euro mediter. partnership

8/13/2019 Euro Mediter. Partnership

1/16

1

Regional Community Building and the Transformation of Politico-Cultural Oppositions:

The Case of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

Frdric Volpi

Department of Politics, University of Bristol

ECPR general conference, Marburg, Germany, 18-20 September 2003

Section: Comparative Politics and Globalisation: Implications for Developing Countries

Panel: Globalisation and political reform

Draft please do not quote without the author permission; comments welcomed at

[email protected]

I. Introduction

Robert Kagan recently suggested that the United States and the European Union are conducting

their foreign policies in very different ways because at heart they posses two very different

conceptions of world order and of the mechanisms that need to be put in place to obtain this

order.1

According to Kagan, the US is still thinking in terms of Machpolitik because as the soleremaining superpower and as the global hegemon it can think in such terms and it must think in

those terms for the sake of the global community. Europeans on the other hand have developed

a postmodern notion of power based on a Kantian perpetual peace ideal of the primacy of

laws and on the rejection of force in the international system, principally because they had to

after the disaster of World War II, but also because they could do so within the confines of

Western Europe, thanks to US protection.

Kagans perspective on international politics turns on its head the relatively fashionableHuntingtonian view that the relations between Muslim polities and western democracies are

very much predetermined by the opposition between Islam (or Islamism) and western

liberalism. 2 Here, far more than an inter-civilisational opposition, it is an intra-civilisational

difference within the west that would shape different international systems. But how far does

the EU approach towards the Muslim world in general and the Mediterranean region in

particular represent something new when it comes to the practical implementation of this ideal

1 Robert Kagan, Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (London: AtlanticBooks, 2003)2 See Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of the World Order (New York:Simon and Schuster, 1996).


2/16

2

political order? Is the European way really making a difference when it comes to dealing with

potential political and cultural oppositions to liberal democracy?

Kagan makes much of the lack of enthusiasm of European countries for direct military action

and regime change in the case of the US intervention in Afghanistan, and their vocal opposition

to the war in Iraq. 3 He points out that although the EU and the US may have shared the same

long-terms views for the future of those countries, they disagreed on the means that one could

legitimately employ to secure these objectives. Typically, Europeans oppose the idea that the

ad-hoc use of force by the US superpower is the best way to establish a more law abiding

international community on grounds on inconsistency. But how far has the EU itself being able

to practice what it preaches (to the US) in its own backyard, in its relations with the states on the

southern shores of the Mediterranean, and with what results?

In part two, I will briefly sketch the main tenets of the EU programme designed to establish an

integrated regional community around the Mediterranean the Euro-Mediterranean partnership

(EMP). In part three, I will address the issue of how far this partnership constitutes a new

approach to community building that shun traditional Machpolitik approaches to international

relations. Finally in part four, I will examine some of the main drawbacks of the EMP approach

to regional integration, and the unintended consequences of this process on politico-cultural

conflict in the region.

II. The Euro-Mediteranean Partnership

The EMP was officially launched at the Euro-Mediterranean conference held in Barcelona in

1995 hence it is also known as the Barcelona process. 4 It was designed as a standard

framework for agreements between the European Union members and twelve Mediterranean

partner countries Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority,

Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Cyprus and Malta. (Libya has an observer status so far but it is likely

to upgrade to full partner as soon as the UN sanctions on the country are lifted.) Bilateralassociation agreements between individual partners countries and the EU have been negotiated

subsequently under this framework. Morocco, Tunisia, Israel and the Palestinian Authority were

the first signatories of these agreements. Egypt concluded its bilateral negotiations in 1999,

Algeria in 2001, Lebanon in 2002, and Syria is still negotiating. For the remaining countries, the

EMP has been already superseded by other agreements, like the customs union signed between

Turkey and the EU in 1996, and the accession treaty (to EU membership) for Malta and Cyprus.

