evaluating the effectiveness of sanctions
TRANSCRIPT
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FOR ARIE KACOWICZ
International
Relations of theMiddle EastEvaluating the Eectiveness of
SanctionsCase Study Ira!
Jeremy Rees
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Sanctions regi"es since the "id#$%%&s have 'eco"e an increasingly
co""on instru"ent a"ong (olicy#"a)ers as a "eans of aecting the
'ehaviour of other states$* +o,ever- the eectiveness of (revious
sanctions atte"(ts at achieving their stated or desired goals is highly
de'ata'le* .his !uestiona'le eectiveness is highly (ertinent given the
current sanctions regi"e i"(osed on Iran 'y the /nited 0ations Security
Council 1/0SC2- as ,ell as the additional "easures i"(osed 'y the /S and
the E/* .his essay ,ill revie, the sanctions de'ate- using the sanctions
regi"e e"(loyed against Ira! fro" $%%&&4 as a case study* I ,ill then
atte"(t to 5nd lessons learned ,hich can 'e a((lied to future cases such
as the ongoing case of Iran- and suggest under ,hat circu"stances these
sanctions are li)ely to achieve the stated goals of the sender countries3*
.his essay ,ill 'e set out in 6 (hases 1$2 theory 'ehind sanctions
i"(osition7 132 revie, of the data currently availa'le on sanctions
$ In $%8& only 8 countries ,ere su'9ect to econo"ic (ressure- 'y the "id#$%%&s
that nu"'er had risen to :;* 0i)olay Marinov-
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eectiveness- and (otential (ro'le"s or inaccuracies that have 'een
voiced 'y critics of the data7 142 a 'rief history of the sanctions regi"e in
Ira! fro" $%%&&47 1:2 analysis of the sanctions regi"e in Ira! in regard
to its successes and failures7 182 lessons fro" the Ira!i case for future
sanctions regi"es7 162 conclusion on the overall value of the use of
sanctions*
Theoretical Considerations
I de5ne sanctions as non#"ilitary instru"ent used 'y one or "ore states
against another state intended to coerce the latter to change its general
'ehaviour- or a s(eci5c action- or to (unish it for this 'ehaviour or action4*
.he relatively fre!uent use of sanctions can 'e e(lained 'y the high
de"and of (olitical leaders to interfere in other countries aairs
intersecting ,ith the availa'le su((ly- es(ecially for such entities as the
/S or E/ ,hich have large econo"ies and generous aid 'udgets:*
3.hroughout this essay the ter" target ,ill refer to countries ,hich are the su'9ect ofsanctions 'y others* .he ter" sender,ill 'e used to refer to a state or states that are
i"(osing sanctions on another state* In this I follo, the syste" used 'y =aniel W*
=re>ner- e Country ?eaders@- (* 866* I etend "y de5nition of sanctions to
include non#econo"ic (olicy instru"ents that are routinely (art of the sanctions
(ac)age that are (laced target states* In this res(ect I follo, the de5nition of
sanctions e"(loyed 'y Chantal de onge Oudraat-
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Sanctions have traditionally 'een considered a "iddle ground 'et,een
di(lo"atic (rotest and "ilitary force8* .he need to intervene in the aairs
of other states is due to the fact that high levels of interde(endence "ean
states "ust ta)e an interest in activities 'eyond their o,n 'orders* For
coercion to ,or)- the costs to the target of sanctions should out,eigh the
costs of conceding6* For this reason- it is generally sti(ulated that
sanctions can achieve only
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(articularly in con9unction ,ith the ulti"ate threat of "ilitary force if the
target should fail to co"(ly%* +o,ever- this assertion 'egs to !uestion- if
sanctions are considera'ly "ore eective if 'ac)ed u( 'y the threat of
"ilitary force- to ,hat etent can successful cases of co"(ulsion 'e
