eufp-making towards the wb - lessons learned

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European Union Foreign Policy Making Towards the Western Balkans: Lessons

Learned?

by

Rudi Guraziu

Submitted to

Middlesex University

School of Health and Social Sciences

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts in International Relations

Supervisor: Dr Peter Hough

September 2008



Contents

Abstract 3

Figures and Tables 4Map of the European Union 5

Map of the Western Balkans 6

Acknowledgments 7Acronyms 8

1. Introduction 9

1.1. Introduction 91.2. Outline of the paper 10

1.3. Literature review 11

1.4. Limitations of the study and methodology 15

2. Theoretical Framework 17

2.1. Defining (Conceptualising) EU foreign policy 172.2. The EU’s decision-making process 22

2.3. Theoretical approaches to EU foreign policy 26

2.3.1. International Relations theories and the EU 26

2.3.2. Neo-functionalism 282.3.3. Intergovernmentalism 30

2.3.4. Rationalist approach to EU policy making 32

2.3.5. Constructivist approach to EU policy making 34

3. European Union’s Approach Towards Conflict Prevention in the Western

Balkans: Lessons Learned 40

3.1. The EU involvement in the Western Balkans prior to 1999 40

3.2. Lessons learned: the EU involvement after the Kosovo war 44

3.2.1. Stability Pact 453.2.2. Stabilisation and Association Process 49

3.2.2.1 Stabilisation and Association Agreements 50

3. In or Out: The Western Balkans Membership Prospective and the Attached

Principle of Conditionality 53

4.1. Inclusion/exclusion dilemma 54

4.2. Enlargement fatigue 564.3. EU Conditionality as a foreign policy tool vis-à-vis the Western Balkans 61

5. Findings and Conclusions 66

References 69

2



Abstract

The Kosovo war marked a turning point in European Union foreign policy. The need to

recover from its ‘poor image’ because of consecutive failures during the Yugoslav crisis

and the necessity for an improved and coherent Common Foreign and Security Policy

(CFSP) drove the EU to take a U-turn in foreign policy towards the Western Balkans.

Additionally, the realisation that the Kosovo conflict could pose a serious threat to the

Union’s peace and security forced the EU to change its position vis-à-vis the Western

Balkans. EU foreign policy in this paper encompasses the totality of EU external

relations. This broad perspective of EU foreign policy facilitates the identification and

subsequent analysis of all the relevant actors involved in its decision-making process.

Further, by examining the empirical evidence arising from several case studies and by

adopting an eclectic theoretical approach this paper shows that the rationalist theories1 in

concert with the constructivist one can offer a satisfactory starting point to comprehend

and explain EU foreign policy making towards the Western Balkans.

1 i.e. theories of IR (neo-realist/neo-liberalist synthesis) and European integration (intergovernmentalism)

3



Figures and Tables

Figures

1.1 A Summary of the differences between rationalism and constructivism 38

1.2 Further Enlargement of the EU to include other countries in future years 60

Tables

1.1 The EU continues to grow. Where will it end? 59

1.2 Support for enlargement - Tested countries 61

4



Source:

http://www.delalb.ec.europa.eu/en/about_the_eu/eu_symbols/map_of_the_european_unio

n

Map of the European Union 2008

5



Source: The Economist, ‘The Western Balkans’, 19 June 2008

Map of the Western Balkans

6



Acknowledgments

Firstly, I wish to thank my supervisor Dr Peter Hough, whose support, and academic

input over the course of this work and throughout the academic year has been invaluable.

Warm thanks also are extended to Dr Heather Deegan, for her kind support during the

academic year. I would also like to thank Gillian Lazar, for her great patience, support,

and kindness during the course of this study.

I am greatly indebted to Professor John Missenden, whose support and encouragement

was unwavering before and during this course. I would also like to thank Penelope

Bridgers for her kind support and encouragement. Above all, my deep gratitude goes to

my friend James Landon Roberts, without whose undying patience, kindness and

encouragement this thesis would have been impossible.

7



Acronyms

CARDS Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and StabilisationCEE Central and East Europe

CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy

DPA Dayton Peace AccordsEC European Community

EFP European Foreign policy

EP European ParliamentEU European Union

EUFP European Union Foreign Policy

EULEX European Union Rule of Law Mission

FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

IR International RelationsMS Member States

NATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganisationQMV Qualified Majority Voting

SAA Stabilisation and Association Agreements

SAP Stabilisation and Association ProcessSP Stability Pact

SEE Southeast Europe

TEU Treaty on European UnionUS United States

WB Western Balkans

ZERP Special Ecological Fisheries Zone

8



Chapter 1: Introduction

The European Union’s foreign policy is an ongoing puzzle.2

1.1 Introduction

One of the major challenges to EU foreign policy (EUFP) since the demise of the Cold

War has been a violent dismembering of the former Yugoslavia. The 1990s were

characterised by consecutive failures in EUFP. Arguably, the EU’s impotence in dealing

with the Yugoslav crisis sprang from the rooted realist paradigm in the minds of

policymakers. Consequently, the Yugoslav conflict exposed sharp divisions within the

EU over the crisis. During that time, the EU lacked cohesion, determination and the tools

to deal with the crisis.3 Since the Kosovo war, the EU has increased its capabilities for

taking clear decisions on some policy matters, in particular when dealing with conflict

prevention. Subsequently, the EU has developed a common policy towards the region,

which encompasses foreign, trade and development policies within the framework of the

Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA). With the introduction of the Stability

Pact (SP) and then Stability and Association Process (SAP) including the SAA with the

enlargement prospect and the strict conditionality attached to the accession process, the

EU gradually set its feet firmly on the ground. On the other hand, the inability of the EU

to take a common position regarding the recognition of Kosovo’s independence once

again revealed sharp divisions among EU Members.

2 Ben Tonra, and Thomas Christiansen, eds, Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy, Manchester University Press, 2004. p.1

3 See S. Lehne, ‘Has the “Hour of Europe” come at last: The EU’s Strategy for the Balkans’, in Judy Batt ed., The Western Balkans Moving On, Chaillot

Paper, No. 70, October 2004, pp. 111-124, p.111.

9



This paper examines the EUFP-making towards the so-called Western Balkans 4

(hereafter referred to as ‘WB’) both theoretically and empirically. The paper does not

seek to undermine the already copious literature on EUFP, but rather points to the

importance of applying a theoretical framework to the study of EUFP-making vis-à-vis

the WB, hence contributing to the theoretical debate.

The paper aims to address the following set of questions. What characterises the

EUFP decision-making processes? Who are the main actors in EUFP decision-making?

Which theory or set of theories is most appropriate in the comprehending and explaining

of EUFP-making towards the WB? Additionally, in order to better understand the EUFP-

making towards the WB it is necessary to address a series of empirical research

questions. Did the EU learn lessons from its failures during the 1990s? Why did the EU

change its foreign policy towards the WB after the Kosovo war? What drove the EU to

such a change? In other words, what might be the ‘raison d'être’ behind such a change?

1.2 Outline of the paper

Although the WB region is considered as a whole, relatively more emphasis is placed on

Kosovo and Serbia, which have been directly affected by the violent dissolution of the

former Yugoslavia. The remainder of this chapter will review the current literature and

sets out the limitations and the methodology of this research. Chapter 2 explores the

theoretical argument and the concept of EUFP in detail. It begins by analysing the

concept and the decision-making process of EUFP. The chapter then sets out the main

4 The countries that define the so-called Western Balkans in alphabetical order are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic

of Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia. As of 21 September 2008, 22 EU Member States have recognised Kosovo.

10



tenets of the argument by exploring current debates on European integration and

International Relations (IR) theories. Chapter 3 analyses the EU’s role regarding conflict

prevention before and after the Kosovo war as well as the reasons that forced the

European Union (EU) to review its foreign policy towards the WB. The chapter argues

that EUFP prior to the Kosovo war suffered from several weaknesses that led to its

impotence in dealing with the Yugoslav crisis. Chapter 4 explores the ambiguity of the

WB membership prospective and the principle of conditionality attached to it. Chapter 5

brings together the research findings and conclusions.

1.3 Literature review5

First and foremost it is important to note that most of the literature frequently refers to

EUFP as ‘European foreign policy’ (EFP) without any explanation. When analysing

EUFP the users of EFP term wrongly connote a range of countries outside the EU (i.e. the

WB) of whose foreign policies they know little. Brian White, however, unlike other

theorists (such as Ginsberg, Wallace, Wagner, Hill, Smith M, Bicchi, Carlsnaes)6, has

tried to clarify why he uses the term ‘European’ rather than ‘EU’ foreign policy. White

(who at least makes an effort to distinguish between these two different concepts)

assumes that as ‘the end of the Cold War has now resulted in the inclusion of states

5 Most of the literature covering the theoretical aspects of EUFP is reviewed in the following chapter.

6 See for example, William Wallace, “‘European” Foreign Policy: A Realistic Aspiration, or an Unattainable Goal?’ in Nicola Casarini and Costanza

Musu eds., European Foreign Policy in an Evolving International System: The Road Towards Convergence, (Basingstoke ; New York : Palgrave

Macmillan, 2007). ; Federica Bicchi, ‘European Foreign Policy Making Towards the Mediterranean’, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. ; Wolfgang

Wagner, ‘Why the EU’s common foreign and security policy will remain intergovernmental: a rationalist institutional choice analysis of European crisis

management policy’, Journal of European Public Policy 10:4 August 2003.; Michael E. Smith, ‘The Legalisation of EU Foreign Policy’, Journal of

Common Market Studies, vol. 39, no. 1, March 2001. ; Walter Carlsnaes, ‘Where is the Analysis of European Foreign Policy Going? Uppsala University

2004. http://www.fornet.info/documents/FORNET%20Presentation%20Carlsnaes.pdf [accessed 06 February 2008]; Christopher Hill ed., The Actors in

Europe’s Foreign Policy, (London and New York, Routledge, 1996).; Roy Ginsberg, ‘Conceptualizing the EU as an International Actor: Narrowing the

Theoretical Capability-Expectations Gap’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 37, no. 3, 1999.

11

http://www.fornet.info/documents/FORNET%20Presentation%20Carlsnaes.pdf





formerly Eastern Europe [ sic] in the integration process …a Europe-wide foreign policy

is now a … possibility… whether or not all these states join the EU’.7

Unfortunately, he chooses to stick with the concept of ‘European’ instead of ‘EU’

foreign policy, regardless of, whether other European countries join the EU, using the

justification that the term ‘should not be ruled out by unnecessarily restrictive language’. 8

This proves unsatisfactory, particularly so, when analysing the foreign policy making of

the EU towards other European countries/regions, in this case the WB. 9 In fact, this

seems like an excuse not to provide a better and more specific explanation. That said it is

important to point out that White explicitly makes two points relative to this issue. First

he emphasises that ‘the notion of European foreign policy is a controversial idea…’10 and

second, he suggests that the term ‘EUFP’ can be useful, but only so far as to cover the

second EU pillar Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP), and in this context, to

differentiate from the other two EU pillars.11 Again, this suggestion is unsatisfactory

because (as will be argued later) the ‘EUFP’ covers more than simply CFSP. When

analysing EUFP the distinction between these two concepts is also important because of

the possibility that many academics, politicians, and the ‘attentive public’ with an interest

in ‘foreign affairs’ would agree that foreign policy (simply put) covers the actions of the

7 Brian White, ‘Foreign Policy Analysis and European Foreign Policy’, in Ben Tonra, and Thomas Christiansen, eds, Rethinking European Union Foreign

Policy, Manchester University Press, 2004. pp. 51-52

8 Ibid.

9 Interestingly though, in contrast to most scholars Günter Verheugen, (the Vice-President of the European Commission) during his speeches concisely

distinguishes between the concept of ‘Europe’ and ‘the European Union’. During his speech in Bratislava in 2004 he stated, ‘first of all, “Europe” and

“the European Union” are not the same, even though the Union now has an almost continental scale’. Günter Verheugen, Member of the European

Commission, ‘Towards a Wider Europe: the new agenda’ The European Neighbourhood Policy Prime Ministerial Conference of the Vilnius and Visegrad

Democracies: Bratislava, 19 March 2004 Available at:http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?

reference=SPEECH/04/141&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en [accessed 07 June 2008].

10 Brian White, ‘Foreign Policy Analysis and European Foreign Policy’, in Ben Tonra, and Thomas Christiansen, eds, Rethinking European Union

Foreign Policy, Manchester University Press, 2004. pp. 51-52.

11 Brian White, ‘Foreign Policy Analysis and European Foreign Policy’, FORNET Working Group 1: Theories and Approaches to the CFSP London

School of Economics, 7/8 November 2003, p.5

12



state (and in this case the EU) taken beyond its borders12 to promote its goals. Thus to

make this distinction clear, this paper will refer to this issue as EUFP.

An increasing amount of literature on EUFP studies has been published since the

end of the Cold War. The EU as a ‘normative’13 power in international relations as well

as both ‘enlargement’14 and ‘democratic deficit’15 have also been a subject of study.

However, very few researchers have tried to explore the theoretical approaches to the

study of EUFP in relation to the WB. Most of the current literature focuses on empirical

research rather than on theoretical analysis of EUFP towards the WB. Furthermore,

researchers have focused on following and explaining developments rather than on the

complexity of EUFP-making towards the WB. The development and implementation of

the SP and the SAA in particular, have been an area of considerable scholarly activity,

but again the literature focuses on the implementation of the EU projects (i.e. in terms of

12 The concept of borders is highly ambiguous, and it has many meanings i.e. boundary, borderland, limes, rim and so on. However, in this paper the EU

borders are defined as the EU’s ‘fixed line of demarcation’ although the EU’s political and geographical borders are not entirely clear. Consider Cyprus for

example, while the Northern Cyprus is not in control of the EU, Cyprus as a member of the EU claims the Northern Cyprus to be an integral part of its

territory. Nevertheless as far as the WB is concerned it is clear that the entire region is bordered with the EU Member States. In fact, since the citizens of

this region (save Croatia) for nearly two decades have been isolated due to restrictions of ‘freedom of movement’ the understanding of the EU borders is

clear. For an analysis on EU Borders see, Nico Pupescu, ‘EU’s Borders and Neighbours’, European Council on Foreign Relations, Oct 2007, Available at:

http://www.ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_eus_borders_and_neighbours/ [accessed 10 Sep. 2008]

13 See for example, Nathalie Tocci, The European Union as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor’, Centre for European Policy Studies, CEPS Working

Document No. 281/January 2008.

14 Helene Sjursen, ‘Enlargement and the Common Foreign and Security Policy: Transforming the EU’s External Policy?’ ARENA Working Papers,

University of Oslo, WP 1998/18 Available at: http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp98_18.htm [Last accessed 20 August 2008].

15 The problem of democratic deficit is a challenging issue to the EU since there are real displeasures in connection with some electorates of the Union

when it comes to future enlargement and hence further integration, but because the topic merits a research in its own and due to length constraints it is

impossible to cover this issue in this paper. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the issue of democratic deficit mainly plays into the hands of populist

political rhetoric and the EU sceptics in general, who argue that without curing the problem of ‘democratic deficit’ European integration cannot progress.

For an analysis regarding ‘Democratic deficit of the EU foreign policy’ see, Koenig-Archibugi who argues that ‘in the EU, the prospect of democratisation

seems particularly problematic because the main actors threatened by it are precisely those in charge of determining the pace and shape of the Union’s

institutional change, that is, the governments of the member states’. Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, ‘The Democratic Deficit of EU Foreign and Security

Policy’ The International Spectator 4/2002. pp. 61-74. p.61; see also Barbé, Esther, ‘The Evolution of CFSP Institutions Where does Democratic

Accountability Stand?’, The International Spectator, vol. 39, no. 2, April- June 2004.