3 Kagan, Paradise and Power .4 European Union, Barcelona Declaration , text adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference on 28

November 1995. Full text availability at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/bd.htm


3/16

3

Essentially, the EMP is an ambitious regional cooperation programme covering all aspects of

the social, economic and political relations between the EU and the states on the southern shores

of the Mediterranean. In practice, the EMP is organised around 3 pillars covering (i) political

and security partnership (ii) economic and financial partnership and, (iii) partnership in social,

cultural and human affairs. In this programme, the political and security partnership aims at

establishing a common area of peace and stability, the economic and financial partnership is

designed for creating an area of shared prosperity, whilst the social and cultural partnership is

the means of developing human resources, promoting understanding between cultures and

exchanges between civil societies. 5

Most commentators agree that at one level the EMP is simply a technical exercise rationalising

the various pre-existing treaties and agreements particularly in the economic and financial

domains signed between the EU and countries on the southern shores of the Mediterranean, as

well as providing a coherent framework for new agreements. 6 Furthermore it also brings

together under a single roof various security initiatives, such as the Italo-Spanish proposal for

the Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (1990), the Mediterranean

Dialogue programme (1994), and the French-inspired Western Mediterranean Security Forum

(1991 and 2001). However, beside this technical exercise, the EMP also served as a vehicle for

a new kind of regional community building because it set forth an ambitious political and

cultural set of objectives. In particular, the proposition to develop the rule of law and

democracy in the southern partner countries and the declaration that it will encourage actionsof support for democratic institutions and for the strengthening of the rule of law and civil

society were propositions that could be seen as directly undermining the political system of

most North African and Middle Eastern countries and introducing a new political model in the

region. 7

In the case of the EMP, as often with EU programmes, however, the devil is in the detail.

Despite giving political, security, economic and cultural aspects the same official recognition,

the different programmes of the EMP have received very differing amounts of attention fromthe EU, and funding through the EMPs financial protocol (MEDA). For example, Richard

Youngs notes that funds allocated for democracy assistance over the latter half of the 1990s

amounted to less than 0.5 per cent of all aid in the region. Over 200 times more money was

given under the main MEDA budget for assisting the process of economic restructuring. 8

5 European Union, Barcelona Declaration .6 See Claire Spencer, The EU and Common Strategies: The Revealing Case of the Mediterranean,

European Foreign Affairs Review , 6 (1) 2001, pp.31-51; George Joff, Europe and the Mediterranean:The Barcelona Process Five Years on, Briefing Paper 16 , Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000.7 European Union, Barcelona Declaration 8 Richard Youngs, The European Union and democracy promotion in the Mediterranean: a new ordisingenuous strategy?, in Richard Gillespie and Richard Youngs (eds.), The European Union and


4/16

4

Indeed, during this period, under this grand EMP scheme, democratic assistance efforts in the

Mediterranean region only amounted to 14% of the Commission overall democratic assistance

budget, which was less than the assistance provided to countries in a less strategically placed

region such as Latin America (which received 17% of these funds). In 2001, however, the

democracy promotion fund of the EMP was disbanded as a distinct regional programme and

merged into the overall democracy promotion programme of the Commission. Still, at the inter-

ministerial conference of Valencia (2002), the EMP promoters boldly stated their ambition to

increase public pressure on democratic reforms and human rights, and from 2005 onwards to

directly link part of the EMP funding to this new political conditionality. 9

As for the exchanges in the field of culture and human affairs, the EMP programme has been

rather tame. First, the EU has been reluctant to engage directly with civil society associations

engaged in political activities, including most Islamic associations. Since the Islamic

associations constitute the backbone of any non-governmental (civil) activities in the Middle

East and North Africa, it is difficult to conceive the civil society/cultural side of the EMP

programme having much of an impact. 10 Secondly, even when the EMP engage civil society in

these countries it is often the case, as Annette Junemann points out, that the powers that be in

North Africa and the Middle East have been quite capable to set up their own pro-governmental

civil society associations and NGOs (GONGOs) to capture the funds provided by the EU. 11 In

this context, Considering the reduced amount of attention and funding given so far to the

political read democracy promotion and cultural read Islamic-liberal dialogue in civilsociety it is tempting to describe the EMP as nothing more than a glorified trade agreement.

However, as Peter Burnell rightly points out in the paper prepared for this conference, when

looking at the impact of external funding on domestic politics it is important to take an holistic

view, as resources spent in one area can upset the balance of power in another.

