evans, j. a. s._histiaeus and aristagoras. notes on the ionian revolt_ajph, 84, 2_1963_113-128

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1/17

Histiaeus and Aristagoras: Notes on the Ionian Revolt

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2/17

AMERICAN

JOURN L

O

PHILOLO Y

VOL.

LXXXIV,

2

WHOLE

No. 334

HISTIAEUS

AND

ARISTAGORAS: NOTES ON

THE

IONIAN

REVOLT.

As Gaetano de

Sanctis

put

it

over

thirty

years ago,

one of

the most

glorious

struggles

for freedom was without

a

doubt

the

great

war

between

the

Greeks

and

the

Persians,

and the first

phase

of this

war was

the revolt

of

the

Ionian Greeks. Yet

Herodotus

has

little

good

to

say

about this revolt.2

In

his

account,

it was instigated for personal reasons; it was carried through

without

proper planning

or

discipline,

and it never

had

a

chance

of success.

Its inevitable

result was to

bring

the

vengeance

of

Persia

down on

Ionia.

The two

individuals

responsible

for the

revolt,

Aristagoras

of Miletus

and his

father-in-law

Histiaeus,

appear

as

opportunistic

adventurers and

Aristagoras

at

least

had

little

stomach

for

danger.3

The account of

Aristagoras

is

relatively straightforward,

and

modern historians have either accepted Herodotus' portrait of

him

or

they

have altered Herodotus'

brushstrokes

a little

and

made

him

into

a

national hero. But Histiaeus

is

a

strange,

ambiguous

figure.

Whenever

this

mysterious

man

appears

upon

the

stage,

he

brings

mystery

with

him,

commented

G.

B.

Grundy

in

his book on

the

Persian War.4

Histiaeus'

character,

motives,

1

Gaetano

de

Sanctis,

Aristagora

di

Mileto,

Revista

di

filologia

e

di

istruzione

classica,

LIX

(1931),

pp.

48-72.

2

Herodotus

(V, 97)

speaks

of the

ships

which Athens sent to aid Ionia

in the first

year

of the revolt

as

the

oapx*

KaKWV

.

.

.

EXX1at

re

KaZ

fapfjapotrL.

In

VI,

3,

the

Ionians

asked Histiaeus

why

he

had

instructed

Aristagoras

to revolt and

brought

such

great

harm on

them.

3

Herodotus calls him

vX'ux

ouK

&KpOS

(V, 124).

4G.

B.

Grundy,

The Great Persian

War

and

its

Preliminaries

(London,

1901),

p.

135.

113


http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/17

and

policy

have been

variously

interpreted,5

but no

interpreta-

tion has

yet

been

entirely satisfactory.

Yet

an

understanding

of

these two men is

vital to our

knowledge

of

the

Ionian

Revolt,

and

it is

worthwhile to

re-examine some of the

problems

raised

by

their careers.

1. The Danube

Episode.

In

513 or 512 B.

C.,6

Darius

led

his

troops

into

Europe,

and

marched

north

along

the

western shore of

the

Black

Sea,

across

the

Danube

by

a

bridge

constructed

for

him

by

the

Ionians,

and

into southern Russia. The

story

is told in Herodotus

(IV,

83-

142),

who

states

that the Ionian fleet

sailed

north to the

Danube,

where

they

threw

a

bridge

across the

river and

waited for

Darius

to come

up

with

the

land

army.

When the

army

had

crossed,

Darius ordered

the Greeks

to

break

down

the

bridge

(IV,

97),

but

at this

point,

Coes,

the

strategos

of the

Mytilenaean

con-

tingent,

spoke up

and

suggested

that Darius

leave

the

bridge

in

place

and set the

Greek

fleet to

guard

it. Darius took

the

advice

of Coes and

posted

the fleet with orders to guard the bridge for

sixty

days.

Darius

fared

badly against

the

Scythians

and was

forced to

retreat

hastily, abandoning

his

sick and wounded

and his

baggage

(IV,

134).

The

Scythians

sent

a

message

ahead to the Ionians

on the Danube

asking

them

to

break

down the

bridge

before the

Persians

could

cross.

Then the Ionians

took

counsel.

And

the

opinion

of

Miltiades

the

Athenian,

who was

leader

and

tyrant

of the men

from

the

Chersonesus

in

the

Hellespont,

was that

they

should

obey

the

Scythians,

and make Ionia

free.

But

HIistiaeus

of

Miletus

opposed

this

opinion,

saying

that

each of

them

was

now

tyrant

of

a

city

thanks

to

Darius,

and

that

if the

power

5

Grundy,

op.

cit.,

pp.

135-42;

Stefan

Heinlein,

Histiaios

von

Milet,

Klio,

IX

(1909),

pp.

