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European Union Institute for Security Studies1

Lessons from Atalanta and EU counter-piracy policies

10 recommendations to the PSC and the EEAS:

The need for the EU to adopt a comprehensive approach

1. There is a need for a single EU piracy coordina-tor/ambassador/special envoy able to lead on:

• maintainingcounter-piracyhighontheEUforeignpolicyagendathrough,inter alia,communicationand media work.

• the comprehensive coordination of the wholerangeofEUcounter-piracypoliciesintheIndianOcean (andnotonlyoff thecoastsofSomalia),including efficient coordination between military(EU NAVFOR OHQ) and civilian expertise.

• the representation of the EU internationally ininternational counter-piracy fora and vis-à-vis appropriate international interlocutors (EU andnon-EU flag states, counter piracy-related con-tactgroups,UNbodies,theInternationalMaritimeOrganisation(IMO),theWorldFoodProgramme(WFP),othermilitarypowershavingfleetsintheregion,relevantflagstates)onissueslikemilitarycooperation,lawenforcementandjudicialcooper-ation–specificallyonRegionalMaritimeCapacityBuildingandregionaljurisdictiontotrysuspectedpirates – but also unilateral declarations on theuseofvesselprotectiondetachments(VPDs).

• ensuringstrategiccoherenceinEUcounter-piracypoliciesintheregion(includingenhancedEUac-tionon landwithinSomalia,human intelligence,developmentandjudicialprogrammesandpoliti-caldialoguewithdecentralisedauthorities).

• promotingenhancedcoordinationwithinMemberStates’ national transport, justice, defence andforeignaffairsministrieson, inter alia,theimple-mentation of the United Nations Convention ontheLawoftheSea(UNCLOS)andtheprosecu-tionandtrialofsuspectedpirates.

European UnionInstitute for Security Studies

SeminarReports

Paris, 23-24 March 2011Brussels, 17 June 2011

by Damien Helly

This report summarises key lessons and recommendations forwarded to the EU Political and Security Committee by the EUISS following its 10-month lessons-learned project which took place in two phases:

an experts’ group meeting on 23-24 March 2011 in Paris and a PSC-level seminar in Brussels on 17 June.

2 European Union Institute for Security Studies

EUISS Seminar Report

2. The Political and Security Committee (PSC)should consider ways to ensure more system-atic manning of appropriate EU delegations with defence attachés competent on counter piracy(with wider mandates than security advisers).

Atalanta’s planning: extension, capacities, and force generation

3. WhileacknowledgingthattheEuropeanExternalAction Service (EEAS) security rules are still inthemaking,theOperationCommander(s)shouldenjoy sufficient autonomy from theHighRepre-sentative in the decision to circulate and shareinformation with partners.

4. The Athenamechanismshouldbereformedtoal-lowmoreefficientforcegenerationforcounterpi-racyaswellasmoreefficientpoolingandsharingof military capacities.

5. Studies for the establishment of a more stableFHQ on land in the region (provided that remote andphysicalcommunicationassetsareoptimal)shouldbefinalisedandleadtoaswiftPSCdeci-sion.

6. The EEAS and above all the European UnionMilitaryCommittee(EUMC)andthePSCshoulddo more preparatory work with Member Statestoadopt ‘quasi-dormantRulesofEngagement–

ROE–tobeusedwhenneeded,withappropriatepoliticalcontroloverit,andtobeactivatedwhenappropriate’.

7. ThePSCshouldencourageamoreopenandcon-structive cooperation between the EUNAVFOROHQandMemberStates’ intelligenceagencies.

International coordination

8. EUMemberStatesshouldcontinuetheirdiscus-sions on the value of having two separate EUand NATO counter-piracy forces with a similar mandate.

Cooperation with the private sector

9. European flag states should be more efficient,throughabettercoordinationbetween theirownministries of Transport, ForeignAffairs and De-fence or agencies at national level, in ensuringtheir national merchant vessels comply with Best ManagementPractice(BMP).

10. InternationallyagreedguidelinesonPrivateSecu-rityCompaniesaboardshipsshouldbeadoptedtoensurethatproperregulationofsecurityserv-ices is applied on the sea and to avoid ‘chaos’ or a‘securityjungle’comparabletoothercrisisthea-treslikeAfghanistanorIraq.



Lessons from Atalanta and EU counter-piracy policies

‘There is no way to avoid piracy anymore; it now occurs in the whole of the North Indian Ocean’

Statement made by one participant in the meeting.

The Somali crisis and linkages with piracy

ThereistodaynorealisticendinsighttothecurrentSomali conflict. State failure and piracy constitute avicious circle and the absence of politicalwillwithinSomalia to tackle these issues is a key part of theproblem. The lack of credible authorities, the avail-ability of weaponry and the absence of alternative economic prospects create the conditions of piracy. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is seen as corrupt and ineffective, since it has no authorityoutsideafewblocksinMogadishu.Piracyflourishesthankstoextensivecriminalnetworks,anappetiteforquickeconomicopportunitiesandalackofpoliticalwilland leadership to address it effectively.

The current centralised governancemodel is hardlycompatiblewiththeSomaliclanstructuresandthisisrecognised by the TFG itself. This has strong implica-tions for law enforcement and security engagementbyinternationalactors.Ifthecentralisedgovernmentmodelisbankrupt,expertshavearguedthatthereisa need for an alternative decentralised support ap-proach,possiblyalongthelinesofthedecentralisationprovisionsoftheTransitionalCharter.Smallerentitiesdoanactuallybetter jobatbalancing interests; theyare also more effective in maintaining consensualforms of government.

The example of Somaliland was given to demonstrate that a subnational political entity, though geographi-callyvulnerabletopiracy,canactuallybepiracy-freeiflocalauthoritieshavesufficientpoliticalwillandaremotivatedbystrongincentives(thequestforinterna-tional recognition in the case of Somaliland).

One key recommendation is that international actors should focus on a more decentralised approach tosupportsubregionalandlocalgovernanceentitieslike

Somaliland (and alsoPuntland, although its level ofcorruptionanditsownlinkswithpiracymakeitalessreliablepartner)tofightagainstpiracyonland.

Thereseemtobetwoschoolsofthoughtwhenitcomesto analysing the piracy phenomenon off the coast of Somalia. The first one is Somalia-focused and con-siderspiracyasameresymptomofstatefailureandunderdevelopment.ThesecondonelooksatpiracyasaphenomenonwhoseautonomyfromtheSomaligov-ernance environment has strengthened over time and thefunctioningextendsoveranareawhichisfarwiderthanthesoleSomaliterritory,involvingtheSomalidi-aspora in theHorn ofAfrica, inEurope, non-Somalinetworks or connections in Yemen and elsewhere,and having an impact on regional and global trade andeconomy,aswellasonEurope’sandtheWest’senergysupply.

Intheviewofsome,thereisadangerinthecommonattitudeofconsideringpiracyasameresymptom.

WhiletheknowledgeoftherootcausesoftheSomalicrisis are quite well-known, there is no equivalentsituational awareness of the piracy phenomenon inits complexity mainly due to a lack of deeply-root-ed human intelligence gathering and sharing. TheAtalanta operation does not have intelligence gather-ingsourcesonlandanddependsonintelligenceshar-ing of EUMemberStates.Among those, only threeare seen to actively share their intelligence with EU structuresdealingwithpiracy.

