eu membership for turkey: endless negotiations? … · table of contents foreword 3 about the...

16AICGSGERMAN-AMERICANISSUES

EU MEMBERSHIP FOR TURKEY:ENDLESS NEGOTIATIONS?

Nilgün Arisan EralpRana Deep IslamJoshua W. Walker

AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR CONTEMPORARY GERMAN STUDIES THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

The American Institute for Contemporary GermanStudies strengthens the German-American relation-ship in an evolving Europe and changing world. TheInstitute produces objective and original analyses ofdevelopments and trends in Germany, Europe, andthe United States; creates new transatlanticnetworks; and facilitates dialogue among the busi-ness, political, and academic communities to managedifferences and define and promote common inter-ests.

©2014 by the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies

ISBN 978-1-933942-47-6

ADDITIONAL COPIES: Additional Copies of this Policy Report are availablefor $10.00 to cover postage and handling from the American Institute for Contemporary GermanStudies, 1755 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Suite700, Washington, DC 20036. Tel: 202/332-9312,Fax 202/265-9531, E-mail: [email protected] Pleaseconsult our website for a list of online publications:http://www.aicgs.org

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) alone. They do not necessarily reflectthe views of the American Institute for ContemporaryGerman Studies.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword 3

About the Authors 4

Turkey and the European Union: A “Unique Partnership”Nilgün Arisan Eralp 7

A Fresh Start is Needed: Fostering Turkish MembershipWithin a Renewed EU Enlargement Set-Up

Rana Deep Islam 15

Defining the Relationship: EU-Turkey Relationsas Seen from Washington

Joshua W. Walker 25

After a flurry of new countries joined the European Union in the past decade, Europe may now be encoun-tering enlargement fatigue. When Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007, there were high hopes in Turkey thatits membership would soon follow. Even after Croatia’s accession in 2013, however, the question of Turkey’smembership still remains unclear. After receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 in recognition of the successof the European project, the EU again looked at its foreign and enlargement policies, and the prospect foradding new member states. Existing members are undecided on Turkish membership, with countries suchas Germany and France preferring a “privileged partnership” to full membership.

More than ten years after the EU initiated negotiations for Turkey’s EU membership, the country remains lockedin negotiations, with economic concerns, human rights, and the Cyprus issue looming large. Turkey is anessential country in the West’s relations with the Middle East and is a key NATO ally. Germany, as a leaderin the EU with a sizeable population of Turkish descent, is an integral player in the EU’s enlargement policytoward Turkey and the two countries share deep ties. Indeed, German President Joachim Gauck’s recentvisit to Turkey shows the close educational and cultural connection between the two countries. At the sametime, his criticism of Turkish democracy and freedoms highlights the challenges still facing the country andhas sparked tensions between Ankara and Berlin. The United States is also invested in Turkey’s relationshipwith Europe, emphasizing the need for Turkey to be integrated into Western institutions as a model for anIslamic democracy in its larger neighborhood, in addition to its value as a strategic NATO partner. ButWashington is also concerned about Turkey’s recent domestic turbulences.

This publication offers insights into the Turkish-German-U.S. relationship, and assesses the prospect ofTurkey’s EU membership. Nilgün Arisan Eralp suggests that there are “glimmers of hope” for Turkey-EU rela-tions, including initiation of a dialogue on visas, high-level visits, and the resumption of talks to resolve theCyprus dispute. However, risk factors remain, especially concerns regarding the lack of a true participatorydemocracy in light of the Gezi Park protests. Rana Deep Islam states that a “fresh start” is needed in EU-Turkey negotiations in order to provide leadership in the Muslim world, maintain credibility for the EU, andensure greater burden-sharing in regional conflicts. Germany is an important actor in reviving negotiations,but, as Islam discusses, the domestic divide among German parties and public may prove a stumbling blockto greater German support. Finally, Joshua Walker offers a perspective on EU-Turkey relations from acrossthe Atlantic. Turkey has long prioritized its relationship with the West and the prospect of EU membershiphas been a driving factor in much of Turkey’s internal reforms. Today, Turkey is globally engaged and itseconomy has expanded considerably, but it still struggles at times with its democratic foundation anddomestic policy. As the EU, Turkey, and the U.S. engage in their own elections in 2014, the trilateral dialoguemust remain important and not fall victim to domestic populist rhetoric. All three authors highlight the impor-tance of the relationship not only to Turkey, but also to the West.

AICGS is grateful to the authors for sharing their analysis on this important relationship and to the Fritz ThyssenStiftung for its support of this publication and project. Our work on Turkey will continue, and we invite you tovisit our website, www.aicgs.org, for additional commentary.

Jackson JanesPresident, AICGS

FOREWORD

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EU MEMbErship for TUrkEy

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Nilgün Arisan Eralp has been the Director of the European Union Institute at the Economic Policy ResearchFoundation of Turkey (TEPAV) since 2009. From 1987-1996, Ms. Eralp was an advisor to several senior publicauthorities including the Ministry of State in charge of EU Affairs and Deputy Prime Ministry, and PrimeMinistry in Turkey. In 1996, she coordinated the “Information Network Project for Small and Medium SizedEnterprises on Customs Union” jointly financed by the Economic Development Foundation (IKV) and theEuropean Commission. Between 1997 and 2000, Ms. Eralp functioned as the Head of Department of Policiesand Harmonization in the Directorate General for the EU Affairs at State Planning Organization. After leavingthis position, she served as the Director of National Program in the Secretariat General for the European UnionAffairs (EUSG) until 2009. Throughout this period she has been a member of the Academic Board in theEuropean Research Centre at Ankara University on behalf of the EUSG. Ms. Eralp has lectured in severaluniversities on EU-Turkish and EU relations and has several publications on the same topic. She received herM.A. in economic development from Leicester University, her M.Sc. in European studies from the LondonSchool of Economics, and her B.S. in economics from Middle East Technical University.

Dr. Rana Deep Islam is a Project Manager at Stiftung Mercator and primarily covers its European activities.Dr. Islam holds an MA from the College of Europe in Bruges and a PhD from the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg. Before joining Stiftung Mercator, he worked at the School of Advanced International Studies inWashington, DC, the European Parliament in Brussels, and the headquarters of the Social Democratic Partyof Germany in Berlin. In his PhD studies, Dr. Islam compared the Middle East politics of the EU and Turkey.During his studies he published frequently in academic journals and media. His latest publications areHerausforderung Nahost – Die Außenpolitik der EU und der Türkei im Vergleich (with a preface by GermanForeign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier) and Sozial – Global – Friedlich? a monograph on social demo-cratic principles in foreign policy.

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Dr. Joshua W. Walker rejoined The German Marshall Fund of the U.S. as a Non-Resident Transatlantic Fellowin September 2013. In addition to his work with GMF, Dr. Walker is the Director of Global Programs at APCOWorldwide in the Office of the CEO, specializing in foreign policy, international affairs, and public-private part-nerships. Before working in the private sector, Dr. Walker was a Council on Foreign Relations InternationalAffairs Fellow serving as a senior advisor to a variety of executive branch principals. He worked at the U.S.Department of State in Secretary Kerry’s Office of the Chief Economist in 2013 and served in SecretaryClinton’s Global Partnership Initiative as the senior advisor on the Middle East and North Africa in 2012. Priorto his work with the U.S. State Department, Dr. Walker was a Transatlantic Fellow at the GMF responsiblefor the Turkey program and Japan portfolio of the Asia team. Active in bridging the academic and policy worldssince his childhood in Japan and pursuing a Fulbright Fellowship in Turkey, he co-founded the Yale Journalof International Affairs, Young Professionals in Foreign Policy in New York, and the Project on Religion,Diplomacy, and International Relations at Princeton along with being a Foreign Policy Initiative Future Leaderand Truman National Security Project fellow. He was selected as a “Top 99 Under 33 Foreign Policy Leader”and “Young American Turkish Society Leader.” Dr. Walker has worked for the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, TurkeyDesk at the State Department, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon. He has been affiliated with andtaught at Brandeis University, George Mason University, Harvard Kennedy School, Middle East TechnicalUniversity, Istanbul Sehir Merkez, Tokyo University, Transatlantic Academy, Princeton University, University ofRichmond, and Yale University. Dr. Walker earned his PhD in Politics and Public Policy with a specializationin international relations and security studies at Princeton University. He holds a Master's degree in InternationalRelations from Yale University, a Bachelor's degree from the University of Richmond, and speaks bothJapanese and Turkish fluently.

01A “UniqUE” pArTnErship

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TUrkEy AnD ThE EUropEAn Union:A “UniqUE” pArTnErshipNILGUN ARISAN ERALP

Introduction

The fiftieth anniversary of Turkey-EU relations cameand went without notice in autumn 2013. Althoughthe relationship between Turkey and the EuropeanUnion (EU) is rooted in history, geographical prox-imity, and ideological appeal of Europe, “trying to geta perspective on Turkey’s relationship with the EUhas been a difficult task, somewhat like attempting topaint [the] landscape on a fast moving train: thescenery would change before a particular settingcould be captured with its significant detail.”1 Theevolution of the relationship has been affected by therapidly changing political and economic situation inboth Europe and Turkey and in the inter-national/regional conjuncture. Consequently, thepartnership between them has become complex,unique, and quite unpredictable.

The volatile nature of the relationship was expectedto change after Turkey became an official EU candi-date country in December 1999, and especially afterthe decision by the EU to initiate accession negotia-tions with the country in December 2004. However,the Turkey-EU relationship has been a unique case inthe history of EU enlargement in that a negative turnin the relationship took place after the initiation of thenegotiations. In principle, the initiation of accessionnegotiations constitutes the beginning of an irre-versible process in which the candidate country’smembership prospect becomes gradually clearer2;however, it has turned out to be the opposite case forTurkey. Relations between the parties have beenalmost in constant crisis since 2005.

Turkey has had a politicized, and consequentlystalled, accession negotiation process with the EU.Of the thirty-three accession chapters, more than halfare blocked in the process. Energy (Chapter 15),

Judiciary and Fundamental Rights (Chapter 23),Justice, Freedom, and Security (Chapter 24),Education and Culture (Chapter 26) and Foreign,Security, and Defense Policy (Chapter 31) are amongthese blocked chapters. Existing EU member stateshave proven to be not wholly in favor of Turkishmembership: In addition to the unresolved Cyprusissue,3 the country has had to face a vocal Germany,which has emphasized its special interest in a “privi-leged partnership”4 (which has now evolved into a“strategic partnership”) as well as a unilateral Frenchveto on five (that has recently become four)chapters 5 due to their direct bearing on membership.

Turkey’s situation has become an important topic inthe domestic debates in the leading EU memberstates, particularly Germany, France, and theNetherlands, and especially during periods of elec-tions and referenda. These debates have started torevolve around major identity issues, i.e., the“Europeanness” of Turkey. In this debate, the“Europeanness” of Turkey was defined in terms ofcultural/religious identification rather thanpolitical/economic references. The debates on Turkeyhave been increasingly contextualized in the Islamversus West debate.6

The EU’s discriminatory attitude led to the weakeningof the pro-EU coalition in Turkey. Accordingly, theTurkish government has decelerated the reformprocess, which would have improved the lives of itscitizens. There has been a lack of progress in thefields of transparency, accountability, corruption,gender equality, and freedom of expression.7

Although the EU has had an important role in thissetback in the democratic consolidation process ofthe country, it would not be fair to attribute all themajor flaws in Turkish democracy to the hesitant

stance of the EU stemming from issues of identity.Turkey has had serious difficulties in understandingand embracing the EU norms and values and the gistof the accession process. This misunderstandingsometimes displays itself as a possible shift in the wayTurkey perceives its relations with the EU. The primeminister of Turkey has been heard several timesstating that the country would abandon its quest tojoin the EU if it was offered full membership in theShanghai Cooperation Organization, and thegoverning party recently joined the Alliance ofEuropean Conservatives and Reformists, which isknown for its anti-EU stance in Europe.

