Aggression and Violent Behavior 18 (2013) 605–610

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Aggression and Violent Behavior

Ethical, legal and social issues surrounding research on geneticcontributions to anti-social behavior

Colleen M. Berryessa, Nicole A. Martinez-Martin, Megan A. Allyse ⁎Stanford University, Center for Biomedical Ethics, United States

⁎ Corresponding author at: 1215A Welch Road, StanTel.: +1 415 860 7135.

E-mail address: megand@stanford.edu (M.A. Allyse).

1359-1789/$ – see front matter © 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2013.07.011

a b s t r a c t

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:Received 26 March 2013Received in revised form 27 June 2013Accepted 16 July 2013Available online 22 July 2013

Keywords:AggressionAntisocial behaviorPhysiological basisEthics

Scientific study of genetic contributions to chronic antisocial behavior has stemmed from many lines ofresearch in recent years. Genetic research involving twin, family, and adoption studies has traditionallybeen used to compare the health and behavior outcomes of individuals who share the same environmentor hereditary lineage; several of these studies have concluded that heredity plays some role in the forma-tion of chronic antisocial behavior, including various forms of aggression and chronic norm-defiance. How-ever, the ethical, social, and legal environment surrounding research on the biological contributions toantisocial behavior in the United States is contentious. Although there has been some discussion in thelast few decades regarding the ethical, social, and legal concerns around this type of research withinacademic and policy circles, analysis and discussion of these concerns rarely appear together. This paperexplores the main themes that interact to form the basis of much of the resistance to positing biologicalcontributions to antisocial behavior.

© 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6052. Determinism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6063. Racism and sexism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6064. Mental illness and stigma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6065. Medicalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6066. Responsibility and punishment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6077. Privacy and discrimination. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6078. Risk and dangerousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6089. Surveillance and regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 608

10. Expertise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60911. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 609References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 609

1. Introduction

Scientific study of genetic contributions to chronic antisocial behav-ior has stemmed frommany lines of research in recent years (for a com-prehensive overview, see Baker, Bezdjian, & Raine, 2006). Geneticresearch involving twin, family, and adoption studies has traditionally

ford, CA 94305, United States.

ghts reserved.

been used to compare the health and behavior outcomes of individualswho share the same environment or hereditary lineage; several of thesestudies have concluded that heredity plays some role in the formation ofchronic antisocial behavior, including various forms of aggression andchronic norm-defiance (Brunner, Nelen, Breakefield, Ropers, & vanOost, 1993; Joseph, 2001; Rhee & Waldman, 2002; Tehrani & Mednick,2000). Research has also focused on the genetic correlates of specificpersonality disorders (e.g., Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder,Conduct Disorder, and Oppositional Defiance Disorder) and personalitycharacteristics that may contribute to antisocial behavior, including im-pulsivity, reactive aggression, hyperactivity, and callousness (Holmes,Slaughter, & Kashani, 2001; Morley & Hall, 2003; Sloan, 2000). Studies

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involving other behavioral outcomes correlated with antisocial behav-ior, such as addiction and substance abuse, have also demonstrated sig-nificant genetic influence (Hicks, Krueger, Iacono, McGue, & Patrick,2004; Kreek, Nielsen, Butelman, & LaForge, 2005; Krueger et al., 2002).

However, the ethical, social and legal environment surrounding re-search on the biological contributions to antisocial behavior in the Unit-ed States is perhaps more controversial than almost any other area ofbehavioral genetics. Indeed, past attempts to organize conferences andresearch initiatives around research in this area have resulted in suffi-ciently vociferous protests that they were shut down (Birch, 1995). Al-though there has been some discussion in the last few decadesregarding the ethical, social, and legal concerns around this type of re-search within academic and policy circles, analysis and discussion ofthese concerns rarely appear together. This paper explores the mainthemes that interact to form the basis of much of the resistance to pos-iting biological contributions to antisocial behavior.

2. Determinism

Public misunderstanding of the extent towhich genetics determinesbehavior has been a significant concern across the field of behavioralgenetics. The prevalence of Mendelian genetics in educational curriculais frequently blamed for a widespread misconception among non-scientific actors, at least in the U.S., that there is a one-to-one, or atmost a-few-to-one, association between genes and behavior (Allchin,2000). This approach is evidenced in how the media frames stories,with headlines like, ‘Is crime in the blood?’ and ‘Study finds crimegene’ (Anderson, 2002). The implications of this view are complex.In the least, it suggests, as Lewontin (1993) argues, that stratificationswithin those who are adjudicated and incarcerated for norm-deviantbehavior are due to genetic causes rather than environmentalinfluences or structural inequalities within socio-legal institutions(Martinez & Mendoza-Denton, 2011).