Whilst most efforts since the launch of the EMP have been spent on crafting economic and

financial agreements, the incremental impact of the partnership on the region remains difficult

to estimate even in narrow economic terms. 12 The ambition of the economic programme of theEMP was to introduce liberalisation in the countries of the south, to facilitate north-south

Democracy Promotion: The Case of North Africa (London: Frank Cass, 2002), pp.40-62, at p.55. See alsothe paper prepared by Richard Youngs for this conference.9 Commission to the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council andthe European Parliament: Reinvigorating EU actions on human rights and democratisation with

Mediterranean partners , Brussels 25/05/2003, COM(2003) 294 final. Available at:http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/doc/com03_294.pdf10 Frdric Volpi, Islam and Democracy: The Failure of Dialogue in Algeria (London: Pluto Press, 2003)11 Annette Junemann, From the bottom to the top: civil society and transnational non-governmentalorganisations in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, in Gillespie and Youngs (eds.), The EuropeanUnion and Democracy Promotion , pp.87-105.12 See Eric Philippart, The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: A Critical Evaluation of an AmbitiousScheme, European Foreign Affairs Review 8 (2) 2003, pp.201220


5/16


6/16

6

emphasising realpolitik or stressing shared norms, values and practices produce different types

of cost-benefit structures.

The realist interpretation

Up to the end of the Cold War, there can be no doubt that most of the dealings across the

Mediterranean were built on a solid realpolitik basis. North African and Middle Eastern

countries played the US and its European Allies against the Soviet bloc for their own benefits;

and the west and the communist bloc rewarded them in function of these countries strategic

value on the regional stage. 17 This approach was reassessed at the end of the Cold War, though

for a while regional players appeared to be unsure of what ought to be the basis of their

relations, or whether there was a distinct Mediterranean community that warranted specific

regional policies. The start of the civil conflict in Algeria in 1992, and the flow of refugee that

reached Europe as a result, quickly led the Southern Members of the European Union to

propose joint European initiatives to tackle the security and socio-economic challenges that

erupted on the southern flank of the EU. From a security perspective, therefore, the Euro-

Mediterranean partnership retained the realpolitik outlook that prevailed during the Cold War.

Communist take-overs were no longer on the cards but Islamist challenges were to be taken

very seriously. 18 Furthermore, if direct military threats were thought to be immaterial in the near

future, the EU increasingly considered illegal trafficking, migration and terrorism as a most

serious issue. 19 Indeed, Javier Solana, then Secretary General of NATO, declared in 1997 that

most security challenges in the Mediterranean arise from worsening socio-economic conditionsand fragmentation, not from military risks 20

From this perspective, the framework of the MEP can be presented in a relatively coherent

manner. It is based on the assessment by the EU that stable regimes running their national

economy efficiently in the Middle East and North Africa would provide the best means of

obtaining a well-policed zone of regional security and prosperity. Therefore, it emphasises the

status quo in so far as this strengthens, or at least does not undermine, the interests of the EU.

The case of EU-Algerian relations could be cited as a good illustration of this approach, as

17 See, Alan Richards and John Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East: State, Class and Economic Development (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990); Joseph Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).18 See, Volpi, Islam and Democracy ; Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: a Political

History (London: Ithaca, 1996)19 In the last decade, a country like Spain intercepted up to 7000 illegal migrants per year passing throughthe Strait of Gibraltar. Pugh, Mediterranean boat people. This influx of people from North Africa wasnot only limited to southern European countries, as country like the UK also witness a dramatic surge inthe number of asylum seeker from country like Algeria (which ranked 7 th highest in the UK list ofcountries of origin of asylum seekers in 1995). Information Centre about Asylum and Refugees in the UK(ICAR), Algerian asylum applications to the UK, Statistical Snapshots Series 2003. Available at:http://www.icar.org.uk/content/res/stats/papers.html20 Quoted in Michael Pugh, Mediterranean boat people: a case for co-operation, Mediterranean Politics 6 (1) 2001, pp. 1-20, at p.7.


7/16

7

MEDA funds were provided to the military-backed Algerian regime despites the latters flagrant

violation of the democratic and human rights clauses of the EMP agreement. (Only during

1997-1999 did the EU stop providing MEDA funds due to blatant election rigging in the

country, but funding resumed after the 1999 election despite further irregularities on a similar

scale. This state of affairs led some commentators to suggest that withdrawing funding was not

directly connected to democracy promotion but part of an elaborate plot to extract more

economic concession from the Algerian regime at a time when it was negotiating the terms of it

EMP bilateral trade agreement). 21 From this perspective, political and security challenges are

directly linked to socio-economic issues, and by improving the socio-economic conditions of

the countries on the southern shores of the Mediterranean, the EMP directly contributes to

resolve whatever security problems there might be. 22 As French Prime Minister Jupp explained

to the Parliament at the height of the Algerian civil conflict, under-development provides a

fertile terrain for the growth of pernicious ideologies therefore, financial support for the

incumbent military regime in Algeria was the best way to solve the crisis. 23

If we take the view that these dealings with Algeria encapsulate the realpolitik rationale of the

