ESKIMOS,REINDEER,AND LAND

*Richard O. Stern is formerly a research associate in anthropology at the Institute of Arctic Biology, University ofAlaska. Fairbanks. He is currently historian for the Alaska Department of Nat•ural Resources, Division of Forest,Land, and Water Management.

Edward L. Arobio is a research associate in economics at the Agricultural Experiment Station, University of Alaska,Fairbanks.

Larry L. Naylor is formerly an assistant professor of anthropology at the Department of Anthropology. University ofAlaska. Fairbanks. He is currently anthropology director at North Texas State University, Denron.

Wayne C. Thomas is an associate professor of economics at the Agricultural Experiment Station. University ofAlaska, Fairbanks.

Richard O. Stern Edward L. Arobio Larry L. Naylor

andWayne C. Thomas*

Bulletin 59 December 1980

2

TABLE OF CONTENTSTable of FiguresTable of PhotosTable of TablesPrefaceChapter I–IntroductionChapter II – Reindeer Biology and EcologyReindeer Biology and Life CycleForage Requirements and Carrying CapacityAntler Growth and FunctionReindeer EcologyGeneralized Yearly Herding ActivityChapter III – Introduction of Reindeer Herding in AlaskaGeneral Historical SummaryConditions Prior to the Introduction of ReindeerReindeer IntroductionEarly DevelopmentChapter IV – Non–Native Ownership of Reindeer: 1914–1940Lomen and CompanyEpidemics, Company Herds, and FairsReindeer InvestigationsReindeer Act of 1937Chapter V – Native Ownership and the Period of Reconstruction: 1940–1977The1940sThe1950sThe 1960s– 1970sGeneral Summary – Reindeer in AlaskaChapter VI – Reindeer Herders and Social RelationshipsHistorical Overview: Seward Peninsula Social OrganizationContemporary Social OrganizationI–Household PersonnelVillage OrganizationVillage InstitutionsThe Herd Owner as Employer in the VillageHerd Owner CharacterizationChapter VII – Marketing of Reindeer ProductsMarketing of Reindeer MeatMarketing MethodsAlaska Reindeer Meat Production: 1960–1977Seward Peninsula Reindeer Meat Sales: 1960–1977Price Received by Herders: 1960–1977Protein Contribution of ReindeerMarketing of Reindeer Velvet AntlerHarvesting of Reindeer AntlerPrice HistoryValue of Reindeer ProductsChapter VIII – Socioeconomics of Reindeer HerdingProduction and Herd ManagementHerd SizesHerdingSlaughteringCorrallingsCalvingReindeer Enterprise BudgetsCostsRevenuesNet Herder Income

3

Regional ConsiderationsRegional EmploymentRegional Personal IncomeVillage ConsiderationsReindeer Industry PotentialChapter IX– Reindeer Herding and LandAlaska Land IssuesPolicy Considerations and Mitigating MeasuresChanging Land OwnershipSubsistence and Wildlife Management PolicyFire–Control PolicyAircraft PolicyAll–Terrain Vehicle PolicySummaryBibliographyAppendix 1 – Memorandum: E.W. Sawyer to Governor ParksAppendix 2 – Comparison of Reindeer Council Range Rules and Lomen Corporation Range Rules (l931)

TABLE OF FIGURESFIGURE 1. Northwestern Alaska d(2) proposals by Secretary of the Interior Rogers B. MortonFIGURE 2. Northwestern Alaska geographyFIGURE 3. Reindeer in northwestern AlaskaFIGURE 4. Reindeer herd operations in northwestern Alaska, U. S. Reindeer Service, 1936FIGURE 5. Reindeer herd operations in northwestern Alaska, government and private, 1948FIGURE 6. Reindeer herd operations in northwestern Alaska, government and private, 1958FIGURE 7. Reindeer herd operations, government and private, Seward Peninsula, 1968FIGURE 8. Reindeer grazing permits, Seward Peninsula, 1977 . 90FIGURE 9. Northwestern Alaska regional groupings circa 1850FIGURE 10. Household social organizationFIGURE 11. The kinship network of a herder in a Seward Peninsula villageFIGURE 12. Seward Peninsula Land Status as of December 30, 1980

TABLE OF TABLESTable 1. Generalized Reindeer Herding and Seasonal Round of ActivitiesTable 2. Traditional Subsistence Cycle (Buckland River Area)Table 3. Reindeer Belonging to Missions in Alaska, 1892–1902Table 4. Reindeer in Alaska, 1892–1915. Distribution and Date of Establishment of the I–HerdsTable 5. Ownership of Reindeer in Alaska, Compared: 1905, 1911, and 1915Table 6. Ownership and Distribution of Reindeer in Deering Village, 1915Table 7. Yearly Reindeer Meat Sales by the Lomens, 1914–1937Table 8. Organization of the Alaska Reindeer Service in 1930Table 9. Governor Parks’ Proposed Reorganization of the Alaska Reindeer Service in 1930Table 10. Reindeer Herd Operation in Northwest Alaska, 1936Table 11 Herds Established 1944–1952Table 12. Reindeer Herd Operations, Government and Private, 1948Table 13. Reindeer Herd Operations, Government and Private, 1958Table 14. Reindeer Herd Operations, Government and Private, Seward Peninsula, 1968Table 15. Annual Estimates of Total Reindeer Number in Alaska, 1891–1977Table 16. Reindeer on the Seward Peninsula, 1951–1977Table 17. Northwestern Alaska Regional Groupings, Circa 1850Table 18. Production and Sale of Reindeer Meat by Alaskan Reindeer Herders, 1960–1977Table 19. Reindeer Meat Sales by Seward Peninsula Reindeer Herders, 1960–1977Table 20. Price per Pound Received by Herd Owners for Reindeer Meat, 1960–1977Table 21. Composition of Foods, 100 Grams, Edible PortionTable 22. Velvet Antler Sales – Alaska, 1975–1977Table 23. Velvet Antler Sales – Seward Peninsula, 1975–1977

4

PrefaceThe following report is based on an interdisciplinary

research study undertaken to investigate the social, eco-nomic, and cultural aspects of reindeer herding in north-western Alaska. The project was funded by the NationalPark Service, U.S. Department of the Interior, and car-ried out by staff of the University of Alaska, Fairbanks.The primary purpose of the research project was to gatherdata on the past and present reindeer herding practicesof the region, but also to seek information on herding andland uses, the future potential of this essentially Nativeindustry, and its impacts on the people and economy ofthe area. Such a study was deemed essential – to assessthe potential impacts of any policy changes or land man-agement decisions which might stem from pending legis-lation to create new national interest lands in the region.This report responds to those needs as outlined in thecontract between the University of Alaska, Fairbanks, andthe National Park Service. The entire history of reindeerherding in the region is treated in the report, as well asthe social, cultural, and economic aspects of the industry,at present and given changes in certain of the variablesidentified as crucial in its continued operation.

There are many significant socioeconomic aspects ofreindeer herding; these are addressed in Chapters VI, VII,VIII, and IX of this report. The sociocultural analysis ofreindeer herding (Chapter VI) examines the relationshipbetween the social structure of the village and the rein-deer herd owner who is a member of that village. ForEskimo villagers, ties of kinship and friendship haveobligatory behaviors connected with them. In this regard,the herd–owner’s role in the village, his status, his au-thority, and his role as an agent of cultural change, anemployer, and a politician are all examined. Conceptu-ally different from the sociocultural analysis, but inti-mately allied with it, is the economic analysis (ChaptersVII and VIII) of the reindeer industry. The economic fielddata and related social data bearing on the economy wereanalyzed using relevant economic theory.

Firm and consumer activity was explored to provideinsight into economic decision making regarding reindeer.Chapter IX investigates the effects of changing land own-ership or management of reindeer grazing lands or rein-deer herding. Potential conflicts between reindeer herd-ing and subsistence, wildlife, fire–control, aircraft, andall terrain vehicles are identified and possible mitigating

Table 24. Value of Reindeer Production – Alaska, 1972–1977Table 25. Value of Reindeer product sales – Seward Peninsula, 1975–1977Table 26. Costs – 600 ReindeerTable 27. Costs – 1300 ReindeerTable 28. Costs – 2400 ReindeerTable 29 Costs– 4000 ReindeerTable 30. Reindeer Herd RevenuesTable 31. Net Herder IncomeTable 32. Potential Meat Production for Sale from Seward Peninsula Reindeer Herds

measures provided. The picture of reindeer herding whichemerges from this study is one based on: 1) the biologyand ecology of the reindeer, to include the limits and pos-sibilities which these imply for Native herders and fed-eral agencies; 2) the historical continuity of reindeer herd-ing since its introduction to mainland Alaska in 1892; 3)the interplay of restraints on reindeer herding in the cul-tural milieu of contemporary village life; 4) the influenceof the market economy on both the herder and consumerof reindeer; and 5) the activities of local, state, and Fed-eral governments, particularly as they relate to reindeerherding and the ownership and management of grazingland.

Except for Chapter IX, the material in this study isbased on research which ended in late 1977 and shouldprovide an accurate picture of reindeer herding throughthat year. Where possible, material published after 1977has been included in an attempt to update the analysis.Chapter IX was completed in 1980 and covers most of themajor issues dealing with reindeer herding and land man-agement between 1978 and 1980.

Many individuals and organizations have contributedin both tangible and intangible ways to the completion ofthis research. We especially thank the reindeer herdersof the Seward Peninsula and the surrounding region whowillingly gave of their time and knowledge to the research.We single out both Dan Karmum, Coordinator of the Re-indeer Herders Association, and Clifford Weyiouanna,President of the Reindeer Herders Association, who wereparticularly helpful. The staffs of the Institute of ArcticBiology, Agricultural Experiment Station, and Anthropol-ogy Program of the University of Alaska contributed inmany ways. Thanks to Bill Workman and Jack Luick ofthe Agricultural Experiment Station and Institute of Arc-tic Biology, respectively, University of Alaska for review-ing several chapters. The personnel of several agenciesalso assisted the researchers during the execution of thisresearch. These agencies include the Bureau of Land Man-agement, National Park Service, United States Fish &Wildlife Service, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Finan-cial support for the publication of this study was providedby the Alaska Humanities Forum; Agricultural Experi-ment Station, University of Alaska; National Park Ser-vice; and the Bureau of Indian Affairs.

5

Chapter IIntroduction

The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971(ANCSA), Public Law 92–203, directed the Secre-tary of the Interior to withdraw up to 80 million acresof public lands under Section 17 d(2) of the Act. Theselands were to be considered as possible additionsto, or for the creation of units in, the National Park,National Wildlife Refuge, National Forest, and Na-tional Wild and Scenic River Systems. Agencies ofthe Departments of the Interior and Agriculture pre-pared recommendations for d(2) proposals. Four ofthe proposed areas were in northwestern Alaskawhere reindeer herding has been an important fea-ture of the economy of the people for many years.Under d(2) legislation proposed by Morris Udall(H.R. 39), a Chukchi–Imuruk National Monumenton the Seward Peninsula and a Cape KrusensternNational Monument at Cape Krusenstern, to bemanaged by the National Park Service, were pro-posed. A Noatak National Preserve, to be managedby the National Park Service, with assistance onrequest from the United States Fish and WildlifeService in the administration of wildlife resources,was proposed for a large portion of the Noatak Riverbasin. A Selawik National Wildlife Refuge was pro-posed above the village of Selawik in the SelawikRiver basin. In northwestern Alaska, enactment ofany or all of these proposals would have a profoundeffect on the reindeer–herding industry’s currentstatus and future. Accordingly, the National ParkService contracted with the University of Alaska,Fairbanks, to conduct research on the socioeconomicstatus of reindeer herding in northwestern Alaskaand provide basic data for the management of rein-deer grazing. This report contains the results of thatresearch.

Research was concentrated on the four northwestAlaska proposal areas as described in H.R. 39 (in-troduced January 4, 1977). The investigators recog-nize that these proposals were changed as a conse-quence of d(2) hearings in the Congress of the UnitedStates. Keeping track of all the changes and counter–proposals was not possible in all cases during thecourse of research; thus, for the purposes of this re-port, the four areas as originally defined were em-phasized. In total area, the four proposals includedsome twelve million acres of land. These proposalareas and adjoining regions supported vast numbersof reindeer in the past but currently only the SewardPeninsula has large numbers of reindeer (see Fig-ure 1). In this report we concentrate on the contem-porary activities on the Seward Peninsula, empha-sizing the historical aspects of reindeer herdingthroughout northwestern Alaska as well.

As work was being completed on this report, the96th Congress finally passed d(2) legislation afteryears of struggle. The four areas used as a basis forthis study remained essentially the same in the billpassed by the Congress and signed by the Presidenton December 2, 1980. One significant change, how-ever, was the replacement of the proposed Chukchi–Imuruk National Monument on the Seward Penin-sula with the Bering Land Bridge National Preserve.

The first stage in the research program was toidentify all the available literature on the social, eco-nomic, historic, and cultural aspects of reindeerherding in northwestern Alaska. An annotated bib-liography of these sources was prepared (Stern,1977) as part of this research project. A review ofthis literature leads to the suggestion that reindeerherding has not contributed its full potential to theeconomy of rural Alaska for a number of reasons,examined herein. Despite the tremendous numberof published articles, books, and reports, and awealth of unpublished materials that are available,no comprehensive historical summary and analysisof the reindeer industry in Alaska exists. Such asummary and analysis is provided here.

