Pp v. Quidato

FACTS:

Bernardo Quidato was the father of accused Bernardo Quidato, Jr. and Leo Quidato. Bernardo lived alone in his house. He owned a parcel of land. Bernardo, accompanied by accused and Reynaldo Malita and Eddie Malita, went to Davao City to sell copra. Afterwhich, Bernardo paid the Malita brothers for their labor, who thereafter left. Bernardo and accused went home. According to Gina Quidato, on the evening of the next day, accused-appellant and the Malita brothers were drinking tuba at their house. She overheard the trio planning to go to Bernardo’s house to get money from the latter. She had no idea as to what later transpired because she had fallen asleep before 10 pm. Accused-appellant objected to Gina Quidatos testimony on the ground that the same was prohibited by the marital disqualification rule found in Section 22 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The judge, acknowledging such, allowed said testimony only against co-accused, Reynaldo and Eddie.

Accused asked Reynaldo to come to the formers house to discuss an important matter. Upon Reynaldo’s arrival at accused house, he saw that Eddie was already there. They started drinking beer. The Malita brothers alleged that the accused proposed that they rob and kill his father. They went to Bernardos house only at 10:00 p.m., after the rain had stopped. Reynaldo brought along a bolo. When Bernardo opened the door, Eddie knocked the old man down. Reynaldo then hacked Bernardo on the nape and neck. Accused and Eddie ransacked Bernardos aparador looking for money to no avail; so, the three of them left.

Leo confronted his brother regarding the incident and learned that Reynaldo and Eddie were the ones responsible for Bernardos death. The two arrested by the police Together with accused. The Malita brothers were interrogated and were made known of their constitutional rights. They signified their intent to confess even in the absence of counsel. The police escorted Malita brothers along with their unsigned affidavits, to a PAO lawyer.

The PAO lawyer made them known to their rights and explained their affidavits in a dialect known to them, only then did they signed such.

RTC found the accused guilty

ISSUE:

WON ERRED IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF MALTA BROTHERS.

RULING:

The two brothers were, however, not presented on the witness stand to testify on their extra-judicial confessions. The failure to present the two gives these affidavits the character of hearsay. It is hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants themselves take the witness stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded from the judicial proceeding, being inadmissible hearsay. The voluntary admissions of an accused made extrajudicially are not admissible in evidence against his co-accused when the latter had not been given an opportunity to hear him testify and cross-examine him.

The manner by which the affidavits were obtained by the police render the same inadmissible in evidence even if they were voluntarily given. The settled rule is that an uncounseled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel is inadmissible in evidence. It is undisputed that the Malita brothers gave their statements to Patrolman Mara in the absence of counsel, although they signed the same in the presence of counsel the next day.

With regard to Gina Quidatos testimony, the same must also be disregarded, accused-appellant having timely objected thereto under the marital disqualification rule. As correctly observed by the court a quo the disqualification is between husband and wife, the law not precluding the wife from testifying when it involves other parties or accused. Hence, Gina Quidato could testify in the murder case against Reynaldo and Eddie, which was jointly tried with accused-appellants case. This testimony cannot, however, be used against accused-appellant directly or through the guise of taking judicial notice of the proceedings in the murder case without violating the marital disqualification rule. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly is a rule familiar even to law students.

Reyes v. CA

FACTS:

Juan Mendoza, father of defendant Olympio, owns a parcel of land devoted for production of palay. The land was cultivated by Julian, husband of Eufrocina. The latter alleged upon the death of Julian, she succeeded him as bona fide tenant. That Olympio, through FISTS, prevented her daughter Violeta and others from entering the premises and that until filing of such case, they were Olympio refused to vacate the premises thereby violating her tenancy rights. Plaintiff therefore prayed for judgment for the recovery of possession and damages with a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in the meantime.

Defendant barangay officials denied interference in the tenancy relationship existing between plaintiff and defendant Mendoza, particularly in the cultivation of the latter’s farm lots and asked for the dismissal of the case, moral damages and attorney’s fees. Mendoza raised abandonment, sublease and mortgage of the farm lots without his consent and approval, and non-payment of rentals, irrigation fees and other taxes due the government, as his defenses

CA ordered defendant Olympio to restore possession of the land to Eufrocina and ordering them vacate the same.

ISSUES:

WON the court erred in holding Olympio liable.

RULING:

No. It is clear that petitioners are asking the Court to re-examine all the evidence already presented and evaluated by the trial court and re-evaluated again by the respondent appellate court. Said evidence served as basis in arriving at the trial court and appellate court's findings of fact. We shall not analyze such evidence all over again but instead put finis to the factual findings in this case. The evidence presented before the trial court and CA served as basis in arriving at

their findings of fact. The Supreme Court will not analyze such evidence all over again because settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court absent the exceptions which do not obtain in the instant case.

In agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence is no more than substantial evidence. Substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderant evidence, as is required in an ordinarily civil case. It has been defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and its absence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence on record, direct or circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment or criteria for that of the trial court in determining wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled to belief.

Pp v. Turco

FACTS:

Accused Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (aka “Totong”) was charged with the rape of his neighbor 13-year-old Escelea Tabada. Escelea was about to sleep when she heard a familiar voice calling her from outside her house. She recognized appellant Turco immediately as she had known him for 4 years and he is her second cousin. Unaware of the danger that was about to befall her, Escelea opened the door. Turco, with the use of towel, covered Escelea’s face, placed his right hand on the latter’s neck and bid her to walk. When they reached a grassy part, near the pig pen which was about 12 meters away from the victim’s house, appellant lost no time in laying the victim on the grass, laid on top of the victim and took off her short pants and panty and succeeded in pursuing his evil design-by forcibly inserting his penis inside Escelea’s private part despite Escelea’s resistance. Appellant then threatened her that he will kill her if she reports the incident to anybody.

