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EUREKA Winter 2014-15Kindly Supported by UCL European Insitute

The “Future of Europe” is a theme that is undeniably present in the minds of Europe’s population today. As new trade agreements are developed, as wars continue to wage on, and as countries seek to rectify their respective pasts, national identities, and claims to various ideals of state sovereignty with the institution of the European Union, one cannot avoid considering how all these issues will affect the future of the institu-tion, the future of the European population, and perhaps most importantly, the continued development of a European identity.

As editors of Eureka, we possessed the unique ability to be able to draw on the diversity of views found in the European Society concerning the future of Europe and its individual states. As such, the number of view-points and individual stories available for all to consider and add to this theme of the future of Europe is as-tounding, and truly reflects the value of a society such as ours. We have sought to demonstrate the plurality of state and institutional-wide issues that plague the EU, but we assert that many of these problems individ-ual states are facing are less unique than perhaps they seemed initially. What can be unique however is our individual responses to these institutional and state-wide problems, and we have portrayed here as well, the extent of policy options available to the EU and its member states in their efforts to confront political extrem-ism, an appropriate balance of nationalism, relations with other global players, as well as a number of other issues covered in this winter edition of Eureka.

We would like to thank all our writers for taking the time out of their hectic university schedules to sit down and truly consider this theme and how they find it embodied in their home countries or daily lives. We have assembled an excellent array of articles and this is thanks entirely to our contributors. We hope to have you write for us again next term.

All the best,Hendrik Obelöer & Shane McGoldrickEditors

Cover photo by Jose Hong

Table of Contents2 A Continent that should know better

4 How various news sources contributed to the growing cul- tural polarisation in Europe

6 Russia, the special path

8 European but not an EU-nion-an

10 EU 2014-2019: New Faces, Great Expectations

12 Sakharov Debate - Religious & Human Rights

14 Permanently Incomplete

16 Europe‘s phone number

18 Wil Brits ever be proud Europeans?

20 Warsaw—25 Years since the fall of Communism

22 Illusion and feasibility in Spanish politics: Podemos?

24 How close is Russia to the EU?

26 Evolving US-EU Trade Relations: An In Depth Look at the TTIP Proceedings

1

25 years after the fall of the Berlin wall, the EU’s borders are again attracting focus. Europe, the conti-nent that often seeks to claim the moral high-ground and which yearly celebrates the tearing down of a wall that divided a nation for years, is slowing erec-ting new ones. In a globalised world with countless problems, creating an effective international system for asylum seekers is one of the most urgent and im-portant issues. But in this field where Europe should be a role model, it gives a decidedly bad example .

I can see you point at the financial crisis leaving many countries in a desolate state, at an unemployed youth, at environmental destruction. Yes, Europe also has its own problems, not too little and not too small. But asylum seekers come from a position we as citizens of Europe cannot even grasp. No matter whether they are politically persecuted, harassed by their society or living under constant suffrage, who could resent them for their search for a better life? Europe and each and every nation in the EU has the power and wealth to help these people and still be left with enough resour-ces to tackle the aforementioned problems. Or diffe-rently put: If we don‘t find the resources and will to help those in greatest need, we need to argue about what our societies want to stand for. This article is going to introduce three measures with which a good step in the right direction is done.

Update Asylum policy:It has already been acknowledged that Europe needs to act as a community on this matter. Regulations have been unified and controls established. This can, however, only be the very first step. It goes without saying that countries do not only need to treat refugees with solidarity but also all other nations. Often countries on the periphery like Italy or Greece are left alone thanks to Dublin II. A sys-tem regulating that every person needs to claim asylum in the first country of entry or respectively can be sent back to this. We need a system of shared responsibility. Countries need to take up a position appropriate to their

size and capabilities, not feel lucky about the geo-graphical position they are in.

“But we can’t afford to let them all in” - We can. There have been times with much higher numbers of asylum applicants and even if there weren‘t, we should change ourselves so we CAN let them in. It is not a question of economic calculation but of political will and the pow-er to answer back those reluctant to share a very tiny bit of their wealth. France and the UK especially have a lot more potential. But even for Germany as the industria-lised country with the highest number of asylum appli-cations worldwide (in 2013 over 120,000), there is much more potential. Most of the refugees are still waiting for their final decisions and to put the German numbers in relation: Sweden takes nearly 4 times as many asylum seekers per inhabitant.

Rethink Frontex: don’t build fences, but bridgesEurope has been the witness of countless cruelties. It has experienced how a wall has separated societies, minds and peoples. And its fall has been the marking point of our time. No other country like Germany has experien-ced this closer. Now in a time when movements like ‚Pe-gida‘ (patriotic europeans against the islamisation of the west) and resentments against refugees grow again they do not shed a good light on it. Fear of the other has beco-me the ‚leitmotif ‘ of much of the discourse.

Agencies like Frontex are not only the product of this but also amplify the problem. The EU builds fences and at the same time rightfully criticises Israel and the USA for theirs. We do not need those fences to ‚save refugees from taking the riskful passage on the mediterranean‘. As ab-surd as it might sound to some: refugees are not going on a holiday. The EU has a nobel peace price, but obvi-ously not for its border policies. Cautious estimates say that currently 20,000 people have lost their lives on EU borders. In the GDR about 900 were shot or killed in their attempt to flee.

If the EU wants to genuinely save lives, it needs to build legal and effective alternatives: possibilities for asylum seekers to claim asylum from abroad or effective ways to cross the mediterranean sea.

A Continent that should know better

Editorial by Hendrik Obelöer

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Reinstall effective rescue missions in the mediterraneanOnly after too many catastrophies Italy started its ‚mare nostrum‘ mission. 130,000 refugees were saved! Europe was proud of this, but at some point Italy refused to carry on alone and now Frontex does the job. After many ne-gotiations the 28 EU nations agreed to gather 2,9 million euros a month... the mare nostrum mission by Italy alone amounted to 9 million. And how is this mission with less ambition, less personal, less money called? First, Frontex Plus. But that was apparently too much gallows humour. At the moment it‘s referred to as the Greek god and mes-senger of the sea ‚Triton‘. Europeans always like to show off their humanist education.

But not only the name and budget differs. Frontex itself puts it in harsh terms. Whereas ‘mare nostrum’ was a se-arch and rescue mission, Triton focuses on border con-

trols. That‘s it with the humanist education. Italy’s Interior Minister once said: ‘Italy did its duty’. Eu-rope doesn’t.

If Europe wants to relate to common values and a shared political consensus, then something has to change. After all, a Europe without a political and open vision would lack support from the public. Reducing the EU to its Eco-nomic functions, on power play and influence, there will be a diminishing reason for many countries to stick to it. For a long time Europe was a continent of war, in which its peoples tried to separate themselves from each other. Europe should know better what it lead to. If we want to save the European project, let’s start by saving those that risk their life believing in it.

Photo by Ali Arif

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Google the words « Merkel » or « lazy greeks » and a simple scroll through the suggested images is likely to trigger two reactions : an initial laughter followed by a sense of disgust. The Eurozone crisis and the resul-ting feeling of economic polarization (often referred to as the « North-South » divide) led to the emergen-ce of multiple political articles, cartoons and images conveying strong opinions, all across Europe. Most of them target politicians but also other European peo-ples.

Betrüger in der Euro-Familie (« Swindlers in the Euro family ») was the cover title of the German newspa-per Focus in 2010 depicting the statue of the goddess Aphrodite (the Venus of Milo) presenting her middle finger to the viewer. The image introduced an article commenting on German concerns about a European Union bailout for debt-ridden Greece. Caustic senten-ces included, amongt others, the mention of « 2000 years of decline », referring to Greek civilization. Re-action on the Greek side resulted in the president of the Greek parliament summoning the German am-bassador as well as a group of particularly offended Greek citizens taking legal action against the journa-lists involved.