EU actions in the region, there is little to be said in favour of the constructivists suggestion that

this partnership across the Mediterranean can create a new type of international system in the

region In this realist scheme, political and economic development in the South is only

encouraged insofar as it supports economic and security policies in Europe, but not for the sake

of individual countries in the Middle East and North Africa, and not for the sake of a cohesiveregional community. The Mediterranean partnership is not therefore a stepping-stone to full EU

membership or the beginning of a new regional community of the same standing as the EU. It is

very much a process and an ideal subservient to the process of community building in Europe.

(Even though some countries like Turkey, Cyprus or Malta may be able to upgrade from one

type of membership to another, others are simply excluded from this more sophisticated

community-building process on a matter of (geographical?) principle. When Morocco asked to

be considered as a potential EU member, the EU flatly rejected this request on the grounds that

Morocco was not a European country.)

If realist views emphasising national or European interests underpin the EMP it is unsurprising

that the construction of a regional partnership should lead to conflict with, and in the southern

partner countries. In this context, cultural oppositions to regional institutions building are

merely a rephrasing of the national interest. Support or rejection of the EMP programmes by the

21 See Hugh Roberts, The Battlefield Algeria 1988-2002 (London Verso, 2003), chapter 21.22 Some commentators rightly detect a crypto Marxist argument underpinning this rationale. See BrynjarLia, Security challenges in Europes Mediterranean periphery perspectives and policy dilemmas,

European Security 8 (4) 1999.23 Quoted in Jocelyne Csari, LEffet Airbus, Les Cahiers de lOrient , No.36-37, 1994-95, p.179.


8/16

8

governments and societies of the various North African and Middle Eastern countries are

dictated principally by domestic political calculations. No one believes in the construction of a

European like community across the Mediterranean, but every one will be willing to engage

with this institutional framework if it provides them with some tactical advantage over their

domestic opponents. The EMP is therefore neither more nor less likely to soothe or exacerbate

politically phrased cultural oppositions than the institution building work of the United States in

Iraq is likely to impact on Islamist politics. 24 Whatever this impact may be, it is to be conceived

in terms of the interests of the EU and of its partner countries, and not in terms of an alleged

regional community (and the greater good that it represents).

(ii) The social-constructivist turn

Some commentators like Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford insist that despite its initial

realist rationale, the EMP laid the foundations for a far-reaching transformation of the

Mediterranean region based on new norms values and practices, and that it has the potential for

generating a convergence of civilizations. 25 They contend that even though the EMP was born

out of instrumental calculation by the EU, and even though the creation of a European-like

security community is not the explicit aim of the EMP, this process may eventually transform

the Mediterranean region into on such community because the policy makers involved in this

process are duplicating the mechanisms that were used to create the EU and the OSCE. Adler

and Crawford point out that because this process has been framed around pluralistic security

community processes, institutions, and practices [] security community building already hasconsciously or unconsciously become part of Mediterranean integration practice. 26

The proposition that the norms and principles of the EU will slowly colonise neighbouring

institutional frameworks via the implementation of the EMP agreements is an interesting one

even though there may be an odd Hegelian history-working-behind-the back-of-men flavour to

this argument. In such a social constructivist approach, there is a slow, and even unexpected at

times, change in the identity and interests of the community members; changes that in turn

become institutionalised in the practices of the community. The process that Adler andCrawford describe involve firstly the creation of a Mediterranean shared narrative i.e.

shared normative and epistemic understandings and meanings about political, economic, and

social life, for example, about social order, the rule of law, human rights, social and political

justice, peace, and security. 27 This shared narrative would then become the basis for actual

practices, policies and institutions of a truly regional character. This process of

24 On Islamist politics in post-Saddam Iraq see, Graham Fuller, Islamist politics in Iraq after SaddamHussein, United States Institute of Peace Special Report 108 (August 2003).25 Adler and Crawford, Constructing a Mediterranean Region26 Adler and Crawford, Constructing a Mediterranean Region, p.13-15.27 Adler and Crawford, Constructing a Mediterranean Region, p.25.


