eu 101 session 5 class preparation

8/12/2019 EU 101 Session 5 Class Preparation

1/13

EU 101 Session 5: UK application, EEC and Empty Chair Crisis

General de Gaulles plan was to put France firmly back on the global stage by pursuing

demonstratively independent policies. This was his paramount interest as he sought to give

new impetus to European integration. While he supported a Europe with France and Germany

as its pillars, he reected any significant relin!uishment of sovereignty to a supranationalauthority.

Franco"#merican relations

General de Gaulle wanted to review the relationship between the $nited %tates and Europe.

The global geopolitical situation had undergone considerable changes between &'() and

&'*+. n the &'*+s, the threat of world war was receding and the $nited %tates no longer held

the monopoly on nuclear protection of the West. n fact, de Gaulle wondered whether the

$nited %tates really would use nuclear weapons to defend Western Europe. -e felt the need to

reconsider the relationship between the ld /ontinent and #merica, especially since he no

longer felt the #merican nuclear umbrella to be reliable. #ccordingly, France pursued anational nuclear policy and developed its own nuclear arsenal.

The $nited %tates reviewed its strategy at the same time, moving from the graduated response

approach to a strategy of massive reprisals. #ny conflict between the superpowers would now

be played out in Europe, not in the territory of the parties to the conflict. France was

determined not to be governed purely by the decisions of the 0resident of the $nited %tates in

issues relating to the defence of the national territory.

France and 1#T

n &2 %eptember &')3, the French 0resident, General /harles de Gaulle, sent a memorandum

to 0resident 4wight 4. Eisenhower of the $nited %tates and 0rime 5inister -arold

5acmillan of the $nited 6ingdom. n it, he called for the terms of reference of the #tlantic

#lliance to be broadened to global scale in order, among other things, to cover certain

geographical areas where France retained particular interests. -e also proposed the creation of

a tripartite 4irectorate of the 1orth #tlantic Treaty rganisation, putting France, Great

7ritain and the $nited %tates on an e!ual footing for the purposes of discussing nuclear

strategy. n the case of refusal by its partners, France, which wished to retain absolute control

of its armed forces, reserved the right to withdraw from 1#T. ndeed, de Gaulle drew no

distinction between 1#T and Europe. -e sought to take advantage of Frances strengthened

position in 1#T in order to consolidate its influence among the %i8 on the basis of a Franco"German a8is. n the other hand, he also hoped to develop European political and strategic

cooperation in order to pressurise the $nited %tates into accepting the French plans for the

reform of the #tlantic #lliance.

The $nited %tates and Great 7ritain did not follow up the French proposals. /onse!uently, on

&& 5arch &')', France decided to remove its 5editerranean naval fleet from 1#T

command. n 9une, it refused to stock foreign nuclear weapons on national soil, forcing the

$nited %tates to transfer :++ military aeroplanes out of France. n the spring of &'*+, the

$nited %tates and Great 7ritain repeatedly stated to the French Government their refusal to

conclude an agreement on nuclear cooperation, particularly on the development of nuclear

warheads. France finally concluded that the ;special relationship between 7ritain and#merica was at work and decided to re"focus its efforts on coordinating policy in Europe. n


2/13

:& 9une &'*EE/?. The =esearch /ommittee met for the first time

on &* 5arch &'*&. Eight days later, it appointed /hristian Fouchet, French diplomat and

former Gaullist parliamentarian, as /hairman, and decided to establish two subcommittees.The /ultural /ooperation /ommittee was headed by 0ierre 0escatore of u8embourg, while


3/13

/arl Friedrich phBls of Germany presided over the 0olitical /ooperation /ommittee. n

&3 9uly &'*&, at 7ad Godesberg, near 7onn, the %i8 reiterated their intention to create a

politically united Europe.

n &' ctober &'*&, /hristian Fouchet submitted to the =esearch /ommittee a first draft

treaty >Fouchet 0lan ?, establishing an indissoluble union of %tates based onintergovernmental cooperation and respect for the identity of 5ember %tates and their

peoples. t proposed cooperation, alongside the /ommunity treaties, in the areas of foreign

policy and defence, science, culture and human rights protection. n institutional terms, the

draft treaty provided for the establishment of a /ouncil composed of -eads of %tate or

Government, which would meet three times a year and adopt decisions on the basis of

unanimity. # /ouncil of Foreign 5inisters would cover the interim period. $nder the draft

treaty, the #ssembly of the /ommunities was granted an advisory role, and it was envisaged

that a European 0olitical /ommission would be established to assist the /ouncil. n other

words, the plan drew a further distinction between the terms of reference of the /ommunity

and those of the future 0olitical $nion.