Sell your islands, you bankrupt-Greeks – and the Acropolis too !, read the headline in the German Bild newspaper in 2010. This sounds perhaps a bit over the top, even facetious, many would think, but the ba-sic logic behind this media jibe was actually embra-ced by German politicians such as Mr Schlarmann (a then senior position-holder at the German Christ-de-mocratic party, CDU) who stated that those who face insolvency must sell everything they have to pay their creditors.

Of course it’s not all about Germans despising Greeks for their financial misconduct. Other criticisms were

directed at Mario Draghi, an Italian, now Presi-dent of the European Central Bank (ECB), whom

many perceived as potentially unsuited for the job because of his Italian origins. In addition, this nega-tive nationalistically charged campaigning is not a one way street. Similar to German newspapers, many Greek media outlets had a handful of cartoons and articles at their disposal which did not exactly prai-se the policies of the German governments, known to many as “Merkel policies”.

In 2012, the Greek newspaper Dimokratia run a pho-toshopped image of the German Chancellor in Nazi attire standing before a swastika. It also ran the word « Dachau » on the front page with the photo, referen-cing to a Nazi concentration camp. “Of course I aim to shock people with my drawings,” Stathis Stavropou-los, the author, told Der Spiegel. He often depicts Ger-man leaders, including Mrs. Merkel, in World War II uniforms. “But the initial agitation should be followed by reflection. That, at least, is my hope.”

How various news sourcescontributed to the growing cultural

polarisation in EuropePaul Weissenberg

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Is the hope of Mr Stavropoulos defenda-ble, though? This kind of media cover-age has the potential to excite nationa-listic beliefs whilst leading to a loss of faith in the EU and its ability to bridge nationalism. If so, it seems that such journalism might prove counterproduc-tive and in fact lead to the creation of an artificial feeling of further cultural po-larisation. Such popularising of clichés indeed leads to a sense of mutual hatred between EU citizens of different states. For those who believe in the « European dream », this is clearly bad news in the very sense.

If there is such a problem, it is reaso-nable to ask whether there is a soluti-on. It seems that the solution might lie in the adoption of a different approach to shared and differing values amongst Europe’s people. Delanty best expres-sed this : « European identity can be de-fined as a cosmopolitan identity rather than a supranational identity or an of-ficial EU identity that is in tension with national identities. As [such], European identity is a post-national self-under-standing that expresses itself within, as much as beyond, national identities ».

One step forward would be to find a me-thod which would put an end to this il-lusionary trade-off roaming in people’s minds between national identities and a European identity.

The EU is not perfect but it has the po-tential to unleash and cultivate a variety of benefits for all its people. The prob-lem lies in the lack of understanding of the EU, it being a complex and still so-mewhat vague concept for most of its citizens. This is partly due to the fact that its large aspirations ought to be backed up by relevant, often complex institutions and mechanisms but, more importantly, because the EU is not a cle-arly defined concept. There are no clear guidelines, limits or a framework which states what, where and when exactly the EU should act. In order for the Euro-pean idea(l) to be led and guided effec-tively, policies which aim at promoting EU awareness ought to be put forward. The study of the EU and its mechanisms could be further integrated into educa-tion all across member sates, for instan-ce.

The kind of media discussed above is fuelled by demand that results from

human behaviour and feelings. In an ideal scena-rio the reader critically perceives what is being laid out in front of his eyes and realizes that the rea-lity is far more complex than depicted. If citizens of Europe are able to reco-gnise the EU as such with all its imperfections but also with its advantages, then the debate can effec-tively move forward in a constructive way and the views will look decidedly much different.

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International political developments always influen-ce and are in turn influenced by the states’ internal po-litics. One familiar topic that always comes up in this discussion concerns the national cultures and how they reflect on cooperation with other states. People’s cultural and religious beliefs influence the actions of the state significantly. It is important to address this issue since it can help us understand certain develop-ments more clearly and enable us to look for better practical solutions to the related problems. In light of the recently amounted tensions between Russia and the EU it is especially relevant to think more deeply about what’s happening inside Russia and better un-derstand its regime. The authorities (or the authority) in Russia have recently revived the all-too familiar idea of a “speci-al path” of the Russian people, who are, according to

them, different to their European counterparts in

their mentality and adhere by different values. Whe-reas the “European values” which are appealed to by the liberal opposition, centre around individual rights and freedoms and call for free and fair elections, re-spect for private property, rule of law and indepen-dent media, the proponents of a “unique” Russian path tend to cite such things as traditional family, spi-rituality and historical unity. The Russian president invoked these concepts repeatedly in his speeches in recent years. At the same time Putin does not formal-ly shun democratic values – instead, he stresses the centrality of the state and its sovereignty supposedly backed up by the historical and spiritual unity of the Russian people. Thus he attains a way to slam at the opposition through aligning them with “foreign inte-rests”, which, of course, serve to destabilize the coun-try, “to tear out its [the bear’s] claws and fangs” to use Putin’s latest metaphor. The new formulation of Russia’s identity thus strives

Russia, the special pathRoman Varum

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to pay lip service to the most basic democratic values, while either reformulating them from a different per-spective or stressing the importance of the particu-larly “Russian” values over them. So, according to the research carried out by the Levada Center, a respec-ted sociological institute from Moscow, in September 2014, 62% of the respondents said that democracy is the suitable form of government for Russia, with 55% (former 34%) saying stated that it must be a very spe-cific type of democracy taking account of the “national character”. The ongoing change in the public discour-se, is further attested by the dynamics of answers to the question of whether the relations between Russia and the West can be “genuinely friendly” or “will al-ways be built on mutual distrust”. The number of peo-ple who answered positively has decreased to a quar-ter in September 2014 when it was more than 50%, while the number who voted for the second option nearly doubled to 64%. The authors note further correlations between the respondents’ answers and their levels of education, knowledge of foreign languages and the experience of travelling abroad. The simplistic Orthodox values advocated by the authorities, says sociologist Alexan-der Levinson, tend to appeal more to people with low levels of education and little foreign experience. Con-sidering that more than 70% of the population never travelled abroad and only 20% have attained higher level of education, this presents easy political capital for a populist platform. Predictably enough, none of the politicians who ad-vocate the conservative agenda adhere by it. Putin’s own daughters are rumoured to live in Netherlands and Germany, while the daughter of Sergey Lavrov, Russian foreign minister, is studying at Columbia Uni-

versity in the U.S. - the country, whose “departure from its Christian roots” Lavrov has lamented. This, coupled with the state’s manipulation of public opinion through the media, suggests that the-re is little more to the ongoing revival of “traditional” values than politicking. Sergey Guriev, an economist who used to lead the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, writes that the government has no rational interest in changing the status quo as it secures their economic privileges. Guriev seems right, provided that the public’s perception of cultural values seems to change once it sees the benefits that an open, de-mocratic system and the rule of law can bring as who-le – including in the economic and social spheres. Since a major debate is held around the supposed fact that Russia requires a “special type of democracy”, it is worth emphasizing that indeed, to quote the po-litical scientist Dmitry Oreshkin, “insisting that our democracy needs to be a special one makes no sen-se, because democracy is always special and tailored to each country’s circumstances”. The question lies rather in the political will to build and uphold actual democratic institutions – and the authorities in place clearly lack it. Hence the substitution of the talk about “a unique Russian culture” for the talk about substan-tive socio-economic issues at hand. Russian culture is indeed unique, as is every other – this does not mean that it needs to be counterpoised to the Western one, when it can coexist and indeed benefit from it. Euro-pean nations do not share identical cultures either and yet they develop peacefully within the EU, pre-cisely because they appreciate the merit of the uni-versal values, around which they are united. Cultural isolationism and pursuit of a “special path” does not lead very far - North Korea, the most “unique” nation on Earth, can attest to that.

