The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 8 | Issue 37 | Number 3 | Article ID 3409 | Sep 13, 2010

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Examining the Myth of Ryukyuan Pacifism

Gregory Smits

Examining the Myth of RyukyuanPacifism

Gregory Smits

Introduction

On August 28, 2009 the Okinawa Association ofAmerica marked its 100th anniversary byhosting the musical King Sho Hashi--DynamicRyukyu at the Redondo Beach Performing ArtsCenter in Los Angeles. The poster promotingthe event characterizes it as “an ultra modernkumiodori musical in Japanese and English,”and the main visual image of the posterfeatures a young man wielding a sword. Thesword is not poised for violence. Instead it isheld backwards, blade against the forearm, asa dance prop.1 The following passage from anarticle describing the musical quotes from itsproducer: “Discussing his purpose in creatingthe work, producer and stage director DaiichiHirata said, ‘For Okinawans, King Sho Hashiwas the first historical figure to have a trulypositive impact on the country. I want to takethat passionate Okinawan tradition and conveyit to future generations using King Sho Hashias the motif’.”2 The promotional poster for themusical says of Shō Hashi that “His visionunited a kingdom.”3

Perhaps the most obvious critical detail thatcomes to mind in examining the discoursesurrounding King Sho Hashi--Dynamic Ryukyuis the peculiarly modern conception ofOkinawa’s distant past that assumes some kindof meaningful “Okinawan” identity alreadyexisted when Shō Hashi began his conquests.Both Hirata and the promotional poster suggestthat there already was a “country” or a“kingdom” of Okinawa, and that Shō Hashi(1372-1439; r. 1422-1439) performed a gloriousservice for the people living in this place byuniting them. In this view, Okinawa has becomea timeless entity, a screen onto whichcontemporary people can project identities,

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values and aspirations. Significantly, thepromotional literature connected with King ShoHashi--Dynamic Ryukyu is silent about thepotentially problematic issue of Okinawa’srelationship with Japan. Moreover, thecelebratory nature of this musical drama andthe literature surrounding it elides somethingthat might seem essential to even the mostbasic telling of Shō Hashi’s story: militaryviolence. Shō Hashi ruled Chūzan at a timewhen Okinawa was home to three small states.He waged bloody military campaigns in thenorth and south of Okinawa to conquerHokuzan (also called Sanboku, destroyed in1416) and Nanazan (also called Sannan,destroyed in 1429). Shō Hashi was surelyambitious, but if his main goal was any moreelevated than that of other conquerors, there isno good evidence of it. Prior to their violentunification, the three Okinawan statesmaintained tributary relations with the MingChinese court via the Ōsōfu, a quasi-independent office located in Chūzan and staffed by Chinese expatriates.4

Let us consider a different celebratory versionof Shō Hashi’s unification, that found in theChūzan seikan (Mirror of Chūzan, hereafter“Seikan”) The Seikan was the Ryukyu’s firstofficial history, completed in 1650 by ShōShōken (Haneji Chōshū). Interestingly, theSeikan account of Shō Hashi’s conquest ismuch longer than that of Satsuma’s conquest ofRyukyu in 1609.5 Roughly like King Sho Hashi--Dynamic Ryukyu, the 1650 account of ShōHashi contained an agenda that spoke to itscontemporary audience. In the classicalChinese manner of writing history, Shō Shōkendescribed Shō Hashi as a virtuous ruler whobrought order to a chaotic Okinawa. Indeed,Shō Hashi “went hungry himself when thepeople were starving and suffered cold himselfwhen the people were cold.” One might wonderhow severely the people of Okinawa sufferedfrom the cold, but such language wasboilerplate praise. Furthermore, Shō Hashi wassagacious, his words and deeds were good, and

he was free of desires—like King Wen,celebrated founder of the Zhou dynasty inChina. By contrast, the king of Sannanfrequently hosted “large, drunken pleasurebanquets” and was without decorum orloyalty.6 Owing to the influence of Chinesedynastic histories, historical sensibilitythroughout East Asia in the seventeenthcentury required that the founder of a dynastybe virtuous and the last ruler of a state bedepraved. Similarly, though for differentideological reasons, modern Okinawannationalism tends to romanticize the Ryukyuanpast.

There is, however, one major differencebetween the seventeenth century account ofShō Hashi and the contemporary musicaldrama: the emphasis in the former on militaryconquest. The bulk of the description of ShōHashi in the Seikan details the battles andtroop movements that resulted in his ultimatevictory. In response to an alleged plan toconquer Shuri by the king of Sanboku, ShōHashi appointed the aji (local warlords) ofUrasoe, Goeku, and Yomitan as generals,assembled an army, and set out from ShuriCastle, arriving in Nago several days later. Atone point, the Chūzan forces outmaneuveredthe enemy and their arrows “fell upon them likerain.”7 Another fight involving 200 defenders ofa northern castle and 500 Chūzan attackers“stained the grass with blood, and corpsessprawled along the roadway.” In addition toswords and arrows, a small band of twentyattackers crept quietly into the castle and setfires.8 Blood-stained grass and corpses liningthe roadway were stock metaphors fordescribing warfare.

Regardless of the precise appearance of thegrass or roadway, the Seikan account isgenerally accurate in pointing out that ShōHashi’s accomplishment was the result of hard-fought battles in which many Okinawansperished. From the standpoint of 1650, therewas no particular reason to elide or minimize

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Shō Hashi’s conquest, unlike the case ofRyukyu’s disastrous war with Satsuma in 1609.Indeed, that war with Satsuma is describedonly in the historical overview that serves asthe Seikan’s introduction, and only in brief,sterile terms. We read that Shimazu Iehisadispatched Kabayama Kenzaemon [Hisataka] asa general, who invaded Ryukyu and capturedthe king. There is no account of specific battles,Iehisa is described as “benevolent anddecorous,” and a few lines later as a “wiseruler”. Shō Hō reinstated Ryukyu’s “oldceremonial customs and music,” thuspresumably restoring harmony to Ryukyu inclassic Confucian style.9

Particularly after 1609, Ryukyu’s elites had totread very carefully to maintain some degree ofpolitical autonomy. Their general approach wasto use connections with China, bakufu fears ofmilitary conflict with the Qing court, andfeatures of the Tokugawa-era hierarchy as acounterbalance to Satsuma’s power.10 As partof this process, Ryukyuan elites becameincreasingly skilled at managing the kingdom’simage. They sought to convey to outsiders theimage of a small, peaceful kingdom, whereConfucian-style virtue mitigated or eveneliminated the need for coercive force tomaintain domestic order or to defend againstexternal threats such as pirates. Herein lies thebasic origin of the myth of Ryukyuan pacifism,which retains widespread currency today.

This paper has four interrelated goals. First, Isurvey the contemporary myth of Okinawanpacifism. Second, I explain the structure,weapons, and select battles of the RyukyuKingdom’s military forces, mainly to make itclear that the myth of Ryukyuan pacifism isindeed a myth. Next, I discuss the nineteenthand early twentieth-century development ofthis myth. Finally, I examine the recent andcontemporary situation and draw some briefconclusions about Okinawa or Ryukyu as animaginary construct. My basic argument is thatRyukyu has long functioned as a blank screen

upon which to project fantasies and desires.