Glimmers of Hope

While Turkey-EU relations looked grim and frustratingafter the repression of the Gezi Park protests sparkedan exchange of harsh and accusatory statements andpostponement of opening one negotiation chapter insummer 2013, the end of 2013 appeared to heraldglimmers of hope. Although neither the EU nor Turkeyhas given a definitive opinion on the final target of therelationship, both have given the impression that theywant to keep the process alive and the atmosphereseems marked by a “cautious optimism,” given thefollowing developments:

After the rather sharp tone adopted in the “PoliticalCriteria” section of the 2012 Progress Report forTurkey prepared by the European Commission—themost critical since the late 1990s and early 2000s—the 2013 Progress Report assumed a milder tone.Though including rightful criticisms, especiallyregarding the state of fundamental freedoms andparticipatory democracy in Turkey, the Report tried tohighlight reformist steps, even minor ones, taken bythe government.

After three years of a standstill, an importantchapter in the accession negotiations (Chapter 22:Regional Policy and Coordination of StructuralInstruments) was opened on 5 November 2013. Thischapter was among the five previously blocked byFrance during Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidential term.

In mid-December, the parties initiated a visadialogue, agreeing to a long-awaited roadmap for theliberalization of visas for Turkish nationals wishing to

travel to the EU. This followed Turkey’s agreement tosign the “Readmission Agreement,” which was aprecondition for the instigation of this process, thatcompels Turkey to take back third-country nationalswho have entered the EU illegally via Turkey.9

Important high-level visits occurred in early 2014.Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkeyvisited Brussels after a hiatus of four years to holdmeetings with the top executives of the EuropeanCommission, European Council, and EuropeanParliament. He also visited Germany and met withChancellor Angela Merkel. French President FrançoisHollande also visited Turkey, despite France stillblocking four negotiation chapters.

Finally, in February 2014, after two years of stand-still, a joint statement10 by the Greek Cypriot andTurkish Cypriot leaders announced the resumption ofpeace talks to resolve the Cyprus dispute under theauspices of the UN Secretary General’s GoodOffices mission. The EU welcomed this developmentand seems to be willing to contribute to the ongoingtalks. These talks have the potential to result in a realbreakthrough in Turkey-EU relations as “in everythingbut name, a solution in Cyprus has become a condi-tion for Turkey’s EU membership.”11 It seems ratherunfair as Turkey and Turkish Cypriots supported acomprehensive and balanced solution packagenamed after the then secretary general of the UnitedNations in 2004, i. e. the Annan plan, whereas it wasrejected by Greek Cypriots in a referenda in Cyprus.

Although there are different interpretations of thefactors that have led to this rapprochement, therecent developments in Turkey’s neighborhoodemerge as the main catalyst. For Turkey, instabilityand increasing isolation in such an unstable and riskyregion of the world necessitated a renewed approachtoward the West and the EU. The fragility of theeconomic situation—namely a declining growth rate,a large and structural current account deficit, heavyreliance on short-term capital inflows, decliningforeign direct investment, and a private sector withlarge foreign currency liabilities—seems to haveplayed a significant role as well. The economic situa-tion has become even more tenuous with the U.S.’withdrawal of monetary stimulus from emergingmarkets.

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From the European perspective, the EU does notwant to lose its influence on Turkey, whose positionacts as a buffer between the EU and a strategicregion whose instability has a serious potential toeasily spread to Europe. Thus, there has been a will-ingness to re-engage with Turkey constructively andto retain leverage on the democratic consolidationprocess in the country, which has been lost in recentyears. In this sense, the EU has become especiallyvocal in the aftermath of the Gezi Park protests. Theprotests have been instrumental in changing theperception of Turkey in the EU, as many Europeans“were deeply impressed by the popular upsurge indefense of liberal democratic values” and, for thatreason, the EU was advised against “running awayfrom Turkey.”12

It is unlikely that the aforementioned developmentssignal a shift setting the EU-Turkey relationship on anirreversible positive track. On the contrary, Turkey-EU engagement still has an unsettled nature that caneasily deteriorate due to a number of risk factors.

Risk Factors in the Turkey-EU Partnership

INHERENT RISK FACTOR

The main risk factor, i.e., the vicious circle that isalmost inherent in the relationship, has not changedmuch. The EU’s reluctance to embrace Turkey, mainlyon “essentialist” grounds questioning itsEuropeanness, led to the evaporation of the domesticownership of the EU accession process in thecountry, as referred above. In the aforementionedhigh-level visits by the French president to Turkeyand by the Turkish prime minister to Germany, neitherthe French nor the German leader made statementsthat would assuage the feeling of exclusion amongthe Turkish public. Instead, Hollande referred to thepopular referendum that would take place in Francefor Turkey’s membership once the negotiations arecomplete, and Merkel said that nothing has changedregarding her skepticism about EU membership forTurkey.

In Turkey, although the EU accession has become astate policy, it has remained at the rhetorical level andnever been internalized. “Decision-makers aresupportive of EU membership in principle but tend to

be uncomfortable with key elements of EU condi-tionality,”13 particularly those that appear in the formof norms and values. As the EU has lost its leverageon Turkey, there has been a serious slowdown inTurkey’s democratic consolidation process, and thecountry seems to not be developing into a pluralistictype of participatory democracy based on the sepa-ration of powers and the rule of law. This situationfurther strengthens the anti-Turkey stance in the EU.

Apart from this “structural risk factor” in the relation-ship, most of these recent developments have theirown uncertainties that can actually be disruptive forrelations and can render the outlook for the futureunpredictable.

THE POTENTIAL RISK FACTORS

For a better assessment of the evolution of Turkey-EUrelations, some potential risk factors need to be care-fully observed.

Messages of the 2013 Progress Report

The European Commission’s last Progress Reporton Turkey was generally regarded as an indicator ofwarming relations.14 The Report’s moderate tonewas the main factor that resulted in such an interpre-tation, which was welcomed by the Turkish govern-ment. However, the Report should be read carefullyin light of the recent developments in Turkey beforereaching such a conclusion.

Referring to the overall peaceful nature of the infa-mous Gezi Park protests, the Report emphasizes thata real participatory democracy has not yet beenconsolidated in Turkey. Furthermore, it states thatrespect for fundamental rights—mainly freedom ofexpression and freedom of association—in the judicialprocess will be regarded as a key benchmark for thedemocratic reforms in Turkey. The message for Turkeywith these evaluations seemed to be “there is moreto liberal democracy than just the ballot box.”15

The messages of the Progress Report should betaken very seriously for the future of Turkey-EU rela-tions, given the state of participatory democracy, ruleof law, and fundamental freedoms in Turkey. It is notdifficult to guess that the EU would have quite a nega-

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tive reaction to two recent laws in the country, thefirst tightening the government’s grip on the internetand the second subordinating the Supreme Board ofJudges and Prosecutors to the Minister of Justice.

Shift of Emphasis in Accession to the “Rule of Law”as Declared by the 2012 and 2013 ProgressReports and the Recent Corruption Probe in Turkey

A major shift of emphasis in the EU’s EnlargementStrategy began in 2012. The EU has placed the “ruleof law” at the heart of the enlargement process,making it a key pillar of the Copenhagen politicalcriteria, resulting from challenges faced by theenlargement countries and some relatively newmember states including Bulgaria, Romania, andHungary in this area. The EU’s 2013 EnlargementStrategy states that “countries aspiring to join theUnion need to establish and promote […] the properfunctioning of the core institutions necessary forsecuring the rule of law. […] Fighting organized crimeand corruption is fundamental to countering the crim-inal infiltration of the political, legal and economicsystems.”16

Given this approach by the EU, and given the waythe recent corruption probe is being handled inTurkey via monopolizing control over the critical insti-tutions of the Turkish state and the erosion of theindependence of the judiciary,17 it would not bewrong to think that Turkey’s performance regarding“rule of law” may emerge as another stumbling blockin its already problematic accession process to theEU. In Erdogan’s visit to Brussels and Berlin, it wasmade clear to him that, no matter how this corruptionprobe started, the transparent and impartial func-tioning of the judiciary is of crucial importance and itis absolutely necessary for Turkey to conclude thecorruption investigation. As the current develop-ments in Turkey do not seem to be in line with thesedecisive recommendations, it is getting harder to beoptimistic about the future of Turkey-EU relations.

Accession Negotiations

The prospects of the accession negotiations will becontingent on additional considerations.

Continuation of French Blockage: A CredibilityProblem for the EU

After a three-year delay, the recent opening ofanother chapter is presented by some as a break-through and/or a strategic shift in the accessionnegotiations. However, this is over-stating its impor-tance, as France continues to unilaterally block theremaining four chapters; Hollande made no state-ments regarding its removal during his visit to Turkey.

It is obvious that the negotiation process suffers froma credibility problem. Consequently, only a tinypercentage of the population of Turkey believes thatthe country would be an EU member state if it fulfillsall the membership conditions. A significantpercentage thinks that no matter what the countrydoes, Turkey will never become a member. France’sblock of accession chapters is largely the cause ofthis sentiment. What has been particularly frustratingis that no other EU member has taken an officialposition against this stance. Consequently, theremaining blockage is a credibility—and maybe alegitimacy—test for the EU in its stance vis-à-visTurkey as it not only contradicts a unanimous deci-sion by the EU,18 but also, naturally, is not based onany EU decision.

In this context, Chapter 17 on economic and mone-tary policy has to be singled out from the other fourblocked chapters, as all EU member states (includingFrance) decided unanimously to open this chapterand invited Turkey to submit its negotiation positiondocument with an official letter from the German EUpresidency at the beginning of 2007. After Turkeysubmitted its negotiation position in March 2007,France chose to block the chapter. The result is thatan EU member state nullified a unanimous decisionmade by the EU and disregarded an official letterfrom the EU presidency.

When this issue is raised in EU circles, its defenderscome up with an apparently reasonable argument:the acquis communautaire in Chapter 17 keepschanging due to the ongoing measures that aim toremove the factors that caused the euro crisis andalleviate its negative effects. However, these amend-ments and additions could be presented as “closingbenchmarks” to Turkey, if and when Chapter 17 is

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opened. As none of the chapters would be fullyclosed until the negotiation process comes to an end,it is possible to change and make additions to theclosing benchmarks. One also wonders why theproblem of a constantly changing acquis chapter oneconomic and monetary policy has not been raised inthe accession negotiations with Iceland, with whomthe EU opened the chapter at the end of 2012.

Hence, it would be important for the future of the rela-tionship to determine whether France’s currentstance on Chapter 17 will continue to be backed bythe EU.

Opening of Chapters 23 and 24: AnotherCredibility Issue for the EU

Chapter 23 on judiciary and fundamental rights andChapter 24 on justice, freedom, and security, whichare important for the political reform process and visaliberalization, respectively, are still independentlyblocked by Cyprus. Although the EuropeanCommission, as well as Hollande and Merkel duringthe high-level visits, refer to the necessity of openingthese chapters in order to make progress on fulfillingpolitical criteria and for an enhanced cooperation invisa dialogue, it has become another credibility issuefor the EU since the chapters are “hostage” to onemember state.

Cyprus has unilaterally blocked these chapters since2009. It is difficult to be convinced that two foundingmember states—France and Germany, who still formthe core of the EU—cannot persuade Cyprus to stopblocking the opening of these two crucial chapters.