Photo by Lennart Gau

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European but not EU-nion-anStephanie Bruce-Smith

The future of states that lie within Europe yet outside the EU

With a seemingly ever-expanding EU it is often easy to forget about those countries that exist outside the framework – that is, of course, unless a euro-crisis causes their currency to skyrocket or a war erupts causing speculation about the return of Cold War ten-sions. “European” has almost become synonymous with EU membership and although it has been argued that it is high time to come up with a new adjective, perhaps there is more at stake here. What sort of re-lationship is foreseeable between an ever-expanding EU and those outside the framework? And should the EU work to better its relations with these countries in order to expand even further?

Candidate countries and those accepted by the EU as possible candidates have by definition shown some indication of where they wish to be – whether or not they’ll get there anytime soon is another matter. Their relationship with the EU hegemon does not seem so tricky to define as the ties between the EU and tho-se geographically in Europe but either not wishing to join or for various reasons have been rejected as pos-sible candidate countries.

Being respectively financially rich and oil-rich, Swit-zerland and Norway seem perfectly happy in their po-sition outside the EU. As associate members of Schen-gen, participants of various programmes (including Erasmus) and having numerous joint or bilateral tra-de agreements, neither of these countries seems that un-EUnion-an after all. This comfortable yet perhaps “casual” relationship with the EU is one that some in UK would probably envy – but this special rapport can hardly be applied to all non-EU states, nor could it be adopted by states unhappy with the current set-up and waiting to leave.

But why not? Why can’t Europe’s outsiders develop a relationship just as cosy as that between the EU and those countries who find themselves nestled in bet-ween EU states?

First of all, despite what this article’s title may sug-gest, Europe cannot be so easily divided into two groups of those within the EU and those outside

it. Each state outside the EU framework has a unique, established affiliation to the Union – indeed, despite the comparison made above, stark differences exist in the agreements and depth of ties Norway and Swit-zerland have with the EU. Norway’s EEA members-hip effectively means that they accept EU legislation without having a say in how this is formed – a “pas-sive recipient” so to speak – something that caused Switzerland to leave the EEA and an arrangement that countries such as the UK would be unlikely to accept if they were to leave the EU. However, although Euro-sceptics (particularly in Britain) hail the Swiss model as their choice of preference, this unique relationship is in danger. The EU’s expansion towards the East is seen by some as making the EU even more insistent on the Swiss forming a relationship closer to that of its EEA partners rather than being an acceptable exception due to its cultural affinity to Western Eu-rope. It is indeed unlikely that Britain upon exiting could hope for similar tre-atment, particularly when it seems that the days of such special treatment are coming to an end.

Secondly, although it was one of these unique bi-lateral agreements that sparked unrest in Ukrai-ne in 2013, one could also argue that it was the per-spective of Europe being divided into those inside and those outside the fra-mework that led to Russi-an involvement. Indeed, there is talk of a new Eastern Bloc (as can be seen in Angela Merkel’s condemnation of Putin in mid-November); the Iron Curtain now being drawn just a little more to the east. Consequently, we could deduce that any EU initiative of rapproche-ment to these European countries is now expected

8

to be met with hostility. This conclusion does, of cour-se, ignore the aforementioned particularities of each of the states outside the EU framework – although it may be perhaps justified if Russia’s foreign policy is interpreted in such a simplistic manner.

So if Norway and Switzerland carry on as before, if the countries wedged between Russia and Europe cur-rently (and for the foreseeable future) are considered off-limits for further close ties with Europe –what about Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan? What is the future of the EU’s relationship with them?

To answer such a question we must look at the directi-on of the EU and also return somewhat to the age-old question of where Europe begins and ends. What the EU aims to be is a topic that seems much clearer after the appointment of Jean-Claude Junker as head of the EU Commission, who has expressed openly his hope for further integration along the lines of establishing some sort of United States of Europe. Which is why, perhaps, the idea of the EU extending to Europe’s geo-graphical boundaries or indeed looking for a special relationship between the EU and all the countries wi-

thin this geographical region is beside the point or off the agenda – at least until a relatively tight-knit and secure federal Europe has been established.

If the EU were to become a more integrated group of states becoming ever closer to a true federation, say, due to the exit of certain Eurosceptic countries, the role of the EU as a single actor could become stronger. A stronger EU means that neighbouring states outsi-de the Union may find themselves overshadowed by such an entity, either wanting to join it (or regretting leaving it) or they may wish to join together in some way to counteract the combined economic and politi-cal weight of the EU (perhaps in the form of a stron-ger EFTA), thus leading back to a divided European continent. If, on the other hand, the drifting away of certain nations from the EU causes the unravelling of the union, relations between what is left of the EU will most likely become purely economic. Thus for now it seems that the future of the EU’s relationships with external European states is dependent on the EU’s fu-ture as an entity – which at the moment is looking as unclear as ever.

Photo by Lennart Gau

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After months of extensive discussion, interrogation and criticism, the European Parliament accepted Pre-sident-elect Jean-Claude Juncker’s team of commis-sioners and his call to breathe “new life into the Eu-ropean project”. The exceptional media coverage that the appointment attracted due to the perceived long-term institutional and political consequences of the process of Spitzenkandidaten was only the beginning of the controversy that arose around the new Com-mission. As Europe wakes up to a new executive on 1 November, a chorus of reactions appeared over how the “make it or break it” team will meet the demand of European citizens for a new course of the European Union. But does the political wrangling over the ap-pointments indicate that the next five years will bring fundamental changes? Who are the faces and what

are the problems that they have to deal with?

Looking at the Commissioner’s profiles, one obvious feature of the new 28 members is the record share of 18 former ministers and prime ministers in compa-rison to previous Commissions. The most important implication of such growing politicization of the ins-titution is opportunity of commissioners with expe-rience in leading large executive administrations to play an active role in shaping the course of the Union. President Juncker‘s strong personality and experien-ce as a Prime Minister of Luxembourg for unprece-dented 18 years also became a topic of criticism due to the perceived possibility that the “old-fashioned federalist” would further alienate EU citizens skepti-cal about transfers of power to the EU. It is clear that the new Commission has the potential to break away from the guardianship of the Council and re-create the air of Europe but how the strong political profi-le of the first “parliamentarised” Commission in the Post-Lisbon era will play out in EU policy-making re-mains to be seen.

Despite Juncker’s confidence that his team will not suffer any blows, attacks on individual commissio-ners were observed even long before their official hearings. One of the problematic nominees was the Commissioner for Education, Youth, Culture and Ci-tizenship. Controversial claims that the former For-eign minister for Hungary Tibor Navracsics was not the most suitable person to promote European values given his close links to one of the most prominent cri-tics of the Union - the head of the Hungarian gover-

EU 2014-2019: New faces, great

expectationsTeodora Delcheva

Photo by Ali Arif

10

nment Victor Orban - appeared to undermine popu-lar trust. As the European Parliament‘s Culture and Education committee rejected to endorse him due to his record in a government accused of erosion of ci-vil rights, Hungary‘s nominee was shifted out of the citizenship portfolio and given a new role within the Commission.

Another member that caused controversy was Spain’s commissioner for Climate Action and Energy Miguel Cañete. In addition to the concern of Green NGOs and MEPs about the idea of merging energy and climate portfolios, Cañete’s background as a former president of an oil company fuelled claims that for a role that is likely to be a target of a lot of corporate lobbying, Jun-cker’s choice of a commissioner shows a lack of ambi-tion for efficient European climate agenda. Referred to as “an oil baron with a family fortune in fossil fuel”, Cañete’s appointment was compared to “putting a fox in charge of the chicken coup” and sparked a Stop Cañete online petition that attracted nearly 600,000 signatures in less than a week. Such a clear case of conflict of interests undoubtedly polluted Junker’s vi-sion of making Europe a clean energy superpower.

Beyond individuals, the structure of the new Commis-sion made analysts wonder whether it will manage to achieve its promises in the context of ongoing crisis in the euro zone. Knowing that the first few months will be crucial for public perceptions, a rapid attack on sluggish growth and unemployment was launched

by announcing a 300 billion euro investment plan to create jobs and regain confidence of European citi-zens. However, while Juncker’s new team definitely indicates a shift in style, in substance the problem of the body’s decisions remains essentially the same - economic regeneration is given a priority over social inclusion and well-being.

