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Establishing bonds with the future: The inclusion ofposterity within social system boundariesGeorge W. Wallis aa Department of Sociology , The University of Georgia , Athens, GA, 30602Published online: 30 Jul 2010.

To cite this article: George W. Wallis (1985) Establishing bonds with the future: The inclusion of posteritywithin social system boundaries, Sociological Spectrum: Mid-South Sociological Association, 5:1-2, 77-94, DOI:10.1080/02732173.1985.9981743

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Establishing Bonds With The Future:The Inclusion of Posterity WithinSocial System Boundaries

GEORGE W. WALLIS

THE UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA

In this paper we consider three arguments for theinclusion of the concept of posterity within socialsystem boundaries: (1) as a survival strategy, (2)as a response to an ethic of compassion, and (3) todevelop a more nearly complete social systemconcept. In conclusion, suggestions for achievingthe goal of including posterity within the socialsystem are reviewed.

INTRODUCTION

Contemporary industrial man has but a limitedmotivation to form bonds with the future. It is hard toidentify rational reasons for making sacrifices now, onlyto protect the interests and ease the lives ofgenerations of strangers whom we wi I I not live to meet.Henry Teller (1909), a Secretary of the Interior early inthe 20th Century, expressed this "consumption ethic":

I do not believe there is either amoral or any other claim upon me topostpone the use of what nature hasgiven me, so that the next generationor generations may have anopportunity to get what I myselfought to get.

The fact that Mr. Teller lived in isolationist timesmight suggest that his views would be unacceptable intoday's internationalist world, were it not that thisethic has received substantial encouragement by JamesNA&tt, a Secretary of the Interior under President RonaldReagan. It appears that planners in companies andplanners for societies behave alike in some important

Sociological Spectrum, 5:77-94, 1985 77Copyright © 1985 by Hemisphere Publishing Corporation

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respects. Both often tend to treat natural resources as•free goods" (Barnet, 1980:300).

If we apply this calculus of benefits to the humanprospect, we face the strong possibility that man mayreact to this approach of environmental danger byindulgence in "avast fling while it is still possible, afling entirely justified by the estimation of presentenjoyments over future ones" (Heilbroner, 1974:115).Many Third Wbrld nations have objected strongly to theluxurious consumption and wasting of foodstuffs, energy,and other material by industrial nations. A. M.Hoogvelt, a Dutch sociologist, suggested that theorganization of economic processes should be transferredto a world planning authority (1978). While this idea iscontroversial, many social analysts agree with hisobjection to the United States, with only 6% of theworld's population, using 30% of its energy. Theresimply are not enough resources to support excessiveluxury for some and a continuing rape of theenvironmental system, if there is to be a decent lifefor the majority of the world's future populations.

In this paper we consider three arguments for theinclusion of posterity wi thin social system boundaries:(1) as a survival strategy, (2) as a response to an ethicof compassion, and (3) to develop a more nearly completesocial system concept. In conclusion, suggestions forachieving the goal of including posterity within thesocial system are reviewed.

SURVIVAL STRATEGY

Richard Barnet says that a new survival strategymust evolve which recognizes the rights of everyone bornto a decent minimal share of the world's resources.Unless each generation is willing to limit its own use ofresources, it is sentencing not only other members of thepresent family of man but also each successive generationto deprivation and misery.

V\fe must develop the practice of stewardship, andeffective stewardship requires at least two things. Itrequires a capacity to feel the pain and to share the joyof people who live at a great distance, and it requires arational system for sharing not only across distance butacross time (Barnet, 1980:315-316). Christopher Jencks,writing on "the social basis of unselfishness" includes"empathic unselfishness" as one of the sources, derivingfrom the fact that we "identify" with people other thanourselves, incorporating their interests into "oursubjective welfare function" so that their interestsbecome our own. Jencks also describes "corrmun i tar ianunselfishness" based upon our subjective understanding ofthe interests of a larger collectivity of which we are apart (Jencks, 1979:64). Presumably, this collectivitymay be extended to include future members of it.

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BONDS WI TH THE FUTURE 79

For hundreds of millions of years, the survival ofhuman and nonhuman societies required only short-rangeinclusion of posterity within the boundaries of socialsystems. It is only as extensive and intensive resort totechnology has extended radical impacts uponenvironmental systems, that a society's very survival hascome to depend crucially upon the incorporation of futuregenerations wi thin its boundaries.