One of the key consequences of this shortage ofhuman intelligence sharing and lack of situationalawareness (Operation Atalanta issaid toworkup to95%onopen intelligencesources), in thecontextoftheclosemonitoringofpirategroupsandtheirinterac-tionwiththeclanandlocalgovernancestructures,istheEU’s inability topre-emptpirates’behaviouranddecisions before they act.

Thisbeingsaid,thereisquitealotknownaboutthepiracy pyramid structure with around 12 financiersclearly identified and about 50 logistics managers,allhavingrecoursetoseveralhundred‘footsoldiers’.While the identityof the topheadsof thenetwork isknown,thereisnoevidencetochargethemandmorehumanintelligenceonthegroundwouldbeneededtodo so.



Despite this lack of sensitive intelligence sharing, itwas however stressed that a lot of information is over-classifiedwithinEUNAVFORandthatthereisaneed–theEEASsecurityrulesstillbeinginthemaking–first to avoid over- classification and second for theOperationCommandertoenjoymoreautonomyfromthe High Representative in the decision to circulateand share information.

Furthermore,whiletherearenuancesinthewaysthelinksbetweenpiratesandterroristgroupsoperate(itis acknowledged for instance that Al-Shabaab and pi-ratesgroupshave,veryprobably,mostlybusiness-likeratherthaninspirationalorideologicalrelationships),itwas recognised that there is also a lack of intelligence on thisaspectof theproblem.Finally,somepointedoutthattheriskofa(sofardoubtful)‘piracy-terrorismnexus’wouldbeextremelybadnewsfortheshippingindustry,andtheyrestatedtheimportanceofdevelop-ingmorehumanintelligenceonland.

Againstthisbackground,variousoptionsforEUactionarebeingdiscussed.TheconditionsunderwhichtheEU could engage Puntland authorities were raised,aswellasitspotentialcontradictionwiththecurrentlysupportedKampalaprocessstillbasedonaglobalap-proachtoSomalia.Ontheotherhand,itwasacknowl-edged that tensions between Somaliland, PuntlandandTFGleadershipsusuallyleadtonoresultswhenallthreeareconsultedtogether.Moregenerally,oper-atinginSomaliaisfraughtwithmanydifficulties,most-ly related tosecurity..The roleofAl-Shabaab in thehumanitariansector, theneed todevelopalternativelivelihoods,toengageyoungpeopleandtodealwithclanleadershipsarechallengesunderexamination.

Whetherpiracy isseenasasymptomoranautono-mous phenomenon with serious consequences forglobal trade, there was a consensus that the EUshoulddomoreonland,withregardtodevelopmentassistanceandhuman intelligencebut therewasnoclear consensus on military actions. It was pointedoutthatinthepast,previouscounter-piracyactivitiesin Somalia were all delivered by proxies from other countries:Eitherintheformof(1)counter-piracyca-pacitybuildingprogrammes,someofwhichhavehadunintended consequences (the training of Puntlandcoastguards by a private companywith the supportof theUK tenyearsago for instance,whichactuallyenabled pirates to improve their skills) or of (2) mili-tary interventions to regain influenceongovernmentauthorities.

An EU comprehensive approach

While therehasbeena tendency to rush to identifyeffective tools that could be applied straightaway inSomalia,thediscussionofthefirstsessionconcludedon the need for a clear, consistent and comprehen-sive strategic approach to the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia. This aspect was elaborated on in the second session dedicated to the EU’s comprehensive approach towards piracy.

AsfarastheEUisconcerned,themainchallengeisthatsuchacomprehensiveandconsistentapproach,whichwaslackingduringtheplanninganddeploymentof Operation Atalanta, is slowly (two years and sixmonthsafterthelaunchofEUNAVFOR)comingintoexistence,andshouldbematerialisedintheEUHornof Africa strategy. The EU started by deploying a vari-etyofinstrumentsinparallelandinanuncoordinatedmannerbeforehavingsuchastrategicapproach.

Attheoperationallevel,EUinstitutionshavelearnedcomprehensiveness ‘by doing’ (the case of system-aticinterdepartmentaldiscussionsofthedraftcouncilconclusions was given as an example1) and had to cope with the institutional instability induced by thecreationandthesettingupoftheEuropeanExternalAction Service (EEAS). Given the complexity of the piracy issue, comprehensiveness is evenmore of achallenge.Indeed,counter-piracypoliciesdonotonlyinvolve and concern the traditional actors of EU cri-sis management (military and civilian planning and conductoftheoperation,development,peacebuildinganddiplomaticdepartments),aswellashumanitarianactors, but also all maritime security-related bodies(DGMOVE,DGMARE,SAGMAS)andprivatesectorinterlocutors.Thisbeingsaid,itwasagreedtherehadbeen‘interactive influencebetweenCSDPandotherinstruments on Atalanta’s subsequent mandates’whichwere‘completelyshared’withcurrentandformer(subsequently included in the EEAS) Commission’sdepartments.

Some experts considered that the to–be-adopted HornofAfricaStrategywas,inthatrespect,goingintherightdirection,althoughitmaynotbefocusedonsecurity only. Unfortunately, the fact that the formerCrisisManagementandPlanningDirectorate(CMPD)andformerDGDevelopmentdidnotparticipateinthe

1. ItwasnotedhoweverthatalthoughtheCrisisResponseCoordinationTeam(CCRT)hadmet25timesduringEUFORTchad/RCA), itonlymetfourtimesinthefirsthalfof2009todiscusspiracy-relatedissues.



meetingprecludedanysubstantialdiscussionontheHorn of Africa Strategy per se,underminingthescopeofthediscussiononcoherenceandacomprehensiveapproach.Thisrealitywasconfirmedbysomeexpertswho stated, perhapswith exaggeration, that ‘EU in-stitutionswerecurrentlytoomuchinterestedincom-petingwitheachother’.Theterm‘culturalreluctance’was also used to describe remaining barrierswithintheEEASasmuchas‘structuralbarriers’intheLisbonTreaty.Inthecurrentcontext,theOHQseesitselfverymuchat thevanguardofcomprehensivenesseffortswhichhavesofarnotbroughtsignificantresults.ThesideeffectofEUcounter-piracyeffortshasbeentoputthe EU in a good international position. For instance theChineseheadofmilitary staff visitedNorthwoodin Spring 2011. Atalanta has enhanced the military di-mension of the EU.

Onesuggestionduringthemeetingwasthecreationof two comprehensive EU-wide coordination mecha-nisms: a joint task force2 on piracy in Brusselswithonecoordinatorwhocould‘garneranddriveforwardacomprehensivestrategy’;andtheappointment(com-manding less consensus among participants) of anEU Special Representative.3 Both ideas have already been suggested to the High Representative/VicePresidentbutnoactionhasbeentakenyet.

Atastrategiclevel,itwasnotedthatsomestrongam-biguities remain; itwasacknowledged thatnoclear-cutchoicehasbeenmadebetweenaSomalia-firstorapiracy-firstapproach,bothbeingseenasimportantand mutually beneficial. It was also underlined thatthe adoption – hopefully soon – of a Horn strategy(focusing inter aliaonSomalia,piracyand theESA/IO regional strategy against piracy and formaritimesecurity) would fill the existing gap.However, someargued that in the absence of a complementaryEUowned(jointlybyEUinstitutionsandMemberStates)Somalia-focusedpiracystrategy(an‘EUcomprehen-sivestrategytofightpiracyoffthecoastofSomalia’)implementedbyonesingleEUfigure,theriskfortheEU is to continue to have a piecemeal approach (amyriadofuncoordinatedthoughsupposedlycomple-mentary instrumentseachhavingadifferentpriority)oraproxyapproach(thechoicebeingtosupportlocalactors’ counter-piracy strategies – in this case the

2. The example of the informal task force on Sudan coordinatedby theEUSRforSudanwashighlightedaswellastheneedtoidentifycleartermsofreferenceforsuchataskforce.