The Contemporary Myth of RyukyuanPacifism

Searching the Web using combinations of termspairing “Okinawa,” or “Ryukyu” with wordssuch as “peace,” “weapons,” and “rape” revealsa large number of sites, whose topics includethe problem of U.S. military bases, theinfamous 1995 rape of a twelve-year-old girl,Okinawan martial arts, other Okinawan artsand crafts, and Okinawan history. The contentof these sites ranges widely in quality, andsome include essays by scholars or othersclaiming familiarity with some aspect ofOkinawan history or culture. Despite diversecontent, what many of these sites have incommon is the perpetuation of a romantic mythof Okinawan or Ryukyuan pacifism, typically inthe service of a contemporary political agenda.

Active or passive acceptance of the myth ofRyukyuan pacifism is common even amonghistorians and other scholars. The usualapproach is to juxtapose an alleged pacifisticpast with a militarized present. For example,Gavan McCormack characterizes the 400-yearperiod of 1609-2009, in terms of two sets ofcontradictions, one of which is “betweenOkinawan deep-seated peace orientation andthe imposed priority to war and subjection byforce.” One way in which this alleged deep-seated orientation toward peace manifesteditself was this:

According to one story, probablyapocryphal, as King Sho Nei in1609 chose non-resistance to thesuperior force of Satsuma, heuttered the words Nuchi du takara.Whether or not he ever spokethem, these words have come to beunderstood as a statement ofOkinawan value. Sho Nei ’ss u b m i s s i o n d i d n o t m e a nsurrender. Facing physically

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superior opponents, submissionwas unavoidable, but consciencea n d v a l u e w e r e n o t t o b eappropriated by force. 1 1

The ascription of this utterance, meaning “Lifeis a treasure,” to Shō Nei (r. 1587-1620) is butone item in a rich apocryphal lore that hasdeveloped about certain events in Okinawanhistory. McCormack, like many other writers,suggests that peacefulness is an engrainedcharacteristic of Okinawa, now or in centuriespast. Let us consider, however, a very differentaccount of Shō Nei’s surrender to Satsuma.

In a recent book on the 1609 war betweenSatsuma and Ryukyu, Stephen Turnbullexplains that the Satsuma invasion force of3,000 soldiers (plus 5,000 sailors and laborers)performed very well, but the fighting was notwithout problems for the invaders. One reasonwas that:

. . . o n l y t h e i s l a n d o fOkinoerabujima surrenderedmeekly. Resistance on Amami-Oshima, Tokunosh ima andOkinawa itself was fierce, but itwas the Shimazu superiority infirearms, and their readiness touse both f ire and sword in aruthless manner against soldiersand non-combatants alike, thatfinally decided the matter.12

Map of the Ryukyu Islands and nearbyareas.

As for the fall of Shuri castle, organized volleysof gunfire pinned down the Ryukyuandefenders long enough to permit the attackersto scale the walls of Shuri Castle using ladders.After capturing the ramparts and breakingdown the castle gates:

In no time at all the vanguard ofthe Shimazu army was standing inthe main courtyard outside theseiden [main palace]. It wouldappear that throughout the attack,King Shō Nei had courageouslyremained at his post but, seeingthat the cause was hopeless, hesurrendered to avoid furtherbloodshed. His three sanshikan[members of the kingdom’s highestgoverning body], Jana Teidō, Nago

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Ryōhō, and Urasoe Chōshi, all ofwhom had fought bravely at Nahaand Shuri, went voluntarily ashostages . . . .13

When the Satsuma fleet tried to enter NahaHarbor, the Ryukyuan defenders repulsed it.Had the Ryukyuan military forces been able toperform a similar feat vis-à-vis the overlandattack on Shuri Castle, the king might wellhave been able to negotiate an end to the warmore favorable to Ryukyu. The key point here isthat neither the king, nor his generals, nor hismilitary forces “chose non-resistance.” Theyresisted vigorously until the invaders hadfought their way to the king’s front door. Onlyat that point did the treasure of life becomeapparent to the kingdom’s top leadership.

As is well known, approximately one-fifth of theland of contemporary Okinawa consists ofmilitary bases, whose presence is a source ofnoise, other forms of environmentaldegradation, a variety of dangers includingsexual assaults by military personnel, and otherproblems. When deployed skillfully, thejuxtaposition of a peaceful Ryukyuan pastversus a militarized Okinawan present suggeststhat, in addition to the obvious problemsassociated with the military bases, theirpresence violates the very spirit or soul of thepeaceful Okinawan people. Among otherfunctions, such a rhetorical strategy therebyenhances the poignancy of the image ofOkinawans as victims. It is also appealing in amore general way to Okinawans and otherswho yearn for a more peaceful world and lookto the past for some indication that a statebased on peaceful foundations is possible.Indeed, as we will see, it was precisely such ayearning on the part of some Europeans in thewake of the Napoleonic Wars that created themyth of Ryukyuan pacifism.

G i ven Ok inawa ’ s r ecen t pas t , i t i sunderstandable that many of the island’sresidents might find comfort in the image of

their home as the center of a pacifistickingdom. More substantially, the legacy of apeaceful Ryukyu Kingdom might containlessons from which all of humanity mightbenefit. McCormack, for example, concludeshis survey of Okinawa’s past four centuries bystating that in “the early 21st century,humanity’s best hope is for a recovery ofOkinawa’s Nuchi du takara values. Okinawa’santi-base and anti environmental destructionstruggles are central to the global struggle forpeace and sustainability.”1 4 There areproblems, however, with this approach. First, itrelies on questionable assumptions thatOkinawa’s people are and have been a singularentity in terms of culture and viewpoint andthat conditions obtaining in the rather distantpast (the Ryukyu Kingdom ended in 1879)necessarily apply—or presumably shouldapply—in the present. Next, it is simply wrong.The Ryukyu Kingdom was a normal state in thatit was based ultimately on coercive force—aswe will see in some detail. Some might wonderwhether, even if Ryukyu was not a pacifiststate, what is the harm in presenting it assuch? My simple answer is that if we areindeed to achieve a recovery of humanity alongthe lines McCormack suggests, then we need tobe realistic about humanity’s capacity forviolence and the inherent roles that coercivepower has historically played in humansocieties.

Perhaps the most prominent figure whoregularly alleges past pacifism in addressingthe base problem is former governor andRyukyu University professor Ōta Masahide. Forexample, in a speech delivered in 1997, whilestill governor, he asserted that:

T h e [ R y u k y u ] k i n g d o m ' spredominant features weredevotion to peace and an absenceof weapons. The people's widerecognition as an unarmed land ofcourtesy was stressed by the late

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Professor William Lebra of theUniversity of Hawaii, whoseOkinawan Religion: Belief, Ritualand Social Structure (1966) arguesthat the cultures of Japan andOkinawa differ fundamentally. Incontrast to Japan's “warriorculture,” Okinawa's is notable foran “absence of militarism.”15

This claim sets up a lengthy discussion of themilitarization of Okinawa from 1945 to thepresent. Notice that Ōta cites the authority ofanthropologist William Lebra, most likely inthis case because his audience was a U.S.congressional study group.