For almost 10 days, she just kept the incident to herself until she was able to muster enough courage to tell her brother-in-law, Orlando Pioquinto, who in turn informed Alejandro, the victim’s father, about the rape of his daughter. Alejandro did not waste time and immediately asked Escelea to see a doctor for medical examination and eventually file a complaint after the issuance of the medical certificate. Turco, meanwhile, alleged that he and Escelea were sweethearts.

The trial court found Turco guilty of the charge.

In his appeal, Turco argues, among others, that no actual proof was presented that the rape of the complainant actually happened considering that although a medical certificate was presented, the medico-legal officer who prepared the same was not presented in court to explain the same.

ISSUE:

W/N the appellant’s contention that the medical certificate may not be considered is with merit

RULING:

Yes. With regard to appellant’s argument on the proof of medical certificate, while the certificate could be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule since entries in official records constitute exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule, since it involved an opinion of one who must first be established as an expert witness, it could not be given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court to show his qualifications. Emphasis must be placed on the distinction between admissibility of evidence and the probative value thereof. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or the rules or is competent. Since admissibility of evidence is determined by its relevance and competence, admissibility is, therefore, an affair of logic and law. On the other hand, the weight to be given to such evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided in Rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid down by the Court. Thus, while evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled to little or no weight at all. Conversely, evidence which may have evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a special rule forbids its reception.

Withal, although the medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay rule, hence admissible as evidence, it has very little probative value due to the absence of the examining physician. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the prosecution relied solely on the medical certificate. In fact, reliance was made on the testimony of the victim herself which, standing alone even without medical examination, is sufficient to convict. It is well-settled that a medical examination is not indispensable in the prosecution of rape. The absence of medical findings by a medico-legal officer does not disprove the occurrence of rape. It is enough that the evidence on hand convinces the court that conviction is proper. In the instant case, the victim’s testimony alone is credible and sufficient to convict.

Heirs of Sabanpan v. Comorposa

FACTS:

A complaint for unlawful detainer with damages was filed by petitioners against respondents. It alleged that Saez was the lawful and actual possessor of the land. He died leaving his children and grandchildren. Francisco Comorposa was fired from his job. Being a close family friend of Saez, he approached the Adolfo Saez. The latter, out of compassion and pity, allowed Fran to occupy the land without any rental. When Fran left for SanFo, he was succeeded by other Comorposa in the possession without any rental.

After which, those occupying the land received a formal demand letter but they refused to vacate and claimed that they were the legitimate and actual possessor of the land

RTC ruled in favor of the Comorposa’s. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC it held that although not yet final, the Order issued by the DENR Regional Director remained in full force and effect. The certification that the DENR's community environment and natural resources (CENR) officer issued was proof that when the cadastral survey was conducted, the land was still alienable and was not yet allocated to any person. Respondents had the better right to possess alienable and disposable land of the public domain, because they have sufficiently proven their actual, physical, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof since 1960.

ISSUE:

1.) Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and err in sustaining the Regional Trial Courts ruling giving weight to the CENR Officers Certification, which only bears the facsimile of the alleged signature of a certain Jose F. Tagorda and, [worse], it is a new matter raised for the first time on appeal?

2.) Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and err in holding that the land subject matter of this case has been acquired by means of adverse possession and prescription?

RULING:

1.) Petitioners contend that the CENR Certification dated July 22, 1997 is a sham document, because the signature of the CENR officer is a mere facsimile. In support of their argument, they cite Garvida v. Sales Jr. and argue that the Certification is a new matter being raised by respondents for the first time on appeal.

In Garvida, the Court held: "A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current." Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best exact copies. As such, they are not admissible in

evidence, as there is no way of determining whether they are genuine or authentic.

The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a facsimile of the signature of CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda. The facsimile referred to is not the same as that which is alluded to in Garvida. The one mentioned here refers to a facsimile signature, which is defined as a signature produced by mechanical means but recognized as valid in banking, financial, and business transactions

Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the Certification. In fact, the DENR regional director has acknowledged and used it as reference in his Order dated April 2, 1998. If the Certification were a sham as petitioner claims, then the regional director would not have used it as reference in his Order. Instead, he would have either verified it or directed the CENR officer to take the appropriate action, as the latter was under the former's direct control and supervision.

Petitioners' claim that the Certification was raised for the first time on appeal is incorrect. As early as the pretrial conference at the Municipal Trial Court, the CENR Certification had already been marked as evidence for respondents as stated in the Pre-trial Order. The Certification was not formally offered, however, because respondents had not been able to file their position paper. Neither the rules of procedure nor jurisprudence would sanction the admission of evidence that has not been formally offered during the trial. But this evidentiary rule is applicable only to ordinary

trials, not to cases covered by the rule on summary procedure -- cases in which no full-blown trial is held.

2.) Petitioners assert that the CA erred in disregarding the Affidavits of their witnesses, insisting that the Rule on Summary Procedure authorizes the use of affidavits. They also claim that the failure of respondents to file their position paper and counter-affidavits before the MTC amounts to an admission by silence.

The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value. Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue

Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. While in summary proceedings affidavits are admissible as the witnesses respective testimonies, the failure of the adverse party to reply does not ipso facto render the facts, set forth therein, duly proven. Petitioners still bear the burden of proving their cause of action, because they are the ones asserting an affirmative relief.

Tan v. Pp

FACTS: