exclude results of testing conducted on blood drawn from the
TRANSCRIPT
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDAFIFTH DISTRICT
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
vs.
WADE F. LILES,
Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
CASE NO. 5D14-1654
RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
The Appellee/Cross-Appellant, WADE F. LILES, by and through
undersigned counsel, hereby responds to the Order to Show Cause
entered by the Court on October 13, 2014. Mr. Lues asserts that
his cross appeal should not be dismissed for lack of prosecution,
and as grounds therefore, states the following:
1. On February 5, 2014, Mr. Liles filed a Motion to Exclude
Results of Testing Conducted on Blood Drawn from the Defendant in
the circuit court. A copy of that motion is attached as Exhibit A,
2. In that motion, Mr. Liles argued that the results of
testing conducting on blood drawn from him should be suppressed from
being introduced into evidence at trial because (1) the State failed
to establish the statutory requirements for blood draws under Fla.
Stat. § 316.1932 and 316.1933; and (2) law enforcement did not have
a search warrant providing them with authority to draw blood.
3. On April 29, 2014, following a hearing on Mr. Liles'
motion, the circuit court entered an Order on Defendant's Motion to
Exclude Results of Testing Conducted on Blood Drawn from the
E-Copy Received Oct 23, 2014 7:48 PM
Defendant. A copy of that Order is attached as Exhibit B.
4. In that Order, the circuit court granted Mr, Liles'
motion. In doing so, however, the circuit court only addressed the
argument that law enforcement lacked a search warrant. The circuit
court did not address Mr, Liles' contention that the State failed
to establish compliance with Fla. Stat. § 316.1932 and 316.1933.
5. In footnote 4 of that Order, the circuit court
acknowledged that its Order did not address Nr. Mies' argument
regarding statutory compliance and indicated it would do so if its
decision on the search warrant issue was reversed on appeal.
6. On May 5, 2014, the State filed a Notice of Appeal from
the circuit court's Order. A copy of the State's Notice of Appeal
is attached as Exhibit C.
7. On or about July 25, 2014, undersigned counsel, William R.
Ponall, and Assistant Attorney General Kristen Davenport talked by
telephone and agreed that it would make more sense and be in the
interest of judicial economy for both of the issues contained in
Mr. Liles' motion to be addressed in one appeal before this Court.
As such, they agreed that they would seek to have this Court
relinquish jurisdiction to the circuit court to rule on the
outstanding issue in Mr, Liles' motion.
8. Based on the aforementioned telephone conversation, on
July 25, 2014, the State, through Assistant Attorney General
Kristen Davenport, filed a Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction to the
circuit court. The stated purpose of relinquishing jurisdiction
was for the circuit court to issue a decision on whether the State
established probable cause as required by Fia. Stat. § 316.1933, so
that both issues raised in Mr. Lues' motion could be addressed in
the same appeal. A copy of that motion is attached as Exhibit D.
9. On August 6, 2014, this Court granted the Motion to
Relinquish Jurisdiction to the circuit court for a period of 45
days. A copy of that Order is attached as Exhibit E.
10. On August 20, 2014, the circuit court entered an Order on
the Remainder of the Defendant's Motion to Suppress After the Fifth
DCA's Relinquishment of Jurisdiction. In that Order, the circuit
court concluded that the State established that it had authority to
draw blood pursuant to Fia. Stat. § 316.1933. A copy of that Order
is attached as Exhibit F.
11. On September 18, 2014, Mr. Lues' filed a Notice of
Cross-Appeal indicating his intent to appeal the circuit court's
Order on the Remainder of the Defendant's Motion to Suppress After
the Fifth DCA's Relinquishment of Jurisdiction. A copy of the
Notice of Cross Appeal is attached as Exhibit G.
12. On that same date, the State filed a Status Report noting
that the circuit court had entered a second Order and that Mr.
Lues would be pursuing a cross-appeal so that all legal issues
could be resolved in one appeal. A copy of the Status Report is
attached as Exhibit H.
3
13. Mr. Lues' Notice of Cross-Appeal is timely filed because
it was filed within 30 days of the trial court's Order on the
Remainder of the Defendant's Motion to Suppress After the Fifth
DCA's Relinquishment of Jurisdiction. It was also filed during the
period of time when jurisdiction had been relinquished to the
circuit court for the sole purpose of the circuit court determining
the remaining issue in Mr. Lues' motion so that both issues could
be considered in this appeal.