Wars, civil and international, have often beenneeded to maintain the survival of particular socialsystems. But attempts to avoid or resolve conflictpeacefully have been even more frequent and important.The development of opportunities for differences tobecome the bases for mutual benefit enables a socialsystem to include diverse populations within itsboundaries. That technique has been most evident withinthe United States, where the bases of diversity haveincluded racial, ethnic, religious, occupational,geographic, and climatic differences. Within the UnitedStates, institutions have been developed to convert thesepotentially problematic differences into opportunitiesfor social growth.

Does such success with differences provide a basisfor developing institutions that channel generationaldifferences into opportunities for survival? If so, howfar into the future can those institutions reach? Or, toput it another way, what institutions are required toextend a society's boundaries as far into the future aswill be required to support its survival?

Our interest in institutions is based on ourassessment that this is a sociological problem more thanit is a psychological problem. Although the actions willbe those of individuals, the survival of a societydepends on those actions being patterned andinstitutional. Obtaining the consistent actions of largenumbers of individuals has been referred to by GeraldFeinberg as "Prometheus Projects" (1969), havingtrans-generational, long-range goals for humanity.

Nearly everyone shares across temporal space on aprivate scale as they provide for their own children. Ona larger scale, the traditional ties between people andland, between a family and its corrmunity, and betweenneighbors were such that identification was a c a m on,natural attitude. "Blut, Boden, und Geist", kinship,sense of place, and sense of fellowship producedcorrmunity. To live on the land knowing that one isliving in the corrmunity of one's fathers and his fathers,and to know that one's children will also be there givesa strong sense of obligation and responsibility. But ina world built on exchange relationships, on theGesellschaft principle, "it is hard to see what posterityhas to give me to compensate me for limiting my share ofresources" (Barnet, 1980:316). This "tragedy of thecorrmons" (Hardin, 1968) is not limited to individualistic

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behavior or to corporate behavior; it is neither acapitalistic nor a socialistic phenomenon. In any systemof economics, at any level, if each family or comnunityor business or nation-state is only for itself, there isno basis for concern for future generations.

The consequences of such attitudes are increasinglyvisible and the projections of the Global 2000 Report(1980), one among many indicators, suggest that survivalrequires a different planning system that will make a farmore effective use of the resources available.

THE ETOIC OF CCMPASSION

Merton and Nisbet (1966) and Bernard Beck (1978)have emphasized how sociology and the process of"discovering society" involve an increasing awareness ofinteractional patterns and are equivalent to locating newsocietal boundaries. Beck described how sociologists goabout expanding the knowledge of society and itsinterdependences. In this process of societaldiscovery, social problems are created.

From this perspective, society seems a peculiarthing. Its existence and force are made apparent by the"tangled net of consequences that anyone's actions canhave for others" (Beck, 1980:355). The on-goingsociological enterprise of discovering society is also aprocess of creating problems. Interdependence means thatit is difficult to abandon people without paying for it.The entire society pays for the costs of racism in thelabor market, of a two-class system of work, ofdiscrimination against women and the aged, and of familyviolence. Vvfe are in the process of discovering thatthere are costs in ignoring our future. The chief costmay be a decent future.

Tocqueville (1945) stressed the role that democraticpolitics play in producing social compassion, in hisprediction that the widening of political democracy wouldhave the effect of widening the social recognition ofsuffering. Merton and Nisbet (1966) described how ourawareness of the net of interrelationships increasesrather than narrows the scope of a social problem. Beck(1978) underlined their work by stressing the way inwhich sociologists expand their knowledge of society andits interdependences and in the process necessarilyproduce social problems.

\Mien the TocqueviI Iian proposition on the broadeningof compassion in a democratic society is combined withmodern sociological theory on the interrelationshipsbetween social institutions, it becomes clear why societycan be described as an ethical enterprise, as a programfor construct ing mutual responsibility among its members.

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BONDS WITH THE FUTURE 81

EXTENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS

Lenski and Lenski (1982:7) draw attention to therole of mutual responsibility in their characterizationof societal organization as a form of evolutionarydevelopment analogous to the evolutionary features ofother species, in that society is an adaptive mechanismwhich increases the chances of survival and reproductionfor societal members. Its chief advantage as an adaptivemechanism is its emphasis upon interdependence. Thus,every social creature has an enhanced capacity forcooperation, usable in many ways, a capacity which givessocietal members definite competitive advantages, chiefof which is the capacity for sharing knowledge.