Visa Liberalization Process

Visa liberalization has a significant symbolic impor-tance for regaining the Turkish public’s trust in the EU.Besides its practical importance for business,students, and tourists, visa liberalization wouldcontribute to alleviating the feeling of being “other” forthe ordinary people of Turkey. The risk in this processexists in the way it was presented to the public inTurkey; i.e., that visas will be automatically removedin three and a half years. In reality, a visa-free regimein the EU is conditional upon some difficult commit-ments in the Road Map prepared by the Commission

and the Re-Admission Agreement signed by Turkey.

The Re-Admission Agreement governing treatmentof migrants to the EU via Turkey, which will enter intoforce in 2017, would definitely necessitate a burden-sharing between Turkey and the EU, at least for theconstruction of reception centers and refugee campsuntil Turkey signs re-admission agreements with thehome countries of the illegal migrants. This can bedone with the EU’s financial assistance and an exten-sive cooperation in border management between theparties.

The discrepancy in the way the commitments in theroad map are perceived by the EU and Turkey is aserious problem in the visa dialogue process. In theroad map prepared by the EU, Turkey appears to havetwo tough commitments to fulfill. These are:

removing the geographical limitation in the GenevaConvention of 195119 on refugees in compliancewith the EU acquis and

amending the visa-free regime it has introduced tothe countries in its neighborhood as an importantsource of soft power.

However, in the “Annotated Road Map”20 preparedby Turkey, it is argued that these commitments will befulfilled upon EU membership, even though such areference to membership does not exist in the RoadMap prepared by the EU.21

Even if all these difficult commitments are met, thefinal decision regarding visa liberalization would stillbe made by the EU Council of Ministers by qualifiedmajority and the European Parliament by absolutemajority. Germany will definitely be dominant in theCouncil voting, where a majority of the remainingmember states would follow suit. It should be takeninto consideration, however, that xenophobic partiesare growing in countries like Finland, France,Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom,and they will have a renewed weight in the EuropeanParliament after the elections in May 2014.

If Turkey’s commitments cannot be fulfilled or if the EUrefuses to initiate a visa-free regime for Turkey despitethe fulfillment of all conditions and the visa regime

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remains intact, this would be another serious blow tothe public’s trust of the Turkish government, to the EU,and most probably to the accession process.

Cyprus Talks

Given the complicated nature of Cyprus in Turkey-EUrelations, the resumed “Cyprus talks,” which weretriggered mainly by the discovery of offshore gasresources in the eastern Mediterranean and theimpact of the euro crisis, have a great potential to playa significant role in breaking the deadlock in theaccession negotiations for Turkey.

However, the resumption of the talks per se does notseem to have an immediate positive effect on Turkey’saccession negotiations. At the beginning of the peacetalks, Cyprus President Nikos Anastasiadis made itclear22 that he would not consider removing Cyprus’unilateral block of negotiation chapters if Turkey doesnot implement the additional protocol, i.e., if Turkeycontinues to keep its ports and airports closed toCyprus. There is a need for caution while estimatingthe positive effect of the talks on Turkey-EU relations.

The gas findings in the eastern Mediterranean stillhave the capacity to further exacerbate the tensionsstemming from the underlying sovereignty dispute atthe heart of the Cyprus problem23 until a final agree-ment is reached.

Prospects for Turkey-EU Relations

Despite the emergence of some positive develop-ments toward the end of 2013, it does not seem quitefeasible that Turkey-EU relations will quickly comeout of the impasse they have been in for some years.

Although the “privileged partnership” option wasregarded by some European politicians as a panaceafor Turkey-EU relations, it will not be acceptable aslong as it is presented as an alternative to member-ship; it is off the agenda. Some scholars24 claim that,thanks to the measures to cope with the euro crisis,the emerging multi-tier and/or multi-speed structurein the EU would pave the way for new and more flex-ible formulations for the membership of Turkey in apost-crisis Europe. It is argued that Turkey can adoptthe EU acquis on key policies such as energy, trans-

portation, the single market, or common security anddefense, but remain outside the EU framework for thesocial charter, the Schengen regime, and the euro.Such an approach can be very attractive and comfort-able given the current state of relations between theEU and Turkey; however, it does not seem very plau-sible. As one high-level EU official said, “you have tobe in first, to be out.” Although a multi-tier and/ormulti-speed Europe seems to be de facto emergingin the EU, for the moment such a structure does nothave a legal base in the Treaties. Most important thanall, even if we assume that such a structure becomeslegal and Turkey was offered a place in a multi-tierEurope, it does not seem probable that it would beTurkey who would choose the EU policies it has toadopt. The key question would be “will Turkey be inthe decision-making mechanisms where the policiesit has to adopt are designed?”

Although none of the parties seems to be willing toreally work for an accession, neither of them woulddare to put an end to the relationship easily. Currently,an effort to keep the negotiation process on track—which is getting more difficult—without thinking aboutthe end sets the tone. The question is: how long aretheyy going to be able to do it?

Withdrawing from EU negotiations would require aserious policy change in Turkey. The goal of EUaccession has become state policy. Nearly half (44percent) of the Turkish public still believes that EUaccession, which was the anchor of the political,economic, and social transformation of the country, isa good thing.25 Turkey’s fading attractiveness in itsown region owed a lot to its EU accession process.There are approximately four million Turks living inEurope, the EU is still Turkey’s main trading partner,and two-thirds of Turkey’s foreign investment comesfrom EU member states.

For the EU, to suspend the negotiation requires aproposal either from the European Commission orfrom one-third of the member states and necessi-tates an approval based on qualified majority from theCouncil of Ministers. It would be difficult for theCouncil to make such a decision, given the currentdistribution of voting power, as it would necessitate255 votes. Additionally, none of the member stateswould prefer such a rupture with Turkey, given the

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severe conditions in its neighborhood.

The real breakthrough in the relationship can beachieved via an “active and credible accessionprocess,” as stated by the European Commission. Inorder to attain that objective, the parties should stoppretending and start regarding each other as realpartners. This would be the litmus test for successfulcooperation.

On the EU’s side, this necessitates dealing withTurkey’s deficits in fulfilling membership conditionsseriously rather than only the “Cyprus problem andcivilizational compatibility questions.”26 Such a shiftin the EU’s stance can be sustainable if it does notstem from a re-evaluation of its interests due to achange in conditions: “It is in the EU’s hands tochange this stance but it is the Turks who can rein-force it.”27 Turkey should take the EU accessionprocess seriously to attain and internalize theuniversal norms and stop referring to EU criticisms asinterference in its domestic affairs. A country cannotcontinue to have a European vocation while resentingthe involvement of the EU in its so-called “internalaffairs,” especially when these “internal affairs” corre-spond to crucial EU and universal values like rule oflaw and fundamental freedoms.

Notes

1 Ahmet Evin, “introduction” in Turkey and the European Community,eds. Ahmet Evin and Geoffrey Denton (opladen: Leske u. budrich,1990).

2 nilgün Arisan and Atila Eralp, “What Went Wrong in the Turkey-EUrelationship” in Another Empire? ed. kerem Öktem, Ayşe kadıoğlu,Mehmet karlı (istanbul: bilgi University press, 2012), 382.

3 The EU has suspended eight negotiation chapters related to customsunion as Turkey does not implement the additional protocol, i.e., keepsits ports and airports closed to Cyprus. Cyprus unilaterally blocks sixchapters.

4 Under Angela Merkel’s leadership, the German coalition has turned tothe notion of “privileged partnership” short of membership, first coined byheinrich August Winkler, a prominent historian opposed to Turkey’saccession.

5 Economic and Monetary policy, Agriculture and rural Development,financial and budgetary provisions and institutions.

6 Christopher Caldwell, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe (suffolk:Allen Lane/penguin books, 2010).

7 nilgün Arisan Eralp, “Turkey-EU relations: has it become a hopelessCase?” TEPAV Policy Note 51 (october 2011).

8 Aycan Akdeniz, “EU-Turkey relations: Towards a Constructive re-Engagement?” TESEV Foreign Policy Program Paper, october 2013.

9 kemal kirişçi, “Will the readmission agreement bring the EU andTurkey together or pull them apart?” CEPS Commentary, 4 february2014, <http://www.ceps.be/book/will-readmission-agreement-

bring-eu-and-turkey-together-or-pull-them-apart>.

10 “Joint Declaration: final version as agreed between the two leaders,”Cyprus Mail, 11 february 2014, <http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/02/11/joint-declaration-final-version-as-agreed-between-the-two-leaders/>.

11 nathalie Tocci, “Turkey’s neighbourhood policy: A Europeanperspective,” On Turkey, The German Marshall fund of the Unitedstates, 5 April 2011.

1 Marc pierini, “Two squares, one requirement,” Hürriyet Daily News, 9December 2013.

1 Ziya Öniş, “Conservative Globalists versus Defensive nationalists:political parties and paradoxes of Europeanisation in Turkey” in Turkey’s

Road to European Union Membership: National Identity and Politics, ed.susannah Verney and kostas ifantis (new york: routledge, 2009).

14 EurActiv, “Commission report signals thaw of EU-Turkey relations,” 21october 2013, <http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/commission-report-signals-thawin-news-531196>.

15 Marc pierini, “Europe and Turkey: still Talking?” European Voice, 17october 2013.

16 European Commission, “Communication from The Commission ToThe European parliament And The Council, Enlargement strategy andMain Challenges: 2013-2014,” <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/strategy_paper_2013_en.pdf>.

17 kemal kirişçi, “Turkey’s Democratic institutions besieged,” Opinion,The brookings institution, 3 January 2013.

18 in the “negotiation framework Document” agreed by all EU Memberstates on 3 september 2005, it is stated that “The shared objective ofthe negotiations is accession.”

19 Turkey provides refugee status to citizens of member states of theCouncil of Europe only. Turkey recognizes “temporary asylum” for peoplecoming from countries that are not members of the Council of Europe.

20 “Annotated road Map Towards a Visa-free regime with Turkey,” 12July 2013, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/agreed%20minutes%20ve%20annotated%20roadmap.pdf>.

21 “roadmap: Towards a Visa-free regime With Turkey,” 2013,<http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/news/docs/20131216-roadmap_towards_the_visa-free_regime_with_turkey_en.pdf>.

22 see AB Haber, 14 february 2014, <http://abhaber.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=55632:nikos-anastasiadis-t>.

23 nathalie Tocci in “Judy Asks: is now the Time to solve the CyprusDispute?” Judy Dempsey’s Strategic Europe, Carnegie Europe, 19february 2014, <http://www.carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=54569>.

24 nathalie Tocci and Dimitar bechev, “Will Turkey find its place in post-Crisis Europe?” Global Turkey in Europe Policy Brief 5 (December2012), <http://www.iai.it/pdf/GTE/GTE_pb_05.pdf>; Meltem Müftüler-baç, “The future of Europe, Differentiated integration and Turkey’srole,” Global Turkey in Europe Commentary 9 (october 2013),<http://www.iai.it/pdf/GTE/GTE_C_09.pdf>.

25 The German Marshall fund of United states, Transatlantic Trends

Survey 2013, <http://trends.gmfus.org/transatlantic-trends/>.

26 nigar Göksel, “ Turkey’s Europeanization: Conspiracy orDemocracy?” On Turkey, The German Marshall fund of the Unitedstates, 12 november 2013.

27 Eduard soler i Lecha, “A new Chapter in EU-Turkey negotiations: Astep Too small,” CIDOB Notes internacionals 78 (november 2013).