14. Nr. Lues' filing of the Notice of Cross-Appeal at this
time was consistent with the purpose of jurisdiction being
relinquished to the circuit court and in accordance with the plan
of action jointly agreed upon between undersigned counsel, William
R, Ponall, and Assistant Attorney General Kristen Davenport.
15. Mr. Lues could not have filed his Notice of Crass-Appeal
within 10 days of the State filing its Notice of Appeal on May 5,
2014, because the Order which Mr. Liles is appealing was not
entered by the circuit court until August 20, 2014.
16. The State filed its Initial Brief in this matter on
October 10, 2014,
17. Pursuant to Fla. R. App. p, 9.210, Mr. Liles' Answer
Brief, containing both his Response to the State's Answer Brief and
argument in support of his cross-appeal, is currently due to be
filed on October 30, 2014.
18. Throughout this proceedings, Nr. Lues, through
undersigned counsel, has diligently cooperated with the State and
coordinated matters with the circuit court to ensure that this
matter is handled in the most efficient manner possible.
19, There has been no lack of prosecution by Nr. Lues or
undersigned counsel.
20. Accordingly, this Court should discharge the Order to
Show Cause and permit this case to proceed on the briefing
scheduled established by Rule 9.210.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was
furnished by email delivery to Assistant Attorney General Kristen
Davenport, [email protected], on this 23rd day of
October, 2014.
/s/ william R. PonallWILLIAM R. PONALLSNURE & PONALL, P.A.425 W. New England Ave., Suite 200winter Park, FL 32789Telephone: (407) 469-6200Florida Bar No, 421634pQallb@crìminaldefenselaw. corn
ATTORNEYS FOR THE APPELLEE/CROSS-AP PE LLAN T
5
Filins #9945010 Electronically Filed 02/0512014 03:44:44 PM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE NINTHJUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR ORANGECOUNTY, FLORIDA
CASE NO. 2011-CF-13421-A-OSTATE OF FLORIDA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
WADE F. LILES,
Defendant.
MOTION TO EXCLUDE RESULTS OF TESTING CONDUCTEDON BLOOD DRAWN FROM DEFENDANT
The Defendant, WADE F. LILES, by and through his undersigned attorney, hereby
respectfully requests that this Honorable Court enter an Order excluding the results of
testing conducted on blood drawn from the Defendant, and as grounds therefore, asserts
the following:
1. The Defendant is charged with DUI Manslaughter, Leaving the Scene of an
Accidenl with Death and Vehicular Homicide based on his alleged involvement in an
automobile crash on October 1, 2011.
2. Lieutenant Channing Tayloroíthe Florida Highway Patrol responded lo the scene
of the accident and made contact with the Defendant,
3. Lieutenant Taylor asked the Defendant if he would consent to a blood draw and
the Defendant refused.
4. After the Defendant refused to consent to a blood draw, Lieutenant Taylor
informed the Defendant that a forcible blood draw would be conducted due to the
seriousness of the crash.
VAI
5. The Defendant's blood was drawn at the request of law enforcement and was
subsequently tested for its alcohol content,
6. Law enforcement lacked the authority to compel the Defendant to submit to a
blood draw without a search warrant or pursuant to the provisions of Florida's implied
consent statutes.
7. The taking of blood from the Defendant constituted a search under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and the corresponding provisions of the
Florida Constitution. See Missouri y. Mc/Veo/y, 185 S.Ct. 1552, 1558 (U.S. 2013).
8. In DUt cases where police officers can reasonably obtain a search warrant before
significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that
they do so. Id. at 1561.
9. The facts of this case do not establish sufficient exigent circumstances justifying
the withdrawal of a blood sample from the Defendant without a search warrant. As such,
the warrantless blood draw in this caso violated the Fourth Amendment and the
corresponding provision of the Florida Constitution.
10. Additionally, law enforcement also lacked the authority to compel the Defendant
to submit to a blood draw under Florida's Implied Consent Law.
11. Section 316.1932(1)(c), Florida Statutes, permits the withdrawal of a blood
sample from a DUI suspect only if law enforcement officer has reasonable cause to believe
the suspect has committed DUI, the suspect appears for treatment at a hospital, clinic, or
other medical facility, and the administration of a breath or urine test is impractical or
impossible.