Fearing French domination of their foreign policy, Frances partners opposed the draft treaty

as submitted. They also reected any strengthening of the institutions intergovernmental

character, regarding it as a threat to the independence and supranational nature of the

/ommunity bodies. 5oreover, the 1etherlands showed reluctance to complicate further the

common market enlargement negotiations under way with the $nited 6ingdom or eopardise

the ongoing discussions between Europe and #merica on the future of 1#T. n the light of

this opposition, de Gaulle hardened his stance, abandoning the compromises that the

European negotiators had reached. n &3 9anuary &'*:, /hristian Fouchet accordingly

submitted a new version of the plan >Fouchet 0lan ?, which this time proposed to grant the

$nion the economic powers that had previously been the prerogative of the /ommunities,

which became subordinate to the intergovernmental cooperation body. This second version,

moreover, made no reference to 1#T.

#t the point when the common market was proceeding to the second stage of implementation,

Frances partners, notably the 7enelu8 countries, once again lambasted and reected the plan.

They accordingly drew up counter"proposals for a more federalist approach, which were

reected in turn by the French Government. #t the beginning of #pril, the %ecretary"General

of the talian Foreign 5inistry, Emilio /attani, replaced Fouchet, who had been appointed

-igh /ommissioner in #lgeria, as 0resident of the =esearch /ommittee. /attani proposed

new amendments, but was not able to reconcile Frances interests with those of the other

European partners. 7elgium and the 1etherlands wanted to see the $nited 6ingdom completeits accession to the EE/ before moving forward with the implementation of 0olitical $nion.

/onse!uently, the Foreign 5inisters, meeting in u8embourg on &2 #pril &'*:, decided to

bring the /ommittees work to an end permanently. n &) 5ay, General de Gaulle sealed the

breakdown in the attempts at political integration. #t a sensational press conference, he

condemned European federalist policies and openly criticised the game played by 7ritain and

#merica.

The failure of the Fouchet 0lans sparked off a series of crises, characterised by disagreement

on the very nature of the European unification process, the powers of the /ommunity

institutions, European independence and relations with the $%#. The -eads of %tate or

Government did not meet again for seven years. This failure would, however, lead to astrengthening of Franco"German relations.


4/13

The crisis in the EE/

The crisis simmering in the European Economic /ommunity between France and its partners

reached boiling point in &'*). The reasons behind the crisis were twofold the difficulties in

financing the common agricultural policy >/#0? and rapid European integration supported

by France@s partners. The financial problems in the EE/, and the /#0 crisis, shook the/ommunity to its very foundations.

Financing the /#0

The agricultural financial regulations in force from &'*: were due to e8pire on & 9uly &'*).

n &) 4ecember &'*(, the /ouncil of 5inisters asked the /ommission to draw up a draft

document on the financing of the common agricultural policy >/#0?. n EE/? and providing the /#0 with its own financial resources. $nder their plan,

the /ommunity would no longer be financed by national contributions, but by own resources

paid directly into the /ommunity budget. They were to be provided partly by agricultural

levies and partly by customs revenue from duties on manufactured goods, of which a

significant proportion would be payable to the /ommunity. n the short term, the resources

would be considerably greater than those actually needed. The proposals also contained

elements conducive to broadening the powers and responsibilities of the European

0arliamentary #ssembly and the /ommission.

The /ommission endorsed the proposal by a maority vote. -owever, the French

/ommissioners and one talian /ommissioner voted against. %ubse!uently, -allstein

submitted the proposal to the European 0arliament without holding initial consultations with

the Governments of the 5ember %tates. This was the /ommissions way of trying to link the

financial regulations to institutional review it hoped to gain ground from Frances

commitment to promoting the /#0. -owever, General de Gaulle made it clear that he was

firmly opposed to it. There seemed no way out of the deadlock. n fact, Franco"German

cooperation had been in decline since /hancellor #denauer had left the political scene. The

debate on the /ommunitys own resources dragged on interminably and was only resolved

with the compromise worked out during the agricultural marathon of &'H:: 4ecember &'*',

when the /ouncil adopted the following two"tier system

I #gricultural levies would be payable to the /ommunity in their entirety

I /ustoms revenue would be payable to the /ommunity according to a sliding scale, in

order to avoid e8cessive disruption of national budgets.