02A frEsh sTArT isnEEDED

Looking at the seemingly endless story of Turkish-European Union relations is reminiscent of the legendof Sisyphus.1 The Greek king was made to roll aboulder to a mountain’s peak but the rock falls backas he reaches the top, and Sisyphus has to start fromthe beginning—time after time. Those ups and downsare characteristic of Turkish-EU relations as well. Tiedby a decade-long process, the relationship displaysa constant cycle of diplomatic alienation and prox-imity. Mutual treaties and the expressed desire of bothsides to proceed with EU accession talks alternatewith serious diplomatic stalemates in which the twoactors seem to have neither the intention nor theinterest in really achieving substantial progress onnegotiations. Like Sisyphus’ infinitely-rolling stone,the story of EU-Turkish relations is caught in the sameloop. In order to avoid ancient history becoming theguiding light for twenty-first century politics, it isimperative to launch political initiatives that are finallyable to end this cycle.

Where We Stand Right Now

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, TurkishEU membership enjoyed momentum. First, theEuropean Union appeared to be committed as neverbefore to push forward the case of Turkish accession.The German chancellor and French president at thetime, Gerhard Schröder and Jacques Chirac, respec-tively, were among the staunchest advocates of suchan enlargement. Both decision-makers brought theneeded political weight to finally reach a breakthroughon the European level, illustrated by the 1999 EUHelsinki decision that formalized Turkey’s member-ship application. Next, the 2003 coming to power ofthe Justice and Development Party (AKP), under theleadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was the startingpoint for a unique domestic reform program that

demonstrated the country’s willingness to implementessential European economic and political values, aprerequisite for further integration. The direction wasclear: Turkey was on its way toward Europe, whosegates were flung open as never before. Membershiptalks began in 2005.

By 2014, times have changed. The atmosphere ofintegration that could be witnessed has turned intothe opposite. Nowadays, politicians and experts fromboth sides increasingly question whether Turkey andthe EU would be better off if they terminate the still-ongoing negotiations.

Four Reasons for the Turkey-EU Stalemate

First, substantial parts of the accession negotiations,divided into thirty-five negotiation chapters, areblocked. The Turkish government still refuses toextend the free-trade agreement to Cyprus, althoughit is obliged to do so on the basis of the free-tradeagreement it maintains with the EU. Ankara explainsthis as a reaction to the EU’s non-implementation oftrade liberalization measures for the Northern part ofthe island, after the Southern Cypriots rejected theso-called Annan Plan. This diplomatic initiative by theUnited Nations (UN) would have sketched out a roadmap for the island’s reunification. The EuropeanCommission considers the Turkish refusal to open itsentry hubs for Southern Cypriot trade carriers to bediscrimination of an EU member state. Consequently,Brussels decided in 2006 to block the opening ofeight negotiation chapters. Another six chapters in thefield of economic and monetary policy were stalleddue to former French President Nicolas Sarkozy, avigorous opponent of Turkish EU membership. Heargued that negotiations in those crucial chapterstouch upon the core business of EU integration and

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A frEsh sTArT is nEEDED: fosTErinGTUrkish MEMbErship WiThin A rEnEWEDEU EnLArGEMEnT sET-UpRANA DEEP ISLAM

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therefore lay the ground for a path dependency thatwill make Turkish accession irrevocable. CurrentFrench President François Hollande seems to bemore friendly to integration and willing to end hispredecessor’s course. At the moment, however, it isnot yet clear whether Hollande is committed tounblocking all areas of negotiations that had beenpreviously been kept on hold, or just those that appearto be economically and politically opportune, at leastfrom the French perspective.

Second, hurdles of political legitimization may proveto be insurmountable. Important member states likeFrance, Cyprus, and Austria have announced theirintentions of conducting referenda on a Turkishaccession. Public opinion polls in those countriesillustrate a stable majority against such an enlarge-ment. As the votes are supposed to be binding for therespective governments, Turkish membershipappears almost impossible, as every enlargementdecision must be made unanimously by the Councilof the European Union. A single dissenting vote isenough to let decades of mutual negotiations erodeovernight.

The third explanation for the estrangement betweenAnkara and Brussels relates to the two alreadymentioned, namely the blocked negotiation chaptersand the referenda that are hard to win: Turkish deci-sion-makers naturally recognize the public and polit-ical rejection from the EU. In this regard, diplomaticrelations are not different from human relations. If oneloses old friends, he will look for new friends, asTurkey did when it fundamentally reshaped its foreignpolicy preferences. Under the auspices of foreignminister Ahmet Davutoglu and Muslim neighbors, tookTurkey only a few years to substantially improve itsreputation among Islamic societies. Many of thesecountries consider Turkey to be a successful exampleof a state with a Muslim majority population that isable to adopt democratic norms and values—gener-ally identified as “Western”—while not losing itsunique Muslim identity. The Arab Spring made thelimits of Turkish rapprochement with the Arab worldobvious. However, one thing became clear: Turkey nolonger sees itself as a state at Europe’s periphery, butrather as a regional center that has stakes in both theEU and its eastern neighborhood. EU membershipremains of value for Turkish decision-makers, but

nowadays it represents just one of several strategicgoals that are weighted according to its cost-benefitratio for Turkey. The warm Turkish-European relation-ship of the past has been replaced by chillyRealpolitik.

Fourth, and most importantly, the Turkish governmenthas lost its commitment to democratic liberalization.The reform spirit that characterized Erdogan’s policyright after he came to power is fading away. This wasdramatically illustrated by the brutal crackdown onthe so-called Gezi protests in 2013 and rhetoricallystated by the European Commission in its annualProgress Reports. The guarantee of fundamentalfreedoms is a necessary and non-negotiable prereq-uisite of EU membership. Since its founding, theEuropean Union has been a community of values andnot just an internal market, as more pragmatic EUobservers might assume. In other words: The commit-ment to freedom of press, opinion, and assembly, aswell as minority rights, is at the heart of the Europeanintegration project and must not be put in question. IfErdogan and his government do not deliver on thatfront, accession will be impossible, not because ofpolitical obstacles, but, rather, because of differentapproaches vis-à-vis the value of civil society involve-ment and democratic participation mechanismsbeyond voting.

A German Perspective

The shift in EU-Turkey relations and the relatedenlargement fatigue is well illustrated when looking atthe issue from a German domestic viewpoint. Due tothe migration of Turkish “Gastarbeiter” (guestworkers) in the 1960s, the Turkish community nowa-days makes up the largest proportion of foreigners inGermany. This fact ties the two countries closelytogether and provides the basis for the high priorityaccorded to Turkish politics in Germany. For a longtime, Germany’s position on Turkish EU membershipwas characterized by bipartisan consent. Thingschanged after the end of the Cold War in 1989/1990.Turkey lost its unique geostrategic position it hadoccupied for so long in the context of the Westernand European security architecture. Instead, culturaland identity-related ideas became more pronouncedin the Brussels-Ankara relationship. A new questionwas being asked: Is a country like Turkey, with a popu-

lation of mainly Muslims, really compatible with theJudeo-Christian heritage of the European Union? TheGerman center-right party, the Christian DemocraticUnion (CDU), adopted this stance and made it anessential part of its party profile. Turkey-skepticismwas reflected in executive politics by then ChancellorHelmut Kohl.

Things changed at the end of the 1990s. The HelsinkiCouncil in 1999 brought new momentum for Turkey-EU relations and finally granted official candidatestatus to Ankara. Reasons for this turn were multifac-eted, but a key factor was the political shift in severalEuropean countries from conservative to center-leftgovernments, which seemed to be more inclinedtoward Turkey’s membership. When GerhardSchröder became chancellor in 1998, his newly-elected coalition with the Green party was deter-mined to put the country’s bid for accession at the topof its European agenda.

The split between center-right and center-left forcesin German politics primarily arose from differentconceptions of the role and purpose of the EuropeanUnion. In the CDU, the dominant voices becamethose who considered the EU to be primarily a culturalproject, based on a common religious and historicalheritage not shared by Turkey. On the other side ofthis debate, the Social Democrats and the Greensdisplayed a different understanding of the Europeanproject. For them, the core of EU integration wasessentially characterized through diversity, making itrather inappropriate to elevate cultural differences—alleged or real—to factors of exclusion. Instead, intheir view the European Union was founded on thebasis of universal political values like democracy,human rights, and the rule of law, which should beapplied as the guiding principles for judging Turkey’sEuropeanness.

However, this clear-cut dividing line of the Germanparty spectrum blurred as enlargement fatigue grewand Turkish government officials’ constant under-mining of basic rights. As a consequence, Germany’spolitical left softened its public position in favor ofTurkish EU membership. During a state visit toGermany by the Turkish prime minister and foreignminister in January 2014, representatives from theGreens and from the SPD emphasized the impor-

tance of accession negotiations. Primarily, however,they had been talking of the necessity to leave openthe door for membership while not mentioning thedesirability of membership, per se.2 In other words:Keeping up negotiations is considered a useful toolfor pushing the implementation of basic rights inTurkey and securing strategic and economic ties thatare essential for both actors. In this sense, negotia-tions are more strongly weighted than the finaloutcome. With the majority of the German populationagainst Turkish EU membership, political strategy alsorecommends the center-left spectrum not tie its polit-ical fate to this matter. Therefore, it can be expectedthat Turkish membership itself will be of decreasingrelevance for the Greens and the SPD, meaning thatthe Bosporus country is about to lose important advo-cates.

The Role of the United States

Across party lines, the U.S. has always been in favorof Turkish EU accession. Strategic and securityconsiderations pushed Turkey’s EU ambition to a U.S.foreign policy priority. During the Cold War, Turkeyserved as a bulwark against Soviet influence. Thecountry’s NATO membership and its geographic loca-tion at the very east of the Mediterranean made it asignificant asset for rolling back Moscow’s attemptsto gain access to Europe, at least from a U.S.perspective. After the September 11 attacks, Turkeybecame of even more strategic interest. Washington’sforeign policy decision-makers recognized thecountry’s potential as a political and cultural bridgeinto the Muslim world. At a time when the idea of a“clash of civilizations” dominated the mainstream ofinternational politics, Turkey was seen as an antidotethat could foster diplomatic dialogue with the region.The Bush administration publicly supported Turkey’smembership aspirations, regularly leading to transat-lantic frictions: Even the Europe-based proponents ofAnkara’s accession considered Washington’s onlysupport as interference in “domestic” EU politics.Some even argued that a U.S. call for Turkish entryinto the EU would be equivalent to European deci-sion-makers demanding Mexico’s integration as thefifty-first state. Regardless of the technicalities, thiscomparison shows the irritation and estrangementfelt by European decision-makers toward Americansupport for the Turkish cause.

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This transatlantic dividing line almost disappearedunder the Obama administration, which has more orless remained silent on the membership question. Inprinciple, it can be assumed that President BarackObama, like his predecessors, prefers Turkey to be in,rather than out, of EU structures. However, he isunwilling to translate such a position into public policyand let this issue be an additional burden for thetransatlantic relationship. The U.S. administration’sreservation in this regard is not to be misinterpretedas a form of complacency about Turkey as a whole;quite the opposite. Washington still acknowledgesthe country’s strategic advantage as a stable democ-racy in a conflict-torn region, as seen since theoutbreak of the Syrian civil war, during which Obamaand Erdogan have maintained close personal anddiplomatic contact.3 The relationship remains strictlybilateral and does not take place within the multilat-eral EU context. It seems that the U.S. considersTurkey to be an essential part of its Middle East poli-tics but, in a break from the past, is no longer anelement of transatlantic relations. The U.S. course ofnon-interference in EU enlargement is significant forand correlates with the stuck negotiation processitself.

