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Is the strong principle proposed by Peter Singer in Famine, Affluence, and Morality viable?

In this paper I propose an argument against the moral and practical viability of the

strong ethical principle found in Famine, Affluence, and Morality. I intend to develop

my argument in two main points. Firstly, I will consider the moral impartiality of the

principle, examining both Singers thought on the matter and the views of four critics.

Secondly, I will examine the practical impact of the principle on the developed world,

with particular regards to charitable giving within the United Kingdom.

Introduction Peter Singer essay Famine, Affluence, and Morality (FAM hereafter) was published in

Philosophy and Public Affairs in 1973. In this paper Singer put forwards two versions of

a simple ethical principle aimed at reshaping society towards aiding those living in

absolute poverty, subject to death by lack of food, shelter and medical care1.

The first version of the principle, being the more morally demanding is described as the

strong2 version and it affirms that If is it in our power to prevent something bad from

happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance,

we out, morally, to do it3. The second version of the principles, with its less pressing

moral demands is the moderate4 one and it affirms that, If is it in our power to prevent

something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything morally

significant, we out, morally, to do it5. Singer himself however, is not satisfied with this

moderate second version, which he includes as a concession for those who do not want to

reduce themselves to live a life at the level of marginal utility6. For this reason, I will

focus my enquiry on the strong first principle.

Since its publication over forty years ago FAM has attracted considerable academic

interest, and although the actual wording of the principle has remained the same since

its first publication, Singer has to reviewed the way he articulates the moral

demandingness and impartiality of the strong principle in later publication. Therefore,

in order to engage more fully with Singers thought about absolute poverty I will

consider other two of his publication wherever the argument in FAM appears wanting or

the authors views have changed; these are Practical Ethics (Third Edition) and Singer

and His Critics.

In the first part I will consider the value of utilitarian impartiality attached by Singer to

the principle, as well as four possible replies to it, in an attempt to find viable

alternatives.

1 SINGER, Peter. Famine, Affluence, and Morality, in POJMAN, (2007) 243 2 SINGER, Peter. Famine, Affluence, and Morality, in POJMAN, (2007) 248. Singer also describes it as the correct one. 3 SINGER, Peter. Famine, Affluence, and Morality, in POJMAN, (2007) 243 4 SINGER, Peter. Famine, Affluence, and Morality, in POJMAN, (2007) 248 5 SINGER, Peter. Famine, Affluence, and Morality, in POJMAN, (2007) 242, bold mine. 6 SINGER, Peter. Famine, Affluence, and Morality, in POJMAN, (2007) 248

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In the second part, I will consider a couple of practical points about applying the strong

principle to affluent societies. These should show how the strong principle could not be

widely followed in its present form because division of responsibilities among

government and citizens, and a relationship-based approach to ethics are intuitively

preferable for most people.

Impartiality of the strong principle The concept of impartiality proposed by Singer has proved to be one of the major

stumbling blocks of his ethical thought about absolute poverty.

On the one hand, partialist concerns for ones own family, nation, and ethnicity often

appears archaic in a globalised world and even dangerous7, given the twentieth century

record of murderous nationalisms. On the other hand, Singers impartialism argues

against the often self-evident priority attributed by most people to their moral duties

towards their loved ones8 (and those with whom they form a relationship) over the duty

to assist with overseas aid.

This type of impartiality is exemplified by Singer through the shallow pond argument

which runs as follows,

[I]f I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought

to wade in and pull the child out. This would mean getting my clothes muddy,

but this is insignificant, while the death of the child would presumably be a

very bad thing9.

The shallow pound argument is the paradigm of a crisis situation; thus if it is in our

power to prevent something bad from happening (the childs death), we out, morally, to

do it. In Singers thought the drowning child can be universalised to represent anyone in

a dire situation; it does not matter if child in difficulties is a few yards or many miles

away if I become aware of the childs condition, whether through personal encounter or

instant communication10, and it is in my possibility to save his life, I ought, morally, to

do it11. Thus the impartiality attached to the strong principle rejects distance as a moral

excuse for not acting ethically towards those far away from us (both geographically and

emotionally). Impartiality also does not endorse proximity as an excuse for taking care

of our own12 first. Singer only allows a particular exception, a two-level impartiality, for

providing for those immediately dependant, e.g. children13.

