Europeanization of Latvian Development Co-operation policy: The process interrupted?

by Péteris Timofejevs HenrikssonDepartment of Political Science

Umeå University

EADI/DSA conference ”Rethinking Development in an Age of Scarcity and Uncertainty”, York, 19-22 September 2011.

Aim of the paperAim of the paper

• to explain the initiation of the initiation and implementation of Latvian development co-operation policy (DCP), 2000-2010.– why did Latvia initiate a DCP in early 2000s?– why did Latvia chose an “extreme” gradualist approach to designing and

implementing its commitments vis-à-vis the EU after 2004?– why did Latvia cut so abruptly its bilateral DCP in 2008?

• to contribute to the so-called Europeanization literature that focuses on the adjustment processes in the EU new member states– with particular focus on the period after the accession to the EU in 2004– with particular focus on the EU policies that lack clear enforcement

mechanisms

Method

• The paper – part of a comparative study of Europeanization processes in Latvia and Slovenia– Latvian DCP – relatively low levels of ODA/GNI, even among the CEECs; an

almost non-existent bilateral DCP (after 2008)– Slovenian DCP – relatively high levels of ODA/GNI among the CEECs; a small

(20% of total Slovenian ODA) bilateral DCP.• Causes-of-effects, qualitative approach – how to explain the outcomes?• Process-tracing – document studies and interviews

Expectations

• External adjustment pressure– the enlargement 2004– the so-called Barcelona process

• Constructivist (social or policy learning) literature– As Latvia did not have any substantial experience with conducting a DCP, the country would

be open to persuasion, involve in a policy learning exercises and, slowly, initiate, formulate and implement its own DCP.

– Observable implications: Norm entrepeneurs, traces of persuasion, domestic resonance, arguments about legitimacy, traces of identification.

• Rational Choice Institutionalist (strategic calculations) literature– As Latvia did not have any substantial experience with conducting a DCP, the country would

adopt a DCP only to be allowed to join the EU, but after the accession the policy evolution would considerably slow down or be rejected.

– Observable implications: Monitoring/reporting in the pre-accession period, salience of strategic motives in the policy-making.

Findings

Initiation – before 2004– The EU pressure – the pre-accession (acquis) conditionality– The Latvian response is to adopt a DCP, establish the basic policy structures, increase the

allocations to ODA– Strategic calculation

• MoF being skeptical about the costs of DCP, • MFA arguing that DCP is a pre-condition for the EU membership

– Little evidence of social learning processes, with exception, the training seminars, mentoring exercises at the level of desk officers or the Heads of Unit.

Findings – ctd.

Implementation – after 2004– No EU pressure, only the diffuse “peer pressure” (the Monterrey process & monitoring)– The Latvian response – to institutionalize its DCP, slowly increase ODA, but ODA/GNI

stagnates (around 0.06-0.07% of GNI), in 2008 – the bilateral DCP effectively abolished.– Strategic calculation

• how much to increase ODA to “appease” the EU?– Social factors

• references to the low popularity of the DCP• DCP as a “non-issue”• inwards-orientation of the political elite

Latvian foreign aid as ODA/GNI, 2002-2010

0

0,02

0,04

0,06

0,08

0,1

0,12

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Latvia

EU-12

How to explain the outcomes?

• Why did Latvia initiate a DCP? Why did the initiation was successful?– The pre-accession conditionality– Low perceived adjustment costs, high perceived benefits (the EU membership)

• Why did Latvia fail to implement fully its commitments regarding the increase of ODA and thus to implement a fully-fledged DCP?– High perceived adjustment costs– Low policy resonance