For many sociologists, the social system concept isfundamental. Their definitions range from the simplicityof introductory sociology texts to the highlysophisticated formulations of Talcott Parsons (1951),Walter Buckley (1967), F.L. Bates (1975), and JosephMonane (1967). In spite of the differences in thecontent and approach among sociological theories, oneidea is corrmon to all of them: the crucial importance ofinterdependence. Each approach is concerned withproviding a distinct but limited perspective on thenature of interdependence, but each recognizes itscritical importance as a feature of systems.

Exchange theories, for example, emphasize the waysin which individuals are dependent upon one another forvarious rewards. In functional theory, shared valueorientations produce interdependence; corrmi tment toshared value systems produces a situation in whichindividuals will transcend their own narrowself-interests, if necessary, to carry out actions thatare beneficial to the social system with which theyidentify. As Lenski (1984:27) reminds us, one of theresults of socialization is that the individual learnsthat the attainment of his own ends is inextricablyI inked with the interests of others. The maximization ofone's personal satisfactions requires cooperation withina framework of a system of rules which, above all else,protects the cooperative activity itself. For such asystem to be effective, each individual must be willingto make a seeming sacrifice. It is only a seemingsacrifice, however, since the only alternative is thecessation of the cooperative activity and its benefits.Thus, enlightened self-interest compels adherence to thesocial rules.

Conflict theory, on the other hand, views coercionor the threat of coercion as providing the basis for asocial order. Symbolic interaction theory, lessexplicitly concerned with the social system concept,recognizes interdependence in that human beings as wellas other life forms do manifest relationships of thistype, partly because they affect the environment in which

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others act (Johnson, 1941:511).Godfrey and Monica Wilson used the concept of

interdependence in an interesting and provocative mannerin their discussion of "increasing scale" in humanrelationships (1968). Scale was described as thefundamental process in modernization. The theory ofscale assumes that increasing size and density in societyrequires correlative changes in constituent socialrelationships. Scale refers to the number of people inrelation and the intensity of the relationships. Thetotal interdependence of persons upon others is the samein all societies. The Bushman is as dependent upon hisfellows as is the urbanized citizen in industrializedsocieties. But his fellows are fewer in number and hisdependencies are intensely circumscribed within a smallbody of people, "consociates" with whom there is aface-to-face relationship. As the size of theindividual's society increases, the intensity of hisdependencies decreases. In the meanwhile, increasingdensity offers pressure toward specialization inrelationships and pushes their expansion beyond the localsocial horizon.

"Scale" is not measured only in terms of numbers orphysical area of the society. The degree of internalspecialization. the degree of intimacy and impersonalityof social relationships, and the degree of opportunityfor mobility of the members of a social system are alsoimportant components. Thus, changes in scale refer tochanges in the boundaries of a society. Severalboundaries may be involved: physical, political,psychological, interactional, and conrmunicational.Practically, increase in scale means that, for a givensociety which has undergone this change, the criticaldifference is that comparatively few people were involvedin social interaction before the change, whereas manypeople are in interaction after the change. For thesatisfaction of his needs, a member of a simple premodernvillage might be totally dependent upon the other peoplein his inrmediate vicinity. At the simplest level, aperson's life is bounded by the edges of his village andextend no further backward in time than the oraltraditions of his people. A modern citizen is a citizenof the worId interact ing wi th mi I I ions of others.

The Wilsons felt that the growth of the extent ofconscious relations, contemporary and historical,represented a movement toward universality. Butuniversality is not reached until we become fullyconscious of our relations to the future and includefuture generations within the boundaries of our societyand include their interests in our planning.

Judah Matras (1979) said that an expansion ofboundary systems occurs when additional members areabsorbed into the system and when the number of componentsubsystems is increased. Thus, the inclusion of future

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BONDS WITH THE FUTURE 83

populations in our consciousness, and in our planning,constitutes a genuine growth of society. As the Wilsonsobserved, an increase in concern for our past representsa growth of conscious relations that is an aspect ofincreasing scale. An increase in concern for ourposterity also represents social growth. As concern forfuture generations becomes an element in our behavior, wewill be modifying our own society. The socialrecognition of posterity's claims will modify the claimswe make upon them. If we self-indulgent Iy squanderresources, we are making claims upon the future and,being present, we can enforce these claims against thosewho are absent.