One crucial point ought to be reinforced before moving on to consider some possible

replies to Singers impartialism. Although Famine, Affluence, and Morality argues in

7 Cf. GREEN, Karen. Distance, Divided Responsibility and Universalizability, in The Monist, Vol. 86, No. 3, Moral Distance (July 2003) 514 8 Singer concedes that our primary concerns for family and own children may be rooted in our nature as social mammals and therefore extremely difficult to eradicate. SINGER, Peter., in JAMIESON, Dale (ed.) (1999) 300 9 SINGER, Peter. Famine, Affluence, and Morality, in POJMAN, (2007) 244 10 SINGER, Peter. Famine, Affluence, and Morality, in POJMAN, (2007) 244 11 12 SINGER, Peter. Practical Ethics (Third Edition), (2011) 202 13 Cf. SINGER, Peter., in JAMIESON, Dale (ed.) (1999) 300.

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favour of placing the welfare of those in absolute poverty above any personal and

superfluous preference, the article interprets this duty to assist others in a very specific

sense, in terms of fundraising and sizable financial donations it does not touch on non-

financial aspects of daily living, such as devoting time and energy to ones family.

Replies I offer below a critical account of four answers to Singer. These are ordered according to

the moral viability of each suggested alternative to Singerian impartiality, beginning

with the least viable.

First John Cottingham proposes a rejection of impartiality for people most people,

considering it a requirement only for those holding public office. Secondly, Bharat

Ranganathan tries to support Singer from a Christian perspective through his

interpretation of the Lukan parable of the Good Samaritan. Thirdly, Karen Green

provides a retelling of the shallow pond example in a way that provides more authentic

universalizability whilst advocating a division of responsibilities at a global level.

Fourthly, Soran Reader offers a relationship-based approach to moral duty that

transcend the usual split between partialist and impartialist theories.

i) John Cottingham

The first example of reply to utilitarian impartiality comes from John Cottinghams

1983 article published in Philosophical Studies. Cottingham argues against the viability

of every form of utilitarian impartiality whilst focusing his attention on the one

articulated by Singer. Interestingly, Cotthingham puts Singers strong principle and the

Biblical command to Love your neighbour on the same level. However, after

caricaturing the remit of these two principles, Cotthingham proposes a double principle

according to which population ought to be divided in two categories with regards to

morally impartiality. The (smaller) section of the population involved in public office is

called to exercise strict impartiality by virtue of their office; whilst the (larger) second

section, represented by ordinary citizens, is morally free to exercise partiality towards

their families and those near to them14. Cottingham goes as far as affirming that this

latter view is also endorsed by Singer. However, though it may be true that Singer

cautiously proposes some form of partiality towards those who are immediately

dependant from us15, it would be a misinterpretation to assume that he would advocate

such a double standard between public officials and private individuals. In fact, FAM

refuses the notion that only national government are responsible for overseas aid. The

strong principle states that the moral duty to assist is placed on everyone according to

their capability to sacrifice non-essential things. Singer has reiterated this idea in

recent years16.

14 COTTINGHAM, John. Ethics and Impartiality, in Philosophical Studies, Vol. 43 No. 1(Jan. 1983) 96 15 Cf. SINGER, Peter. Famine, Affluence, and Morality, in POJMAN, (2007) 244 16 Cf. SINGER, Peter. Practical Ethics (Third Edition), (2011) 213

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ii) Bharat Ranganathan

Bharat Ranganathans 2011 article published in the Journal of Religious Ethics outlines

a possible via media between the moral demandingness of Singerian impartiality and

the natural concerns of an individual for ones special relations17. Central to

Ranganathans argument is the notion of neighbour-love as articulated in the parable of

the Good Samaritan (Cf. Luke 10:25-37)18.