3. ThoseopposedarguedthatanEUSRwouldstillnothavetheappropriatemandatetocoordinateserviceswhichdonotdependontheEEAS,i.e.Com-mission’sDGs,notspeakingofECHOwhichisinaparticularsituation.

EAS/IOone,asstated in theHornofAfricastrategydraft). Once the new EU Horn of Africa strategy is adopted, the key challenge inEUcounter-piracy ef-fortswillbetoensurethattheirimplementationis(1)reallycoordinatedbyawell-identifiedEUleadership;(2) comprehensive enough to include both existingEUinstrumentsandMemberStates’bilateralactionsaccording to an effective burden-sharing approach;and (3) leads to a more coherent EU representation ininternationalforadealingwithpiracy-relatedissues(IMOandUNworkinggroupsamongothers).

While comprehensivenesshasbeen taken into con-sideration during Atalanta’s extension phases al-thoughnotintheinitialplanningphase,anothercoher-encechallengehadtobefaced,namelyclearburdensharingbetweenEUinstitutionsandMemberStates,particularlyregardingtheprosecutionofsuspectedpi-rates,asdetailedinthesectiononlegalissues.

At the operational level, more generally, it seemsMemberStatesdonotyethaveanationalwhole-of-government comprehensive view of the Somali piracy issue shared by all departments of each respectivegovernment. Some departments like Foreign Affairs may have such a view but others (the example ofMinistriesofTransportwasmentioned)donot.Thereseems to be a general lack of interdepartmental coor-dinationatMemberStateslevel,particularlybetweenMinistriesofTransportinchargeofIMO-relatedissuesontheonehandandMinistriesofForeignAffairsandDefenceontheother.Someparticipantsgavetheex-ampleofacountrywhereinformationcirculatedbytheOHQdoesnotactuallyreachtheappropriatenationaladministrations,who,asaconsequence,feeltheyarenot informed.

AsecondlevelofinformationdeficitliesintheEUandnational narratives about the piracy issue. It seemsagreed that governments are indeed aware of the global scopeofpiracy’simpactontheeconomy.However,therealcostofitdoesnotseemtobethatwell-communi-cated,becauseofthedifficultyofbuildingupanefficientstandardnarrativethatwouldbeequallyconvincinginall Member States. Counter-piracy policies’ externalcommunicationstrategies thereforeneedfurtherworkonvariouskindsofoutreach:outreachtotheindividualMemberStates,andoutreachtothebroadpublicopin-ion via themedia. It was acknowledged that despitesuccessfulmediaworktheavailablehumanresourceswere largely insufficient todesignmoresophisticatedandcomprehensivecommunicationandmediastrate-giesandthereforeappropriatequalityandimpact.



While EU NAVFOR has experienced difficulties indealing with the abovementioned information and burden-sharing deficits, it however also broke newground in approaching the issue comprehensively.The operation has de facto developed a network of EUcounter-piracycontactpointsintheregion(Kenya,Mozambique,Madagascar,Yemen,India,Seychelles),andbuiltuprelationswitharound10portauthorities.Thishasrequireda lotofengagement. Inparallel tointernal changes ongoing within EU delegations (the shift froma development-focusedapproach towardsa more comprehensive political approach, includingalsosecurityaspects),theoperationhadtorelyonfa-cilitators and liaison staff whose work is said to ‘have movedtoashadowdefenceattachérole’(particularlyinDjiboutiandtheSeychelles)whilesomestaffwereco-located in some EU delegations (Djibouti) or inMember States’ premises (rotating between the UKHigh Commission and the French embassy in theSeychelles). One of the lessons of this experience is theidentifiedneedtomanappropriateEUdelegationsproperly with defence attachés (with wider mandates thansecurityadvisers).

A second lessonon comprehensiveness is theuse-fulness of having civilian maritime expertise (drawnfromboth theCommissionandprivatesector)work-ing together with the military within – although notnecessarily on a permanent basis – the OHQ itself to ensure that the regulation dimension ofmaritimesecurity is adequately factored into military work.

Legal issues

Legal issues involved in EU counter-piracy policiesfirst relate to the judicialchainofactionspursued inthecaseofsuspectedpiratesbeingarrestedatsea.They comprise evidence collection, suspects’ trans-fers,prosecution,trialanddetention.Asecondgroupofissueshastodowiththeuseofgovernmentalvesselprotectiondetachments(VPDs)andofprivatearmedprotection (on board or as private escorts).

TherearecurrentlynoEU-widecriminalproceduresonpiracyandanyactionagainstsuspectedpiratestakesplaceinanationalcriminalprocedureframework.Thisfact increases complexity at the operational level.

AlthoughanyEUstateisallowedtoarrestandprose-cutesuspectedpirates,MemberStatesareextremelyreluctanttodosoandveryfewofthemhaveexplicitly

incorporated the crimes of piracy and armed robbery at sea into their respective criminal codes. There was adebateamongparticipantsabout the relevanceofMemberStates’positionsonthematter.Someconsid-eredthatprosecutingsuspectedpiratesinEuroperep-resentstoohighapoliticalcostforEuropeangovern-ments,givenpublicopinion’ssensitivityaboutfurtherimmigration (theNetherlands,GreeceandGermanywerequoted).Othersdeniedtherighttopiratestostayinthecountrywheretheyhaveservedtheirsentence.Someunderlinedthefactthatdecentdetentioncondi-tionsinEuropedidnotplayadeterrentroleforpirates,rathertheopposite.Itwasalsostatedthat‘fairburdensharingrequiresthestatesintheregiontoprosecutemorevigorouslyandtoenterintotransferagreementswith theEU’.Another groupof participants stressedthe fact thatprosecutingand incarceratingpirates inEuropewasthebestwaytocollectevidenceandin-telligenceaboutpirates’networksandtodemonstratethe consistency of Member States’ commitment tothefightagainstpiracy.TheargumentwasalsomadethatsocialreintegrationinEuropeofpirateswhohaveserved their sentence and who decide to stay on the Europeanterritoryisafundamentalhumanright.Thepointwasalsomadethatrelyingonregionalcountriesunwillingorunabletosolvetheprosecutionanddeten-tionissuewasprobablyaflawedstrategyintheshorttermandthattheoptionfortheEUMemberStatestoactuallydotheirjobfully(i.e.notonlyarrestingbutalsoprosecuting,tryingandincarcerating)wasthemostef-fectivewaytocombatpiracyandtoavoidthecurrent‘capture and release’ phenomenon.At themoment,around940suspectedpiratesarebeingprosecutedin18countriesbutmanyofthemarereleasedbecauseof lack of evidence.