13



project completion, disbursement, performance), and policy recommendations16 rather

than focusing on why and how the EUFP towards the WB is made. An exception is the

work of Claire Piana who argues that the WB ‘is the only area in the world where there is

a true European [Union] foreign policy’.17 Piana, by using the Former Yugoslav Republic

of Macedonia ((FYROM) hereafter referred to as ‘Macedonia’) crisis of 2001 as a case

study, tries to analyse the decision-making process within CFSP. However, the problem

with this analysis, (as this paper will argue) is that any attempt to explain EUFP-making

towards the WB through a specific case study or in terms of the CFSP alone would be

unsatisfactory.

When it comes to the study of EUFP Christopher Hill and William Wallace in The

Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy suggest that it is fairly easy to explain the mechanisms

through which the foreign policies of nation-states operate but not as easy when

challenging European Political Cooperation (now CFSP), since the latter represents a

different order in the international system.18

16 See for example , Judy Batt ed., The Western Balkans Moving On, Chaillot Paper, No. 70, October 2004; Gjergj Murra, ‘Food for Thought the Stability

Pact for South East Europe – Dawn of an Era of Regional Co-operation’, pp. 38-43 Available at:

http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/murra1.pdf [accessed 29 May 2008]; Armando García Schmidt, ‘Kosovo: What Next? Corner-stones for

a New EU Policy’, Spotlight Europe, 007/09, December 2007; In addition, writers such as Bechev and Scholtz for instance mainly focus on the principle

of EU Conditionality and the promotion of regional cooperation among the WB countries. See for example, Othon Anastasakis and Dimitar Bechev, ‘EU

Conditionality in South-East Europe: Bringing Commitment to the Process’, European Balkan Observer Vol. 1, No. 2 November 2003; Dimitar Bechev,

Carrots, sticks and norms: the EU and regional cooperation in Southeast Europe’, Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol. 8, No. 1, April 2006;

Frank Schimmelfennig and Hanno Scholtz, ‘EU Democracy Promotion in the European Neighbourhood: Political Conditionality, Economic Development,

and Transnational Exchange’, National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) Working Paper No. 9, August 2007. p.3. Available at:

http://www.nccr-democracy.uzh.ch/nccr/publications/workingpaper/pdf/WP9.pdf [accessed 03 June 2008]; See also, Mustafa Türkes and Göksu Gökgöz,

‘The European Union’s Strategy towards the Western Balkans: Exclusion or Integration?, East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 20, No. 4, pages 659–

690.

17 Claire Piana, ‘The EU’s Decision-Making Process in the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Case of the Former Yugoslav Republic of

Macedonia’, European Foreign Affairs Review 7. 2002, pp. 209– 226., p.216.

18 Christopher Hill and William Wallace, ‘Introduction: Actors and Actions’, in C, Hill ed., The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy. Edited by. London and

New York: Routledge, 1996.

14



Further, Ben Tonra and Thomas Christiansen’s edited book, Rethinking the

European Union Foreign Policy, provides a variety of constructivist approaches to the

study of EUFP. Like Bicchi,19 Tonra and Christiansen broaden the conceptualisation of

EUFP encompassing more than the intergovernmentalists understanding (i.e. CFSP). For

them the EUFP involves ‘the totality of the EU’s external relations, combining political,

economic, humanitarian, and, more recently, military instruments at the disposal of the

Union’.20 However, Carlsnaes has noted that although the literature on EUFP brings new

challenges the research is marked also by a ‘widening variety of conclusions’. This

according to Carlsnaes is not a healthy sign in the literature on EUFP.

21

1.4 Limitations of the study and methodology

Because of the complexity of EUFP, it is fair to point out that this paper does not seek to

provide an in-depth analysis of every aspect of EUFP and its behaviour towards all WB

countries. Instead, it will focus on Kosovo and Serbia while alluding to other countries as

examples throughout. The author anticipates that this research could be seen as a point of

reference for a future in-depth study within this under-researched theme.

The aim of this paper is not to test one theory against the other but rather, with the

help of the IR (neo-realist/neo-liberalist synthesis) and European integration (neo-

19 Federica Bicchi, ‘European Foreign Policy Making Towards the Mediterranean’, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

20 In particular, the book addresses three challenges that arise from the development of foreign policy in the EU over the past decade: ‘first, it suggests

ways of reconceptualising the external relation of the European Union as foreign policy and therefore to apply concepts to the study of this area that draw

on the insights of approaches from the wider field of FPA. Second, it discusses the positioning of the study of EUFP in relation to the discipline of

international relations, in recognition of the transformation that the European construction has undergone in the recent past. And third, it links

developments in the debate about integration theory, in particular the constructivist challenge to the established rationalist and intergovernmentalist

approaches, to the study of EUFP’. Ben Tonra, and Thomas Christiansen, eds, Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy, Manchester University Press,

2004. p.2.

21 Carlsnaes argues ‘What to some ears is lovely polyphonic music may to others -- not as easily enamoured of “new challenges” and a “widening variety

of conclusions” -- simply sound like a cacophony of dissonant voices’. Walter Carlsnaes, ‘Where is the Analysis of European Foreign Policy Going?’

Uppsala University 2004 http://www.fornet.info/documents/FORNET%20Presentation%20Carlsnaes.pdf [accessed 06 February 2008]

15



functionalist/intergovernmentalist/Constructivist) theories, it will try to analyse the EU’s

attitude towards the WB. Although the constructivist approach is illuminating when it

analyses and explains the role of the Commission, Special representative(s) and other

personalities and bodies negotiating on the EU’s behalf with the WB, it cannot, for

instance, explain divisions within the EU towards Kosovo’s independence where its

Member States (hereafter referred to as ‘MS’) were unable to reach a consensus in

relation to Kosovo’s independence. Thus, a rationalist approach could be more helpful in

explaining the EU’s behaviour towards this issue. On the other hand, the fact that the

EU’s ‘high representative’ was able to negotiate and then strike a deal during the

Macedonian crisis in 2001 on behalf of the EU undermines the rationalist approach to

EUFP-making (analysed in the following chapter). In circumstances such as these, the

choice of an eclectic approach is more appropriate. Thus, the argument presented in this

paper is that the rationalist theories22, in concert with the constructivist one, can offer a

satisfactory starting point for the understanding of this ongoing puzzle (EUFP) and may

subsequently help to explain the making of EUFP towards the WB.

Both primary and secondary sources have been used where possible and various

documents from EU institutions have been analysed. To compensate for the lack of first

hand interviews and/or questionnaires the author has given special attention to a broad

selection of journals, working papers, magazines, and newspapers.


16



Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

Theories do not simply explain or predict, they tell us what possibility exists for

human action and intervention …23

This chapter aims to explore the ambiguity of EUFP. It begins by investigating the

concept of EUFP in great detail. Here, EUFP is understood as the foreign policy of the

EU as a whole, and therefore the European integration process is envisaged as part of the

EUFP. The second section explores the complexity of decision-making process within the

EU. The third part of this chapter analyses the main theoretical approaches to the study of

EUFP.

2.1 Defining (Conceptualising) EU foreign policy-making

Before embarking on whether a EUFP exists or not it is important to define concisely the

terms of ‘EU’ and ‘foreign policy’. The EU in this paper is defined as ‘a unique economic

and political partnership between 27 democratic European countries’.24 Foreign policy for

Joseph Frankel, ‘… consists of decisions and actions which involve to some appreciable

extent relations between one state and others’.25 Similarly, for William Wallace ‘foreign

policy is that area of politics which bridges the all-important boundary between the

nation-state and its international environment’.26

23 Steve Smith, ‘International Theory: Positivism and Beyond’, in Steve Smith Ken Booth, Marysia Zalewski, eds., (Cambridge University Press, 1996).

p. 13.

24 http://europa.eu/abc/panorama/index_en.htm

25 Frankel quoted in Brian White, ‘Analysing Foreign Policy: Problems and Approaches,’ in Michael Clarke and Brian White, eds., Understanding

Foreign Policy; The Foreign Policy Systems Approach (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 1989), p. 6.

26 Wallace quoted in ibid p. 5.

17



The EU’s foreign policy according to Christopher Hill ‘exists alongside’ foreign

policies of the MS and ‘acts as a centripetal force’.27 This centripetal force causes

convergence within the MS and is embodied by factors such as shared experiences,

aspirations and political/economic institutions. In addition, the Union’s common

interests, identity, values, and knowledge28 lead towards common objectives (i.e.

increasing integration), in effect, common foreign policy. Hill notes that ‘even in national

capitals we can observe a conscious aspiration to achieve a common foreign policy…’ 29

According to Brian White, there are at least three views on the existence of the

EUFP. One view is that EUFP ‘already exists but the term may not be used’.

30

The author

of this paper and those who argue that EUFP is an integral part of the process of

European integration and that the various EU treaties have a ‘strong foreign, security and

defence dimension to it’ share this view.31 The second view is that EUFP ‘does not exist

but it should’.32 Proponents of this view believe that the EU’s sequent failures to stop the

recurring crisis in the Balkans during the 1990s clearly indicate that a common if not a

single EUFP is necessary to deal effectively with such issues.33 The third view is that

EUFP ‘does not exist, it never will, and, moreover, it never should’.34 This view is

27 Christopher Hill, ‘Renationalising or Regrouping: EU Foreign Policy since 11 September 2001?’ , JCMS 2004 Vol. 42, No. 1, p.145.

28 The European Parliament’s President Hans-Gert Pöttering at the opening of the Joint Parliamentary Meeting on the Western Balkans said, ‘knowledge

comes through contacts, contacts build trust, and trust is indispensable for common action’. EU and Western Balkans parliamentarians exchange

integration experiences External relations, 27 May 2008. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu//news/expert/infopress_page/030-29860-147-05-22-

903-20080526IPR29845-26-05-2008-2008-false/default_en.htm [Last accessed 20 August 2008]

29 Christopher Hill, ‘Renationalising or Regrouping: EU Foreign Policy since 11 September 2001?’ , JCMS 2004 Vol. 42, No. 1, p.145.


Foreign Policy, Manchester University Press, 2004. p. 52

31 See for example Hazel Smith, European Union Foreign Policy: What it is and What it Does, (London: Pluto Press, 2002); Karen E. Smith, European

Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World. (Cambridge: Polity Press. 2003).


Foreign Policy, Manchester University Press, 2004. p. 52.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

18



advocated by those who believe that the capacity to control foreign and security policy is

a fundamental, ‘defining characteristic of the nation-state’.35 This latter view is related to

a ‘state-centric’ realist perspective.36 Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that now most

politicians and academics explicitly or implicitly recognise the existence of the EUFP.

Hazel Smith for instance not only does not question the existence of EUFP, but in

fact defines it as that similar to the nation-state. She asks a rhetorical question, ‘Does the

EU have a foreign policy?’ and her answer is plain: ‘the EU does indeed have a foreign

policy, and it is much the same as that of the nation-state’.37 It can be characterised thus

due to ‘its developed philosophy based on liberal capitalist democracy, and its panoply of

domestic competencies and policies on issues ranging from the common market to co-

operation in policing and judicial matters’.38 Likewise, this interpretation of EUFP does

not cause Karen Smith any confusion at all; in fact, she is quite comfortable with the idea

that the EU has a foreign policy similar to any other state actor. She defines the EUFP as

‘the activity of developing and managing relationships between the state (or, in our case,

the EU) and other international actors, which promotes the domestic values and interests

of the state or actor in question’.39

Yet, if foreign policy, as defined above by Wallace and Frankel, is seen as a tool

exclusive to the state, and subsequently understood as a political community tool through

which a state (normally but not always) asserts itself in the international scene, how then

should the EU as a ‘unique’ economic and political actor project itself outside its

borders? Does the EU, as a political system where a policy-making cycle can be

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 Hazel Smith, European Union Foreign Policy: What it is and What it Does, (London: Pluto Press, 2002). p. 7-8

38 Ibid

39 Karen E. Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World. (Cambridge: Polity Press. 2003) p.2

19



identified, have the capability to develop and formulate foreign policy objectives and the

instruments to implement them?40 The EU and its MS according to Walter Carlsnaes

‘have clearly engaged in many such undertakings over the years, and in this regard their

behaviour is no different from that of a single state pursuing foreign policy actions’.41

That said, the EU still ‘operates, often uneasily, between these two ideal types’. 42 On the

one hand, the EU is ‘not’ a state and consequently lacks many of the characteristics that

statehood provides as a foundation for national foreign policies.43 On the other it has

more power to ‘operate collectively’ in the international system than any international

organisation, as well as a wider degree of autonomy for its collective services - the

European Commission (hereafter referred to as ‘the Commission’), the Council

Secretariat, and its ‘High’ and ‘Special’ Representatives.44

The above contradictions point to the complicated concept of EUFP. The problems

of EUFP conceptualisation are further complicated because of the unorthodox setting of

foreign policy within the EU framework. The disagreements among different scholars as

to whether EUFP should be understood under the Community - external relations (first

pillar), or CFSP (second pillar) or in the Justice and Home Affairs (third pillar) are

obvious.45 For some analysts EUFP is synonymous with EU’s CFSP. That is, the EUFP

should be distinguished from the ‘external relations’ of the European Community (which

40 Cristina Churruca, ‘The European Union’s Common Foreign Policy: Strength, Weakness and Prospects’, Research/Policy Workshop on New

Dimensions of Security and Conflict Resolution (Coorganised by DG RDT and DG RELEX, 14 February 2003, p.2.

ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/improving/docs/g_ser_conflict-security_churruca.pdf [20 June 2008]

41 Walter Carlsnaes, ‘Where is the Analysis of European Foreign Policy Going? Uppsala University 2004. p.14.

42 William Wallace, “‘European” Foreign Policy: A Realistic Aspiration, or an Unattainable Goal?’ in Nicola Casarini and Costanza Musu eds. European

Foreign Policy in an Evolving International System: The Road Towards Convergence, (Basingstoke , New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). p. 3.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 Christopher Hill, ‘The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Conventions, Constitutions and Consequentiality’, European

Foreign Policy Unit (EFPU), London School of Economics and Political Science, November 2002

20



cover principally trade, aid and development relations with third parties). Hence, the

EUFP should be limited in the framework of the CFSP.46 For others the former definition

is too restrictive. For this group of analysts EUFP should incorporate all three pillars

together with activities that come under the purview of the EU as well as MS of the union

– namely the foreign policies of the MS themselves.47 In this context, EUFP is understood

as a ‘foreign policy system where these three strands can be differentiated for analytical

purpose’.48 According to Hill EUFP is ‘the ensemble of the international activities of the

EU, including output from all three of the EU’s pillars, and not just that relating to the

CFSP’.

49

Moreover, Hill and Wallace have argued that ‘Community, Union and national

foreign policies are increasingly intertwined at both policy-making and policy

implementation levels’.50

This paper adopts a broader definition of EUFP. Hence, EUFP in here is understood

as the foreign policy of the EU as a whole: ‘all declarations, decisions, and actions that

are made by the use of all instruments the EU has at its disposal, that are decided at the

EU level, and conducted in its name toward a country or an area outside its borders’ 51, in

this case the WB. This understanding does also include external economic relations,

development and humanitarian aid policies, migration issues, and all other relevant

matters developed as a result of the EU third pillar. The issues of analysis of the national

foreign policies of the MS are not treated separately so long as they are conducted in the

46 Cristina Churruca, ‘The European Union’s Common Foreign Policy: Strength, Weakness and Prospects’,

47 Brian White, ‘Foreign Policy Analysis and European Foreign Policy’, FORNET Working Group 1: Theories and Approaches to the CFSP London

School of Economics, 7/8 November 2003; Walter Carlsnaes, ‘Where is the Analysis of European Foreign Policy Going?,

48 Cristina Churruca, ‘The European Union’s Common Foreign Policy: Strength, Weakness and Prospects’, p.1.

49 Christopher Hill, ‘Renationalising or Regrouping: EU Foreign Policy since 11 September 2001?’ , JCMS 2004 Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 143-163, p. 145.


Foreign Policy, Manchester University Press, 2004. p. 59

51 Federica Bicchi, ‘European Foreign Policy Making Towards the Mediterranean’, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. p. 2.