During the second stage in the research program,extended periods of resident field research were con-ducted by the investigators. Richard O. Stern un-dertook an extended period of resident research inthe Seward Peninsula region from December, 1976,until the beginning of September, 1977. At varioustimes, the other investigators undertook field re-search with the reindeer herders for periods lastingup to six weeks at a time. The fieldwork portion ofthe research concentrated on collecting data on sig-nificant variables which were identified by the re-searchers during the examination of the writtensources; in addition, we evaluated the contributionwhich could be gained from securing these data.

Chapter IIReindeer biology andecology

Our primary concern is with the socioeconomicaspects of reindeer herding, therefore the discussionbelow concerning reindeer and ecology will be onlya general one, and is presented in order to place thehuman interactions with reindeer in their properbiological perspective. Reindeer biology and ecologyhave been researched extensively, but few biologistswould state that a perfect understanding of all as-pects of reindeer biology, ethology, and ecology ex-ists. The relationship of reindeer to their range, feed-ing preferences and tolerances, the function of ant-ler in feeding adaptations, the ecology of fire in range

6

regeneration and succession, and the growth dynam-ics of reindeer under various feeding regimes arebut a few of the problems which remain to be inves-tigated. Current research efforts are being directedtowards the resolution of some of these questions. Anumber of useful sources exist which present in moredetail the information which is abstracted here(Luick et al., 1975; Pegau, 1968, 1970a, 1970b;Skoog, 1968; Zhigunov, 1968; Espmark, 1964a,1964b, 1971; Stern, 1977; Courtwright, 1959; andKlein, 1970, 1971).

Reindeer biology and life cycleReindeer are the domestic or semidomestic form

of the animal Rangifer tarandus spp. In NorthAmerica, reindeer in the wild are usually called cari-bou. In Siberia and Scandinavia, the term “reindeer”usually refers to animals kept under human control(i.e. domesticated), while “wild reindeer” is the termused to distinguish those animals which roamunherded in the wild. The Saame (Lapp) term forsuch wild, unmarked reindeer is peurat (Ingold, 1976).Following Skoog (1968), domesticated reindeer will bereferred to in this chapter as “reindeer,” and the wildreindeer will be referred to as “caribou.” There are rela-tively few differences in behavior and morphology that

allow one to distinguish between reindeer and cari-bou. A general trend toward smaller size in rein-deer may be viewed as part of the overall trend to-ward smaller animal size in domesticated animals.An alternative explanation is that the trend resultsfrom human attempts to maximize herd size by con-trolling their movements, protecting them from thenatural selection forces of predators, disease, andparasites, as well as manipulating the genetics ofreproduction through husbandry techniques to en-hance survival. Pelage also varies between reindeerand caribou, with reindeer tending to be lighter incolor spotted more often than caribou.

The natural life span of reindeer varies from tento fifteen years. Cows are usually fertile by theirsecond year, some becoming so by sixteen months.Sexual maturity in bulls is likewise reached by thesecond year. Cows remain fertile up to ten years.After the tenth year, successful pregnancies decreaseas the cow becomes less able to forage successfullyduring winter and spring pregnancy. Some bulls canlose their potency after a few years while others re-main fertile for at least ten years. A single bull canimpregnate twenty or more cows during the ruttingseason. Bull–to–cow ratio is one of the most impor-tant factors in herd management.

7

For convenience in describing the yearly cycle ofactivities and events in a reindeer herd, we will be-gin in the early spring as the herd is beginning itsmovement to the calving grounds. Pregnant cowsmove instinctively to the same calving grounds yearafter year from their winter ranges. In caribou, thisspring migration of up to tens of thousands of ani-mals has generated the popular conception of longannual treks by the animals. In general, reindeermigrate less than caribou. In mid–April, calvingbegins and continues through May. A single calf isborn to most cows every spring. Late winter andspring are critical times for the reindeer, the longwinter having depleted the animal’s health and bodyfat reserves. Calving may still occur during sub–zerotemperatures. Predators such as wolves, bears,foxes, and ravens may kill many animals or frightenand scatter the herds. An early rainfall with a sud-den drop in temperature may cause ice conditionson top of the snow that reindeer cannot breakthrough to reach the plants below. Soft snow makestravelling difficult for the animals. After birth andas summer approaches, the newborn calves and theirmothers tend to separate briefly from the herd, dur-ing which time the calf apparently learns to recog-nize its mother. The hot summer months on the tun-dra bring on swarms of warble flies, mosquitoes,blackflies, and other flying insects which harass theherds. At this time, the reindeer move to high, windyplaces such as ridge–tops, or to the cooler, breeziershores of lakes or the ocean to seek relief.

During the summer, antlers are regrown, havingbeen dropped during the winter by bulls and in thespring by steers, barren females, and yearlings.Pregnant females usually retain their antlers untilafter parturition (Espmark, 1971). By July, the newantler is fully developed, although the internal massof spongy tissue does not fully harden until fall. InJuly, the antlers are covered by a soft, furry mate-rial which resembles velvet, thus giving rise to theterm “velvet antler” for this stage in their develop-ment. The velvet on the antlers dies and is rubbedoff during late summer and fall. The winter coat ofthe reindeer also tends to be shed during late springand early summer. Underlying the old winter coatis a new growth of shorter, thick black hair. Thishair grows during the summer months while the re-indeer feed on nutritious summer forage plants andachieves their greatest weight gains.

As fall approaches, the reindeer tend to move in-land toward more sheltered areas. As rutting sea-son approaches, the groups of reindeer that havescattered throughout the yearly cycle tend to re-group. In northwest Alaska, rut begins in Septem-ber and lasts into October, occurring when the ant-lers of the males have grown to their largest size.Reindeer are the most difficult to handle at this time

of year. The bulls gather “harems” of cows aroundthem, while castrated males tend to form groups bythemselves (Espmark, 1964a). However, during thewinter, bulls and steers tend to group together tograze while the cows with their calves graze together.Favorite wintering areas tend to be in open forestwith loose snow and on the windswept slopes of hillswhere ample forage is available.

Forage requirements and carryingcapacity

Reindeer (and caribou) eat various lichens duringthe winter and early spring. In summer, variousgrasses, marsh plants, and the leaves of birch andwillow become included in the diet. Mushrooms andoccasionally small mammals and bird eggs are eaten(Skoog, 1968). Lichens are extremely brittle whendry in the summer, and they can be easily damagedwhen reindeer walk on them. When lichen rangesare overgrazed or burned, the regeneration processmay require 20 to 40 years or longer. Thus, the avail-ability of food resources can vary seasonally andregionally for reindeer, a condition that can alsoextend over a long period of time. The relationshipbetween reindeer and their food resources is a criti-cal factor in herd survival. The relationship betweenreindeer growth, nutrition, reproduction, and mor-tality is still imperfectly understood.

The carrying capacity of reindeer ranges is cur-rently thought to be determined by the amount andquality of available winter–range lichens. Thesewinter ranges are limited compared with summerranges. The lichens that dominate these ranges cangrow extremely slowly, as noted by Pegau (1968,1970a, 1970b), and are thought to be more suscep-tible to overgrazing vis a vis summer forage. Whenlichens are overgrazed, burned, trampled, or other-wise damaged, regrowth can take decades.

Antler growth and functionReindeer are social animals, and within the herd

are a number of hierarchically ordered groups. In-dividual animals tend to recognize others withintheir own group. Reindeer are unique among theCervidae (deer) family in that both males and fe-males grow antlers. These antlers are postulated toplay a key role in the status of an individual ani-mal. Body size, age, strength, sex, and season arealso factors. During the winter, the various age–sexclasses shed their antlers at different times withpregnant females the last to drop their antlers.Dominant animals tend to control access to the bestgrazing locations, and in winter, when animals haveto paw through 40 to 80 cm (17 to 34 inches) of snowto reach forage, a dominant animal using its ant-lers and body action can displace a subordinate one

8

at the feeding craters. Antler retention by pregnantfemales during late winter, a time of forage scarcity,may thus be an important adaptive feature and asignificant factor in the dominance hierarchy, sinceit allows them access to the best available forage(Espmark, 1964b). The possible biological effects ofantler harvesting by man are being investigated bythe Institute of Arctic Biology, University of Alaska(Luick, 1977). Of particular concern is the impact ofsuch harvesting on bulls’ performance during thebreeding season and on the recognition of their moth-ers by calves (Espmark, 1971).

Reindeer ecologyReindeer–herd management requires a knowledge

of both reindeer behavior and needs, as well as aknowledge of the location, distribution, abundance,and use of the various reindeer foods on any par-ticular range. A useful distinction exists betweenherding and husbandry (Paine, 1964, 1972). Herd-ing includes all the knowledge outlined above, plusthe ability, judgment, and experience to move theanimals safely to the proper range at the right timeof the day or season. Husbandry on the other handincludes another set of skills concerned with rein-deer reproduction and herd increase. The herd owneruses all these skills together to execute a plan orimplicit set of goals in herd management. As a hus-bander, the owner views the herd as a capital asset,one which can be nurtured towards future securityand which represents wealth. Decisions which theherder/ owner must make in the husbandry contextinclude: how many bulls to castrate to raise as mar-ketable steers; how many steers, bulls, old cows toslaughter; optimal bull–to–cow ratios necessary toassure herd increase; calving mortality; eliminationof diseased stock; and range conditions. The owner/herder must also consider a number of other envi-ronmental, economic, and social considerations andfactors. Throughout this report, management willbe used to refer to both of these allied concepts ofherding and husbandry.

Referring to the Kautokeino Lapps of northernNorway, Paine (1972) suggests that husbandry de-cisions can be thought of as:

Alternative allocations of reindeer capital:a) Minimal necessary allocation of male animals

as draft animals: castration;b) Selective allocation of animals to the realiza-

tion of cultural values, in particular the provision ofouter clothing where premium is placed on color andother qualities of the skins: slaughter (both malesand females); and

c) Allocation of animals to the realization of liquid capi-tal, i.e. money: retention of maximum number of femalesas breeding animals and also of a select number of studbulls; marketing of male animals. (Paine, 1972).

In cultures which have long traditions of reindeerherding, such as those of the Lapps or the Chukchi,there is a distinct age separation among herders inthe herding and husbandry branches of knowledge.Almost every man is a herder of greater or lesserability. Only some men manage to develop theirherds through the application of husbandry knowl-edge and skills so that their herds grow. Young menand boys rapidly acquire herding knowledge andabilities through experience and informal instruc-tion. Women and girls can also acquire such knowl-edge and skills. The skills in husbandry, however,rest with older men who have acquired their ownherds and built them up over time. As their vigor toherd animals declines, their social status, politicalpower, and decision–making abilities increase. Leeds(1965) has drawn attention to the almost “embar-rassing neatness of fit” between Chukchi social in-stitutions and the ecological demands placed upona mobile, reindeer–herding society.

On the Seward Peninsula, the reindeer herd own-ers do make use of their knowledge of the biologyand ecology of reindeer to manage their herds. Forexample, the knowledge that different age–sexclasses of animals tend to group together at varioustimes of the year is used to decide when and howmuch effort will be required to round up animalsfor the purposes of corralling, butchering, and cas-trating. Groups of animals may also be brought to-gether or dispersed under the owners’ supervisionaccording to plans for rotational grazing of particu-lar areas of range. With the current extensive herd-ing practices on Seward Peninsula, groups of bullsoften roam unmarked but not unaccounted for byherders. These bulls no doubt service females dur-ing the rut, allowing the herd owners to maintainlower bull–to cow ratios in their tended and fullycounted herds. An examination of the seasonal roundof the reindeer owners of Seward Peninsula demon-strates further how they utilize biological and eco-logical knowledge.

Generalized yearly herding activityThroughout this report, great emphasis is placed

on variability in herd management practices. Con-sequently, a generalized yearly round of contempo-rary herding activities does not really apply to theparticular activities of any one herd owner. Indi-vidual herding and husbandry decisions are influ-enced by idiosyncratic factors, such as availabilityof other income and/or personnel to assist, and byexigencies of particular herds. Herding decisions arealso influenced by factors beyond the individual’scontrol, such as weather, availability of fuel, andavailability of a buyer and his laborers for the sum-mer handling/velvet–antler cutting. Be that as itmay, a general round of activities is presented for

9

the purpose of illustrating the activities and associ-ated problems faced by the herd owner during thecourse of the year.

Herd owners are primarily concerned with gener-ating enough income in order to secure food for them-selves and their families. Herding is usually com-bined with other activities during the course of theyear to produce such income. These other activitiesinclude: subsistence hunting, fishing, and gather-ing; entrepreneurial enterprises such as stores andhousing rentals; and wage labor.

Herding activities are therefore scheduled to mini-mize conflicts with employment, subsistence activi-ties, seasonal variations in weather, and necessarylabor. Every herd owner and his family participatesin some subsistence hunting, fishing, and gather-ing activity to a greater or lesser degree. Often, re-indeer–herding/husbandry tasks are combined withsubsistence–related activities, as for example dur-ing late summer butcherings when the family willpick berries and fish while the herd owner attendsto locating and butchering the animals. During win-ter–herding activities, the herders may hunt forptarmigan, rabbits, and furbearers, or set traps andsnares for small game and predators. In the spring,following months of winter isolation indoors, whenwarmer weather and longer daylight hours combineto make outdoor living extremely attractive, herdowners are torn between going hunting and lookingafter their herds. A compromise is often reached, asthe meat and oil furnished by seal, walrus, whale,and beluga hunting is a culturally important partof the diet. No family likes to rely solely on reindeermeat or store–bought foods when the “native foods”(nikipiak) are available from the land and sea. Thegeneral round of activities associated with herdingis provided in Table 1.