Terminating Membership Talks is Not anOption

The EU’s negotiation process with Turkey is open-ended. This means that accession is the aim of nego-tiations but not predefined, as was the case with allother enlargements in the past. Turkish decision-makers consider this limitation as proof of a “second-class membership,” illustrating the EU’s unwillingnessto grant accession. Accordingly, the open-endedprocess is a delaying tactic that allows the EU toelevate Turkey’s association with the Union whilepostponing the final decision to an indefinite time infuture. Be that as it may, the negotiation mandate—atreaty of international law—was approved by allparties involved in October 2005, stating:

“As agreed at the European Council in December2004, these negotiations are based on Article 49 ofthe Treaty on European Union. The shared objectiveof the negotiations is accession. These negotiationsare an open-ended process, the outcome of whichcannot be guaranteed beforehand.”4

An open-ended process implies the possibility offailure. And seeing the many burdens and challengesthat are characteristic of today’s state of Turkey-EUrelations, such a scenario is currently more likely thanintegration. Of course, one can legitimately questionthe point of negotiations when both partners haveseemingly lost their commitment and will to bring themembership talks to a common success. However,the first question must be: What are the conse-quences of terminating the accession process? Withregard to all actors named above—the U.S., the EU,and Turkey—three considerations should be kept inmind:

Leadership in the Muslim world. Turkey must havea strong interest in keeping up the closest possibleties with the European Union. Its improved reputationamong Muslim societies, as previously mentioned, ispredicated upon its status of being a genuineEuropean democracy. Turkey’s political system, itssymbiosis of a Muslim heritage and Western values,is highly appreciated among many people in theregion, and it distinguishes the nation from the auto-cratic or non-elected decision-making systems thatare still in place in many countries of the Middle Eastand North Africa. This means, too, that once Turkeyand the EU cut their bonds entirely, Ankara will loseits unique selling point that made it a source of inspi-ration for democratic and liberal transformation in thepast. Furthermore, and from an economic perspec-tive, Turkey has always been a gate keeper forEuropean-Middle Eastern market relations. Turkeyserved as a facilitating hub for trade, market access,and foreign direct investments. An end to the negoti-ation process and its unforeseeable economic impli-cations will be a huge set-back for the developmentof regional markets, especially at a time when hugeeconomic and demographic challenges, aggravatedby the events of the so-called Arab Spring, suggestthat economic integration is needed most.

Maintain credibility. The European Union, too,would be well advised not to diminish its relationshipwith Turkey. Throughout fifty years of common history,the EU (and its predecessors) has announced—somewould say promised—membership for Turkey severaltimes. The so-called Ankara Agreement from 1963established a close association between both sides;the Turkey-EU customs union from 1995; the EU

decision to make Turkey a membership candidate in1999; and finally the start of negotiations in 2005were steps in a process that was supposed to leadto membership in the end. However, anything otherthan full-fledged integration would dramatically under-mine the EU’s credibility for being a reliable and trust-worthy actor in international politics. The Turkish casewould thus reach far beyond the borders of EU-Turkeyaffairs and give the impression of a European Unionnot sticking to its commitments. Such a scenariowould deeply affect the EU’s ability to interact withother non-EU entities on the basis of legally-bindingtreaties. Loss of credibility in foreign and securitypolicy is also a concern. Considering the multifacetedstability challenges in the EU’s neighborhood, Turkeyis an outstanding asset. The country maintains diplo-matic relations, personal contacts, and cultural affili-ations with many regional stakeholders, as well astraditional soft and hard power tools. Ankara cansignificantly contribute to make the EU’s actions ininternational relations more robust. Former enlarge-ment commissioner Günter Verheugen often under-lined that, in this regard, the EU needs Turkey morethan the other way around.5

Burden-sharing. The U.S. would also benefit fromthe leadership and credibility that would come withmaintaining Turkey-EU relations. The closer theirbonds, the better and more capable both partners,the EU and Turkey, can act on the international level,especially vis-à-vis the Middle East. At a time whenthe United States feels pressure from the limitationsof its own foreign policy, the more it gives attention tointernational burden-sharing and alliance-buildingwith like-minded partners. Iran’s nuclear program; theSyrian civil war; and constant unrest in Egypt, Libya,and Tunisia exceed the individual conflict resolutionmechanisms of the U.S., Turkey, and the EU, whileimplying serious economic, political, and stabilityimplications for all three. Only through cooperationwill Washington, Brussels, and Ankara have a chanceto pacify a conflict-ridden region. The membershiptalks are an essential element of the strategic part-nership between Turkey and the EU, and they benefitthe U.S.’ interest in the medium-term, too. As such,Washington should end its silence on Turkish-European affairs.

In the end, it is clear that even though a termination

of membership talks might be possible, it must not bean option. Such a scenario is not in the interest of theEU, Turkey, or the United States.

Time for New Ideas

The current stalemate on Turkey-EU relations posesa dilemma: while negotiations are going nowhere,neither side can afford a de facto end. This makessense to look again into the negotiation mandate,which states:

“While having full regard to all Copenhagen criteria,including the absorption capacity of the Union, ifTurkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obli-gations of membership it must be ensured that Turkeyis fully anchored in the European structures throughthe strongest possible bond.”6

The emphasis needs to be put on the idea of a“strongest possible bond.” The formulation impliesthe prospect for a mutual relationship that is still to bedetermined. This lays the groundwork for the conceptof a “dynamic membership.” The enlargement processin its current form does not foresee anything otherthan a clear-cut “yes” or “no” to the membershipquestion, an outlook that seems to be too short-sighted to fully mirror the complexity of the issue atstake. It was Cemal Karakas, a German politicalscientist from the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt,who introduced the concept of a so-called gradualmembership.7 The idea is that membership talks donot need to lead to an entire adoption of the acquiscommunautaire at once. Instead, accession could beplanned to take place step-by-step, depending onthe accession country’s technical ability to complywith the EU’s required common rights and obliga-tions. Such a procedure allows the sectoral inclusionof Turkey into policy fields where feasible and appro-priate, for instance customs, energy, or foreign policy.

The current blockade of the membership process isforemost due to the lack of political will and ability toreach a common solution. During the process, theopening or blockade of a negotiation chapter itselfhas turned into a trivial bargaining chip that is meantto serve a domestically-driven interest agenda insteadof negotiating in a constructive spirit of achievingprogress. In reality, disagreements on the factual level

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are much less than the current stalemate mightsuggest. The technical and administrative implemen-tation of EU legislation could have already been muchfurther developed now if both sides had followed theidea of a gradual membership plan.

One significant example where sectoral inclusionwould be helpful is in trade and customs policy.Based on the mutual customs union that the twosides agreed to in 1995, the EU defines the commonexternal tariff that also extends to Turkey, althoughthe country is not involved in decision-making. In otherwords, Brussels decides on the trade policy thatAnkara maintains with third countries. Such a transferof national sovereignty to the European level withoutpolitical representation implies a serious lack ofdemocratic legitimacy for EU-Turkey relations.Gradual integration can cure such an institutionalmalfunction that has crept into EU-Turkey relations.

Other policy areas, too, would allow such a gradualintegration, be it food safety, intellectual property,energy, transport, or free movement of capital.Negotiations are already under way in all those fields.In the event that Turkey fulfills all adoption criteria,those chapters should be closed and accession talksfinalized by transferring full membership rights toTurkey in those policy areas. Granting partial member-ship rights would allow Ankara to take part in therespective Council of Ministers, including full votingpower but excluding the veto right. The latter shouldbe no crucial matter, considering that an increasingnumber of decisions are made by qualified majorityvoting (QMV).

Furthermore, the Committee of PermanentRepresentatives of the EU member states, whichprepares the respective Council meetings, tries toreach consensus on all policy issues beforehand. Astrong esprit de corps remains the guiding principleof decision-making on all levels. However, at the sametime, it must be clear that once Turkey is included inEU structures on a member level, the country commitsto fully implement all directives and regulations thatare decided by the Council in that policy field. In orderto also maintain the co-decision procedure betweenthe European Parliament and the Council, and for thesake of assuring democratic participation as muchas possible, Turkish representatives of the legislature

could be integrated into a Turkish-European parlia-mentary chamber that could evolve out of the existingEU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee. Turkishdecision-makers could then participate in the fullspectrum of EU legislation.

Last but not least, a gradual integration must not beconfused with the idea of a “privileged partnership,”which is particularly supported by German ChancellorAngela Merkel. The dynamic form of integration, asdescribed above, keeps the long-term goal of fully-fledged membership and will allow the EU to stick toits promises at the same time. The “privileged part-nership,” however, excludes any form of membershipand will therefore not resolve the credibility gap thatthe EU would suffer if it rejects the Turkish accessionbid.

What to Expect from a RenewedEnlargement Set-up

There are four clear advantages to a fully revampedenlargement set-up:

First, dynamic membership allows a step-by-stepintegration that would not overburden the institutionaldesign of the EU. It should be kept in mind that the so-called Copenhagen Criteria not only apply to a candi-date country, but also to the EU that is supposed tohave enough absorption capacity to successfully inte-grate a new member country into its structures. Andindeed, a Turkish accession would have far-reachingimplications for the EU’s policy set-up, e.g., withregard to the free movement of labor, the mobility ofpeople and services, the allocation of structural fundsand subsidies, or the distribution of votes in theCouncil of Ministers and the European Parliament.Furthermore, one can argue that the EU has not yetsuccessfully coped with the “big bang” enlargementof 2004 that added ten new countries into the circleof EU member states. We can legitimately questionwhether the EU will again be able to integrate acountry as big as Turkey in size and population. Adynamic integration, however, would prevent an insti-tutional overstretch and allow a smooth transition intothe Union, according to the EU’s capacities.

Second, a gradual approach would counter Turkey’sostensible turning away from Europe. Indeed, Turkey

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redefined its strategic relations that it maintains withits neighboring non-European countries. In January2013, Prime Minister Erdogan caused irritation inEuropean capitals when he stated that Turkey canimagine replacing its EU candidacy with membershipin the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a multi-lateral forum including, among others, China andRussia.8 Partial integration into the EU, however,would keep the country within genuine EU structures.The institutional ties would even be reinforced as thelevel of association would be as dense as neverbefore. A structural rift between the two parties couldbe forestalled.

Third, a dynamic membership appears to be the onlyoption acceptable for Ankara. Turkey still rejects anykind of institutional association that does not includefull membership status. As a mutual agreement canonly be reached on the basis of consensus, Brusselsmust offer more than just “everything but institutions”as it does with the countries of its neighborhoodpolicy. Indeed, Turkey would be subject to a newlyarranged enlargement procedure, which might lead tosuspicions of a second-class membership. However,it must be clear that “take it or leave it” accessionrounds, like the one from 2004, are definitively over.Ten years later the setting and the frame conditionsfor European politics completely changed, be it withregard to the financial crisis, questions of democraticlegitimacy, or the serious foreign policy challenges inthe EU’s neighborhood. The enlargement procedure,too, must adapt to those realities of the EU in thetwenty-first century. However, a full-fledged member-ship still remains the final goal of the process. Thedynamic integration therefore appears to be the onlyviable option that can serve the priorities and needsof both sides.