The issue of maority voting

The entry into force of the 5erger Treaty, signed on 3 #pril &'*), which fused the E8ecutives

of the European /ommunities, was postponed because of the deep political rift between

France and its partners.


5/13

The third stage of the transitional period, which began on & 9anuary &'**, provided that in

future a larger number of decisions would be adopted on the basis of a !ualified maority,

rather than unanimity. nly the most important issues, such as the accession of new 5ember

%tates, or controversial decisions, such as the harmonisation of legislation and economic

policy, remained subect to unanimity. This was also true of any initiative that went beyond

the provisions of the treaties.

General de Gaulle was willing to use all means at his disposal in order to avoid the application

of the maority rule. From &'*+, in parallel to the Fouchet negotiations, he asked #lain

0eyrefitte, %ecretary of %tate for nformation, to study the potential for France to undermine

or, at least, bypass the supranational nature of the /ommunity decision"making process.

4e Gaulle did not participate in the negotiations on the Treaty of =ome, which he accepted in

&')3 purely for economic reasons and on the condition that the application of the maority

vote was postponed.

The ;empty chair policy

The proposal for the financing of the common agricultural policy >/#0?, developed in &'*)

by Walter -allstein, 0resident of the /ommission, marked the beginning of what was known

as the ;empty chair crisis. The /ommission@s proposal was geared towards developing its

own financial resources, independently of the 5ember %tates, and attributed additional

budgetary powers to the European 0arliament. 5oreover, the progression, on & 9anuary &'**,

to the third stage of the transitional period preceding the establishment of the common market

was to involve the application of the maority vote in the /ouncil of 5inisters. France could

not agree to this development, which it regarded as an unacceptable renunciation of

sovereignty. n addition, General de Gaulle, who had not participated in the negotiations on

the Treaty of =ome, criticised Walter -allstein for having prepared his budgetary proposal

without prior consultation with the Governments of the 5ember %tates and for having

behaved almost as though he were 0resident of a European government. -e also accused

-allstein of behaving like a -ead of %tate. France was, in fact, afraid that a coalition of

5ember %tates might, on the basis of a maority decision, challenge the common agricultural

policy, which France had persuaded its partners to accept only with great difficulty.

France held the 0residency of the /ouncil until


6/13

0resident of the /ouncil, proposed a compromise solution. This compromise stipulated that a

country which believed that its vital national interests might be adversely affected could not

be overruled by a maority, and that negotiations had to continue until a universally acceptable

compromise was reached. The document, which fundamentally altered the spirit of the

EE/ Treaty by creating a new mechanism by which %tates could e8ert pressure on the

/ouncil, did not, however, make any reference to the nature of the essential national interestand the arbitration procedure in the event of dispute.

%ince then, the ;u8embourg /ompromise has fre!uently been invoked by 5ember %tates in

order to block maority decisions. /ontrary to the literal interpretation of the te8t, they have

used the compromise in practice to make unanimity the normal decision"making procedure.

The national delegations have, therefore, let the u8embourg /ompromise degenerate into a

right of veto for sometimes minor issues. $nder this arrangement, the /ouncil agrees to

continue discussions until such point as all ministers are satisfied with the proposed solution.

While the u8embourg /ompromise allowed the %i8 to break the deadlock, it created a

situation which sometimes gave rise to a certain resistance to change, for fear that the

negotiations might be blocked, and imposed a de facto limitation on the /ommission@s right ofinitiative. This political loophole, which became increasingly unmanageable as the number of

5ember %tates increased, was partially corrected by the application of the %ingle European

#ct, which, from & 9uly &'32, considerably broadened the range of decisions that could be

adopted by !ualified maority.

nstitutional challenges

#lthough the European Economic /ommunity >EE/? got off to a good start, the Europe of the

%i8 was soon shaken by serious internal crises. The causes lay both in General de Gaulles

determination to modify the /ommunitys obectives by keeping any development towards

supranational authority to a minimum and in the financial and institutional problems inherent

in a multinational organisation built on compromise. t proved necessary to change the focus

of the institutions in order to break the deadlock.