As shown in the table, as soon as freeze–up oc-curs (when fresh and salt water bodies are frozen

solidly enough to travel on) and there is solid snowcover, the herder’s mobility increases. At the sametime herder mobility is increasing, the reindeer aresometimes restricted in their movements becauseof the snow and the difficulty encountered in mov-ing across ice. Some herd owners travel by snowmachine on a regular basis to check their herdsthroughout the winter. During the winter months,a herd owner may hire one or two men to stay moreor less constantly with his reindeer. These herderslive in cabins located throughout the herd owner’srange, or occasionally they simply camp out of doors.One herd, which has a rotational grazing plan andis also the largest herd on Seward Peninsula, istended by full–time herders on a continual basisduring the winter. These herders are supplied regu-larly by airplane by another one of the herders whois an airplane owner/pilot. Another herd owner whohas recently acquired a small plane intends to useit to scout for his herd and then radio its location tohis herders.

Often, two handlings take place during the win-ter months, from October to April. One handling mayoccur in the early winter, sometime between Octo-ber and December. The other is a late–winter han-dling in February or March. The availability of la-bor, the number of animals to be slaughtered, theweather, and the herd owner’s own work–scheduleare factors which determine whether or not to roundup completely or just to butcher during such han-dlings. Depending on the reasons for the handling,the entire herd may not be rounded up or corralled.If the primary purpose of the handling is to markdeer for identification, then the entire herd needsto be rounded up, put through the corral, andbranded by ear marks. Each herd owner has his ownear mark pattern to identify his animals. If the mainpurpose is to butcher a certain number of animals formarket, however, a complete roundup is not necessary.

Table 1. Generalized reindeer herding and seasonal round of activities.

Month Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov DecBiological Spring Fall events migration migration

Calving Rut

Seasonal Ravens Insects Caribou migrations hazards Bears and hunters

FoxesWolves

Environmental Crusting Breakup Freezeup hazards snow

Herding Slaughter** Antler (Slaughter) Slaughter** activity cutting Prime hides Meat

marketing, hides** Indicates primary slaughtering times

10

The herd owner knows how many animals he hasand how many he wants to slaughter for the mar-ket. A group may be located, driven by snow ma-chines to either near the village or a herd owner’scamp, and slaughtered on the snow–covered ground.

The primary reason for the early–winter han-dlings is to slaughter animals for the market. It isat this time of year that the animals are in primecondition for marketing their meat. In the late–win-ter handling, the herd owner may be concerned withknowing how many animals he can afford to butcherfor the market, and thus may simply put the ani-mals through the corral in order to count and markthem, and make such a determination. Hides are inthe best condition in early winter for bedding, andin late winter for mukluk pieces and craft sewing.

In the spring (May–June), soft snow conditions,overflow water on the rivers, and the coming ofbreakup greatly reduces the herder’s mobility. Snowmachines are not so efficient under such conditions.At the same time, the reindeer are inclined to travelfarther, moving from the winter grazing areas to thetraditional calving grounds.

The calving season, which lasts from about April15 to June 1, is the most critical time of the year forthe herd owner. The calving success of his herd willdetermine his course of action for the next year, andwill affect his plans for butchering, herding, andhusbandry. Subzero spring temperatures, predators,bad weather, and icing are all hazards to the newborn calf. Most herd owners try to be present withthe herd as much as possible during this period, butspring is also a time of intensification of subsistence–related activities.

For a newly established herd, the first two calv-ing seasons are the most difficult for the herd owner.Prior to actual calving, females will instinctively tryto migrate to their traditional calving grounds. Theseare between 10 and 50 miles apart on Seward Pen-insula ranges. If the new herd owner can hold hisanimals on their new range at this critical period,the females will come to accept it as their new calv-ing ground after a couple of years. The historicalrecord is full of stories of newly established herdswhich left their assigned ranges and returned to the

customary calving grounds.During the summer, the reindeer tend to move

along the coast or lakes, where a breeze providessome relief from the insects and heat. Herd ownerstake advantage of this movement toward coastal lo-cations by utilizing corrals along coasts and riverswhich are easily accessible by power boats.

Reindeer herding sometimes conflicts with thesubsistence activities of northwest Alaskan Eskimos.For example, in the spring, seal hunting, waterfowlhunting, and, after break–up, fishing are all impor-tant activities. Beluga (white whale) and seal hunt-ing continue into late June. By early July, most ofthe sea ice is gone; and commercial salmon fishingand subsistence fishing in the Kotzebue Sound areaand southern Seward Peninsula occupy manypeople’s time in July and August. Berry–picking tripsare also common throughout the late summer. Somevillagers store hundreds of pounds of salmonberries,blueberries, crowberries, and other edible plants to eatduring the winter months. (The traditional yearly roundof subsistence activity, based on the Kangyikmiut,Buckland River, area, is provided in Table 2.)

In the last decade, the summer handlings havetaken on a new importance for the herd owners. Thesale of velvet antlers to Oriental buyers provides aquick source of cash income. To harvest the antler,the herd owners round up their animals in late Juneand early July, well after the calving season. In thepast couple of years, one major antler buyer hassupplied a small helicopter and labor to assist inthe roundups. Travel across the wet, uneven tundrais difficult at this time of year. Some all–terrain ve-hicles are used by some of the herd owners; how-ever, the machines’ reliability are not as good asdesired. In the summer of 1977, most summer round-ups to bring the reindeer into the corrals have beendone on foot after the antler buyer’s helicopter lo-cated and drove the herds to the mouth of the cor-ral. In addition to the antler cutting during sum-mer roundups, some castrating, marking, and butch-ering takes place. After the summer handling, theherds may not be seen again for one or two monthsor until August or September. Most herd owners dodeep track of their herd’s location during the summer,

Table 2. Traditional subsistence cycle (Buckland River area).

Month Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov DecFishing Fishing

Caribou hunting Caribou huntingActivity Beluga

huntingBerrying

Upriver (fishing) Upriver (fishing)Location Downriver (caribou corral)

EscholtzBay

(adapted from Lucier 1954, In: Ray 1964)

11

relying on reports from charter pilots flying betweenvillages, their own observations while on subsistence–related travels, and reports of other villagers who haveseen some animals during their own travels. De-pending on the owner, market needs, and availablelabor, a late–summer butchering may take place.The hides are prime in the late summer/early fallfor clothing, and the animal fat, a culturally desir-able part of the animal, is most copious just beforethe cold winter months.

Over the last ten years, the Reindeer Herders As-sociation has taken over many coordinating func-tions from the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). Anassociation representative usually attends everyhandling and keeps tallies of the various owners’animals. In addition, supplies may be brought bythe association representative for the constructionand repair of corrals and cabins necessary for herdmanagement. The logistics and communications ofroundups have been made easier with the installa-tion of usually reliable phone systems in the villagesand the increasing use of citizens’ band (CB) radiosbetween villages, camps, boats, and snow machines.

Today, the major activities for the reindeer ownerover the course of the year involve calving, summervelvet–antler sales, winter corralings to count andmark animals, and winter and sometimes a summer,butchering for marketing reindeer meat. In general,the reindeer are handled three to four times a year,while at the same time the herd owner may find him-self in conflict with his other economic activities.

Chapter IIIIntroduction of reindeerherding in AlaskaGeneral historical summary

Reindeer herding in Alaska has gone through threemajor stages of development. During the first stage,from 1892 to 1914, the industry was introduced tomainland Alaska and experienced its early growth.At this time, the ownership of reindeer was largelyconfined to the government, missions, individualLapps, and Eskimos. Beginning in 1914, the non–Native ownership of reindeer increased and a pe-riod of commercial exploitation of reindeer beganwhich would last until 1939. Since 1940, ownershipof reindeer has been restricted to Alaskan Natives, com-mercial exploitation has been relatively unimportantup to the last ten years or so, and government effortshave been directed at establishing a self–sustainingNative enterprise (Lantis, 1950; Olson, 1969).

Since the 19th century, the Eskimos of northwest-ern Alaska have been exposed to a number of Euro–American influences. These resulted from contacts

with whalers, missionaries, government employees,and non–Native settlers who introduced changes inthe lives of the people in the form of new technologyand new ideas. Significant changes in the traditionalhunting cycle, settlement pattern, social organiza-tion, and population size and distribution of all Es-kimo groups in northwest Alaska were initiatedduring the period from 1850 to 1890 (Burch, 1975;Ray, 1975). In the years following the passage of theOrganic Act of 1884, there was a marked increasein the number of whites entering the Territory ofAlaska. While the Organic Act had provided for acivil government in Alaska, the remote Territoryexperienced minimal administrative attention dur-ing its earlier years due to inadequate appropria-tions for such service and its remoteness from thecontinental United States. In addition to the Ameri-can whalers and those of other nations along thewestern coast, Revenue Service personnel, govern-ment teachers of the Bureau of Education, and mis-sionaries also found their way into northwesternAlaska during this period. In addition, traders, min-ers, and others made their way to northwesternAlaska for varying lengths of time before (and af-ter) reindeer were first brought to Alaska in 1891and located on the islands of Amnaknak andUnalaska. The increased pressure on the naturalfood resources of the Eskimos by these newcomershas often been cited as the rationale for importingthe reindeer into Alaska.

Reindeer were first imported from Siberia by theReverend Sheldon Jackson, General Agent for Edu-cation in Alaska, in 1891 on a trial basis for theavowed purpose of providing a stable food supplyfor the Native inhabitants. The Bureau of Educa-tion was initially charged with distributing the re-indeer among the Natives of northwestern Alaska.The first year’s successful importation of reindeerdemonstrated that obtaining and shipping themfrom Siberia was feasible and in 1892 reindeer werefirst shipped to mainland Alaska. Congressional ap-propriations were then obtained for subsequentyears. Some $158,000 was spent on the importation,purchase, and administration of reindeer between1893 and 1903.

During the decade 1892 to 1902, the United StatesGovernment imported some 1,280 reindeer intoAlaska from Siberia. By the time the Czarist gov-ernment forbade any more exports in 1902, therewere some 5,148 reindeer in Alaska, resulting fromthe importations and natural increase. The Rever-end Sheldon Jackson pursued a policy of placing thereindeer into the hands of the mission churches, fortheir use and subsequent distributions to the Na-tives. Lapps were brought from Scandinavia to teachreindeer herding to the Alaskan Eskimos, and bythe early 1900s they owned a large proportion of

12

the reindeer. A 1906 investigation by the Depart-ment of the Interior resulted in Jackson’s leavingoffice and a different Bureau of Education policy re-garding reindeer ownership and distribution. Oneof the central goals of the new policy was to place morereindeer directly into the hands of Native owners.

By 1916, there were over 1,200 Eskimo herd own-ers in Alaska; however, the average herd sizeamounted to less than 50 reindeer per owner. Rangeproblems were also beginning to appear and manysmall herds mingled and strayed. Native ownershipof reindeer actually began to increase shortly afterthe gold–mining industry boom was over on theSeward Peninsula. For the most part, the Lapps andthe mission churches, and not the Eskimos them-selves, profited most from the sale of reindeer to min-ing camps and prospectors and from the freightingof the miners’ outfits. By 1920, the local marketshad decreased substantially and, with them, the fi-nancial rewards of herding. Observers also report adeterioration of range quality by this time due toover–grazing. The coastal stripten or so miles wide and the ar-eas nearest the villages werebadly deteriorated (Lantis, 1950).In the 1920s, extensive whiteownership of reindeer, particu-larly by the Lomens who were in-volved in various enterprises,caused some economic conflictsand many range disputes withNatives. Reindeer ownership andaccounting had become major con-cerns of the Bureau of Educationby 1929. In that year, reindeer ad-ministration in Alaska was placedin the hands of the Governor’s Of-fice. Between 1920 and 1929, theLomens exported considerableamounts of reindeer meat to mar-kets in the continental UnitedStates, a practice that ended withthe start of the Great Depression,as did the plans for implementingmajor administrative changeswithin the Reindeer Service.

The situation deteriorated rap-idly between 1929 and 1937. Whilethe Lomens lobbied actively for fa-vorable range regulations, market-ing privileges, and the settlementof disputes in reindeer matters, thedepression caused them to losetheir export market. Decreasing furprices and lower incomes from trap-ping, combined with excess num-bers of Native–owned reindeer,

drove the local demand for reindeer down. By 1937,reindeer were slaughtered but not purchased, rangedeterioration was a clear problem, disease andpredators were taking large numbers of animals, andNative interest in herding declined. Responsibilityfor the Reindeer Service was transferred to the Bu-reau of Indian Affairs in 1937. Herds continued to in-crease through the early 1930s. In 1932, an estimated640,000 reindeer existed in Alaska, a figure that wasto decrease to 250,000 over the next eight years. By1950, only an estimated 25,000 reindeer remained.

The Reindeer Act of 1937 was the culmination ofefforts to resolve the problems with reindeer whichhad developed over the preceding decade. The actrestricted ownership to Natives, provided for gov-ernment aid, and authorized appropriations for thepurchase of all reindeer and improvements ownedby non–Natives. The actual purchase was completedin 1940. During both World War II and the postwarrecovery period, little attention was paid to the de-clining industry and remote people in northwest

13

Alaska. During the late 1940s and early 1950s, herds werereestablished throughout Alaska, this time with carefullyselected and experienced reindeer men in charge.

All the herds east of Kotzebue Sound failed by1966, with caribou largely being held responsible forthe failures. However, from 1960 to the present, therehas been considerable interest in the successful de-velopment of a Native reindeer industry. Numerousstudies have indicated its economic and ecologicalfeasibility. Unfortunately, this new view of reindeeras a commercial resource has not been easy to trans-late into successful operations.