341-51;

Swoboda,

Histiaios,

R.-E.;

How

and

Wells,

Commentary

on

Herodotus,

note on

IV,

137;

Max

Cary,

C.

A.

H.,

IV, pp. 212-27; A. Blamire, Herodotus and Histiaeus, C. Q., IX, n. s.

(1959),

pp.

142-54.

o

For a

discussion of the

date

of the

Scythian expedition:

H.

T.

Wade-

Gery,

Miltiades,

in

Essays

in Greek

History

(Oxford,

1958),

pp.

155-70;

also

Cameron,

J.

N.

E.

S.,

II

(1943),

note

32.

Wade-Gery

prefers

514 B.

C.

for

the

expedition,

but

for reasons

which

are not

compelling.

There

is a

growing

consensus

of

opinion

in favor

of

513.

J. A. B.

EVANS.

14




4/17

HISTIAEUS AND ARISTAGORAR.

of Darius

should be

put

down,

he would not be

able to

rule

over

Miletus

neither

would

any

other of them

be able to

rule over

any city;

for

every

city

would desire to be

governed

by

the

people

rather

than

by

a

tyrant.

And

when

Histiaeus

declared

this

opinion,

straightway they

all inclined there-

unto,

whereas before

they

had

assented unto the

opinion

of

Miltiades.7

The

Ionians,

under Histiaeus'

direction,

led

the

Scythians

to

believe

they

were

betraying

Darius

and broke

down

a

section

of

the

bridge

on the north bank

of

the

river.

The

retreating

Persian

army

reached the Danube at

night,

and were

panic-stricken

to

find

the

bridge

broken.

But Darius ordered

an

Egyptian

with

a

very

loud voice to stand on

the

river-bank and call for Histiaeus

of

Miletus. At the first

call,

Histiaeus

answered.

Modern

historians

have

tended to

regard

this

episode

as

an

agreeable

fiction,

fabricated

perhaps

to bolster the

reputation

of

Miltiades.8

But

there

is

good

reason

to

accept

it as historical.

After

Darius reached Sardis

(V,

11),

he

summoned both

His-

tiaeus and Coes and told them to choose their rewardsfor their

services to him.

Histiaeus

chose

Myrcinus

on the

Strymon

river,

and

Coes

chose to

be

tyrant

of

Mytilene.

If

the

Danube

episode

were

fictional,

it

would

be hard

to understand

what

motive

Darius

might

have

had

for

bestowing

these

rewards on

Histiaeus

and

Coes.

The main

objection

to the

episode

concerns Miltiades.

At the

Danube

bridge,

Miltiades

showed his

hand as

an

anti-Persian too

clearly to go unnoticed, and if Histiaeus and Coes received their

rewards from

Darius,

it is difficult to

believe that

Miltiades

did

not receive

condign

punishment.

Darius left

behind

an

army

in

Thrace,

commanded

first

by

Megabazus

and then

by

Otanes,

and

either

of

these

could have ousted

Miltiades

from the Chersonese.

However,

it

appears

that

Miltiades

was driven

from the

Cherso-

7

Quoted

from the

translation

of J.

Enoch

Powell,

I,

p.

326

(Oxford,

1949).

8

Thirwall was the first to

suggest

that this

story

was

fabricated

as

part

of Miltiades'

defense

in

his

trial of

493/2

(VI,

104),

and modern

scholars

have tended to

regard

it

as

at least

in

part

fictitious.

See

Macan's

note

on

IV,

137;

also

Swoboda,

Histiaios,

R.-E.;

Wade-Gery,

op.

cit.,

pp.

158-63;

Joseph

Wells, Miltiades,

son of

Cimon

(till

the

time

of

Marathon),

Studies

in

Herodotus

(Oxford, 1923),

pp.

112-24.

115




5/17

J.

A

. .

EVANS.

nese

by

a

Scythian

raid

in

511

or

510,9

and

the

Persian

army

in

Thrace

apparently

did

nothing

to

protect

him.'0

If

Miltiades

was

known

to be

an

anti-Persian

by

511/10,

that

is,

if

the

Danube

episode

was

historical,

it is

easy

to

understand the Persian

lack

of

concern

when

the

Scythians

attacked him.

If

Herodotus'

account of this

episode

is

substantially

accurate,

one

fact stands out. When

the Great

King

reached the Danube

in

his

retreat,

he had his

Egyptian

crier hail Histiaeus. His-

tiaeus,

Herodotus

believed,

was

already

a man

whom

Darius

trusted;

he

was

probably

commander

of the

fleet

which was

made

up

of

Ionian,

Aeolian,

and

Hellespontine

contingents

(IV,

89).

His

loyalty

in

this

incident

fortified

his

position

even more at

the Persian

court,

and

brought

him

as reward

Myrcinus

in

Thrace.