The European 0arliamentary #ssembly

nce Europe had been built from the top down, the idea of democratising the European

institutions began to gain ground. The European 0arliamentary #ssembly, consisting of

members of the national parliaments, made clear its desire to be elected by universal suffrage

and demanded the right to appoint the new %ingle /ommission. n


7/13

France proposed that the position of the /ouncil of 5inisters be strengthened. The partner

%tates, however, rather envisaged the creation of an independent body with e8tended powers,

based on a merger of the -igh #uthority of the European /oal and %teel /ommunity >E/%/?,

the /ommission of the European Economic /ommunity >EE/? and the /ommission of the

European #tomic Energy /ommunity >E#E/ or Euratom?. France opposed the merger of the

e8ecutives for some time. -owever, under pressure from the other 5ember %tates, it finallyaccepted the principle.

#fter accepting the principle of merging the /ommunity e8ecutives at the /ouncil of

5inisters on :< %eptember &'*European /oal and %teel /ommunity >E/%/?, European Economic

/ommunity >EE/? and European #tomic Energy /ommunity >E#E/ or Euratom??. n

France@s proposal, the /ommittee of 0ermanent =epresentatives >/=E0E=?, composed ofambassadors from the 5ember %tates, played a permanent role in support of the /ommission,

which still retained the right to propose legislation, and the powers of implementation and

representation.

The first 0resident of the %ingle /ommission was Walter -allstein of Germany, who had

presided over the EE/ /ommission since &')3 and had formerly served as a 5inister under

/hancellor #denauer. -is strong personality rapidly left its mark on the /ommission. For the

followers of federalist thinking, the /ommission represented the embryo of a future federal

European government. -owever, General de Gaulle was resolutely opposed to this approach

and ensured that -allstein@s mandate was e8tended for only si8 months following the merger.

=efusing to accept this compromise, -allstein resigned.

The /ouncil of 5inisters was the principal decision"making body of the European Economic

/ommunity >EE/?. t regularly held meetings of the national 5inisters !ualified to discuss

the items on the agenda. Each EE/ country took it in turns to hold the 0residency for si8

months. The /ouncil@s decisions were drafted by the /ommittee of 0ermanent

=epresentatives >/=E0E=?, with assistance from a number of committees of e8perts and

senior officials from the national ministries.

The $nited 6ingdom and its applications for accession to the /ommon 5arket

4uring the &'*+s, there were changes in the $nited 6ingdoms policy towards Europe. The

wait"and"see approach of the &'(+s and &')+s, which, at most, allowed European cooperation

at intergovernmental level, was gradually replaced by a will to participate more actively in the

European unification process.

# fear of being sidelined in international affairs and the resounding success of the European

Economic /ommunity >EE/? were the main factors behind the change in direction of the

7ritish Governments in the early &'*+s. 0ublic opinion and the maor political parties, with

their commitment to national sovereignty, appeared to be divided. The /onservative 0arty

was more pro"Europe than the abour 0arty. The latter, together with the trade unions, was in


8/13

fact keen to protect the welfare state and %tate control of the economy against what it

popularly perceived to be a capitalist Europe too wedded to the idea of free trade.

The $nited 6ingdoms interest in Europe met with a mi8ed reaction elsewhere. The strongest

opposition came from France, which although it had welcomed the idea of the $6s accession

in the forties and fifties, changed its stance to reection when General de Gaulle came topower. This was a symptom of the two countries@ ostling for position as leaders of Europe. n

this light, France took a sceptical view of the $nited 6ingdoms relationship with the $nited

%tates. The $6 Government also found itself called to task for old wartime grudges.

The end of a great power

-aving refused to participate in the European Economic /ommunity >EE/?, the $nited

6ingdom became aware of the isolation it had brought on itself, especially since the special

relationship between the $nited 6ingdom and the $nited %tates cooled after the &')* %ueD

crisis. The empire on which Great 7ritain@s status as a world power had rested until the

%econd World War collapsed, and the political and strategic ties with the /ommonwealthwere rela8ed. The links between the 7ritish and former colonial economies declined steadily

throughout the &'*+s.

%ubse!uently, the $nited 6ingdom turned increasingly to Europe and the European Economic

/ommunity >EE/?. The $nited %tates encouraged the $nited 6ingdoms accession in order to

counterbalance the influence of Gaullist France and prevent the /ommunity from drifting

towards protectionism.

The $nited 6ingdom@s first application for accession to the /ommon 5arket

The $nited 6ingdom was not part of the European unification process in the &')+s. t first

applied for accession to the European Economic /ommunity >EE/? in &'*&. t was somewhat

envious of the rapid economic growth of the EE/ countries. The $nited 6ingdom wished to

avoid being economically and politically e8cluded from the new Europe and sought rather to

preserve its traditional role of intermediary between Europe and the $nited %tates. -arold

5acmillan, the 7ritish 0rime 5inister, prepared the 7ritish application after obtaining the

backing of his Government and the /onservative 0arty. The -ouse of /ommons approved the

$nited 6ingdoms application and the partners appeared to react favourably overall.