9/16


10/16

10

Whilst there can be little doubts that powerful players on the international stage could impose

their institutional arrangements, it is far less evident that, a new institutional framework not

withstanding, a liberal-democratic ethos should pervade and underpin this process of

(international/regional) community building. 32 The Habermasian/Kantian framework that is

implicit in this constructivist scheme and in other similar deliberative models makes a strong

connection between the Truth of the norms and values proposed and their associated

practices and the capability of these concepts to spread to other individuals and communities.

(In other words, because people recognise the same Truth after deliberation they may come to

accept it.) Yet, this suggestion that a liberal civil society and civil beliefs is a necessary

component of region building is built on flimsy epistemic foundations. From an epistemological

perspective, the current dominance of a liberal worldview in politics and economic may be

recognised pragmatically as a matter of facts, but one ought not to equate this visible

dominance to a proof that liberal norms and practices have therefore more solid epistemic

foundations or are closer to any kind of Truth than other worldviews. 33 There is no compelling

theoretical reason to believe that people all around the world should logically come to similar

views should they open channel of communications with the liberal world. (Though in fairness

to Habermas it is worth noting that he himself does not quite make this kind of direct

connection.) 34 It seems to me that Islamic ideologues, should they choose to do so, could devise

a Mediterranean community building rationale on Islamic principles and practices thereby

Islamicising liberalism instead of liberalising Islamism.35

Obviously, once one take a moresceptical approach to the alleged epistemic supremacy of the liberal democratic discourse, it

becomes more difficult to unambiguously rate the success or failure of the process of replication

of its institutions and practices. Agents may built similar institutions and agree on practicing

the same practice for very different reasons and with the view of achieving very different (and

perhaps even antagonistic) objectives.

III. The EMP and the sources of politico-cultural conflict in the Mediterranean

There are at least three main problems in the formation of a more cohesive and secure

Mediterranean community via the EMP programme. First there are important issues (and

32 According to Adler and Crawford, power plays a major role in the creation of security communities.This role may be understood as a magnetic attraction of periphery states to the core. Adler and Crawford,Constructing a Mediterranean Region, p.11.33 See for example Richard Rorty, Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers, Volume 3 (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1998).34 See Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and

Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press 1997).35 See, Frdric Volpi, Language, practices and the formation of a transnational liberal-democraticethos, Global Society 16 (1) 2002, pp.89-102; Heiner Bielefeldt, 'Western' versus 'Islamic' human rightsconceptions?, Political Theory 28 (1) 2000, pp.90-121


11/16

11

conflicts of interests) that remain primarily conceived in terms of national interest e.g.

migration and that generate mutually negative perceptions of the partner countries on both

shores of the Mediterranean. Second, the liberal promoters of this regional community

themselves face a number of contradiction in political practices as they seek to advance their

project whilst fighting off the dangers of terrorism in a sometimes less than liberal fashion. 36

Third, even when the EMP has the scope to push forward its ambitious regional agenda, this

institutional model is undermined by the poor practices deployed on its behalf. Let me develop

these points one by one, and highlight their cumulative impact on regional politics.

Firstly, an issue such as the control of migratory fluxes has been at the heart of the EMP from

the very start of the process. For domestic reasons, the EU member states, and especially

southern members like Spain, France or Italy, have sought to reduce the flow of migrants from

countries of North Africa and the Middle East. 37 Whilst the EU is keen to have an influx of

educated and trained workers from these countries, they are unwilling to receive non-qualified

job seekers, which they see as a drain on their welfare system. However, Middle Eastern and

North African countries do face similar problems of coping with large numbers of non-qualified

job-seekers, whilst being unable to retain their most qualified workers who are affected by this

brain drain. In other words, across the region, all the partners want to obtain or retain

employable qualified workers whilst none want to welcome or keep untrained job seekers for

the sake of their national economy. The EU therefore repeatedly encourages the southern

partner countries to adopt new border control agreements as well as providing them with funds policing borders and for local development initiatives. 38 Yet, as Abdelaziz Testa points out,

whilst North African and Middle Eastern countries may have agreed to the terms of the EMP

and may receive funds to this effect, they often replied by wilfully (though not explicitly) failing

to implement these reforms on the ground. 39 Unsurprisingly, because the southern partners of

the EU estimate that migration is crucial to ease the pressure on their domestic labour market

and generate cash remittances, they have an incentive to play the ineffectiveness card when it

comes to implementing these formal agreements. And Testa rightly emphasises that these

political players will continue to find it unattractive to co-operate with their EU partners over