12. Here, at the time of the blood draw, law enforcement lacked probable cause to
believe the Defendant committed DUI, the Defendant did not appear for treatment at a
hospital, clinic, or other medical facility for treatment, and the administration of a breath or
urine test was not impossible or impractical.
13. Section 316.1933, Florida Statutes, permits the withdrawal of a blood sample
from a DUI suspect only if law enforcement has probable cause to believe the person was
driving under the influence and has causod the death or serious bodily injury to a human
being. FIa. Stat. 316.I933(1)(a).
14, Here, at the time of the blood draw, law enforcement lacked probable to believe
that the Defendant committed DUI or that he had caused serious bodily injury or death.
15, Accordingly, law enforcement lacked the authority to withdraw a blood sample
from the Defendant.
WHEREFORE, the Defendant, WADE F. LILES, respectfully requests that this
Honorable Court enter an Order precluding the State from introducing into evidence at trial
all evidence/testimony regarding testing conducted on the blood drawn from the Defendant
in this matter.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy hereof has been furnished by
oservice delivery to the Office of the State Attorney at Division12sao9.org, this 5' day of
February, 2014.
Is/ MICHAEL J. SNURESNURE & PONALL, P.A.425 West New England AvenueSuite 200Winter Park, FL 32789Telephone: (407) [email protected] Bar No. 363235
Attorneys for Defendant
4/29/2014 12:39 PM FILED IN OFFICE EDDIE FERNANDEZ CLERK OF CIRCUIT COURT ORANGE CO FL
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,IN AND FOR ORANGE COUNTY, FLORIDA
STATE OF FLORIDAPlaintiff
y. Case Number: 48-2011-CF-13421-A-O
WADE LILESDefendant.
THIS CAUSE having come on to be heard on the DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
EXCLUDE RESULTS OF TESTING CONDUCTED ON BLOOD DRAWN FROM
THE DEFENDANT and the Court being fUlly advised on the premises, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
Absent a warrant, blood can only be obtained bythe Government from a person,
including the Defendant, ifthere is an exception to the search warrant requirement. In
the instant case the only possible exceptions would be exigency, consent and FIa. Stat.
3 1 6. 1 933 ,
With regard to exigency, the case ofMissouri y, McNcelv, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013),
makes it clear that Schmerber y. California, 86 S.Ct. 1826 (1966) did not authorize a
warrantless searches ofa person's blood simply because a blood alcohol level declines
over time. Instead, under Schmerber, each case is looked at on an individual basis to
determine if an exigency requires the taking of the blood. In the instant case, the
evidence failed to establish an exigency existed to take the Defendant's blood without his
consent.
With regard to consent, the record is clear the Defendant did not expressly
consent. However, implied consent may1 be a recognized exceptiÇn to the warrant
requirement to obtain a defendant's blood. MeNeely at 1566. FIa. Stat.
316.1932(l)(e), a part of implied consent, provides for when a driver has impliedly
Cf. Frost y. Railroad Commission, 271 US 583 (1926), cited with approval in Kooniz y. St. Johns RiverWater Management District, 133 S.Ct. 2586, 2596 (2013) (for invalidating regulation that required thepetitioner to give up a constitutional right "as a condition precedent to the enjoyment of a privilege.")
L
consented to a blood draw. However, the facts as testified to at the hearing failed to
establish that this subsection applied and the State indicated that the State was not
proceeding under this subsection.