On one hand the author supports the claims of the strong principle about the moral

duties imposed on affluent individuals. He also broadly supports Singers views about

disregarding partiality and proximity of those in need of assistance. On the other hand,

Ranganathan elaborates a justification for self-regards19 and for preferential love

towards those closest to us on the basis that these two categories of partiality may help

people to be more ready and productive in assisting others in their need.

Interestingly, Ranganathans considers the duty to assist others in a wide sense. If

Singer limits himself to talk about money and affluence, Ranganathan suggests that

devolving time and energy is an equally important way of assisting others. In a sense,

people can give money to relieve overseas crises, but they can also spend time and

engage in mutually regarding activities20 with individuals close to them without

breaking any Singerian principle. Ranganathan illustrates this thorough the example of

a doctor deployed overseas with Doctors Without Borders. In her spare time she

recharges herself by reading novels and playing football. Supposedly, she works on the

frontline in a crisis situation like the ones described by Singer, and she has spent some

money buying non-medical books or perhaps some sportswear. Unfortunately, this

doctor/crisis scenario is precisely one used by Singer to dismiss any superfluous activity

that may detract from the ultimate goal of saving lives21. On Helping Ones Neighbor

also fails to articulate how to respond to Singers moral demandingness should those in

absolute poverty be also geographically close neighbours.

iii) Karen Green

Karen Greens 2003 article published in an edition of The Monist dedicated to moral

distance provides a third, rather more constructive, reply to Singer. In this piece the

author presents a critical response to impartiality without wholly endorsing the

principle of partiality which can lead to worst kind of action22.

Thus, in outlining a more successful via media than Ranganathan, Green proposes a

reply to the shallow pond argument by envisaging a group of strong swimmers23 placed

17 RANGANATHAN, Bharat. On Helping Ones Neighbor, in Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 40, No. 4 (2012) 653 18 Ranganathans interpretation of Luke 10:25-37 in relation to neighbour-love is not the only one. For a reading less supportive of Singer see WALKER, Thomas W. Who is my neighbor? An Invitation to See the World with Different Eyes, in HICKS, Douglas & VALERI, Mark (ed.) (2008). 19 Cf. RANGANATHAN, Bharat. On Helping Ones Neighbor, in Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 40, No. 4 (2012) 671 20 RANGANATHAN, Bharat. On Helping Ones Neighbor, in Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 40, No. 4 (2012) 671 21 Cf. SINGER, Peter. Practical Ethics (Third Edition), (2011) 213 22 GREEN, Karen. Distance Divided Responsibility and Universalizability, in The Monist, Vol. 86, No. 3, Moral Distance (July 2003) 504 23 GREEN, Karen. Distance Divided Responsibility and Universalizability, in The Monist, Vol. 86, No. 3, Moral Distance (July 2003) 507

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in an unpredictable situation of emergency on the seashore where many individuals, not

as capable swimmers as they are, are suddenly in danger of drowning. Green suggests

that each strong swimmer should try to save the lives of those closer to her in order to

maximise the numbers of lives that could be saved by the entire group of swimmers. In

the case of equidistance of a person from two rescuers a tiebreaker would be needed, and

one swimmer would have to agree save that individual, whilst the other would have to

rescue the next closest. Only by dividing responsibilities the swimmers could maximise

their limited resources and prevent avoidable deaths.

Much like Singers own example about the child in the shallow pond, Greens argument

aims at forming the morality of ordinary citizens, thus the strong swimmers are

defined as such, not as lifeguards the swimmers are private individuals called to do

their best in a situation of emergency, they are neither Cottinghams officials holding

particular responsibility nor they are experts in saving lives. Even if professional

lifeguards should be present, the strong swimmers would not be freed from moral

obligations. Morally, individuals would have to cooperate with the relevant authorities

in order to relieve the crisis.