36 See for example, Amnesty International, United Kingdom: Briefing on the Terrorism Bill, AmnestyInternational, London, 25 April 2000. Available athttp://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGEUR45043200037 See, Bernabe Lopez Garcia and Miguel Hernando de Larramendi, Spain and North Africa: towards adynamic stability, in Gillespie and Youngs (eds.), The European Union and Democracy Promotion,

pp.170-191; Pugh, Mediterranean boat people.38 See the paper prepared for this conference by Richard Youngs for some of the latest development onthis issue.39 Abdelaziz Testas, Maghreb-EU migration: interdependence, remittances, the labour market andimplications for economic development, Mediterranean Politics 6 (3) 2001, pp.64-80.


12/16

12

migration as long as they expect significant benefits to be reaped from it. 40 Thus on this

(perceived) critical matter, the EMP appears to have little to offer to the formation of a regional

community as envisioned by constructivist approaches. From a realist perspective, the situation

is hardly any better as it is the very position of weakness of the southern partners of the EU in

itself a desirable state of affairs that is ensuring the continuance of this problem, as well as

fuelling xenophobic sentiments on both shores of the Mediterranean.

Secondly, the promotion of a regional security community has been problematic in the EMP

process principally because it remains unclear, even for its European promoters, whether liberal

democratic ideals ought to be advocated across the board, or whether some aspects of politics

(such as security) ought to be insulated from the rest of the field. 41 In the post-9/11 context, the

renewed concern not only with state security but also with the securitisation of society can be at

odds with the earlier EU discourse on liberalisation and democratisation. The discourse on

democratisation has not been waived altogether as western democracies still perceive the spread

liberal democracy as the best long-term opportunity to reduce international conflict an

assessment based on the alleged findings of the democratic peace theory. 42 In the post-9/11

order, however, these demands on North African and Middle Eastern countries have been

supplemented by new demands for tighter control of the actual and potentially terroristic

elements in their polities. Critically, however, there is a tension between democratising and

liberalising political activities on the one hand, and carefully monitoring the activities of

potentially subversive social and political movements. It is a well-known conundrum ofliberalism that there is a loophole in theory that allows the powers-that-be to justify in principle

the imposition of restrictions civil and political liberties today if this is needed for securing them

for future generations and challenges to the security of the state highlight a clearly defined

political good that must be secured for future citizens to enjoy their liberal freedoms.

The substance of the message that is coming out of both the executive and legislative branches

of the governments in Europe (and the United States) in the wake of 9/11 is that the new powers

given to security agencies to tackle terrorism and that new decrees and legislation temporarilyimpinge on some civil liberties with the view of protecting other more important civil and

political liberties which are under the lethal threat of terrorism. Undoubtedly the political

leaders making this argument have the most benign intentions, but regardless of their excellent

intentions, the implementation of this notion is bound to be problematic because of the ad-hoc

40 Over 90% of Algerian and Tunisian expatriates and over 80% of Tunisian expatriates reside in Europeand it is estimated that 95% of remittances transferred to the Maghreb originate there. Testas, Maghreb-EU migration, p.64, p.68.41 See the paper prepared for this conference by Richard Youngs.42 On the merits and demerits of the democratic peace argument see the contributors to Democracy,

Liberalism, and War: Rethinking the Democratic Peace Debate , T. Barkawi and M. Laffey (eds.),Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001.


13/16

13

nature of the decision-making process invoked, and because of the nature of the political good

involved trust .43 Thus, at the regional level, whatever kind security community one is trying

to create on the basis of shared liberal democratic norms, value and practices, it is accepted that

one might turn to other norms and means in the case of specific issues, such as security. 44

Unsurprisingly, North African and Middle Eastern regimes have jumped on this bandwagon and

carefully cordoned off large areas of political activities on security grounds. As Daniel

Brumberg points out, this new emphasis on security generally means an entrenchment of

liberalised autocracies in the region. 45 (Again, the case of Algeria, from the 1992 military coup

to the conclusion of the EMP bilateral agreement negotiations in 2001 is a dramatic illustration

of this scenario.) 46 Ultimately, these policies underpin the incremental entrenchment of two

largely incompatible political rationales one of greater liberalisation, the other of greater

autocratic power accumulation at the heart of Middle Eastern and North African polities, and

are setting the stage for a future confrontation.