Although Lebra did not take up the topic as anissue for serious investigation, he perpetuatedthe myth of Ryukyuan pacifism in the context ofpresenting background information aboutOkinawa. Almost certainly the passage to whichŌta refers is one in which Lebra comparesOkinawa with the mainland of Japan. Whilepointing out the relatively more prominentstatus of women in Okinawa society, Lebrastated that one reason might be:

the absence of militarism duringthe past five hundred years . . .Nearly all Western visitors sincethe time of Captain Hall havecommented on the mildness andlack of overt aggression inOkinawan behavior. The absenceof any martial spirit save whereinfrequently inculcated by theJapanese was particularly apparentin the battle for Okinawa duringWorld War II, when virtually everyJapanese fought until killed orc o m m i t t e d s u i c i d e w h i l eOkinawans were not averse tosurrender when they could.16

As we will see, Lebra was incorrect about theabsence of militarism for 500 years and thelack of battle-related suicides amongOkinawans. We will also see that “Captain Hall”and other British sailors who visited Naha in1816 were indeed influential perpetrators of anidealized image of Ryukyu.

We will return to Hall later, but here it isinteresting to note that although Ōtaappropriated Lebra’s authority in the passageabove, it is highly unlikely that Ōta or otherswho seek to highlight Okinawan sufferingwould actually quote from Lebra as I have here.The reason is that we now have strongevidence pointing to a scenario precisely theopposite of that described by Lebra. In otherwords, significant numbers of Japanese soldiersduring the Battle of Okinawa surrendered,whereas many Okinawan civilians killedthemselves and their families, often inespecially gruesome ways. Indeed, these groupsuicides have become a major grievance in thecontemporary narrative of Okinawanvictimization. One major issue is the extent towhich they were voluntary. Ōe Kenzaburō,Steve Rabson, Matthew Allen, Ōta and othershave convincingly argued that in many casesJapanese military authorities ordered suchsuicides and even provided means for carryingthem out. Moreover, there was intensepsychological pressure at work, wherebyOkinawan civilians, and especially soldiers inthe Japanese army, were under constantpressure to prove their loyalty to emperor andcountry, a loyalty that mainland Japaneseauthorities frequently found suspect. Insofar asan Okinawan soldier might “willingly” havesacrificed himself, the prevailing environmentcomplicates the issue of personal free will.17

The juxtaposition of an allegedly idyllic landwithout weapons or violence and themilitarized islands of today, leads almostinevitably to the metaphor of rape. In an essayentitled “The Rape of Okinawa,” George Feifertakes the usual rhetorical approach, setting the

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stage as follows:

Throughout the centuries whenJapan was almost hermeticallysealed against fore igners ,Okinawans welcomed their shipswith a graciousness that startledpassengers and crews. Althoughfear may have prompted it, thecallers did not think so. Anothere i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y [ s i c ]Englishman spoke for almost allsuch travelers when he reportedOkinawans' most prominentcharacteristics as "their gentlenessof spirit and manner, their yieldingand disposition, their hospitalityand kindness, their aversion toviolence and crime." "For gentledignity of manners, superioradvancement in the arts andgeneral intelligence," anothersailor maintained, "the inhabitants. . . are by far the most interesting,enlightened nation in the PacificOcean." The Russian writer IvanGoncharov was skeptical of suchpraise when he arrived in 1853.But "What a place, what people!"he found. "All exuded such afeeling of peace, simplicity, honestlabor and plenty that it seemed tome . . . a longed-for haven."18

The paragraphs that follow this passagedescribe the U.S. military bases and thesuffering they inflict on Okinawa’s inhabitants.The title of Feifer’s essay was surely promptedby an actual incident, which he mentions in thepreliminary paragraphs: the 1995 rape of atwelve-year-old schoolgirl by three U.S.soldiers. Although sexual assault had long beena scourge connected with the bases, thisparticular incident became a cause célèbreamong women’s advocacy groups and the anti-base movement. The victimization of this

young, innocent girl quickly came to symbolizethe larger-scale rape of the former “peacefulkingdom.”19

While there are many good arguments foreliminating or reducing the U.S. militarypresence on Okinawa, the rhetorical strategy ofinvoking contrast with an allegedly peacefulkingdom of centuries past is not only based ondubious assumptions about the normative forceof history and the social and cultural coherencyof “Okinawa” across time, but it is simplyincorrect. The Ryukyuan state, like all states,relied ultimately on coercive force—or thethreat of it—to maintain order. This coerciveforce not only unified the island of Okinawa,but through the conquest of other islands, itcreated the Ryukyu Kingdom. During thefifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Ryukyufunctioned as a small-scale empire. Inconsolidating its empire and maintaining it, theOkinawan polity in Shuri sometimes clashedmilitarily with southward-expanding politiesbased in the province of Satsuma. To the south,pirates often attacked Ryukyuan or Chineseships engaged in trade or diplomacy, andpirates even attacked the port of Naha onoccasion. In short, the Ryukyu kingdom did notlack police and military forces or occasions touse them.

Military Affairs in the Ryukyu Kingdom

Soon after military force placed Okinawa underone ruler in 1429, the conquest of the otherRyukyu Islands began. Let us consider theexample of Amami-Ōshima and nearbyKikaijima. In 1450 (1451 in some accounts), sixshipwrecked Koreans drifted to Gajashima, asmall island in the Satsunan chain. Theyreported that the island was half under thecontrol of Satsuma and half under the controlof Okinawa. Later, four of these Koreans weretaken to Sasari at the northern end of Amami-Ōshima. The local Okinawan mil itarycommander there sent the Koreans on to Shuri,where they met with the king and other

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officials. From their account, we know thatAmami-Ōshima was under Okinawan militarycontrol by that time but that the fight to controlKikaijima was still in progress. Several Koreanaccounts point to the 1440s as the timeOkinawan forces conquered Amami-Ōshima. Onnearby Kikaijima, residents resisted theOkinawan invaders vigorously, finally causingKing Shō Toku personally to lead an invasion ofthe island in 1466.20

The observations of the Koreans in 1450 aresignificant in several respects. Notice, forexample, that at this time Okinawans controlledhalf of Gajashima, an island very close toSatsuma. The many islands between Satsumaand Okinawa served as potential objects ofconflict between a northward-expandingRyukyu Kingdom and the southward-expandingambitions of some of the warlords whocontrolled Satsuma. Gajashima seems to havebeen the all-time northernmost limit of Shuri’smilitary control. The Chikama family, retainersof the Hōjō, controlled Satsuma at the turn ofthe fourteenth century, and they forged anetwork of trade routes throughout thenorthern Ryukyu Islands. In 1493, a force fromSatsuma invaded Amami-Ōshima and clashedwith an army under Shuri’s command. In abloody battle, the Ryukyuans drove off theSatsuma invaders.21 In 1537, King Shō Shin (r.1477-1527), often credited by modern myth-makers with creating the “peaceful kingdom”by confiscating and locking up all weapons, ledan invasion force of Okinawan soldiers to quella rebellious Amami-Ōshima. The Kyūyō, anofficial history, states that Shō Sei dispatchedsoldiers to Ōshima in 1538. Some accountsrecord King Shō Gen as leading an invasion ofAmami-Ōshima in 1571, though there is somedebate among historians regarding the veracityof the 1571 campaign.22 Invasions of Miyako,Yaeyama, and other islands also took placeduring the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Inshort, the Ryukyu Kingdom became a small-scale empire, created, expanded, and sustainedby the use of military force.