Instead, the State indicated that the State was relying on Fia, Stat. 316.1933 to
justi' the warrantless search ofthe Defendant's blood. However, FIa. Stat. 316.1933 is
not part of the implied consent law,2 Fia. Stats. 3 16.1932(1)(a)ia, 316. 1932(1)(a)lb,
3i6.1932(1)(c), and 316.1932(0(e) clearly set forth what is covered by Florida's implied
consent law. While previous versions of Fia. Stat. 316.1933 were part of implied consent
and in fact contained the word "consent," the statute covering the time frame when the
instant blood was withdrawn does not, Prior to July 1, 2002 FIa. Stat, 316.1933(1)
required that a person "shall submit, upon the request of a law enforcement officer, to a
test of the person's blood ..."if the officer had probable cause to believe that the
defendant liad driven a vehicle 'hi1e under the influence of alcohol or drugs and caused
the death or serious bodily injury of a human being. However, Laws of Florida Chapter
2002-263 (the result of the passage of the C.S.C.S.H.B. 1057) altered the state of affairs
and now no longer directs that a person shall submit to a blood test. The amended statute
now directs the law enforcement officer to require a persOn to submit to a test by
reasonable force if necessary, In amending the statute, the legislature appears to have
misinterpreted Schmerber y. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). This finding is based upon
the staff analysis for CSCSHB 1057 under the section titled "Constitutional Issues"
which states:
The United States Supreme Court has held that requiring someone to
submit to breath or blood testing in DUI cases does not violate the Fourth
Amendment' s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures or
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. See Schmerber y.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
Intellectual honesty requires this Court to find that this modification of the law was the
legislature's adoption of the Schmerber exigency standard and removal of FIa. Stat.
2 ThIs fact seems tobe ignored due to older case law interpreting the pre 2002 amended version ofFia. Stat. 3t6.1933.
316.1933 out of the implied consent law3 Unfortunately for the State, as discussed
above, the evidence at the hearing failed to establish that an exigency existed to authorize
the blood withdraw, Without an established exigency, Schmerber did not authorize a
warrantless blood withdrawal. See McNeely.
If the legislature's amendment was not an attempt to adopt the Schmerber
standard by amending FIa. Stat. 316.1933, the statute would be unconstitutional by failing
to require the existence of an exigency before directing the officer to obtain blood.
MoNeely. The next issue is whether or not, under the circumstances, the officer was
allowed to rely upon a statute that has not be declared invalid.4 In Montgomery y, Stat;
69 So,3d 1023 (FIa. 5Ih DCA2O1 I), the Fifth DCA laid out the general good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule, However, with all general rules there are recognized
exceptions. In Illinois y. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-350, 355, 107 S. Ct. 1160, 1167,94
L. Ed. 2d 364 (1987) the United States Supreme Court addressed whether the good faith
exception could be applied to a clearly unconstitutional statute:
Unless a statute is clearly unconstitutional, an officer cannot be expected
to question the judgment of the legislature that passed the law.... A statute
cannot support objectively reasonable reliance if, in passing the statute, the
legislature wholly abandoned its responsibility to enact constitutional
laws, Nor can a law enforcement officer be said to have acted in good-
faith reliance upon a statute if its provisions are such that a reasonable
officer should have known that the statute was unconstitutional .... As we
emphasized in Leon, the standard of reasonableness we adopt is an
objective one; the standard does not turn on the subjective good faith of
individual officers.
Pursuant to Munoz y. State, 629 So,2d 90, 98 (FIa. 1993) "the legislature cannot enact a
statute that overrules ajudicially established legal principle enforcing or protecting a
federal or Florida constitutional right." In the instant case, the Florida Legislature's 2002
amendment of FIa, Stat, 316.1933 directed law enforcement to conduct a warrantless
Even if this Court \vere to find that the legislature was not attempting to adopt Schmerber, theamended Fia. Stat. 316.1933 clearly is no longer Included in implied consent,
The Defense argues that the State failed to lay the predicate to allow the blood to be withdrawnunder Fia. Stat. 316.1933; however, that determination is not is not necessary at this time. However, if thisOpinion is reversed on appeal, this Court will be prepared to issue a separate Order on that issue.
noncönsensual non-exigent search ofa non-arrested person's blood. Such a statute, as
written, clearly violates the Federal and State constitution as much as statute that directs a
police officer to take a warrantless nonconsensual non exigent DNA or blood sample of
any non-arrested person the officer has probable cause to believe committed a sexual
battery,
Under Krull and Munoz, even assuming the facts of the instant case met FIa. Stat.
316.1933, unless the statute adopted the Schmerber standard, the statute is clearly
unconstitutional without an exigency requirement and where the statute is no longer part
of implied consent. By failing to include an exigency requirement in the statute the
legislature wholly abandoned its responsibility to enact constitutional laws and under
Kmh the State cannot rely upon a good faith reliance on a statute in the instant case
which purports to trump the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
In conclusion, the warrantless, nonconsensual, nonexigent blood draw of the
Defendant violates the State and Federal Constitutions and therefore the Defendant's
Motion to Exclude is Granted.
