar’sendgame.LessthanaweekafterNagasaki,EmperorHirohito,agodlikefigurewhoneverappearedorspokeinpublic,foundhimselfheadofadividedgovernmentinwhichfanaticsinthearmyhighcommandwouldchoosenationalsuicideoversurrender,andintervened.Inanunprecedentedradioaddress,theemperorannouncedthatJapanwouldsurrenderunconditionallyandcalledonhissubjectstosupportthisdecision.Japan’sformalsurrendertookplaceonUSSMissouriinTokyoBayon2September1945.TheSecondWorldWarwasover.FromAllytoAdversaryWhendidthealliancebreakdownandtheColdWarbegin?Wasit1944,whenafterliftingthesiegeofLeningrad,theRedArmyrolledfromvictorytovictory,reachedtheoutskirtsofWarsaw,ejectedtheGermansfromBulgariaandRumaniaandpavedthewayforoffensivesthatwouldcaptureHungary,Czechoslovakia,andEast55InSeptember1944,LieutenantColonelPaulTibbets—arguablyAmerica’smostexpertpilotatthetime—wasassignedtosecretlyorganizeAmerica’sfirstnuclearstrikeforce,developingtacticsfornucleardelivery,trainingthecrews,andreachingalevelofreadinesswherehecoulddeployandexecutethestrikesonshortnotice,ifsoordered.Hewastoldon30December1944tobereadytodeliverastrikeby15June1945,andinMarch1945wasinformedthatNorthFieldonTinianIslandinthePacificwouldbethestagingbase.HisforceconsistedofB-29long-rangeheavybombersthathadbeenspeciallymodifiedinaprogramcalledSilverplate.On29June1945,hisunit—the509thCompositeGroup,20thAirForce—deployedtoaspeciallyguardedpartoftheTinianfacility.Thenewatomicdevicewastestedsuccessfullyon16JulyinthedesertsofNewMexico,andfromthe26thto28thofJuly,thebombsweredeliveredtoTinianbyseaandair.Meanwhile,on25July,amilitarydirectivesignedbyPresidentTrumanwassentfromPotsdamtoWashington,directingthattheloadbedeliveredassoonasweatherpermittedvisualbombingafter3Augustononeofthetargets(Hiroshima,Kokura,Niigata,orNagasaki)andthatadditionalbombsbedeliveredononeofthosetargetsassoonasavailable.TrumandepartedPotsdamtoreturntoWashingtonon2August.WhileenroutehomeaboardtheUSSAugusta,Trumangavehisfinalpermissiontoexecutetheearlierdirective.Forfurthercontext,seePaulW.Tibbets,FlightoftheEnolaGay(Columbus,OH:APaulTibbetsBook,1989);CharlesW.SweeneywithJamesA.AntonucciandMarionK.Antonucci,War’sEnd:AnEyewitnessAccountofAmerica’sLastAtomicMission(NewYork,NY:AvonBooks,1997);Ferrell,ed.,HarryS.Truman&TheBomb:ADocumentaryHistory;J.SamuelWalker,Prompt&UtterDestruction:TrumanandtheUseofAtomicBombsAgainstJapan(ChapelHill,NC:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,1997;andGordonThomasandMaxMorganWitts,RuinfromtheAir:TheEnolaGay’sAtomicMissiontoHiroshima(Chelsea,MI:ScarboroughHousePublishers,1977.

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Prussia?Thesemilitarycoups,arguesRobertDalek,“increasedStalin’sabsolutecontroloftheSovietUnionandmadehimlessconcernedaboutoffendinghisallies.”56TheSovietswerealreadyemplacingthepeopleandprocessestheywouldneedtocontroltheconqueredterritories.57HadStalinalreadydecidedbythenthathewouldabandonthealliance?WasthebreakdownoftheallianceinevitablewhenTrumandeployedanuclearweaponagainstJapan?ThebombingofHiroshimashockedStalin,whoknewfromSovietespionageaboutthebomb,butwassurprisedthatTrumanwoulduseitsoquickly.DidtheColdWarstartin1946,whenStalin’selection-evespeechinMoscowalarmedWashington,DC,andincitedGeorgeKennan’sfamous“longtelegram”?58Wasit1947,whenGeorgeMarshall,returningfromalongandcontentiousforeign-ministersconferenceinMoscow,launchedtheMarshallPlan?Wasit1948,withtheBerlinblockade?Or1950,withtheKoreanWar?Scholarsdisagree,andthispaperwillnotenterthedebate.WorthnotingisthatTrumanwasshoweredwithadvicefromallpointsofviewandthetwomenhecametorelyonandrespectmost,DeanAchesonandGeorgeMarshall,wereamongthelastseniorAmericanofficialstogiveuponcooperationwiththeSoviets.