On an individual level, there is concern that even themisconceptionthat individuals can inherit antisocial behavior can be a self-fulfillingprophecy. There is considerable historical precedent, long before geneticswas a factor, for associating antisocial or norm-defiant behavior withheredity (Glaser, 1979). The persistence of this idea can be partiallyexplained by the fact that inherited virtuewas used to justify the hierar-chal, patrilineal socio-political structures which marked most civiliza-tions (Galton, 1869; White, 2007). These ideas both perpetuatedfundamentally unjust social structures, many of which survive, andcurtailed the idea of social mobility. Given that rebellion against class-based societies and the promise of social mobility are such a deeplyrooted part of the civil ideology of the United States, it is not surprisingthat there should be somuch antipathy toward even suggesting biolog-ical contributions to norm-defiant behavior.

3. Racism and sexism

The prevalence of racial tension in theU.S. increases the sensitivity ofany indication that there may be biological differences between racialgroupings, especially when the implication is that one race is inherentlybiased toward certain behaviors (Wasserman, 1996). Historically, unso-phisticated studies have purported to show inherited differences in cog-nitive ability or pro-social behavior between African Americans orBlacks and Caucasians (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994; Jensen, 1969;Rushton, 1997). While it has been conclusively demonstrated thatsuch studies had no scientific validity, their publication and supporthas formed an association between endemic racism and studies of her-itability in cognitive ability and antisocial behavior. The implication,made explicit by some protesters at past conferences, is that all such re-search is merely an attempt to find scientific support for the inferiorityof non-white races, in particular Blacks and Hispanics (Breggin, 1995;Williams, 1994).

The study of antisocial behavior has also focused on biological differ-ences between the sexes. Since the 1960s, theories connecting XYY Syn-drome, in which males receive an extra Y Chromosome, to prisonpopulations and antisocial behavior have permeated academic discus-sion (Jacobs, Brunton,Melville, Brittain, &McClemont, 1965). Recent re-search has supported the idea that males are far more likely to developantisocial behavioral tendencies than females, as they are exposed toand biologically affected by greater levels of risk in factors such as hy-peractivity, social problems, and neurological effects from family or ad-olescent environments (Moffitt, 2001).

Controversial evolutionary theories on criminal behavior posit thatmales are more likely to exhibit criminal behavior, especially rape, dueto natural selection and an evolutionary propensity to violence. The ar-gument runs that, historically, men who used violence and force todominate others gained more resources and sexual partners, makingthem and their progenymore likely to survive andmaintain their genet-ic lineage (Thornhill & Palmer, 2000). At any level, portraying innate dif-ferences between men, women, and the development of antisocialbehavior encompasses the danger of the naturalistic fallacy, the notionthatwhat is found in or produced bynature is inherently “good” ormor-ally justifiable (Wilson, Dietrich, & Clark, 2003). A misunderstanding ofthis concept could be used to justifymale antisocial behavior and lead tothe perception and conclusion that men are less culpable than womenfor antisocial or criminal behavior, especially violence against women,which would cause severe problems within general public understand-ing of antisocial behavior and within socio-legal institutions.

4. Mental illness and stigma

One important research theme is the uncertain distinction betweenmental illness, which tends to be largely associated with lack of controland self-damage, and antisocial behavior, which is largely externalizedand almost always involves physical, mental or property damage toothers. There is understandable conflictwith directly associating antiso-cial behavior with mental illness, as some researchers have in recentyears (Fairchild et al., 2008, 2011), as it risks downplaying the intentor choice behind the antisocial act, as well as the stigma that this typeof behavior is not socially or legally acceptable. Mental illness is associ-ated with biological malfunction and an individual's inability to controlor containmanifestations of their illness. Associating antisocial behaviorwith mental illness could potentially destigmatize such behavior andlabel it as an unavoidable or acceptable result of illness, rather than achoice by the actor. As the structure of social order takes as its founda-tion the unacceptability of antisocial behavior, the resistance to linkingantisocial behavior with mental illness is clear. Conversely, fosteringthe social stigma associated with antisocial behavior can have his ill ef-fects too. Farrington (1977) showed that the labeling of youthdisplaying antisocial behavior as delinquent had major adverse effectson the life course and eventual outcome of the youth (see also Adams,Robertson, Gray-Ray, & Ray, 2003). Furthermore, as recent currentevents have demonstrated, there is an increasingmedia tendency to im-mediately associate violent and homicidal behavior withmental illness,as in the case of Jarrod Loughner, whowas convicted of a mass shootingin Tucson, Arizona in 2011 (Moisse, 2011; Pickert & Cloud, 2011) andAdam Lanza, who opened fire in a Connecticut elementary school in2012 (Staff, 2013; Walshe, 2012).