Fourth, such new membership logic can also beconsidered as a role model, because it is transferrableto other aspirant or candidate states that want tobecome part of the EU, e.g., the countries of thewestern Balkans. And regarding the revolutionaryevents in Ukraine in 2014, it is very likely that Kiev’smembership will also sooner or later form part of theenlargement agenda. In all those cases the structuraldeficits of the EU’s integration capacity remain thesame. As such, the dynamic integration can takeeffect far beyond the Turkish case. Even more so: the

United Kingdom, too, is committed to renegotiate theterms of its membership status. The Cameron admin-istration openly admits its desire to renationalizecertain policy fields that are currently governed bythe EU. Considering that London apparently wants topartially opt-out of the Union, the gradual membershippattern can be of value for candidate countries in thewaiting line as well as for member states that want toloosen their EU ties. Altogether this new form ofdynamism could once and for all bridge the gapbetween the seemingly disparate poles of deepeningand widening.

Conclusion

The idea of a dynamic membership leaves open manyissues and it is legitimate to question its compatibilitywith European law. However, the EU has always beena project under construction, constantly undergoingsignificant changes in its more than sixty-year history.There is no such thing as finalité as the EU’s institu-tions are in a permanent flux depending on the imper-atives of its socio-political environment. Now is thetime for European decision-makers to remember thisstrength that always characterized the idea of inte-gration—change. The economic and financial crisis,which turned into a democracy and legitimacy crisis,and the many security challenges in Europe’s neigh-borhood, give good reason to cast doubt on the effi-ciency of the EU’s political and institutionalcapabilities. “Business as usual” is the worst of allpossible options. Instead of maintaining a policy of“muddling through,” what is needed most is a majorredesign of EU politics. The enlargement agendacannot be excluded from such a general review as theEU’s relations toward newcomers was always at thevery heart of European integration. All stakeholders,be it from academia, politics, or civil society, are nowcalled upon to be creative and think of new and freshideas. The idea of a dynamic membership is meant togive stimulus in this regard as it might be able tobreak the cycle of mutual frustration and disappoint-ment that became a permanent factor of Turkey-EUrelations in the past. What we need now is creativityfor how best to unite two partners that belongtogether.

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Notes

The views expressed are those of the author alone, and do not neces-sarily reflect the views of the stiftung Mercator.

1 see also: rana Deep islam, Herausforderung Nahost: Die

Außenpolitik der EU und der Türkei im Vergleich (with a preface byfrank-Walter steinmeier) (Wiesbaden: springer Vs, 2013), 11.

2 see also: Dietmar neurer, “Erdogan-kritiker fordern klartext vonMerkel,” Handelsblatt, 3 february 2014, <http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/berlin-besuch-des-tuerken-premier-erdogan-kritiker-fordern-klartext-von-merkel/9426736.html>; “steinmeier: Tür zur EUmuss offen bleiben,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 february 2014,<http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/erdogan-in-berlin-steinmeier-tuer-zur-eu-muss-offen-bleiben-12782816.html>.

3 see also: Dana stuster, “Turkish protests test obama’s close friend-ship with Erdogan,” Foreign Policy, 4 June 2013, <http://blog.foreign-policy.com/posts/2013/06/04/obama_erdogan_turkey_protests_friends>.

4 European Commission, Turkey Negotiation Framework (2005), 1,<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/turkey/index_en.htm>.

5 “Wir brauchen die Türkei mehr als sie uns braucht,” Süddeutsche

Zeitung, 18 october 2009, <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/eu-verheugen-wir-brauchen-die-tuerkei-mehr-als-sie-uns-braucht-1.31695>.

6 European Commission, Turkey Negotiation Framework (2005), 1,<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/turkey/index_en.htm>.

7 Cemal karakas, “für eine abgestufte integration – Zur Debatte um denEU-beitritt der Türkei,” Policy Report, peace research institute frankfurt(2005).

8 henriette rytz, “Mehrdimensionale ‘Modellpartnerschaft’ - Die strate-gische kooperation der UsA mit der Türkei unter der obama-Administration,” policy report, stiftung Wissenschaft und politik (2013),27.

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03EU-TUrkEy rELATions AssEEn froM WAshinGTon

2014 has not been a good year for Turkey and byextension its relations with the European Union.Beginning with the political uncertainty—stemmingfrom a wide-ranging corruption probe that broke atthe end of last year—Turkey, the region’s most stabledemocracy, is now more focused on its domesticrather than foreign policy priorities. Unfortunately forTurkey’s friends in Europe and EU enthusiasts inTurkey, this means that a process that was alreadydifficult enough, given the history of relations, hasbecome even more complicated. In the short term, thebest that can be hoped for is to quietly keep theprocess alive on technocratic life-support so that itdoes not become a victim of politics on either side.Since the 1960 Ankara agreement between theEuropean Community (EC) and Turkey, in many ways,the EU-Turkish relationship has been both domesticand foreign policy for Ankara; therefore, this shouldbe nothing new.

Unfortunately, there seem to be dark clouds hangingover EU-Turkish relations since protests erupted lastyear over development of Gezi Park in Istanbul. Theprotests quickly focused non-stop Western mediacoverage domestically on Taksim Square, whichbecame mistakenly equated in Western minds withTahrir Square, despite the major differences betweenEgypt and Turkey. Further complicating the relation-ship are recent threats from Ankara to expel Westernambassadors over comments on domestic develop-ments, law suits over media coverage, and a cultureof fear that many thought Turkey had moved beyond.Perhaps even more importantly, against this back-drop, foreign investors are staying away from Turkey—causing the lira and the Istanbul stock exchange toplummet and Turkey’s economy to sputter.

Making matters more complicated, Turkey has threeelections in less than a year’s time, each of which will

test the ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP)hold on municipal, presidential, and parliamentarypower, all in an election year for the EuropeanParliament, too. While the AKP triumphed at themunicipal polls on March 30, the real tests are still yetto come. With all these factors at play, uncertainty isnow the norm for Turkey. Even before the recentdomestic developments, Turkey’s outlook for 2014was sobering, with leading risk consultancies such asEurasia Group and International Crisis Group puttingthe country in their Top 10 most risky areas.

With domestic elections in both partners scheduledfor 2014; continued regional chaos without clearleadership on, or direction in, Ukraine or Syria; andaccumulated frustrations from the peak of what oncewas considered a mutually beneficial relationship thatmade global sense, Turkey and the European Unionfind themselves at a crossroads. 2014, it seems, willbe as much about weathering the short-term storm asdefining and focusing on the long-term relationshipthat these two critical partners have shared since theend of World War II—even despite the changes anddynamics at play today. Similarly, the EU and Turkey’srelationships with the United States have beenevolving, but rather than being a mutually reinforcingset of trilateral relations, they are increasingly sepa-rated bilaterally and growing apart. Therefore, in manyways it is time for Turkey and the EU to define theirrelationship by either taking it to the next level withtangible progress on membership or agreeing to takea break while they figure out their priorities, lest theysimply drift apart like cold Anglo-Saxons or passion-ately break-up like Mediterranean lovers. Whateverhappens, it will equally define U.S.-EU-Turkey rela-tions for the twenty-first century.

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DEfininG ThE rELATionship:EU-TUrkEy rELATions As sEEnfroM WAshinGTon1

JOSHUA W. WALKER

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Setting the Stage

Turkey’s attributes are well known: a key ally of theUnited States, a long-standing member of the NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and a candidatefor membership in the EU, Turkey has strong ties tothe West in a volatile, yet strategic region of the world.Turkey sits geographically at the crossroads ofEurasia, but has only in the last decade of the post-Cold War environment assumed the confidence andtrappings of a geopolitically pivotal player. As a non-permanent member of the United Nations SecurityCouncil from 2008-2010, a G20 founding membersince 2008, and most recent holder of the post ofSecretary General of the Organization of the IslamicConference (OIC), Turkey’s rise regionally hasimpacted its global ambitions and the contours of itsrelationship with the EU.

At the dawn of the new century, scholars of Turkishforeign policy declared that Turkey was “changing”2

and entering a “new world,”3 however, in hindsight,the most significant changes were yet to come inAnkara. Indeed one of the more active debates aboutTurkish foreign policy today is to what extent what isbeing observed today is “real” change versus acontinuation of what was observed in previous timesunder new rhetorical guises and the level of discon-nect between Ankara’s ambition and capabilities.Given the extremely dynamic nature of Turkish politics,predicting the future is always foolhardy, but if historyis any guide, its foreign policy and key bilateral rela-tionships—like with the EU—are always only onedomestic crisis or flourish away from success orfailure.4 Historically, betting against Turkish civilsociety and its people has never been a smart move,yet its government and institutions have rarely lived upto the promise of Ataturk’s republic born from theashes of the Ottoman Empire over ninety years ago

Turkey, with its combination of economic pragmatismand soft power, appeals as a Muslim-majority seculardemocracy with a conservative and pious Muslimleader, and has fared much better than almost anyother Muslim-majority nation in global affairs in recentyears, yet now the foundations of its “success” arebeing challenged. Shedding its former policies ofdisengagement in international politics, Ankara hasbecome an active participant in all of its regions over

the last decade and, particularly given its closegeographic proximities to the “hotspots” of thisdecade, has become a central player who acts as aforce multiplier for the West. It has been a criticalactor, but with its internal malaise, could unfortunatelybecome a polarizing divider just as easily. Turkey hasbeen transformed in a way not seen since the days ofthe Ottoman Empire as a truly global player whosereach extends far beyond just its geographic neigh-borhood, as demonstrated most recently by internalpolicy decisions and court rulings on the use ofTwitter and YouTube that has garnered widespreadattention.

Turkey has emerged in the twenty-first centurystronger than it has ever been in its modern history,going from a peripheral player to Europe’s mostdynamic actor and economy, yet this rise is accom-panied by challenges and areas for structuralconcern.

Turkey’s Place in the West5

Relations between Turkey and the West have alwaysbeen dynamic and reflective of the historical circum-stances. Turkey for the past seventy years has priori-tized its relationship with the West as manifest in itsmembership in almost every Western multilateralorganization. Casting its lot with the West during theCold War was made particularly easy given the SovietUnion’s aggressive movements on the Turkish straitsand northeastern Anatolia. As a result, Turkey’s ColdWar relationship with the U.S. was indicative of mostbilateral alliances during the period and representeda convergence of national interests in containing theinfluence of the Soviet Union. With the TrumanDoctrine, the United States publicly committed itselfto protecting Turkey, thereby linking it with the West.While the historical roots of Turkish-Western rela-tions can be traced to the gates of Vienna where theOttomans twice laid siege, Turkey’s inclusion was notideational but rather facilitated by the geo-strategicrealities of the Cold War and America’s leadership ofthe West.6

The collapse of the Berlin Wall in November 1989was met with fear in Ankara that it was no longer rele-vant to the West, and to Washington in particular.7

Having been unequivocally part of Europe since

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joining NATO in 1952 during the Cold War, andbased on the strategic logic of the time, Turkeyexpected its Western credentials to hold up. As apart of almost every European organization from itsinclusion in the Council of Europe in 1949 to theAnkara agreement of 1963 that created a customsunion with Europe, Turkey looked to Europe as itslogical home and partner. But Turkey’s successivecoup d’états and war in the 1990s against theKurdistan Worker Party (PKK) led to an inward focusand European protests about human rights violationsfurther strained relations.8

Turbulence in U.S.-Turkey relations has always beeninevitable given the global, regional, and domesticchanges that both countries have experienced overthe last decade. Given the strategic foundation of thisalliance, the challenges currently faced in Ankara areoften played down and muted by the benefits thatstrong relations offer declining U.S. leadership inTurkey’s neighborhood. There are causes for realconcern regarding changes in Turkish domestic poli-tics and foreign policy that could lead to even greatertensions in U.S.-Turkey relations down the road andthe choice between stability in the short term versusliberal democracy in the long run are often self-fulfilling for an interagency process in Washingtonthat has always had trouble dealing with the complex-ities and paradoxes of Turkey. Yet it is equally clearthat Washington has a critical role to play in the futuredirection of Turkey and that the country continues tooffer the U.S. numerous opportunities for strategiccooperation and support if managed correctly.Therefore, while U.S.-Turkish relations have deterio-rated since the Cold War years and the “model part-nership” framing of the relationship has never beenrealized, given that Turkey is at the center of one of themost critical regions of the world, and recent eventsin the country, as well as the region, have only height-ened Turkey’s importance to America.9

Europe: Turkey’s Western Anchor?10

Turkey’s historical preoccupation with Europe and itssubsequent quest for an acknowledged Europeanidentity can be explained on many levels. Historically,Europe has represented “modern civilization” in thewords of Turkey’s founding father Mustafa KemalAtatürk. Economically, Europe represents over half of

Turkey’s foreign investment and the bulk of lucrativeforeign trade is conducted with EU member states.Geo-politically, Turkey has always insisted on beingpart of every European organization based on its 3percent geographic claim to Europe. However,despite the arguments made by many Atlanticist quar-ters in Europe and the United States that favorTurkey’s geo-strategic value within the framework ofthe EU, many Europeans remain skeptical aboutTurkish membership.11 As a result of this sentiment,the EU has kept Turkey waiting at its doorstep forover four decades, to its own detriment, and now,with events unfolding internally and in Ukraine,perhaps peril. Still, for Turkey, the single most impor-tant historical external factor in its domestic agendaremains the EU.