The ironyof thecurrentsituation is thatwhilepiracythreatensglobaltradeseenasa‘commongood’,re-sponses to itarestillverymuch fragmentedandre-flectdiversenationalinterests,whichactuallyhasbe-come a largely irrelevant approach: a merchant vessel cannotbeidentifiedasbelongingtoonecountryonlyanymorebecauseofthediversityofitslegalbounds:crew members are very often from different nationali-ties,theflagstateunderwhichtheshipisregisteredalso has some responsibility, the destination of itscargoisrelatedtooneorseveralcountries’particularinterests,etc.Thisreality ledtheparticipantstocon-sider that there is a discrepancy between the global and universalnatureof thepiracy threaton theonehandandthenation-basedjudicialresponsestoitonthe other.



AlthoughEUNAVFORstaffaretrainedtocollectevi-dence,theyarenotforensicexperts.Whenacapturedmerchantvesselisreleased,thereisahighriskthatsomeevidence(bloodstains,DNAsamples)iserased–notpurposely–bythecrewandthatthecrewandvessel itself will not be available to appear as wit-nessesorevidenceduringthetrial.Thisunderminesevidencecollectionandcontributestothe‘captureandrelease’ dynamic.

Militaryvesselsarenotequipped todetainsuspectsforlongperiodsoftime.However,thereissometimesno choice but to transform them into floating deten-tioncellswhileajudicialdecisionistakenabouttheirtransfer.Thispresents risks forMemberStateswhomaybemetbyclaimsforcompensationforunlawfuldetention (as it has been the case for one of them).

EachEuropean country follows the provisions of itsowncriminalprocedurecode.Thisleadstoincoherentsituationsandactions thatarenotcommensurate tothe EU dimension of EU NAVFOR.

Onerecommendationwhichcameoutof thediscus-sionwastopushforaswifterandstrongerharmonisa-tionofEUMemberStates’ criminal codes regardingpiracyandnotablytoencouragethosethathavenotyetdoneso to includeexplicitly thecrimesofpiracyand armed robbery at sea in their respective codes.

Another recommendation was to implement more sys-tematicallytheinvolvementof lawenforcementoffic-ers/shipriders(eventhoughshipmastersareactuallylawenforcementofficersinsomecountries)providedbyexistingUNSCresolutions.

Anotheraspectofprosecutionistheinputprovidedbyevidencecollectiontocounterpiracyintelligence.In thisfield,somecooperation isongoingbetweenEU NAVFOR and Interpol, which receives all evi-dence collected by the operation. The degree of information sharing has varied over time and ac-cordingtothenumberofdirect interventionsmadeby EU NAVFOR (hence a small decrease in the last few months).

AlthoughtheEUhasconcludedtransferagreementswithregionalcountrieslikeKenyaandtheSeychelles,the implementation of these agreements is becoming more and more problematic. In the last 12 monthsonly 4 suspected pirates were transferred to Kenyaandtheagreementwiththiscountrywasdepictedasa‘failure’or‘verydisappointing’.Theprisonsystemin

the Seychelles is reaching its capacity limits. Some solutionsarebeing looked for – if theyhavenot al-readybeen found– inSomalia itself.Regional enti-ties likeSomalilandandPuntlandarenowbeingap-proached to start developing capacities to incarcerate Somalipirateswhohavebeentriedinanothercoun-try.Sucharrangementswould followtheUNSpecialRepresentativeforPiracy’sreportrecommendinginter alia thatspecialjurisdictionsshouldbesetupontheSomali territory. An agreement between the Seychelles andtheTFGwassignedinFebruary2011onpost-trialtransfers and memoranda of intent were signed with PuntlandandSomaliland.Theseagreementsprovidethat the Seychelles and the EU will be able to monitor transferred prisoners.

Somedoubtswere raisedabout thisoption: the reli-abilityofSomaliauthorities–especially theTFGandPuntland–wasquestioned; thissolutionwill requiresustainablefundingfromtheinternationalcommunityandthiswasnotguaranteed.Alternatively,othercoun-triesoftheregion, likeTanzania,couldbeinterestedintheideaofhostingaregionaltribunalforpiracy,andthispossibilityisbeingexamined.Finally,whiledevel-oping the Somali prison sector only will not be possible without developing thewhole justice and rule-of-lawsystemsthatarerelatedtoit,theconducivenessofcur-rentconditionsinSomaliaforsuchambitiousreformswereseriouslyquestionedbysomeparticipants.

Against this background, someexperts concluded itwould be highly probable that under the current cir-cumstances (no appetite among Member States toprosecutethesuspectsthemselves,limitsofthetrans-fer agreements option and unlikelihood of a Somalisolution in the short term), suspected pirates willcontinuetobereleasedonaratherlargescale.Thiswillprobablynotgounnoticedtothepress,Europeanpublicopinionandthemaritimeindustry. Inthiscon-text, itwas concluded that therewasstill ‘a politicalgulfbetweenwhatwecandoandwhatwewilldo’andthat ‘without political involvement’ the military alone‘will still be able to do very little’.

Legal issues - The VPD debate

Military and civilian assessments of the evolution ofpiracy concur thatmaritime insecurity in theGulf ofAden and off the coast of Somalia has increased for merchantvessels.Moreprecisely,ithasbeenadmit-tedoverthelastfewyears,pirateshavechangedtheir



workingmethodseveraltimes,andusemoresophisti-cated technology in a larger area than in the past. This facthasledthemaritimeindustry,whichunanimouslyrefuses the very principle of arming crewmembers,to push for increased security engagement aboardvessels,inadditiontoexistingescortsanddeterrencemeasures.

Two options are on the table: governmental vessel protection detachments (VPDs) and private armedguards and escorts. Both are subject to debatesamong experts.

Theindustryhasalsostateditspreferenceforgovern-ment-armedguards:inthatcase,theyseethechainofcommandisclearer,aswellastheuseoflethalforce.Intheeventthatacrewmemberiskilled,theliabilityisalsoclearbecause themerchant vessel is legallyconsidered as an extension of the troops’ state. (Inthatcase,theshipmasterloseshisresponsibilitywithregardtothedetentionofthesuspectedpirates).

Asfarasstate-managedVPDsareconcerned,itisuptoeachflagstatetodeclarethatitacceptstheprinci-pleofhavingVPDsonboard.Itisalsouptoeachgov-ernmenttodecideif itwantstodeployVPDsaboardmerchantvesselsallowedtodosobytheirflagstate.SomeEUMemberStatesaresometimesinbothsitu-ations and there are national debates on each type of responsibility(flagstateontheonehandandsecurityprovider on the other).

Oneof the lessonsalready identifiedand repeatedduringthemeetingisthatthereisaneedfortheEUtobemoreefficientinconvincingflagstates(EUandnon-EU) to issue unilateral declarations allowingVPDs aboard their vessels. So far only three thirdstates have done so (Liberia, Sierra Leone and StVincent and Grenadines). Within the EU, the EUNAVFOR OHQ has been the one body negotiating with thirdflagstates.Negotiationsaresaid tohavebeen ‘chaotic’. Thus the relevance of this tasking,giventhelimitedpoliticalstaffavailableintheOHQ,wasquestioned. Itwassuggested thatperhapsan-other diplomatic entity of the EU (for instance EU delegations abroad) should be assigned to negoti-atewiththirdflagstates(Panama,MarshallIslands,etc.),especiallythosewhichcarryWFPcargo.Inthisparticularcase, itwasstressed thatescortingWFPvessels,which is itskey task, isstillvery time-andcapability-consuming forEUNAVFOR,and that thesystematisation of the use of VPDs aboard these

vesselswould allowmore robust and sophisticatedcapabilitiestoconductothertasks.