attri'uted to sanctions as o((osed to "ilitary force@
Sanctions can 'e either unilateral or "ultilateral- the latter not necessarily
re!uiring the a((roval of the /0SC* Elliott esti"ates that- in the case of
unilateral /S sanctions- unilateral sanctions have a (oor record of
success$&* .his vie, has generally 'een considered as self#evident$$*
/nilateral sanctions have 'een referred to as
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these sanctions are co"(rehensively a((lied 'y the international
co""unity* Alternatively- the glo'ali>ation of econo"ic activity "eans
there are li)e,ise "any "ore su((liers of "ost goods and services and
"any "ore (otential "ar)ets for a targets e(orts* .hus- if sender states
should cheat on the sanctions regi"e or refuse to 9oin it in the 5rst (lace-
the sanctions regi"e ,ill lac) the ro'ustness to inNict the necessary
severity on the target- and thus fail to co"(el it to concede to the
senders de"ands$4*Marinov 5nds that sanctions i"(osed 'y institutions-
and thus "ultilateral- are "ore eective than unilateral sanctions- for the
reasons discussed a'ove$:* +o,ever- "ultilateral sanctions are also "ore
dicult to organise and sustain$8* Multilateral sanctions re!uire
coo(eration 'et,een a nu"'er of states* Sanctions "ay fail 'ecause the
(ri"ary sender is una'le to enforce the a((lication of sanctions*
ac)sliding states "ay intentionally fail to enforce sanctions regi"es that
they 5nd costly or contrary to their (erceived interests$6* Moreover-
(rivate rent#see)ing actors 1sanctions 'usters2 "ay 5nd ,ays to
clandestinely overco"e sanctions regi"es* .his is es(ecially the case
,hen the (otential rents are large- and the goods are s"all- high#value-
$4 Ki"'erly Ann Elliott- ner-
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and ho"ogeneous on ,orld "ar)ets- such as oil$;* So"e sanctions
regi"es are 9ust too technical or e(ensive to 'e ade!uately i"(le"ented
'y so"e states$G- (articularly 'y develo(ing countries- ,hich "ay often
neigh'our the target state* Current "ultilateral sanctions regi"es fail to
oer ade!uate co"(ensation to third#(arties that ,ill 'ear the 'runt of
the sanctions- giving the" little incentive to co"(ly ,ith the sanctions
regi"e$%* Kae"(fer and ?o,en'erg 5nd that unilateral sanctions "ay 'e
"ore eective- es(ecially if the sanctioning state has close (olitical-
cultural and econo"ic ties ,ith the target3&* =re>ner 5nds that "ultilateral
sanctions regi"es i"(osed 'y international organisations are "ore li)ely
to 'e eective as they have "echanis"s to (revent countries 'ac)sliding
and can co"'at free#rider (ro'le"s3$*
Sanctions regi"es have changed in character over ti"e* Fro" WWII until
the "id#$%%&s- sanctions ,ere co"(rehensive in sco(e- generally
targeting all facets of a states econo"y33* +o,ever- fro" the "id#$%%&s-
and es(ecially follo,ing the (erceived failures of sanctions i"(osed
$;I'id* (* ;67 Willia" +* Kae"(fer D Anton =* ?o,en'erg-
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against ugoslavia- +aiti- and Ira! in the early $%%&s- a ne, a((roach
)no,n as s"art 1or targeted2 sanctions34develo(ed that has co"e to 'e
the nor" in sanctions regi"es3:* S"art sanctions ,ere develo(ed
follo,ing the realisation that targeting elites in (o,er- and their
su((ortive constituencies- ,ould 'e "ore li)ely to yield results- as elites-
(articularly in autocratic regi"es- ,ere often sheltered fro" the negative
eects of sanctions* Moreover- they ,ere intended to 'e "ore hu"ane-
targeting those 1generally unelected2 (ersons directly res(onsi'le for
violating international standards of 'ehaviour- rather than the target
states civilian (o(ulation38* S"art sanctions include an array of
"echanis"s- "ost i"(ortant of ,hich are ar"s e"'argoes36- 5nancial