21



name of the EU. The paper opts for this understanding because EUFP-making covers

more than simply CFSP and it involves more actors than that which

intergovernmentalists/rationalists (as argued below) would expect. Indeed when studying

EUFP decision-making process the MS’ officials should not be regarded as acting on

behalf of their States when they pursue EU policies vis-à-vis the WB.

Having explored the existence and the conceptualisation of EUFP this paper now

analyses the EUFP decision-making process

2.2 EU foreign policy decision-making process

How are foreign policy decisions made in the EU? Unlike the decision-making of nation

states the EUFP decision-making is quite complex. It involves various European

institutions, in particular the Commission, the European Parliament (EP), and the Council

of the EU.52 Yet although the Commission, responsible for different aspects of external

relations, enlargement, association and development policies, is ‘fully associated’ with

the CFSP the ultimate power in this policy field rests with the MS. 53 Further, the Council

of the EU lays down the principles and general guidelines for the CFSP and adopts

common strategies through intergovernmental decision-making procedures made by

unanimity.54

It is clear that the EU is ‘still a treaty-based polity’ and its MS hold ultimate

authority to sanction all decisions, particularly in foreign and security policy. 55 It is also

clear that the capacity to block the decision-making, instead of participating in it,

52 European Union, ‘Decision-making in the European Union’, Available at: http://europa.eu/institutions/decision-making/index_en.htm

53 European Commission, ‘External Relations’, Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/intro/index.htm

54 Ibid.

55 Michael E. Smith, ‘Toward a theory of EU foreign policymaking: multi-level governance, domestic politics, and national adaptation to Europe’s

common foreign and security policy’, Journal of European Public Policy 11:4 August 2004: p. 741.

22

http://europa.eu/institutions/decision-making/index_en.htm






represents the main ‘national’ power still enjoyed by EU MS in the CFSP 56 since the so-

called ‘Luxemburg Compromise’57. In this context, it is arguable that the MS are more

likely to be the main agents in policy-making towards the WB. However, they are not the

only factors affecting the outcome of negotiations.

This variety of bodies/actors involved in EUFP-making – the President of the

Commission, the various Commissioners, the Council of Ministers, the President of

Council, and in particular the inclusion of the ‘High Representative for CFSP’ and his

‘special representatives’– often adds to the ambiguity of who is in charge of EUFP. 58 In

fact, ‘a defence dimension, [and] a High Representative – have complicated, as much as

they have streamlined, the EU’s capacity to act’.59 Nevertheless, even with the inclusion

of the ‘High Representative’ and ‘defence dimension’ within CFSP, the MS continue to

be the main actors within this field mainly because CFSP follows an intergovernmental

approach.60

However, it would be wrong to assume that the only actors who formulate and

decide the outcome of EUFP-making vis-à-vis the WB are the Union’s MS (i.e.

individuals that act in the name of these states). This by no means suggests that the MS

are irrelevant: in reality quite the opposite applies. The MS are the most important factors

in EUFP because power politics, national interests, all matter, as will be shown latter in

56 Michael E. Smith, ‘Toward a theory of EU foreign policymaking:’ p. 744.

57 The veto power was introduced as a result of serious disagreements between the then French president Charles de Gaulle and the then European

Commission’s president Walter Hallstain over the funding of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The CAP came into operation in January 1962 which

triggered the so called ‘empty chair crises’ following the withdrawal of French officials from Brussels. The crisis was in the end resolved by the

‘Luxemburg Compromise’ appeasing France and giving ‘each member state a veto over any decisions if it was of vital national interest’ See Alistair Jones,

Britain and European Union, (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2007), pp. 10-27.

58 http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/intro/index.htm

59 Christopher Hill, ‘The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union’, p.5

60 Claudia Major, ‘Europeanisation and Foreign and Security Policy – Undermining or Rescuing the Nation State?, POLITICS: 2005, Vol. 25(3), 175–190

Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd. p. 183.

23

http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/intro/index.htm






the paper and as rationalists would expect. But clearly, they are not the only ones. For

instance, the Commission together with the High Representative for CFSP and other

‘special representatives’ in the WB region, play an important role. In fact, the

Commission and the EU ‘special representatives’ have been and still are the strongest EU

presence in the WB. As Nicholas Whyte puts it, ‘rather than pompous and ineffective

statements from the Council of Ministers, Europe [the EU] is now sending in [its High

Representative for CFSP] Javier Solana, a figure with almost the authority of an

American Secretary of State’.61 This assumption is correct as far as the WB is concerned,

however, it appears not to be the case in other parts of the world (the Georgian crisis

being a recent example)

That said, the EUFP decision-making has been criticised as too cumbersome with a

‘strong pull towards soggy consensuses’.62 On the other hand, although this criticism may

well be valid one has to keep in mind that CFSP has not long been in practice, and

although the old members of the union have gained substantial experience in co-operation

during the decision-making process, the new MS are still learners in CFSP.

In an attempt to ease the decision-making, the EU has introduced Qualified

Majority Voting (QMV) with the dual safeguards of ‘constructive abstention’ (i.e. an

abstention which does not block the adoption of the decision) 63 and the ‘possibility of

referring a decision to the European Council if a member state resorts to a veto’. 64 These

61 Nicholas Whyte quoted in Claire Piana, ‘The EU’s Decision-Making Process in the Common Foreign and Security Policy’, p. 212.

62 David Hannay ‘EU Foreign Policy: A Necessity, not an Optional Extra’ October/November 2002 - CER Bulletin, Issue 26. Available at:

http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/26_hannay.html [accessed 30 May 2008].

63 If the MS ‘qualify their abstention by a formal declaration, they are not obliged to apply the decision; but they must accept, in a spirit of solidarity, that

the decision commits the Union as a whole and must agree to abstain from any action that might conflict with the Union’s action under that decision’. ‘The

Amsterdam Treaty: an effective and coherent external policy’. Available at: http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/a19000.htm

64 Ibid.

24



amendments are seen as a response to the ‘recurring crises’ in the WB65 and if practiced

they could offer flexibility within the existing framework. The problem, however, is that

the Treaty is very ambiguous. On the one hand, it states that, the QMV can be used as an

option in foreign policy decision-making and on the other any member state can block the

taking of the vote. Moreover, to add to the confusion the Amsterdam Treaty confirms the

principle of unanimous decision-making. Yet according to Article 23 (2) the Council is

supposed to act by qualified majority ‘when adopting joint actions, common positions or

taking any other decision on the basis of a common strategy’.66

Unfortunately, the use of these strategies has been ‘disappointing’

67

because the MS

‘for important and stated reasons of national policy’ can ‘oppose the adoption of a

decision to be taken by QMV’.68 However, since this paper focuses on the EUFP

decision-making towards the WB it is important to point out that the recent EU decisions

to send its mission to Kosovo (the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX))69 and

sign the SAA with Serbia70 have been taken precisely because of the previously

mentioned flexibility. The EU on both occasions was able to agree under the ‘joint

action’ and the ‘constructive abstention’ principles giving MS such as Cyprus the

possibility of not agreeing to send a mission to Kosovo71 and the Netherlands of not

65 Wolfgang Wagner, ‘Why the EU’s common foreign and security policy will remain intergovernmental: a rationalist institutional choice analysis of

European crisis management policy’, Journal of European Public Policy 10:4 August 2003: 576–595, p. 588.

66 Treaty of Amsterdam Article 23 (2). http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11997D/htm/11997D.html#0001010001

67 Per Stig Møller, ‘European Foreign Policy in the Making’, The Brown Journal of World Affairs, 9:2, Winter/Spring 2003.

68 Treaty of Amsterdam Article 23 (2). http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11997D/htm/11997D.html#0001010001

69 EULEX Kosovo, ‘Council Joint Action’ 2008/124/CFSP, of 4 February 2008, on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, Official Journal

of the European Union. Available at: http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/home/docs/JointActionEULEX_EN.pdf [last accessed 9 September 2008]

70 See, Toby Vogel, ‘The EU needs to show backbone in the Balkans’, Europeanvoice (online) 05.06.2008, Available at:

http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/the-eu-needs-to-show-backbone-in-the-balkans/61041.aspx

71 Pim De Kuijer, ‘[Comment] the 28th Member State’, 18 February 2008, EUobserver (online).[ emphasis on the original]. Available at:

http://euobserver.com/9/25680 [accessed 08 September 2008].

25



concurring to the signing of the SAA72 respectively without obstructing it. Do the Cypriot

and the Dutch abstentions suggest that the EU has finally learned how to agree to

disagree, or do they add more confusion to the interpretation of the Treaty?

It is arguable that this vagueness leaves the treaty open to interpretation, but what is

clear, is the fact that, MS can block any decision that questions their national interests.

Moreover, since the Irish ‘no’ to the Lisbon treaty has further diluted the EU’s aspirations

for a more consolidated foreign policy, there is little prospect of QMV for substantive

foreign policy decisions in the near future. Thus, in a nutshell, ‘the practice of voting in

the Council very much depends on the balance of these principles and therefore on the

willingness of MS to refrain from blocking consensus’.73

2.3 Theoretical approaches to EU foreign policy-making

2.3.1 International Relations theories and the EU

There is an ongoing dispute among scholars as to which theories best explain the EUFP

and its role in the international system. For neo-realists, states will always be the main

actors in international system and as a result, anarchy, not hierarchy, will remain the

dominant ordering principle of the international system.74 Moreover, according to them

the EU’s international role is nothing more than the ‘sum of member-state diplomacies’.75

On the other hand, Hill has pointed out that the realist assumption that EU’s ‘international

72 Spaic, T. ‘Holland Moderates its Stance: Road to EU open to Serbia’, Blic 16 April 2008, (online). Available at: http://www.blic.co.yu/news.php?

id=1972 [accessed 19 September 2008].

73 Wolfgang Wagner, ‘Why the EU’s common foreign and security policy will remain intergovernmental’ pp. 588-89.

74 Adrian Hyde-Price, ‘A ‘tragic actor’? A realist perspective on ‘ethical power Europe’ International Affairs 84: 1 (2008); Ben Tonra, ‘The European

Union’s Global Role’, FORNET Working Group 1: Theories and Approaches to the CFSP London School of Economics, 7/8 November 2003.

75 Christopher Hill, ‘The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union’, p. 3.

26



presence amounts to little more than the sum of the national interests of the EU’s two or

three major states’ is a crass mistake.76

Neo-realists view the EU from the perspective of inter-state co-operation, and since

states will aim to maximize their absolute gains, the co-operation between them will be

limited.77 These same neo-realists, however, ‘do not deny or bemoan the fact that liberal

ideas (such as just war, “effective multilateralism”, human rights and democracy

promotion) can and do shape policy; what they question is the claim that such ideas

continue to determine policy when they conflict with vital national or common

interests’.

78

According to them issues such as human rights and democracy promotion

will concern EUFP decision-makers only when EU’s security and economic interests are

not at stake.79

Neo-realists have also put the emphasis on the problems of distribution. They argue

that states may fail to co-operate because they may fail to agree on the distribution of

common gains resulting from co-operation.80 Hence, it may be rational for states to forgo

absolute gains because ‘perhaps a partner will achieve disproportionate gains and, thus

strengthened, might some day be a more dangerous enemy than if they had never worked

together’.81 Furthermore, states may still fail to co-operate because of the risk of being

exploited since the international system lacks a central authority that would monitor and

sanction defection, co-operative behaviour may be exploited by other states.82

76 Christopher Hill, ed., ‘The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy’. London and New York: Routledge, 1996. p.ix.

77 Ben Tonra, ‘The European Union’s Global Role’ p.5.

78 Adrian Hyde-Price, ‘A ‘tragic actor’? A realist perspective on ‘ethical power Europe’ International Affairs 84: 1 (2008), p.39

79 Ibid

80 Wolfgang Wagner, ‘Why the EU’s common foreign and security policy will remain intergovernmental’,.

81 Grieco in Ibid.

82 Wolfgang Wagner, ‘Why the EU’s common foreign and security policy will remain intergovernmental’,.

27



The dispute between neo-realist and neo-liberals about absolute gains and relative

gains arguably arises out of their efforts to explain the EU from the inter-state

perspective.83 In contrast to neo-realists who argue that states will seek to maximise their

absolute gains, neo-liberals argue that ‘a web of interstate cooperation might indeed

develop based upon an acceptance of relative gains’.84 Nevertheless, according to Tonra,

‘such a neo-liberal [interest-based] model would [ultimately] look at CFSP through the

lens of absolute-gains’.85 That said, when it comes to the EU’s role in the international

system, neo-liberals share the same view as neo-realists. They both agree that states are

the main international actors and that anarchy is the defining character of the international

system and the principal force that defines and shapes state behaviour.86 They also, share

much more analytical territory than they dispute.87

Yet, the IR theorists have struggled to accommodate European integration within

their ‘orthodox theorising inter-state system’.88 Consequently, they have found it difficult

to explain the increasing co-operation among EU MS. Such an attempt to explain the

European integration as will be shown below, comes, from the European integration

theorists, namely neo-functionalists and intergovernmentalists.

2.3.2 Neo-functionalism

One of the first attempts at theorising European integration was the theory of neo-

functionalism. The neo-functionalist assumption is that co-operation in one field would

83 Ben Tonra, ‘The European Union’s Global Role’,

84 Ibid. p.5.

85 Ben Tonra, ‘Constructing the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Utility of a Cognitive Approach’, The Journal of Common Market Studies

Vol. 41. No. 4, p. 734.[emphasis original].

86 Ben Tonra, ‘The European Union’s Global Role’ .

87 Ibid.,

88 Ibid., p.4

28



create pressures for cooperation in another field, hence leading to further integration. 89

The concept of spillover, which refers to a situation where co-operation in one field

necessitates co-operation in another, is a core aspect of neo-functionalism. 90 However,

this does not mean the spillover process is uncontrollable, as national governments would

only allow spillover to occur if it was perceived as necessary to the realisation of their

interests.91 According to Haas, ‘interest groups and political parties would be the key

actors in driving integration’.92

Neo-functionalists emphasise the process through which power is gradually

transferred to a ‘new centre’ as integration in some areas makes it more necessary in

others and transnational elites and interest groups tend to ‘socialise’ and develop common

views and interests.93 For them the progression of a truly collective foreign policy would

represent an ‘orthodox expression’ of how the EU worked; ‘with the pursuit of shared

interests being assigned ultimately to a supranational authority which, over time, would

further extend its policy reach’.94 At the same time, they also acknowledge the

significance of national governments in the process of integration.95 In fact Lindberg has

argued that ‘only the positive action of legitimate national authorities (the nation state)

can be the ultimate basis of integration’, hence ‘political and economic integration cannot

be expected to succeed in the absence of a will to proceed on the part of the MS’.96

89 Carsten Stroby Jensen, ‘Neo-functionalism’ in Michelle Cini ed., European Union Politics, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003).

90 Ibid.

91 Jakob C. Ohrgaard, ‘International relations or European Integration: is the CFSP sui generis?’, in Ben Tonra and Thomas Christiansen eds., Rethinking

European Union Foreign Policy, (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2004), p.40

92 Haas in Carsten Stroby Jensen, ‘Neo-functionalism’, p.81; see also, Jakob C. Ohrgaard, ‘International relations or European Integration: is the CFSP sui

generis?’, in Ben Tonra and Thomas Christiansen eds., Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy.

93 Philip H Gordon, ‘European Uncommon Foreign Policy’, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3, (Winter, 1997-1998), pp. 74-100

94 Ben Tonra, ‘The European Union’s Global Role’ p.3

95 Jakob C. Ohrgaard, ‘International relations or European Integration: is the CFSP sui generis?’, p. 38.

96 Lindberg quoted in ibid.

29



For Neo-functionalist regime theorists MS of international regimes benefit both

collectively and individually. According to them, international regimes are created and

maintained because they help states to overcome collective action problems97 and because

these structures provide at least some benefits to MS and individual participants.98

2.3.3 Intergovernmentalism

In contrast to neo-functionalists who particularly emphasise the autonomy of

supranational officials and transnational elites, intergovernmentalism stresses the

importance of the nation states in the European integration process. One of the most

prominent critics of neo-functionalist theory is Andrew Moravcsik who has introduced a

theory of liberal intergovernmentalism.

Despite the richness of its insights, [writes Moravcsik] neo-functionalism is today widely

regarded as having offered an unsatisfactory account of European integration (…) neo-

functionalism appears to mispredict both the trajectory and the process of EC [European

Community] evolution. Insofar as neo-functionalism advances a clear precondition about

the trajectory of EC over time, it was that the technocratic imperative would lead to a

‘gradual’, ‘automatic’, and incremental progression toward deeper integration and greater

supranational influence … Instead, however, the process of Community-building has

proceeded in fits and starts through a series of intergovernmental bargains.99

97 Wolfgang Wagner, ‘Why the EU’s common foreign and security policy will remain intergovernmental: p.579

98 David H. Bearce, ‘Institutional Breakdown and International Cooperation: The European Agreement to Recognize Croatia and Slovenia’, European

Journal of International Relation, Vol. 8 (4). 2002 p. 475

99 Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal intergovernmentalist Approach’, Journal of Common Market

Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 1993. pp. 465-6

30



The liberal intergovernmentalist theory is based on assumptions drawn from the

rationalist approach (examined below) and from the belief that states behave rationally.100

Intergovernmentalists who are influenced by classical theories of IR and in particular

neo-realism see European integration as a ‘zero-sum game’101. Liberal

intergovernmentalists however, tend to see negotiations as ‘positive-sum games

bargaining’.102 Intergovernmentalists emphasise national interests, bargaining, lowest-

common-denominator deals, and the unwillingness of states to compromise their core

national interests.103

According to them European integration involves both cost and benefit. Further, at

the core of intergovernmentalism, remains the concept of sovereignty defined by Nugent

as the ‘notion of power, authority, independence, and the exercise of will’ and in this case

as the ‘legal capacity of national decision-makers to take decisions without being subject

to external restrains’.104 Is this how the meaning of sovereignty is understood within the

EU? For intergovernmentalists European co-operation implies at most a pooling or

sharing of sovereignty, rather than any transfer of sovereignty from national to

supranational level.105 Gordon, for example, argues that EU MS ‘will only take the

difficult and self-denying decision to share their foreign policy sovereignty if the gains of

common action are seen to be so great that sacrificing sovereignty is worth it, or if their

interests converge [at] the point [where] little loss of sovereignty is entailed’.106

According to him ‘these conditions have not held in the past, do not currently hold, and

100 Michele Cini, Intergovernmentalism’, in Michelle Cini ed., European Union Politics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). p.103

101 Michelle Cini, ‘Intergovernmentalism’,

102 Federica Bicchi, ‘European Foreign Policy Making Towards the Mediterranean’, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. p.12

103 Philip H Gordon, ‘European uncommon foreign policy’, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3, (Winter, 1997-1998), p. 78

104 Nugent quoted in Michelle Cini, ‘Intergovernmentalism’, p. 96.

105 Keohane and Hoffmann in ibid.

106 Philip H Gordon, ‘European uncommon foreign policy’, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3, (Winter, 1997-1998), p. 81.

31



are not likely to hold in the future’.107 He argues that the costs of integration are still

perceived as greater than the potential gains when it comes to foreign and security policy,

particularly when compared to commercial policy, monetary policy and open borders

where the ‘gains of unity were [perceived] greater than the lost sovereignty cost of all the

governments that agreed to participate’.108

However, the study of the EU and its foreign policy-making has been transformed

over the past years, and as a result, the neo-functionalist/intergovernmentalist debate has

shifted to the rationalist/constructivist debate. In fact when it comes to the EU policy-

making process this plethora of different approaches boils down to two main views,

rationalism and constructivism.

2.3.4 Rationalist approach to EU policy-making

EUFP-making, according to rationalist theory, takes its cue from ‘two level’ games

played by states.109 The first game begins at the domestic level and refers to how states

form their preferences in the domestic environment. The second game is played among

states and involves inter-state bargaining.110 Thus, according to rationalists, states choose

the course of action that maximizes their gains/minimizes their losses in the context of

given set of values.111 Rationalist scholars regard preferences of MS as rigid, aimed at

gaining the preferred outcome. They argue that state actors utilise ideas and belief

systems based on preformed preferences in order to achieve their predetermined material

107 Ibid.

108 Ibid., pp. 80-81.

109 Ibid.

110 Putnam in Michelle Cini, Intergovernmentalism’, p. 102.

111 Chris Brown with Kirsten Ainley, ‘Understanding International Relations’, Third Edition, (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2005).

32



objectives.112 MS are thus the principal actors in EUFP who will delegate decision-

making power not because they are striving for a ‘European federation’ but only if

delegation is perceived as helping them to achieve their interests.113

Often it is assumed that big MS in particular are the main actors in determining the

final outcome. In this context, the main actors in EUFP-making are MS and the main

negotiating method is bargaining.114 Further, rationalist theorists focus on the policy

outputs and ‘if the outputs are limited or non-existent’, then they simply reflect the fact

that the major state interests (power-based perspective) or the bargaining process

(interest-based perspective) has so determined it. Consequently, they dismiss CFSP as an

irrelevance and as ineffectual vis-à-vis the real world of international activity. 115 Wallace

by quoting Dr Samuel Johnson argues that a ‘collective foreign policy’ is ‘like a dog’s

walking on its hind legs. It is not done well; but you are surprised to find it done at all’. 116

Moreover, because the EU in foreign policy is solely intergovernmental, EUFP is

therefore no more than the sum of what the MS severally decide. 117

However, not all aspects of EU policy-making can be explained by the rationalist

theories of IR (neo-realist/neo-liberalist synthesis) and European integration

(intergovernmentalism) who assume that states are the principal actors and bargaining is

their main negotiating approach. The EU aspects of identity, norms, values, socialisation

112 Wolfgang Wagner, ‘Why the EU’s common foreign and security policy will remain intergovernmental’ ; Federica Bicchi, ‘European Foreign Policy

Making Towards the Mediterranean’, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

113 Wolfgang Wagner, ‘Why the EU’s common foreign and security policy will remain intergovernmental: p.589

114 Federica Bicchi, ‘European Foreign Policy Making Towards the Mediterranean’, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.


Vol. 41. No. 4, p. 742

116 William Wallace, “‘European” Foreign Policy: A Realistic Aspiration, or an Unattainable Goal?’ in Nicola Casarini and Costanza Musu eds. European

Foreign Policy in an Evolving International System: The Road Towards Convergence, (Basingstoke ; New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). pp. 3-11.

p.8

117 Christopher Hill, ‘The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31,

No. 3. September 1993. p. 309

33



and Europeanisation can be better explained by constructivist theories. In fact, Checkel

has argued that when it comes to European studies, constructivism has increasingly

acquired buzzword status.118

2.3.5 Constructivist approach to EU policy-making

Unlike rationalists who concentrate in bargaining, constructivists focus on structures of

argumentation.119 Constructivists are open to a wider and perhaps more significant set of

questions when looking at the international persona of the Union such as that of the

creation of a transnational European identity, the impact of Europeanisation on national

foreign policies and the export of European values and norms through EUFP.120

Aggestam argues that Europeanisation of foreign policy has occurred and this is ascribed

to ‘the build-up of mutual trust, increased communication and the political will amongst

its members’.121 The Europeanisation of national foreign policies according to

Regeslberger has occurred because of ‘the high degree of institutionalisation122 and

Brusselisation’123 as well as socialisation.

The constructivist theorists point out that socialisation affects actors’ interests and

preferences.124 They argue that the main reason for EU policy-making lies in the

118 Jeffrey T. Checkel, ‘Social Constructivisms in Global and European Politics (A Review Essay)’, ARENA Working Papers WP 15/03, p.1. Available

at: http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp03_15.pdf [accessed 14 August 2008].

119 See for example, Jeffrey T. Checkel, ‘Constructivist Approaches to European Integration’, ARENA Working Paper, No. 06, February 2006

120 Ben Tonra, ‘The European Union’s Global Role’, p.6

121 Aggestam quoted in Ben Tonra, ‘Constructing the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Utility of a Cognitive Approach’, The Journal of

Common Market Studies Vol. 41. No. 4, p. 746

122 For a concise review on institutionalisation, Brusselisation, and socialisation, see Elfriede Regeslberger, ‘The EU as an Actor in Foreign and Security

Policy: Some Key Features of CFSP in an Historical Perspective’, FORNET, CFSP Forum, Volume 5, Issue 4 July 2007, see also Kissack’s brief view on

institutional approach towards EUFP decision making, Robert Kissack, ‘Theoretical Approaches to the Study of the EU as an Actor in the Multilateral

System’, FORNET Working Group 1: Theories and Approaches to the CFSP London School of Economics, 7/8 November 2003, particularly p.14.

123 Elfriede Regeslberger, ‘The EU as an Actor in Foreign and Security Policy: Some Key Features of CFSP in an Historical Perspective’, FORNET,

CFSP Forum, Volume 5, Issue 4 July 2007, p.3

124 Federica Bicchi, ‘European Foreign Policy Making Towards the Mediterranean’, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. p.14;

34



dynamics of socialisation, the main actors tend to be all but the highest ranking national

representatives, and the main negotiating style is closely related to arguing. 125 According

to Hill and Wallace the EUFP preparation now takes place in the context of European

Political Cooperation (now CFSP) through consultations and thus, ‘Officials and

ministers who sit together on planes and round tables in Brussels and in each other’s

capitals begin to judge “rationality” from within a different framework from that they

began with’.126 This suggests that policy-makers do not see themselves as missionaries of

their national policy but rather ‘they are actively seeking to internalise the views of their

colleagues in order to see that their own positions are at least complimentary in the

common and shared endeavour of CFSP’.127

Nevertheless, as Tonra quotes one of the diplomats with extensive experience of

CFSP this internalisation of others expectations ‘works [only until] where there is a real

conflict when higher politics destabilises the framework … it happened with

Yugoslavia’128 during the recognitions of Croatia and Slovenia where Germany decided

to go on its own way. Interestingly, however, the fact that a consensual position was

reached in spite of French and British scepticism could be seen as a good example of

socialised decision-making over power politics. According to David Bearce the main

reason behind the EU’s decision to recognise these two breakaway republics of former

Yugoslavia was the risk of ‘institutional breakdown’. He argues that the ‘risk of

125 Ibid., p.13

126 Hill and Wallace, ‘Introduction: Actors and Actions’, in Christopher Hill ed., The Actors in Europes Foreign Policy’, 1996, p.12.


Vol. 41. No. 4, p.740.

128 Ibid.

35



institutional breakdown provides a strong incentive for states valuing the institution to

make the compromises necessary to achieve a timely and cooperative agreement’.129

Further, constructivist theorists have pointed out that even in the absence of strong

supranational institutions, the CFSP has contributed to a convergence of national foreign

policies and to a growing sense of a common international identity. 130 They point out that

an ‘automatic reflex of consultation’ exists between policy-makers and as a result

national foreign policy actors seek out the views and the opinions of partners before

arriving at defined national positions. Thus, the first point of cognitive reference becomes

‘what will the European partners think’ rather than ‘what is our position in this…’ Hence,

‘this intake of partners’ views becomes habitual, even instinctive over time’.131

However, the evidence regarding the recognition of Kosovo’s independence 132

suggests otherwise, countries such as Slovakia and Cyprus for instance did not develop a

thought along the lines of ‘what my European partners think if…’133 In fact, the numerous

calls on the Union from the majority of EU members and the commission to recognise

Kosovo’s independence en bloc were totally ignored.134 The French and British foreign

129 For an excellent analysis on why the EU(then EC) decided to recognise these two breakaway republics of former Yugoslavia see David H. Bearce,

‘Institutional Breakdown and International Cooperation: The European Agreement to Recognize Croatia and Slovenia’, European Journal of International

Relation, Vol. 8 (4). 2002, p. 472

130 Wolfgang Wagner, ‘Why the EU’s common foreign and security policy will remain intergovernmental: p. 576


Vol. 41. No. 4, pp. 739-740

132 It is worth noting that the new member states of the Union have profoundly affected EUFP especially in relation to the Kosovo’s independence.

Romania, Cyprus and Slovakia have strongly supported Serbia’s position although the majority of the Union have already recognised Kosovo as an

independent state. Moreover, Slovakia in particular has gone a step further announcing that the holders of a Kosovo passport will be denied entry into

Slovakia even if they have a Schengen visa endorsed. See Euractiv, ‘Slovakia denies entry to Kosovo passport holders’, 01 August 2008, Available at:

http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/slovakia-denies-entry-kosovo-passport-holders/article-174704?Ref=RSS [5 August 2008];


Vol. 41. No. 4, p. 741.

134 The US and the EU had agreed to extend the negotiations for another 120 days where subsequently the EU appointed the German Ambassador in

London Wolfgang Ischinger as its representative in an attempt to convince both other EU sceptics and Russia to accept Kosovo’s independence as the only

option. See, IHT, ‘Kosovo leaders say upcoming talks are last attempt in resolving province's future’, IHT, (online). Available at:

http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/07/30/europe/EU-GEN-Kosovo-Talks.php [accessed 24 September 2008]. ; See also, Daniel Dombey and Neil

36



Ministers, Kouchner and Miliband respectively have emphasised that ‘Kosovo will be a

major test for our common foreign and security policy’ therefore it is of paramount

importance that ‘we are ready to come together to safeguard Kosovo’s stability and allow

the EU to play its proper role. Our message is clear: Kosovo is a European responsibility

from which we will not walk away. It concerns the security of us all’.135

However, despite many attempts to reach a common position regarding Kosovo’s

independence, on 18 February 2008 (a day after Kosovo declared its independence) the

EU showed again its deep divisions in relation to this issue. Consequently, in the absence

of an agreement to recognise Kosovo ‘en bloc’ after the Council meeting the EU

declared, ‘the Council notes that MS will decide, in accordance with national practice and

international law, on their relations with Kosovo’.136 Accordingly, the actions of some

MS towards Kosovo’s independence clearly disregard the principle of the ‘common

position’ set out in the Treaty on European Union (TEU).137

Although it could be said that there were Slavic/Orthodox sensibilities resisting the

consensus138 within the EU the fact that Bulgaria (Slavic/Orthodox) and the majority of

MacDonald, ‘EU divided over Kosovo’, Financial Times, 7 March 2008, (online). Available at:http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/89212eb6-ccb7-11db-a938-

000b5df10621.html?nclick_check=1 [accessed 19 August 2008]; IHT, ‘EU fails to endorse Kosovo independence plan’ 30 March 2007 (online)

http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/03/30/europe/EU-GEN-EU-Kosovo.php [accessed 09 September 2008]

135 Bernard Kouchner and David Miliband, ‘Kosovo: Europe’s challenge’, The Guardian 06 September 2007, (online). Available at:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/sep/06/kosovoeuropeschallenge [last accessed 7 September 2008].; Further the Kosovo issue ‘is

increasingly regarded by many as the make-or-break issue for a unified EU foreign policy’. Patrick Moore, ‘Kosovo: Is EU Set To Recognize

Independence?’ 26 October 2007 http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1079030.html [Lased accessed 8 September 2008].

136 Council of the European Union, ‘2851st Council meeting - General Affairs and External Relations -EXTERNAL RELATIONS’, Brussels, 18

February 2008. Available at:

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/98818.pdf [last accessed 24 September 2008].

137 Article 24.3 (Consolidated treaties) states that, the MS ‘shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly … They shall

refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations…’

Further, Article 29 (consolidated treaties) states that MS ‘shall ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions’. The Treaty on

European Union, ‘Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union’, 9 May 2008, Official Journal of the European Union C 115/15. Available at:

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0013:0045:EN:PDF [last accessed 26 September 2008].

138 Peter Hough ‘personal communications’

37



other Slavic countries have supported the ‘Ahtisaari plan’139 and subsequently recognised

Kosovo’s independence undermines this assumptions. Therefore, it is more plausible to

assume that this lack of unity arose and persists because some of the EU MS consistently

aim towards ‘protecting’ their national interests in relation to the Kosovo problem.