In early 1977, there were fifteen reindeer herdsgrouped together in northwestern Alaska. All but theShaktoolik herd were confined to the Seward Penin-sula. This herd and those at Stebbins, and on St.Lawrence, Nunivak, Hagemeister. and Kodiak Is-lands, and the scattered herds on the Aleutian Is-lands under the management of the U.S. Fish andWildlife Service, are not generally considered in thisreport. On the Seward Peninsula, total numbers ofreindeer were estimated to be less than 20,000. Herdsize ranged from 100 or less to some 4,000 head.

As J. Sidney Rood, one–time General ReindeerSuperintendent, said, “the roots of present problemslie in the past;” (1937) and so it is that the currentstatus of the reindeer industry is the result of natu-ral and social forces which have been operating fora long time. Figure 2, Northwestern Alaska Geogra-phy, is presented to show the location of major settle-ments, rivers, and other geographic features referredto throughout the remainder of this report.

Conditions prior to the introductionof reindeer

For thousands of years, the Eskimo peoples ofAlaska have lived on the resources of the land, sea,and air. In northwestern Alaska, a relatively stablesource of food in the form of sea mammals and cari-bou allowed the Native inhabitants of the region tolive in semipermanent villages along the coast andrivers. Some groups depended on a mixed economyof fish, caribou, and sea mammals. This diet wassupplemented by whatever other items were season-ally available: berries in the fall and late summer,bear when it could be taken, small mammals suchas rabbit, and waterfowl. Wherever the people livedor moved to hunt, trap, fish, and harvest, they madeuse of the resources available to them. When foodwas plenty, they lived abundantly and happily; intimes of scarcity, they ranged far and wide, or madeuse of alternative resources when and if they becameavailable. Well–established trade routes moved prod-ucts from the interior regions (caribou skins, fish,wooden bowls, and jade) to the coast in exchange forthe products of the sea (ugruk skins for umiat covers,rope, blubber, meat, and muktuk). Siberian trade

items (reindeer hides, especially spotted fawn skins),and, later, European trade goods (metal, cloth, to-bacco, rifles) became an integral part of this tradenetwork of goods.

Prior to the introduction of reindeer into Alaska,cultural contact was extensive. During the periodfrom 1848 to 1854, American whalers pushed north-ward into the Chukchi Sea and Arctic Ocean, pur-suing the products of baleen whaling: oil for lamps,and baleen for corset stays, skirt hoops, and buggywhips. As the number of whalers increased, after1875, hunting and trading for furs, baleen, and wal-rus ivory also increased in importance to ensure aprofitable trip. The Pacific Steam Whaling Companyestablished shore stations at Point Barrow (1884)and Point Hope (1887). Port Clarence (near Teller)became a major resupply point (Ray, 1975). Tech-niques for overwintering in the Arctic were quicklydeveloped, with the crew living on board or on shorenearby while the ship was locked in the Arctic icefor eight months of the year. Establishing winterquarters enabled them to start the following whal-ing season much earlier than before, and some ships,operating in this way, stayed out from their homeports in New England or San Francisco for as longas five years. During the long winter months, thewhalers traded with the Natives; hired men to huntfor them; and amused themselves with games, li-quor, and Native women (Bockstoce, 1977a, 1977b).

Trade in metal products such as pans, nails, andtools, and in staples such as flour, coffee, tea, to-bacco, and liquor (which was illegal), became firmlyestablished during the 1850s to 1890s, a period thathas been referred to as the “early transitional pe-riod” by Burch (1975). Trade in repeating rifles,which also was supposed to be illegal in the laternineteenth century (1880s), increased, as the gov-ernment was largely unsuccessful in deterring itusing only the Revenue Cutter Service. Sailors alsobrought measles and venereal diseases. In general,the presence of such diseases signaled the start ofmajor disruptions of the aboriginal kinship and so-cial systems.

According to some authorities, the Native popula-tions were reduced by about 50% between 1850 and1880 (Foote and Williamson, 1966; Burch, 1975;Hall, 1977). Ray suggests, however, that the popu-lation did not decrease (1964, 1975), and actuallyasserts that the Native population in the BeringStraits region increased substantially by the turnof the century. Despite Ray’s interpretation, it is gen-erally accepted that by the twentieth century theEskimo population of the region was on the increase,and is still continuing today with the advent of mod-ern medical care to the villages and a high birth rate(Alonso and Rust, 1976; Rogers, 1971; Hippler, 1969).

Since the original importation of reindeer to mainland

14

Alaska in 1892, anthropologists, historians, andother scholars have debated the validity of SheldonJackson’s assertions that the Eskimos were in suchdesperate plight for food as he claimed. Bockstoce,Foote, and others have convincingly demonstratedthe decline in marine mammal resources on thenorthwest Alaskan coast between 1850 and 1890(Bockstoce, 1977a; Foote, 1965). During the periodfrom 1850 to the turn of the century, the caribou,which was the primary land resource utilized byEskimos, was also decreasing (Skoog, 1968; Burch,1972). The reasons for this decline are not altogetherclear. It appears that the caribou population whichinhabited the Seward Peninsula may have been anoverflow population of the western Arctic caribouherd from their center of habitation in the centralBrooks Range. A number of biologists have observedthat caribou populations of the world undergo cy-clical population fluctuations that are relatively in-dependent of the effects of human predation (Skoog,1968; Burch, 1972). While it is commonly stated thatfirearms were largely responsible for the decline ofcaribou on the Seward Peninsula between 1850 and1900, an alternative interpretation suggests thatthe decline in numbers was largely due to naturalcauses. This interpretation better fits the data (Skoog,1968; Burch, 1972; Ray, 1975).

By 1880 there were very few caribou left on theSeward Peninsula, and by 1890 there were few ani-mals that could be found at all except near the “cen-ter of habitation” of the western Arctic caribou herdin the central Brooks Range (Skoog, 1968). Some-time after 1930, caribou began to return to areasalong the Chukchi Sea and the Noatak and KobukRiver drainages. Residents of Kivalina and Noatakvillages again began to harvest caribou for the firsttime in several decades. The caribou that have re-populated this area have been credited with luringaway many of the reindeer from the reindeer herdslocated near these villages.

Between 1970 and 1977 the western Arctic cari-bou herd declined from an estimated 240,000 ani-mals to around 60,000. The resulting “caribou cri-sis” in northwestern Alaska today is a recurring situ-ation that, prehistorically, could have been met inone of two ways. When a predator population is to-tally dependent on a single prey species, and thatprey declines in numbers and/or density, the preda-tors can either: 1) utilize alternative food resourcesor strategies; 2) reduce their numbers correspond-ingly by death and/or emigration; or 3) some combi-nation of these (Odum, 1971). The caribou–huntinghuman populations have faced this situationthroughout their occupation of interior northwest-ern Alaska. Characteristically, they have shiftedtheir hunting emphasis to other regions (emigration)and utilized alternative food resources (strategy

change) by fishing or exploiting mammals other thancaribou (Campbell, 1968; Spencer, 1959; Hall, 1975;Hickey, 1976). This is a gross oversimplification ofthe specific historical instances of hunter/gatherersubsistence strategies. A more elegant treatment ofthis problem would have to take into account a num-ber of other variables: resource abundance, distri-bution, and availability; settlement location; andhuman demography, to name but a few (Jochim, 1976).

In this report, a comparison of the northwesternAlaska interior Eskimo groups and the caribou–hunting groups of the Seward Peninsula is reveal-ing. While such a comparison must be very generaland based completely on secondary sources, it canbe demonstrated that caribou were the mainstay ofboth groups and that changes in caribou distribu-tion and abundance did cause changes in the sub-sistence strategies of the groups. The Seward Pen-insula groups were less drastically affected by thecaribou’s abandonment of the peninsula becausethey had more alternative food resources to exploitsuch as beluga, fish, and seals (Ray, 1964). In con-trast, interior northwest Alaska was virtually aban-doned during the half a century from 1890 to 1940when the caribou were low in numbers.

According to Burch (1975), the boundary betweenhis early and intermediate transitional periods var-ies from place to place. The year 1890 serves as aconvenient marking point with the establishmentof schools, missions, and reindeer herds as eventswhich signal the change. The actual changes whichtook place during his “early transitional period”(1850–1890) may be summarized briefly. Despite dis-agreements about the order of magnitude (and eventhe direction of the change, Ray, 1964, 1975), it isgenerally agreed that the Eskimo population ofnorthwestern Alaska had both declined in numbersand changed their subsistence patterns as well assettlement locations during the period. The marineand terrestrial food resources of the region had alsodeclined, essentially from overhunting by and forwhites to supply a commercial market and from natu-ral causes such as diseases and predation. The use offirearms by Natives was probably a minor factor.

By the time reindeer were brought to the SewardPeninsula in 1892, several effects had resulted fromthe contact with Euro–Americans (Burch, 1972;Skoog, 1968). Foreign diseases already had beenintroduced. Traditional food resources had been de-pleted. Bowhead whales and walrus were reducedin number. Caribou were no longer present on theSeward Peninsula. Firearms were known and uti-lized, but played little part in the elimination of cari-bou from Seward Peninsula. Alcohol and its use wasknown. Contacts with white technology had beentaking place for several decades, at least on a spo-radic basis. Between 1819 and 1880, Foote attributes

15

the greater detrimental effects on the Native popu-lation to “the spread of foreign diseases and the re-duction of food sources. The introduction of firearms,alcohol, and new ideas appears to have been of sec-ondary importance” (Foote, 1964).

In Burch’s early transitional period, from 1850 to1890, he sees serious disruptions to Eskimo life stem-ming from contagious diseases and the introductionof liquor through white contact “exacerbated by thedrastic decline of the caribou population” (Burch,1975). The population was both reduced in numbersand displaced in location compared to the precontactperiod. These demographic changes forced a num-ber of changes in the social organization of north-western Alaska Eskimo society. As Burch (1975) pro-vides an adequate discussion of these changes, itwill not be necessary to repeat them here.

Reindeer introductionWhen the Reverend Sheldon Jackson first toured

the arctic region of Alaska, he was dismayed by theconditions he saw. The conditions were basically ashave been described above, but Jackson failed toplace them in historical perspective or in a culturalposition relative to the southeast Alaskan Indianswith whom he was used to working. Thesemisubterranean houses of the Eskimos appearedwet and cold. Little did he realize the excellent pro-tection they offered during the long arctic winters.The declining resource base alarmed him, as did thedeclining self–respect and cultural viability of thenorthwestern Alaskan Eskimos. To “save” the Eski-mos from starvation and to promote industrial edu-cation, he proposed to bring reindeer from Siberiato Alaska. He also proposed to bring Siberian rein-deer herders to teach the Alaskan Eskimos how toherd reindeer. Through this scheme he believed hecould save the Eskimos’ stomachs and dignity at thesame time (Ray, 1965; Ward, 1955, 1956).

While Jackson initially failed to secure Congres-sional funding for his project, he did succeed in rais-ing $2,146 through public subscriptions, mostly insmall amounts donated by philanthropic churchgo-ers. This money was used in 1891 to buy 16 rein-deer in Siberia and locate them on Amaknak andUnalaska Islands. Following the success of this pur-chasing and transportation scheme, the Bureau ofEducation agreed to administer the money for theremainder of the project. On July 4, 1892, 171 rein-deer were brought from Siberia and located at thenewly created Teller Reindeer Station. Teller Rein-deer Station at Port Clarence originally had been aschool for the Eskimos of the area, but with the intro-duction of reindeer it was designated the reindeertraining station for the Eskimo herders. Following thefirst year’s overall success in purchasing and ship-ping reindeer from Siberia to Alaska, Congress

agreed to appropriate money for additional impor-tations and for administrating the program there-after. Over the next ten years, 1,280 reindeer werebrought to Alaska, until 1902, when the RussianCzar forbade all further exports of reindeer fromRussia. Unfortunately, the Siberians whom Jacksonhad thought would be able to train the Alaskan Es-kimos proved to be reluctant teachers. No oneseemed to have considered that traditionally the Si-berians and Alaskans had been bitter enemies. Inaddition to language barriers, it was difficult to per-suade the Siberians to divulge their animal herdingand husbandry knowledge. In the summer of 1894,William Kjellmann, a Norwegian–American teacheremployed by the Bureau of Education, was in-structed by Jackson to bring Lapp herders and theirfamilies from Norway to teach reindeer herding. Inthe summer of 1894, Lapps with their families ar-rived at the Teller Station. They were promised, aspartial payment for their services, what reindeerthey required for food and clothing. This was in di-rect contradiction to Native use of reindeer, for upto this time no Eskimo had been permitted to slaugh-ter reindeer for food.

The increases that occurred in reindeer numbersduring the first two years of the industry were ap-parently more fortuitous than the result of goodherding practices. Herds were kept close to the TellerReindeer Station and after two years of grazing, thevegetation within a three mile radius of the stationhad been completely depleted. Such overgrazing hadtaken place that new grazing areas had to be found.Despite this overgrazing, the mild winters aided theherds to increase steadily without heavy calf lossesin the spring. In August, 1894, the CongregationalMission at Wales, under the charge of William T.Lopp, received a gift of 100 reindeer from Jacksonin accordance with Jackson’s plan to furnish rein-deer to the missions. The Lapps who had come toteach the Eskimos basic husbandry and herding ofreindeer were also given permission to utilize anyanimals they wanted. They were also paid salariesof 1,200 kroner a year. As no Eskimo owned a suc-cessfully operating herd at this time, the gift of re-indeer to the mission and the presence of the Lappswith their preferential use of reindeer led the Eski-mos to conclude that they were not going to benefitfrom the reindeer industry.