When

Darius told Histiaeus

he needed him

as

a

coun-

sellor

at Susa

(V,

24),

it is

quite

possible

that

he

was

being

completely

honest. 1

2.

Histiaeus'

Summons

to

Susa.

When Darius

retired

from

Europe,

he left behind

an

army

under

Megabazus

whose

campaign

Herodotus

describes

in

the

early

sections of Book

V.

Under the

King's

orders,

Megabazus

subdued

the Paeonians

and

removedthem

to

Asia. The Paeonians

lived

in

the

Strymon

valley,

in the same

area as

Myrcinus.

The

King's

reasons for

wanting

the

Paeonians removed

are

obscure,

but it seems

likely

he

intended to secure the

coastal

road

through

Thrace

into

northern

Greece.

Darius had

already given Myrcinus

to

Histiaeus,

although

Megabazus

did not learn this

until

he

reached Sardis

after

his

campaign

was

over

(V,

23).12

If

Darius

was

sufficiently

aware

9

N.

G. L.

Hammond,

II,

The

Philaids and the

Chersonese,

C.

Q.,

VI,

n.

s.

(1956),

pp.

113-29.

Although

I

cannot

accept

Hammond's

date

for the

capture

of

Lemnos

and Imbros

by

Miltiades,

his

argument

for

the

dates of

Miltiades'

flight

and later return

to the

Chersonese

seems

well-founded.

10

Cary

(C. A. H., IV,

p.

214) suggested that it was in fact Megabazus

who

expelled

Miltiades.

11

A.

Blamire,

op. cit.,

p.

145,

suggests

this

was the true reason

why

Darius

took

Histiaeus to

Susa.

12

Admittedly

the

Greek of

V,

23 can be

interpreted

to

mean

that

Megabazus

learned of

what

Histiaeus was

doing

before he

(Megabazus)

reached

Sardis

but after

he

left the

Strymon valley.

116




6/17

HISTIAEUS AND

ARISTAGORAS.

of

the

strategic

nature of the

Strymon valley

to order

the

removal

of

the

Paeonians,

it is

hard

to

believe he did

not know what he

was

doing

when

he

gave

Myrcinus

to Histiaeus.

Blamire

13

proba-

bly goes

too

far when he

suggests

that Histiaeus chose his reward

for

saving

the

bridge

as he was

instructed to

choose,

but

there

is a

strong

probability

that

Darius

gave

Histiaeus

Myrcinus

for

the same

reason

as he ordered

the Paeonians

removed.

He

wanted

to secure

the coastal

road. For

this

reason,

he was

willing

to

place

Myrcinus

in

the

hands

of

his

loyal

lieutenant,

Histiaeus.

This is

not to

say

that

Megabazus

never made the

protest

to

Darius which

Herodotus records

(V, 23).

The

jealousy

between

the

Great

King's

Greek

and

Persian officers is

a

recurrent theme

in

Herodotus,

and

no

doubt

Megabazus

did not like to see His-

tiaeus in

possession

of

Myrcinus.

But

if

Histiaeus would not

rebel from

Darius

when he had

a

golden

opportunity,

is it

con-

ceivable he would

try

a

revolt

in

Thrace,

where there was a

Persian

army present?

Histiaeus

had

already

stated

his

policy

to the Ionian

tyrants by

the

Danube.

It was

that

the

tyrants

owed

their

positions

to the

support

of the

Great

King;

without

that

support

they

would be

immediately deposed.

I

doubt

if

Histiaeus ever

changed

his

opinion

about the source of

his

power.

Finally,

there

is

no

real

evidence

that Histiaeus

ever did

give

up Myrcinus.

When

he went

up

to

Susa,

he

left

behind

an

epitropos,

Aristagoras,

his

son-in-law

and

cousin,

who ruled

in

his

place.

Histiaeus

was still

tyrant

of

Miletus,

however. When

Aristagoras

rebelled,

Darius

as a

matter of course

called

on

His-

tiaeus to account

for the actions

of his

epitropos (V,

106).

It

is

probable

that

Histiaeus,

though

in

Susa,

continued to control

Myrcinus

and

to

rule it

through

his

deputy

until

the outbreak

of

the

Ionian

revolt,

when

Aristagoras

seems to have

repudiated

the

power

of the

Persians

and

of

his father-in-law at

the

same

time.

However,

Myrcinus

continued

to

be a

possession

of Miletus.

In

496

or late

497,

Aristagoras

retired

there,

and

lost his

life

fighting

the Edoni.

So

much for

the

story

that Darius took Histiaeus to Susa

because

he

wanted to

remove the

Milesians

from the

Strymon

valley.

There is no reason to

believe he did remove the Milesians

13

Blamire, op. cit.,

p.