The prospect of EU accession has traditionally beena major factor in Turkey’s internal reform process. Themajor impetus for reform came after Turkey becamea candidate for membership in December 1999. Thereform process initially started in 2001 with a seriesof critical constitutional amendments. A series ofreform packages followed. They brought inter aliagreater freedom of expression and association,banned capital punishment, reduced the influence ofthe military over civilian government, and improvedthe rights of minorities. The EU, through thesereforms, also helped to catalyze the growth of civildiscourse in Turkey. In this period, many taboo issuessuch as the Kurdish question, the Armenian genocideclaims, the rights of non-Muslim minorities, theCyprus problem, and the limits of secularism becamesubjects of debate. The EU’s conditionality clearlycontributed to Turkey’s democratic transformation.12

Reform packages adopted in the context of EUaccession also steadily reduced the military’s influ-ence, and precipitated a revolutionary change in themilitary’s mindset.13 EU engagement also helpedtransform the Islamist movement from stronglyopposing EU accession to embracing the idea, aswell as the reforms associated with it.14 As Turkeytransformed domestically, its allies in the EU grew instrength and number, leading to the opening of nego-tiations in 2005 on the grounds that Turkey had “suffi-ciently” fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria.

When the AKP came to power in 2002 as the histor-ical successor of Turkey’s right-leaning Islamic

conservative movement, it had many domestic hurdlesto overcome. Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the AKPbegan using their foreign policy agenda to placatetheir domestic opposition and to expand areas ofpossible cooperation with Turkey’s secular elites andbusiness community. In particular, the AKP focusedon the EU accession process to broaden its domesticsupport and weaken its opponents between 2002and 2005. Ironically, the launch of EU accessionnegotiations in October 2005, after an acrimoniousdebate in the EU over Turkey’s membership and prob-lematic terms of Turkey’s Accession NegotiationsFramework, actually triggered setbacks in the reformprocess in 2006 and 2007. The decisive victory wonby AKP at the July 2007 national elections ushered inshort-lived expectations of a renewed period ofreform. However, the government’s enthusiasm fordrafting a new constitution was undercut by resist-ance from the opposition and the judiciary’s caseagainst the AKP in 2008. In part, this resistance wasprovoked when the government became distractedfrom its constitutional reform agenda and insteadpushed through legislation to lift a ban on the use ofheadscarves in universities.

Having spent much of the young twenty-first centurycelebrating Europe’s various achievements, forBrussels, the perennial question involving Ankara waswhether to deepen or widen. Yet only seven yearsafter Greece joined the euro zone in 2001, the GlobalFinancial Crisis erupted in the United States andspread to Europe. Previously unthinkable scenariosand questions became common discussion points.The question of whether the euro zone would disin-tegrate and what would be the consequences for theEU became a real, rather than an academic, one thatTurkey seemed to revel in, given its own economicgrowth and trajectory. The widespread concernamong economists that a Greek exit from the eurozone would lead to serious, even catastrophic, conse-quences for the rest of Europe and the globaleconomy was never realized, but it reinforced aTurkish confidence, some would say arrogance, thatreinforced the very worst qualities in domestic politics.

In an ironic twist of fate, at precisely the moment inwhich the EU process could offer Turkish leaders toempower their civil society and be seen as a criticalpartner and true friend, the foundations of the EU

were being questioned. As a result, Turkey’snewfound swagger and emergence as a global actorhas been both decried as arrogant and welcomed asa sign of a more engaged partner that could help todetermine the future direction of Europe as a globalactor. Yet, in the EU’s darkest moment, Turkeyremained eerily silent and distracted about the eurozone crisis as well as its own accession process,while the EU has been dismissed because of its loudcritiques during Turkey’s most recent unrest.

Newspaper columns and columnists—who used towrite about every aspect of the accession processand EU decision-making with sensationalist head-lines about ramifications for Turkey—have turned theirattention elsewhere. The most visible sign of theapathy and indifference of the Turkish governmentand public was the most recent EU CommissionProgress Report on Turkey released last fall. Whatused to be one of the most significant internationalspotlights for Ankara, for the first time generatedalmost no headlines other than the Turkish EUminister’s colorful criticisms about Europe being likea camera that was out of focus that could not capturethe dynamism of Turkey in a still frame. Unlike eventsat home, Syria, or Ukraine that continue to makeheadlines, Turkey’s European dreams seem to bedrifting off into oblivion with little attention being paidon either side of the Mediterranean.

Populist rhetoric on the part of Prime MinisterErdogan against the EU has become a commontalking point in Turkish politics, yet it risks further alien-ating Europe at precisely the wrong moment. Beingblinded by hurt pride and a rightful sense of injusticeat the hand of certain European politicians, Turkeyhas begun to look more toward its neighborhood.However, Ankara’s value-add in its new neighbor-hood hinges precisely on the ongoing domestic trans-formations that are highly dependent on its EUaccession process, as being seen throughout theregion’s democratic revolutions. Turkey’s continuingaccession process is a net positive regardless of itseventual membership outcome and is in fact one ofthe primary reasons for the country’s enhanced valueto its neighbors.

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Turkey and Europe Still Need Each Other

The EU is no longer the sole driver of reform now thatTurkey is coming of age as a regional power in themidst of the “Arab Spring” and euro zone crisis.Reform must come from within and Turkish voters willultimately decide on the parameters within which theirleaders will operate. Yet the EU is needed as ananchor. In fact, it is needed more now than everbefore, especially in order to reinvigorate the dividedand polarized pro-reform grand coalition that the AKPonce succeeded in rallying in its first term in office.This coalition is now in disarray and off course as aresult of everything going on in domestic Turkish poli-tics. Rather than being blinded by ambitions ofgrandeur or zero-sum electoral politics, Turkey’sleaders should realize that its value-added in theneighborhood largely hinges on its ongoing domestictransformation—a transformation the EU process stillempowers. In addition, the EU mechanisms andsupport for strengthening key domestic institutionssuch as the judiciary, media, and military are nowneeded more than ever.

Even beyond domestic reforms, the link betweenTurkey’s EU candidacy and its neighborhood policycannot be underestimated. Ankara’s ambition to be aregional leader is best captured by Arab perceptionsof Turkey. The attractiveness of Turkey for Arabinvestors is directly associated with its ability to bridgemarkets because of linkage to the EU. This is espe-cially important in times of uncertainty and crisis.Annual surveys of Arab public opinion published since2009 reveal that the majority of respondents haveconsistently believed Turkey’s EU membershipprospects made it an attractive partner for the Arabworld. Yet internal struggles have led to drops in thesebeliefs, which suggests that respondents are awareof Turkey’s slowing EU accession process.15

However, the majority and plurality believes that aban-doning the EU would be detrimental to Turkey’s long-term interests.

The EU continues to be Turkey’s biggest tradingpartner. Bilateral trade in 2010 totaled €103 billion.Furthermore, almost 80 percent of foreign directinvestment in Turkey comes from the EuropeanUnion.16 Reinvigorating Turkey’s relations withEurope represents not only a key to economic

success, but also the best guarantee that thecountry’s domestic transformation will ultimatelyculminate in a standard of democracy that will makeit a guiding light for the region. The transatlanticanchor provided through NATO injects the Turkishmilitary with the necessary confidence to embarkupon and allow reforms in the country.17 Therefore, inorder to fulfill its full potential, both domestically andon the world stage, Turkey’s EU process is critical notjust for Ankara, but for Brussels and Washington aswell.

Finding a place for Turkey in the Transatlantic Tradeand Investment Partnership (TTIP), which has beendescribed as an “economic NATO,” is a critical short-term step and a good place to start in reestablishingtrilateral cooperation and Western support of Turkeyby reassuring jittery foreign investors. As Turkey’s EUmembership continues to stall, Washington must becreative and fresh in its approach, including pushingits European allies to do the same to reinvigorate atrilateral partnership that has broken down in recentyears. Combined Western resources could be lever-aged in Ankara and other regional partners to developkey regions and sectors. The power of Westernbrands—and symbolism of joint American andEuropean investment—in Turkey will help the privatesector engage in a critical Middle East market. Andgiven that conspiracy theories and anti-Westernismmakes engagement in other parts of the region almostimpossible, the opportunity is growing more urgentevery day.

The alternative is not that Turkey will morph into anIslamic Republic, as many alarmists charge. Turkey’shistorical and contemporary experiences, as well aseconomic, social, and religious make-up, suggest thatsuch fears are misplaced. However, as in many of itsArab neighbors—and more than a few of its EU coun-terparts—the lure of populist nationalism and streaksof intolerance are strong. The euro zone crisis anddomestic scandals have certainly emboldened andseemingly legitimized populists—in Turkey as well asin Europe. Today, the danger is more apparent that aTurkey with no EU prospects comes to resemble anincreasingly authoritarian Russia that also sits outsideof the EU as a Eurasian regional power.

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Going Beyond Life Support

The EU accession process—which for now thankfullyno governing parties have an interest in suspending—should continue but be detached from strategiccooperation, without the wires being crossed. TheEuropean Commission-sponsored “positive agenda,”proposed last year, already has sought to develop aTurkey-EU discussion in the areas in which progressis possible. But the mix of membership and non-membership goals means that even this modeststrategic dialogue has never really taken off, let aloneled to an agenda of action. It has been held hostagetoo long to the accession process that includesparochial veto players and the rhetorical flourishes ofshort-sighted politicians rather than statesmen onboth sides. In a new framework built completelyoutside EU settings and with strong backing by theUnited States, strategic cooperation between Turkeyand the EU could finally develop, shifting attentionfrom bilateral difficulties to common goals in the midstof the euro zone crisis.