Kjellmann resigned as third superintendent of theTeller Station in the summer of 1895 over disagree-ments with Captain Healy of the Bear, although hisofficial reason for resigning was his wife’s health(Ray, 1975). Kjellmann had been a capable admin-istrator with keen insight into the problems whichwere developing with the reindeer situation. He didreturn to the Teller Reindeer Station in 1896 as su-perintendent.

16

Early developmentIn 1896 there were 1,175 reindeer in Alaska, dis-

tributed in four herds spread out between Wales andGolovin Bay. One of these was the government herdat Teller Reindeer Station, while the other threewere mission herds at Wales and at Golovin. To al-leviate suspicion that no Eskimos would ever gettheir own herds, Jackson loaned 100 reindeer inJanuary of 1895 to Charley Antisarlook, an Eskimoreindeer apprentice. With the 15 reindeer he hadearned as an apprentice, Charley moved his newlyacquired herd to the Synrock River. By the end oftwo calving seasons, his herd had increased to 217head. Four years after the introduction of reindeerinto Alaska, only one herd was in Eskimo hands,and few Eskimos had even tasted reindeer meat(Ray, 1965). By 1896, the mission herd at Wales hadincreased to 168 animals, while the herds at GolovinBay belonging to the Swedish Covenant and theEpiscopal Missions numbered some 130 head. Theremainder of the reindeer, some 650 animals, werelocated at the Teller Reindeer Station. In 1900, theLutheran Mission at Teller, under the charge of T.L. Brevig, was loaned 100 deer. Brevig had been re-cruited to come to Alaska from Norway because hecould speak Saame (Lappish) and minister to theLapps. In addition, he also spoke English and Nor-wegian, and he quickly mastered Eskimo (Brevig,1944). The numbers of reindeer in Alaska loaned tomissions up to the year 1902 are provided in Table3. Lapps and other non–Native owned 860 reindeer;the missions owned 1,635; a total of 2,591 wereowned by 43 Eskimos.

A drive of reindeer to Barrow in 1898 for the reliefof whalers stranded there, followed byanother aborted drive up the Yukon toCircle for the relief of miners in thesame year, served to distribute rein-deer over a large part of Alaska.Kjellmann had made a second trip toNorway in 1897 to recruit families tocome to Alaska to teach reindeer herd-ing to the Eskimos. While he was inNorway, news came that miners in thegold fields up the Yukon River were indanger of starving. Congress was per-suaded to authorize $200,000 to bringover Lapps and 539 reindeer steerswhich were then to be driven fromHaines to Circle. As this meshed per-fectly with Jackson’s original plans tobring Lapps to Alaska as reindeer in-structors, he went to Norway to inter-cept Kjellmann. In the fall of 1897, 113Lapplanders, Finns, and Norwegians,representing 63 herders, signed con-tracts to come to Alaska.

The acquired reindeer were shipped by railroadfrom the east coast to Seattle, by boat northward toHaines, and then driven to Circle by Hedley E.Redmyer and a crew of six men, including five Lapps.By April 15, 1898, 362 animals had died. When the“relief” finally arrived in Circle on February 28, 1899,only 114 animals had survived the journey(Redmyer, 1951). Antisarlook’s 100 loan deer weretaken back and shipped to St. Michael, there to besent up the Yukon River. At St. Michael, it was de-cided that they would not survive such a trip, butthe deer were not returned to Antisarlook. Instead,more reindeer were borrowed from Antisarlook andthe mission herd at Wales to be driven north to save“starving” whalers at Barrow (Ray, 1965, 1975).

The second drive evolved when reports came fromBarrow that four whaling ships had been crushedin early winter ice east of Barrow. Five other shipshad also been forced to winter in emergency quar-ters as well. Vessels that had escaped the ice packbrought word that insufficient food supplies existedat Barrow for all the men trapped there for the win-ter. Lieutenant D.H. Jarvis, Lieutenant E.P.Bertholf, and Surgeon S.J. Call of the Revenue Cut-ter Bear set out from Nelson Island to borrow allthe Lapp’s deer at Wales and the remainder ofAntisarlook’s herd to provide the whalers with food.Seven Eskimo herders and apprentices were hiredto help with the drive. Between January 19 andMarch 19, 1898, 448 reindeer were driven the 1,200kilometers (750 miles) between Wales and Point Bar-row, with only 382 reindeer surviving the trip. Onceat Barrow, it was discovered that most of the “starv-ing” whalers were actually quite well supplied with

Table 3. Reindeer belonging to missions in Alaska, 1892–1902.When When No. In herd

Mission Station Herds Location loaned due loaned 1902Cape Prince of Wales Aug. gift 118 224(Congregational Mission) 1894Golovin Bay Jan. 1901 50 264(Swedish Evangelical Mission) 1896(Protestant Espiscopal Mission) Jan. 1901 50 89

1896Point Barrow (Presbyterian) Sept. 1903 100 238

1898Gambell, St. Lawrence Island July 1905 70 150(Presbyterian) 1900Teller Sept. 1905 100 221(Norwegian Evangelical Lutheran) 1900Nulato (Roman Catholic) Mar. 1906 100 151

1901Bethel (Moravian) Feb. 1906 88 188

1901Carmel (Nushugak River) Feb. 1906 88 188(Moravian) 1901Kotzebue Sept. 1906 95 160(California Yearly Meeting–Friends) 1901(Source: Jackson, 1903.)

17

food, thanks to the fine organizational efforts ofCharles Brower and others (Bockstoce, 1977b). Ofthe reindeer actually reaching Barrow, only 180 wereactually slaughtered for food. The remainder of theanimals were to form the nucleus of the herd startedat Point Barrow under the direction of the Presbyte-rian Mission. In this way, reindeer herds were dis-tributed from St. Michael to Point Barrow. But insteadof benefitting, elevating, and assisting the Eskimosto become self supporting, Caucasians were aided.

In the decade following these “rescues,” reindeerwere also distributed throughout northwesternAlaska through additional loans to missions, loansto independent Lapps who had served their appren-ticeship and wished to start their own herds, andloans to individual Natives who wished to run theirown local herds. The 1,635 reindeer owned by Alas-kan missions in 1902 contrasts with 2,591 ownedby 43 Eskimos and the 922 reindeer owned by thegovernment and other non–Natives. The averageherd size for the 43 Eskimo owners of reindeer in1902 was approximately 60 rein-deer, ranging in actual herds offrom 4 to 269 head. Most authori-ties agree that a herd of reindeerneeds to be at least 1,000 to 2,000head to be economically viable(Lantis, 1950; Olson, 1969;Zhuginov, 1968). Nearly 50 percent of the total 4,148 reindeer inAlaska by 1902 were in non–Na-tive hands. This situation was notwhat the original project hadcalled for. It was met with dissat-isfaction in Washington, and spe-cial agent Frank C. Churchill wassent to investigate Alaska’sschools and reindeer program in1905 (Churchill, 1906). The dissat-isfaction with the schools resultedfrom Jackson’s policy of keepingeducation and religious trainingtogether in teacher recruitmentand daily instruction. Jackson’sopponents wished to see a moresecular educational system inAlaska.

Figure 3 (Reindeer in Alaska) ispresented to show the distributionand duration of reindeer herding invarious areas of northwesternAlaska. An examination of Table 4shows that by about 1910, reindeerwere distributed throughout north-west Alaska, from Bethel on theKuskokwim River delta to Barrow.

Another event of some signifi-

cance in the history of reindeer herding came withthe Nome Gold Rush, which was accompanied by atremendous immigration of non–Natives to theSeward Peninsula. During the Gold Rush, reindeerwere used as draught animals, a practice that con-tinued for some years. Animals were either hiredout to miners for freighting (the particular approachof the Lapp owners) or animals were sold outrightto the miners. Reindeer meat was also sold to thepopulace of the booming towns. Because of a lim-ited supply of reindeer meat, some meat was im-ported from Siberia during the winter of 1899–1900to feed the 2,500 people then at Nome as well. In1900, a measles and pneumonia epidemic swept theregion. Many Natives and non–Natives alike died,including herder Charley Antisarlook and his twobrothers. His wife Mary inherited the herd.

During the first decade of the twentieth century,several problems in reindeer herding emerged. Someof these problems were resolved, while othersemerged to continue into the 1920s. Problems with

18

reindeer thefts and range damage plagued someowners. Government policy towards reindeer own-ership changed after Churchill’s 1906 investigation.Inadequate supervision of herd growth contributedto general range overstocking. Differential treat-ment of Lapp and Eskimo owners caused bitternessbetween the two groups. Lastly, the acquisition ofreindeer and ranges by the Lomen family, beginningin 1914, ushered in new problems concerning Na-tive and non–Native ownership (e.g., marketing) andanother new direction for government policy on re-indeer herding.

After the initial gold strike boom at Nome, many

prospectors remained to explore thecoast and interior of Seward Penin-sula for precious metals. Reindeerteams continued to deliver mail andfreight, but not all went well for theNative reindeer owners. As men-tioned above, Charley Antisarlookdied in a measles epidemic in 1900.His widow, Mary, took her few re-maining reindeer (those that had notbeen borrowed to save the whalers atBarrow) from Synrock to Unalakleetbecause theft and range fires made itdifficult to continue herding them onthe Seward Peninsula. The slowdownof economic growth of Seward Penin-sula caused additional problems forNative owners. Perhaps most impor-tantly, the government policy, as for-mulated by Sheldon Jackson, was nottruly protective of Native interests inreindeer. Jackson had believed thatreindeer would ensure the continu-ance of the missionary stations towhich Eskimos could then flock, ceas-ing their nomadic way of life, seen bysome to include “begging and immo-rality,” and congregating around themissions, which would have assuredfood supplies and spiritual aid (Jack-son 1903). It is readily apparent thatin Jackson’s mind, reindeer repre-

sented a means by which he could attain his mis-sionary goals and to ensure the permanence of mis-sion stations as opposed to providing a direct ben-efit for Natives.

Reindeer had increased so significantly during thefirst 15 years in Alaska that by 1906 administeringthem became a serious problem (Table 5). Althoughthe originally stated goal of the program had beento provide food as well as a source of skins and in-dustry for the Eskimos, by 1905 various Lapps, mis-sions, and the government still owned more rein-deer than did the Natives (Table 5). In addition, theapprenticeship method of training had not been

Table 4. Reindeer in Alaska, 1892–1915. Distribution and dateof establishment of the herds.Stations and Herds Date Stations and Herds DateTeller 1892 Noatak 1910Wales No. 1 (Mission) 1894 Shishmaref No. 3 1910Golovin No. 1 (Mission) 1896 Tubutulik 1910Barrow No. 1 1898 Bethel No. 2 (Kilohalin) 1911Bethel No. 7 (Mission) 1901 Buckland No. 1 1911Kotzebue No. 1 1901 Cape Douglas No. 1 (Okbaok) 1911Bethel No. 5 (Taluksak) 1902 Deering No. 2 (Goodhope R.) 1911Deering No. 1 (Lane R.) 1905 Unalakleet No. 2 (South R.) 1911Kivalina No. 1 (South R.) 1905 Wales No. 2 (Ootennas) 1911Shishmaref No. 1 1905 Bethel No. 3 (Kivigluk) 1912Icy Cape 1906 Igloo No. 2 1912Bethel No. 4 (Nukluak) 1907 Spruce Creek 1912Council 1907 Bethel No. l (Akoolakotak) 1913Egavik 1907 Bethel No. 6 (Oungogtulit) 1913Golsovia No. 1 1907 Cape Espenberg 1913Igloo No. 1 1907 Deering No. 3 (Kugruk R.) 1913Shaktoolik 1907 Iglotalik No. 2 (Bonanza) 1913Shungnak 1907 Nome 1913Sinuk 1907 Buckland No. 2 (Sokweena) 1914Wainwright 1907 Cape Douglas No. 2 (Dunnak) 1914Golovin No. 2 1908 Golsovia No. 2 (Pitnuktalik) 1914Kivalina No. 2 (North R.)1908 Igloo No. 3 1914Mountain Village 1908 Wales No. 4 (Cape York) 1914Point Hope 1908 Kotzebue No. 3 (Lomen/Lapp) 1914Wales No. 3 (Kozuks) 1908 Bethel No. 8 (Kalkak) 1915Barrow No. 2 1909 Igloo No. 4 1915Selawik 1909 Kivalina No. 3 1915Shishmaref No. 2 1909 Kivalina No. 41915glotalik No. 1 1910 Shishmaref No. 4 1915Kotzebue No. 2 1910 Shishmaref No. 5 (Keok) 1915

Table 5 Ownership of reindeer in Alaska, compared: 1905, 1911, and 1915.Percentage owned of

Number of owners total reindeer Number of reindeerOwners 1905 1911 1915 1905 1911 1915 1905 1911 1915Natives 85 460 1,140 41% 60% 66% 4,859 20,071 46,683Government N/A N/A N/A 24% 11% 5% 2,500 3,951 3 ,408Missions N/A N/A N/A 11% 14% 10% 1,163 4,664 6,890Lapps/other N/A N/A N/A 16% 15% 19% 1,712 4,944 13,262 non–NativesTotal reindeer 10,234 33,629 70,243(Sources: Churchill, 1906; U.S. Bureau of Education, 1912, 1917).

19

successful as the conditions of apprenticeship con-tinually changed from year to year (Ray, 1975). With-out clearly discernible rewards to be gained frombecoming involved with reindeer, it was difficult topersuade young men to enter the apprenticeship pro-gram. Some of those who did become so involvedappear to have been socially marginal as well as veryyoung (Ray, 1975). It was not until the pattern ofownership changed following Churchill’s 1905 inves-tigation that herding became a viable pursuit. Fol-lowing the change in ownership patterns, herdingknowledge passed from father, as a private herdowner, to son as a matter of practical instruction andon–the–job learning. This pattern suited Eskimo edu-cational approaches far better than did a formalizedcontractual apprenticeship system.