34 .hese "ay 'e targeted either at individuals such as "e"'ers of the ruling
elite and their fa"ilies- or against s(eci5c econo"ic activities and co""odities*
eter Wallensteen- Carina Stai'ano- D Mi)ael Eri)sson- Ma(ing )argeted
Sanctions !#ective: *uidelines for Im&lementation of +, Polic% O&tions-
1/((sala /((sala /niversity- 3&&42- (* 6G*
3: Chantal de onge Oudraat-
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sanctions3;- travel restrictions3G- aviation 'ans3%- as ,ell as econo"ic
sanctions or e"'argos on s(eci5c (roducts or industry- or trade ,ith
certain individuals*
=ue to their technical co"(leity s"art sanctions are "ore dicult to
i"(le"ent than co"(rehensive sanctions4&* .hey are "ore de"anding
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"ai"u" i"(act on the target* .hus- ,hilst in theory s"art sanctions are
an attractive o(tion7 in reality they "ay not 'e (ractically feasi'le43*
.he logic 'ehind "ost sanctions is generally a'out creating either (olitical
insta'ility or regi"e change in the target state44* .o this end- Marinov has
conducted a study 'ased on the data of +uf'auer et al* in an atte"(t to
5nd the correlation 'et,een leadershi( change and sanctions* +e 5nds
that sanctions- on average- increase the li)elihood that an incu"'ent ,ill
lose (o,er 'y 3G in a year that sanctions are i"(osed on the
incu"'ents state co"(ared to a nor"al year4:*
So"e states are also "ore li)ely to 'e susce(ti'le to sanctions than
others* Marinov 5nds this to 'e the case ,ith de"ocracies- as o((osed to
autocracies ,hich a((ear 'etter a'le to resist sanctions eorts48* ?i)e,ise-
countries ,ith lo, or no econo"ic gro,th are "ore susce(ti'le to
sanctions- as are s"aller- "ore o(en econo"ies ,here foreign trade
"a)es u( a greater (ercentage of L=- as these countries are less a'le to
a'sor' the i"(act of econo"ic (ressure46* States that are highly
de(endent on another country in ter"s of the (ercentage of their total
43 I'id* (* :&3*
44 Arne .ostensen D eate ull- e Country ?eaders@- (*
8;47 Arne .ostensen D eate ull-
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foreign trade are also "ore susce(ti'le to unilateral sanctions i"(osed 'y
that country4;*
Finally- the issue of the "orality of sanctions has 'een !uestioned-
(articularly in regard to the sanctions i"(osed on Ira!* ?eaders of target
states "ay not value hu"an life in the sa"e ,ay in ,hich sender states
do4G* Co"(rehensive sanctions are essentially function as a for" of
collective (unish"ent 'y the international co""unity* Whereas in ,ar-
states are legally 'ound to follo, the (rinci(les of distinction 'et,een
"ilitary (ersonnel and assets and civilian (o(ulations- and of
(ro(ortionality of res(onse- international hu"anitarian la, does not
currently a((ly to sanctions regi"es- although they 'oth "ight 'e e!ually
as devastating to civilians4%*So"e (eo(le have 9usti5ed sanctions as a
"eans of avoiding ,ar7 ho,ever- others have cited the 9ust as devastating
eects of sanctions:&
- or concluded that sanctions "a)e ,ar even "ore
li)ely:$*
4; I'id*
4G Arne .ostensen D eate ull-
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Current Data: Results & Problems
/nder a((ro(riate circu"stances- sanctions can 'e advocated 'y any
theory of international relations- thus the current divide over the
eectiveness of sanctions a"ongst scholars
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target states ,illingness to co"(ro"ise* Other (ro'le"s also eist* .hese
include selection 'ias- counterfactuals D invisi'le eects- sanctions as
sy"'ols- and co"(arison failure* I ,ill ea"ine each of these in turn*
Selection 'ias ta)es t,o for"s* First- it "ay refer to the de5nition of
success ,hich is used to deter"ine ,hether sanctions have 'een eective