143.

117




7/17

from

the

Strymon.

Histiaeus

went to Susa as

a

valued

advisor

of

Darius,

and he remained

tyrant

of Miletus

(and Myrcinus),

though

he

ruled

in

absentia.14

3.

The

Expedition

to

Naxos.

The

opening

move in

the

Ionian

Revolt was

an

expedition

to

Naxos

led

by Aristagoras.

But

the

account

of

it

in

Herodotus

has

satisfied

few

historians.

Grundy

5

attempted

to show that

the

plan

of revolt

had been

made

before the

Naxian

expedition,

which merely providedthe opportunity and the favorable circum-

stances.

Max

Cary accepted

Herodotus'

story,

but

rejected

the

allegation

that

the

Persian

commander

Megabates

warned the

Naxians

beforehand

and so

caused the

failure

of the

expedition.

That

a

keen

and

competent

commander,

and a

Persian noble-

man,

should have

turned

traitor

out of

pure spite

is incredible.

16

One would

like

to know

why

it is

inherently

incredible. In

any

case,

the

story

is

probably

untrue,

not because it is

incredible,

but because this is the kind of inside story for which Hero-

dotus could not

possibly

have had a

reliable source. Herodotus

is no doubt

reproducing

a

popular

Ionian

legend

in

this

tale

of

Megabates,

and

it

is

of some

importance

to discover

how

it

arose.

We must realize

that

the

Ionian

revolt was

a

nationalist

move-

ment,

and

in

nationalist

movements,

cause

and effect

do

not

always

follow

one another

in

completely

logical

sequence.

It

is

true there were botheconomicandpolitical causes for the revolt.17

But

I

suggest

that the real cause was

a

growing

feeling

of

unity

among

the

subject

Greek

cities,

and

a

dawning

consciousness

of

the difference between

the

imperial

barbarians and the

conquered

Hellenes.

Ironically,

what

unity

there

was

among

the

subject

Greek cities was

imposed by

the

Persians. It

was

Persia

which

brought

together

a

united fleet from these cities

for the

Scythian

and Naxian

expeditions.

But once

brought together,

14

For

the

part

Miletus

played

in Persian

policy

in

the

Aegean,

see

John

L.

Myres,

Herodotus,

Father

of

History

(Oxford, 1953),

p.

201.

15

G. B.

Grundy,

op.

cit.,

pp.

84-5.

1

C.

A.

H.,

IV,

p.

217.

17

Hermann

Bengtson,

Griechische

Geschichte von

den

Anfdngen

bis in

die rimische

Kaiserzeit

(Munich,

1950),

pp.

141-2.

J. A. S.

EVANS.

118




8/17


9/17

J. A. S.

EVANS.

Miletus.

Immediately

after

the

fleet returned from

Naxos,

before it had

time

to

demobilize,

Aristagoras

called

together

a

group

of men he could

trust,l8

among

them

Hecataeus the

logo-

poios,

and laid his

plan

for revolt before

them.

Herodotus

(V, 36)

records

only

the

advice

which

Hecataeus

gave

to this

council,'9

but

the

very

fact

that

Hecataeus

advised

against

the

revolt shows

that the council was not

made

up

of

conspirators

already

committed to

rebellion whenever

a

good

opportunity

arose.

Aristagoras

disclosed the disaffection

in

the

fleet,

and

it

must

have

been

this disclosure which led

the

council

to resolve to

try

revolt. Their

first move

was

to

send

Iatragoras

to

the fleet to

raise

it,

and

they

were

completely

successful.

Next

Aristagoras

broke

into

open

rebellion

(V,

37).

The

rebels

made

every

effort

to

win

popular

support.

They

did

not seize

the treasures

from the

temple

at

Branchidae as

Hecataeus

suggested

(V, 36)

for

this

might

have

brought

accusa-

tions of

sacrilege. They

handed over

the

unpopular

puppet

tyrants

whom

they

had

captured

at

Myus

to their

own

cities,

most

of

which

prudently

let

them

go

into

exile,

but

Coes,

the

tyrant

of

Mytilene,

was so hated

that

his

former

subjects

stoned

him to

death

(V,

38).

Then

Aristagoras

touched

off a democratic

revolu-

tion.

The

tyrants

were

driven out.

Aristagoras

abdicated

his

own

tyranny

(or pretended

to,

according

to

Herodotus,

V,

37);

that

is,

he

deposed

his

father-in-law,

for he was still

ruling

as

18

Herodotus

(V,

36)

calls them

stasi6tai

(Aera

7rw

OraaLowrevw),

but

these men probably acquired this label from their future actions. There

is no

reason

to

assume,

as

Grundy

does

(op.

cit.,

p.