5. Medicalization

Another major theme in the biology of antisocial behavior is the ex-tent to which positing biological contributions to such behavior has theeffect of medicalizing norm-defiance and thus simultaneously reducingthe role of personal responsibility and opening the door to pharmaco-logical approaches to ‘curing’ the individual of aberrant behavior. Thedangers of medicalization feed back into the dangers of determinismin as much as individuals may blame their biology for their behavior,

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eitherwith the intent to absolve themselves of personal or legal respon-sibility or as an explanation forwhynothing can be done to change theirbehavior patterns (Muller-Hill, 2002; Rothstein, 1999). On a more so-ciological level, there is some hope thatmedicalizationmay reduce stig-ma associated with antisocial behavior, much as the medicalization ofmental illness was intended to reduce the stigma associated with suchdisorders (Conrad & Slodden, 2013; Mehta & Farina, 1997; Olafsdottir,2010; Pescosolido, 2013; Vilhelmsson, Svensson, & Meeuwisse, 2011).It is unclear, however, whether this reduction in stigma presents an un-qualified benefit. A deeper understanding of the extent to which stigmaagainst norm-defiance acts as a deterrent for its conductwould be help-ful in untangling such interactions.

The second strand of medicalization involves the possibility ofproviding ‘treatment’ for antisocial behavior in the form of constructiveor pharmacological therapy. Recently, research involving the use Atten-tion Deficit Hyperactive Disorder medication to reduce criminality andcurb impulsiveness and aggressive behavior has been discussed(Lichtenstein et al., 2012). Although there are no known plans at thistime to actively develop pharmacological interventions specifically forantisocial behavior, due largely to the lack of strong data on the neuro-logical origins of such behavior, the possibility is repeatedly suggestedwhen biological contributions to antisocial behavior are mentioned.This association may be due, in part, to the perceived association be-tweenmental illness and antisocial behavior, or perhaps to the pharma-cologically and technologically-centered nature of modern Westernmedicine to change or transform behavior (Elliot, 2004). Either way,while the possibility of prevention, intervention and/or treating individ-uals with biological risk factors may be suggested as a benefit there arepractical and philosophical complications.

Evidence suggests that the compliance rate of individuals who havebeen prescribed pharmacological solutions for severe mental illness isproblematic. How much more problematic would such regimes be ifthey were not intended to help the individuals emotional state, butrather to make the individual more norm compliant and acceptable tosociety?While the argument could be made that individuals with anti-social traits are frequently ‘unhappy’ due to their inability to integratewell in society, there is certainly no guarantee that this should be true,raising the vexed question of whether it is acceptable to change anindividual's personality in the service of social order. Aside fromwheth-er this would involve enforced medication, there is the question of howsocial order is defined and at what point its preservation outweighs therights of the individual to their mental and physical identity. Already,the practice of forcibly medicating defendants in criminal trials inorder to improve their fitness to stand trial is controversial (Ladds &Convit, 1994; Symonds, 1980). It is difficult to predict the reaction toprolonged forcible medication to improve prosocial behavior, althoughit is conceivable that the discussion would resemble the fraught debateover the chemical castration of convicted sex offenders (Meyer & Cole,1997; Peters, 1992; Spalding, 1997).

6. Responsibility and punishment

In the legal system, criteria for personal responsibility must be metin order to justify punishment. The legal criteria for responsibility re-flects a folk psychological, rather than scientific, model of behavior, re-quiring that an act must be connected to a culpable mental state inorder to establish liability (Morse, 2011). Some have speculated that be-havioral genetics may undermine the foundations of criminal res-ponsibility and punishment, if the research sufficiently supports adeterministic view of behavior — that a particular gene caused aperson's behavior or action (Farahany&William, 2006). If this viewpre-vails, it is speculated, we could not support the punishment of criminalswho carried the genes for behavior connected to the criminal acts andthe criminal justice system would undergo radical shifts in form andpurpose. At the same time, many argue that behavioral genetics cannotbe said to support deterministic views in amanner that should affect the