The announcement of the first application

The 7ritish 0rime 5inister, -arold 5acmillan, prepared his countrys application with great

care. 0ossessing a solid maority in the /ommons, he could afford to ignore resistance to the

/ommon 5arket within the /onservative 0arty and was able to appoint dedicated pro"

Europeans to the key posts within his Government.

#t international level, he promoted the advantages of the $nited 6ingdoms membership of

the EE/ to the /ommonwealth countries. -e also toured the capital cities of the %i8 in order

to sound out the 5ember %tates of the European Economic /ommunity >EE/? about the

$nited 6ingdoms possible accession.

Within the close"knit circles of the 7ritish abour 0arty, there was some opposition to7ritains possible application for accession to the European /ommunities. The opponents


9/13

were afraid, in particular, of losing the benefits of the Welfare %tate in a liberal Europe. They

were against any loss of sovereignty and fre!uently raised the spectre of capitalist Europe.

-owever, the -ouse of /ommons vote of ( #ugust &'*& won resounding support. The -ouse

of /ommons adopted the Governments proposal by EE/?.

Germany, the 7enelu8 countries and taly were prepared to make substantial concessions.

-owever, the negotiations on enlargement were adourned following General de Gaulles

categorical veto on &( 9anuary &'*


10/13

4e Gaulle@s attitude also stemmed from reasons not connected solely with EE/ interests. n

addition to the anti"7ritish resentment that he had continued to harbour ever since he was

e8iled to ondon during the war, he was afraid of 7ritish"#merican nuclear cooperation.

When, in ctober &'*:, #merican 0olaris rockets were supplied to the 7ritish, this was a

grave blow to Franco"7ritish relations, while de Gaulle continued to develop close relations

with Germany.

The $nited 6ingdoms second application for accession to the /ommon 5arket

The ctober &'*( elections in the $nited 6ingdom were won by the abour 0arty. The

abour 0arty leader, -arold Wilson, took over from the /onservative 0rime 5inister, -arold

5acmillan, who had come up against the opposition of French 0resident /harles de Gaulle in

the bid to accede to the European /ommunities. The new 0rime 5inister, who had previously

been opposed to the $nited 6ingdoms accession to the European /ommunities, gradually

began to pursue a more Europe"oriented policy. This new direction in foreign policy was

largely a result of the difficulties encountered by the 7ritish economy in the mid"&'*+s.

=elations with the /ommonwealth continued to weaken and trade relations within theEuropean Free Trade #ssociation >EFT#? were developing at a slower pace than e8pected.

0articipation in the European /ommunities therefore seemed the best solution to revive the

7ritish economy, all the more so because e8ports to the /ommunities 5ember %tates were

constantly on the rise. The /ommunities also seemed to provide the necessary framework in

which to overcome the balance of payments deficit and to devalue the pound sterling, a

measure which had become essential. Finally, accession offered the $nited 6ingdom the

prospect of playing an active role in the development of the /ommunities, which were

e8periencing continued growth, and of reducing its dependence on the $nited %tates by

choosing the path leading towards an emerging Europe.

-owever, during -arold Wilsons first term of office, conditions were not yet favourable for

an open policy change towards accession to the /ommunities. pposition to accession within

the abour 0arty itself was too great and the memory of the failure met by the first application

for accession in &'*< was still too vivid in the minds of the general public. t was only

following efforts made to persuade his party and after the elections held in 5arch &'** that

-arold Wilson had a large enough maority to take the decision to make a second application

for accession to the European /ommunities. #t the same time, the empty chair crisis served to

highlight General de Gaulles opposition to the maority vote and to the /ommunities

evolution towards a federal structure. This reassured the 7ritish leaders, because even if

-arold Wilson was ready to accept the economic terms associated with accession to the

/ommunities, the 0rime 5inister was not keen on accepting the slightest limitation of 7ritishsovereignty in terms of foreign and defence policy. n &+ 1ovember &'**, the 0rime

5inister announced to the -ouse of /ommons that he had decided to visit the European

capital cities to see whether conditions were favourable for a 7ritish application for accession.