Thirdly and finally, the EMP has been unable to be fully satisfactory as a community-building

mechanism because of its own technical deficiency and problems of implementation that its

proponents have been unable to solve (or unwilling to address). Thus far, the economic

dimension of the EMP has been the driving force behind this process of regional integration.

Yet, this economic engine appears to be failing to make a significant impact on the political

mechanisms in place in the southern Mediterranean region. Dillman suggests that economic

liberalisation did not spill over to political reforms in North Africa because authoritarianregimes have been able to use these reforms to strengthen their position by dictating the winners

and losers in the first stages of economic liberalisation. 47 Indeed, looking at some of the very

first signatories of the EMP and some of the largest recipients of MEDA funds over the years

Morocco and Tunisia, the picture is mixed at best. If Morocco has made some small but

significant steps towards political liberalisation, its actions in the Western Sahara meant that it

was rated as one of the worst authoritarian regime in the world by the Freedom House

organisation. 48 Regarding Tunisia, most commentators agree that it is today a far more

43 See, Mark Warren (ed.), Democracy and Trust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); DiegoGambetta, Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988).44 For example, the new provisos of the UK immigration act means that the security and justiceapparatuses do not use the same practices when dealing with national and foreign terrorist suspects. SeeGG. Grimwood and V. Miller (2001) The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill. Immigration, asylum,race and religion: Bill 49 of 2001-2002, London: House of Commons Library.45 Daniel Brumberg, The trap of liberalized autocracy, Journal of Democracy 13 (4) 2002, pp.46-68. Forvarious other definition of the mechanisms of these pseudo-democratic regimes see also: Larry Diamond,Thinking about hybrid regimes Journal of Democracy 13 (2) 2002, 21-35, and Thomas Carothers, Theend of the transition paradigm, Journal of Democracy 13 (1) 2002, pp.5-21.46 See Volpi, Islam and Democracy ; Roberts, The Battlefield Algeria.47 Dillman, International markets and partial economic reforms in North Africa.48 Freedom House, The Worlds Most Repressive Regimes 2003: A Special Report to the 59th Session ofthe United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Geneva, 2003 . Available at:http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/mrr2003.pdf


14/16

14

politically controlled country than it was at the beginning of the 1990s. 49 In these cases,

whatever the indirect impact of economic and aid programmes on domestic politics may be, it

certainly does not appear to positively reinforce the process of democratic reform.

The tendency of EU officials to believe in the natural connection between economic reforms

and growth, and political liberalisation none withstanding, there is an additional problem

created by the kind of political practices deployed by the EU and their indirect impact on the

domestic ethos of the southern countries. As Fulvio Attina points out, besides the direct impact

of these resources on the shape of domestic regimes, there is also an important impact on the

mechanisms of political decision-making. 50 Clearly, the EU has been taking advantage of its

dominant economic position to set the terms of the EMP bilateral agreements with its partner

countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Whatever kind of community one is trying to

create in the Mediterranean region it is clear that the position of strength of the EU in dictatingthe terms of financial and economic agreements cannot but shape the perceptions of which

political practices are worth practicing amongst its southern partner countries. In this respect,

if one seriously considers the implications of a social-constructivist perspective and not

merely reaffirms the value of a liberal vision for the region one cannot but conclude that these

practices produce a second order discourse for the EMP. This discourse based on expediency (or

practicability) is not only loosely connected to the formal EMP discourse on liberalisation and

democratisation, but it also provides an alternative foundation for a Mediterranean regional

ethos. This is a point about political learning . The discrepancies and dichotomy betweendiscourses and practices that pervade the EMP process do not simply have unfelicitous practical

consequences on regional and domestic institutional frameworks, they also ensure that political

players take this second order performative discourse as embodying the rules of the game when

dealing with the EU and they reinforce their autocratic tendencies when it comes to dealings

with their domestic constituencies.

Conclusion

Can the European Union create, through its Euro-Mediterranean partnership (EMP), a new kind

of regional community in the Mediterranean that increases security and reduces politico-cultural

conflict in the Middle East and North Africa? Many European policy makers may view the

rationale for this north-south cooperation in the Mediterranean region in terms of a liberal

social-constructivist European approach to global political change, as illustrated by the

ambitious terms of the Barcelona declaration (1995) and the subsequent outlining of the

49 Larbi Sadiki, Political Liberalization in Bin Alis Tunisia: Faade Democracy Democratization 9 (4)2002.50 Fulvio Attina, The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Assessed: The Realist and Liberal Views,