From the Koreans who drifted to Gajashima in1450 we know that Ryukyuan firearms (handcannon) at this time were of advanced design,“similar to those of our own country.” TheKoreans reported that they studied theseweapons with the aid of a royal official chargedwith the oversight of firearms. Such firearmsalmost certainly came from China. Ming courtrecords include a 1452 decree by the Board ofJustice forbidding the practice by residents ofthe Fujian coast of conveying military hardwareto Ryukyuans in private trade deals. Theinhabitants of coastal areas of Fujian oftenstockpiled these weapons to repel wakō pirateattacks.23

A Ming-vintage Chinese artillery piece

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(bottom) called a futsurōki in Japanese.Ryukyu was an early adopter of such

weapons during fifteenth century.

Other shipwrecked Koreans described militaryaffairs in and around Shuri castle in detail in a1462 account. The soldiers guarding theperimeter of the castle served yearly tours ofduty, with a member of the royal familyappointed to train and oversee each year’s newconscripts. The basic unit of the army was a100-man group, several of whom guarded thecastle. When the king ventured out, a 300-mancontingent of mounted soldiers accompaniedhim. Within the castle, about 100 peopleserving in five-day rotations administered themi l i tary forces and made log is t ica larrangements. Outside of Shuri, a local warlordadministered a stone fortress in each of thenearby districts. The Korean account did notspecify the number of these fortresses, butother sources list sixteen of them in addition toShuri.24

Ruins of an Okinawan stone fortress (J.gusuku, O. gushiku).

This early system of military organization wasalmost certainly the direct predecessor of the

hiki system established by Shō Shin, a pivotalmonarch in Ryukyuan history. Throughout hislong reign, he strove, with considerablesuccess, to strengthen the power of the kingvis-à-vis the hereditary warlords (aji), toenhance the ideological and symbolic authorityof the king, and to build a centralized, efficientmilitary system. It is therefore ironic that ShōShin figures prominently in one strand of themyth of Ryukyuan pacifism: the story of karate.Because the king confiscated weapons andforbade their use, the basic story line goes,Okinawans became adept at fighting with theirempty hands or using farm implements asw e a p o n s . 2 5 M o d e r n m y t h m a k i n gnotwithstanding, Shō Shin pursued two basicstrategies with respect to military affairs. Onthe one hand, he sought to place all Ryukyuanmilitary power under direct royal command. Onthe other, he sought to strengthen Ryukyu’smilitary by implementing a more efficientorganization and improved infrastructure.

Shō Shin required all local warlords to reside inShuri, bestowing great social prestige on themwhile eliminating their military power. To fillthe local power gap thus created, the kingimplemented the so-called magiri-shimasystem. “Magiri” were local administrativedistricts, and the term “shima” refers tovillages within the districts (probably relying onthe metaphor of villages as “islands” withindistricts). Shō Shin and his successorsappointed non-warlord officials to oversee thedistricts, and the former warlords involvedthemselves with the aristocratic society of thecapital and central government politics.Significantly, references to local military forcesin monuments erected between 1522 and 1554used the term “magiri gun” (district forces)instead of aji gun (warlord forces). We do notknow the details of the composition of theseforces, but they were all under Shuri’s directcommand by the end of Shō Shin’s reign.26

The hiki system was the core of Shō Shin’s newmilitary organization. Perhaps the easiest way

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to grasp the logic of this arrangement is tothink of “hiki” rather literally as meaning “topull together.” Each hiki pulled togethervarious officials and military forces intonetworks capable of dealing with emergencies.The hiki combined in one organization bothmilitary and police functions, including guardduty, administration of government, andadministration of trade. Ryukyuan ships werethe governing metaphor of the hiki. The hikiwere led by officials with the title sedo (O.shiidu), a variant of sentō, ship’s captain. Thenames of the hiki all ended with –tomi, whichwas also the suffix for the names of large ships(like –maru for Japanese vessels). Thisterminology is indicative of the centralimportance of oceanic trade, a royal monopoly,for Ryukyu’s prosperity. Takara Kurayoshi hascharacterized the hiki as “overland ships”(chijō no kaisen) and ocean-going vessels as“floating hiki” (umi ni ukanda hiki). Notsurprisingly, the hiki also provided shipboardmilitary forces for Ryukyuan trade vessels, allof which were armed from 1421 onward. Thehiki were grouped into three watches (ban),each of which contained four hiki. It is likelythat the heads of these three watches evolvedinto the Sanshikan (O. Yoasutabe), the highestorgan of government in Ryukyu from thesixteenth century until the end of thekingdom.27 In modern military terminology, onemight character ize the hiki as rapiddeployment forces.

In conjunction with these networks of rapiddeployment forces, Shō Shin sought tostrengthen the underlying infrastructure of themilitary, a policy continued by his immediatesuccessors. A famous 1509 monumentinscription at Urasoe tells of the king’s storingweapons there to reduce the need to obtainthem from outlying areas. It is this inscriptionthat is typically cited in connection with claimsthat Ryukyu became a society without weaponsbecause of Shō Shin’s policies. The king alsowalled in the northern face of Shuri Castle andin 1522 built a road for military use between

Shuri and Naha. In 1546, Shō Sei extended thenetwork of defensive walls around Shuri Castleand constructed Yarazamori Fortress to defendthe entrance into Naha Harbor. Shō Shin alsoestablished an official to oversee artillerydeployment and technology.28 As we will see,the combination of the Yarazamori Fortress andeffective cannon served the kingdom very wellwhen an invasion force from Satsumaattempted to enter Naha Harbor in 1609. Italso helped repel major attacks by pirates in1556 and 1606.

By the middle of the sixteenth century,Ryukyu’s military had reached its fulldevelopment, and Figure 4 illustrates its basicorganization. One general point reflected inthis diagram is that Shō Shin designed hismilitary reforms in part to focus the kingdom’sresources on guarding the central organs ofstate, namely the port of Naha and ShuriCastle. A network of fortresses and roadsthroughout the Shuri-Naha area supported this

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military organization. Yarazamori Fortress andMie Fortress were on opposite sides of thenarrow entrance to Naha Harbor. An iron chainboom could be drawn between the two castlesto close off the entrance to ships. Large-boreartillery pieces were concentrated in this areaas well.

A large-bore artillery piece called a hiya,which would have been deployed as part of

the defense of Naha Harbor.

Iō Fortress, nearby but further into the harbor,functioned as the main arsenal, distributingweapons to the hiki soldiers as they assembledat their defensive positions. Tomi Fortress,deep inside the harbor, was the command andcontrol center. The Pearl Road, built explicitlyfor military purposes, connected thesefortresses to each other and to Shuri Castle.29

The location of major defense centers andthe Pearl Road connecting them. Shō Shin

initiated this structure and later kingsenhanced it.