Therecommendationwhichemergedfromthediscus-sionisthatEUMemberStatesshouldworktoagreeonacommonapproachtoincreasethenumberofuni-lateraldeclarationsfromthirdstatesauthorisingVPDs.Another recommendationwas forMemberStates toclarifythemodalitiesaccordingtowhichVPDscouldcollectevidenceagainstsuspectedpiratesincaseofan attack. The need for increased harmonisation of nationalEUlegalsystemsasfarassuspectedpirates’prosecutionandinterrogationbyajudge–possiblyviavideoconferencemeans–werealsodiscussed.

As flag states, EUMember States, for various rea-sons do not have the same position on allowing their merchantvesselstohaveVPDsonboard.InGreece,theshippingindustryisagainstitandhasbeenlobby-ingtheGreekgovernmentinthisdirection.However,recentattacksseemtohaveblurred thepositions inGreeceontheissue.WithintheGreekadministration,it is also acknowledged that there are legal loopholes onliabilityintheeventthatmerchantshipswithVPDsareattackedandindividualsareinjuredorkilledorifthe vessel is damaged.

OtherEUMemberStateshavebeenusingVPDs toprotecttheirownnationalvessels.However,thisposi-tion is ratheruncleargiven the fact that theexistinglegalframeworkdoesnothelpstatestodefinethena-tureoftheirnationalinterestconnectedtoeachmer-chant vessel. Several factors need to be considered altogether: the citizenship of the crew member, thestatewherethevesselisregistered,thedestinationofthecargoandthestateeconomybenefitingfromtheshippingsupply.Thisambiguity related to thedefini-tionof national state interestswas illustratedby theDutchexample,withRotterdambeing themaindes-tinationofmostofthecargoeswhichcouldthereforebeconsideredintheremitofDutchnationalinterest.Untilrecently,theDutchgovernmentwasagainsttheuseofVPDsbut ithas recentlydeployed twocrewstoIndiaandSingaporetoescort twovesselsofhighvalue.Thisexampleshowsthatpoliticalpositionscanevolve on this topic.

Experts reminded the group that the quantitativeneedformoreVPDshasalreadybeencalculatedandamountstoaround400armedguards.Itwasunder-lined that EU Member States currently do no havesuchcapacitynorwillingnesstoreachthislevel.



In this context, several options are to be envisagedby the EU and its Member States. The first one isto deploy VPDs according to certain priority criteriabasedforinstanceofvessels’vulnerabilitytoattacks.Secondly,morecouldbedoneatthepoliticalleveltosupport countriesof the region todevelop theirownVPDsinthecontextofcapacitybuildingcommitments.Thefirstoptiondoesnot,however,solvethequestionoflackofgovernmentalVPDcapacity,whilethesec-ondonewouldnotbringsolutionsintheshortterm.

Hencethediscussionsaboutthepossibleuseofpri-vatearmedguardsaboardvesselswho,accordingtosomeexperts,‘shouldonlyeverbeconsideredwhenpassive defence measures cannot be applied any-moreorareinefficient’.

Shipownersalreadyincreasinglyuseprivatesecuritycompanies (PSCs) to ensure their security. Legally,theirflagstatesshouldtakethisresponsibilityofficiallythrough unilateral declarations. They sometimes donotdosoand turnablindeye toshipowners’ con-tractingPSCs.

Thecurrent IMOguidancecontainssomeprovisionsstatingthattheorganisationdoesnotsupportthede-ploymentofPSCsaboardvessels.Forsomeexperts,theseprovisionsshouldbechangedor removedbe-causetheyareusedinbadfaithbyflagstatesinordernottohaverecoursetoPSCs.Finally,whilesomeex-pertsconsideredtheIMOshoulddomoretoopenthedebateontheinternationalregulationofprivatearmedguards,othersarguedthatthisorganisationprobablylacks the expertise to do so.

TheuseofPSCsonboardhasspecificlegalandse-curityconsequences.First,PSCsarenotallowed tofireshotsexcept inselfdefence.Theirdeterrentroleisthereforelimited.Second,anincreasingamountofweaponry on the sea made some participants worry about an escalation of the level of violence in thearea.For someexperts, this risk is theprice topayforincreasedpiracydeterrence.Thediscussionledtothe conclusion that internationally agreed guidelinesonPSCsaboardshipsshouldbeadopted toensurethatproperregulationofsecurityisappliedontheseaandtoavoid‘chaos’ora‘securityjungle’comparabletoothercrisistheatreslikeAfghanistanorIraq.SomestateshaveparticularlystrongreservationsontheuseofPSCssinceUNCLOSstipulatesthatonlysovereignstates have the responsibility to ensure freedom ofmovement on the sea.

Atalanta’s planning: extension, capacities, force generation

Lessons from pLanning

EUNAVFORwas launched in 10weekswhichwasdescribed as a remarkable achievement. The mission planningwasdonebya relativelysmallbutefficientteam,contradictingthethesisaccordingtowhichlargeplanningstructuresarebetter.SynergiesbetweentheOHQ (whichwasnotestablishedearlyenough)andCMPDwascommendedandonelessontobetakenawayisthatitwouldhavebeengoodtoalreadyben-efit from thepresenceofOHQ level plannerswithinthe OHQ from the very beginning of the process. This lesson was seen by some – not all – participants as a confirmationoftheneedforacentralpermanentOHQ,reinforced by the fact that a lot of time seems to be spent by OHQ staff in their liaison work with different Brusselsservicesthatdonotalwayssharethesamepositions.Another lesson identifiedwas theneed toinvolveCPCCandtheCommissionmorecloselyintoa more comprehensive Civ-Mil planning process toencompass the military as well as law enforcement di-mensionsoftheoperationwhentheCMCisdrafted.

A third lesson from EU NAVFOR planning is that it appearedtobefirstlydesignedforasmall-scaleandshort-termoperation,relyingontheOHQdealingwithfrequentlyrotatingFHQsandhavingtoperiodicallyre-viewtheOPLANaccordingly.Withtheevolutionofthethreatandconsequentlyoftheoperation,theengage-ment becamemore enduring and the forces gener-atedmoresignificant.TheideaofamorestableFHQon land in the region (provided that remote and physi-calcommunicationassetsareoptimal)seemedtobeconsensually welcome by the participating experts,but there is no consensus among Member States.Thisoption–whichisexpectedtobethesubjectofaspecificinternalstudy–wouldavoidtoohigharateofstaffturnoverandtheuseofavailablevesselsbytheForceCommandertocarryouthiscommandingtask.Itwouldhoweverprobablycreateadditionalcommoncosts.ForCSDPingeneral,itwasstatedthattheEUfuture operations should providemore clarity in thechain of command between the OHQ and the FHQ andinthedefinitionoftheOPLAN.

The end state approach employed for EU NAVFOR was criticised. It was said that it presented severalchallenges to theEU’s comprehensive approach, totheefficiencyof forcegeneration(untilnoweffective



MemberStates’capacitieshaveremainedveryunclearalthoughtheLibyacrisishasshownthereisprobablymuchmorecapacityavailablethanstatedduringforcegenerationmeetings on piracy), to the creation of along-termresults-orientedmindsetamongthetroops.Inotherwords,thefeelingwassharedthat‘thepoliti-calobjectivesofthismissionhadmuchmoretodowithdomesticobjectivestobringMemberStatestogethertowardsaconsensus,thanwithfightingpiracyandad-dressing the root causes.’One formula summed upMemberStates’dilemma:‘aneconomyofforceoraneconomic force?’

extension pLanning processes

Astheoperationevolved,EUNAVFORset itselfob-jectivesabout‘acceptablelevelsofpiracy’whichalsohadtoevolveovertime.Thispracticehasbroughtonekey lessonaboutEUNAVFOR:EU institutionsneedto be more agile in their adaptation to ongoing chal-lenges.MemberStateswould benefit fromadoptingamoremultilateralandcommonapproachrelying,forinstance,onmoresystematicresourcespooling(theexample of embarking one Member State’s troopsaboardanotherMemberState’svesselswasgiven).