Wnen we raise the issue of the relationship betweengenerations, we are raising the issue of the relationshipbetween social organization and time. How do societiesenter into the time process? How is time to beconsidered as a dimension in social organization?Durkheim's argument that time be considered as a socialconstruct (Goody, 1968) laid a foundation for modernsocial science treatments of this topic. A body of workon the social meaning of time has since been developed bymany writers: G.H. Mead, (1932), Alfred Schutz (1962),Wilbert Moore (1963), Ernest Gellner (1964). F.L. Polak(1961), Toulmin andGoodfield (1965), R.M. Maclver (1949,1965), George Wai I is (1970), F.R. Kluckhohn (1961),Wendell Bell (1976), Edward Cornish (1977), and EdwardHall (1984).

Moore observed that social organization can be seenas a machine for increasing time and for defeating theproblem of its scarcity. It reflects the attempt bygroups to persist through time, "from generation togeneration". This is true for both human and non-humansocieties. At the non-human level, e.g., ant or beesocial organization, continuity is achieved through theprimary process of biological reproduction. As in allsocieties, the sharing of information is required, but atthis level the transmission of information through thegenetic structure is the source of continuity andconsistency. At the human level, cultural information,coded in symbols, supplements biological nature and istransmitted and controlled by the socializing andinstitutionalizing forces of society. In spite of thefact that social organization persists through time,typically transcending the lives of its individualmembers, it is also a fact that, as George H. Meadobserved, "reality exists in a present" (1932:1).Neither the past nor the future exists. For Mead, theunit of existence is the act of the individual. Actingoccurs only in the present. The past and the future haveno metaphysical existence. Buber (1937) argued that thepresent is that which is continuous and enduring. Itexists only so far as actual presentness, meeting, andrelation exist. Maclver and Page (1949:511) describe the

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84 WILLIS

social structure as a "nexus of present relationships"which lives only as it is maintained by the will ofsocial beings in the present. Society exists as a time-sequence, as a becoming, not a being. It is a processand not a product. "As soon as the process ceases, theproduct disappears" (Maclver and Page, 1949:511).

The function of the process is to produce order.Order implies continuity, a transcendence of time.Members of a society consider themselves members of ameaningful entity which was there when they were born andwill be there when they die. Their social order may notbe just or efficient or congenial. Their expectationsmay be for a bowl of gruel a day, harsh punishments, andshort and mostly unhappy lives. But even theseexpectations indicate some degree of order and stability.The opposite is a society in which there are no effectivepredictions, no expectations based on patternedbehavior—in effect, the opposite is no society at all,but chaos, ancmie, and social entropy.

One of the principal virtues of social systemtheorizing is its objectivity and freedom from thesubjectivity that characterizes some other approaches.But it is precisely in the subjective assessments of someof these other approaches, e.g., phenomenology,interaction theory, sociology of knowledge, that therelationships of the human components of society to eachother and to their temporal and spatial environments canbe more clearly perceived. A substantial body ofsociological theory therefore is concerned with phenomenathat simultaneously are concerned with the subjectiveaspect of society and with phenomena which unite andtranscend historical time and space.

As Paul Pfuetze (1954:56-57), observed, in acomparative examination of the work of G. H. Mead andMartin Buber, every individual has something that ispeculiar to himself. Each one has his own value and hisown standpoint. Each one also has continuity. To retainits identity, each individual (act, event, perspective,or person) must carry on a continuous and changingrelationship to the rest of nature. Individuals implyand require the environment as a condition of their ownexistence. The pollution that a father's carelessnessimposes pji his own son can be mirrored in the father'sappreciation of the harm he has inflicted on his son.The boundaries of the system are not adequately definedif one attends only to the objective degradation that thefather imposes on the son's environment. It isincomplete unless we also include the subjectiveappreciation of the father (cf. Dewey et al., 1966).Without that, his subsequent contribution to the system,his actions, would be unintelligible. All of nature isin constant flux; therefore, each individual orperspective must change along with its environment as theprice of its own existence.