Moreover, Greens argument in favour of division of responsibilities is useful in

articulating problems related to the scale of global emergencies. Which charity/appeal

should I donate to among a staggering number of life-saving initiatives? Whilst Singer

would advocate supporting a very restricted number of highly effective organizations24

(e.g. the ones that saves more lives) whose scope is might be limited to emergencies,

Karen Green may be able to provide a different and more reasonable answer to this

question. Much like the strong swimmers, ordinary citizens are often sensitized towards

several contemporaneous humanitarian crises that demand charitable donations. In this

situation, where resources are finite, some type tiebreaker has to be employed; e.g.

proximity of the crisis, scale, lasting effects/consequences and as Soran Reader

suggests next, also relatioships.

iv) Soran Reader

Soran Readers 2003 article in The Monist addresses the issue of impartiality and

distance by suggesting that the places which gives origin to moral duties is

relationship25 - the more I am linked to someone (or even something), the fuller my

relationship is with that person; and the fuller the relationship, the bigger the burden

moral duties I am expected to address. Thus Reader affirms that,

[R]elationship is a kind of relation between a moral agent and something else.

Most pertinently, it is the kind of relation that places moral obligations on the

moral agent. [] relationship involves an actual connection between agent

and patient, a real something between them which links them together.26

24 Singer himself supports two of the biggest international charitable organizations, Oxfam and

Unicef, by devolving thirty percent of his income to them. Cf. GREGORY, Eric. Agape and Special Relations in a Global Economy: Theological Sources, in HICKS, Douglas & VALERI, Mark (ed.) (2008) 42. 25 Cf. READER, Soran. Distance, Relationship, and Moral Obligation, in The Monist, Vol. 86, No. 3, Moral Distance (July 2003) 370. 26 READER, Soran. Distance, Relationship, and Moral Obligation, in The Monist, Vol. 86, No. 3, Moral Distance (July 2003) 370

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The connections shared by the relata which form the relationship are kinship,

friendship, presence, biology, history, shared activities, environment, institutions,

conversations, play, and trade27. Connections are not information campaigns about

particular charitable causes28. Depending on the number and strength of these

connections, relationships can be classified from full ones (e.g. parent-child

relationship) to weak ones (e.g. fellow commuters), highlighting an ever decreasing

order of moral responsibility between the relata.

Moreover, even at their weakest, relationships require some sort of encounter. Reader

demonstrates that a casual encounter gives origin to a relationship, and this

relationship, however brief that may be, warrants moral obligations either unilaterally

or between the parties.

Reader affirms that relationships, both full and weak ones, are formed and strengthened

all the times. These provide the ethical frame which charges people with moral duties

towards an ever greater number of individuals in an ever decreasing level of strength

and demandingness. For example, even though I am morally obliged to assist and care

for all those with whom I am in a relationship, the duties I am expected to perform for

my children are more in number and type than those I am expected to perform towards

my work colleagues; in turn these are more than my duties towards fellow commuters.

Outside these concentric circles of connections and moral duties are those with whom we

do not or cannot have a relationship at all, such as the overseas cases highlighted by

Singer. Their crises necessarily require a positive response but because of the lack of

relationship we find moral duty towards them only weakly obligating29.

I suggest that according the moral frame proposed by Soran Reared, there ought to be a

clear distinction between the example of the shallow pond and the universalised

impartialist approach advocated by Singer. The shallow pond illustration cannot be

universalised as an example of my moral duty to assist an unspecified child who could

be anyone in dire circumstances anywhere in the world. In other words, this example

cannot be universalised because it presupposes the formation of some of the links

outlined by Reader and therefore, also of a relationship, albeit in a very superficial

sense. Instead, the shallow pond argument proves how an actual encounter between two

individuals puts them into a relationship that gives origin to a moral obligation to

prevent something bad from happening at the very least. In this case presence,

activation of the senses, [] the intertwinement of a bit of life30 form the real something

between the relata. This brief relationship poses on me, as the stronger agent, a duty to

assist the child in difficulties, even though she may be completely unknown to me.