84)

that there

can be

little

doubt that

Herodotus'

incidental reference to

'conspirators'

or

'insurgents

'

indicates that

the

plan

of revolt had been

made

before-

it

may

be,

long

before-the

expedition

to

Naxos.

19

It

has been

doubted

if this

advice of

Hecataeus

is

authentic,

in

spite

of

the fact that

Herodotus' source

for

it

may

well

be

Hecataeus

himself. But the

motif of

the

wise counsellor

is

used

elsewhere

in

Herodotus where it is

not

likely

to be

authentic,

and

De

Sanctis

(op.

cit.,

pp.

60-1)

also has

tried to

show on

historical

grounds

that

the

story

was

probably

fabricated

after

the

revolt

was

crushed.

But on

close

examination,

Hecataeus

does

not

seem

to

have been

particularly

shrewd.

As

George

Grote

pointed

out,

he

argued

as

if

Miletus

would

have

to

stand

alone in

the

revolt

(Hist.

of

Greece

[Everyman

ed.],

V,

p.

5).

This

misapprehension

can

hardly

be

called

cleverness

after

the

event,

and

it

is

a

point

in

favor

of

accepting

the

story

as

authentic.

120




10/17

HISTIAEUS AND

ARISTAGORAS.

Histiaeus'

deputy.

Miletus,

be

it

remembered,

revolted

not

merely against

Persia.

It

revolted

against

its

tyrant,

His-

tiaeus,

too.

Herodotus

(V,

35)

makes

Histiaeus

partly responsible

for

the

revolt,

for

he

relates

what was no

doubt

a

popular legend,

that Histiaeus

sent

a

message

to

Aristagoras,

tattooed

on

the

scalp

of a

slave,

bidding

him

revolt. Modern

historians

have

been

nearly

unanimous

in

rejecting

this

story,

although

it

is

possible

Histiaeus could have

communicated with

Aristagoras

in

a

more

orthodox fashion.

But what motive

could

Histiaeus

have had

in

urging

a

revolt?

20

If

he were

really

a

prisoner

at

Susa,

unable to

return to

Miletus,

as Herodotus

says,

could

he

have

imagined

that

Darius

would be more

willing

to let

him

go

when

Ionia was

in

revolt than

when

it was

in

peace?

Moreover,

it

is

scarcely likely

that

Histiaeus was

happy

to

find himself

deposed

as

tyrant

of Miletus.

As for

Aristagoras,

he

acted out of

mixed

motives,

partly

self-interested, partly

idealistic.

A man

who could

champion

the

unfortunate

Myndian captain, Scylax,

against

a

cousin of

the Great

King

was

quite

capable

of

championing

Greece

against

Persia

with

ideals as

high

as

any

Miltiades or Themistocles could

muster.2'

At

the same

time,

he

had

every

reason to

fear

what

Artaphernes

might

do

to

him.

To

sum

up:

the immediate

cause of the Ionian

revolt was the

friction

which

developed

between

the Persian officers

and the

Greeksailors

in

the fleet

which

attacked Naxos,

and since

Aris-

tagoras

took

the side of the

Greeks,

he

emerged

as a

popular

hero.

After

the fleet

returned to

Myus, Aristagoras,

faced with the

prospect

of

Artaphernes'

wrath,

and

no doubt

elated

by

his own

popularity,

saw the

opportunity

was

ripe

for revolt

and

decided

to touch

it off.

This is

not

the

place

to

go

into the

underlying

causes of the

revolt,

which had

been in existence

for

twenty

or

thirty

years.

But the

immediate cause was disaffection in the

fleet,

and before the

Naxian

expedition

neither

Aristagoras

nor

anyone

else could

have foretold

that

this

wave of anti-Persian

feeling

would

spring

up.

The

revolt

was not

the

result of

lengthy,

careful

planning.

20

See remarks

of

A.

Blamire, op.

cit.,

pp.

147-9.

21

De Sanctis

(op. cit.,

p.

59)

urges

this

view.

121




11/17

J.

A.

S.

EVANS.

Successful

rebels become

heroes;

unsuccessful ones are less

fortunate.

Aristagoras

was

unsuccessful. His

diplomatic

mission

to mainland Greece

to

get military support

was

a

complete

failure;

only

Athens

and

Eretria sent

help

and that

was

quickly

withdrawn. He was

an

energetic

leader,

but

he showed no out-

standing

military

ability,

and

although

he

had

abdicated

his

office

as

Histiaeus'

deputy

in

Miletus,

it

seems he

still

exercised

some of the

powers

of a

tyrant.

In

late

497,

he

retired

from

Miletus

and

went

to

Myrcinus

(evidently

still

a

possession

of

Miletus)

where he lost

his

life. Herodotus

(VI,

5)

remarks

that

the Milesians were

glad

to

be rid

of

him.