The different contracts made by Sheldon Jacksonwith missions and Eskimos clearly show the differ-ent privileges given to the Lapps (RG 75, entry 812“Contracts” National Archives Building). In an agree-ment between the U.S. Bureau of Education and theFriend’s Church at Kotzebue, dated September 1,1902, the Friend’s Mission, Sheldon Jackson—

agree(d) to pay the salary for 5 years ofan experienced Lapp to teach the native boysherding, not to exceed 5 years, and also tofurnish said Lapp with clothing and rationsfor the first year...and further agreed to fur-nish shelter, clothing and rations to the Lappherder. (Churchill, 1906).

An agreement of the same date with a Nativeherder was not so generous. At variance with theabove contract, no food or clothing were to be pro-vided for the Native, nor could he dispose of ani-mals except with the permission of the mission andthe Bureau of Education. In addition, the agreementwith the Native was for 17 years, as opposed to fivefor Lapps. Further restrictions were placed on theNative with regard to slaughtering and inheritance.A Native could slaughter male reindeer for his fam-ily, but only with the permission of the local super-intendent. Upon the death of a herder, half the herdreverted to the government or the mission.

For the first 15 years, both in Alaska and Wash-ington, controversy existed over the goals and thecontrol of the reindeer program. Generally, the dis-agreements focused on the religious versus the secu-lar control of education in the Territory, rather thanon reindeer herding per se. Under Jackson’s policy,all teachers were required to be members of a church.In his capacity as general agent, he was able to en-force this policy. He was also able to obtain govern-ment support for the missionary activities by con-tracting with the missions to run “contract schools”.Through his efforts, church and education werestrongly interrelated during the early Territorialyears of Alaska. Since the reindeer supervisors at

the local level were all also the educational teach-ers, Native reindeer herders were forced into vari-ous degrees of contact with religion and education.Jackson was not without support for this policy. TheMoravian missions and the Swedish Evangelicalmission schools were among Jackson’s firmest support-ers, as was the Presbyterian church (Hinckley, 1966).

Special Agent Frank C. Churchill’s investigationof Alaskan schools and the reindeer service repre-sents a turning point in the government policy to-ward both. Churchill was an Indian Agent, an expe-rienced investigator, and a firm believer in the con-cept of separating secular educational and govern-ment activities from missionary proselytizing. Al-though he was charged with investigating the con-ditions of education in Alaska, his recommendationsconcerning the reindeer industry are most impor-tant in the present context. E.A. Hitchcock, Secre-tary of the Interior under Theodore Roosevelt,charged Churchill with investigating all aspects ofthe operation of the reindeer program, including thestatus and condition of the herds, and making rec-ommendations regarding “...whether or not eitherthe loaning of reindeer to the missions maintainingschools, or the loaning of the same to the Natives asa method of industrial education should be contin-ued or abandoned” (Churchill, 1906).

Based on his investigations made during the sum-mer of 1905, Churchill submitted an initial reportto the Secretary of the Interior on December 11,1905. Subsequently, three supplemental reportswere submitted. Following Churchill’s report andrecommendations, Sheldon Jackson was asked to re-sign. The long battle between the supporters of com-bined missions and schools and the supporters ofseparate church and state activities, with most gov-ernment officials in the latter camp, ended withJackson’s resignation (Ray, 1975). While Jackson didresign, he did not completely leave educational af-fairs in Alaska until 1908.

For someone like Churchill, who believed in care-ful separation of church and state, the ambiguousownership status of government, mission, and pri-vate reindeer must have been distressing. His rec-ommendations to straighten out the situation wereunambiguous:

Until (the ownership of reindeer can be de-termined) ...I am unable to determine withsufficient certainty (what rules should be putinto force) to warrant positive recommenda-tions in certain particulars, but I beg leaveto refer to the general trend of this report,throughout which the general policy of gettingthe animals into the hands of the natives asfast as their capacity for caring for them canbe developed has been made prominent.(Churchill, 1906).

20

The proposed rules and regulations governing theAlaska reindeer service which Churchill had beenasked to comment upon were put into effect on June10, 1907, and December 7, 1908. The rules were anattempt to manage the ever–increasing numbers ofreindeer and to stop the involvement of the missionsin herding activity. Female reindeer were especiallyrestricted from sale, transfer, and slaughter whilethey remained in Native herds. On the other hand,the herds of the Lapps, the missions, and the non–Native owners were not subject to these same rules.This group was actually encouraged to act to furthertheir own self–interests, more often than not in openconflict with Native interests and government policy.

By 1914, over 20 years after reindeer were firstbrought to Alaska, Jackson’s original goals for Na-tives had virtually been fulfilled. Churchill’s inves-tigations had been instrumental in forcing large–scale transfers of reindeer into Native hands. (Com-pare ownership figures for 1915 and 1905, Table 5.)The natural increases in reindeer numbers nowmade reindeer available to most northwest AlaskanEskimos who wanted them. Beyond satisfying thelocal needs, a surplus of stock existed for export.Starting in 1909, arrangements were made with theDepartment of Agriculture for the export of reindeermeat, hides, and antlers through the Bureau of Edu-cation. In October of 1911, about 125 carcasses wereshipped from Nome to Seattle. This represented thefirst sale and export of reindeer meat by Eskimoherders. Prices in Seattle ranged from 25 to 75 centsa pound for the 18,750 pounds of meat exported (U.S.Bureau of Education, 1912).

Overall, the local superintendents of the Bureauof Education (the village school teachers) were verysuccessful in placing reindeer into Native hands. Ascan be seen in Table 5, by 1915 the ownership pat-tern of reindeer in Alaska was considerably alteredas compared with the pattern of 1905. Within theprogram, however, were the seeds of many newproblems—problems a dispersed ownership policycould not prevent. By placing as many reindeer inNative herds as possible, the Bureau of Educationwas setting the stage for the natural selection ofbetter herders/owners to succeed, thus creating fora few years a “reindeer aristocracy,” the possible de-velopment of which Churchill had foreseen (1906).During the following period, characterized by rein-deer fairs and adequate local markets for Nativeowned deer, wealthy herd owners were highly re-spected and envied. Secondly, by encouraging theproduction of as many animals as possible withoutfirst securing adequate export markets, the Bureaucreated an economic vacuum that was quickly filledby non–Native owners, who were not restricted inthe disposal of their deer by Bureau of Educationrules, as has been pointed out above.

Chapter IVNon–Native ownership ofreindeer: 1914–1940

As we have seen, non–Native ownership of rein-deer was not unknown prior to 1914. The missionswhich had been given herds between 1894 and 1902constituted an earlier precedent, as did Lapp own-ership of reindeer received in payment for their ser-vices as teachers and herders. Large scale Lapp own-ership of reindeer began when their contracts withthe government expired in 1901. With their privatelyowned herds, they dispersed by 1911 from theSeward Peninsula area to new grazing grounds lo-cated at Unalakleet, Eaton Tanana, Golovin,Kotzebue, and Bethel (U.S. Bureau of Education,1912). The advantages of new grazing areas led tosubstantial increases in their herds.

Many Eskimos owned and tended deer by 1914;however, many of the owners had so few deer thattheir herds could not be considered viable economicproduction units. The 1917 Report of the Work ofthe Bureau of Education for Alaska shows 1,568Natives owned reindeer; of this number, active herd-ers and owners totaled 1,398. The 67,448 reindeer(69% of the 98,582 reindeer in this territory) in 98Native herds represent an average herd size of only688 reindeer. The average number of reindeer ownedby any one individual was about 48. With such smallprivate herds, there was little chance that many ofthem could be utilized as productive herds in a com-mercial marketing system. Such a system needs aminimum of 1,000 animals in the herd, and 2,000 to3,000 are preferable (Lantis, 1950; Olsen, 1969;Zhigunov, 1968). In its effort to get reindeer into thehands of as many Natives as possible, the govern-ment was actually contributing to the downfall ofthe enterprise. Between 1914 and 1922, Lomen andCompany acquired reindeer and ranges which com-peted with the Natives’ interests. Therefore, the twoforces then at work contributing to problems of thereindeer industry were: small Native–owned herdsand competition between the Native herders and thenon–Native owners.

Average herd size for 1917 for the Native ownersmasks a great variability in the number of animalsactually owned by individuals. Both small and largeherds could be found; and both large and small herdsbelonging to many individuals often occupied thesame range. The roundup and marking reports forDeering, for example, show that in the years 1905to 1915, three herds were established. The first herd,Deering No. 1, was established in 1905 by Eskimoswho had earned reindeer working for the Wales mis-sion herd. In 1910, 498 reindeer were being run inthe Deering No. 1 herd distributed as follows: 294

21

reindeer owned by six Native herders, 53 reindeerbelonging to six Native owners, and six reindeerowned by one apprentice who worked for the mis-sion. The total reindeer owned by the 13 Nativesand the mission numbered 498, hardly a substan-tial increase from the 343 reindeer originally broughtfrom Wales by three Native apprentices to Deeringin 1905. Even those 343 original reindeer were notequally owned by the three apprentices; one owned318, one 21, and the third but four. The Deering No.2 herd was started near the Goodhope River in 1911;the No. 3 herd, started in 1913, was kept in theKugruk River area; while the No. 1 herd was keptin the Lane River region. Table 6 shows the distri-bution of ownership of these three herds as of 1915(U.S. Bureau of Education, 1917; Churchill, 1906).

Table 6 also indicates that no Lapps owned rein-deer in the Deering area, nor were there any govern-ment or mission apprentices by 1915. In the threeherds of the Deering area, 12 herders owned 1,548reindeer, and herders cared for an additional 545 re-indeer owned by 3 other individuals. A total of 2,516reindeer were herded in the Deering area and providedthe basis for reindeer meat, hides, and by–productsfor Deering’s population, which included a number ofnon–Native miners who lived and worked in theInmachuk River and surrounding region. The Nativepopulation of the Deering area had been substantiallyreduced in 1914 when a number of families left thearea under the leadership of the Friend’s mission-ary and moved to the newly established village ofNoorvik in the lower Kobuk River delta.

Lomen & CompanyPrivate white ownership of reindeer exclusively

for business purposes began in 1914 with the pur-chase by the Lomen brothers of the Alfred Nilimaherd of Kotzebue. The Lomen family operated Lomenand Company in Nome, an organization of variousbusiness interests dating from the 1900 Gold Rush.The holdings of the company included a drug store,a photography studio, a freighting and lighteringenterprise, and a reindeer operation. The patriarchof the organization was Gudbrand Lomen, a Nor-wegian–American who was also the Federal DistrictCourt Judge for the Second Judicial District inNome. His sons, Carl, Alfred, and Ralph, managedthe company affairs from Nome, New York, and Se-attle offices. Between 1914 and 1921, the companypurchased some 8,700 reindeer, which were to be-come the nuclei of herds established at Buckland,Egavik, Kotzebue, and Teller. In addition, cold–stor-age plants to handle reindeer were constructed atEgavik, Elephant Point, and Golovin, and one waspurchased at Nome.

Lomen and Company was organized in 1914 tohandle the newly purchased reindeer and to man-age what the Lomens expected would be a rapidlydeveloping industry. When the Lomens purchasedtheir first reindeer, they had the financial backingof Jafet Lindeberg, a Norwegian miner who had be-come wealthy during the early days of the NomeGold Rush. Alfred Nilima was able to sell 1,200 deerto the company because of increases he had enjoyedfrom his herd. Two additional herds (one at Golovin,

Table 6. Ownership and distribution of reindeer in Deering Village, 1915.

Deering no. 1 Deering no. 2 Deering no. 3(establ. 1905) (establ. 1911) (establ. 1913) Totals

Non–Native ownershipMission reindeer 112 112Government reindeer 30 30

Native ownershipHerders number 5 4 3 12Reindeer 771 431 346 1,548Owners number 5 15 13 33Reindeer 37 225 283 545Apprentices working for the herders and other Native ownersNative owners Number 2 5 3 10 Reindeer 64 169 48 281Total Natives 12 24 19 55Total reindeer owned by Natives 872 825 677 2,374

Sled reindeer (included in total reindeer)Trained 15 18 14 47Being trained 5 1 5 11

Total reindeer in herd 872 967 677 2,516 (Source: U.S. Bureau of Education, 1917).

22

the other at Teller) were purchased from the Swed-ish Evangelical Society in 1916. With the continualpurchase of non–Native and mission–owned herds,by 1929 the total purchases of reindeer by theLomens amounted to 14,083 animals (Lomen Fam-ily Collection, n.d.).

When government investigations of the reindeerindustry began in the 1930s, one of their primarygoals was to identify the legality of non–Native own-ership of reindeer, primarily that of the Lomens.Reindeer Service and Bureau of Education employ-ees such as William Lopp fought with the Lomensand other white owners for years over the legalityof their ownership of reindeer. In 1921, UnitedStates Attorney Fred Harrison of Nome wrote to theAttorney General regarding the Teller herd sales:“The Government would be unable to prove that ithad any property right in the deer” (Quoted in aletter from Ernest Walker Sawyer to Secretary ofthe Interior Wilbur, May 3, 1930).

Lindeberg’s support of the Lomens ended in 1921when he suffered financial reverses as president ofthe Miner’s and Merchant’s Bank in Nome. The clos-ing of a Tacoma bank forced him to end his backingof the Lomens’ various enterprises. Following theloss of Lindeberg’s support, Carl Lomen set out toraise capital for the businesses.