European Foreign Affairs Review 8 (2) 2003, pp.181-200


15/16

15

Common Strategy on the Mediterranean (2000). 51 In practice, however, the outcomes of the

EMP initiatives in the region often appear to differ little from the results obtained by countries

(e.g. the Unites States) using a more traditional i.e. realist approach to international

relations. There are at least three main reasons for this state of affairs. Firstly, there are crucial

regional issues, such as migration, that remain primarily viewed in terms of national interest,

and for which national governments tend to be unwilling to recast the problem in a truly

regional perspective. Secondly, in the post 9/11 order particularly, there are obvious tensions

between the long-term strategic aims of EU engagement with its Mediterranean partners and its

tactical security choices. (On the one hand the EU is attempting to strengthen existing illiberal

state institutions in North African and Middle Eastern countries in order to gain more effective

cooperation on security/anti-terrorist policies; on the other hand it is keen to promote power-

sharing and good governance in countries that essentially function on a non-democratic basis.)

Lastly, the various national, sub-national and supra-national institutions involved in the EMP

programme are often unable to address the practical challenges of multi-layered trans-national

governance in a coherent way. 52 In particular, the EMP find it extremely difficult to promote the

right political ethos and the EU partners are left to interpret an ambiguous combination of

discourses and practices that repeatedly contradict one another.

In this context one may contemplate three scenarios for the political future of the Mediterranean

region. First, it may be argued that the EMP process is largely irrelevant to the issue of political

and security reforms. The European Union not is the political and military heavy weight thatsome imagine it to be, and the economic weapons that it possesses are only truly relevant for

economic liberalisation. Political and security issue in North Africa are massively over-

determined by issues such as domestic politics (particularly Islamist challenges), the regional

balance of power, and the actions of the US. Any progress or concession that may be made to

the EMP to please European governments and public opinion is made for purposes of

expediency and implementation is conditioned by these other priorities. It is a piecemeal

process that does not have a momentum of its own and its impact is mostly cosmetic. This, in

my view, is fairly indicative of the present situation in the region.

The second scenario is that current European efforts to promote liberalisation and to establish

more secure relations with North Africa are merely a subtle rephrasing of realpolitik pace

Kagan. Policy makers may voice their support for, and genuinely believe in, liberalisation and

democratisation, but policies are primarily devised to maintain the position of strength of the

EU in the region. Sophisticated rephrasing of modernisation theory suggesting that authoritarian

political orders might represent the best option for the southern partner countries during a

51 European Council, Common Strategy of the European Union on the Mediterranean Region , Annex V,Presidency Conclusions, European Council Feira June 2000 (SN 200/0 ADD I).52 See Spencer, The EU and Common Strategies.


16/16

16

period of international instability and socio-economic transformation, and the best way to avoid

falling into the pangs of anarchy, do in fact underpin the EMP approach. After 9/11 in

particular, those European policy makers concerned with fashioning a new world order at the

image of the most successful western political and economic institutions have come to view

culturally phrased read Islamic political opposition as a main source of instability and,

therefore, democratisation as an ambiguous process. Once more, the suggestion that the

liberalisation of the political field is not a main threat to the political order but constitutes

instead the premise of a good political and economic system is under scrutiny. In this context,

the EMP policies focusing on democracy promotion and strengthening civil society that appear

to be failing or to be counter-productive could be seen as performing their function

appropriately in a situation were stability and the furtherance of the status quo is given a greater

priority than liberalism and pluralism.

Thirdly and finally, from a social contructivist perspective, regional cooperation and reforms

need to be pushed forth despite these initial setbacks, as long-term gains for all those involved

in this process cannot be secured without the tentative build up of a necessarily imperfect

institutional platform. The main challenge for the proponents of this approach is to gain a

reasonably accurate picture of the kind of epistemic community that is being constructed around

the Mediterranean, and the kind of political learning promoted by the EMP. The principled

opposition between the EU and the US (or constructivism and realism) on how to behave in

international relations that Kagan mentions in his book, even if true, does not necessarilytranslate into the construction of different international orders. What constitutes a regional order

is a particular combination of principles (ethos) and of practices (techne). In the Mediterranean

region, however, the EU finds it difficult to link the two in coherent way. As a result, there is a

tendency for the practical inadequacies of the EMP to corrupt its discursive impact, thereby

pushing the process of region building off its estimated Kantian course and towards a realist

order.

euro mediter. partnership

Documents