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BONDS Wl TH THE FUTURE 85

Alfred Schutz was, like G. H. Mead, a philosopherwhose work has had great influence on sociologicaltheory. His discussions of the "corrmonsense world" ofeveryday life helped to redefine the sociology ofknowledge. Schutz emphasized the subjective aspect ofdefining a situation, suggesting that two forces areprimary in this process: the actor's biography (hisaccumulation of knowledge acquired from previousexperiences) and the choices the actor makes amongvarious interests (Heeren, 1970:47). The formulation ofa problem determines the borderline between the"taken-for-granted" and the problematic. Choice is basedupon problem-relevance, relevance to the actor's projector interest at hand (Heeren, 1970:45-51).

Schutz distinguishes among four zones of decreasingrelevance: 1) the world within our reach, observable byus and alterable by our actions, 2) areas that providethe conditions under and the means by which we must workto attain our goals in the primary relevance sphere (azone whose potentialities must be understood even thoughthe zone is inaccessible to our actions), 3) regions ofthe relatively irrelevant that for the present have noconnection with our immediate interests, and 4) regionsof the absolutely irrelevant because we believe that nochange in them could possibly affect our purpose at hand(Heeren, 1970:48).

Schutz could thus "typify" the actor's fellowmembers of society in terms of their placement in time.First, there are contemporaries", co-existent with theactor in his actual biographical moment and with whom amutual interplay of action and reaction can beestablished. There are "predecessors", upon whom theactor cannot act, but whose prior actions and theiroutcome are open to his interpretation and subject toinfluence by his own actions. Finally, there are"successors", of whom no experience is possible buttoward whom the actor may orient his actions in a more orless empty anticipation (Schutz, 1962:15-16).

From the Berger-Luckmann perspective,"contemporaries", "predecessors", and "successors" arelocated in a corrmon reality, a "symbolic universe", which"provides order for the subjective apprehension ofbiographic experience. Experiences belonging to differentspheres of reality are integrated by incorporation in thesame, overarching university of meaning" (Berger andLuckmann, 1966:97). The symbolic universe ordershistory, locating all collective events in a symbolic butcohesive unity that includes past, present, and future.With regard to the past, it creates a memory that isshared by all the individuals socialized within thecollectivity. With regard to the future, the symbolicuniverse creates a corrmon frame of reference for theprojection of individual actions (Berger and Luckmann,1966:103).

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The symbolic universe links men withtheir predecessors and theirsuccessors in a meaningful totality,serving to transcend the finitude ofindividual existence and bestowingmeaning upon the individual's death.

Ws, now, are the link between the past and thefuture. We are "time travelers", charting our coursesthrough time with maps of the future (Bell, 1976:58).The maps we are using to find our way, to define oursituation, represent, as Schutz suggested, not only ourperception of our interests but also represent ouraccumulated experience, accessible to us as knowledge.However, as limited as our experience or our knowledge ofour experience may be, it is still absolutely superior toour knowledge of the future. "There are no pastpossibilities and there are no future facts" (Bell,1976:58). Our maps are only more or less accurate, moreor less satisfactory guides to behavior. Thus, behaviorbased on them can only be more or less effective.Nevertheless, as we have previously suggested, any set ofmore or less shared expectations is preferable to thelack of expectations, to chaos. We must act as if weknow the future, although we cannot truly know it untilit is the present. Our actions depend for theireffectiveness upon how accurate our interpretations ofthe present and our predictions of the future are. Onthe other hand, unlike the closed past, the future isrelatively open; there still exist possibilities ofchoice among alternatives, and our choice of certainpredictions can be a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Each of the factors which promote and attendsocietal growth produces a certain degree of socialdislocation to which the appropriate response is someform of technical or social innovation. The increasingdemands upon limited resources require that adjustmentsoccur in the present activities and relationships ofcontemporary social systems. Continuity of the systemrequires improved planning techniques and strategies aswell as new technologies. Survival also requires that wenot use the system only to magnify our own narrow,shortsighted interests. If only in the name ofselfishness, we must consider the future. "Selfishnessinvolves concern with one's welfare over time" (Jencks,1979:66). We must have concern not only for ourselvesand our society as we now are, but with our welfare asthe kind of people and the kind of society we wi I I becometomorrow, in 10 years, in 30 years, with a new generationassuming corrmand. The inclusion of posterity withinsocial system boundaries has been habitual in somesystems. It has not been the practice in industrialsociet ies.