Lomen Reindeer and Trading Corporation was or-ganized in 1923 with holdings of 30,000 to 40,000reindeer and an authorized capital stock of$1,500,000 in their initial organization. Upon buy-ing out Lomen and Company, Lomen Reindeer andTrading Company issued $2.00 in stock for every$1.00 share held in Lomen and Company (WarrenReport, 1935).

In an effort to repay past debts, promote the rein-deer business, and place it on a sound financial foot-ing, the Lomens attempted to secure capital throughcompany reorganization and the insurance of newownership shares. The Lomen Reindeer Corpora-tion, changed in 1933 to the Northwestern LivestockCorporation, was organized in March, 1927. Stockwas issued and used to gain limited financial re-sources as well as repaying a $316,290 loan madeto the Lomens several years earlier by A.H.Burroughs and Leonard and Arthur Baldwin. Evenwith this success, the Lomens were never able tosecure enough capital to overcome the problems fac-ing the reindeer business. During his trips to NewYork to raise capital, Carl Lomen opened sales of-fices there and Seattle.

Promotional campaigns for reindeer were con-ducted by Carl Lomen with such success that hebecame known during this period as the “reindeerking” of Alaska (Lomen, 1954). Between 1930 and1933, several subsidiaries were formed under theLomen Reindeer Corporation. The Alaska Livestock

and Packing Company, the Lomen Commercial Com-pany, and the Nunivak Development Company wereall created in 1930. Part of the stock holdings of theparent Lomen Reindeer Corporation in Alaska Live-stock and Packing Company were sold in smallblocks to west–coast residents. The family hope wasto create awareness of and a market for reindeer ofwhich by 1930 they had more than enough, but forwhich their had no major market outlet. Alaska Live-stock and Packing Company was created to operatethe herds and the packing house aspects of the rein-deer business. A store was also purchased in Candlein 1931. The Dexter herd at Golovin was purchasedin 1929.

While the Lomens maintained that their policy wasto export reindeer meat to the continental UnitedStates and to leave the local markets to the Nativeowners, this did not resolve problems between themand the Native herders. The history of meat saleswhich began in 1918 is provided in Table 7. Althoughexport sales warded off a direct confrontation foryears, conflict was ultimately unavoidable. Whenminers and their supportive merchants began tomove out of the Seward Peninsula in the 1910s, thereindeer herds were larger than ever and still in-creasing. Throughout the 1920s, the number of Na-tive–owned reindeer continued to increase, but themarketing potential for reindeer decreased as thelocal markets declined. Meanwhile, the Lomen Re-indeer and Trading Corporation expanded to includeocean freighting services, trading posts, and light-erage and commercial slaughtering services.

In order for the Lomens to achieve vertical inte-gration, a series of other steps were taken. The En-terprise Steamship Company was organized with acapital stock of $5,000, and the coastal vesselsNokatak and Silver Wave (I) were acquired. The El-ephant Point Natural Cold Storage Plant was con-

Table 7. Yearly reindeer meat sales by theLomens, 1914–1937.

Number of Number ofYear carcasses Year carcasses

1914 no data 1926 ca. 3,6001915 no data 1927 9,0001916 no data 1928 12,0001917 no data 1919 14,5001918 624 1930 14,3681919 no data 1931 6021920 no data 1932 1,9431921 no data 1933 3,2001922 no data 1934 no data1923 no data 1935 no data1924 1,109 1936 no data1925 3,600 1937 no data

23

structed on Escholtz Bay to hold carcasses beforeshipment to markets in the 48 contiguous states. AtTeller, another corral and processing plant were con-structed. When the Silver Wave (I) was wrecked inice off Cape Espenberg in the fall of 1924, she wasreplaced quickly by the Silver Wave (II), a sixty foot,twin–screw motor vessel. The Enterprise SteamshipCompany was reorganized and renamed the ArcticTransport Company between 1927 and 1929. TheM.S. Sierra, a 2,000–ton ship, was purchased, aswere the 240–foot Arthur J. Baldwin and theDonaldson. Only four years after Lomen and Com-pany acquired reindeer, their activities were re-viewed by the Bureau of Education, as noted in thereports for 1917–1918. The Bureau felt that theyhad done three things which promised well for theindustry:

1) They developed an outside market, mostly inMinneapolis, shipping ca. 624 carcasses;

2) They were buying steers on the hoof for ship-ment to the states; and at $10 a head, large localNative owners were anxious to sell, thus leaving abigger local market for smaller herds; and,

3) They conducted large drives of steers fromherds across Seward Peninsula to demonstrate itsfeasibility. (U.S. Bureau of Education, 1919).

At that time, Superintendent Walter C. Shieldswrote that he did not believe many problems woulddevelop as long as white reindeer owners continuedtheir current policy. Any friction between white andNative owners was more likely to come over the is-sue of grazing grounds.

The Governor of Alaska, John F. A. Strong, had arather different attitude, which was expressed inthe same report.

Perhaps the attitude of the Bureau ofEducation is somewhat at variance with myown, but I believe that where the reindeerindustry can be encouraged among the whiteswithout detriment to the Natives, every as-sistance should be offered, for it is onlythrough the white owners and shippers thatit will be possible to add to the food supply ofthe country at large. (U.S. Bureau of Educa-tion, 1919).

In these differences of opinion between GovernorStrong and Superintendent Shields can be seen theroots for a conflict between supporters of reindeeras a Native industry for the benefit of the AlaskanEskimos and supporters of the reindeer industry asa commercial enterprise, as represented by theLomens’ involvement in the production and marketingof reindeer products.

The Lomen family’s involvement in reindeer upto 1940 is a significant episode in the history of re-indeer operations. Leaving aside the legal questionswhich were eventually raised about the ownership

of reindeer, the use of ranges, and grazing rights, itis clear that the Lomens acquired both deer andrange between 1914 and 1923. They attempted toestablish markets for the sale of reindeer meat. Theirefforts were concentrated at developing marketsoutside of Alaska as the local market was alreadyserved adequately by the Native herds. In establish-ing these markets, they attempted to gain a verti-cal integration of the reindeer industry by control-ling the supply, storage, and distribution of reindeerproducts. To some extent they also attempted to cre-ate their own market demand for the meat in thecontinental United States. While this appears on thesurface to be simply a case of an effort to establish asuccessful business operation, there is more to theLomens’ involvement with reindeer. The activitiessurrounding their efforts were, more often than not,at the expense of the Eskimos for whom the govern-ment had introduced reindeer in the first place. In-terpretations of their involvement have been debatedfor many years.

The 1917 report submitted by SuperintendentShields listed seven recommendations for the rein-deer industry in Alaska. He observed that warble–fly damage in the herds appeared to be increasing,and recommended: 1) expert supervision for theherds; 2) Native supervision, especially as chief herd-ers; 3) importation of 200 Siberian bulls to improvethe breeding stock; 4) settlement of grazing rightsdisputes; 5) funds to support The Eskimo (newspa-per), which served as a communications link betweenthe Native reindeer herders; 6) continuation of thereindeer fairs for at least three more years; andlastly, 7) that the Chief of the Alaska Division of theBureau of Education should make a winter visit toAlaska to aid the reindeer industry (U.S. Bureau ofEducation, 1918).

The 1917 report was to be Walter C. Shields’ last,for he died in the influenza epidemic of December,1918/January, 1919. Shields was a well–traveledman, capable with both a dog–team and reindeer,and well respected by the Natives on Seward Pen-insula. Shields’ death dealt a blow to the reindeerindustry and the Native interests. His organiza-tional abilities and the respect the Eskimos hadplaced in him were irreplaceable.

Epidemics, company herds, and fairsThe influenza (Spanish flu) epidemic of 1918/1919

was disastrous for the Eskimo reindeer herders. Insome villages, five out of seven people died. Mary’sIgloo had a population of some 300 to 400 peopleprior to the flu, while after the epidemic the popula-tion of the village numbered only 90 to 100 persons.The reindeer herders at two of the four camps sur-rounding the village were saved by their isolation,but only two people in one of the camps survived

24

(Oquilluk, 1973). The flu spread along the coast fromsouthern Alaska via Unalakleet, Colovin, and Nome,and was carried to Wales by the mail carrier. Whenthe news of the impending disaster reachedShishmaref, before any one infected arrived, the vil-lage council decided to deny entry to the village toanyone until the flu had run its course. A barricadewas erected southwest of the village and no one waspermitted to cross it. In this way, the flu was pre-vented from reaching any further north thanShishmaref (Oquilluk, 197 3; Keithahn , 1963).

Once the influenza had run its course, it left manyproblems behind. In addition to losing the estimated900 people who died on the Seward Peninsula, theremaining population was psychologically markedby the experience. The epidemic reduced the num-ber of experienced reindeer herders, as well as thepool of men on which to draw for future training.Some observers of the industry, such as Shields, hadsuggested that herding and management neededimprovement in some areas even before the flu (U.S.Bureau of Education, 1918). Significant problemswere also left in the wake of the epidemic regardingthe estates of deceased Native reindeer owners.Could reindeer acquired by inheritance be legallysold? Could whites inherit reindeer? It was not un-til the various reindeer investigations of the 1930sthat a Solicitor’s Opinion was obtained on these mat-ters. In the intervening decade, the reindeer not onlyincreased in numbers, but more and more wereplaced into the hands of non–Native owners.

During this period, conflicts between the demandsof school and the demands of the increasing rein-deer herds also appeared. Charles N. Replogle, theteacher and Friends missionary at Noorvik, reportedthat nearly every family in that newly establishedvillage (formed in 1914 largely by immigration fromthe Deering and Candle area) owned reindeer andwere not without their problems. “In all the workand progress of the business there has been and re-mains yet the problem of the herder’s family” (U.S.Bureau of Education, 1918). Among the family prob-lems were the parents’ desires to have their chil-dren with them to help with the reindeer, to havetheir children learn the business which also meantduring the winter when school was usually in ses-sion, and the perceived need to be a specialist inherding in order to succeed. Replogle noted, too, thatthe help of a wife was essential in reindeer camps,and that the rotation of families between the herdsand the village had helped to ease the problem oflong absences for the schoolchildren. While muchindividual variation in skills had existed amongadult Eskimos in the past, most had been general-ists in the sense that they knew a variety of skillswell enough to be able to make a living. Reindeer herd-ing, however, was meant to be a full–time occupation

as the Bureau of Education saw it for the Eskimos.Between 1918 and 1920, William T. Lopp, Chief of

the Alaska Division of the Bureau of Education,urged the consolidation of reindeer owned by indi-viduals into “company” or cooperatively managedherds. It was his belief that this would bring aboutbetter herding and management. Lopp was not thefirst to suggest a company type of organization.Charles S. Thomson, Missionary of the Congrega-tional Church at Wales, and Dr. James H. Hamilton,teacher at Diomede, wrote Lopp on September 16, 1911:

As a substitute for the ownership of in-dividual deer by natives, indicated by earmarkings, we suggest that the natives bepermitted to own herds on the corporationplan, each owning a fractional share of theentire herd; viz., an undivided interest, ac-cording to his investment, and receive fromtime to time a pro rata share of the profitsin the form of dividends. (U.S. Bureau ofEducation, 1912).

The Bureau of Education believed that reindeerfairs could be a way to encourage cooperative man-agement of the Native reindeer herds. At such fairs,they suggested to the Eskimo reindeer owners thatclubs be formed to promote better herd manage-ment. The first Reindeer Fair was held at Igloo inJanuary of 1915. At this fair, speeches were madeby the various delegates: Superintendent Shields,Carl Lomen, and others. Bureau of Education em-ployees talked about how cooperation and kindnesswould work in favor of the Eskimo herders (Bureauof Education, 1917). Fairs held in subsequent yearsat Igloo, Noatak, Noorvik, and Unalakleet provideda meeting place for reindeer owners to organize“clubs” or “owners associations.” By and large, it ap-pears to have been the large herd owners who mostfavored the formation of associations. By virtue oftheir political and economic advantage, they tendedto dominate the “Reindeer Companies” which wereformally organized in the early 1900s. Because oftheir large reindeer holdings, company–type organi-zation favored their political and economic ambitions.

Meanwhile, the number of reindeer continued toincrease. Since the 1890s, the Bureau of Educationhad been responsible for administrating the rein-deer herds, but the Reindeer Service consistedmostly of the “local reindeer supervisors” who werealso the school teachers in most villages. Double dutywas often beyond the expertise and desires of theteachers, who found themselves entangled in disputesover inheritances, ranges, and reindeer about whichthey had no knowledge. A general reindeer superin-tendent was supposed to oversee the work of the lo-cal supervisors, but little guidance was given. Theregional superintendent of the Bureau of Educationtried to visit the herds, attend the handlings, and

25

approve the tallies along with the local teachers, allin addition to his principal job of administrating theschools. The logistics of this in the 1920s, com-pounded by limited budgets, severely impaired thesuperintendent’s ability to do any of these tasks well.

Reacting in part to the recommendations of Su-perintendent Shields’ 1917 report, the Bureau ofEducation did two things in 1920 which affectedNative reindeer operations. The U.S.S. Boxer, ac-quired from the United States Navy to bring schoolsupplies north to Alaska from the continental UnitedStates, was also charged with taking reindeer car-casses back to the contiguous United States for saleon behalf of the Natives. The Boxer had a carryingcapacity of 500 tons and for years provided themeans by which Native herders were able to mar-ket animals beyond their local area. In some years,carcasses were only transshipped for Native herd-ers and associations to meet with other steamersheading south to continental United States markets(U.S. Bureau of Education, 1923). Later, theU.S.M.S. North Star, belonging to the Bureau ofIndian Affairs, performed the same functions.