56Dallek,TheLostPeace,pp.53-54.57SeeAnneApplebaum,IronCurtain:TheCrushingofEasternEurope,1944-1956(NewYork:RandomHouse,2012).58ElectionstotheSupremeSovietoftheUSSRwerescheduledfor10February1946—thefirstsuchelectionsineightyears.StalinusedelectionevetodeliveraspeechtoagroupofMoscowvotersintheBolshoiTheaterinwhichhereassertedthevalidityofMarxist-Leninisttheory,drewasharpcontrastbetweencapitalismandcommunism,andblamedtheSecondWorldWarontheinternaltensionsofcapitalistnationscompetingwithoneanother.Amonghisotherobjectives,StalinwasrallyingtheSovietpeopleforcontinuedsacrificesastheyrebuilttheirwar-torncountry.Atthetime,GeorgeF.Kennan(oneofAmerica’sleadingexpertsontheSovietUnion)wasservingasdeputyheadofmissioninMoscow.KennanfoundlittleneworremarkableinthespeechandmerelysummarizeditinhiscabletoWashington.On13February,theStateDepartmentaskedKennanforaninterpretiveanalysisofthespeech.KennanrespondedwithMoscowEmbassyTelegram#511,summarizinghisthoughtsonwhatwasdrivingSovietpolicy,withargumentsgoingfarbeyondtheelection-dayspeech.Kennan’sanalysisreinforcedtheviewsofhardlinersinWashingtonsuchasJamesForrestal,whoviewedanypolicyofcooperationwithRussiaasillconceived.Forfurtherdiscussionofthelongtelegram,seechaptereleveninGeorgeF.Kennan,Memoirs1925-1950(NewYork,NY:PantheonBooks,1967)andchapterteninJohnLewisGaddis,GeorgeKennan:AnAmericanLife(NewYork,NY:PenguinPress,2011).

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TrumanneverabandonedthemajoroutlineofFDR’svisionforastablepostwarworld,butintheabsenceofRussiancooperation,hewasforcedtoadapttotherealitiesofconfrontationandbuildanewgrandstrategy.TowardaNewGrandStrategyTrumanreliedheavilyonhissenioradvisers,especiallyAchesonandMarshall,tooverseetherecastingofAmericanstrategyvis-à-vistheUSSR.59WhileAchesonandMarshallwerehighlyregardedasoutstandingstatesmen,theyrespectedthepresident’sprerogativetomakepolicydecisions,supportinghimevenwhentheydisagreed,andtheyrespectedhispoliticalskillsinworkingwithaRepublicanSenate(particularlywithVandenbergaschairmanoftheSenateForeignRelationsCommittee)toimplementaseachangeinAmericanforeignpolicy.60America’snewgrandstrategyemergedgradually.AlthoughitwasnotfullyinplaceunderTruman’stenure,theimportantcontoursweresketchedoutandinvolvedahandfulofmajorthemes:Americanleadershipintheworldcommunity,containingfurtherRussianexpansion,amultinationalAtlanticalliancewithastableEuropeanelement,rehabilitatingGermanyandJapan,buildingastrongmilitary,addressingtheimplicationsofnuclearweapons,andpreventinganewworldwar.Truman’sfirstforeign-policydecisionaspresidentwastoestablishtheUnitedNationsasscheduled.AlthoughheeventuallyfoundtheUNlessusefulthanhoped,AmericanparticipationwassymbolicofthemanywaysinwhichtheUnitedStateshadrejecteditsprewarisolationismandassumedthemantleofgloballeadership.AshomeoftheUN,theInternationalMonetaryFund,andtheWorldBank,theUnitedStateswasgeographicallyandsymbolicallyattheheartofthepostwarpoliticalandfinancialsystemsandatthecenterofworldaffairs.59Truman,wantingsomeonewithstrongpoliticalstandinginlineforthepresidencyshouldhedie,madeJamesF.ByrneshissecretaryofstateinJuly1945,withDeanAchesonhisdeputy.Truman’srelationswithByrneswerestrained,andinJanuary1947,TrumanreplacedhimwithGeorgeMarshall.WhenMarshallretiredforhealthreasonsattheendofTruman’sfirstterm,TrumanturnedtoDeanAcheson,whobecamesecretaryofstateinJanuary1949andremainedinofficefortheremainderofTruman’spresidency.SeeForrestC.Pogue,GeorgeC.Marshall:Statesman,1945-1949(NewYork:Viking,1987);DeanAcheson,PresentattheCreation(NewYork:W.W.Norton&Company,1969);JamesChace,Acheson(NewYork:Simon&Schuster,1998);RobertL.Beisner,DeanAcheson:ALifeintheColdWar(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2006);andAffectionandTrust:ThePersonalCorrespondenceofHarryS.TrumanandDeanAcheson,1953-1971(Lincoln,NE:UniversityofNebraskaPress,2010).60SeeLawrenceJ.Haas,Harry&Arthur:Truman,Vandenberg,andthePartnershipThatCreatedtheFreeWorld(Lincoln,NE:PotomacBooks,UniversityofNebraskaPress,2016);andHendrikMeijer,ArthurVandenberg:TheManintheMiddleoftheAmericanCentury(Chicago,IL:UniversityofChicagoPress,2017).