DON AND RDERED in Chambers in Ori o, Oranp County, Florida this
jjthdayof___________ 2014.
MIKE MURPHYCircuit Judge
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished tothe Office of the State Attorney, Division 12 (Division12sao9.org); and Michael Snure,425 W. New England Avenue, Suite 200, Winter Park, FL 32789([email protected]) by email and US mail,
B7LUa-. kÇt 2Sud ici&A s s istant
ni
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THENINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FORORANGE COUNTY, FLORIDA
STATE OF FLORIDA CASE NO: 48-201 1-CF-01 3421-OPlaintiff/Appellant,
vs. DIVISION: 12
WADE F. LILESDefendant/Appellee.
NOTICE OF APPEAL
NOTICE IS GIVEN that the Plaintiff/Appellant, State of Florida, appeals to the Fifth
District Court of Appeal an Order of this Court rendered on the 29April2014. The nature of the
Order(s) is:
An Order titled ORDER ON DEFENDANTS MOTION TO EXCLUDE
RESULTS OF TESTING CONDUCTED ON BLOOD DRAWN FROM TI-lE
DEFENDANT rendered on 29April 2014.
I DO CERTIFY that a copy (copies) hereof (has) (have) been fürnished to James C.
Dauksch, III, C/O Inventory Attorney, 636 W. Yale Street, Orlando, FL 32801; and Michael
Snure, 425 W. New England Avenue, Suite 200, Winter Park, FL 32789 by (de1iveyØ (mail)
(fax) (e-mail) on this 5th day of May, 2014.
JEFFREY L.Ninth Judith
COURT4ange co,1 FLFILED IN oPEsClerk, C r,
By
D.C.
Assistant State AttorneyFlorida Bar # 0602205Divisioni 2®sao9.orgPO Box 1673, 415 N Orange AveSuite 400Orlando, FL 32802-1673(407)836-2190COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
E-Copy Received Jul 25, 2014 11,33 AM
P11TH14' I) lSflICT
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORID2
FIFTH DISTRICT
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellant,
V. CASE NO. 5D14'-1654
WADE F. LILES,
Appellee.
MOTION TO RELINQUISH JURISDICTION
Appellant, State of Florida, pursuant to Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.300, requests this Honorable Court permit
relinquishment of jurisdiction in this matter to the circuit
court for thirty (30) days to allow the circuit court to enter
an additional order on the Appellee's motion to exclude blood
test results, and as grounds therefore states as follows:
1. The State appeals from the trial court's order granting
the Appellee's motion to exclude the results of testing
conducted on blood drawn from him after a fatal traffic
accident. (R. 360-63) . In its order, the court found that
section 316.1933, Florida Statutes, is unconstitutional. That
statute requires a law enforcement officer to order a blood draw
if the officer has probable cause to believe that a motor
vehicle driven by a person under the influence of alcohol has
caused a death or serious bodily injury.
Ii
2. In his motion to exclude, the Appellee argued that the
statute permitting such a blood draw was unconstitutional and
that the officer in the instant case lacked probable cause under
the statute. (R. 235-37, 351-56). The trial court's order was
entered after a full evidentiary hearing. (R. 375-453)
However, the court specifically did not reach the issue of
whether the trooper had probable cause for the blood draw, as
required by the statute, as that determination was unnecessary
in light of its legal conclusion that the statute is
unconstitutional. (R. 362 n.4)
3. Should this Court ultimately agree with the State that
the statute is constitutional, or that the trooper relied on the
statute in good faith, a remand would be necessary to resolve
the factual issue of whether there was probable cause under the
statute. Such a remand would presumably take place months from
now, well after the evidentiary hearing, and the lower court's
decision on this matter would be subject to another appeal.
4. In the interest of judicial economy and fairness to the
parties, it would make more sense for the trial court to rule on
the factual issue of probable cause now, so both issues can be
litigated in the same appeal. At a pretrial conference, the
trial judge indicated that he would be glad to rule on this
issue to make it part of the same appeal.
5. Undersigned counsel is authorized to state that William
R. Ponall, counsel for Appellee, agrees that relinquishment
would be appropriate here.
WHEREFORE, the Appellee respectfully requests this Court
enter an order relinquishing jurisdiction to the circuit court
for a period of thirty (30) days, to allow the court to enter an
order on the remaining issue.