Furthermore, the fact that all of the countries who resisted the consensus, (i.e. Slovakia,

Spain, Romania, and Cyprus140 in particular)141 have their own internal problems in

relation to ethnic minorities supports this assumption.142 Therefore, the EU’s inability to

reach a common decision vis-à-vis Kosovo’s independence is better explained by the

rationalist approach to EUFP.

In a nutshell, the differences between rationalism and constructivism are

summarised in figure 1.1.

Figure 1.1 summarises the contrast between these two views143.

Rationale for EUPolicy Making

Main Actors Nature of Negotiations

Rational

Choice

Member States’

Preferences

Member States Bargaining

Constructivism Socialisation,Habit

Commission, Policy Networks, the ‘High

Representative’, and so

on.

Arguing

139 After more than 16 months of intensive negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo in April 2007 the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General for

Kosovo’s status talks, Maarti Ahtisaari, presented his comprehensive proposal recommending supervised independence for Kosovo guaranteeing extensive

rights for the Serbian minority in Kosovo through decentralisation where international authorities would monitor its implementation. The plan, however,

was rejected by Russia and therefore it was not endorsed by the UN Security Council through a new resolution that would have paved the way for the

deployment of EULEX mission in Kosovo. For more details see the Full proposal, United Nation, ‘Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status

Settlement’, Available at: http://www.unosek.org/docref/Comprehensive_proposal-english.pdf [last accessed September 2008]

140 See for example, Tony Barber, ‘Brussels vows to speed Serbia’s path to EU’ Financial Times, 4 February 2008, (online). Available at:

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/75ba24e0-d314-11dc-b861-0000779fd2ac.html [17 July 2008]

141 It should be noted that Portugal has not recognised Kosovo, but this hesitations is arguably because of the friendly relationship it has with its neighbour

Spain.

142 See for example, Euroactiv, ‘Europe divided over Kosovo plan’, 2 April 2007, Available at: http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/europe-divided-

kosovo-plan/article-162922 [accessed 19 August 2008].

143 Federica Bicchi, ‘European Foreign Policy Making Towards the Mediterranean’, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. p.14.

38



In conclusion, by analysing various concepts of EUFP this chapter has exposed the

contentiousness and ambiguity of the term. Even though most scholars and politicians

recognise the existence of EUFP there does not exist a common definition of the term

itself. Further, whereas the European integration theorists struggle to explain the EU’s

international role, the IR theorists struggle to explain the increasing cooperation among

the EU MS. Yet, both IR and integration theories could offer support to the development

of EUFP144 and consequently help to explain the making of the EUFP towards the WB.

Thus, the above evidence indicates that the study of EUFP should not be limited to only

one theoretical approach. In fact, any such attempt is misleading and doomed to failure.

What follows is an analysis of the EU’s involvement in the WB before and after the

Kosovo war.

144 Peter Hough, ‘personal communications’.

39



Chapter 3: EU’s Approach Towards Conflict Prevention in the

Western Balkans: Lessons Learned.

… if the awful conflict in Kosovo has brought something good with it, it is that we

understand our belonging together far better .145

Joschka Fischer

3.1 The EU involvement in the Western Balkans prior to 1999

The end of the Cold War brought hope for peace in the international community in

general and the European community in particular. Many scholars and politicians alike

looked to the future of Europe with great optimism issuing grandiose statements such as

the ‘end of history’146 or ‘the hour of Europe has come’.147 However, only a few weeks

later this optimism came to an abrupt end when in parts of the former Yugoslavia the

inter-ethnic conflicts erupted. With the Cold War out of the way, the United States (US)

expected the EU to take on more responsibility in its backyard. Besides, the US was

convinced that the Balkan crisis was a European problem and therefore the EU should

step in to handle the crisis.148 The US was reluctant to engage at that time because of

Washington’s beliefs that there were no American interests at stake. The then US

Secretary of State James A. Baker, visiting Yugoslavia as it began to itself tear apart

145 Joschka Fischer quoted in Lykke Friis and Anna Murphy, ‘”Turbo-charged Negotiations”: The EU and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe’

Journal of European Public Policy, 7:5 Special Issue: p. 779.

146 Francis Fukuyama, ‘After the “End of History”’, Available at: http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-fukuyama/revisited_3496.jsp [accessed 15

August 2008].

147 In the beginning of the Yugoslav war in 1991 the Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister at the time, Jacques Poos, said, ‘This is the hour of Europe, not the

hour of the Americans’.

148 Stanley Hoffmann, ‘Towards a Common European Foreign and Security Policy?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, June 2000, Vol. 38, No. 2, p.

191

40



bluntly expressed the American disinterest in getting involved: ‘We’ve got no dog in this

fight’.149

However, the fast erupting crisis in the then Yugoslavian ‘federal’ state caught the

EU off-guard and consequently exposed sharp divisions in their approach to the crisis,150

particularly over the recognition of the two breakaway republics Slovenia and Croatia.

During that time, the EU lacked cohesion, determination and the tools to deal with the

Yugoslav crisis.151

In the following months and years, the EU would witness the worst atrocities on its

doorstep since the end of the Second World War. In a spillover effect the war spread

quickly from Croatia to Bosnia. The Bosnian war revealed particularly embarrassing

failures152 of EUFP vis-à-vis the WB and was openly regarded as a ‘black chapter’ of

EUFP.153 Arguably, the EU’s impotence – to act and put an end to these atrocities – arose

from the embedded realist paradigm in the minds of policymakers. This was evident in

EU’s efforts to pursue a policy towards preserving the sovereignty of the former

149 R. W. Apple Jr, ‘Crisis in the Balkans: News Analysis’, Clinton’s Positive Thinking: The NATO Alliance Is Alive and Kicking, New York Times:

April 26, 1999 (online) Available at: .http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?

res=9F0CE4DC163DF935A15757C0A96F958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=2 [last accessed 5 August 2008], Nicholas Whyte asserts that when it

comes to EU policy vis-à-vis the WB the European perspective unlike the American one is ‘no longer [to] support one dog or another, but [is] interested in

the entire pack’. Hence ‘James Baker’s 1992 quip that “we don’t have a dog in that fight” has become almost as notorious as Jacques Poos’ “l’heure de

l’Europe”. , However when Baker made his remarks the EU was in total disarray, hence, EU’s attempt to preserve the Yugoslavian sovereignty (‘the entire

pack’), made things worst. What Whyte is saying, however, is more appropriate to the latest developments in the region, i.e post Kosovo war. Nicholas

Whyte, ‘Heure de l’Europe – Enfin Arrivee?’, in The Macedonian Crisis and Balkan Security, ESF Working Paper No. 2 July 2001 p.7

150 See S. Lehne, ‘Has the “Hour of Europe” come at last: The EU’s Strategy for the Balkans’, in Judy Batt ed., The Western Balkans Moving On,

Chaillot Paper, No. 70, October 2004, pp. 111-124, p.111 see also, Graham Timmins and Dejan Jovic, ‘Introduction: The Next Wave of Enlargement: The

European Union and Southeast Europe after 2004’, Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Volume 8, Number 1, April 2006, pp. 1-5.

151 S. Lehne, ‘Has the “Hour of Europe” come at last: The EU’s Strategy for the Balkans’

152 The EU’s failure in dealing with the conflicts during the violent disintegration of ‘former Yugoslavia is well documented’. See Fraser Cameron and

Rosa Balfour, ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy as a Conflict Prevention tool’, European Policy Centre, EPC Issue Paper No. 47, June 2006, p.9.

153 Arolda Elbasani , ‘The Stabilisation and Association Process in the Balkans; Overloaded Agenda and Weak Incentives’, European University Institute,

EUI Working Papers, SPS 2008/03. p.17

41



Yugoslavia. Thus, in the interest of establishing the Yugoslav sovereignty154 the EU

failed to recognise the roots of this problem and subsequently found itself in total disarray

over the importance of the region to its own security.

Having failed to prevent the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia, the EU yet again

missed an opportunity for a stronger role in the region during the Albanian crisis of 1997.

The EU Council refused to accept the possibility that the Albanian domestic crisis could

pose an indirect threat to their security and as a result blocked a proposal to send a

stabilisation force. In the absence of an agreement, the Italian government led a limited

coalition of the willing in a successful intervention.

155

Yet, one of the most obvious examples of the EU’s reactive rather than preventative

policy to the crisis was the decision to exclude the Kosovo problem from the Dayton

Peace Accords (DPA).156 Up until 1998-1999, the EU saw the Kosovo issue as a human

rights problem157 despite Kosovo’s regular appeals to the international community over

the likelihood of military conflict and its potential threats to regional security. The EU’s

serious miscalculations became known only two years after the DPA was signed and the

Kosovo situation deteriorated. Hence, the EU attitude supports the hypothesis that

‘foreign policy disasters often happen because policymakers apply valid theories to

154 Adrian Hyde-Price argues that ‘in the interests of establishing regional order, the EU proposed solutions that implicitly recognized Serbian military

gains and ethnic cleansing, and worked politically and diplomatically with regimes guilty of gross human rights abuses’. Adrian Hyde-Price, ‘A ‘tragic

actor’? A realist perspective on ‘ethical power Europe’, International Affairs 84: 1 (2008) 29–44, p. 33.

155 William Wallace, ‘Is there a European Approach to War?’ European Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper 2005/2 March 2005. p.10.; see also S. Lehne,

‘Has the “Hour of Europe” come at last’ p.112

156 Summary of the Dayton Peace Agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina, 30 November 1995. Available at:

http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bossumm.html [last accessed 15 September 2008]

157 Predrag Jureković, ‘Nation-Building in the Western Balkans: Some Additional Lessons and the Role of the EU’ in Jean-Jacques de Dardel and Gustav

Gustenau and Plamen Pantev eds., Post-Conflict Rehabilitation: Lessons from South East Europe and Strategic Consequences for the Euro-Atlantic

Community, (National Defence Academy and Bureau for Security Policy at the Austrian Ministry of Defence, Vienna, April 2006) pp. 210-225 see also

Christopher Hill, ‘The EU’s Capacity for Conflict Prevention’European Foreign Affairs Review 6: 2001. pp. 315–333.

42



inappropriate circumstances’.158 Consider for example the EU/US behaviour during the

Dayton talks, in which by appeasing a Serbian regime guilty of gross human rights

violations they ignored the Kosovo crisis, leaving it out of the DPA. This appeasement

made the Serbian regime more aggressive in the following years towards Kosovo’s

population. In fact, Milosevic was quite convinced that the west would support

Yugoslavian sovereignty and therefore would not interfere in case of war.

By 1998, the EU faced another war on its doorstep and once again its impotence in

conflict prevention was exposed.159 Although the EU’s cohesion had improved since

DPA, the Kosovo crisis confirmed again its lack of determination, unity, and capabilities.

The decisions to threaten and then to use force as well in order to stop the Serbian

atrocities first in Bosnia and then in Kosovo160 were born in Washington161 and not in

Europe.162

The EU’s impotence to deal with the aforementioned crisis until 1999 was arguably

because the EU had suffered a ‘capability-expectations gap’163, as described by Hill. Hill

argued that,

158 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).p. 20, Available at:

http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=103612169. [accessed 18 June 2008]

159 Lykke Friis and Anna Murphy, ‘”Turbo-charged Negotiations”: The EU and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe’ Journal of European Public

Policy, 7:5 Special Issue: pp. 767-786.

160 It should be noted however, that it was not until the Kosovo crisis exploded that the Union decided to act, see, Cristina Churruca, ‘The European

Union’s Common Foreign Policy: Strength, Weakness and Prospects’ p.3

161 This was a clear indication that a direct involvement of the USA in the WB was of paramount importance since the begging of the violent dissolution

of the former Yugoslavia. In fact, the EU was shocked during the 1999 bombing ‘about the superiority of American military technology over their own

and about the extent of their dependence on it’, (Stanley Hoffmann, ‘Towards a Common European Foreign and Security Policy?’, Journal of Common

Market Studies, June 2000, Vol. 38, No. 2, p. 195). Moreover, the then US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrook had pointed out that ‘unless the

United States is prepared to put its political and military muscle behind the quest for solutions to European instability, nothing really gets done’. Philip H

Gordon, ‘European uncommon foreign policy’, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3, (Winter, 1997-1998), pp. 74-100. p. 74.

162 S. Lehne, ‘Has the “Hour of Europe” come at last: p.112

163 Christopher Hill, ‘The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31,

No. 3. September 1993. pp. 305-328.

43



the … tasks - which the Community [now EU] is certainly be expected to perform by

many influential insiders and outsiders - pose a serious challenge to the actual capabilities

of the EC [EU], in terms of its ability to agree, its resources, and the instruments at its

disposal. It is arguable, indeed, that the Community has been talked up (…) to a point

where it is not capable of fulfilling the new expectations already (and often irrationally)

held of it. This is true both of the number and the degree of the expectations.164

Fifteen years on since Hill’s famous article was published and the EU still suffers from

the inability to agree on many issues, but its serious involvement in the region and its

determination to make the WB a success have incredibly narrowed the ‘capability-

expectations gap’.

Why did the EU change its foreign policy towards the WB after the Kosovo war? In

other words, what is the ‘raison d'être’ behind such a change?

3.2 Lessons learned: the EU involvement after the Kosovo war

Has the EU learned its lessons from these recurring crises? The need to recover from its

‘weak image’ because of consecutive failures during the Yugoslav crisis and the

necessity for an improved and coherent CFSP165 as well as the realisation that the Kosovo

conflict could pose a serious threat to Union’s peace and security, drove the EU to make a

U-turn in policy towards the Southeast Europe (SEE).166 Consequently, regional co-

164 Christopher Hill, ‘The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role’, p. 315.

165 Cameron and Balfour argue that ‘this overall failure coloured perceptions of the CFSP and it was several years before the EU began to develop serious

capabilities to engage in conflict prevention’. Fraser Cameron and Rosa Balfour, ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy as a Conflict Prevention tool’,

European Policy Centre, EPC Issue Paper No. 47, June 2006. p. 9.

166 It is often argued that the EU’s credibility as an important Actor in the international system depends on its success in the WB. See, S. Lehne, ‘Has the

“Hour of Europe” come at last’ p.124; Alexandros Yannis, ‘EU Foreign Policy in the Balkans: A Credibility Test’, FORNET CFSP Forum Volume 3,

Issue 2 March 2005.; The European strategy document points out that, ‘the credibility of EU foreign policy depends on the consolidation of the EU’s

achievements in the western Balkans. European Council, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy’, 12 December 2003, p. 8.

Available at: http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf [last accessed 28 September 2008].

44



operation, conditionality, prospective enlargement, and military engagement came all

simultaneously at play in the EU’s policy towards the SEE167 part of which is the so-

called WB. According to Sophia Clement although the EU is ‘the provider par excellence

of “carrots” in all countries of the region, [still it] was unable to prevent the outbreak of

war in Kosovo in 1999’.168 This is mainly because its pre-Kosovo war approach to

conflict prevention was flawed. Since the Kosovo war, the EU has been more capable in

taking clear decisions on some policy matters, in particular those to do with conflict

prevention. With the introduction of the SP and then the SAP including SAA with the

enlargement prospect and its conditionality attached to it the EU gradually set firmly its

feet on the ground.

3.2.1 Stability Pact169

The Kosovo war that led to the (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) NATO bombing

over the Serbian Military targets in 1999 sent a clear and strong warning to EU nations

that its internal stability would be seriously threatened should they continue to take a

passive rather than an active role in the region. This became apparent after the rapid

deterioration of the Kosovo conflict created another crisis in terms of the flow of

refugees. Shortly after the NATO bombing commenced the Serbs ethnically cleansed

hundred of thousands of Kosovar Albanians. By then the EU had realised that there was

an urgent need for a comprehensive preventive approach that would avert similar

disasters in the future.