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BONDS WITH THE FUTURE 87

Many sociologists are futurists. Most futuristshave concentrated on the future of some society orinstitution. Or they have discussed the how offuturistics (forecasting, extrapolation of trends. Delphitechnique, modeling, etc.) or the why. Few haveaddressed themselves to the matter of why a social systemshould include coming generations within its concept.Few, therefore, have dealt with the problems of how thisis to be done. Thus far in this paper, we haveattempted to demonstrate by argument why the socialsystem concept should be expanded in this way. How canit be done? NMiat societal factors successfully fosterthe inclusion of posterity wi thin system boundaries?

HOW IT CAN BE DONE

There are many who wi I I make great sacrifices fortheir children: only a few will do so for theirgrandchildren. "It is the absence of just such a bondwith the future that casts doubt on the ability ofnation-states or economic orders to take now the measuresto mitigate the problems of the future" (Heilbroner,1974:115). In thinking about these problems, it isimportant to keep in mind two points: "The world that wewill experience in five to 20 years is being shaped bydecisions made now", and secondly, "almost anything canbe done in 20 years" (Cornish, 1977). Cornish remindsus, once the decisions to do them were made, it took onlyfour years to release the energy of the atom; it tookonly eight years to put man on the moon. The world ofour descendants, the future, must be made a part oftoday's decision making.

The ability to exert integrative influences toproduce comnunity between generations is suggested by theabilities that produce conmunity between different socialunits. There are obvious and important differencesbetween the creation of unifying ties at trans-societalbut intra-generationaI levels, and the creation ofsimilar or functionally equivalent ties attrans-generational but intra-societal levels, yet theprocesses are interrelated and partially overlapping. Ifpolitical and social conrmunity can be achieved betweenhighly disparate cultures such as the United States andIndia, between Maine and California, then it may appearthat the creation of continuity and corrmunality betweenseveral generations of the same society is not anunsolvable problem. The difficulties of achievingtemporal community may be offset to some degree by theadvantages of having already achieved geographic,political, and social comnunity.

Jacob and Teune (1964) specified several factorsthat seem to have socially integrative effects uponcon-munities: geographical proximity, . homogeneity,interactions between persons or groups, knowledge of each

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88 WALL IS

other, shared functional interests, the "character" or"motive pattern" of a group, system of power anddecision-making, sovereignty-dependency status of thecomrunity, governmental effectiveness, and previousintegrative experience.

Geographical proximity and identity are notable fortheir power in producing close, "Gemeinschaft-like"relationships. These factors have their counterparts intemporal proximity, temporal continuity, and temporalidentity. The closer people exist together, in time aswell as in place, as generations, the more likely it isthat integrative relationships wi I I develop among them.However, this is not an argument that geographical ortemporal proximity is sufficient. The geographicalvalues behind the Zionist and Palestinian movementstestify to the force of a "homeland" concept. We seemany exceptions: the enmity between populations whichshare not only geography but are also relativelyhomogenous in many ways shows that these factors, in andof themselves, are not enough, e.g., the hostilitybetween Israel and Syria, Libya and Egypt, Iran and Iraq,between Christians and Moslems in Lebanon, betweenseveral Latin American nations similar in geography,ethnic background, language, and religion, and the socialdisorganization of many slum areas in the United States.Despite these contra-examples, proximity and culturalhomogeneity tend to be dominant integrative forces. Itis for this reason, at least in part, that we identify soreadily with our parents and with our children. We sharea corrmon life, and we understand each other. It is notour knowledge about specific individuals which influencesintegration so greatly. It is knowledge about the typeof person as identified by racial, ethnic, class, andother group characteristics. The professionalsociologist in the United States is far closer to hispeers in England and France and Germany than he is tomany of his fellow citizens of the United States who arefar removed from him in education, occupation, orlifestyle, but who are close to him in geographic space.It is "knowledge that links up with a preconceivedgallery of stereotypes which each of us holds and uses asa touchstone in determining whether we want to live andwork together" (Jacob and Teune, 1964:27-28).

There is, in effect, a kind of "cognitiveproximity". But with ever continuing changes,obsolescence of knowledge and social forms, continueddisruption from social and technological innovations, andthe differences in generational experiences, thiscognitive proximity is often destroyed. The term"generation gap" is appropriate, for the changes wroughtover time introduce social chasms between generations.Homogeneity is dissolved along with feelings ofbelongingness, of consciousness of kind and the sense ofshared fate. Social distance increases; we find it

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BONDS WITH THE FUTURE 89

increasingly difficult to identify with our own children,and it becomes extraordinarily difficult to see ourselvesin the generations that will follow them (Bell,1968:174).