criminal justice system (Morse, 2011). There is consensus in the scien-tific community that behavioral genetics research does not support con-tentions that behavior or action is caused by genes, and may, therefore,pose a poor fit with the legal system's goal of establishing whether aparticular mental state was present in order to determine criminal lia-bility. Behavioral genetics studies are meant to find a correlation be-tween behavioral and genetic differences on a population, notindividual, level. Furthermore, genetic differences are heavily mediatedby adverse environments (Farahany, 2009). For example, the presenceof the MAOA gene has been linked with increased aggression and anti-social behavior in humans (Shih, Chen, & Ridd, 1999). However, re-search has also found that the MAOA gene is significantly more likelyto increase the rate of aggression in humans when combined withmal-treatment during childhood; theMAOA gene influences vulnerability toenvironmental stress during childhood (Kim-Cohen et al., 2006).

Despite considerable concerns about whether behavioral geneticdata can be appropriately applied to determinations of legal responsibil-ity and punishment, such evidence has been presented in courts withincreasing frequency (Coleman & Farahany, 2006). Genetic findingshave been introduced by defense attorneys as well as prosecutors in at-tempts to show that a range of behaviors are genetically determined,such as a person's increased propensity for aggression or addiction(Farahany & Bernet, 2006). Initial assessments of the impact of geneticevidence in court indicate that judges and juries have been skepticalof such attempts to introduce genetic evidence to reduce an individual'slegal responsibility (Jury Still Out, 2006). However, while behavioral ge-netic evidencemay not domuch to alter the finding of legal responsibil-ity, such evidence does seem to have some effect in reducing sentencesimposed, by influencing evaluation of mitigating factors for sentencing(Evansburg, 2001). In particular, behavioral genetic evidence has beenused for this purpose during the sentencing phase of death penaltycases (Denno, 2011) although the effect is strongestwhen the behavior-al genetic evidence is combined with other types of evidence that sup-ports mitigating factors (Denno, 2009).

However, there is also reason to think that use evidence of biome-chanical mechanisms, such as brain scans, can be a double-edgedsword. While they may, in some cases, be useful as a mitigating factorin sentencing theymay also cause judges or juries to view the defendantas so dangerous as to require indefinite incarceration (Aspinwall,Brown, & Tabery, 2012). As researchers identify more correlations be-tween genes and behavior, there could be use of genetic information re-lated to schizophrenia or bipolar disorder to establish criminal insanitydefenses, among many other potential applications. There is a dangerthat genetic evidence may be presented inappropriately at court andin amanner that does not take into account the nuances of the interplaybetween environment and genetics. Since the use of such evidenceseemsunlikely to be stop, there is an urgent need consider how such ev-idencemay be appropriately presented and utilized in the court system.

7. Privacy and discrimination

The potential for misusing genetic research for violating privacy andperpetuating discrimination in a legal setting has been a both an aca-demic and policy concern for years (Council for Responsible Genetics,2008). For example, the U.S. Genetic Information NondiscriminationAct (GINA) was passed in 2008 in an attempt to protect individualsfrom being discriminated against by their employers and health insur-ance issuers based on their genetic makeup. In part, the Act was moti-vated by the finding that the fear of future genetic discriminationcould dissuade individuals from volunteering to participate in the re-search on new genetic tests, therapies and other types of research(Press, 2008). In relation to abuses involving the legal system and anti-social behavior, Canadian Justice Charron highlighted in a 2006 courtdecision the rise of forensic genetic evidence and the danger it posedto individual privacy and security: “There is no question that DNA evi-dence has revolutionized the way many crimes are investigated and

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prosecuted…The importance of forensic development to the adminis-tration of justice can hardly be overstated. At the same time, the pro-found implications of government seizure and use of DNA samples onthe privacy and security of the person cannot be ignored” (R. v.Rodgers, 2006 1S.C.R. 554, 2006 SCC 15 at para. 4; Council forResponsible Genetics, 2008).

Forensic applications of genetic information in the legal system arenot new, especially the use of genetic databases to collect and storethe DNA of offenders. However, laws establishing and regulating thesedatabases have been under constant scrutiny and, in many cases, litiga-tion (Campbell, 2011; Kaye, 2009; Kim, Mammo, Siegel, & Katsanis,2011). In addition to other criticisms, some state laws provide eitherlax or non-existent limits on the non-legal use of the databases,allowing database information to be used to “assist in …educationalresearch or medical research or development”1 or to advance “otherhumanitarian purposes”2 and therefore allows personal genetic infor-mation to be utilized without consent (Simoncelli & Steinhardt, 2005).There is understandable worry that the genetic privacy of those in-volved in the criminal justice system, even those not convicted inmany cases, are increasingly being violated by such research.