The EU can no longer be taken for granted in Turkeyand political will is necessary to break out of thecurrent status quo. Ankara is unlikely to call off theaccession negotiations, but it will continue to vigor-ously and confidently pursue economic and diplo-matic relations with its neighbors, looking foropportunities to exert influence and reap commercialbenefits. In this case, interdependence does not ruleout conflict: a continued deadlock in accession nego-tiations might well inject a hefty dose of antagonismin the relationship and foment competition. One neednot look further than Ukraine to understand thestrategic stakes involved for the EU and Turkey.Therefore, a better trilateral framework should beestablished for a future partnership. To make interde-pendence work, Brussels needs to engage Ankaraand vice-versa, with Washington playing the role ofhonest broker and partner.18

Re-affirming Turkey’s value to Europe and Europe’svalue to Turkey in the midst of the elections may bepolitically difficult. But it is strategically critical. Giventhat Turkey and the EU share a common neighbor-hood, not just compatible strategic interests, a struc-tured framework for cooperation beyond theaccession process is critical to weathering the short-

term storms without the casualty of Turkey’s Europeanaspirations. It must go beyond the security confinesof NATO or business realms of the customs union andTTIP. Yet, it should not be as cumbersome as thelonger-term project of EU membership. The dialogueought to begin now. Otherwise, there is the risk ofsilence for the foreseeable future.

Kick-Starting the Trilateral Debate

Discussions about “alternatives” to the EU were onceall the rage in Ankara. Today these debates happenmore often in Brussels, Moscow, and Washington.Turkey seems content to re-assert itself throughout itsformer Ottoman domains with a flexible attitudetoward alliances and partnerships that would havebeen unthinkable less than five years ago. Whileconvergence between Ankara and Washington hasreached new heights as a result of the “Arab Spring,”the same cannot be said for EU-Turkish relations thatlack a sense of purpose or urgency. If anything, theweakening of the EU through the euro zone crisis hasbeen welcomed by Turkey, and Ankara’s tarnishedshine from internal scandals has been cheered bysome in Europe. Thus, as America draws closer toEurope (as a result of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine)and Turkey (because of the need for support in theMiddle East), trilateral U.S.-EU-Turkey cooperation isin danger of being cannibalized and replaced by bilat-eral relations that are not mutually reinforcing or asfoundationally strong.

Turkey today is at a crossroads. It is more globallyengaged than at any time since the foundation of theTurkish Republic. Yet, its democracy is far fromperfect, and its relationships are strained in the after-math of the “Arab Spring” and its own domestic scan-dals. There is no panacea to these foreign policycrises. However, there is at least one policy frame-work that will help enable Turkey’s Western friends tobetter understand and address them: a deeperAnkara-Brussels-Washington partnership, evendespite the domestic political concerns in all threepartners. As the Middle East’s largest and Europe’sfastest-growing economy, Turkey is uniquely situatedto play a consequential role in a region critical to U.S.national interests.

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The U.S. will continue to temper Ankara’s sometimesnationalist and populist policies in favor of pragmaticcooperation, such as with Israel and Cyprus (both ofwhich may look to Turkey for energy transit or exportprojects in the near future) or even the EuropeanUnion. Washington can play bad cop to Brussels’good cop (or vice-versa if coordinated in advance)given their broad areas of agreement and mutualeconomic incentives with Turkey. Where there areshort-term disagreements, longer-term gains willeventually facilitate Turkey’s evolution as a responsibleregional leader—one that is on the right path to joiningthe European Union to further enhance its influencealong with having the strong backing of the UnitedStates, or if necessary, the tough-love of a stablepartner.

Timing in 2014: Election Year

Election years always seem to bring out the worst indemocracies. From electoral politics to powerfulSuperPACs in America, the system often getsstrained. Yet, elections are a necessary process, inwhich leaders must demonstrate to their domesticconstituencies that they understand their dailyconcerns. As a result, elections rarely hinge on foreignpolicy. In Turkey’s factitious parliamentary system,Prime Minister Erdogan has been campaigning sincethe beginning of the year simultaneously for Mayor ofIstanbul, President, and Prime Minister in a populisttone—puzzling many Europeans not used to the styleof Turkish politics. Listening to the nationalist/populisttone of Turkey’s most successful campaigner andpolitician in living memory, analysts continually try toequate Erdogan’s words to Turkey’s actions. Foreignpolicy concerns and formerly deferential statementson Europe are falling by the wayside. Indeed, amidTurkey’s most consequential set of elections indecades, the very champions and daily managers ofthe EU must not hide behind the worst populisttendencies to score cheap political points at theexpense of a valuable long-term partner.

Turkey has enjoyed its decade-long regional rise as apragmatic and active actor in the Middle East whileneighboring states have failed their population.Particularly in light of Ukraine, the time is ripe for theTurkish government to engage in healing its domesticwounds through enhanced foreign cooperation to

carry Turkey across the threshold of full-fledged liberaldemocracy. Only by deepening and projecting its“democratic depth” can it have a lasting impact athome, representing the best to and serving as aleader in its neighborhood.19 Unfortunately Turkey’sown championing of democracy and regional reformis still as fragile as its own democratization process,as evident in the lack of progress on a new constitu-tion or the perennial Kurdish problem. Turkey’s stalledEU accession has only added to the difficulty fordemocratically-elected and populist leaders. WhetherTurkey will develop into a more liberal type of democ-racy should be more important to the future of U.S.-EU-Turkey relations than joint dialogues, speeches, orinitiatives on the regional and world stage.

At a moment in which Western leadership is beingquestioned in Eurasia and sectarian tensions continuein the Middle East, the timing has never been moreopportune to re-focus on the core principles anduniversal values of U.S.-EU-Turkish relations.Coordination and policy on Turkey continues to affectvital interests throughout Washington that ideallymust go beyond the administration to the Hill andsociety at large, even if there is short-term turbulence.Despite record levels of communication and travelbetween top leaders in Ankara and Washington, thesocietal and institutional connections are still in needof revitalization and strengthening. Senior Turkish offi-cials brag about the amount of time their leadersspend on the phone with top U.S. officials. As a result,Ankara has grown accustomed to listening only tothe administration, which is particularly unhelpful in aWashington that is so polarized and split alongpartisan lines. Similarly, in Brussels, as Europeanleaders shift and new priorities are found, Ankarashould be engaged as a potential partner in findingsolutions to Europe’s problems rather than being partof the problem. Washington’s proactive encourage-ment and support for both Brussels and Ankara asthey go through elections creates greater opportuni-ties for synergy and trilateral cooperation even if oftenbilateral concerns will need to be dealt with reac-tively.

Re-Affirming Turkey’s Western Credentials

Double standards and contradictions, motivated bydomestic, economic, or geopolitical interests,

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nonetheless remain in the foreign policies of America,Europe, and Turkey. These issues should be honestlydiscussed with a view to overcoming them jointly. Tothe extent that the West is defined as a set of princi-ples and democracy, the very challenge with Turkeyis applying these standards consistently and univer-sally in constructing a viable partnership that is conse-quential, flexible, and mutually beneficial. Rather thanseeing Turkey’s growing international role as merehubris or its domestic scandals as being its downfall,they should be taken as an opportunity to reinforceTurkey’s Western credentials that makes it a uniqueinterlocutor to all its neighbors.

Reinvigorating Turkey’s relations with the Westcontinues to represent the best guarantee that thecountry’s domestic transformation will culminate in astandard of democracy that will make it a guiding lightin the Middle East. The transatlantic anchor providedthrough NATO, and hopefully TTIP and the EU, caninject Turkish leaders with the necessary confidenceto embark upon immediate reforms. U.S. policytoward Turkey has been stale for too long. In 2014,Ankara, Brussels, and Washington need a new, morecomprehensive framework to coordinate and imple-ment policies jointly. Without a fresh, holisticapproach—and regardless of domestic politics in allcapitals—the U.S.-EU-Turkish relationship willcontinue to have intrinsic worth, but miss its fullpotential in 2014 and far beyond.

Notes

1 This work builds on previous writings of the author including Joshua W.Walker, “The U.s.-Turkey relationship in 2014,” Transatlantic Academyblog, 18 April 2014, <http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/node/686>and “Eerie silence about the Euro Zone Crisis,” The EuroFuture Project

Paper Series, August 2012, <http://www.gmfus.org/archives/eerie-silence-about-the-euro-zone-crisis/>.

2 heinz kramer, A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the

United States (Washington, DC: brookings institution, 2000).

3 Alan Makovsky and sabri sayari, Turkey’s New World (Washington,DC: Washington institute for near East policy, 2000).

4 Classic works on Turkish foreign policy include William hale, Turkish

Foreign Policy 1774-2000 (London: frank Cass, 2002); Andrew Mango,Turkey: The Challenge of a New Role (London: praeger, 1994); philiprobins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War

(seattle, WA: Washington University press, 2003); and reşat kasaba,The Cambridge History of Turkey. Volume 4: Turkey in the Modern World

(Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2008).

5 Draws on previous work in Joshua Walker, “The forming of the Us-Turkish special relationship,” in The History of American Turkish

Relations: 1833-1989, eds. bilge Criss, bruce kuniholm, and selcukEsenbel (istanbul, Turkey: Cambridge scholar press, 2011).

6 stephen Larrabee and ian Lesser, Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of

Uncertainty (santa Monica: rand Corporation, 2003).

7 see huseyin bagci, Zamnin Ruhu: Kuresel Politikalar ve Turkiye

(istanbul: orion publishing, 2007).

8 henri barkey, “The Endless pursuit: improving U.s.-Turkey relations,”in The United States and Turkey: Allies in Need, ed. M. Abramowitz(Washington: The Century foundation, 2003).

9 for more see Joshua Walker, (november, 2010). “The United statesand Turkey: Can they Agree to Disagree?” Middle East Brief #46 (CrownCenter for Middle East studies, november 2010).

10 Draws extensively from co-authored reports “Getting to Zero” and2010 brussels forum paper series: kemal kirişci, nathalie Tocci, andJoshua WalkerA Neighborhood Rediscovered: Turkey’s Transatlantic

Value in the Middle East (Washington, DC: German Marshall fund,2010).

11 nathalie Tocci and Ahmet Evin, eds., Eds. Towards Accession

Negotiations: Turkey’s Domestic and Foreign Policy Challenges Ahead

(florence: European University institute, 2004).

12 senem Aydın and fuat keyman, “European integration and theTransformation of Turkish Democracy,” EU-Turkey Working papers no. 2(Centre for European studies, 2004).

13 Ersen Aydınlı, nihat Ali Özcan, and Doğan Akyaz, “The TurkishMilitary’s March Towards Europe,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, no. 1,(January-february 2006), 84.

14 hakan yavuz, “islam and Europeanization in Turkish-Muslim socio-political Movements,” in Timothy byrnes, and peter J. katzenstein, eds.,Religion in an Expanding Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge Universitypress, 2006).

15 see TEsEV polling in Meliha Altunisik, “Turkey: Arab perspectives,”TESEV Foreign Policy Analysis Series 11 (2009), 25.

16 Turkey 2011 progress report

17 for more on this see kemal kirişci, nathalie Tocci, and JoshuaWalkerA Neighborhood Rediscovered: Turkey’s Transatlantic Value in

the Middle East (Washington, DC: German Marshall fund, 2010).

18 see most recent ECfr report “What Does Turkey Think?”<http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECfr35_TUrkEyfinALfinAL.pdf>.

19 nora fisher onar, “Democratic Depth: The Missing ingredient inTurkey’s Domestic/foreign policy nexus?” in Another Empire? A Decade

of Turkey’s Foreign Policy under the Justice and Development Party,

eds. kerem Öktem, Ayşe kadıoğlu, and Mehmet karlı (istanbul: bilgiUniversity press, 2002).

Located in Washington, D.C., the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies is an independent, non-profit public policy organization that worksin Germany and the United States to address current and emerging policy challenges. Founded in 1983, the Institute is affiliated with The Johns HopkinsUniversity. The Institute is governed by its own Board of Trustees, which includes prominent German and American leaders from the business, policy, andacademic communities.

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