At the heart of the issues is themeaning of our idea of culture. Wienone speaks of a...culture, one thinksof a long-linked set of beliefs,traditions, rituals, and injunctions,which in the course of history hasachieved something of a homogeneousstyle. But modernity is,distinctively, a break with the pastas past.

The socially integrating factors described by Jacoband Teune may operate at several levels:internationally, intranationally, interconrmunally andinterregional ly, and within local conrmuni t ies. V\fe wouldadd the intergenerational levels, in which integrativeforces may operate across generational boundaries. Onemay identify many ways in which transgenerational tiesare created. For example, there is cognitive identityachieved by successive generations. This is especiallypotent in slowly changing societies. Also, cognitiveidentity is established through temporal proximity, as innuclear family, inrmediate succession patterns. There aremany other ways through which trans-generationalties arecreated: assumption of continuity, as when beliefs inthe survival of a culture over time are widely andstrongly held. As Heeren observed in his discussion ofSchutz, with regard to the realm of our successors, "wecan have no certain knowledge of them. ..the single thingwe can be sure of is that we wi I I have some successor"{Heeren, 1970:53). There are also the uses of literacyin transmitting values and knowledge and as a basis foraccumulated history, oral tradition, religious andsymbolic representations of symbolic values that providelinks with the past, such as rituals and holy days, etc.In addition to the foregoing, one may add the following:a sense of confidence in the society based upon anawareness of the society's problem-solving capacitiesderived from the successful meeting of past challenges,corrmon ancestry, charismatic leadership, and subjectionto a rational-bureaucratic authority system which has thepower to direct corrmunity affairs toward long-termsurvival goals. Finally, but not least among thesestrategies, is the deliberate creation of value systemsto provide a basis for long-term integration.

The tediousness which is a mark of the foregoinglist itself suggests the richness of the culturalresources available for achieving intergenerational ties,including links with future generations. Specific,

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practical means are identifiable, means through which theinstitutional goals of connecting us to our future arefostered through a combination of organized social actionand individual action, each of which is complementary tothe other. These approaches are consistent with theforegoing analysis and are feasible, given our currentresources.

A people can increase its sense of identificationwith the past. Edmund Burke remarked that a "people willnot look forward to posterity who never look backward totheir ancestors".

A people can strengthen its sense of identity andself-confidence by increasing its awareness of itssociety's history of success in overcoming priorchallenges, by identifying with its past throughknowledge of its history.

A sense of security can be fostered, based on theconfident expectation that there will be a future.Avoidance of consumption orgies and psychologicalhoarding is critical in this process. There may be newmodels for status achievement needed that do not requireirrational consumption and displays of energy.

Projects that will require the efforts of a sizableportion of mankind are needed. Gerald Feinberg (1969)describes these as "Prometheus Projects" which havetransgenerational, long range goals for humanity. Suchprojects cannot be an effort of one person or even ofsmall groups of people. If there are no institutionsthrough which a joint effort can be made, involvingperhaps millions of people and a number of nation-states,then we must create the necessary institutions as we goalong.

More rational value-orientations may be developed.Environments are not fixed realities. Practically, theterm environment refers to everything external to thepopulation (or an individual) and relevant to it to somedegree (Dewey et al., 1966). The meaning of theenvironment depends upon what we bring to it and what weare, and what we can do depends on it. Ourvalue-orientations refer to those aspects of theenvironment to which we attach importance and wish tostress, to esteem, to protect, or to enhance. There areneeded values and objectives that will lead us toward amore efficient use of resources rather than misuse forpurposes of display, ostentation, and greed, or for thecontinued engorgement of the purses of a small proportionof humanity.

There are surely other existing means by which ouridentification with the future may be strengthened, andstill more wiI I emerge as we cont inue evolving. To f indeffective means to accomplish this goal is an awesomechallenge. Success will require a day-by-day display ofconfidence in our system and in our future. No greatprogram wi I I be created by the threat of annihilation

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alone or by the threat of the impending "decline andfall" of our society. No charismatic leader, norational-bureaucratic official can ensure the necessaryagreement and conformity by means of which survival canbe assured and without which no program can succeed.

A historical perspective shows clearly that peopleswho have depended upon a form of deus ex machina forsurvival, upon some last minute miracle or providentialintervention to save them from their errors have not beensaved. History does teach us this: it is our decisionto survive or perish.

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