or not* In the ,ords of +uf'auer et al*- the
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in all cases of atte"(ted coercion- this ,ould "ore accurately reNect their
coercive a'ility* +o,ever- rational (olicy "a)ers are (resu"a'ly "ore
li)ely to i"(le"ent sanctions ,hen they thin) there is a reasona'le
chance of success- thus 9ustifying the forgone econo"ic 'ene5ts that
sanctions ,ould lead to* .his then- ,ould (resu"a'ly lead to a 'ias in the
data sho,ing a higher rate of success than ,ould other,ise 'een the
case- ,ere sanctions a((lied in all instances of atte"(ted coercion*
Counterfactuals- as in any case of causal analysis- cause (ro'le"s in
assessing the success of sanctions* .his is 'ecause it is dicult to )no,
the outco"e should a dierent (olicy choice have 'een "ade8&* .he
sanctions data include only instances ,hen sanctions ,ere i"(le"ented-
not ,hen they ,ere "erely threatened* For "ore accurate data- all cases
of threatened- as ,ell as actual coercion- should 'e included* Invisi'le
eects refer to the (ossi'ility of the (otential of sanctions conditioning the
'ehaviour of states* For instance- 'ecause of the negative eects of
sanctions- (otential targets "ay (ursue (olicies congruent ,ith the
senders (references- ,ithout ever crossing the threshold of (ressure even
'eing a((lied and sanctions threatened8$* States )no, that they can act
,ithin certain 'oundaries of action ,ithout 'eing (unished- thus often
they confor" to a certain standard of 'ehaviour- ,ithout even 'eing
as)ed to do so*
8& =avid ald,in- e Country ?eaders@- (*868*
ere"y Rees
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Most literature on the eectiveness of sanctions is 'ased on a
funda"ental assu"(tion- that is- that sanctions are in fact intended to
achieve so"ething vis#U#vis the target state* .here is no reason ,hy this
should necessarily 'e true ho,ever* olicy#"a)ers often have a range of
o'9ectives- of ,hich (ressuring a target state to concede is 'ut one*
Sanctions can (lay a role in achieving other o'9ectives of (olicy#"a)ers-
such as a((easing do"estic audiences or a s(eci5c constituency* .his- of
course- "a)es it far "ore dicult to "easure the eectiveness of
sanctions in co"(elling target states83- as the ai" of the sanctions regi"e
"ay have little to do ,ith the achieve"ent of this goal- and the sender
state "ay 'e ,ell a,are that the sanctions are not going to aect the
target states actions even 'efore they i"(le"ent the sanctions84* A(art
fro" do"estic audiences- sender states "ay ,ish to send a signal a'out
,hat sort of 'ehaviour ,ill not 'e tolerated in future* .hey "ay also ,ish
to signal resolve- es(ecially concerning a ,illingness to use "ilitary force
should the status !uo continue* ?eaders of states fre!uently use
threatening rhetoric against other states- 'ut ,hereas
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"ore intangi'le set of o'9ectives- often dicult to "easure- ,hich develo(
slo,ly over ti"e- "ay 'e (ursued in an atte"(t to aect (eo(les ideas
and e(ectations of ,hat sort of 'ehaviour is acce(ta'le in international
relations* InNuencing international nor"s "ay 'e a 'roader o'9ective
,hen states i"(ose sanctions regi"es88*
Finally- as ald,in notes- (olicy#"a)ers are not only interested in ,hether
sanctions ,or) &er se- they are interested in the ,hether sanctions ,or)
in co"(arison to other (otential for"s of action* Whilst "ilitary force is
often advocated as the "ost eective for" coercion- success rates for
"ilitary force are highly contested- falling in the range of :& to ;386* In
fact- Marinov 5nds to his sur(rise that the use of force actually increases a
leaders hold on oce8;* When the costs of "ilitary versus non#"ilitary
coercion are co"(ared- even if "ilitary coercion is "ore li)ely to achieve