These four replies try to strike a balance between the impartialism of the strong

principle and the intuitive but partial concerns of most individuals for their loved ones

27 Cf. READER, Soran. Distance, Relationship, and Moral Obligation, in The Monist, Vol. 86, No. 3, Moral Distance (July 2003) 371 28 READER, Soran. Distance, Relationship, and Moral Obligation, in The Monist, Vol. 86, No. 3, Moral Distance (July 2003) 374 29 READER, Soran. Distance, Relationship, and Moral Obligation, in The Monist, Vol. 86, No. 3, Moral Distance (July 2003) 380 30 READER, Soran. Distance, Relationship, and Moral Obligation, in The Monist, Vol. 86, No. 3, Moral Distance (July 2003) 373

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and their communities. Karen Green and Soran Reader propose solid arguments

affirming that (a) we ought to envisage a good level of cooperation between governments

and citizens in the relief of humanitarian crises, and that (b) relationships are

fundamental in shaping our understanding of moral duty and they should not be

disregarded as the source of moral obligations between the relata.

I will now move on to consider the implications of applying the strong principle

impartially on a wide scale. In turn this will raise some questions about the viability of

the principle with regards to the costs of reshaping society according to the strong

principle.

The cost of reshaping society Peter Singer affirms that abiding to his principles would dramatically reshape society as

any superfluous money would be devolved to charitable causes, leaving nothing for

anything which does not advance the cause of tackling absolute poverty31.

This position has been criticised by Susan Wolf who advocates a more holistic approach

to life. Fundraising and activism are excellent things, but there is more to life than

these; interests in the arts, sports, and other non-charitable pursuits are integral parts

of being a human32 and they contribute to ones personal fulfilment, therefore

renouncing to these would mean sacrificing something of moral importance. Singers

reply however, affirms there can be no comparison between pursuing superfluous

interests as personal fulfilment, and preventing the deaths of millions of people affected

by absolute poverty by sacrificing those personal interests33.

Thus, if the strong principle were to gain widespread following all the money spent by

our society on non-essential goods and services (from expansive clothes, to

entertainment and the arts) would be diverted to assist the poorest people on the planet.

This would mean that the consumer society as we know it would slow down and

perhaps disappear entirely34, but it would also lead to many lives being saved in the

poorest areas of the planet.

However, I would argue that at this point Singer fails to acknowledge some important

points. I will illustrate two of them, but more could be raised. First, who is going to pay

for Singers altruism?

Charity begins at home There is an unfortunate theme recurring in FAM and in Singers rhetoric about absolute

poverty; it is the continual contraposition of wealthy domestic communities to poverty-

stricken overseas ones. The reason for this type of discrimination between domestic and

overseas poor is not explained; but I would suggest that it is made in the assumption

that either absolute poverty in developed countries (be they the USA, UK or other) can

be overlooked altogether because if its modest size in true keeping with utilitarian

values or that it is a matter for national government to address, perhaps through the

31 Cf. SINGER, Peter. Famine, Affluence, and Morality, in POJMAN, (2007) 249 32 Cf. WOLF, Susan. Moral Saints, in in POJMAN, (2007) 431 33 Cf. SINGER, Peter. Practical Ethics (Third Edition), (2011) 213 34 SINGER, Peter. Famine, Affluence, and Morality, in POJMAN, (2007) 249

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welfare system. However that may be, it is clear that Singer allows little or no room at

all for charity at home, and although he affirms that absolute poverty is limited largely

to the developing nations35, he fails to articulate how we should assist those affected by

this problem in our own communities. Moreover, it would be reasonable to assume that

the number of those in absolute poverty within affluent societies would only be set to

rise should a Singerian contraction of consumer society come about.

Taking the United Kingdom as an example, in the financial year 2013-2014 the Trussell

Trust (the foremost foodbank charity in the UK) provided 913,138 people with three

days worth of emergency food; among these 330,205 were children36. The scale of the

emergency is vast and although the Government has a particular responsibility for the

wellbeing of the subjects, we cannot expect people to impartially donate towards

overseas appeals whilst allowing their fellow citizens to go hungry.