On the other hand, further changes quickly came un-derway. To tackle the claim of lack of legitimacy, in what looks like a revolution in the way the Commissi-on communicates with the public, Juncker introduced plans to post all contacts of Commissioners, cabinet employees and director-generals with lobbyists on the institution’s register. Also, significant moves to-wards improving the Commission’s efficiency were made with the creation of the post of First Vice-Pre-sident with the task to evaluate the work of the Com-mission and report on how to approach better regula-tion. The second change was to enhance the role of the Vice Presidents in order to break down segmentation within the Commission and move away from static structures. But while such decisive initial attempts seem impressive, they are definitely not enough to prove that Juncker’s ambition for a team “open to ch-ange and ready to adapt” is entirely genuine.

There is no doubt that a lot of possibilities lie in the next five years. Expectations are for change at a time when Europe needs it the most. Will this change ensue as predicted? Only time can show.

Photo by Ali Arif

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Bringing together academics, politicians, lawyers, and civil society activists, this year‘s Sakharov Debate hosted with the European Parliament Office in the UK discussed the challenges of religious diversity in our liberal democracies.

Martine Croxall, BBC news journalist, set the backg-round with a chronological history of religious law going back to Cyrus the Great’s general policy of religi-ous tolerance in 550BC, she highlighted that religious freedom had developed on the principle that it must not infringe on public order in ways detrimental to societies, while progress made so far, notably with the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights, had enabled the extension to specifically non-religi-ous beliefs such as humanism. Still, she concluded, as less preferred religions still suffer from persecutions, can we find a way to reduce tensions between indivi-

dual minority rights and common values?

The panel first tried to understand where religious disputes were centred. Responding to misperceptions that frictions between religious rights emerged with increasing Muslim migration flows, Can Yenginsu pointed that most cases from the UK brought up in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) related to the infringement of rights of Christians, in work and education but also in commercial law and death rights. Dr Myriam Hunter-Henin also hinted that chal-lenges to social consensus had been brought about as much by non-religious as religious people, since Ar-ticle 9 of the European Convention covered the Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Cases of non-believers protesting against prayers at coun-cil meetings in Devon (see: Mr Clive Bone vs. Bideford Town Council) or an atheist mum questioning the pre-sence of crucifixes in Italian classrooms (See: Lautsi vs Italy) are case in point that freedom from religion has become as important as freedom of religion.

Sakharov Debate - Religious & Human Rights

Mélody Barreau

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In face of this widening of disputes, what legal fra-mework are we equipped with for the resolution of religious rights? The 2000 Human Rights Act which included Article 9 of the EU Convention, dramatically and positively empowered individuals to make claims in ways a previously negative right did not. Yet the in-crease in litigation with the coming into force of the Human Rights Act was not equalled with an increase in protection of religious freedom. UK courts have fai-led to be responsive to claims notably because they had to have regard for, but not respect, the EU juri-sprudence taken in particular contexts. Indeed, even if proclaimed legitimate by the ECtHR, the French ban on face coverings would be inappropriate in the UK because the constitutional background is different from that of the UK. Although the UK court had adop-ted a disappointing restrictive approach to Article 9 so far, a recent decision by the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR (See: Eweida and others vs. UK) was likely to signal a more liberal approach. Internationally, little more than pressure and diplomacy was available to deal with religious rights: Ed McMillan-Scott critici-sed that the persecutions of religious groups in pow-erful states like China remained ignored on the world stage because of their sway in international politics.

In light of this, how do we strike the balance between common and individual values? Discussing some recent court decisions (see: Ladele case), the panel attempted to outline what best practice looks like, by taking into account questions of legitimate claim and proportion. The limit to accommodating individual requests in a way which undermines social cohesion, is the right of others: an individual’s claim for a right to segregated sitting at university would not be justi-fied, because it would disproportionately impinge on the right of others by imposing segregated sitting across the university. On the legal side of the panel, the case on face covering in France presented a case in point of failed balance.

Seizing upon the question of Laïcité, Martine Croxall asked if it be preferable to follow the French model of Laïcité and abolish the Church Establishment? From a legal point of view, the panel agreed that Laïcité, the separation of the state and the church, fitted well , but was not the necessary condition for a human rights framework. France had in fact extended the 1901 principle too far, and turned secularism into more than a principle of neutrality. Even within a church es-tablishment, the principle of neutrality could be res-pected by giving regard to a right to and from religion in public grants and contract for service provision. Per se, having a majority religious group did not present a violation of Human Rights. Ed McMillan-Scott, ho-wever, criticised the recent visit of Pope Francis in the European Parliament and generally warned against allowing religious representatives to influence po-litics. He encouraged to ‘follow France’ in matters of state/church separation and not let religion dictate politics. Catriona Robertson argued differently: she highlighted that the presence of religious represen-tative enriched the conversation, so we should invite more of them to participate rather than look to purge the political sphere of values.

The debate thus highlighted that a strong legal frame-work is in place to ensure the protection of and from religion. Yet, politically speaking, much remains to be discussed at the national level, and at the European and international level in order to see individuals’ aspirations be respected. Nationally, while practices from the Christian heritage have long been ingrained in our society, religious claims tend to be highly me-diated, risking the stigmatisation of the Muslim po-pulation in particular. Internationally, the tendency has been to enforce human rights protection in weak countries while ignoring the biggest violator such as China because of their international position.

Photos by Silvia Butti& Carlotta Kreuzburg 13

European politicians frequently embed political ap-peals in somewhat decrepit notions of a‘European community of shared values’. But is it even possible to determine those distinctively European values? And if so, why does no one seem to bother to free them from the widespread assumption of their self-evident nature? A historical analysis: ‘Community of shared values’ is one of the most well-tended catchphrases in the rhetorical repertoire of Angela Merkel. In her endeavours to defend an ever more fragile EU against sceptical forces both from within and without her political home base, the Ger-man chancellor does not seem to tire from exploiting a whole set of knockout arguments fed by the appa-rently self-evident historical, philosophical and politi-cal wellsprings of EU legitimacy.As with most catchphrases, the notion of a ‘commu-nity of values’ serves the purpose of comforting and unifying diverse critical audiences. What is holding a half-baked federation of 28 highly diverse nation states together if not the comforting assumption that they still stand united in their respective concepts of right and wrong? What happens if one makes the ef-fort of de-constructing the notion of common Euro-pean values? Could something like a set of concrete common values even be identified in a historically fragmented entity like Europe? In the concluding lec-ture of his academic career (Winkler, Heinrich Au-gust; “Was heißt westliche Wertegemeinschaft?” in Internationale Politik, 01.04.2007), the eminent Ger-man historian Heinrich August Winkler attempted to do so, and formulated a number of conclusions that we should take very seriously: Firstly, Winkler constitutes that there is no such thing as European, but only Western values. When we ad-dress the European community of values as such, we are referring not to a group of nations united by a common history of values, but a group of states who stand united in their willing commitment to the over-arching values of the West.Large swaths of Europe, not to forget Germany her-

self, had hardly any or even no share in the histo-

rical development of what we today understand to be Western values. The concept of the ‘Western world’, as has been preserved from cold war times, has nothing to do with the historical Occident as such. The old west is constituted by that part of Europe which iden-tified with the Roman catholic church in the middle ages. The anglo-saxon democracies of North America, Australia and New Zealand, and even Israel identify themselves as part of a larger community under the umbrella of Western values, and participated signifi-cantly in shaping what is known as ‘the West’ today. Whereas NATO member states Turkey and Greece had never before the cold war era been seen as part of the historical west, the three Baltic states, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary had - and continue to incorporate Western values into their res-pective political identities until the present day.