167 Spyros Economides, ‘Note from the Editor’, FORNET, CFSP Forum Volume 3, Issue 2 March 2005. p. 1.

168 Sophia Clement cited in Christopher Hill, ‘The EU’s Capacity for Conflict Prevention’ European Foreign Affairs Review 6: 2001. p.328

169 It should be noted that on 30 June 2008 the ‘Stability Pact’ for South Eastern Europe officially closed its Secretariat in Brussels since the

responsibility for promoting co-operation in the region was handed over to the new ‘Regional Cooperation Council’ (RCC) on 27 February 2008, as the

successor of the Stability Pact. See, http://www.rcc.int/index.php?action=page&id=2&link_id=6

45



Having acknowledged the EU’s earlier mistakes the then German Foreign Minister

Joschka Fischer continually pointed out that ‘the previous policy of the [EU] vis-à-vis the

former Yugoslavia had two serious deficits: it concentrated on consequences instead of

on sources of conflict, and it tackled the problems of the region individually, separately

from [those] in other parts of Europe’.170 Likewise, the former Greek Foreign Minister

stated ‘the only way to deal with conflict is to address effectively the root causes through

a long term structural prevention policy’.171 In the offices of EU policy-makers the need

to deal with the symptoms of the conflict rather than its consequences became an

inescapably important issue. Consequently, the EU quickly agreed to the launch of the

SP172 for SEE during the June 1999 EU summit in Cologne, as a response to the Kosovo

war.173

Fischer, who received credit for the idea174, suggested that the EU should take the

responsibility for the region as a whole by developing a long-term strategy for SEE. The

German Foreign Ministry clearly felt that the prospect of membership in EU and NATO

structures was the most effective way to stabilise the region in the long term. 175 However,

the proposal of full membership, as advocated by Germans, was not acceptable to some

EU members. Unlike the UK who supported the German proposal176 France was

170 Lykke Friis and Anna Murphy, ‘”Turbo-charged Negotiations”: The EU and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe’ Journal of European Public

Policy, 7:5 Special Issue: p. 770.

171 Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, Georgios Papandreou, Helsingborg, August 2002, quoted in Sarah Bayne, ‘Conflict prevention and the EU: From

rhetoric to reality’, International Alert and Saferworld, p.19. Available at: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/images/pubdocs/euconflict.pdf [accessed August

2008].

172 It is important to note that even though the SP is not an entirely EU project, the EU is mainly responsible for it.

173 Lykke Friis and Anna Murphy, ‘”Turbo-charged Negotiations”,

174 The initial idea for the SP arose in late 1998, therefore it predates the NATO bombing.

175 Lykke Friis and Anna Murphy, ‘”Turbo-charged Negotiations’, p. 769.

176 This proposal was closely coordinated by the United States, where Secretary of State Madeleine Albright made a similar proposal in April 1999’. see

James C. O’Brien, ‘Brussels: Next Capital of the Balkans, The Washington Quarterly, 29:3. 2006. pp. 71–87.

46



uncomfortable with the idea of full membership,177 and as a result, the EU MS carefully

diluted the membership promise.178 Consequently, Fischer ‘drew back from a firm

commitment on membership’ stating: ‘if you talk about the general prospects of

integration, that’s what the Stability Pact is proposing, but it doesn’t go into too much

detail. We’re certainly not talking about the accession dates’.179 On the other hand,

Special Coordinator Bodo Hombach famously characterised the initiative as nothing less

than ‘fast track to full EU membership’.180

The most significant fact here is that the EU for the first time had explicitly framed

the Kosovo conflict as a European crisis. Moreover, the EU’s determination to act

strongly indicates that Jacques Poos’ idea of the ‘hour of Europe’ had this time come for

real.181 Fischer had made it clear that, ‘there are no political, economic, cultural, religious

or any other reasons why we should refrain from giving the people in Dubrovnik,

Sarajevo, or Belgrade, what people in Dublin, Frankfurt and Warsaw already have,

namely a firm place in Europe’.182 Consequently, the framing of the Kosovo crisis as ‘part

of us’ supported Fischer’s idea of membership prospect for the WB during the

negotiations.183 Hence, without considering the proposal in detail, the Foreign Ministers

agreed that,

177 Lykke Friis and Anna Murphy, ‘”Turbo-charged Negotiations”:

178 Dimitar Bechev, Carrots, sticks and norms: the EU and regional cooperation in Southeast Europe’, Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans Vol. 8,

No. 1, April 2006

179 Fisher quoted in Lykke Friis and Anna Murphy, ‘”Turbo-charged Negotiations”: p. 773.

180 Dimitar Bechev, Carrots, sticks and norms: p.35

181 Dimitar Bechev, ‘Between Enlargement and CFSP: the EU and the Western Balkans’, Paper prepared for the LSE European Foreign Policy

conference 2-3 June 2004, London School of Economics. Available at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/intrel/EFPC/Papers/Bechev.doc [accessed 6 June 2008]

182 Fischer quoted in Lykke Friis and Anna Murphy, “Turbo-charged Negotiations”: p. 779.

183 Lykke Friis and Anna Murphy, ‘”Turbo-charged Negotiations”: p. 779.

47



A political solution to the Kosovo crisis must be embedded in a determined effort geared

towards stabilizing the region as a whole […and that] this Stability Pact is to help ensure

cooperation among the countries in the region towards comprehensive measures for the

long-term stabilization, security, democratization, and economic reconstruction…

184

The SP reaffirmed that ‘the EU will draw the region closer to the perspective of full

integration of these countries into its structures.’185 However, the initial ambiguity over

the proposal worried some of the Balkan countries because of the possibility of

developing the SP as an alternative to EU membership’.186 This puzzle, however, was

later clarified at a summit in Sarajevo in June 1999, weeks after the Kosovo war ended.

The Summit reaffirmed the EU’s ‘responsibility to build a Europe that is at long last

undivided, democratic and at peace’187 sending a clear signal to the states of the WB that

they are potential candidates to join the Union although the statement did not explicitly

refer to EU membership. The membership prospective was confirmed a year later on the

presidency conclusions of the Feira Council in June 2000 where the EU for the first time

explicitly refers to the WB states as potential candidates.188

184 The Council of the European Union, General Affairs - conclusions, Brussels,17 May 1999. pp. 4 -5. Available at:

http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/s99589.pdf [accessed August 2008.

185 Stability Pact for South East Europe, Cologne, 10 June 1999. p.20. Available at: http://www.stabilitypact.org/constituent/990610-cologne.asp

186 Fraser Cameron and Antoinette Primatarova, ‘Enlargement, CFSP and the Convention: The role of the Accession States’, EPIN Working Paper No 5,

June 2003, p. 7.

187 See Sarajevo Summit Declaration, 30 July 1999. p. 2. Available at: http://www.stabilitypact.org/constituent/990730-sarajevo.asp.

188 Paragraph 67 stated that, ‘the European Council confirms that its objective remains the fullest possible integration of the countries of the [WB] region

into the political and economic mainstream of Europe through the Stabilisation and Association process, political dialogue, liberalisation of trade and

cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs. All the countries concerned are potential candidates for EU membership’; Presidency Conclusions of the Santa

Maria da Feira European Council, 19-20 June 2000, paragraph 67, Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/fei1_en.htm [accessed August

2008].

48



What is striking about the SP is the fact that the negotiated outcome was influenced

by the way the Kosovo crisis had been framed. The ‘belonging to Europe’189 aspect

clearly supports the constructivists’ approach to EU policy-making who argue that,

identity, socialisation and Europeanisation affects actors’ interests and preferences and

thus the negotiation outcome. Further, the style of negotiations during the SP

deliberations was closely related to arguing (a constructivist approach) rather than

bargaining (the rational choice).

3.2.2 Stabilisation and Association Process

Months after the SP was launched the EU introduced the SAP in November 1999190 and

adopted it at the Zagreb summit in November 2000.191 The SAP was subsequently

granted over five billion euros for the period 2001-2006 including CARDS. The purpose

of the SAP, according to the Commission, is an ‘integrated long-term approach’ that

would bring all countries of the WB closer to EU’s structures. According to Commission

‘the best way to get the countries of the WB to avoid conflict and work towards European

standards of political and economic behaviour was to hold out the prospect of EU

membership one day, subject to strict political conditions, including a requirement for

regional cooperation’.192

189 The ‘EU governments had in effect accepted that the Western Balkans, like their eastern counterparts, were part of the wider European community’.

William Wallace, ‘Is there a European Approach to War?’ European Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper 2005/2 March 2005. p.12; see also, Alexandros

Yannis, ‘EU Foreign Policy in the Balkans: A Credibility Test’, FORNET CFSP Forum Volume 3, No 2 March 2005, p.2

190 European Commission, ‘CARDS’ Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/how-does-it-work/financial-assistance/cards/index_en.htm

191 Zagreb Summit 24 November 2000,

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/sap/zagreb_summit_en.htm

192 In addition, as key components of this integrated strategy towards conflict prevention the Commission has made economic development, human rights

and democracy. According to the Commission, ‘treating the root causes of conflict implies creating, restoring or consolidating structural stability in all its

aspects’. The concept of ‘structural stability’ is characterised by ‘sustainable economic development, democracy and respect for human rights, viable

political structures and healthy environmental and social conditions, with the capacity to manage change without to resort to conflict’. European

Commission ‘On Conflict Prevention’, COM (2001) 211 final: Brussels: 11 April 2001, p.10. Available at:

49



These strategic agreements became more feasible following the Kosovo war since

the EU by then had gained substantial experience in Central and East Europe (CEE) and

SEE even though the EU’s policy towards the WB differed from that of the CEE,

regarding regional cooperation. Therefore, while regional cooperation is an explicit

condition for advancing towards EU integration for the WB that level of cooperation was

not formally imposed on the CEE.193

By the end of 2001, it became clear that the SAP was the EU’s main tool to deal

with the WB194 and its centrepiece became the conclusion of the SAA as a contract

between the EU and the WB.

3.2.2.1 Stabilisation and Association Agreements

The development of the SAA has high political importance and economic significance

and is one of the most important tools of the EU strategy intended to support the process

of integration of the countries of the WB into the EU. 195 It is important to note that SAA

is signed with sovereign states only. In March 2001, Macedonia was the first country to

sign the SAA.196 The signing of the SAA apparently was the strongest incentive used by

EU’s foreign policy Chief Javier Solana in the quest to find a political solution to the

Macedonian conflict.197 The fact that Solana was able to assert pressure on behalf of the

http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/news/com2001_211_en.pdf [accessed 06 July 2008].

193 Judy Batt, ‘Introduction: the Stabilisation/Integration dilemma’, in Judy Batt, ed. The western Balkans Moving on, Chaillot Paper No. 70. October

2004. p.10. see also Dimitar Bechev, ‘Carrots, sticks and norms’: p.32

194 Dimitar Bechev, ‘Between Enlargement and CFSP: the EU and the Western Balkans’, Paper prepared for the LSE European Foreign Policy

conference 2-3 June 2004, London School of Economics. Available at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/intrel/EFPC/Papers/Bechev.doc [accessed 6 June 2008]

195 European Commission, The Western Balkan countries on the road to the European Union,

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/sap/history_en.htm#2

196 Euractiv, ‘EU membership perspective for the Balkans’, Euractiv 24 July 2003, (online), Available at: http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-

membership-perspective-balkans/article-117543 [last accessed 16 September 2008].

197 Claire Piana, ‘The EU’s Decision-Making Process in the Common Foreign and Security Policy’, p. 212

50





Union, and hence, reach a political agreement (Ohrid Framework Agreement) 198 after a

brief but serious conflict between the ethnic Albanians and Slavic Macedonian military

forces contradicts rationalists’ assumptions that EU MS are the only actors on EUFP. The

Macedonian crisis marked the first EU successful story in the region and showed the WB

that the ‘hour of Europe’ has indeed dawned and this time is there to stay. 199

Ollie Rehn told the Foreign affairs Committee that, ‘the EU wants the WB to

become as “normal, prosperous and boring” as Scandinavia, with the help of SAA’.200

The signing of the SAA by Macedonia was followed in November 2001 by Croatia.

Currently all other WB countries have signed the SAA save Kosovo. As regards Serbia

the EU for years restated its position that it will not sign the SAA unless Serbia delivers

the top war criminals to the Hague Tribunal.201 Ultimately, however, in support of

Serbian pro-European forces, the EU agreed to the signing of the SAA,202 though it insists

it will not be ratified unless Serbia gives up the last fugitives accused of war crimes.203

198 The Ohrid Framework Agreement signed on 13 August 2001 includes constitutional reforms (i.e. including the Albanian language as an official

language), administrative decentralisation and police reorganisation. However it is important to note that the agreement has not been fully implemented as

yet. See the full text of Ohrid Agreement, at Council of Europe, ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’, Available at:

http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/police_and_internal_security/OHRID%20Agreement%2013august2001.asp [last accessed August

2008]

199 Despite some problems during the 2008 elections, Macedonia is considered by the Commission to be ‘the only functioning multi-ethnic state in the

Balkans’. Olli Rehn, ‘Making the European Perspective real in the Balkans’ Keynote address at the Conference ‘Bringing the Balkans into Mainstream

Europe’ by Friends of Europe Brussels, 8 December 2005 SPEECH/05/770 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?

reference=SPEECH/08/287&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en

200 European Parliament, ‘EU wants a “boring Western Balkans”, Rehn tells Foreign Affairs Committee

External relations, 03 April 2008. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/infopress_page/030-25655-092-04-14-903-

20080403IPR25654-01-04-2008-2008-false/default_en.htm [accessed 20 August 2008].

201 The Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn on its part has continuously stated that the EU will insist on ‘full cooperation with the [International

Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia] ICTY’, which means Serbia must do ‘everything in its power to find and arrest all remaining indictees’. EU

wants a "boring Western Balkans", Rehn tells Foreign Affairs Committee

External relations, 03 April 2008. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/infopress_page/030-25655-092-04-14-903-

20080403IPR25654-01-04-2008-2008-false/default_en.htm [accessed 20 August 2008].

202 See for example, Kurt Bassuener, ‘Yielding to Serb demands won’t make the EU credible’ Europeanvoice, 22 May 2008. Available at:

http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/yielding-to-serb-demands-won-t-make-the-eu-credible/60838.aspx [accessed 12 August 2008].

203 Toby Vogel, ‘The EU needs to show backbone in the Balkans’, Europeanvoice (online) 05.06.2008, Available at:

http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/the-eu-needs-to-show-backbone-in-the-balkans/61041.aspx

51



Although the EU signed the SAA with Serbia in May 2008, both the SAA and the Interim

Trade Agreements were immediately suspended pending Belgrade’s full cooperation with

the Hague Tribunal.204 Apart from obstructions caused by the Netherlands, deep divisions

among Serbian political elite also hindered the signing of the SAA.205 After several

obstructions by the Serbian opposition, the parliament ratified the SAA. However, Olli

Rehn’s Spokesperson Krisztina Nagy said ‘as regards the EU, the decision on the

ratification of the SAA and the taking of effect of the Interim Agreement is [clearly] in

the hands of the Council of Ministers’.206 The EC Director for the Balkans Pierre Mirel

echoed the ambiguity over the SAA with Serbia as well. He said, ‘We have two states

that are not officially part of the SAP. Firstly Serbia [ sic], which has signed the [SAA…

but] won’t be applied until full cooperation with the Hague Tribunal is achieved, and

Kosovo’.207 Although the signing of the SAA with Kosovo is very problematic, given that

some of the EU MS have yet to recognise its independence, Mirel acknowledged that

‘Kosovo is de facto on the EU stabilization and association process’.208

204 B92, ‘EU: No new elements to allow interim deal’, 29 July 2008, Available at:

http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=29&nav_id=52275

205 What is striking about some Serbian leaders is that they believe the EU needs Serbia and not the other way round. Former premier Kostunica said,

‘The EU must choose... whether it will sign a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Serbia or, under United States pressure, send a mission to

implement (a plan for) supervised independence of Kosovo…’ (Ellie Tzortzi, ‘Serb PM tells EU to choose between Serbia and Kosovo’, Reuters 03

January 2008, (online). Available at: http://uk.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUKL0367270520080103 [accessed 03 August 2008]). Of course, if left

outside the EU, Serbia could potentially stay as a source of instability in the region, but it is clear that Serbia needs Europe’s help to help itself.