The preparation of Operation Atalanta’s strategic re-viewlastedsurprisinglylong(sevenmonths)becauseofinstitutionalreformsimpliedbytheimplementationoftheLisbonTreaty.DecisionsonEUNAVFORRulesof Engagement (ROE) depended on the adoption of a newOPLANwhichitselfdependedonprogressmadeonRMCBbyotherEEASstructures.Theallegedten-dency of Brussels institutions to be ‘happier to talkabout theprocessrather thantheoutcome’hascer-tainlyverymuchsloweddownthepaceofadaptationof EU NAVFOR.

Extension planning has also proved to lack agility duetothefactthatCouncildecisionsareusually(forpoliticalreasons)toodetailedandthateachMemberStates has to consult national parliaments for anymodification.Anotherreasonforslownessisthatdeci-sionsonextensionhavebeentakenatCouncil levelwhilesomeexpertssuggestedthatasetofdecisionson operational changes could actually be dealt withbythePSCitselfmorefrequently.ThisdiagnosiswasqualifiedbyacriticalappraisaloftheroleoftheEUMC,seenasnot proactiveand fast enough in its role of

providingmilitaryadvice to thePSC (whichwasde-picted as a potentially very swift decision-making body asdemonstratedduringtheGeorgiacrisis)whenitistasked to do so.

Capabilities wise, EU NAVFOR, after two years ofoperation, is still short of maritime patrol aircrafts,medicalsupportandmaritimetankers.Thissituation,accordingtoexperts,ismainlyduetopoliticalandin-stitutionalunwillingnesstoacceptamorecommercialapproach,throughsubcontracting,tofillthesecapabil-itiesgaps.ThesuccessfulexperienceofLuxembourgwhichfundedtheuseofprivateaircraftswasgivenasagoodexampleofMemberStates’possible innova-tiveapproaches.However,MemberStates’reluctanceto consider an increase of common costs within the Athenamechanismsmaintainsastatusquothatistothedetrimentofoperationalefficiency.

The Libya crisis has already started to have a very seriousimpactoninternationalmilitarycounter-piracyeffortswhichhaveconsequentlybeencutby25%dueto reroutingof vesselsand thewithdrawingofaUStanker.PotentialinstabilityinotherpartsoftheMiddleEast could also probably require themobilisation offurtherresourcesawayfromthecounter-piracyopera-tion.Anumberofnationshavealreadyimposedcave-ats on movements of their warships committed to EU NAVFOR which have started to constrain the ability of theForceCommandertodeliverthemissionorderedbytheOperationCommander.

Althoughitsmandateisnotonlytocontributetodeter-ringpiracy,butprimarilytoprotectWFPandAMISOMshipping,theOHQrepeatedlypointedoutthefactthatWFPescortingbindsanunnecessarylargeproportionof EU NAVFOR’s assets and that there is a need to rethinkburdensharing.Itseemstherehasbeenverylittle responsivenessat thepolitical level inBrusselswhere the HR is reportedly working on the matter.

AsforevolvingRulesofEngagement(ROE)someex-pertsalsoadvisedtheEEASandabovealltheEUMCtodomorepreparatoryworkwithMemberStatesandtoadopt‘quasi-dormantROEtobeusedwhenneed-ed,with political control over it, and to be activatedwhen appropriate’. The amendment inMay 2011 ofAtalanta’sROEshashoweverbroughtsignificantre-sults,forinstancewiththeimplementationofthe‘seeand avoid’ concept.



exit strategy pLanning

EU NAVFOR has been extended according to the prin-cipleofa‘rollingenddate’.However,expertsagreedthat the perpetuation of such temporary measureswithoutanyendstatedoesnotmakemuchsenseandthat it was time to start thinking of an exit strategy.

It was noted that there could be divergences in theinterpretation of what ‘an acceptable level of piracy’ is.WhileforMemberStatesitseemedthatthecurrentstateofplayispoliticallyacceptable,thisisclearlynotthecasefortheIndustry.Givingtheenduringnatureofthe piracy threats and the relatively low level of politi-cal eagerness to remain engaged in the area for too long (some participants even warned again the risk of transforming EU NAVFOR into a ‘playground forunemployednavies’),somealternativeoptionsshouldbeconsidered tohandover the counter-piracyworktootheractors.Asfarasthe‘darkbluework’iscon-cerned, experts recognise that there are only a fewnationsable tocopewith it,andeven lesswilling todosoandthatmostcountriesintheregionareamongthem.WhileIndiaisveryactive,SouthAfricaremainslargely passive (with the exception of recent engage-mentnexttoitsborders),SaudiArabiaandOmansi-lent. The need for a potential EU NAVFOR exit strategy and handover to other international or regional players wasraised,butnoclearanswerorviewscameup.

International coordination – NATO, UN

The starting point is that not a single maritime force aloneisabletobringasolutiontothepiracyproblemin the area. Experts estimate that while 83 warships shouldbepermanentlydeployedintheareainorderto have always one vessel at a one hour reactiondistance from potential attacks, there are currentlyonly around 34warships patrolling in the area. Thesecond challenge is political, since it seems impos-sible tounifyall internationalactorsalong thesamepoliticallines.Asaconsequence,theworkofSHADE,co-chairedbytheEUandtheCMFandwhichmeetsevery six weeks, is more about ‘deconfliction’ thangenuinecoordination.SHADEmeetingsarethereforefocusingonthetacticallevelandasoneexpertstated,‘wemakesurewedon’t raisediscussionsat thepo-litical level,otherwise it stops the talks.’So far,onlytacticalcoordination,describedas‘verygood’,ispos-siblebecauseofa lackofamoreambitiouspolitical

mandateassignedto the forces. Inoneorganisationortheother,EUMemberStateshavethe‘tendencytopitchattheminimumforcelevel’andareverycautiousinthewayOPLANisdrafted.

EUNAVFORcoordinationwithNATOhas to beun-derstood in the broader framework of EU-NATO re-lations; thata formerNATOSecretaryGeneraloftendescribesasa‘frozenconflict’.Whentensionsarise,theydosoatpoliticallevel,sometimesbecauseofin-dividualantagonisticattitudes.Assomeexpertssaid,thereisthe‘impressionofabeautycontestbetweentheEU,NATOandCMF’. It is the fourth timeNATOandtheEUsimultaneouslydeployforcesinthesamearea and with the same mandate (EUFOR Althea and NATOHQSarajevo,strategicliftforAMIS,policemis-sioninAfghanistan).Fromanoutsider’spointofview,EU-NATO competition on piracy has grown and is a matterforconcernfortheindustry.TheEUandNATOalso compete for media coverage and visibility and it wasunderlinedthat‘whilesuccessisnotshared,fail-ureis.’