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RussianexpansionismandtheslowlygrowingrealizationinWashingtonofjusthowweakBritainwasafterthewarledtotheTrumandoctrineforSovietcontainment,asunveiledtoCongressinMarch1947.Thispolicy,combinedwiththerehabilitationofEurope’seconomythroughtheMarshallPlananddiplomaticandmilitaryactivity,wasessentialincounteringSovietgeopoliticalexpansionandwasretainedandrefinedbyeveryColdWarpresident.61AfterscoringanunexpectedupsetovergovernorThomasDeweyinthepresidentialelectionofNovember1948,TrumanauthorizeddiplomatstobeginnegotiationsontheNorthAtlanticTreaty,whichwassignedinWashington,DC,onApril4,1949.62Theinstitutionalheartofthetreaty,theNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO),wouldbecomewhatmanybelievetobethemostsuccessfulallianceinhistoryandakeycomponentinsuccessfulColdWarnavigation.Truman’scloserelationshipwithVandenbergwasagainimportanttoSenateacquiescence.TheMarshallPlanmeanwhilefacilitatedtherecoveryofkeyWesternEuropeanallies,allowingastrongEuropeanarmofNATOtoemerge.WhentheKoreanWarbrokeoutin1950,PresidentTrumanbroughtGeneralDwightD.EisenhoweroutofretirementandsenthimtoEuropeasthefirstSupremeAlliedCommanderEurope(SACEUR)tooverseebuildingamilitarystructureforNATO.Eisenhower’sdecisiontochallengeSenatorRobertTaftfortheRepublicanpresidentialnominationin1952wasmotivatedlargelybyhisdesiretokeepAmericadeeplyinvolvedinNATO,somethinghefearedtheTaftwingoftheRepublicanPartywouldreverse.63CollaboratingcloselywithBritainandFrance,theU.S.mergedtheoccupationzonesofGermanyintoaWestGermanstatethateventuallyregaineditssovereigntyandjoinedNATOasachiefmember.America’scommitmenttoNATOgaveEuropeanstatesasecurebasisfromwhichtoallowWestGermanytoregainitseconomicstrengthandrearm,despitelongmemoriesofGermany’sreputationforaggression.InJapan,theUnitedStatesfacedadifferentproposition.America’searlyvisionforsecurityintheAsiaPacificregionwasbasedonthehopethatChiangKai-shek’snationalistgovernmentwouldunifyandeconomicallyreviveChina,buttheTrumanadministrationcametorealizethiswasunlikely.64InOctober1949,theChinese61ForbackgroundonthedevelopmentoftheTrumanDoctrineandtheMarshallPlaninaworkthatDeanAchesonconsidereddefinitiveand,infact,recommendedtoPresidentTrumanwhenhewaswritinghismemoirs,seeJosephMarionJones,TheFifteenWeeks(SanDiego,CA:HarcourtBraceJovanovich,1955).62ForbackgroundonthegenesisofNATO,seeDonCook,ForgingtheAlliance(NewYork,NY:ArborHouse/WilliamMorrow,1989).63SeeRobertR.BowieandRichardH.Immerman,WagingPeace:HowEisenhowerShapedanEnduringColdWarStrategy(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1998).64Inlate1945,PresidentTrumancalledGeneralGeorgeC.MarshalloutofretirementtoheadamissiontoChinatonegotiateanendtothecivilwarbetween

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communistswonalong-ragingcivilwarandproclaimedthePeople’sRepublicofChina.GiventhestronganimosityagainstJapanamongAmericanalliesinthePacific,theUnitedStatesmanageditssecurityrelationsintheregionprimarilythroughbilateralsecuritytreaties.America’smilitarybuildupwasslowtoachieve.Intheimmediateaftermathofthewar,demobilizationproceededrapidly,leavingmostAmericancombatforcesillpreparedforaction,andTrumancappedmilitaryspendingsoasnottodestabilizetheeconomy.MeanwhileCongressendedthedraftandrefusedtheadministration’sproposalforuniversalmilitarytrainingandAmerica’sembryonicnuclearforceswerecaughtupinthegeneralchaosofpostwarreversiontoacivilianeconomy.Thecrisesof1948,mostprominentlytheSovietcoupinCzechoslovakiaandtheBerlinblockade,beganachangeincoursethatwascementedaftertheoutbreakoftheKoreanWarin1950.Bythattime,theU.S.wasontheroadtoalargestandingmilitaryheavilydependentonnucleardeterrence.Thentherewastheproblemofthebomb.RealizingthatnuclearproliferationwasinevitableandthatnuclearweaponsposedanunprecedentedrisktotheUnitedStates,TrumanattemptedtocontrolnuclearweaponsthrougharmscontrolviatheBaruchPlan,proposedinJune1946.65WhenitbecameobviousthattheSoviettheChineseKuomintanggovernment,ledbyChiangKai-shek,andtheChineseCommunists,ledbyMaoTse-tung.Aftermonthsofeffort,Marshallconcededhecouldnotachieveanylastingcompromise.HisdealingswiththeKuomintangnationalistsreinforcedperceptionsintheadministrationthattheirgovernmentwasoutoftouchwiththepeopleandthoroughlycorrupt.65AttheLondonForeignMinistersmeetinglastingfrom11Septemberto2October1945,discussiondeadlockedbetweentheSovietsontheonehand,andtheotherwartimealliesontheother.NomeaningfulprogresswasmadeonthepostwarpeaceplansforEurope.TheBritishfeltthattheunresolvednuclearissuewasattherootoftheproblem,andinNovember1946primeministerClementAttleeandhisCanadiancounterpart,MacKenzieKing,cametoWashingtontomeetwithTruman.Theoutcomeofthissummitwasacommuniqué(AgreedDeclaration)issuedon15Novthatproposedthatallnationsshouldhaveaccesstobasicscientificinformationrequiredforpeacefulusesofatomicenergy,thatanarrangementwouldbedrawnforarrangementstocontrolatomicenergytotheextentnecessarytoensureitspeacefuluse,andthatonethearrangementwitheffectivesafeguardswasinplace,atomicweaponsandallotherweaponsadaptabletomassdestructionwouldbeeliminatedfromnationalarsenals.ThecommuniquécalledfortakingthemattertothenewlyformedUnitedNations.AtaforeignministersmeetinginMoscow,StalinagreedtotakethemattertotheUN.WhentheUnitedNationsconvenedforthefirsttimeinitstemporarylocationinLondoninJanuary1946,itcreatedtheUNCommissiononAtomicEnergytotakeupthematterofinternationalcontrols.Meanwhile,SecretaryofStateByrneshadturnedtohisdeputy,DeanAcheson,andchargedhimwithcomingupwiththeAmericanproposal.AchesonandhisfellowcommitteememberswereassistedbyapanelofexpertsledbyDavidLilienthal

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Unionwasdeterminedtobuilditsownnuclearstockpilewithnoconstraints,theU.S.slowlyevolvedtoatwo-trackapproachthatkeptthepossibilityofarmscontrolopenbutemphasizedfieldingastrongnucleardeterrent—somethingthatbecamemoreurgentafterthefirstSovietnucleartestin1949.(wholaterwouldbecomethefirstchairmanoftheUSAtomicEnergyCommission).TheAcheson-LilienthalgroupincludedGeneralLeslieGroves,directoroftheManhattanProject,andJ.RobertOppenheimer,directoroftheLosAlamosLaboratorythatdesignedandproducedthefirstbombs.TheAcheson–Lilienthalgrouparrivedatascheme(whosetechnicalcomponentwaslargelytheworkofOppenheimer)toproposeaninternationalauthoritytoregulateatomicenergybyasystemoflicensingandinspections.Allthoriumanduraniumminedwouldbethepropertyoftheinternationalauthority,andunderappropriatelicensingarrangements,denaturedU-235,U-233,andplutoniumcouldbeleasedtonationalauthoritiesforpeacefuluses(researchortheproductionofradioactiveisotopesandpower).Onceaneffectiveinternationalsystemofsafeguardswasinplace,nationalarsenalsofnuclearweaponswouldbebanned.TheAcheson–LilienthalreportwenttoTrumanon21March1946.OntherecommendationofSecretaryByrnes,andwithaneyetotheeventualneedforCongressionalratificationofanyinternationalarrangement,TrumanappointedBernardBaruchtobetheAmericanrepresentativeontheUNAtomicEnergyCommissionandpresenttheplan.Afterwideconsultationwithinthegovernment,Baruchaddedsanctionsforallegedviolations(presumablyincluding,asnecessary,theuseofforce)approvedbyasecuritycouncilvotingwithouttherightofveto.On7June1946,Trumanapprovedtherevisedplan.BaruchpresentedthisphasedapproachtonucleardisarmamenttotheUNAtomicEnergyCommissionon14June1946.Threedayslater,theSovietrepresentative,AndreiGromyko,presentedMoscow’salternativeproposal,whichcalledfordestructionofallexistingnuclearweaponsthreemonthsaftertheconventiontookeffect,withthesystemofinternationalcontrolthentobeputinplace,andwithnoeliminationoftherightofpermanentpartyveto.Aninconclusivestalemateensured.BaruchremainedUSrepresentativeuntil4January1947,bywhichtimetheUNAtomicEnergyCommissionhadpreparedareportreflectingthedeadlockandsubmittedittothesecuritycouncil.TrumanappointedWarrenR.AustintoreplaceBaruch,andon11February1947,debatebeganonthematter.Thestalematecontinued,anddebatebecameamatterofcompetingpublicrelationsexercises.Forfurtherinformation,seeChapter17ofDeanAcheson,PresentattheCreation:MyYearsintheStateDepartment(NewYork,NY:W.W.Norton&Company,1969.SeealsoChapters15and16ofRichardG.HewlettandOscarE.Anderson,Jr.,TheNewWorld:AHistoryoftheUnitedStatesAtomicEnergyCommission,VolumeI,1939-1946(Berkeley,CA:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1962);andTowardEffectiveInternationalAtomicEnergyControl(Washington,DC:U.S.StateDepartmentPublication2713,1947).

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ConcludingThoughtsWhenHarryTrumanleftofficeinJanuary1953,themajorelementsoftheAmericangrandstrategywerefirmlyinplace.ThroughthefortyturbulentyearsoftheColdWar,legacyassembledfromRoosevelt’svisionprovidedaframeworkforTruman’ssuccessors(EisenhowerthroughGeorgeH.W.Bush).FDR’sgreatestfear,ofathirdworldwar,sharedbyTruman,butwasevaded—partlybyluck,butlargelybecauseofwisepolicychoices.AmericamanagedthetransitioninrelationswithRussiafromallytoenemyinawaythatstabilizedthecentralcompetitors(whoquicklybecamenuclear)andshiftedarmedconflicttotheshadows(largelythroughproxiesinthethirdworld)andcreatedanintensespy-on-spywar.Alongtheway,theUnitedStateslearnedthestrategicvalueofpatience.Intherealmofnuclear-armscontrol,forinstance,Americapersisted,andwhatappearedhighlyimprobable,ifnotimpossible,in1946—arms-controlarrangementswithintrusiveonsiteinspection—becamepossiblebyColdWar’send.Proliferationdidnotcascadeunrestrained,againlargelyduetoAmericanleadershipinchampioningtheNuclearNon-ProliferationTreatyandgivingnationsincentivestojoinit.Thenuclear-armsracewasdangerousandthepossibilityofconflictescalationtothenuclearthresholdthroughmiscalculationneverwentaway.America’ssecuritypolicyfromTrumanonwardfollowedtworules:bepreparedtonegotiatearrangementstorestrainandcontrolarms,andsimultaneouslyensurethemilitaryclouttorespondeffectivelytocheatingandtechnicaladvances.Americaalsosolidifieditsbeliefintheimportanceofalliances.NATOsurvivedmanycrisesinwhichobserversforecastitsimminentdemise.IntheAsia-Pacificregion,wheremultilateralalliancestructureswereunattainable,theU.S.developedanetworkofbilateralallianceswithWorldWarIIfriendslikeAustralia,formerenemieslikeJapan,anddividedcountrieslikeSouthKorea.Whilefarfromperfect,America’smanagedtransitioninitsrelationswithRussia/theSovietUnionintheyearsfollowingWorldWarIIoffersmanylessonsworthponderingtoday.Butthatisanotherstory.

ThisworkwasperformedundertheauspicesoftheU.S.DepartmentofEnergybyLawrenceLivermoreNationalLaboratoryunderContractDE-AC52-07NA27344.LLNL-TR-744757