206 B92, ‘Parliament ratifies SAA, Russian energy deal’, B92 (online) 9 September 2008

http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2008&mm=09&dd=09&nav_id=53326

207 B92, ‘EC Kosovo heading for EU’, B92, 13 September 2008 (online), Available at: http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?

yyyy=2008&mm=09&dd=13&nav_id=53443 [accessed 13 September 2008]

208 B92, ‘EC Kosovo heading for EU’, B92, 13 September 2008 (online), Available at: http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?

yyyy=2008&mm=09&dd=13&nav_id=53443 [accessed 13 September 2008].

52



Chapter 4: In or Out: the Western Balkans Membership

Prospective and the Attached Principle of Conditionality

We must never forget that European integration is not about milk quotas and customs

duties. It is about peace, stability and prosperity for our citizens. Instability in one part of

Europe immediately affects the other parts.209

Commission Vice-President Günter Verheugen

As mentioned in the previous chapter since its first announcement at the Feira Council in

June 2000 the WB membership prospective has been continually reaffirmed by various

EU officials. The Zagreb Summit in November 2000 set out clearly the EU membership

prospective for the WB once they meet in full the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ of a ‘stable

democracy, respecting human rights, the rule of law, and the protection of minorities,210

… a functioning market economy as well as the ability to cope with competitive pressure

and market forces within the union [and the] ability to take on all the obligations of

membership’211 i.e. the entire body of EU law and policy known as the ‘acquis

209 Günter Verheugen, Member of the European Commission, ‘Towards a Wider Europe: the new agenda’ p. 2.

210 The minority rights issue is quite problematic even within the EU, (i.e. Spain, Slovakia, Cyprus, Greece, and so on). Checkel for instance has

questioned why ‘the EU promotes one conception of minority rights vis-à-vis candidate countries, but refuses to apply this same standard to its own

member states?’, Jeffrey T. Checkel, ‘Constructivist Approaches to European Integration’, ARENA Working Paper, No. 06, February 2006. p. 23.

211 European Commission, ‘Enlargement -Accession Criteria’, Available at:

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/criteria/index_en.htm

53



communautaire’.212 This chapter explores the ambiguity of WB membership perspective

and the attached principle of conditionality.

4.1 Inclusion/exclusion dilemma

At the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003, the EU confirmed its commitments

to support and prepare the region for future integration into the European structures. 213

Most recently, in June 2008 Summit the European Council reaffirmed again ‘its full

support for the European perspective of the WB, as set out in the Thessaloniki agenda …

[and] that membership perspective remains essential for the stability, reconciliation and

the future of the WB’.214

Starting from this background, the ‘inclusion/exclusion dilemma’215 as far as the WB

countries are concerned seems resolved, although it is not yet clear when they will

become fully-fledged EU members. What is clear, however, is that the EU’s key rationale

towards the WB integration is political stability, as Commission Vice-President Günter

Verheugen has emphasised ‘instability in one part of Europe immediately affects the

other parts’ .216 Therefore, as long as the region is stable politically the economic aspect of

212 The candidate countries have to adopt the entire body of European laws known as the acquis communautaire. This includes all the treaties, regulations

and directives passed by the European institutions as well as judgements laid down by the Court of Justice.

European Commission, ‘Enlargement- How does the country join the EU’, available at:

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/negotiations_croatia_turkey/index_en.htm#5

[last accessed 24 September 2008].

213 The Thessaloniki European Council, June 2003, Available at:

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/sap/thessaloniki_agenda_en.htm ; Since the

Thessaloniki the same commitments were reiterated in December 2007 and in February 2008 the Council ‘reiterated its commitment to fully and

effectively support the European perspective for the Western Balkans’. See, European Commission, ‘Western Balkans: Enhancing the European

perspective’, Brussels, 05 March, 2008, COM (2008) 127 f inal. Available at:

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/balkans_communication/western_balkans_communication_050308_en.pdf [ last accessed 16 September 2008].

214 European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council (19/20 June 2008). Brussels, 20 June 2008, 11018/08. p. 52. Available

at: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/foodprices/council_con_en.pdf

215 Karen E. Smith, ‘The outsiders: the European neighbourhood policy’, International Affairs 81, 4, 2005, pp. 757-773.

216 Günter Verheugen, Member of the European Commission, ‘Towards a Wider Europe: the new agenda’, p. 2.

54



the integration prospect will be of second rank. According to Altmann ‘even Croatia217,

which compared to the other […six] countries of the WB performs clearly better in the

political as well as in the economic sphere, has received the blessing of the EU

Commission to start accession negotiations in a kind of political gift…’218

In addition, Solana has pointed out that apart from the security issues the EU is also

obliged to bring the WB into its structures. During a news conference in Wiesbaden he

stated that, ‘Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo belong to our Continent and their stability is

fundamental to us [but] we [also] have an obligation to offer them a perspective to get

closer to the EU and eventually be members’.

219

Yet, one of the main uncertainties about

the future of EU enlargement is the syndrome of the EU’s ‘absorption capacity’ 220 and

‘enlargement fatigue’.221

217 Currently Croatia is the only country in the WB with which the EU has started accession negotiations. For a more detailed analysis on Croatian EU

perspective see Romana Vlahutin, ‘The Croatian Exception’, in Judy Batt, ed. The western Balkans Moving on, Chaillot Paper No. 70. October 2004. pp.

21-35

218 Franz-Lothar Altmann, ‘The European Union’s Policy in South East Europe – The danger of Unfulfilled Expectations’, in Predrag Jurekovic and

Frederic Labarre eds, From Peace Making to Self Sustaining Peace - International Presence in South East Europe at a Crossroads? (National Defence

Academy Vienna, Austria, 2004). P. 250 Available at: http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/jup04/jup01part4.pdf [accessed 09 February 2008].

219 IHT 2007 ‘EU must offer Balkans hope of EU membership, official says’ International Herald Tribune, March 1, 2007

http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/03/01/news/yugo.php [19 August 2008]. Likewise, Günter Verheugen stated that apart from the ‘major interests in the

stability, prosperity and democracy of its neighbours’ the EU has a ‘moral and political obligations towards’ the WB. Günter Verheugen, Member of the

European Commission, ‘Towards a Wider Europe: the new agenda’

220 Due to length constraints this paper cannot explore the ‘absorption capacity’ syndrome, however, a Centre for European Policy Studies research paper

argues that the term ‘absorption capacity’ should be dropped, since ‘it is giving the impression of some pseudo-scientific and static reality’ unless

deconstructed into more specific and objective elements. The authors note that there is a tendency in some political discourse now to say that, because the

Constitution that was meant to prepare for enlargement failed to be ratified, the enlargement process has now hit a roadblock described as ‘absorption

capacity’. For more details see, Michael Emerson, Senem Aydin, Julia De Clerck-Sachsse, and Gergana Noutcheva, ‘Just what is this “absorption

capacity” of the European Union?’ Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), No. 113, September 2006

221 European parliament press release, ‘EU wants a “boring Western Balkans”, Rehn tells Foreign Affairs Committee’, External relations, 03 April 2008.

Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/infopress_page/030-25655-092-04-14-903-20080403IPR25654-01-04-2008-2008-

false/default_en.htm [accessed 20 August 2008]

55



4.2 Enlargement fatigue

The EU has been suffering from ‘enlargement fatigue’ since France’s two vetoes of

British accession in the 1960s222 although the EU enlargement commissioner Ollie Rehn

has coined the term recently describing the EU’s backlash against 2004 expansion. 223

Nevertheless, enlargement fatigue has been more evident since the 2004 EU expansion

and in particular after the Dutch and French ‘no’ to the EU constitution in their 2005

referenda.224 The ambiguity over further EU Enlargement has been increased after the

Irish ‘no’ to the Lisbon Treaty. This of course has caused some anxiety to the WB

governments whose reforms hinge on their EU membership prospective. Moreover, this

could further dilute regional co-operation set out first on the SP. As stated by a

Macedonian official ‘the Stability Pact would not have had any value on itself if it did not

contain a membership perspective’.225

The enlargement fatigue has also been worrying Olli Rehn who fears that ‘an anti-

enlargement backlash poses a serious threat to the prospect of bringing the rest of the

Balkans into the western club’.226 Rehn emphasised that ‘the political memory of human

beings is unfortunately very short’ and ‘if we go wobbly on enlargement we risk a

nationalist backlash, and we can’t afford that’.227 Moreover, it is possible that if left

222 ESI, ‘Beyond Enlargement Fatigue?’ Part 1, The Dutch debate on Turkish accession, European Stability Initiative ESI, Brussels, 24 April 2006.

Available at: http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_74.pdf [accessed 17 September 2008]

223 Kathimerini, ‘Balkan leaders warn EU against slowing accession due to “enlargement fatigue”’ Kathimerini 06 December 2006, (online). Available at:

http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_world_1_06/12/2006_77429 [accessed 17 September 2007].

224 Richard Gowan, Does the EU Still Want the Balkans’ e!sharp, March-April 2007, Available at:

http://www.peoplepowerprocess.com/images/magflash/mar07/pdfs/pages37-39.pdf [accessed 26 January 2008]

225 Lykke Friis and Anna Murphy, ‘”Turbo-charged Negotiations”:’ p. 770

226 George Parker and Chris Condon, ‘Some Balkan states may find EU's door closed’, Financial Times (online) 7 April 2006, Available at:

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/043af1cc-c5d4-11da-b675-0000779e2340.html [accessed 17 July 2008]

227 George Parker and Chris Condon, ‘Some Balkan states may find EU's door closed’,

56



unattended the WB could become ‘a ghetto that could create criminal and even security

risks for Europe’.228

Despite these fears emphasised by the Commission there has been an increasing

political opposition towards further enlargement even to the WB who have made

significant progress with the SAA towards accession negotiations. Following the EU

summit on 20 June 2008, French President Sarkozy and German Chancellor Merkel,

pointed out that there would be no further enlargement unless all the EU Members ratify

the Lisbon Treaty.229 The French in particular have made it clear that there would be no

enlargement without the new Treaty.

230

Sarkozy argues that the EU would not be able to

expand beyond the current 27 ‘without reforming its institutions’.231 He said: ‘I say to

those countries in favour of [enlarging to] the WB: we need Lisbon’.232 Yet a week later,

he stressed that he is ‘in favour of EU expansion to the Balkans […since they] are,

without doubt, European, but the current members who back expansion cannot at the

same time say “we don’t want Lisbon, but we want expansion”, because Lisbon and

228 James O’Brien, ‘Brussels: Next Capital of the Balkans, The Washington Quarterly, 29:3. 2006. pp. 71–87. p.72 http://www.twq.com/06summer/docs/

06summer_obrien.pdf

229 Simon Taylor, ‘EU executive: EU can enlarge without Lisbon treaty’, 23.06.2008

http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2008/06/2329/eu-executive-eu-can-enlarge-without-lisbon-treaty/61344.aspx [accessed 12 August 2008].

230 France’s State Secretary for European Affairs Jean-Pierre Jouyet who is known as Sarkozy’s top aide on EU enlargement issues, said that ‘Paris

advocates the union’s spread to the whole of the Western Balkans, and that the process of stabilization and association will not be halted, however, there is

no doubt there will be no new EU members without adequate reform of the EU system and enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty’. B92, ‘France: No candidate

status for Serbia in 2008’, 20 July 2008 , Available at:

http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=20&nav_id=52066 [accessed 20 July 2008].


232 Ibid, [emphasis on the original].

57



expansion go hand in hand’.233 Sarkozy’s tough stance on EU’s future expansion appears

to have convinced EU sceptics such as Poland234 to ratify the treaty.235

The Commission and some other EU officials, however, reject Sarkozy’s argument

that the EU could not enlarge without the Lisbon Treaty. 236 Johannes Laitenberger (a

spokesperson for European Commission President José Manuel Barroso) argues that,

‘from a legal point of view the Nice Treaty does not pose an obstacle to further

enlargement’.237 Likewise, Czech Deputy Prime Minister Alexandr Vondra said that

France’s warning on future enlargement is incorrect. He said ‘it simply is not true [ sic] -

the enlargement can go ahead even without the treaty … It’s kind of a lie [what Sarkozy

said]. It’s not impossible. It’s about the political will’. He added that, ‘to allow for the

EU’s further expansion [ sic], only the accession protocol must be “adjusted” for future

members’.238 Moreover, a group of former politicians and diplomats expert in the Balkans

have criticised the EU ‘of backtracking on its promises to bring those countries into the

233 B92, ‘Sarkozy for Balkan enlargement, but not yet’, 10 July 2008 (online) Available at: http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?

yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=10&nav_id=51804 [accessed 10 July 2008].

234 See, BBC, ‘Sarkozy: Poles won’t block Lisbon’, BBC 4 July 2008 (online). Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7490233.stm [accessed 17

September 2008].

235 Some leaders of the EU feel that if the Lisbon Treaty were in force the EU would have been in a much stronger position vis-à-vis Russia following its

invasion of Georgia. See, OpenEurope. http://www.openeurope.org.uk/media-centre/bulletin.aspx?bulletinid=77 [accessed 17 September 2008].

236 Ollie Rehn, the enragement commissioner, rejected Sarkozy’s argument stating that the WB countries should ‘achieve EU candidate status according

to their respective merits’ and that the EU had a “strong setback capacity”, indicating that he believes the EU will bounce back well from Ireland’s

rejection of the Lisbon treaty’. Simon Taylor, ‘EU executive: EU can enlarge without Lisbon treaty’,


238 Marketa Fiserova and Alan Crawford, ‘French Warning on EU “Kind of a Lie”, Czech Deputy Premier Says, Available at:

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601085&sid=awqbccxFLAT4&refer=europe [accessed 15 July 2008]; Likewise, the Austrian Foreign

Minister Ursula Plassnik responding to Sarkozy’s view on enlargement said, ‘I do not share the opinion of French President Nicolas Sarkozy that Croatia

cannot enter the EU on the basis of the Nice Treaty. Legally that is not true, nor is it politically intelligent’. B92, ‘Plassnik: Don’t hinder Balkan

integration’, 20 September 2008 (online) Available at: http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2008&mm=09&dd=20&nav_id=53628

[accessed 20 September 2008].

58

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7490233.stm






European fold [… and] clinging to the status quo rather than pursuing bold moves to

change the Balkans’.239

The ambiguity over the future EU expansion is also evident on the opinion polls. A

Bertelsmann Foundation study in 2007 (table 1.1) has reported that as many as 72% of

the Dutch 70% of the French 68% of the British and 67% of the Spanish respondents

believed that the EU would continue to enlarge beyond 27 members.240

Table 1.1 The EU continues to grow. Where will it end?

How many members will the EU have in 2020?

still 27 MS more than 27 MS less than 27 MS don’t know

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung, EU 2020 - the View of the Europeans Results of a

representative survey in selected member states of the EU, 20 September 2006.

239 IHT, ‘Panel slams EU over Balkans’ International Herald Tribune (online) 9 May 2006 . Available at:

http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/05/09/news/balkan.php [accessed 19 July 2008]. Austrian chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel has described EU dilemma

with enlarging into the Balkans as a ‘psychological problem’. George Parker and Chris Condon, ‘Some Balkan states may find EU's door closed’,

Financial Times (online) 7 April 2006, Available at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/043af1cc-c5d4-11da-b675-0000779e2340.html [accessed 17 July 2008].

240 EU 2020 - the View of the Europeans Results of a representative survey in selected member states of the European Union, 20 September 2006.

Available at: http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/bst/en/media/xcms_bst_dms_18555_18556_2.pdf

Interviewees from … % % % %

France 13 70 12 6

Great Britain 8 68 12 12

Belgium 12 68 23 7The Netherlands 8 72 12 8

Germany 13 64 15 8

Austria 17 64 13 6

Italy 10 60 11 19Poland 12 52 7 29

Lithuania 8 62 9 21Slovakia 12 58 5 25

Spain 10 67 9 14

Hungary 15 63 11 11

Finland 10 61 19 9

59



By contrast, the Eurobarometer poll for 2006 shows a strong resistance to this inevitable

enlargement among the same EU Members.241 The polls on figure 1.2 show that 42% of

the respondents are against further enlargement of the EU. As regards the WB the

Eurobarometer Survey table 1.2 shows that as many as 36% of the overall respondents

are against Croatian accession and as many as 53% against Albanian accession in the

near future.