the desired (olicy change in the target state- sanctions are the (refera'le
o(tion if the cost dierential 'et,een the t,o is large enough that there is
88 .his "ay ta)e ti"e to develo(- is dicult to "easure- and is de'ata'le if iteven has any aect- as the continuing de'ate 'et,een realists and
constructivists de"onstrates*
86 I'id* (* %4#%:* ald,in suggests that actual 5gure is (ro'a'ly lo,er*
8; Marinov concludes that force li)ely generates t,o ty(es of eects* First- it
"ay ,ea)en a leader* Second- it "ay generates a
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a higher net gain through sanctions than through "ilitary force8G* ald,in
su"s this (oint u( ,ell
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itself led to considera'le da"age to Ira!i infrastructure* For instance-
Ira!s electricity out(ut ,as reduced to : of its (re#,ar level64*
In A(ril $%%$ the /0SC ado(ted Resolution 6G;- ,hich re#ar"ed the
(revious resolutions and set out in detail the ter"s under ,hich sanctions
,ould 'e lifted6:* It also "odi5ed the (revious resolution in that it allo,ed
Ira! to i"(ort foodstus* As Ira! ,as still not a'le to sell oil ho,ever- this
"odi5cation (roved to 'e of little relevance* It set u( a revie, (rocess-
under ,hich every 6& days the /0SC ,ould deter"ine ,hether to lift or
"odify the sanctions regi"e* Finally- it stated that ece(tions to the oil
e"'argo ,ould 'e a((roved on a case#'y#case 'asis- ,hen it ,as
deter"ined ade!uate 5nancial resources ,ere needed to (rovide for
essential civilian needs68*
In August and Se(te"'er $%%3- /0SC Resolutions ;&6 D ;$3 ,ere (assed
res(ectively- authorising Ira! to e(ort V$*6 'illion /S= of oil over a si#
"onth (eriod- ,ith Ira! set to receive a((roi"ately V$ 'illion 1the rest
'eing ear"ar)ed for the Co"(ensation Fund- to fund /0 o(erations in
Ira!- and to (ay oil transit fees to .ur)ey2 66* All (ay"ents out of this
account ,ere to 'e scrutinised and a((roved 'y the /0 Secretariat* .he
64 I'id* (* 3$&*
6: SHRESH6G; 1$%%$2* Availa'le at htt(HHdaccess#dds#
ny*un*orgHdocHRESO?/.IO0HLE0H0R&H8%6H34HIMLH0R&8%634*(df@O(enEle"ent*
68 /nited 0ations- )he +nited ,ations and the Ira012u-ait Conict3 455614557
10e, or) /0- $%%62- (* 3%#44*
66 A''as Alnasra,i-
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(ur(ose of the resolution ,as to reduce the deteriorating situation of the
civilian (o(ulation7 ho,ever- neither resolution ,as i"(le"ented*
.he oil#for#food regi"e ,as revisited again in A(ril $%%8 under /0SC
Resolution %G6* Essentially- the sa"e as Resolutions ;&6 and ;$3 in
su'stance- this resolution raised the a"ount of oil Ira! ,as a'le to sell to
V3 'illion- ,ith V$*4 'illion going to Ira!* .his a"ount ,as esti"ated to 'e
insigni5cant relative to civilian- and ,as re9ected 'y the Ira!i
govern"ent6;* .he Ira!i leadershi( sa, the (rogra" as the 'asis for the
/0SC "aintaining sanctions on it inde5nitely6G* .hey ho(ed that the
continuing suering of the Ira!i (eo(le ,ould eventually lead to crac)s in
the international consensus6%* Only in anuary $%%6 did the Ira!i
govern"ent enter into negotiations ,ith the /0SC over the
i"(le"entation of the resolution follo,ing a severe 'out of hy(erinNation-
and it ,as not until =ece"'er $%%6 that Ira!i oil 5nally reached the ,orld
"ar)et*
In Fe'ruary $%%G- the /0SC raised the a"ount of (er"issi'le oil sales to
V8*3 'illion every si "onths;&- as it 'eca"e clear that the (revious 5gure
,as too s"all to "eet "ini"u" needs* In =ece"'er $%%%- the ceiling on
oil e(orts ,as a'olished altogether- 'ut all other (arts of the (rogra"
6; A''as Alnasra,i-
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,ere )e(t;$* y uly 3&&&- a total of V43*4 'illion ,orth of Ira!i oil had