In terms of the size of Ryukyuan armies,documents connected with Okinawan invasionsof other Ryukyu Islands, mobilizations todefend against pirates, and the mobilization todefend against the Satsuma invasion of 1609indicate a range of between 1000 and 3000soldiers, with naval flotillas ranging in sizefrom 46 to 100 ships.30 Ryukyu manufacturedsome of its own weapons and acquired othersfrom China and Japan. There is abundantevidence that Ryukyuans traded in weaponsbetween these places, most commonly bringingJapanese swords to Ming China, where theywere in great demand.31 Ryukuans often madeadaptations to foreign weapons. For example,many sword blades came from Japan, but thehandles were of Ryukyuan design to facilitatewielding them with one hand.32 On the eve ofthe Satsuma invasion, the kingdom’s major portwas well fortified and defended with large-boreartillery pieces (shot with a diameter of 7-9 cmwas most common). The hiki in Okinawa wereable to muster an army of about 3,000 soldierson relatively short notice. Ryukyuan swordsand bows were of effective design. Small-borepersonal firearms, however, while abundant,were not on a par with Satsuma’s muskets.Superior muskets, and the concentration of

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Ryukyuan defense resources in the port ofNaha contributed to the kingdom’s eventualdefeat, as did the battle-hardened quality of theSatsuma invaders.33

Although Ryukyu’s defeat by Satsuma is wellknown, there are surprisingly few details onbattle statistics. We do know, however, thatSatsuma’s attempt to enter Naha Harbor was afailure. The 3,000 defenders, the two castles,the boom across the harbor, and the Ryukyuanartillery inflicted damage on the Satsumaforces and caused them to retreat. Althoughthe Naha port defenses were effective, theoverland approaches to Shuri Castle were notwell defended. After a Satsuma force brokethrough Ryukyuan defenses at Urasoe, itquickly surrounded Shuri Castle, cutting it offfrom the vast defense network that extendedaround Naha Harbor.34

After 1609, Ryukyu came under Satsuma’sdominat ion. The new pol i t ical orderundoubtedly resulted in changes to thekingdom’s military affairs, but many details ofthis period await further research. Overall,however, it is important to stress that post1609 Ryukyu was not without armed militaryand police forces. Pirate attacks on Ryukyuanshipping remained a common problem, andSatsuma occasionally complained thatRyukyuan sailors did not defend their shipsvigorously enough (Satsuma typically put upmost of the capital for Ryukyu’s tribute tradeafter 1609).35 Ryukyuan ships sailing to Chinacontinued to be armed for their voyages and toneed those arms. Seventeenth-centurybureaucratic reforms reduced the status of thehiki but did not eliminate them. One documentpoints out that in response to the appearance ofa foreign ship at Yaeyama in 1640, “soldiersfrom Satsuma and several hundred Ryukyuansoldiers” were dispatched.36

After 1609, Ryukyu’s tributary relations withChina became crucially important for thekingdom’s political autonomy. Ryukyu’s

greatest military challenge, therefore, was toensure that tribute relations and trade tookplace without incident. Numerous accounts ofRyukyuan tribute ships battling pirates appearin the Kyūyō, an official history. An entry for1672 describes Ryukyuan tribute shipssurrounded by pirates who attacked withflaming arrows. After a “bloody battle,” theRyukyuan ships broke through the ring ofpirate boats, at a cost of six sailors killed andtwenty-four wounded.37 In another incidentduring the reign of Shō On (r. 1795-1803), twoRyukyuan ships on their way to China fought apitched overnight battle with three pirateships. The Ryukyuan crew brandished weapons(heiki) and used “a new type of cannon” (ifū noteppō) in their defense, which was ultimatelysuccessful—at least according to the officialversion of events.38 Apparently, these sameships were attacked again near Fujian, and theKyūyō explains that the Ryukyuans mannedtheir battle stations and defended themselveswith cannon and pikes. The pirates sent outsmaller boats that surrounded the tribute ships,and the battle took many twists and turnsbefore the damaged Ryukyuan ships were ableto enter Fujian.39

The importance of trade and diplomacy for thekingdom’s prosperity both before and after1609 required it to maintain naval forcescapable of repelling the pirate attacks thatwere endemic in the South China seas.Moreover, the post-1609 Ryukyuan statesometimes wielded coercive force vis-à-visinternal dissenters. For example in 1632, KingShō Hō punished a number of allegedly derelictofficials who oversaw the China trade bybanishment to remote islands. One was evensentenced to death, but Satsuma intervened toreduce that sentence to banishment.40 Otherwell-known cases include the execution ofHeshikiya Chōbin, Tomoyose Anjō, and fifteenof their supporters in 1734, following a failedb id to topp le Sa i On ’ s (1682 -1761)administration, and the severe punishment ofsome prominent residents of Kumemura who

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protested the 1802 change in how Ryukyuanstudents sent to Beijing were selected (thekanshō sōdō). In short, even after 1609, Ryukyuwas a normal country, and this normalcyincluded, for better or worse, state deploymentof coercive force for political and economicends.

Origins and Development of the Myth ofRyukyuan Pacifism

One general point to bear in mind regardingthe image of Ryukyu as a pacifist kingdom isthat by the nineteenth century Ryukyuanofficials had become extremely adept atmanipulating the kingdom’s image vis-à-visoutsiders. The most important group ofoutsiders was Chinese investiture envoys(sakuhōshi).41 Let us consider the case of vice-envoy Li Dingyuan in 1800. In Shi Ryūkyū ki,Li’s detailed record of his stay in Ryukyu, hedescribed with much enthusiasm the plot of thekumiodori play Kōkō no maki (Tale of filialpiety) and concluded with an exclamation thatheaven greatly rewards those who give theirlives for filial piety.42 During the eighteenthcentury, Ryukyuan officials began the practiceof entertaining Chinese envoys with kumiodoridesigned to impress upon them the image of arefined and virtuous kingdom. Kōkō no maki,based on a legend from the time of King Gihon(r. 1249-1259), features a daughter who offersher life for the good of society and herimpoverished mother, only to be saved bymiraculous cosmic intervention. She ends upmarrying the king’s son. The play was firstshown to Chinese envoys in 1756.

In Li’s case, just before his departure, royalenvoys unexpectedly showed up with fans,incense, and other gifts. It was the birthday ofhis mother in China, but Li had not told anyonein Ryukyu about it. Ryukyuan officials had donetheir research well, and Li was most impressedby this display of filial consciousness on theirpart.43 My point in mentioning Li’s experiencein Ryukyu is simply to emphasize the skill with

which Ryukyuan officials worked to portraypositive images to foreign visitors. In classicConfucian values, a state governed by virtuewould have little or no need for coercive force.Ryukyuans presented this same general imageto European visitors as well as Chinese.

Starting in the early nineteenth century,European ships made their way to Naha withincreasing frequency. These visits produced avariety of reports about the inhabitants ofOkinawa and other Ryukyu Islands, some ofwhich were published and reached an audienceof armchair travelers. The relative obscurity ofRyukyu added to its exotic appeal in suchcontexts. According to a summary of theseaccounts by George H. Kerr, “The visitor wasinvariably struck by the absence of arms orincidents of violence, by the unfailing courtesyand friendliness of all classes, by theintelligence of the gentry, and by the absenceo f t h i e v e r y a m o n g t h e c o m m o npeople.”44 Kerr’s general history of Ryukyu, theonly such work available in English, quotesthese European writings at great length,without any serious critique of their contents.Because he did not read Japanese, Kerrdepended on assistants to translate orsummarize Japanese materials into English. Hisbook, though well written and intelligent, didnot reflect the state of Japanese or Ryukyuanscholarship on Ryukyu circa the 1950s. The hikisystem, for example, a foundational institutionin premodern Ryukyu, receives no mentioneven though Iha Fuyū had already published ananalysis on this topic some two decades earlier.In short, Kerr seems to have had no knowledgeof Ryukyuan military affairs and took thenineteenth-century European reports of apacifist society at face value. I make thesepoints not to criticize Kerr, who did a superbjob given the limitations of his circumstances.His book, however, has been and continues tobe, a prominent vehicle for perpetuating themyth of Ryukyuan pacifism.