n early &'*2, -arold Wilson and his Foreign %ecretary, George 7rown, carried out a series of

visits to the leaders of the %i8. The reactions in the capital cities were mostly positive, owing

to the fact that ondon had stated its willingness to accept the terms of the treaties and to

fulfil the same obligations as its future partners. The most muted welcome came once again

from France, in particular because of the economic difficulties e8perienced by the $nited

6ingdom and the countrys special relationship with the $nited %tates in foreign policy

matters which, in the eyes of the French 0resident, threatened to hinder FrancoHGerman plansfor political cooperation. -owever, the 7ritish 0rime 5inister was convinced that lessons had


11/13


12/13

payments e!uilibrium and the definition of the role of the pound sterling. 7efore giving its

final opinion on the applications for accession of the applicant countries, the /ommission

suggested the immediate opening of accession negotiations. The /ommissions opinion

therefore did not enable the !uestion to be resolved the Five and France each found

arguments in favour of their respective positions. France continued to e8press strong

opposition to the immediate opening of accession negotiations, arguing that a solution firstneeded to be found to the 7ritish problems raised by the /ommission.

General de Gaulles second veto

n :' %eptember &'*2, the /ommission of the European /ommunities delivered an opinion

on the applications for accession of the $nited 6ingdom, reland, 4enmark and 1orway in

which it proposed the immediate opening of accession negotiations with the applicant

countries. 4espite this opinion, Frances partners in the /ommunity, who were in favour of

the first enlargement of the /ommunities, continued to meet with opposition from General

de Gaulle. The French 0resident pointed to the economic difficulties e8perienced by the

$nited 6ingdom and demanded that a solution to the maor problems be found before itsaccession to the /ommunities. $nlike the Five, 0aris was convinced that the $nited

6ingdoms accession to the /ommon 5arket, even on the condition that it accepted the terms

laid down in the treaties, would fundamentally change the nature of the /ommunity and cause

it to move in the direction of a single free trade area.

#side from the economic arguments put forward to block the $nited 6ingdoms accession,

the French 0resident had other concerns. 4espite the commitments made by his government

in economic matters, the 7ritish 0rime 5inister did not agree with the French views on

foreign and defence policy. -arold Wilson continued to advocate the need for $nited %tates

involvement in European defence and reected the establishment of a European nuclear force.

The French 0resident feared that in an enlarged /ommunity, France would not only be at risk

of encountering greater difficulties in defending its economic interests, but that it would also

be in danger of losing its leadership role to a more #tlanticist policy with the arrival of the

new 5ember %tates.

n &3 1ovember, the 7ritish Government was forced to devalue the pound sterling. The

French 0resident did not hesitate to voice his reaction. -e believed that this was proof that the

7ritish economy was not ready to meet the conditions of the /ommon 5arket. n

:2 1ovember &'*2, even before the accession negotiations with the applicant countries could

begin, General de Gaulle held a press conference in which he declared his opposition, for the

second time, to the $nited 6ingdoms accession to the European /ommunities. n hisstatement, the French 0resident particularly emphasised the incompatibility of the 7ritish

economy with /ommunity rules and stressed that the $nited 6ingdoms accession to the

European /ommunities firstly re!uired that the country undergo a maor political and

economic transformation. -e reiterated his proposal for an association between the European

Economic /ommunity and the applicant countries to promote trade, but ondon immediately

reected the idea of an association, which would e8clude it from the /ommunity decision"

making process.

-owever, Frances partners in the /ommunity were not willing to accept this unilateral

decision. They therefore tried to find alternative solutions to break the deadlock and maintain

the prospect of accession for the applicant countries. 7ut all the proposals came up against theopposition of General de Gaulle he became increasingly isolated from the other 5ember


13/13

%tates and even went as far as threatening to leave the /ommunity if 7ritain were to accede.

The difference of opinion between France and its partners on the issue of 7ritish accession

affected the /ommunities activities. t became essential to find a solution to the 7ritish

!uestion in order to break the deadlock and pursue the development of the /ommunities. The

Fives mistrust of Frances European policy was increased when, in February &'*', the

French 0resident proposed to the 7ritish #mbassador to 0aris, /hristopher %oames, that the$nited 6ingdom accede to a single European free trade area which would replace the

/ommunity structures. The 7ritish 0rime 5inister, -arold Wilson, not only reected Frances

proposal but revealed its substance to the Five, thus contributing to Frances isolation. nly

when /harles de Gaulles tenure as 0resident of the French =epublic came to an end three

months later were negotiations able to be relaunched.

eu 101 session 5 class preparation

Documents