'een e(orted- and the govern"ent had received V3&*G 'illion of this
a"ount*
In uly 3&&$- the /S and the /K ta'led a 9oint resolution to "odify
sanctions the co"(rehensive sanctions regi"es against Ira! to a s"art
sanction regi"e* +o,ever- Russia threatened to veto it- so the oil#for#food
(rogra" ,as etended;3* In 3&&3- a tougher "onitoring regi"e ,as
ado(ted- ,hilst the strict ar"s e"'argo re"ained in (lace- 'ut
restrictions on civilian i"(orts ,ere lifted- ece(ting (otential dual#use
ite"s;4*
Anal%sis
A"ong the literature on sanctions there is no scholarly consensus on
,hether the sanctions regi"e against Ira! ,as eective* Elliott counts the
case of Ira! as a success;:- as do Cortright and ?o(e> after revising their
;$ SHRESH$3G: 1$%%%2- section C* Availa'le at
htt(HH,,,*un*orgH=e(tsHunsco"HKeyresolutionsHsres%%#$3G:*ht" *
;3 ar'ara Crossette-
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(urely (unitive- rather than coerciveG8* As Cortright and ?o(e> sho,-
although Ira! did in fact (artially co"(ly ,ith the /0SCs re!uire"ents
regarding its ,ea(ons (rogra"sG6- the /0SC refused- due to (ressure fro"
the /S and the /K- to reci(rocate Ira!s (artial concessions* In 0ove"'er
$%%;- resident ill Clinton re"ar)ed that -
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conditions of Ira!s deteriorating econo"ic (ros(ectsG%* .he oil#for#food
(rogra"- 'y channelling the revenues fro" Ira!i oil sales fro" the /0
straight to the Ira!i govern"ent served to give the govern"ent a
"ono(oly on international trade* 0ot only did this "a)e (eo(le "ore
'eholden to the govern"ent should they ,ant to receive 'ene5ts fro"
this activity- 'ut it re"oved another (otentially (o,erful force in Ira!i
society* .he class of traders- ,ho could accu"ulate ,ealth inde(endent of
the govern"ent and through such resources (ose a threat to the ruling
elites- ,as deci"ated 'y the 'an on foreign transactions* .hus sanctions
not only failed to (roduce the desired change in leadershi( and acted only
to e"(o,er Ira!s dictatorshi(%&- 'ut re"oved a (otential for" of
do"estic o((osition* Moreover- the 'runt of the sanctions ,as not felt 'y
the Ira!i leadershi(%$or the "assive ar"y and internal security a((aratus
it "aintained to hold (o,er- and other (olitical loyalists%3
* Instead- the
regi"e directed the severest suering onto its (olitical o((onents such as
G% A''as Alnasra,i- -
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the "arsh Ara's of southern Ira!%4* Moreover- do"estic Ira!i anger- as
,ell as international 'la"e ,as directed "ore to,ards the /0SC for
i"(osing the sanctions than at the corru(t and autocratic Ira!i leadershi(*
.he /0 struggled to ,in the - -
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ins(ections resu"ed in 3&&3#3&&4 this situation had not changed%G* Much
of Ira!s che"ical ,ea(ons ca(a'ilities ,ere located and destroyed%%- as
,as its 'iological ,ea(ons ca(a'ilities$&&* When the /nited 0ations
Monitoring- Beri5cation and Ins(ection Co""ission 1/0MOBIC2 ins(ectors
entered Ira! in 3&&3- they found no evidence of rene,ed che"ical or
'iological ,ea(ons (rogra"s$&$* Ira!s 'allistic "issile (rogra" ,as also
halted* All 'ut t,o of the G$% 'anned Scud "issiles )no,n to have eisted
(rior to $%%& ,ere accounted for 'y /0SCOM* Although- Ira! had o'tained
so"e dual#use technology and atte"(ted to i"(ort Russian guidance
syste"s- no evidence ,as found that such ,ea(ons had 'een develo(ed
or tested* In 3&&3- /0MOBIC found that Ira!s As#Sa"oud II "issile
eceeded the (er"itted range of $8&)" and eradication of these ,as
under,ay ,hen the 3&&4 invasion 'egan$&3*
%G =avid Cortright- D Leorge A* ?o(e>- -
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0ot only ,ere Ira!s WM= and 'allistic "issile ca(a'ilities eradicated or