A major development of myth of Ryukyuan

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pacifism came from the visit to Naha in 1816 oftwo British ships, the Lyra and Alceste. Theships were on a mission to survey parts of theKorean coast and the Ryukyu Islands, and theystayed at Naha from September 15 throughOctober 27. Several members of the crew notedtheir observations of Okinawa, but Basil Hall,captain of the Lyra, and John M’Leod, physicianon board the Alceste wrote lengthy accountsthat were later published and widely read.These accounts gushed with praise over thekindness, gentleness, and intelligence of theOkinawans, whose behavior comparedespecially well with the alleged boorishnessand arrogance of “the Chinese.” According toHall and M’Leod, Okinawa was a land of peaceand serenity. Its residents bore no weapons andits people committed no crimes. According toHall: “We never saw any punishment inflictedat Loochoo; a tap with a fan, or an angry look,was the severest chastisement ever resorted to,as far as we could discover.”45 Hall’s account ofsocial order enforced by fan taps was destinedto be repeated many times and remains apotent image to this day.

It is perfectly likely that Hall’s account isaccurate as far as it goes. Why would Hall andthe other crew members, whose movementswere restricted to a small area, ever have hadoccasion to observe police and judicialactivities during their short stay? Obviously,Hall was unaware of the kingdom’s law court,the hirajo or with the Ryukyu’s two detailed lawcodes. Likewise, he was unaware of theoffenders against these laws, who had beenarrested, tortured, fined, exiled, had theirproperty confiscated, or faced the deathpenalty.46 It is hardly surprising that theaccounts of Hall and M’Leod describing anidyllic Oriental land of peace and tranquility,free of the scourges of war, weapons andanimosity, would have appealed to Europeansin the wake of the Napoleonic Wars.Interestingly, Hall discussed Okinawa withNapoleon himself when the Lyra put in at St.Helena, and reported in his account that:

Several c ircumstances . . .respecting the Loo-Choo peoplesurprised even him a good deal;and I had the satisfaction of seeinghim more than once completelyperplexed, and unable to accountfor the phenomena I related.Nothing struck him so much astheir having no arms. “Pointd’armes!” he exclaimed; . . . “Mais,sans armes, comment se bat-on?”

I could only reply, that as far as wehad been able to discover, they hadnever had any war, but remainedin a state of internal and externalpeace. “No wars!” cried he, with ascorn fu l and i nc redu lousexpression, as if the existence ofany people under the sun withoutwars was a monstrous anomaly.47

One striking thing about this passage is theimplication of superior moral virtue for thosewho hold to a belief in Ryukyuan pacifism, incontrast to a rogue Napoleon who scoffed at it.One suspects that scholars like Ōta, who surelyknow that the myth is unfounded, are of similarmind. In any case, given the degree ofignorance of Ryukyu and other parts of EastAsia that prevailed in 1816, it is conceivablethat even thoughtful or worldly people mighthave believed Hall’s tale, though Napoleon didnot. Certainly many of them would have wantedto believe in a country without weapons.Similarly, after experiencing the harrowingBattle of Okinawa in 1945 and decades of U.S.occupation thereafter, many contemporaryOkinawans would surely find the ideaappealing.

At the end of the nineteenth century Basil HallChamberlain, a relative of Captain Hall andnoted authority on Japan, visited OkinawaPrefecture briefly and published a lengthy

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analysis in The Geographic Journal. His accountvigorously endorsed the myth of Ryukyuanpacifism. Part of Chamberlain’s account ofRyukyuan history reads:

In some important respects thecountry really deserved the titlebestowed upon it by a Chineseemperor in 1579, and is stillproudly inscribed on the gate of itscapital city, the title of “The Landof Propriety.” There were no lethalweapons in Luchu, no feudalfactions, few if any crimes ofviolence. . . . Confucius’ ideal wascarried out—a government purelyc iv i l , a t once absolute andpatriarchal, resting not on anyarmed force, but on the theory thatsub jec t s owe unqua l i f i edobedience to their rulers . . .48

Here, of course, Chamberlain takes thedescriptions of Hall and M’Leod and explainsthem in terms of classical Confucian values. InChamberlain’s version, Ryukyu was not only arare or unique example of a society withoutwar, weapons or aggression, but also a rare orunique instance of a Confucian paradise.

Later in his account, Chamberlain restates thematter in terms of the prevailing tenets ofracial science. After discussing the physicalqualities of Ryukyuans in some detail andcomparing them with the qualities of Japanese,Chamberlain states:

The mos t prominent race -characteristic of the Luchuans isnot a physical, but a moral one. Itis their gentleness of spirit, theiry i e l d i n g a n d s u b m i s s i v edisposition, their hospitality andkindness, their aversion to violenceand crime. Every visitor has come

away with the same favourableimpression—Captain Broughton,whom they treated so hospitablyon the occasion of his shipwreck in1797; Captain Basil Hall, DrMcLeod, Dr, Guillemard—even themissionaries, poor as was theirsuccess, and all the Japanese. Formyself, I met with nothing butkindness from high and low alike.49

Today’s advocates of the myth of Ryukyuanpacifism similarly tend to speak of “the”Okinawans as if they are and were a singularentity. Instead of relying on crude notions ofracial characteristics, of course, thecontemporary preference is to rely on aromantic version of history.

The famous scholar of Ryukyu Iha Fuyu(1876-1947) is the final link between morerecent conveyors of the pacifist myth like Kerr,Lebra, and Ōta and the original nineteenthcentury European myth-makers. Iha is a moreambivalent figure in this respect because someof his writing does acknowledge Ryukyu’smilitary past. For example, in the 1930s heanalyzed accounts of military affairs in theOmoro sōshi, discussing weapons, defenseworks, the military character of the hiki, andrelated topics.50 Elsewhere, however, Ihaargued that Shō Shin enforced a policy ofpacifism (hisen shugi) by confiscating weaponsand prohibiting their use. He did acknowledge,though, that these moves were also aimed atsuppressing internal rebellions and defendingagainst pirates. As Uezato points out, in partowing to an imprecise conception of keyconcepts such as “defense” or “pacifism” Iha’sexact stance is hard to discern.51

Conclusion

Among scholars of Ryukyuan history in theearly twentieth century, there were explicitcritics of the notion of a pacifist Ryukyukingdom. Yokoyama Shigeru, for example,

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vigorously criticized Basil Hall’s assertion of aland without weapons. Among postwarscholars, Nakahara Zenchū criticized Iha’sportrayal of a pacifist Shō Shin, arguing thatShō Shin’s policies were moves intended tostrengthen the kingdom’s military capabilities.Nakahara also argued that it was not the casethat the Shimazu confiscated the kingdom’sweapons after 1609. In recent decades,scholars such as Takara Kurayoshi, MaehiraFusaaki, Teruya Masayoshi, TomiyamaKazuyuki, and Uezato Takashi have confirmedand further developed the arguments ofYokoyama and Nakahara, shedding much lighton the deta i l s o f Ryukyuan mi l i taryo r g a n i z a t i o n , e q u i p m e n t , a n dtactics.52 Abundant evidence of the RyukyuKingdom’s military and police structures andcapabilities is available for anyone who cares totake a close look the academic literature. Aglance at the headlines of the entries in theKyūyō should be sufficient to dispel the notionthat Ryukyu was a land without weapons, crimeor conflict.