The French Baron de Montesquieu, one of the great classics of Western political thought, declared the necessity of separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers, The one country in which his writing sparked a most explosive political effect had not even come into existence during his lifetime. The United States of America were the first country in the world to practically implement an institutionalised separa-tion of powers. In Thomas Jefferson’s world-famous Declaration of Independence, a key paragraph explo-res those ‘self evident truths’ which had grown out of many centuries of historical experience. Jefferson, who had enjoyed a classical humanist education in the light of the ascending European enlightenment, had recorded the world’s first modern revolution. There-fore it is inevitable to see the development of Western

Permanently incomplete

Lukas B. Wahden

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values partly as a product of transatlantic intellectu-al cooperation. Secondly, Winkler out-lines how it took several centuries to implement Western values in even their countries of origin. It took four decades for the United States to fully ac-cept the term ‘democracy’ in connection to consci-ously elected represen-tative governments and almost nine decades for American slavery to final-ly be abolished after a long and bloody civil war. In Europe, the horrors of the Jacobinian, Napoleonic and Bourbon regimes led

much of the old world to resort to antirevolutionary tendencies and to reject the values promoted by the French revolution. Only slowly did the monarchies of countries such as Denmark, Sweden, Prussia or Aust-ria yield to a systematical expansion of civil rights and civic political participation. Mostly, the implementati-on of democratic political structures in the West was not revolutionary but reformist. And in Southern Eu-rope, the way to westernisation was much harder, and much longer indeed.

But in no other country of the historical occident did Western ideas of democratisation, liberalisation and enlightenment face as relentless a resistance as in Germany. Much unlike France, Germany had experi-enced a period of ‘enlightened absolutism’ in the se-cond half of the 18th century. The German public had accepted the assumption that Germany did not requi-re the import of ‘foreign values’ to flourish, and that the country would be best off in a system of authorita-rian leadership of a popular sovereign in cooperation with an enlightened bureaucratic apparatus. The ubi-quitous dogma of ‘Ordnung, Zucht und Innerlichkeit’ (order, discipline and inwardness) as was cultivated by imperial German intellectuals stood in crass con-trast to the Western ideals of ‘liberté, egalité, frater-nité’. After the military defeat of 1918, the myth of a German mission, of a German ‘Sonderweg’ that was to offer a superior alternative to Western democracy and eastern Bolshevism, prevailed. When in 1918 the Weimar Republic was declared, it rested on more than shaky grounds.Unlike other countries, where the introduction of parliamentary democracy had happe-ned on a historical momentum of national unity and

self-empowerment, in Germany it fell into the com-plex response to a devastating military defeat. The be-neficiary of this historical peculiarity was Adolf Hitler.

The defeat of Nazi Germany laid ground to one of the grand historical projects of our time, the reunification of the West. The admission of eight east central Eu-ropean states into the European Union was a logical consequence of Willy Brandt’s declaration to ‘let grow together what belongs together’. Like Germany, the three Baltic states, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slova-kia and Hungary have always been part of the histo-rical occident, but were not able to fully embrace the political culture of the West until their recent admis-sion into the European Union.Contrary to many people’s beliefs, the introduction of Western values into all of Western political reality is neither a completed process, nor are even Western core countries like the United States, France or Britain immune from taking backward steps away from fulfil-ling their own ideals. It is time to once more extend a hand over the Atlantic ocean and rediscover the rele-vance of transatlantic unity - even if the price to pay is the long quest of encouraging America to recall the values that lie at her own heart, and rebel when re-bellion is due, as for instance against the highly un-democratic negotiations surrounding the controver-sial Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). What one can ultimately deduce from Winkler’s ana-lysis is that the European Union is not, like federalists maintain, pre-determined to grow together because its member states are rooted in a common set of valu-es. On the contrary, the very challenge of European unification is a struggle for the thorough implementa-tion of these values! Pluralistic democracy, the sepa-ration of powers, parliamentary order, the rule of law, the implementation of human and civic rights and a culture of argument are goals worth fighting for.If Angela Merkel and her aides continue to use the notion of common European values as a political we-apon, they are marginalising and hindering the neces-sary process of re-discovering what European values actually are and what they ought to be. We should not yield this field to politicians, academics and those who try to categorise and instrumentalise European values for political purposes, but strive towards pub-lic empowerment and a new Western and European democratic idealism. The ‘community of values’ is a political corpse, but it is one that is waiting to be bre-athed new life into. Values are no means to an end, they are an end in themselves. This, in my opinion, is all there is to be understood about the question of the European community of values.

15

Henry Kissinger, former US Foreign Secretary, as-ked “Who should I call if I want to call Europe?” Well, the European Union (EU) has started write this num-ber down. The 2009 Lisbon Treaty saw the begin-nings of a new European institution under the fancy title of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EEAS has been conceptualised to serve as “more than a foreign ministry – combining elements of a de-velopment and of a defence ministry,” in the words of Catherine Ashton (the first High Representative to head the institution). Five years after the creation of the EEAS it now stands at a crucial moment, with a change in leadership and an established institutional capacity. In my humble opinion, the defining challen-ge for the EEAS is to find its raison d’etre within the EU. The EEAS’ ‘Comprehensive Approach’ alongside its ambition to bring the EU’s collective weight united as player on the global stage.

On institutional relevance

‘Another gazillion offices and bureaucrats’ I hear you grumble? Actually, the very objective of the EEAS is to coordinate and streamline the EU and the Member States’ multiple external portfolios and actions.

Europe’s phone number Dimitri Cautain

The EEAS has taken on the role of a diplomatic corps, essentially giving European foreign policy a political and collective character. The grand political lines on European foreign policy are decided on a consensus decision-making process at the Foreign Affairs Coun-cil where all 28 EU Foreign Ministers are present. Si-milarly, political decisions at the level of delegations (the EEAS’ equivalent of embassies) are similarly con-sensus-based. Thus, decisions on political lines or on what responsibilities the EU will pursue, ultimately remain in the hands of Member States.

However, the EEAS has also a responsibility to coor-dinate actions taken by the European Commision. Is-sues such as environmental policy, energy policy, tra-de agreements, etc. all have an external dimension to them. Significantly, since his appointment Jean-Clau-de Juncker as President of the European Commission (November 2014) took the decision to allow Moghe-rini to preside the group of European Commissioners with portfolios affecting Europe’s foreign policy. Thus, Mogherini’s challenge to bring coherence to her role as both European Commission Vice President and High Representative (i.e. head of the EEAS) is tending towards a resolution.

Photo By Sophie Aversa

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Whose foreign policy?

Yet, with more coherence and efficiency the EEAS ta-kes on, a tension will grow between this new insti-tution and Member States’ own diplomatic services. Firstly, there is a dynamic happening whereby smal-ler Member States’ are streamlining their diplomatic services and cutting down on their diplomatic pre-sence worldwide. Thus, these Member States’ are relying more on EU delegations for information on developments and issues in countries where they no longer have representation; to smaller Member Sta-tes, EU delegations are becoming an important tool for information and for implementation.

Yet, secondly, the EU is home to former imperial pow-ers which struggle to shed their domineering tenden-cies (i.e. since the turn of the century, UK and France have been involved in almost as many interventionist wars and occupations as the USA, which is not a tro-phy to be proud of). The emergence of a fully-fledged European foreign policy making decisions on issues will inevitably lead to an erosion of the authority and autonomy of national foreign policies. For now these tensions are mediated by the consensus-based decisi-on making process which is a the heart of EEAS deci-sion-making (and also the EEAS own lack of historical significance in the eyes of its interlocutors). However, with more Member States investing greater import-ance into the EEAS, a difference of expectations from Member States themselves may accentuate the tensi-on between a European foreign policy and disunited Member States’ national interests.

What’s missing?