reduced through the "onitoring and sanctions regi"e- 'ut the Ira!i
"ilitary ,as left severely ,ea)ened* Follo,ing the Iran#Ira! ,ar- and then
the Lulf War- Ira!s "ilitary had 'een deci"ated* +o,ever- the sanctions
regi"e- 'y denying Ira! the o((ortunity to (urchase ne, ,ea(ons and
e!ui("ent through the ar"s e"'argo- and 'y denying it the a'ility to (ay
for such (urchases or develo( indigenous e!uivalents through the oil
e"'argo- (revented Ira! fro" re'uilding and re(lenishing its "ilitary
ca(acity* .he 5nal revenue 5gures fro" oil sales fro" the oil#for#food
(rogra" totalled V6:*3 'illion- of ,hich the Ira!i govern"ent received
a((roi"ately one third* Although it is esti"ated 'y the /S Leneral
Accounting Oce that Ira! earned V$*8#3*8 'illion (er year fro" oil#
s"uggling and )ic)'ac)s 1such as the AW scandal2- it concluded that
fro" $%%;#3&&3 Ira! earned only V$&*$ 'illion fro" illegal it is esti"ated
that the cost to Ira! of oil revenue denied ,as a((roi"ately V38& 'illion
over the entire (eriod$&4* 0ot only did this severely li"it Ira!s a'ility to
"aintain let alone e(and its oil (roduction$&:- it also severely curtailed
the resources that ,ere availa'le for "ilitary s(ending* In $%G%- Ira!i
"ilitary s(ending and ar"s i"(orts ,ere esti"ated at V$8 'illion*
+o,ever- this 5gure average V$*: 'illion annually throughout the $%%&s-
$&3 =avid Cortright- D Leorge A* ?o(e>-
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a((roi"ately $& of its (revious level$&8* .his left the Ira!i ar"y ,ith
decaying and o'solete ,ea(ons* Sanctions successively de(leted the Ira!i
"ilitarys ca(a'ilities- and thus reduced the (otential for any Ira!i
aggression$&6* .he (arlous state of the Ira!i ar"y ,as de"onstrated 'y
the 3&&4 invasion- ,hich lasted a "ere 4 ,ee)s* Sanctions left -
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for" of genocide$&%* .he Ira!i govern"ent esti"ated 'y =ece"'er 3&&$-
u(,ard of $*6 "illion (eo(le had died as a result of the sanctions
regi"e$$&* Moreover- the long#ter" eects of the sanctions are also
signi5cant* .he infant "ortality rate ,as "ore than tri(le fro" its $%6&
rate at $38 (er $&&&- school attendance fell- leading the literacy rate to
decline fro" G& to 8G- "alnutrition rose severely a"ongst the
(o(ulation- (er ca(ita L= ,as lo,er than in $%8&- and oil (roduction has
only 9ust risen to its (re#$%G& ca(acity$$$* .hese eects ,ill (rove a severe
handica( in the future for those no, atte"(ted to 'uild a sta'le (eaceful
and de"ocracy in Ira!* .he costs in ter"s of hu"an life and econo"ic
develo("ent ,ere severe indeed*
/lti"ately- deciding ho, eective the sanctions in Ira! ,ere de(ends on
,hat goals one chooses to evaluate the data under- at ,hat cost- and the
co"(ared to ,hich alternatives* .he sanctions regi"e (roved co"(letely
ineective- and so"e say even counter#(roductive- at (roducing
leadershi( change* Although not an e(licit o'9ective of the sanctions
regi"e as set out in Resolution 6G;- it ,as certainly an i"(ortant ai" of
$&% 0ote ver'ale dated anuary 3%- $%%6- fro" the er"anent Mission of the
Re(u'lic of Ira! to the /nited 0ations Oce at Leneva addressed to the Centre
for +u"an Rights 1EHC0*:H$%%6H$:&2* Availa'le at
htt(HH,,,*unhchr*chH+uridocdaH+uridoca*nsfH.estFra"eH'f%e8338;4&%:a4fG&386;:c&&838'4d@O(endocu"ent*
$$& Arne .ostensen D eate ull-
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those countries- (articularly the /S and the /K- that ,ere funda"ental in
instituting the sanctions regi"e* ?i)e,ise- the cost in ter"s of hu"an
suering ,as colossal* +o,ever- ,hen these ai"s are co"(ared to the
alternative of the use of force it is de'ata'le ,hether these costs ,ere not
e!ually as high as they ,ould have 'een in the alternative situation* .he