Why, then, does the myth of Ryukyuan pacifismfind continue to find such fertile ground onwhich to thrive? There is no single or simpleanswer. Certain habits of thought that assumeenduring qualities among groups of people overtime facilitate uncritical extrapolating theprevailing anti-base, anti-military sentiment inOkinawa backward in t ime. The basicinstitutions, issues and events of Ryukyuanhistory prior to 1879 are not widely knownamong non-specialists. This situation meansthat relatively few people are able or willing tocall the myth into question. More generally alack of detailed knowledge of Ryukyuan historyenables Ryukyu to function as a blank screenonto which contemporary people can projectdesires such as de-militarization. Perhaps themost important contributing factor is thetrauma of Okinawa’s recent past. Although notnecessarily accurate across large spans of time,McCormack’s characterization of Okinawa as aplace that has suffered the imposition of war

and violence upon it by outside forces is surelyaccurate from 1879 to the present. A largepercentage of Okinawans yearn for a de-militarization of their island, and it is onlynatural to project this image onto past ages toprovide inspiration and hope for the future.

If Orientalism is the process of Europeansprojecting desires or fantasies onto distant“eastern” lands, then the nineteenth-centuryversion of the myth of Ryukyuan pacifism mightaccurately be regarded as a variety ofOrientalism, albeit one abetted by Ryukyuanofficials and researchers. Indeed, all partieswere involved in conjuring up a Ryukyu thatsuited their purposes. The modern andcontemporary manifestations of the myth nowinclude a substantial number of residents ofOkinawa among its proponents. The details ofthe Ryukyuan past are sufficiently remote thatRyukyu’s history can be molded to servecontemporary agendas with relative ease.Obviously, interpreting the past is always acontentious issue, and many aspects ofOkinawa and Ryukyuan history remain thesubject of scholarly debate and disagreement.That said, however, the effacing of all forms ofcoercive activity on the part of Ryukyuansthroughout history goes beyond the usualboundaries of academic debate. It is aremarkable propaganda accomplishment, onefirst seriously attempted by eighteenth-centuryRyukyuan officials.

It is understandable, of course, that thoughtfulpeople would be distressed by the propensity ofhumans to behave badly. The myth of Ryukyuanpacifism undoubtedly resonates with a deepand widespread desire among many of us tobelieve that human nature is potentially goodenough that societies free of coercive force arepossible, while also adding poignancy to thenarrative of modern Okinawan suffering. Thispsychological mix is powerful enough toanesthetize the critical thinking function thatshould be part of any scholarly or journalisticendeavor. I am not convinced, however, that a

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fairy tale version of Ryukyuan history has muchto offer by way of practical benefits. Insofar asthe U.S. military presence has been a corrosiveforce in Okinawan society, then the relevantarguments for eliminating or correcting itshould be made in the context of the presentand recent past without recourse to animpossible version of history.

Gregory Smits is an Associate Professor ofHistory at Pennsylvania State University. He isa social and cultural historian of Japan, whoseinterests range from the fifteenth through theearly twentieth centuries. A specialist in thehistory of the Ryukyu Kingdom, he is the authorof Visions of Ryukyu: Identity and Ideology inEarly-Modern Thought and Politics and co-editor with Bettina Gramlich-Oka of EconomicThought in Early-Modern Japan.

This is a revised and expanded version of anarticle that appeared in the inaugural issue ofThe International Journal of Okinawan Studies.

Recommended citation: Gregory Smits,"Examining the Myth of Ryukyuan Pacifism,"The Asia-Pacific Journal, 37-3-10, September13, 2010.

Notes

1 Link (as of 11-5-09).

2 Keiko Uchida, “How the Musical ‘King ShoHashi’ United the Power of the OkinawanPeople,” Matthew Galgani, trans (9-14-2009),here (as of 11-5-09).

3 Link (as of 11-5-09).

4 Maeda Giken, Okinawa, yogawari no shisō:hito to gakumon no keifu (Naha, Japan: Dai'ichikyōiku tosho, 1972), pp. 64-67.

5 One characteristic of the Chūzan Seikan isthat it minimizes the coercive and military

aspects of Ryukyu’s connections with Satsuma,instead characterizing them in terms of moralrelationships. Moreover, it has very little to sayabout the events of 1609 compared with othermajor events in Ryukyuan history.

6 Yokoyama Shigeru, Iha Fuken (Fuyū), andHigashionna Kanjun, eds., Ryūkyū shiryō sōsho,vol. 5 (Hōbun shokan, 1940, 1988), p. 37.

7 Yokoyama, Ryūkyū shiryō sōsho, vol. 5, p. 39.

8 Yokoyama, Ryūkyū shiryō sōsho, vol. 5, p. 40.

9 Yokoyama, Ryūkyū shiryō sōsho, vol. 5, p. 12.For a thorough account the Ryukyu-Satsumawar, see Stephen Turnbull, The SamuraiCapture a King: Okinawa 1609 (New York:Osprey Publishing, 2009). Despite beingwritten for non-specialists, this book is basedon a close reading of the relevant primarysources.

10 For more details, see Gregory Smits, Visionsof Ryukyu: Identity and Ideology in Early-Modern Thought and Politics (Honolulu:University of Hawai’i Press, 1999), pp. 15-49.

11 Gavan McCormack, “Okinawa’s Turbulent400 Years” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol.3-3-09, January 12, 2009.

12 Turnbull, The Samurai Capture a King, p. 55.The Ryukyuan military was an early adopter offirearms, possessing them prior to 1450. By1609, however, Ryukyuan firearms, which wereof Chinese design, were inferior to theEuropean-style guns of the invaders.

13 Turnbull, The Samurai Capture a King, p. 45.

14 McCormack, “Okinawa’s Turbulent 400Years.”

15 Ōta Masahide, “Okinawa Calls for a JustPeace: Speech to the U.S. Congressional StudyGroup on Japan,” (as of 3-20-2006).

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16 William P. Lebra, Okinawan Religion: Belief,Ritual, and Social Structure (Honolulu:University of Hawaii Press, 1966, 1985), p. 13.Lebra’s Japanese translator, the late MitsuguSakihara, himself an Okinawan conscript inBattle of Okinawa, found this passage socontrary to everything he had observed, that heconvinced Lebra to have it omitted in theJapanese version of the book (personalcommunication).

17 See the chapter “The War Comes Home toOkinawa” in Haruko Taya Cook and TheodoreF. Cook, Japan at War: An Oral History (NewYork: The New Press, 1992), pp. 354-372. Seealso Ōta Masahide, "Re-Examining the Historyof the Battle of Okinawa," in Chalmers Johnson,ed., Okinawa: Cold War Island (Cardiff, CA:Japan Policy Research Institute, 1999), esp. p.29; Norma Field, In the Realm of a DyingEmperor: Japan at Century's End (New York,Vintage, 1993), esp. pp. 33-106; Steve Rabson,“Case Dismissed: Osaka Court UpholdsNovelist Oe Kenzaburo for Writing that theJapanese Military Ordered ‘Group Suicides’ inthe Battle of Okinawa” The Asia-Pacific Journal,April 8, 2008; Steve Rabson, “OkinawanPerspectives on Japan’s Imperial Institution,”The Asia-Pacific Journal, February 16, 2008;Kawabata Shunichi, Kitazawa Yuki, andMatthew Allen, “A Story That Won’t FadeAway: Compulsory Mass Suicide in the Battle ofOkinawa” International Herald Tribune/AsahiShimbun, May 15, 2007, posted at Japan Focuson July 12, 2007.