Allowing behavioral and genetic research on criminal DNA data-bases is a severely slippery slope. In 2007, a Congressional bill3 was in-troduced to create a separate DNA database of violent and sexualpredators convicted of crimes against children. Although the bill wasunsuccessful, databases like these could create awealth of genetic infor-mation for researchers on specific forensic populations, such as child sexoffenders, that could be used to study specific genetic associations tospecific antisocial tendencies. However, findings from databases likethese could also lead to specific phenotypic characteristics that arequite common, such as race, height, and hair or eye color, to be associat-ed with a specific type of antisocial behavior. Large populations of indi-viduals with these characteristics might be discriminated against orstigmatized in variousways, such as profiling by law enforcement or so-cial labeling by society at large, because their physical characteristicswere incorrectly linked to certain types of antisocial behavior.

8. Risk and dangerousness

There are a number of legal proceedings in which evaluations of therisk and dangerousness are utilized, such as: involuntary civil commit-ment hearings, assessments of sexually violent predators, capital sen-tencing proceedings, bail and parole hearings, domestic violenceassessments, and sex offender registration. There is often little judicialinquiry into the scientific validity of methods used to determine riskand dangerousness at these proceedings (Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, 2006).

Several of the main concerns regarding the use of information re-garding behavioral genetics in evaluations of risk and dangerousnessare similar to those that arise regarding determinations of legal respon-sibility: whether the type of scientific evidence is an appropriate fit forthe purpose for which it is used in legal proceedings and whether thecurrent presentation of such evidence at legal proceedings is prematureand may mislead decision makers into thinking the data suggests morecertainty regarding a connection between genes and behavior than canbe supported scientifically (Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, 2006). Asnoted above, genetic evidence has increasingly been submitted at thesentencing phase of trials and while it can serve to bolster claims formitigating factors, it also appears to have the potential for increasingthe judge or juries' perception that a person is highly dangerousand in need of long-term or indefinite confinement or incarceration

1 State of Alabama (ALA. CODE § 36-18-31 2007).2 State of Massachusetts.3 Save Our Children: Stop the Violent Predators Against Children DNA Act of 2007, H.R.

252, 110th Cong. (2007)

(Aspinwall et al., 2012). Behavioral genetic screenings may also be in-creasingly used to evaluate children, and there is reason to worryabout someone being labeled and tracked as dangerous before there issufficient behavioral evidence that the child poses a long-term risk ofdangerous behavior (Sheldrick, 1999). Some examples of genetic evi-dence that have been presented as part of risk assessment proceedingsare expressions of the MAOA allele, XYY chromosome profile, and ge-netic markers related to substance addiction.

As genetic correlations to a variety of behaviors continue to be found,there is a need to consider how they may influence different types oflegal determinations and proceeding. For example, the genetics of ad-diction behaviors continue to be identified (Crabbe, 2002; Dick &Agrawal, 2008) and have the potential to influence not just criminalproceedings, but also family law cases and social services eligibility. In-deed, some states have already implementedmandatory drug testing asa condition of receiving welfare payments, a policy that genetic predis-position to addiction may, in theory, be used to anticipate (Budd, 2011;Newell, 2011; Schaberg, 2012; Sulzberger, 2011). The search for geneticunderpinnings of sexually predatory behavior has the potential to com-bine with the trend toward indefinite commitment of sexually violentoffenders in a manner that leads to long-term confinement of peoplewhose actual behavior would not have warranted long-term confine-ment without such evidence of risk of dangerousness (Lamparello,2011). Because a person's behavior involves complex interactions thatgo beyond the mere presence of a genetic marker, there will be a needto proceed carefully and study whether the weight given to genetic ev-idence by judges and juries seems to be disproportionate to scientists'assessment of its predictive value. It will be important to ensure thatmore scrutiny and regulation of the scientific validity of genetic evi-dence is required for its presentation in legal proceedings.