re"oval of Sadda" +ussein fro" (o,er too) t,o ,ars to acco"(lish*
?i)e,ise- the cost in ter"s of civilian deaths follo,ing the 3&&4 invasion-
although a "atter of de'ate- ,as (ro'a'ly lo,er- although the sanctions
regi"e avoided the cost to the coalition in ter"s of "ilitary causalities
fro" the ,ar* Whereas- the sanctions ca"(aign ,as fairly lo, cost- easy
to )ee( in (lace inde5nitely- and eective at denying Ira! "ilitary
hard,are- the 3&&4 invasion ,as costly for the /S and its allies* With
regard to econo"ic cost- certainly fro" the vie, of the /S the sanctions
regi"e ,as far less costly than the use of force- due to the sheer si>e of
cost of the invasion- sta'ilisation 1as yet 'y no "eans assured2 and
reconstruction* 0on#econo"ic costs should also 'e ta)en into account-
such as the di(lo"atic costs to the /S and its coalition (artners- and anti#
Western senti"ent* In ter"s of containing Ira! and denying it advanced-
'allistic and nuclear ,ea(ons- the sanctions regi"e a((ears to have 'een
highly successful- as ,as its a'ility to i"(ose severe costs on Ira! relative
to the costs i"(osed on the sender states* Finally- the "aintenance of
such co"(rehensive sanctions over such a long (eriod of ti"e reNects the
success of the /S in (articular at achieving and sustaining su((ort of its
sanctions regi"e*
ere"y Rees
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Lessons from Iraq Case Study
.he )ey features to ta)e out of the sanctions regi"e in Ira! is that it ,as
eective at containing Ira!- and li"iting Ira!s access to ,ea(ons-
advanced "ilitary technologies- and WM=* It ,as ineective at regi"e
inducing regi"e change* In ter"s of econo"ic costs- these ,ere relatively
lo, for the sender states- 'ut eceedingly high for Ira!- as ,as the hu"an
cost* Success can 'e contri'uted to the length and co"(rehensiveness of
the general sanctions* ut targeted sanctions a((ear to have failed to
result in (olicy changes fro" the Ira!i leadershi(*
Future usage of sanctions ,ould 'ene5t fro" ac)no,ledging these
lessons- although any future sanctions regi"e should ta)e account of the
(articular factors (ertinent to the s(eci5c case* For instance- the current
sanctions against Iran are unli)ely to yield results if- assu"ing Iran does
intend to develo( nuclear ,ea(ons ca(a'ilities 1,hether (otential or
actual2- it dee"s the ac!uisition of such ,ea(ons as necessary for regi"e
survival- and sanctions as less costly to the regi"e than not attaining such
ca(a'ilities 1given Irans o,n (erceived threats fro" other nuclear states
such as Israel or the /S2* Moreover- sanctions failed to (roduce regi"e
change in Ira! due to the autocratic nature of its govern"ent* Liven Iran
is a "ied#regi"e ty(e- co"'ining 'oth de"ocratic and autocratic
ele"ents- sanctions "ay 'e "ore li)ely to achieve regi"e change than in
Ira!- ho,ever- the (otential of a rally#round#the#Nag eect is a distinct
(ossi'ility*
Conclusion
ere"y Rees
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.he sanctions literature is generally agreed regarding the e"(irical results
on the eectiveness of sanctions* +o,ever- there is considera'le variation
in the inter(retation of these results* Moreover- various studies have
de"onstrated the nuances variation 'et,een dierent for"s of sanctions-
such as unilateral and "ultilateral sanctions- or co"(rehensive and s"art
sanctions*
.he sanctions regi"e in Ira! a((ears to have 'een a !uali5ed success*
.he regi"e successfully contained Ira!- and denied it ,ea(ons
technology* +o,ever- it failed to achieve regi"e change- and led to
considera'le suering in the targeted state*
ere"y Rees
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i'liogra(hy
# Alnasra,i- A''as- - ner- =aniel W*-
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