18 George Feifer, “The Rape of Okinawa,” WorldPolicy Journal, 17:3 (Fall, 2000), pp. 35-36.

19 For a scholarly analysis of the significance ofthe 1995 rape, see Linda Isako Angst, “TheSacrifice of a Schoolgirl: The 1995 Rape Case,Discourses of Power, and Women's Lives inOkinawa,” Critical Asian Studies, vol. 33, no. 2(2001).

20 Ishigami Eiichi, “Ryūkyū no Amami shotō

tōchi no ahodankai,” Rekishi hyōron, No. 603(2000), pp. 5-9; and Uezato Takashi, “Ryūkyūno kaki ni tsuite,” Okinawa bunka, vol. 36, no.91 (2000), p. 76. The Korean source on whichthese authors rely is the Joseon Wangjo Sillok.See also Entry #115. Kyūyō kenkyūkai, eds.,Kyūyō (Yomikudashi edition) (Kadokawashoten, 1974), p. 11.

21 Ishigami, “Amami,” pp. 3-4, 9; and UezatoTakashi, “Ko-Ryūkyū no guntai to sonorekishiteki tenkai,” Ryūkyū Ajia shakai bunkakenkyūkai kiyō, no. 5 (October, 2002), pp.113-114.

22 Uezato,“Guntai,” p. 114 and entry #202 and#227. Kyūyō kenkyūkai, Kyūyō , p. 14.Regardless of the details, it seems clear thatAmami-Ōshima resented Shuri’s control andoften resisted with violence.

23 Uezato, “Ryūkyū no kaki,” pp. 76-78.

24 Uezato, “Guntai,” pp. 108-109.

25 Perhaps the most prominent example of thisnarrative is Nagamine Shoshin, “OkinawanKarate and World Peace,” found at many websites such as this (as of 11-7-2009). Althoughrare, some martial arts writers acknowledge amore realistic interpretation of Shō Shin’sactions. For example: “Although it isdocumented that King Shoshin ordered hisprovincial lords, or aji, to live near his castle inShuri, many historians no longer believe thathe totally disarmed his ruling class. Although afamous stone monument, the Momo UrasoeRan Kan No Mei, which is inscribed with thehighlights of King Shoshin's reign, tells of theKing seizing the aji's swords and how heamassed a supply of weapons in a warehousenear Shuri castle, some Okinawan historiansbelieve that King Shoshin was actually buildingan armory to protect his ports and prepare forany potential invasion by wako, or pirates, notthat he was stripping the Okinawan samurai orthe general population of their weaponry”(found here as of 3-21-2006).

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26 These events are well documented in anygeneral history of Okinawa. Uezato explainstheir significance in the context of militaryaffairs with great clarity. See “Guntai,” pp.110-112.

27 For a detailed analysis of the hiki, see TakaraKurayoshi, Ryūkyū ōkoku no kōzō (Yoshikawakōbunkan, 1987), pp. 103-119. See also Uezato,“Guntai,” p. 112, 118-119.

28 Uezato, “Guntai,” p. 113; and Uezato“Ryūkyū no kaki,” p. 78.

29 Uezato, “Guntai,” pp. 117-119; and Uezato“Ryūkyū no kaki,” pp. 82-87.

30 Uezato, “Guntai,” pp. 120-121; and Uezato,“Ryūkyū no kaki,” p. 84.

31 Uezato, “Guntai,” p. 124; and Uezato,“Ryūkyū no kaki,” pp. 82-83.

32 Uezato, “Guntai,” p. 123.

33 Uezato, “Guntai,” pp. 115-116, 121-124;Uezato, “Ryūkyū no kaki,” pp. 82-88; andTurnbull, The Samurai Capture a King.

34 Uezato, “Guntai,” pp. 115-116; and Uezato,“Ryūkyū no kaki,” pp. 82-88.

35 For example, in 1670 pirates connected withMing loyalist forces captured a Ryukyuan ship,and Satsuma criticized the Ryukyuans as“cowards in the extreme.” See, TomiyamaKazuyuki, Ryūkyū ōkoku no gaikō to ōken(Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 2004), p. 80.

36 Uezato, “Guntai,” pp. 116-117.

37 Entry #464. Kyūyō kenkyūkai, Kyūyō, p. 211.

38 Entry #1465. Kyūyō kenkyūkai, Kyūyō, pp.439-440.

39 Entry #1487. Kyūyō kenkyūkai, Kyūyō, pp.445-447.

40 Tomiyama , Ryūkyū ōkoku no gaikō to ōken,pp. 176-7.

41 Satsuma maintained only a small directpresence in Ryukyu precisely because Ryukyu’srelationship with China was crucial both forSatsuma and Ryukyu. With Satsuma support,Ryukyu devoted considerable resources tomaintaining a good image vis-à-vis Chineseofficials.

42 Li Dingyuan, Shi Ryūkyū ki, Harada Nobuo,trans., ed. (Gensōsha, 1985), pp. 335-337.

43 Li, Shi Ryūkyū ki, pp. 407-408. See alsoKakazu Takeshi, “Rikuyu engi: Tei Junsoku gafukkokushi fukyuu” Ryūkyū shinpō, 4-24-1993(#17 in the series Ryūkyū kanshi no tabi).

44 George H. Kerr, Okinawa: The History of anIsland People (Rutland, VT: Charles E. TuttleCompany, 1958), pp. 250-251.

45 Kerr, Okinawa, p. 255. For extensive excerptsfrom the crew members of these two ships, seepp. 249-260.

46 There are many accounts of Ryukyuanjudicial proceedings and law codes. Oneexcellent source is Okinawa no hankachō,which details criminal cases before the Hirajoin the 1860s and 70s. One case, for example,involves the investigation into the actions ofpolice officials who tortured a suspectexcessively, thus causing his death. See HigaShunchō and Sakihama Shūmei, eds., trans.,Okinawa no hankachō (Tōyō bunko 41)(Heibonsha, 1965), pp. 85-94. See also“Satsuma-han shihaika no saibanken,” Chapter3 of Tomiyama, Ryūkyū ōkoku no gaikō to ōken,pp. 170-197.

47 Kerr, Okinawa, p. 259.

48 Basil Hall Chamberlain, “The Luchu Islandsand Their Inhabitants: I. IntroductoryRemarks,” The Geographical Journal, vol. 5, no.4 (April, 1895), pp. 310-311.

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49 Chamberlain, “The Luchu Islands,” pp.318-319.

50 Iha Fuyū, “Ko-Ryūkyū no bubi o kōsatsushite“karate” no hattatsu ni oyobu.” Hattori Shirō,Nakasone Masayoshi, Hokama Shuzen, eds.,Iha Fuyū zenshū, vol 5 (Heibonsha, 1974), pp.196-215 (originally published 1932); and “Ko-Ryūkyū no “hiki seido” ni tsuite—Ryūkyū bunkano ranjukuki ni kansuru ichi kōsatsu,” Zenshū,vol. 9, pp. 279-322 (originally published 1935).

See also Uezato, “Guntai,” p. 105.

51 Uezato, “Guntai,” p. 105; and Iha Fuyū, “Ko-Ryūkyū no seiji,” Zenshū, Vol. 1, pp. 419-495,esp. pp. 431-440.

52 For a concise summary of these argumentsand a listing of the key essays, see Uezato,“Guntai,” pp. 105-106. In English the mostcomprehensive work is Turnbull, The SamuraiCapture a King.

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