The Libya crisis, with strong German reservationsabouttheEUusinglethalforce,hasreinforcedthedi-versityofpositionsontheEU’sroleincounterpiracyandtheuseofforcebyEUNAVFOR.

EU NAVFOR relations with NATO have evolved over time.While itwasacknowledged that twoyearsagoboth organisations considered they had reached the limitsofcoordination,someprogresswasthenmadeoncloserrelations:informationsharinghasimproved,VTCmeetings are heldmore frequently and similarCONOPSonSomaliBasinandGulfofAdenopera-tionshavebeenadopted(togetherwiththeCMF).

NATOisstillverymuchinaquestforlegitimacyinthecounter-piracyfieldandmakesitscasebydescribingits large permanent planning and training capabilities aswellasitsintelligencefusioncentreandstrongper-manentSITU.However,figuresspeakforthemselvesandEUNAVFORisclearly, includingintheviewsofthe private sector, the leading actor in counter pira-cyoff thecoastofSomalia: itensures90%ofWFP/AMISOMconvoyescort(thusNATOonly10%).AsforNATO,doubtswereraisedaboutOceanShield’sabil-ity to implement its mandate given the very few assets it has at its disposal.

EUMemberStateswhoaremembersofbothorgani-sationsusuallytrytomaintainabalancedcommitment



towardsthetwoorganisationsalthoughsomeexpertshaveopenlyquestionedNATO’saddedvalueincoun-terpiracyintheregion.EUMemberStatesaredividedalong two opposed positions: one consisting of con-sideringthatinthefutureEUMemberStates’assetsprovidedtoOceanShieldshouldbetransferredtoEUNAVFOR(anoptionthatsomeseeasunlikelyonthegrounds thatshouldOceanShieldbedisbanded, itsvesselswouldberedeployedelsewherebutsurelynottothebenefitofEUNAVFOR)andanothersupportingamorepragmatic‘multipleclubs’approach.

Some more thinking is needed to envisage the next stepsforEU-NATOcoordination.AfirstchallengeforEU-NATO cooperation is to improve joint efforts toreachouttootherinternationalnaviesactiveorpoten-tiallyengagedinthearea.Despitejointdémarchesto-wardsChina(jointEU-NATOvisitstoChina),Russia,India and SouthAfrica (invitations to attend coordi-nationmeetingsand touse theMercury informationsharingsystem),verylittlehasbeenachieved.

Russia appears to be a very versatile interlocutor.SouthAfricadoesnotattendmeetings towhich it isinvitedalthoughithasstartedtoengageinthesouthoftheareaofoperation.Indiadoesnotshareinforma-tionandseestheIndianOceanasitsownbackyard.Chineseforcesareresponsibleforthesecurityoftheirnational merchant vessels and face extremely severe sanctions in case of failure. One opportunity wasmissedbyEUNAVFORtoengagetheirChinesecoun-terpartsincooperationontheIRTCbecauseofatech-nicalmistakemadebytheEU.Sincethen,Chinahasnot seemed to be keen to repeat the experience. The planningofChineseconvoysisdoneintheirMinistryof Transport, which operates within a hierarchicalprocessseparatedfromtheMinistryofDefencewithwhom the EU and NATO have been in contact. Other AsiancountrieslikeJapan,SouthKoreaandThailandareinvolvedincounterpiracybutnotunderanyEUorNATO framework. The analysis of the EU military is that they have done their best to engage other interna-tionalactorsbutthattheirworkhasreacheditslimitsand that theonlyway forward is todiscusscounter-piracycoordinationatamorepolitical level.While itwassuggestedthatpiracycouldbeputontheagendaofpoliticaldialoguewithsomeoftheabovementionedcountries,itwasalsoacknowledgedthatthereisstillalongwaytogobeforeCFSPisconsideredasacred-iblepoliticaldialoguechannel.

A second challenge is to share the burden of es-cortingWFP vessels with NATO. So far, NATO has

only accepted twice to escort WFP and AMISOMvessels in the last year. It is a very asset demand-ing task and because of NATO’s limited capabili-ties,theorganisationisnotverykeentotakeitover.

Regional Maritime Capacity Building (RMCB)

Ongoing efforts on Regional Maritime CapacityBuilding (RMCB)were seen by planning experts astheonlywayoutfortheEUifitdoesnotwantto‘bestuck’intheareaofoperation.

Onthemilitaryside,participantsseemedtoagreethatmoreshouldbedone toenhanceregionalcountries’maritime security capacities through short and long-termprogrammes.TheCMPDhasbeenworkingonoptionsforCSDPoperationstobeconsideredbythePSC. Even if RMCB does not bring any immediatesolution, itwillcertainlyhelpcreateabetterenviron-ment for thenavies. It couldbebasedon theexpe-rience of navy visiting teams offering training while being harboured in regional countries’ port facilities.Training could include counter-piracy methods (evi-dencecollection,destructionorstorageofequipment,etc.).SomeparticipantssuggestedmorecooperationshouldbedevelopedwithNATOandAfricom in thisfield. Another dimension concerns capacity build-ing of regional coastguards at national and regionallevel,currently implemented in the frameworkof theCriticalMaritimeRoutesprogrammemanagedbytheCommission.ItwasalsomentionedthattheEUcouldperhaps try toengage theUNmoresubstantiallyonthepiracyfileinordertodesignaglobalsolutiontoanalready global challenge.

Onthecivilianside,thedebatefocusedontheneedtoimprovethejudicialchainintheregion.Sofar,in-carceration in the region–as the result of post-trialagreements signed or in the process of being signed between Somali authorities and other countries likethe Seychelles – has attracted most of the attention. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) hasdevelopedamulti-donorregionalprogramme(almost20millionUSDsofar)fundedbytheEU,itsMemberStatesandotherdonors.Themainprojects involvedplanstobuildnewprisonfacilitiesinSomalia(Garoowein Puntland funded mainly with UK resources andHargeisa in Somaliland). Projects costs will also in-cludeconvictedpirates’repatriationcostsandprisonguardstraining.OneoptionsuggestedbytheexpertswastochannelEDF,otherinternationalandevenpri-vate–fromtheindustry–fundstotheUNODCtrust



fund.Somereservationshoweverweremaderegard-ingtheeffectivenessofsuchaprogrammewhichstillhastodemonstrateitsaddedvalueinputtinganendtothecaptureandreleasephenomenon.TheUNODCiscurrentlyprocessingaround800suspected/convict-edpirates’casesunderitsprogramme.Itwaspointedoutthatmanysuspected/convictedpirateshavebeenreleased from Puntland facilities, included some pi-racy financiers,whichmakes it necessary to under-takecloserpoliticaldialoguewithPuntlandauthorities.One advantage of developing prison facilities couldbeeasieraccesstosuspectedpiratesforprosecutorsand navies to collect evidence and gather intelligence on piracy networks.

It was noted that arresting and detaining suspectedpirateswould lead to a loss of revenues for SomalipeopleandthatfocusingonlyonthejudicialchainintheregionandinSomaliawouldnotbringalternativelivelihoodstocommunities.

Itwasalsounderlinedbysomeexpertsthatcapacity-building measures should also ensure the develop-mentofsustainableandreliablemaritimeadministra-tions in theconcernedcountriesof the regionwhichistheprerequisiteforthefurtherdevelopmentofanyconstabulary(coastguard)function.Inaddition,asal-ready experienced in other regions exposed to piracy andarmedrobberyatsea,suchasintheSingaporeandMalaccastraits,strongEUsupport toaregionalmaritime cooperation agreement aiming at reinforcing cooperationbetweencoastalcountriesandfacilitatinginterventionofinternationalforcescouldbetheframe-workofanexitstrategyensuringthesettingupofstra-tegiclogisticsupportandsurveillanceoftheWesternIndian Ocean, thereby guaranteeing the increasedsecurityofEUeconomicsupplyandtradeinterests.