Most significantly, policies pertaining to the EU’s neighbourhood have been areas of great success, but others have been outsourced so to speak. Such a po-licy would be the EU’s border policy. Despite the EEAS’ responsibility to coordinate external action, it has no authority or scrutiny over the EU’s independent bor-der agency, Frontex. Yet, Frontex has been involved in setting-up agreements with third-party states on Europe’s borders to facilitate its border management duties. The autonomy of Frontex is detrimental to the very values a unified European foreign policy seeks to promote and work by. Furthermore, the EEAS risks losing credibility if its raison d’etre can be eroded by Member States or the European Commission refusing to hand over issues that fall in the remit of the EEAS’ responsibilities.

The very existence of a European foreign policy is an opportunity for Europe to work towards rectifying centuries of reprehensible external action by some European states. Following centuries of subordinati-on, today’s international system remains structurally skewed in favour of former (?) colonial and imperi-al powers. Take a look at the United Nations Security Council and its current composition for example. A European foreign policy can start to challenge such structural inequalities as it disturbs the relevance of having individual European states represented in these institutional arenas. Such institutional changes are not likely to bring substantive changes in the sub-ordinating dynamic of the international system. But, the values-based approach of a European foreign po-licy that gains more clout internationally as well as internally, may serve as a vehicle for action on the awareness of Europe’s histories and actualities of do-mination (i.e. through reparations, debt cancellations, coordinating/amplifying educational exchanges, re-forming subordinating structures in international in-stitutions). Such sensitivities and objectives are unli-kely to be acted upon and achieved by self-righteous national diplomatic corps.

The Mogherini-era begins

In conclusion, the EEAS is heading for some turbulent waters ahead as it starts to challenge the relevance of certain national foreign services, whilst simulta-neously becoming a crucial tool for many other Mem-ber States. With an established institutional frame-work, the Mogherini-era is set to start carving out a space for the EEAS both within the EU, but also on the international stage. Yet, it remains to be seen whether, next time Henry Kissinger tries to call Europe he gets straight through to Mogherini or first to an operator with various numerical options depending on the is-sue Kissinger wants to discuss.

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Will Brits ever be proud Europeans?Arthur Davis

The average Brit does not identify as European. ‘European’ is not even an option on most surveys of (supra)national identity, including the UK census. Because of this, the exact stats on European identi-ty are hard to find, but as a Brit from Dover, there is no hiding from the general sentiment. This is Cool Britannia; we don’t need Europe. ‘European’ is the identity of the poncy, cosmopolitan elite with not just the income to travel to Europe, but also the cultur-al capital to appreciate it . And while some, such as broadcaster, Jon Snow claim that ‘Britishness’ is ob-solete, filmmaker, Terry Jones claims: “I suppose an essential aspect of being British is not liking others very much. We are set apart by our lack of French-ness, German-ness or Italian-ness”. Unsurprisingly, a 2002 study found an inhabitant of Bratislava around twice as likely to consider themselves European as an inhabitant of Edinburgh . Why are we in Britain so

scared of Europe and will we ever take on Eu-ropean identity?

I

Importantly, Britain will not Europeanise politically until its people have Europeanised socially. Top-down assertion of European identity on Brits, Italians or Swedes will not lead to the success of the European project. And if British society is ever to become Eu-ropean there are pre-conditions, namely “cognitive mobilization” towards Europe – increased exposure to foreign countries and greater linguistic proficien-cy. Bratislava, multilingual and encircled by its neigh-bours, has no trouble here.

Yet, sceptics have good reason to doubt the capacity of Brits to Europeanise.We sometimes forget that a British identity hasn’t always existed, and smaller re-gional identities which ‘British’ subsumed – such as Scottish or English – aren’t much older and for some still more relevant. A key question then: Why on earth would a Welshman who doesn’t even identify with London (Britain) identify with Brussels (Europe) in-stead?

Photo By Maria Gendelman

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Photo By Maria Gendelman

Indeed, rather than converging and unifying, identi-ties across Britain and Europe are being challenged and fracturing. UKIP, Front National, Jobbik, AfD, among others, all pose institutional threats to the very existence of the EU, free movement of people and the European identity. And here in Britain, our Kingdom is far from United. In September, 45% of Scots, including a majority of young voters, voted to secede from the union. British, as well as European identity is crumbling. Individuals are dissenting from their prescribed identities.

Sceptics also ask: what do we really have in common with a Greek or a Slovak? There are great divides across Europe, which extend far beyond differing social customs.These critiques rest on the idea that there is no intrinsic social glue holding the embodi-ment of Europe (the EU) together, but rather that it rests on an opportunistic and artificial unity aimed at promoting trade and preventing conflict. It is also a union by the rich, for the rich – the elite prosper as free movement creates cut-throat competition be-tween labour and between nation-states. Of course we don’t identify, many say, with this instrument of capitalist exploitation.

But, according to Europhiles, we have already begun to Europeanise. Simply take your 2014 British man, with his gender ambiguity and his stylised stubble; he knows his way around Amsterdam and an overpriced chai latte. Compare him with the 1945 model. Is this not evidence in itself? And though this doesn’t repre-sent every Brit, Europeanising is no longer the pre-serve of the elite. Nearly every Brit now holidays in Europe, has European friends or co-workers, daringly buys tapenade from the foreign foods section of Tes-co – even though no-one quite knows what it is – and revels in the unpronounceable name of their latest IKEA purchase, with the cute diagonal line through the ‘o’.

And just as national identity evolves from subnation-al identities, they argue, so will supranational identity follow national ones. While after many years various regional tribes became ‘English’, so will the modern Brit tend towards European identity. In fact, some say that a Brit and a European are ostensibly the same thing. British values, they say, are quite the same as European values; the British state is, deep down, very similar to other European liberal democracies, rest-ing on similar shared norms – the importance of the public sector, support for international institutions, non-use of the death penalty etc.

But maybe this talk of whether we’re British, Europe-an or something else entirely misses the point. May a Brit not also be a highlander, a Scot, a European, an African, a Christian, a Muslim, an atheist, work-ing class or middle class? Surely these identities are not mutually exclusive. Identity is highly individual. We know that the British identity is challenged, like almost every European national identity, by smaller groups within its borders (like independence move-ments) and by groups which transcend its borders (like ISIS), but we do not dispute its continued exist-ence amongst these new and myriad identities.

The road to the average Brit identifying with Europe leads not through top-down imposition of an identity by Brussels, whose continued nudges have failed in the face of UKIP. It leads instead through “cognitive mobilization” towards Europe, as identity develops organically. Europe must be opened up to all and, as we become closer and more interconnected, we, like the people of Bratislava, may learn to appreciate what it is to be European. What must be made crystal clear, however, is that for European identity to develop, we must not attack identities subordinate to it – Kentish, English, British – but rather strengthen them, recog-nising our rich tapestry of identity. The standout fea-ture of the European is their multitude of identities. We are, after all, united in diversity.

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Warsaw—25 Years since the fall of Communism

Josephine Mizen

Walking around Warsaw, it is not hard to see the scars that the Twentieth Century has left behind. From the Palace of Culture and Science given as a ‘gift’ to the Poles by Stalin that still dominates the skyline, to the Old Town that actually only dates back around fifty years after being rebuilt because of near total de-struction in 1944, the signs are everywhere. But what, to me, is most impressive about the city is the amount of change it has gone through in the last twenty-five years.

One of many Eastern European cities controlled by Communist regimes for forty years, Warsaw has the added issue of having been extensively bombed and emptied of its entire population after the failure of the 1944 Uprising. What was left was an opportunity to rebuild the city almost from scratch, and Stalin, with the assistance of the Polish government, knew exact-ly what he wanted: wide roads, imposing structures, and a hark back to Seventeenth Century Polish archi-tecture when Poland was allegedly at its most ‘Polish’.

Warsaw was to become a model for cities across the Eastern Bloc.