Respectfully submitted,
PAMELA JO BONDI
ATTORNEY GENERAL
¡si Kristen L. Davenport
KRISTEN L. DAVENPORTASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERALFla. Bar #909130444 Seabreeze Blvd.
Fifth FloorDaytona Beach, FL 32118(386) 238-4990
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
DESIGNATION OF EMAIL ADDRESS
Undersigned counsel can be served at the following email
address: [email protected]
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above
Motion has been furnished to William R. Ponall, counsel for
Appellee, 425 West New England Avenue, Suite 200, Winter Park,
Florida 32789, by email to [email protected], this
25th day of July, 2014.
/5/ Kristen L. DavenportKristen L. DavenportCounsel for Appellee
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDAFIFTH DISTRICT
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellant,
V,
WADE F. LILES,
Appellee./
DATE: August 06, 2014
BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
CASE NO. 5D14-1654
ORDERED that Appellant's Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction, filed July 25,
2014, is granted. Accordingly, jurisdiction is hereby relinquished to the circuit court for
45 days. Appellant shall file a report on the status of the proceedings below before the
relinquishment period expires.
/ hereby certify that the foregoing is(a true copy of) the original Court order.
C.O Uk?
t.NUfl-,
'?.
PAMELA R. MASTERS, CLERK
cc:
Office Of Attorney GeneralOrange Co. Circuit Ct.Clerk (2011-CF-13421)
Michael J. Snure Kristen L. DavenportHon. Michael Murphy
8120/2014 4:24 PM FILED IN THE OFFICE OF EDDIE FERNANDEZ CLERK OF CIRCUIT COURT ORANGE CO FL
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THENINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN ANDFOR ORANGE COUNTY, FLORIDA
CASE NUMBER: 2011-0E-013421-A-O
DIV 12
STATE OF FLORIDA
Plaintiff,
vs.
WADE F LILES
Defendant.
ORDER ON THE REMAINDER OF THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESSAFTER THE FIFTH DCA'S RELINQUISHMENT OF JURISDICTION
THIS CAUSE, having como onto be heard before the Court upon the THE FIFTH DCA'SRELINQUISHMENT OF JURISDICTION and the Court having reviewed the pleading and beingotherwise duty advised in the premises, hereby
ORDERS AND ADJUDGES as follows:
On April 29, 2014 this Court entered an Order on Defendant's Motion to Exclude Resultsof Testing Conducted on Blood Drawn from the Defendant. In that Order, this Court declined toRule on the issue of whether the State laid the predicate to allow the blood to be withdrawn underFIa. Stat. 316.1933 because that determination was unnecessajy due to the remainder of theopinion.
The Fifth DCA has now relinquished Jurisdiction for this Court to address the FIa. Stat.316.1933 predicate issue to allow for the parties to brief that issue if necessary to avoid apotential second appeal. This Court finds that despite the Defendant's arguments to the contrary,includïng any hearsay, State y. Bowers, 87 So. 3d 704 (FIa. 2012) or accident report privilegeobjections, and law enforcement's Initial belief of the Defendant's direction of travel, that In theevent that the DCA reverses this Couds original Order, the evidence established the statutorypredicate to obtain blood pursuant to FIa. Stat. 316.1933.
DONE AND ORDERED In chambers, at Orlando, Orange County, Florida this¿Sdayof - 20
Honorable Milce MurCircuit Coud Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the forooing was furnished tothe Office of State Attorney, 415 North Orange Avenue, Orlando, Florida, 3801, aeI James
ter Park Fl 32789 on this day ofSquip. 425 Wjew England Ave Ste 200 Win
Judictjssistant
t'
Filing # 18417952 Electronically Filed 09/18/2014 07:35:45 PM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THENINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN ANDFOR ORANGE COUNTY, FLORIDA
CASE NO. 2011-CF-13421-A-O
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Plaintiff/Appellant,Cross -Appellee
vs.