Whilepiracywasdepictedbymanyasasymptomofthe Somali crisis, therewas some discussion aboutransoms payment and money laundering trackingseen by some participants as ‘the symptom of the symptom’.

SeveralagenciesareworkingonInternationalMoneyLaundering(IML)intheregion:Interpol,Europol,andmorerecentlytheUNODC.TheUNcontactgrouponpiracy has set up a newworking group on financialflows in2011andhasstarted toworkon the issue.UNODCisworkingonthematterincoordinationwithEuropol, Eurojust and Interpol. It was admitted thattrackingprovestobeanextremelydifficultworkgiven

the degree of informality of money transfers often usingan illegal local ‘hawala’ transfersystem.Thereisaclearlackofhumanintelligencethatwouldmakeitpossible toknowmoreabouthowpiracynetworksfunction, and this is even truer for informal financialflows. Furthermore, experts agree that around twothirdsofransompaymentsactuallystayinSomaliaandare reinvested in other activities. The rest is likely to go to countrieshosting largeSomali diasporas (Nairobimoreparticularly,butalsoDubaiandUgandawherethediasporaissaidtobelinkedtooiltrafficking).

AnyeffectiveactiononIMLintheregionwillneedtorelyonjudicialprocessesagainstpiracyfinanciersandthereforeonregionalcapacitybuilding in thissector,namely the adoption of appropriate legislation and the settingupofpowerfulnationalfinancialcrimedepart-ments.So far, thedegreeof commitmentandpoliti-cal willingness in the region seems rather low despite isolated statements.Although someefforts could bemadeintargetingthemainpiracyfinanciersbyfindinglegalgroundsfortheirarrestbylocalorinternationalagencies on the basis of national or international war-rants,thecurrentstateofplayledsomeparticipantstoexpresssomedoubtsaboutIMLtrackingasthebestandquickestroutetosuppresspiracy.

A second conclusion is that without covert humanintelligence on land, very little can be achieved onInternationalMoneyLaundering(IML).TheonlyoptionfortheEUandotherpowersintheirfightagainstpira-cyisthereforetosubstantiallyinvestincoverthumanintelligence within Somalia. A third suggestion wasto increase information sharing and cooperation be-tweenEuropeanprosecutors,theUNODCandprivateinsurancecompaniesinvolvedinransomnegotiationson IMLandother judicial issuesrelated to individualsuspected pirates’ cases. Finally, more cooperationshould also be encouraged between EU NAVFOR,UNODCandInterpolontheseissues.

Coordination with the private sector– Best Practice

SincethelaunchofEUNAVFOR,theindustryconsid-ersthattheEUmilitaryhasdoneanexcellentjobbutthat their task is constrained by a lack of political will tobemoreproactiveandefficientindeterringpiracy.Some participants therefore stated that in their view ‘governments have failed to prevent piracy’. The pri-vatesectorhaslearnedovertimethattheEuropean



militarywerenottheonlyinterlocutorstheyshoulddealwith,especiallyregardingBestManagementPractice(BMP)implementation.

Thispoliticalpassivityhasledtheindustrytoengageinwideadvocacycampaignstoputpressureongov-ernments. Recent statements from the private sector also indicate that ifnoprogress ismade in thefightagainst piracy off the coast of Somalia in the coming months, alternative shipping routes would be moreandmoreseriouslyconsidered,despitetheirforeseenadditional cost.

Cooperation between the industry, the EuropeanCommission (DGMOVE) and EUNAVFORwas de-scribedasextremelyfruitful.Theco-locationofprivatesector representatives within the OHQ and the opera-tion’s policy of ‘complete openness and liaison’ is an unprecedentedsuccess.

However,severalchallengesremain.

Firstofall,thereisnocommonunderstandingbetweentheprivatesectorandgovernmentsaboutwhatanac-ceptablelevelofpiracywouldbeandseafarerswantmoreeffectiveactionstoensuretheirsecurity.

Second, cooperation on ships’ Best ManagementPractice (BMP) has reached certain limits – despite‘significant improvements’, with key flag states notdoingenoughtoensuretheirnationalmerchantves-sels comply with BMP. For instance, some vesselshavearmedguardsonboardbutarenotnecessarycompliant. Furthermore, a number of flag states donotprovide thenecessary instructionson theirLongRangeIdentificationTracking(LRIT) to theirnationalvessels and fail to share this information with the EuropeanMaritimeSecurityAgency(EMSA)andEUNAVFOR.LRIT informationsharingwouldbekey toimplement new protection approaches envisaged by EU NAVFOR based on the avoidance of pirates’ moth-ershipsthankstovessels’routesmonitoring.Amongthoseflagstateswhocouldcooperatemoreactivelyare6EUMemberStates,oneflagundertheEU,oneassociated country, one candidate country, and 4overseasterritoriesof3differentMemberStates.This

situation is inclearcontradictionwith theagreementsignedby19MemberStates,oneassociatecountryandoneoverseasterritoryofaMemberStatetopro-videLRITinformationtoEUNAVFOR.TheEuropeanCommission(DGMOVEinchargeofmaritimesecu-rity) has adopted a Commission RecommendationfosteringfulluseoftheBMPbyEUbodiesandfirstofallbyEUMemberStates’flaggedships. Itsendsonaweeklybasis‘gentlereminders’totheseflagstates’ministries of transportation based on the information on compliancewithBMPprovided byEUNAVFOR.Suchapolicyhasmetwithpositivereactionsfromflagadministrations,butitisstillaprocessthatcanbeim-proved by better involvement of all actors. This state of play,forsomeexperts,underminesdeterrenceefforts,as demonstrated by the attack in the last few months ofthreeships,sailingundertheflagofthesameEUMemberState,whichwerenot incompliance.Thereis still somedebatebetween thisEUMemberState(which isalsoacontributingnation toEUNAVFOR)andtheEuropeanCommissiononthesecases.Moregenerally,itisunclearwhy6MemberStatesstillomitorrefusetosharetheirLRITinformation.Onthepri-vateside,itisnotclearhowshipmastersandofficersinterpretandapplyBMPandexpertssay ‘manyseethem as a pick and mix of recommendations’ while they shouldbestrictlyand fully followed.Oneconclusionof thedebatesonBMPcompliancewastheneedtoincreaseEuropeanFlagStates’senseofresponsibili-ties vis-à-vistheirnationalmerchantvesselsthrougha more efficient coordination between Ministries ofTransport,ForeignAffairsandDefenceoragenciesatnational level.

Third, theprivatesectorhasawide interpretationoftheUNCLOSregardingconspiracytopiracy,whichitconsidersassufficientgroundsfortargetingandpros-ecuting suspected pirates.Governments do not seethings that way.

Fourth,theprivatesectorhasrepeatedlystateditfa-voursmoreashoreactionsagainstpiratesandregretsthereisnopoliticalappetiteforthem.DebatesamongMemberStatesinthePSCwerestillongoingonthismatter,althoughEUNAVFOR’smandatealreadyen-visagesrobustactiontobetakenifneeded.

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