Other charitable causes Secondly, Singer appears to disregard those situations that are not crises but are

ongoing causes of concern, such as deaths by diseases that may become curable through

research efforts. Should the calculating impartiality advocated by Singer found

widespread consensus, there could be little financial support available for medical

research into long term medical conditions37.

Taking another example from the United Kingdom, Cancer Research UK received a

total of 460,000,000 through fundraising in 2013 38. This sum supports 35,000 clinical

trials, 4,000 scientists and practitioners, as well as other projects. However, according to

data about cost-effectiveness of saving lives gathered from GiveWell.org39, the same

amount of money could have saved an average of 85,762 lives40 in developing countries.

Surely, most consequentialists holding to Singers strong principle would argue in

favour of a redistribution of most of the funds, or at very least of the fundraising efforts,

donated to Cancer Research UK towards areas in absolute poverty. Only in this way the

greatest number of lives could be saved, however counterintuitively that may be for

many.

Conclusion Even after four decades, FAM remains relevant and it offers a thoughtful attempt at

solving the problem of absolute poverty through the implementation of a radical ethical

principle. However, as I have tried to suggest, the strong principle is not a viable route

for dealing with this problem in the long term. Through the illustration of four replies to

Singer I have highlighted the importance of a relationship-based approach to ethics and

the division of responsibilities between government and citizens. Whilst through the two

35 Largely not wholly. SINGER, Peter. Practical Ethics (Third Edition), (2011) 203 36 trusselltrust.org/stats (April 2014) 37 Singers own selection of most effective charities includes neither research projects nor charitable undertakings in developed countries. Cf. thelifeyoucansave.org/WheretoDonate (April

2014) 38 cancerresearchuk.org/about-us/how-we-are-run/annual-report-and-accounts (April 2014) 39 givewell.org/international/technical/criteria/cost-effectiveness (April 2014) 40 Cost-effective cost-effectiveness assessed between 2,950 and 29,500 per life (exchange rate at $1 = 0.59).

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examples given above, I have suggested that the strong principle would not be tenable

with regards to the domestic needs of those in absolute poverty or affected by long-term

conditions.

Lastly, it is worth noting that in the later parts of FAM and Practical Ethics, the

language of the strong principle is put aside in favour of more realistic and pragmatic

suggestions. These later guidelines, and not the strong principle, form the basis of

Singers commitment to eradicate absolute poverty overseas. Because of this shift, even

in the authors practical reasoning, it is very difficult to understand how the strong

principle could be a tenable ethical rule41.

Bibliography

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1983)

GREEN, Karen. Distance Divided Responsibility and Universalizability, in The Monist,

Vol. 86, No. 3, Moral Distance (July 2003)

HICKS, Douglas & VALERI, Mark (ed.). Global Neighbors: Christian Faith and Moral

Obligation in Todays Economy, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. (Grand Rapids,

US-MI, 2008)

JAMIESON, Dale (ed.). Singer and his Critics, Blackwell Publishers (Malden, US-MA,

1999)

SINGER, Peter. (ed.). Applied Ethics, Oxford University Press (New York, US-NY, 1986)

_____. Famine, Affluence, and Morality, in POJMAN, Louis P., Ethical Theory (Fifth

Edition), Thomson Wadsworth (Belmont, US-CA, 2007)

_____. Practical Ethics (Third Edition), Cambridge University Press (New York, US-NY,

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RANGANATHAN, Bharat. On Helping Ones Neighbor, in Journal of Religious Ethics,

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READER, Soran. Distance, Relationship, and Moral Obligation, in The Monist, Vol. 86,

No. 3, Moral Distance (July 2003)

41 FAM moves from the strong principle to making a case for donating at least ten percent of my

income. Later guidelines from Singer suggest a percentage starting as low as one percent. Cf.

thelifeyoucansave.org (April 2014)