However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, more and more town planners looked to the west for inspiration. What in 1989 was a roofless stadium built out of soil has now become the site of Poland’s sleek and shiny National Stadium, hosting major sporting and music events since opening in 2010. Whilst the Palace of Culture still takes precedent on the skyline, it is no longer so isolated, and its distinctive spire is being ever so slowly shrouded by glassy skyscrapers cropping up on all sides. Warsaw’s distinctive yellow trams, which have been running since 1866, now oper-ate alongside a modern underground line, with the sec-ond line due to open over the 2014 Christmas period.

The changes that have taken place in Warsaw don’t merely begin and end with architecture. Far more im-portant, in fact, is the change in culture; from a city always looking east, subordinate under the watchful eye of Moscow, to a city that proudly stands as the capital of Poland, leading the way in bringing the country rapidly up to speed with the western Europe it once lagged behind as it stagnated under the rule of Communism. English has long since overtaken Rus-sian as the favoured foreign language, and this once

Photo By Lenart Gau

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Photo By Hendrik Obelöer

isolated city, cut off from the western world, is now becoming part of a global network. Since joining the European Union in 2004, a number of Polish univer-sities have joined the Erasmus Exchange programme. The University of Warsaw, consistently ranked among the top universities in the country, has begun teaching some courses in English as more and more interna-tional students flock to the Polish capital. Evidence of westernisation, sometimes almost amusingly forced, is everywhere. Large indoor shopping centres—an-other invention spreading east from the USA—now advertise their products on sprawling billboards not in Polish, but in English, which may leave the predom-inantly non-English-speaking elderly citizens of the capital somewhat confused. Sometimes the westerni-sation is almost excessive—every time I visit Warsaw another Starbucks or Caffe Nero seems to have popped up. But whether you love these mega brands or hate them, they’re nevertheless proof of the changes that Warsaw has gone through. Those who still sound sur-prised that McDonalds and Coca Cola really do exist in Eastern Europe are sadly behind the times—you can scarcely walk down a street without seeing one.

Of course Poland still has a way to go before it can completely shake off the burden of the Twentieth Century. With less than two per cent of the entire pop-ulation being made up of immigrants, it is arguably lagging behind a number of the other ex-Communist states. If multiculturalism implies modernity, then the Czech Republic, with its 404,000 immigrants, is arguably modernising much faster. Much of Poland is still overwhelmingly rural, and emigration out of the country is causing a severe shortage of skilled workers. But the rapid changes taking place in War-saw—from transport to culture to the number of souvenir shops cropping up all over the Old Town—prove that change is not merely possible; it is certain. The speed of the modernisation of this capital city, and of capital cities right across the former Eastern Bloc, which were isolated from the rest of the world for so long, shows positive signs of things to come.

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Illusion and feasibility in Spanish politics: Podemos?

David Sanchez Garcia

Photo By Silvia Butti

Spain, with an unemployment rate of 24% and a youth unemployment rate of 53%, is also leader in the ran-kings of social inequality in the OECD and early school dropouts in Europe. Moreover, the population has suffered since the beginning of the crisis from huge social cuts in education, in health and service, and in R&D, while at the same time corruption has become a scourge affecting officials from virtually any party.The lack of measures to solve these problems has re-sulted in a general sentiment of impunity and politi-cal disaffectedness throughout Spain. This has been the breeding ground for a one-year-old political par-ty, which now has reached the potential to compete with the two main long-established parties in Spain. This party is called Podemos (translated as “We can”). But who are they? How have they managed to gain support? And, more importantly, what role will they play in the future of Spain and Europe?

Since the restoration of democracy in Spain – follo-wing dictator Francisco Franco’s death in 1975 – the Spanish political landscape has been dominated by two parties: the right-wing People’s Party (PP) and the centre-left Spanish Socialist Workers‘ Party (PSOE), which used to get a combined share of about

80% of the turnout. Podemos’ origin is usual-ly related with the so-called 15-M Movement

or the Indignants Movement which originated in the midst of the economic crisis aiming to promote a more participative democracy. This movement was defined by its ways of action and the citizens’ politi-cisation; however it lacked a specific party platform and avoided any political affiliation. In January 2014 then, Podemos was born. However it also fed from other organizations, such as the Anti-Capitalist Left.

Podemos describes themselves as a “method for the popular and citizens’ power”, a “popular initiative” which goes beyond the party itself, with the goal of “transforming the silent and wretched majority into a force of change”. Podemos avoids identifying itself as left-wing, but the press generally categorizes it as left-wing or even far-left, frequently emphasising its anti-establishment view. They defend those down below and are united against those who Podemos calls “caste”, the privileged ones.

Podemos has been able to effectively combine idea-lism and pragmatism, something essential to achieve real social change. The clearest example of this prag-matism is that, instead of trying to promote plurality also in the leadership of Podemos, it is strongly domi-nated by Pablo Iglesias, a 36-year-old political scien-tist and university teacher with an excellent academic 22

background. His media presence, his pedagogic style, his use of new political language mixed with his easy to comprehend argument style , often faulted as po-pulist, have been the basis of Podemos’ success.

As a result, the Spanish political situation has chan-ged. The threat posed by Podemos to the two-party system is inciting the traditional parties -PP, PSOE and IU- to redefine their respective platforms and start a process of image renewal, including the use of social networks and a higher presence of younger officials. Moreover, we can observe the population’s newly dis-covered politicisation: there is renewed public inte-rest in politics, which is noticeable when looking at the audience in many TV programmes that Podemos members have attended. The hope of a change is the main instrument of the We-Can party.

Nevertheless, many sceptics consider this new movement will lead nowhere. One of the many reasons for this view is the vagueness of the project-- yet perhaps the Spanish population wants a change irrespective of its nature. Re-garding the Podemos programme, its viability has also been highly criticized, especially due to the huge investments required to fund some of its economic measures, such as the re-structurating of the European debtand the establis-hment of a maximum wage and basic income schemes for people without re-sources. Another of the most recurring criticisms against Podemos is its ideolo-gical link with Hugo Chávez’s regime in Venezuela.But Podemos is not so unique. Current-ly, all throughout Europe we can see a large increase of non-traditional par-ties which have also completely altered their national political landscapes; the most well-known are the Front Natio-nal (France), The Five Star Movement (Italy), UKIP (UK) and Syriza (Greece). Some common features of these parties are their innovative speech and often a Manichean simplistic perceptions of reality: there is a clearly defined enemy to defeat, whether it is immigration, the EU or the “caste”, and this is something many can relate to.

What does the future hold? In Spain there are Municipal Elections in May 2015 and then, in November, General

Elections are expected to occur. Recent opinion polls confirm that Podemos is already a consolidated party, so it will certainly play a major role in the elections. Furthermore, debates about hypothetical agreements between parties are the order of the day, although un-certainty about what might happen reigns over the society. Is the current political engagement promoted by Podemos something to last in the long-term? Is Po-demos a feasible option to govern Spain? Only time will tell.

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How close is Russia to the EU?John Mair

Nikita Khrushchev once memorably remarked that Russia “is both European and Asiatic – the largest part of our territory lies on the Asian continent.” Rather than emphasising the vast concentration of the coun-try’s population on European soil, he chose to high-light the dominance of its non-European side. On the other hand, Peter the Great, Russian Tsar at the turn of the 17th century, taxed facial hair, as he believed the clean-shaven look to be more European. Where, in terms of Europe and the EU, does the colossal state of Russia thus stand today, on what many consider to be the eve of a second Cold War?

Some extent of Russian Europeanism can be recog-nized in its trade. Despite economic sanctions be-tween the EU and Russia over the Ukrainian crisis, the EU is still Russia’s largest trading partner. Fur-thermore, there have been attempts at improving the cooperation between Russia and the EU since the end of the Cold War and this can possibly be considered a sign of the country’s growing desire for continen-tal integration. In 1994, for example, The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was signed by both par-ties and the idea of cultural unity was included, mean-

ing the two would work towards a connection in the national sense; as one European people.