WADE F, LIJJiS,
De fendant/Appellee,Cross-Appellant
NOTICEI OF..CROSS -APflAZ
NOTICE IS HEREBY given that the Defendant/Appoi.lee/Cross-
Appellant, WADE F. LILES, appeals Lo the Fifth District Court of
Appeal, the attached Order on the Remainder of the Defendant's
Motion to Suppress After the Fifth DCA's Relinquishment of
Jurisdiction, rendered on August 20, 2014.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing çws provided by
mail, delivery to the Office of the State Attorney,
Qjvisioni2Øsaoog and Assistant Attorney General Kristin
Davenport, on this 18th day
of September, 2014.
Is! Wi1liam_ß PonallWILLIAM R, PONALLSNURE & PONALL, P,A,425 W. New England Ave., Ste. 200Winter Park, FL 32789Telephone: (407) 469-6200Facsimile: (407) 645-0805Florida Bar No, [email protected]
r'
6/2012014 4:24 PM FILED IN THE OFF10E OF EDDIE FERNANDEZ CLERK OF CIRCUIT COURT ORANGE CO FL
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT CF THENINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN ANDFOR ORANGE COUNTY, FLORLDA
CASE NUMBER; 201i-CF0l3421-AO
DIV 12
STATE OF FLORIDA
Plaintiff,
vs.
WADE F LILES
Defendant.
ORDER ON THE REMAINDER OF ThEpifENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESSAFTER THE FIFTH DOA'S IThLINQUISHMENT OF JURISDICTION
THIS CAUSE, having come on to be heard before the Court upon the THE FIFTH DCA'SRE1INQUISIIMENT CF JURISDICTION and the Court having reviewed the pleading and beingotherwIse duly advised In the premises, hereby
ORDERS AND ADJUDGES as follows:
On April 20 2014 thIs Coud entered an Order on Defendant's Motion to Exclude Resultsof Testing Conducted ori Blood Drawn from the Defendant. in that Order, this Court declined toRule on the Issue of whether the Stete laid the predicate to allow the blood to be withdrawn underFia Stat, alô,1g33 because that determination was unnecessary due to the remainder of theopinion.
The Fifth OCA has now relinquIshed Jurlsdiclion for this Court to address the Fia, Slat.316.1933 predicate issue to allow for the parties to brief that issue if necessary to avoid apotential second appeal. This Court finds that despite the Defendant's arguments to iho contrary,including any hearsay, State y, Bowers, 87 So. 3d 704 (FIa. 2012) or accident report privilegeobjections, and law enforcement's Initiai belief of the Defendant's direoflon of travel, that in theevent that the DCA reverses this Court's original Order, the evidence established the statutorypredicate te obtain blood pursuant to Fia. Slat, 316.1933.
DONE AND ORDERED in chambers, at Orlando, Orange County, Florida thisday 20 j ti'.
Honorable tlike Murçi$1'Circuit Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
i HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the forgoing was furnished tothe Office of State AtIorney, 415 North Orange Avenue Ociando, Fiorida, 3280t, Micbaei JamesSn re, Es u! 426 W P4ew England Ave Ste 200 wùiter Park Fl 32789 on this C) day of
20J4.
Judic9ssistant
E-Copy Received sep 18, 2014 4:07 PM
í4í&jii-i \v,\
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDJ\.Çop
FIFTH DISTRICT
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellant,
V. CASE NO. 5Dl4-1654
WADE F. LILES,
Appellee.
STATUS REPORT
Appellant, State of Florida, pursuant to this Court's August
6, 2014, order, files this Status Report, as follows:
1. On August 6, 2014, this Court entered an order granting
the State's motion to relinquish jurisdiction to the trial court
for 45 days to allow the trial court to enter a supplemental
order addressing factual issues not addressed in the original
order.
2. The trial court has now entered an order finding that
the trooper had probable cause for the blood draw, as required
by the applicable Florida statute. The Appellee intends to
cross-appeal from this order, allowing all legal issues to be
resolved in this proceeding.
Respectfully submitted,
PAMELA JO BONDI
ATTORNEY GENERAL
¡s! Kristen L. Davenport
KRISTEN L. DAVENPORTASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERALFla. Bar #909130444 Seabreeze Blvd.
Fifth FloorDaytona Beach, FL 32118(386) 238-4990
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above
Status Report has been furnished to William R. Ponall, counsel
for Appellee, 425 West New England Avenue, Suite 200, Winter
Park, Florida 32789, by email to [email protected],
this 18th day of September, 2014.
/s/ Kristen L. DavenportKristen L. DavenportCounsel for Appellee