We need look no further

for

the

real reason for

Aristagoras'

strange departure

from

Miletus

before

the revolt was

over,

and

well before

the

Ionian

position

became

hopeless.

His

popularity

had

proved

ephemeral.

The Milesians remembered

that

he

was

the

son-in-law of their former

tyrant,

and

that

he

still

held some

tyrannical powers.

Aristagoras

made

a

strategic

retreat

to

Myr-

cinus,

where he

might

win

military

prestige

for

himself

and

secure

the revenues

from the

gold

mines there for Miletus.

After the revolt

was

crushed,

it

must have seemed to

many

people

that

Aristagoras

went to

Myrcinus

to

find a

refuge

for

his fellow-rebels

if

they

should lose

Miletus,

and

this

is what

Herodotus

(V, 124) suggests.

But I

doubt

if

the revolt

appeared

hopeless

to the

Greeks

in

497/6.

It

may

be

noted

that about

the

time

Aristagoras

went to

Myrcinus,

another adventurer

was

setting

out for the same

general

area.

Miltiades

was

returning

to the Chersonese.22The Persian

position

in Thrace must have

collapsed completely by

this

time,

for

when

the cities on

the

Hellespont

joined

the revolt

in

498,

the Persians lost

communica-

tion

with

their

troops

in

Europe.

It

may

have seemed to

many

Greeks

(including

Miltiades)

that

Thrace could

keep

its

inde-

pendence,

whatever

happened

in

Ionia.

Herodotus'

view

(V,

124)

is

that

Aristagoras

escaped

from

Miletus

because

he saw the revolt

was

hopeless

and

he

had

no

stomach for

danger. Probably

the truth is that he saw his

popularity

was

waning

at

home,

and

tried

to

recover

it

by

an

exploit

which would secure valuable

revenues

for

Miletus

if

it

was

successful.

The

grandiose

nationalist dreams of

a

pan-

22

In

496 B.

C.,

according

to

Hammond,

op.

cit.,

pp.

113-29.

122




12/17

HISTIAEUS

AND

ARISTAGORAS.

Hellenic

attack

on

Persia

(they

have a

ring

of

authenticity)

which

Aristagoras

had unveiled

for the

Spartans (V, 49)

had

faded

by

497,

and

Miletus was

digging

in

for a

long

war and

needed

extra revenues.

3. Histiaeus and the

Revolt.

Histiaeus' course

of action

during

the revolt was

strange

and

ambiguous.

He

was in

Susa when the

revolt

began,

but Hero-

dotus

(V, 35)

regarded

him as

one of

its

co-authors nevertheless.

King Darius suspected Histiaeus too (V, 106), although he

accepted

Histiaeus'

explanation

that

Aristagoras

had

acted

on

his

own

authority.

The

satrap

at

Sardis,

Artaphernes,

seems

to

have

cherished

a

lively

suspicion

of

Histiaeus

(VI,

1),

and

the

Ionians

accepted

the

story

that

Histiaeus was

behind the

revolt

(VI,

3).

Yet Histiaeus could

have

no

plausible

motive

for

urging

the

revolt.

He

could

have

no

motive for

revolt;

yet

he could

have

had

a plausible motive for pretending he was responsible for it.

When he

came down to

Sardis

and

crossed over to Chios

(VI,

2),

the Chians

held

him under

arrest

until he convinced them

he had

always

been

a

supporter

of

the insurrection.

The whole

tradi-

tion

which makes

Histiaeus

responsible

for

the revolt

probably

derives

from

his

own

propaganda

between

496/5

and

his death.

Yet the

question

remains:

what was Histiaeus'

real

policy?

According

to

Herodotus

(V,

106-7)

he deceived

Darius with

false promises and receivedpermission to return to Ionia. After

a

curious

delay

(the

dialogue

with Darius

[V,

106-7]

was

held

just

after

Darius heard the

lonians

had

burned

Sardis,

whereas

Histiaeus

appears

in

Sardis

only

in

496/5)23

he

arrived,

not

in

lonia but

in

Sardis.

Once

there,

Artaphernes

(VI, 1)

accused

him

bluntly

of

complicity

in the revolt.

Thereupon,

Histiaeus

fled

to

Chios,

where he was

arrested,

but

later released after

the

Chians

were satisfied

that

he favored

the

revolt.

Histiaeus' next move, apparently, was to foment

a

rebellion

23

For the

date:

Swoboda,

Histiaios,

R.-E. The

delay

is curious.

I

suspect

that

Histiaeus

arrived

in Sardis

earlier than

we

gather

from

Herodotus,

and had

been

operating

there

for

some

time,

perhaps

as

long

as

a

year,

before

the

enmity

between

him and

Artaphernes

broke out

into

the

open.