The establishment of the “Four Common Spaces” re-inforced this nearly a decade later, which also empha-sized the importance of cultural exchange as well as the EU’s ideals of freedom, justice and security. The more recent EU-Russian partnership for cooperation (2010) is also an example. These efforts were respon-sible for bringing Russia closer to Europe.

Unfortunately this bridge was essentially burned by the Ukrainian crisis of the past year: the annexation of Crimea largely halted EU-Russian cooperation. The results included the deterioration of Russian trade re-lations that has undeniably created isolation from the West and harmed its European, and ultimately global, integration.

Although European integration may have been on the Kremlin’s mind in the shadow of the Cold War’s after-math, the idea of establishing a parallel force to “rival the EU”, as Jon Henley of the Guardian puts it, has al-ways lurked in its vicinity. Now with the recent sign-ing of the Ukraine EU Association Agreement, Russia is using what are allegedly “protective measures” to punish the Ukraine with exports and thus effectively criminalising this same Europeanisation.

Photo By Lenart Gau

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This union indeed parallels the EU and consolidates Russia’s distance from it and its closer association with states, such as Belarus, of a strong dictatorial nature. This associational distance from democracy, combined with the questionable democratic creden-tials of Russia itself, is against EU principles, whose membership is conditional to a sufficient degree of democracy. The EEU also increases Russian influ-ence in Asia, and naturally as the East becomes clos-er, Brussels is left behind. The Eastern union can be seen as a form of Soviet resurrection, and as Ukranian Kremlinologist Lilia Shevtsova argues, the EEU sim-ply consists of “authoritarian leaders using each oth-er to preserve their power”.

It is important to note that the Four Common Spaces were also only set up after Russia rejected the Euro-pean Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), for fear of being considered a “junior partner”. Isn’t being made a so-called “junior partner” what being a part of a great-er entity, such as Europe, is all about? Indeed Rus-sia seems disinterested in this, and sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf in fact claims that a “superpower [like Russia] has no place in their [medium sized European countries] midst”.

As a result of the year’s turmoil, Russian public opin-ion has also become increasingly anti-European: a June poll demonstrated the highest level of anti-EU sentiment since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Photo By Lenart Gau

What was formerly a generally positive view towards Europe has become a decisively negative one. Does this mean that, to Berlusconi’s dismay, EU member-ship, or the epitome of Russian Europeanism, is not in sight? Vladimir Chizhov, Russia’s permanent EU representative, states that the country has no plans of joining the union.

The Europhobic nature of the country, when combined with its increased isolation in light of the Ukrainian crisis, has therefore not led the attempts at improved Russo-European relations to be capitalized. Putin seems to retain the now-ingrained Russian desire to create its own body separate from Europe, a senti-ment represented by the government’s anti-Western rhetoric. For example, a statement from the Kremlin was just released, in reference to the West’s actions over the Ukrainian crisis, that warned Russia’s part-ners (including the EU) “not to mess with us”. Fur-thermore, Putin’s rhetorical “rattling [of] his nuclear sword”, as US navy admiral James Stavridis put it, fur-ther exacerbates the ice spreading from Russo-Amer-ican relations to those between Russia and the EU. His speech to the Kremlin in March demonstrated the country’s disregard for international treaties and the EU’s voice as he confirmed Russia’s revanchist status vis-à-vis Eastern Europe.

Hence, despite its formal partnerships and economic ties to the European Union, in practice Russia is only drifting further away from this body, see-mingly in the hope of asserting one of its own.

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The UCLU European Society recently featured chief EU negotiator for the Transatlantic Trade and Invest-ment Partnership in a presentation and panel discus-sion with Dr. Alessandro Spano to discuss not only the processing of free trade agreements between the EU and other nations, but also the current progress on the current proceedings with TTIP. What is TTIP? It’s a relatively ground breaking free trade agreement between the United States and the European Union. TTIP has been in the working for the past few years, but during 2014 we have seen negotiations acceler-ate as increasingly more detailed aspects of the treaty are debated and established. TTIP has been claimed from its inception as beneficial on both sides of the Atlantic, raising respective GDPs by anywhere be-tween one half and one percentage point, an increase that, especially for largely developed economies still shaking off the memories of a quite recent recession, is significant.

TTIP is vastly intricate, and the caveats of the treaty provide us with a great deal of interesting and fruit-ful debate concerning, for example, the relationship between multinational corporations and the govern-ments signed onto the treaty. However, this treaty also provides significant insights into how the political cli-mate between the US and EU will develop for at least the next decade. The presentation hosted by the Eu-ropean Society unveiled for many how strikingly dif-ferent the negotiation process with the US has been in comparison with previous encounters. The expansive and fundamentally unchangeable negotiations frame-work that the United States typically brings to the table in situations such as these was found decided-ly absent, according to the EU chief negotiator. Does this seemingly more flexible, less hard-line approach from the States portend the development of a more even-keeled, cooperative relationship between the US and EU?—I believe a great deal of people on both sides of the Atlantic would certainly hope so. Howev-er, with a House and Senate which has just adjourned in the throws of Republican control, negotiations may not be as warm-hearted, or as easy to count on as the former Democratic controlled Senate afforded. Before we digress into an analysis of what this 135th con-gress will look like, and what that could mean for US-

EU relations, we need to survey the mechanisms

Evolving US-EU Trade Relations: An In Depth Look at the TTIP Proceedings

Editorial by Shane McGoldrick

processing a treaty such as this on both sides of the Atlantic.

In the European Union, large scale trade negotiations such as TTIP are unsurprisingly difficult to negotiate quickly, the immense number of countries affected by the trade deal are testament to this. Thus, a repre-sentative committee is elected consisting of EU par-liament members, who naturally also represent the interests of their home country. This committee will pre-approve the eventually agreed upon framework for the trade deal. Much later, the individual legisla-tures in each EU member state will embark on the ex-tensive process of ratifying the deal. This same type of process roughly mirrors the ratification strategy of the United States when it comes to such large scale deals. In order for the Senate to overcome the diffi-culty of negotiating out fine-details of such an agree-ment, as its interests comprise those that of a variety of party platforms and individual states, the Senate will often grant “fast-track” negotiating capabilities to the Executive, namely Barack Obama. After the execu-tive approves the eventually agreed upon framework, it will be sent to the floor of Congress to be voted on. 26

What does this mean for US-EU relations? Well it ap-pears at this stage in the game decidedly positive if a republican controlled congress is more likely to pass TTIP, as resulting economic coordination could spell a more strongly cohesive relationship centred on shared economic gains. In addition, the White House has just announced plans for a new comprehensive privacy bill that would sure up the EU’s doubts about protecting consumer privacy. I think that the fact re-mains as per the usual, that US relations with the out-side world simply cannot afford to be understood in terms of a narrow focus on the Executive brach. In-deed, what many do not realise is how strongly party interests affect the layout of foreign relations. It can often all depend on what agenda advances the inter-ests of said party in the long run. This is unideal, but it is of course the reality of politics. If however, TTIP is deemed suitable for the republican agenda, perhaps we can expect the development of a relationship be-tween the US and EU that is decidedly less tempera-mental, and that shows a more definitive awareness of the other institutions’ needs, and an ability to joint-ly work towards achieving those ends.

Photo By Carlotta Kreuzberg

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In the previous Congress, it was actually Senate demo-crats who did not grant Obama this trade negotiation capability, this so-called “fast track” ability. What re-mains to be seen is whether republicans deem grant-ing this ability to the executive is in their best inter-ests as a party. Many note the undeniable GDP and job number benefits of such a trade deal. Thus, the ques-tion is also whether the newly powerful republican faction will allow Obama the immense credit of being able to tie down such a deal. According to an article in Foreign Policy, the congressional “flip” in party dom-inance could be a boon for such a trade deal in the end. There exists now a great many congressional re-publicans on committees that could affect the smooth passage of a treaty like TTIP, and much of the repub-lican party is decidedly pro free trade —despite the existence of that distinct minority infamously known as the Tea Party.