Figure 1.2 Further Enlargement of the EU to include other countries in future years

Source: Eurobarometer 66, Public Opinion in the EU, Fieldwork: September-October

2006, Publication: September 2007

241 Eurobarometer, ‘Public opinion on the European Union’, September 2007. Available at:

http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_en.pdf

60



QA33. For each of the following countries, would you be in favour or against it

becoming part of the EU in the future?

Table 1.2 Support for enlargement - Tested countries

for % against % don’t know %

Source: Eurobarometer 66, Public Opinion in the EU, Fieldwork: September-October 2006,Publication: September 2007

On the other hand, Olli Rehn has continuously stated that the EU ‘will stand by the

commitments [… it has] made, once the [WB] countries fulfil the strict conditions for

accession. But conditionality [according to Rehn] only works if the countries can trust in

the EU’s commitment to eventual membership, even if that is many years away’.242

4.3. EU Conditionality as a foreign policy tool vis-à-vis the WB

When it comes to the Union enlarging into the WB, the EU has put ‘conditionality’243 at

the heart of its relation with the region and regional cooperation as a key condition for the

WB countries. That is in contrast to CEE – where the EU did not impose regional

242 Olli Rehn, ‘Making the European Perspective real in the Balkans’ Keynote address at the Conference ‘Bringing the Balkans into Mainstream Europe’

by Friends of Europe Brussels, 8 December 2005 SPEECH/05/770 Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?

reference=SPEECH/05/770&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en ; Günter Verheugen also suggests that ‘because we [ the EU]

cannot impose our rules on the partners, they need to be convinced’. Günter Verheugen, Member of the European Commission, ‘Towards a Wider Europe:

the new agenda’ p.9.

243 It is important to note that although conditionality is mainly identified with the EU’s stringent accession criteria it is not invented by the EU. In fact

conditionality ‘has been long used as an informal tool for inter-state relations and has been formalised, designed and redesigned by the Bretton Woods

institutions over the last decades’. South East European Studies Programme workshop, ‘EU Conditionality in the Balkans’, St Antony’s College,

University of Oxford, Friday 22 November 2002. Available at: http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/ext/seesox/Balkans_files/08Conditionality-background_1(2).pdf


Croatia 50 36 13Macedonia 40 44 16

Montenegro 40 43 17

Bosnia and Herzegovina 39 46 15Serbia 37 48 15

Albania 32 53 15

Kosovo N/A N/A N/A

61



cooperation – for the WB the EU elevated the commitment to regionalism into an

element of its conditionality.244 Since then, the principle of conditionality has become a

standard part of the EUFP, and is accepted unconditionally by the receiving end.

Furthermore, conditionality is seen as one of the strongest policy tools that the EU has at

its disposal for maximising its policies towards the WB.245 Apart from being intended as

an incentive for the WB countries to implement the necessary reforms that would

eventually lead to an opening of accession talks, it is also aimed at deepening regional

integration. In addition, the EU’s conditionality has assisted in overcoming domestic

obstacles to further democratic reform.

246

The Commission, however, has been criticised over the way compliance with

conditionality is awarded. Kramer has argued that ‘the Commission’s conditionality

paradoxically rewards states that are most successful in complying with its prerequisites

and punishes the most needy and least stable ones’.247 Yet for Schimmelfennig and

Scholtz ‘EU conditionality is mainly positive, that is, the EU offers and withholds carrots

but does not carry a big stick’.248

244 Dimitar Bechev, Carrots, sticks and norms: the EU and regional cooperation in Southeast Europe’, Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans Vol. 8,

No. 1, April 2006. p. 32.

245 Plamen Ralchev, ‘The EU Conditional Assistance as a Policy Tool Towards Southeastern Europe’, FORNET, Brussels, 2004. Available at:

http://www.fornet.info/documents/Ralchev-Presentation20Feb2004.pdf

246 Frank Schimmelfennig and Hanno Scholtz, ‘EU Democracy Promotion in the European Neighborhood: Political Conditionality, Economic

Development, and Transnational Exchange’, National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) Working Paper No. 9, August 2007. p.3. Available at:

http://www.nccr-democracy.uzh.ch/nccr/publications/workingpaper/pdf/WP9.pdf [accessed 03 June 2008]

247 Heinz Kramer in Mustafa Türkes and Göksu Gökgöz, ‘The European Union’s Strategy towards the Western Balkans: Exclusion or Integration?, East

European Politics and Societies, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 659–690. p. 679.; See also, Wim van Meurs, ‘The Europeanisation of the Balkans: A Concrete

Strategy or just a Placebo?’, Austrian Federal Ministry of Defence: National Defence Academy and Bureau for Security Policy, Sep. 2006, p. 126.

Available at: http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/10_wg_intpeaceplan_100.pdf; Helene Sjursen and Karen E. Smith, ‘Justifying EU Foreign

Policy: The Logics Underpinning EU Enlargement’, in Ben Tonra and Thomas Christiansen, eds., Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy

(Manchester : Manchester University Press, 2004).

248 Frank Schimmelfennig and Hanno Scholtz, ‘EU Democracy Promotion in the European Neighborhood: p. 5.

62



However, what is striking about the principle of conditionality is the fact that

individual EU MS also use it as a tool to achieve their national interests. This assumption

supports the rationalist approach to EUFP, which regard MS’ preferences as rigid with

the aim at gaining the preferred outcome. Consider for example the Netherlands, Greece,

and Slovenia. The Dutch government has made it clear in several occasions that it would

block Serbian integration into the EU if it does not fully cooperate with the Hague

Tribunal249. For the Dutch this issue is considered to be of great national interest. In fact,

‘the Dutch government led by Wim Kok resigned in 2002 after a report on the

[Srebrenica] massacre blamed politicians for sending the Dutch UN troops on an

impossible mission’.250 For years, the Dutch have held a tough approach over Serbia.251

The recent initiative on 15 September 2008 to unfreeze an Interim Trade Agreement with

Serbia was blocked by the Netherlands, because of Belgrade’s failure to cooperate with

the Hague Tribunal.252 According to Serbian officials the Dutch (EU) decision to block

the agreement was not ‘the first, and likely [would] not [be] the last injustice, but that’s

no reason [for Serbia] to change [its] strategic course […towards European

integration]’.253

249 It should be noted that the Dutch have allowed the signing of the SAA between Serbia and the EU, under the ‘constructive abstention’ principle, but

they have made it clear that they would not ratify it without full cooperation.

250 Some of the Dutch politicians feel that they have a moral obligation to bring the perpetrators of the Srebrenica massacre before justice although the

recent Court ruling has cleared the Dutch of their responsibility during the Srebrenica massacre where the Serbs slaughtered more than 8000 Muslim men

and boys. See B92 ‘Court says Dutch not to blame for Srebrenica deaths’ 10 Sep. 2008, B92 (online). Available at: http://www.b92.net/eng/news/crimes-

article.php?yyyy=2008&mm=09&dd=10&nav_id=53379 [accessed 10 September 2008]

251 In 2007, they blocked Serbian efforts to conclude an initial partnership with the EU because of Belgrade’s failure to catch key war crime fugitives.

IHT, ‘EU must offer Balkans hope of EU membership, official says’, IHT (online) March 1, 2007, Available at:

http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/03/01/news/yugo.php [19 July 2008]

252 Dutch Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen pointed out that, ‘whether and when the agreement will be unfrozen depends on specific actions, not

promises by Serbia …[and] only the arrest of Ratko Mladić and his extradition will be considered “full cooperation”’, B92, ‘EU keeps trade deal with

Serbia “frozen”’ 15 September 2008 B92 (online) Available at: http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?

yyyy=2008&mm=09&dd=15&nav_id=53476 [accessed 15 September 2008]

253 B92, ‘EU keeps trade deal with Serbia “frozen”’,

63



Similarly, Greece who has already vetoed the Macedonian bid for NATO

membership, continually threatens Skopje that it will veto its bid to start accession talks if

it does not change its name into something acceptable for Athens. Macedonian Premier

acknowledging the uncertainty over the EU accession stated, ‘I have said many times that

the dispute with Greece over the name and the barriers being erected by Greece are the

key to Macedonia’s accession to the EU’.254 It is important to note that although Greece is

under the US pressure to compromise with its demands, it is unlikely that they will accept

anything that could be seen as a future threat to their territory.255

Further, the empirical evidence also suggests that smaller states in particular use the

EU Presidency as a tool for the promotion of their national interests. Slovenia for

example ‘has been using its clout as a holder of EU presidency to block Croatia’s EU bid’

over the fisheries row and border dispute.256 This led to Croatian government accusing

Slovenia ‘of using its six-month term in the EU presidency to press Zagreb over unsolved

bilateral issues’.257 President Mesic was reported as having said ‘If Slovenia prevents our

entry into the EU by persistently insisting on its attitudes, it will be disastrous for our

future relations’ if that happen any ‘friendship between Slovenia and Croatia is over for

254 See, Kathimerini, ‘Athens waves second veto’, 09 September 2008 (online). Available at:

http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_100010_09/09/2008_100250 [accessed 17 September 2008]. See also, Euractiv, ‘Greece to say

“No” to FYROM’, 31 May 2007, (online) available at: http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/greece-fyrom/article-143595 [accessed 17 September

2008].

255 Mina, ‘U.S. pressure on Greece increases’, Mina, 20 September 2008, (online). Available at: http://macedoniaonline.eu/content/view/1860/45/

[accessed 20 September 2008]; Dora Bakoyannis said after the meeting with her Macedonian counterpart on 20 September 2008, said that ‘Greece would

not give up on finding a solution that would imply a single name for the Macedonian state’.B92, ‘Macedonian, Greek FMs in talks’, 20 September 2008

(online). Available at: http://www.b92.net/eng/news/region-article.php?yyyy=2008&mm=09&dd=20&nav_id=53632 [accessed 20 September 2008]

256 BalkanInsight, ‘Croatia 'To Join EU by 2010' 13 March 2008, (online). Available at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/8575/ [accessed 17

September 2008].

257 EUBusiness, ‘Croatia warns Slovenia not to block its EU bid’, 31 January 2008. (Online). Available at: http://www.eubusiness.com/news-

eu/1201798926.59/ [accessed 17 September 2008].

64

http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_100010_09/09/2008_100250





good’.258 Eventually the Croatian government yielded to EU’s systematic pressure under

Slovenian Presidency and lifted the special ecological fisheries zone (ZERP).259

258 EUBusiness, ‘Croatia warns Slovenia not to block its EU bid’, 31 January 2008.; see also, Reuters, ‘EU warns Croatia again on fisheries zone’, 18

February 2008, (online). Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUSL1848835420080219 [accessed 18 September 2008]; Elitsa

Vucheva, ‘Croatia risks delay in EU membership, MEP warns’, Euobserver 11 January 2008, (online). Available at: http://euobserver.com/9/25430


259 Hannes Swoboda, ‘The Western Balkans Between the Irish “No” and the Slovene Presidency’, Available at:

http://www.kosovapress.com/ks/index.php?cid=2,8,50718 [accessed 1 August 2008].

65



Chapter 5: Findings and Conclusions

The aim of this research was to analyse the making of EUFP before and after the Kosovo

war and the reasons that forced the EU to change its foreign policy towards the WB. By

adopting, a broad understanding of EUFP this study was able to detect and analyse all the

relevant actors involved in the decision-making process. The paper argues that the MS

are still the central actors in EUFP-making towards the WB but clearly they are not the

only ones. Kosovo’s independence case in particular has shown that some of the EU

members maintain power and willingness to take decisions on a purely national basis,

thus, clearly disregarding their commitments for ‘common positions’ set out in the TEU.

On the other hand the fact that the EU was able to reach a consensual position regarding

the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, despite French and British opposition could be

seen as a good example of socialised decision-making over national preferences.

Another important finding is that EU policy-making within CFSP did not follow

exactly the intergovernmentalist approach. Instead, this research shows that when it

comes to EUFP-making towards the WB the role of the Commission and ‘high

representative’ are particularly important. The fact that Solana was able to reach a deal on

behalf of the EU during the Macedonian conflict supports this assertion. In addition, the

EU’s ability to send its mission (EULEX) to Kosovo and sign the SAA with Serbia in

spite of serious Cypriot and Dutch oppositions respectively, under the formula of

‘constructive abstention’ further supports this assertion. Therefore, although the

intergovernmentalist decision-making method is dominating within the EU, it is

66



necessary to take the role of the Commission and ‘high representative’ into consideration,

to fully understand the EUFP.

Further, the findings in this paper indicate that EUFP, prior to the Kosovo war,

suffered from several weaknesses leading to its impotence in dealing with the Yugoslav

crisis. One being that in the early 1990’s the EUFP decision-makers were mainly

influenced by realist thinking and therefore, by aiming to preserve Yugoslav sovereignty,

failed to recognise the root of the problem, and second, the EU lacked cohesion in that it

was suffering from a ‘capability-expectations gap’. Hence, the need to recover from its

‘poor image’ (resulting from recurring failures during the Yugoslav crisis) and the

necessity for an improved and more coherent CFSP drove the EU to make a U-turn in its

policy towards the WB, subsequently narrowing considerably the ‘capability-expectations

gap’. Additionally the depiction of the Kosovo conflict as a ‘European crisis’ contributed

to the policy change. The recognition of the WB as ‘part of us’ during the SP negotiations

clearly supports the Constructivist approach to EUFP which argues that identity,

socialisation and Europeanisation affects actors’ interests and preferences and

intrinsically affects negotiated outcomes.

The evidence, further suggests that the WB membership prospective seems to have

been solved despite the obvious element of enlargement fatigue, although, it is not clear

when the WB countries will become fully-fledged EU members. Another obvious

problem resulting from enlargement fatigue is that the conflicting messages stemming

from various EU officials increase the existing ambiguity over membership perspective,

and could, as a result, discourage the WB governments when proceeding with their

reforms. Therefore, even though continuing EU confirmations to the WB countries with

67



regard to their EU perspective seems to have resolved the ‘inclusion/exclusion dilemma’,

this cannot be taken for granted as long as the EU suffers from enlargement fatigue and

the MS use the membership conditionality as a tool to pursue their bilateral issues.

Further, the case studies analysed in this paper suggest that the constructivist

approach alone cannot explain the EUFP-making towards the WB, and therefore to fully

understand the EU actions, a rationalist approach was necessary. In fact, all three cases

examined in the previous chapter support the rationalist approach to EUFP. In the

Slovenian case, the main negotiating approach regarding the dispute over fisheries zone,

has been bargaining, and the negotiated outcome has been states’ (EU’s) preferences. The

Slovenian case in particular reveals the fact that smaller states use the EU Presidency as a

tool for the promotion of their national interests. In the Greek case, the negotiations over

the name dispute are ongoing. However, although Greece is under the US pressure to

compromise with its demands, it is unlikely that it will accept anything that could be seen

as a future threat to their territory. In the Dutch case, bargaining was the main negotiating

approach, but the fact that they did yield to EU pressure in abstaining from voting over

the signing of the SAA with Serbia supports the constructivist approach, (i.e. joint

interests and socialisation). On the other hand, the previous chapter has shown that on 15

September 2008 the Dutch blocked the EU’s interim trade agreement with Serbia, hence,

supporting the rationalist approach to EUFP-making.

In conclusion, this study has shown that the explanation of EUFP-making towards

the WB should not be limited to just one theoretical view and a single case study. On the

contrary, the choice of an eclectic approach was entirely appropriate given the complexity

of EUFP-making. Further, several case studies explored in this research show that the

68



rationalist theories,260 in concert with the constructivist one, can offer a satisfactory

starting point to comprehend and explain this ongoing puzzle (EUFP).

Words: 12600

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