But this is

pure

conjecture.

123




13/17

against

Artaphernes

(VI,

4),

but

he could not have

imagined

that

any

such rebellion would

have been successful.24

At

any

rate,

the

plan

miscarried,

and Histiaeus then

attempted

to return

to

Miletus.

But his former

subjects

would

not

have

him,

and

when

Histiaeus tried to force

his

way

into

the

city,

he

was

wounded

in

the

thigh.

So he returned to

Chios,

but

got

no further

support

there,

and

he went on to

Mytilene.

The

Mytileneans

were

won over

and

gave

him

eight

ships;

and

with

these

Histiaeus

sailed to

Byzantium

where,

Herodotus

says (VI, 5),

he seized

all

ships

sailing

from

the north

except

those which said

they

were

pre-

pared

to

obey

Histiaeus.

Apparently

he

was

not

blockading

the

straits,

but

simply

attempting

to build

up

a

following

in

Ionia.

He

stayed

at

Byzantium

until

he heard of the

battle

of

Lade,

when he commenced

a

series of manoeuvres

which

no

modern

historian

has

fully

understood.

What

was Histiaeus

trying

to do?

His

course of action seems

ambiguous

and

inconsistent,

and

although

it

is

probable

he chose

to

appear

ambiguous

for

policy's

sake,

the

inconsistency

is harder

to

explain.

Yet there

is one

explanation

we can

surely

reject.

His actions do

not

betray

irresolution or

desperation,

and his

final

campaign

after

Lade was

not

nothing

more than

the dis-

tracted

dodging

and

doubling

of

the

quarry

before the

hounds.

25

If

he

were

dodging

and

doubling, why

did he

not

choose

to

dodge

out

of the Persians'

clutches?

Instead,

when he heard

the

Phoenician fleet

was

sailing

north,

he

left

Thasos,

which

he

was

besieging

(VI,

28),

and sailed

south to Lesbos where

he would

be

directly

in

its

path.

This

was not the

move

of

a

frightened

man or a

desperate

one.

In

fact,

Histiaeus showed no fear of the Persians

at

all.

His

final

capture

was a

piece

of bad luck he could

not

have

foreseen. Forced

by

lack

of

supplies

to

lead

a

foraging expedi-

tion into Atarneus

on

the

mainland

(VI,

28),

he ran

into a

Persian

force

unexpectedly.

There

was

a

skirmish,

and His-

24

Heinlein

(Klio,

IX

[1909],

p.

346)

argues

that

Histiaeus had

per-

suaded Darius that the Ionian

revolt

was

directed

against

Artaphernes,

and

not so much

against

the Persian

Empire,

but

this is

an

impossible

thesis

to

accept.

Had

Darius

believed

this,

he

would

have

recalled

Artaphernes.

25

Cary,

C.

A.

H., IV,

p.

227;

see

also

Blamire,

op.

cit.,

p.

151.

J. A. S. EVANS.

24




14/17


15/17

Histiaeus'

flight

from Sardis was

a

turning-point

in his

career,

but

I

think we would

be

wrong

to

think

he

abandoned

his

policy.

He

still

sought

a

negotiated

settlement

between Ionia and

Persia

which would

preserve

his

own

position

and

perhaps

increase his

power. By

insisting

he

had

always

supported

the

revolt,

he

won

some

support

at

Chios,

and

then

apparently

tried to

bypass

Artaphernes

and

put

out feelers to

Persian friends

of

his

own

at

Sardis. But

Artaphernes

blocked

him

again.

If

Histiaeus

could

regain

his old

position

at

Miletus,

he

would

become too

important

for

Artaphernes

to

ignore,

or

if

Arta-

phernes

would

not

negotiate,

Histiaeus

could

come to terms

directly

with the

king.

But Miletus would

have

nothing

to do

with

Histiaeus,

and

once he

was

rejected

there,

Chios withdrew

what

support

she

had

given

him.

Histiaeus

turned

to the

Aeolian

city

of

Mytilene,

which

gave

him

eight

ships,

and

with

these

he

sailed to

Byzantium.

The

mystery

which

surrounds

Histiaeus' actions

probably

arises

only

from the fact that

we know so

little

about the

state

of affairs

in

Ionia at this

point.

Chios

and Miletus were the

hard

core of the

revolt,

or so

we

should

gather

from

their

record

at Lade

(VI,

14-17).

Lesbos

was

probably

less

enthusiastic;

Histiaeus'

promises

of

a

negotiated

peace may

have won some

support

there,

and even the

pro-Persian

tyrants

had their

par-

tisans

in

the

Greek

cities. As

for

Byzantium,

she had

entered

the revolt

late

and

under some

compulsion (V,

103);

it

is

doubtful if

she

supported

it

enthusiastically.