9. Surveillance and regulation

From a social policy perspective, there are additional concerns sur-rounding the use of behavioral genetic information to justify the in-creased surveillance of certain groups (Rose 2010). Countries likeBritain already surveil and regulate individuals who have a history ofcertain types of antisocial behavior. Introduced in 1998 in the UK, andused until very recently, civil Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs)are individualized orders issued to individuals found to have exhibitedantisocial behaviors – which the Crime and Disorder Act (1998) defineas actions ranging from criminal behaviors like arson, vandalism, andlooting, to other behaviors like begging, racism and suicide attempts –that seek to prohibit future antisocial behavior by barring the individualfrom performing specific actions, going to certain areas, or carrying orbuying certain items (Anti-Social Behaviour Act, 2003; Crime &Disorder Act, 1998). In addition, the UK uses closed-circuit television(CCTV) to surveil public spaces with the goal of preventing crime, andit is estimated that 1.85 million cameras surveil public areas in the UK(Gerrard & Thompson, 2011). Both ASBOs and the CCTV systems havebeen controversial, and have produced criticisms about privacy,unwanted or unwarranted regulation, and blurring the line betweencriminal and noncriminal behaviors (for example, see Ashworth,2004; Greely, Riordan, Garrison, & Mountain, 2006).

With respect to biological contributions to antisocial behavior, re-search involving forensic collections of genetic information, such asDNA databases, also brings issues on the surveillance and regulation ofindividuals with types of antisocial behavior. Would it be possible touse research on forensic databases to pinpoint genetic or biological con-tributions to antisocial behavior, and then surveil or regulate the behav-ior of individuals with genetic or biological predispositions to preventtheir antisocial behavior by barring that person fromperforming specificactions, going to certain areas, or carrying or buying certain items?Conceptually this notion could be extended to imagine a precrimeprophylactic used to thwart those who have not yet committed anyantisocial acts, but have a “genetic propensity” to do so, from exhibiting

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any future antisocial behavior (Rose, 2010). Thus, ethical complicationssurrounding how to intervene or prevent antisocial behavior are tangi-ble future concerns (Larsen, Voronovich, & Bliss, 2004, p. 14; VanCamp, Dierickx, & Leuven, 2007, p. 250).

10. Expertise

Expertise in evaluating behavioral genetics research to what extentit affects or influences antisocial behavior is a pervading theme acrossantisocial behavior research. This expertise includes not only opinionsby clinicians and scientists published or given in court, but also includeshow judges, juries, and the general publicwill evaluate and apply the re-search within a forensic setting. There is worry that jury members andjudges do not possesses the knowledge or expertise to make legal deci-sions based on genetic evidence of antisocial behavior, including theability to recognize scientific validity of proposed evidence or argu-ments in court (Jacobs, 1992–1993). Further, although not mandatoryfor state courts, the Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993) Su-preme Court Decision established that judges must make an indepen-dent determination, without deferring to the scientific community, ofthe validity, and therefore the admissibility, of scientific evidence incourt. This has created a burden on many trial court judges who mustnow attempt to weigh and understand scientific evidence, most ofwhich have little or no scientific training. Although there have beensome efforts to educate judges on scientific evidence since Daubert,such as conferences, programs and pamphlets, these resources are notextraordinarily exhaustive and most judges are still under qualified tounderstand the validity and importance of bioscientific research on an-tisocial behavior in court.

This becomes additionally complicatedwhen a psychiatrist or sci-entist gives expert testimony on behavioral evidence in court, suchas testimony claiming a defendant's genetic or biological predisposi-tion to specific types of antisocial behavior, to a judge or jury who,trusting those labeled “experts,” might take opinions expressed inexpert testimony at face value or as fact without knowing the scien-tific reliability the testimony. Several studies (Ivković & Hans, 2003;Raitz, Greene, Goodman, & Loftus, 1990; Vidmar & Diamond, 2001)have shown that jurors are very influenced and persuaded by experttestimony on scientific evidence, even if they do not fully compre-hend it. Juries are thus very likely to put too much weight on behav-ioral genetic evidence when trying to understand a defendant'santisocial behavior. This could cause a whole range of problems injury trials regarding the sentencing and responsibility determinationof the defendant.

11. Conclusion

In conclusion, we have reviewed the different themes, questions,and corresponding ethical, social, and legal concerns that arise out of re-search on the genetic contributions of antisocial behavior. Although dis-cussions on these themes have existed for decades, and new geneticscience has added dimensions to these conversations, little real progresshas beenmade on how to handle these concernswithin themedical andcriminal justice systems. Indeed, the concerns raised here are only the“tip of the iceberg” arising from behavioral genetic research that thecriminal justice and legal systems will have to tackle in future years.We recommend amore comprehensive reviewof the current and futureimpact of data on biological contributions to antisocial behavior on con-temporary social institutions.

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