In

other

words,

the

cities

where

Histiaeus

received

support

and

co-operation

were

places

where

the enthusiasm

for

the revolt

was

quite

possibly

flagging

by

496/5.

After the battle

of

Lade,

Histiaeus and

his

force of Lesbians

sailed

to

Chios

and

seized control of it.

It was

still

possible

for him

to

salvage something

out

of the wreck

of

the

Ionian

revolt. He next sailed to

Thasos,

attracted

by

its

gold

mines,

and

probably

determined to increase

his

sphere

of

influence

before the Phoenician

fleet

was able to move north.

The

scholars

who have

suggested

that Histiaeus

wished to build

up

an

island

kingdom

for

himself

may

not

be far

wrong,27

provided

we

realize

27

Cf.

Swoboda,

Histiaios,

R.-E. The

idea

is

dismissed

by

Blamire,

op. cit.,

p.

151.

J.

A.

S. EPVANS.

26




16/17

HISTIAEUS AND ARISTAGORAS.

that

this

kingdom

could never

have

been more

than

a client

tyranny

under Persian

suzerainty.

But when

Histiaeus

heard

the Phoenician fleet was

moving

north,

he sailed back

to

his base at

Lesbos.

He could

have had

no

intention

of

making

a last stand

there

for

freedom. If the

Lesbians

fled at

Lade,

would

they

make

an

heroic stand at the

eleventh

hour

?

Instead,

Histiaeus wanted

to

be on hand

when

the Phoenician fleet

arrived,

so

that

he

could

conduct

negotia-

tions

with it

in

person.

The best-laid plans do not always work out, and Histiaeus,

who

had

pursued

his

pro-Persian

policy

with

singular constancy,

made his final error. His

supplies

ran

out,

and

he

crossed to

the mainland

to

forage.

He

met

a Persian

force,

was

captured

after

a skirmish which could have been

unintentional,

and fell

into

the

hands

of his

bitter

enemy, Artaphernes.

Artaphernes

had blocked

him

twice

before;

now he checkmated

him for the

final

time-permanently.

To sum up: Histiaeus at the Danube bridge had told his

fellow

tyrants

their

positions

depended

on

the Great

King's

support,

and

with

singular

constancy

he continued to base his

policy

on

this belief.

He aimed at

a

negotiated

settlement of

the

revolt with

Persia,

which

would

have

preserved

his own

posi-

tion

and

brought

Ionia

under

Persian

control without

further

bloodshed.

He

may

not

have acted

altogether

from

self-interest;

quite

possibly

he

thought,

as

Hecataeus

did,

that revolt

was

useless, and in any case he was out of sympathy with the

nationalist

feeling

behind

it.

But

his

policy got

no

support

from

Artaphernes

who

was

determined

to

crush the revolt

with

a

military victory.

Perhaps

the

satrap

at

Dascylium

was more

sympathetic;

at

least,

Cyzicus

managed

to

negotiate

a

settlement

with him at some

point during

the

revolt

(VI,

33).

Perhaps

Darius also

supported

the

scheme

of

Histiaeus,

for he

was

displeased

at

his execution

(VI,

30).

Miletus before the revolt had been the chief instrument for

increasing

Persian

influence

in the

Greek

world;

28

why

should

Darius

want his instrument

destroyed?

Histiaeus

himself

was a victim of

Artaphernes'

jealousy

and

28

Myres,

op. cit.,

p.

201.

127




17/17

J.

A. S.

EVANS.

his

reputation

fell

victim to his

own difficult

position.29

Had he

lived

longer,

he

would

probably

have

stood revealed

as

a

pro-

Persian

agent.

As

it

was,

he

remained

an

ambiguous

figure,

whose course

of action

was

judged

in

the

light

of

his

own

propa-

ganda

in

the

three

or

four

years

before

his

death,

and

as

a

result,

it

has

seemed at

best

mysterious,

at

worst

irrational,

from

his

own

day

to our

own.

J. A.

S.

EVANS.

MCMASTER

UNIVERSITY.

29

It seems to me that Histiaeus' reputation for double-dealing in

Herodotus comes

directly

from

Ionian

tradition and need

not owe

any-

thing

to

a

hostile Persian

source,

even

though

we

do know

Herodotus

had

such sources

(Joseph

Wells,

The Persian

Friends of

Herodotus,

Studies

in

Herodotus,

pp.

95-111).

Herodotus

had

an

added

reason for

disliking

both

Histiaeus

and

Aristagoras:

he

held

these two men

responsible

for

the

revolt,

of

which

he

disapproved.

128

evans, j. a. s._histiaeus and aristagoras. notes on the ionian revolt_ajph, 84, 2_1963_113-128

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