Also in 1920, the Bureau of Biological Survey(BBS), in conjunction with the Bureau of Education,began a series of experiments to cross–breed rein-deer and caribou on Nunivak Island. Under a coop-erative agreement between the Lomens and theBureau of Biological Survey, Nunivak Island was tobe used to conduct “...investigations, experimentsand demonstrations for the improvement of the re-indeer industry in Alaska” (U.S. Bureau of Educa-tion, 1921). The cooperative agreement providing forthe experiment was protested by the island resi-dents. Although the experiments were meant to im-prove the breeding stock of all herds, island resi-dents objected to the Lomens’ presence on NunivakIsland. Lomen and Company claimed the island astheir rangeland. Natives claimed that the Lomen–operated store and reindeer herd on Nunivak Islandwere not being operated in the best interests of theNatives. The later reindeer investigations of the1930s looked into these charges and counter–charges, but no conclusion was reached. The cross–breeding experiments failed to benefit either theLomens or the Natives in the long run.

By 1922, there were approximately 259,000 rein-deer in Alaska. Two–thirds of those reindeer werein Native hands while the remaining third wereowned by whites, Lapps, and the government. Virtu-ally all mission herds had been sold to the governmentor non–Natives. From historical accounts, contem-porary accounts of the period, and informants’ state-ments, it appears that a number of individual Na-tives were starting to amass large enough herds tobe able to live largely from the income of their herds.These men had learned reindeer herding at an early

age, as apprentices or as boys helping their fatherswith the herds. They stayed out from the villagesfor most of the winter with the herds, patrolling theirrange and keeping their reindeer under surveillance.They generally drove sled deer, as opposed to dogteams, which were used more by trappers. Some in-dividuals were successful trappers at the same timethey were successful herders.

Using the capital represented by their herds, theirfamiliarity with the newly introduced items of west-ern culture, and their own initiative, herders begandeveloping into entrepreneurs. Several herdersstarted and operated their own small stores, trad-ing reindeer for fur skins and selling what suppliesthey had on hand. In one village on the Seward Pen-insula, for example, a cooperative reindeer associa-tion was formed August 7, 1924. At that time, thelargest herd owner was also a trader, trapper, andowner of the only gas powered boat in the village.Of the 59 owners of reindeer in the village at thetime, he owned the most reindeer, a total of 603,while only five of the other herders owned more than100 deer. The remaining owners owned between oneand 92 reindeer, for an average of only 16 per indi-vidual. In total numbers, six people controlled 1,505of the 2,425 total reindeer in the village (U.S. Bu-reau of Indian Affairs, n.d.).

In 1924, with reindeer numbers steadily increas-ing, it became apparent that changes were neces-sary if the reindeer industry were to continue as aviable operation. In a memorandum dated Febru-ary 15, L.J. Palmer advised the Chief of BiologicalSurvey that 242,000 reindeer existed in Alaska, withan average herd size of 2,000 head. He also statedthat herds could be expected to increase in the fu-ture to an average of 7,500.

The need of using large grazing unitswill necessitate the establishment of co–op-erative herds among the numerous smallowners, and this will result in the forma-tion of many co–operative associations orlivestock companies, especially among theEskimos. As a natural development of therapidly growing use of the open range, thereis certain to be established in the very nearfuture a grazing permit system for the con-trol of range and regulation of the reindeergrazing. (Palmer, 1924).

Palmer also advised that herds of mixed non–Na-tive and Native ownership be split where feasibleand placed on separate ranges. Such separationwould prevent conflicts between Natives and non–Natives over the ownership of herd increases andover the use of rangeland. He also urged the adop-tion of a ten point program of herd management,emphasizing open herding, a ratio of 5 to 10 bullsper 100 female deer, and “proper” selection of the

26

best animals, both males and females, for breedingpurposes.

Palmer’s advocacy of open herding was based onhis belief that it resulted in better calving percent-ages and healthier stock. In a memorandum of De-cember 8, 1923, he addressed this problem with datato support his belief: . .

that the herds in the Illiamna Lake sec-tion and the Pt. Barrow section are in poorercondition generally than elsewhere ...it de-velops that the herds are very closely herdedand otherwise poorly handled. Conse-quently it is our opinion that the close herd-ing and poor management is the chief causefor the less successful results in these sec-tions. (Palmer, 1923).

He was also correct when he predicted that graz-ing permits would be established. In 1927, Congresspassed the Alaska Grazing Act, which called for theGeneral Land Office (now the Bureau of Land Man-agement) to issue grazing permits for reindeer andother livestock in Alaska. Applications for permitswere taken by the General Land Office, but the GreatDepression appears to have prevented the actual is-suance of permits to Native associations and non–Native herd owners alike.

By the mid–1920s, the small private holdings ofthe Native owners, coupled with problems in inher-itance and sales, the proliferation of identifying ear-marks, and disputes over range and handlings,caused the Bureau of Education to re–examine itspolicies. One attempt at resolving some of the prob-lems came with introduction of the joint stock–own-ership system. Under this system, the animals be-longing to the people of any one village were to beherded by paid herders. Upwards of 50 people in avillage often owned reindeer in numbers varyingfrom one to two to several thousand animals. How-ever, under the system of the Native “companyherds,” management became rather more difficultthan easier because of several complicating factors.The lack of adequate local markets and the practiceof paying for labor in meat and not wages preventedthe companies from generating enough cash to payexpenses. There were no enforceable restrictions ongrazing or on the number of animals allowed on ranges.Ranges at that time were well established by custom-ary use, by occupancy, and by permit applicationspending with the General Land Office. The net re-sult was that the herds were allowed to grow toolarge to herd and manage effectively.

Additional problems, although less severe, onlycompounded the difficulties. Roundups were oftenincomplete and herds that were rounded up wereoften of mixed ownership. An insufficient numberof males were castrated, providing insufficient num-bers of marketable steers or leaving a number of

poor breeders in the herds. Often, men experiencedin the reindeer business had no more voice in themanagement of the company herds than owners ofonly a couple of reindeer who had had little or noherding experience. Lastly, the government employ-ees who were charged with reindeer matters hadonly advisory authority. They could not order a re-duction in herd numbers to protect the rapidly de-teriorating ranges. The summer ranges along thecoastal strip of Seward Peninsula were being sub-stantially overgrazed.

During the joint stock company period, companiesoperated not so much like their counterparts in thecontinental United States which were profit–moti-vated organizations, but more as a vehicle for man-aging the village herds in a fair manner. A chiefherder was selected from among all company mem-bers to control herd operations. This individual, usu-ally an experienced reindeer man and often one ofthe largest herd owners, was placed in charge of theday–to–day operations of the herd. Members of thecompany primarily contributed labor, assisted dur-ing handlings and corrallings, helped guard theherd, and butchered animals from it. Families some-times stayed out with the herders. Roundups andcorrallings, though often incomplete, remained ma-jor social events. Payment for labor and other ser-vices to the company was made in the form of“shares” added to one’s account. No formal stock cer-tificates were issued; accounts were kept in ledgerbooks under the name of each herd co–owner. Cred-its for labor and services, and debits for butcheringor food purchased from the village store were re-corded for each co–owner in the ledger books. Whileshares were supposed to represent reindeer, in factthey represented only an abstraction, since sharespaid to one’s account for labor services and sharespaid in on the basis of percentage increases in theherd were not distinguished. Percentage increaseswere given on the basis of the total number of ani-mals owned by individual owned. Since only the fe-males one owned contributed to the increases, sharesshould have been based on the numbers of breedingfemales, not on the total number of animals, but suchwas not the case.

This problem of giving percentage increases basedon total numbers of animals instead of on the numberof breeding females owned caused herds to increasefaster on the books than in reality. Shares of stock,each representing one reindeer (regardless of sex),quickly became inflated. As the share systemworked, in the spring of each year a percentage in-crease was given to each herd co–owner based onthe spring calving successes. The increases werecalculated at a rate of 50 to 60% of the owner’s pre-vious share total. The shares received were actuallyreduced by ten per cent before they were given to

27

the owner. This ten per cent represented a “tax”which was added to the company treasury and fromwhich company expenses were supposed to be met.Such expenses as food, materials, and labor were tobe paid from this treasury account.

The flaw in the system came with calculating theshares to be paid to herd co–owners. There was nodistinction made between male and female reindeerowned by each shareholder. One share representedone reindeer, regardless of that animal’s potentialfor future herd increases. In the absence of completeyearly roundups and adequate markings of animalsas to their owners, the number of reindeer listed pershareholder increased faster on paper than in ac-tual herd counts. Within a few years, reconciliationbetween the ledger shares owned by company mem-bers and their actual reindeer in the herd had be-come impossible.

In addition to the problem of determining actualnumbers of reindeer owned by each herder, therewere other difficulties that grew out of the “com-pany” period. Theoretically, every co–owner (share-holder or company association member) had an equalsay in the management of the company herd. Ac-cording to informants, conflicts between large andsmall herd owners did develop. The small ownerswere viewed as “too bossy” by the large owners. Tocompound the problem, since the small owners hadless at stake in the management of the herd, theyapparently paid less attention to proper slaughter-ing practices and contributed virtually no labor inthe yearly operations of the herd. By not cooperat-ing with the larger owners, the effectiveness of thelarger owners, who had more vested interest in theherd and the overall operation, was greatly reduced.This lack of cooperation was detrimental to the herdoperations, for the larger owners were generally thebetter herders and husbanders. The large ownerstended to have more experience, ability, and desireto handle reindeer, whereas the small owners hadsometimes never even seen their animals. Smallowners also often butchered more than their sharesentitled them to take, or butchered without obtain-ing butchering permits from the company officers.The larger owners were powerless to prevent suchactivities since they could invoke no formal sanc-tions. Complaints to the Reindeer Service person-nel and to the school teachers often wentuninvestigated due to lack of time, money, and in-terest on the part of the government employees.

The stock associations continued for a period ofabout 25 years (1925 to 1950). The effectiveness ofthe stock association type of herd managementsteadily declined during this period. For example,during the early years of the Deering Reindeer StockCompany, the herds were well tended and corralingstook place on a regular basis. During the late 1920s,

company members realized that June handlings forthe purpose of obtaining fiscal reindeer counts wereexpensive and difficult to arrange because of sum-mer travel logistics. There were also conflicts withsubsistence activities. They concluded such countswere unnecessary when the winter handlings couldtake care of all the June requirements. Constantherding declined steadily as there was the feelingthat herding on a continual basis was not necessaryas reindeer increased without constant herding.

After the peak years in the early 1930s, herd sizesbegan to decline as some herds were not handled orherded for stretches of several years in succession.At the time of the Depression, when there was vir-tually no wage labor available, many herds weresimply abandoned. High percentage increases con-tinued to be given to herd co–owners even thoughthe herds continued to decline throughout the 1930s.In the late 1930s, it became increasingly apparentto Eskimo herd owners and the Reindeer Servicealike that the stock ownership companies were notmanaging the herds effectively. The Federal govern-ment initiated a change in the policy reverting backto the Lapp–like individual ownership of reindeer.The effects of the company period are still being felttoday, however, particularly when old issues relat-ing to reindeer ownership and range use are broughtup that date back to this period.

During the decade 1920 to 1930, the principalproblem facing the reindeer industry was too manyreindeer, or conversely, inadequate markets for thenumbers of reindeer available for slaughter. As men-tioned earlier, the Lomens attempted to create mar-kets in the continental United States through vig-orous promotion of reindeer products. In Seattle andCalifornia, their efforts were met with oppositionfrom cattle interests. Shipping problems and local or-dinances banning reindeer meat sales in the westernstates led to the downfall of A.A. Selden and AxelGottlieb’s plans for their Eskimo Sisters Reindeer Com-pany in Pacific Grove, California (Selden, n.d.).

In an attempt to bolster the development of amarket, a herd was established in interior Alaskaat Cantwell in 1922. Reindeer Service employee BenB. Mozee led a drive of 1,437 reindeer fromGoodnews Bay to the Broad Pass area. The goal ofthis drive was to set up a herd near the recentlycompleted Alaska Railroad so that the railroad couldtransport reindeer to its ice–free terminus atWhittier. Predators, lack of constant herding, per-sonnel changes, and losses to caribou herds contrib-uted to the demise of the Cantwell reindeer indus-try by 1928 (Luick, 1973).

The largest drive of reindeer in the 1930s to newgrazing grounds was a Lomen–organized drive of3,000 head of reindeer from Seward Peninsula to theheadwaters of the Mackenzie River in the Northwest

28

Territories of Canada. Field examinations by thePorsild brothers had determined that range wasadequate and that a social and economic need forreindeer existed in Canada’s north (Porsild, 1929).Field Superintendent for the Lomen Reindeer Cor-poration, Dan Crowley, and Chief Herder AndrewBahr directed the drive. Only ten per cent of theoriginal animals taken completed the thousand–miletrip from the Naboktoolik corral on Escholtz Bay.Calves born along the route during the five–yeardrive did replace most of those animals lost, so that2,375 reindeer were ultimately delivered at theKittigazuit corral in March, 1935. During the origi-nal field investigations of the area, the cooperationof the Alaska Reindeer Service and the Bureau ofBiological Survey had been secured, but the diffi-culties which the Alaska reindeer industry was fac-ing at the time were not appreciated. The Canadianreindeer industry located at the Mackenzie Deltadeveloped along lines parallel to the Alaska indus-try, but without ever going through a disruptive pe-riod of non–Native competition (Stager and Denike,1972; Miller, 1935; Scotter, 1972a, 1972b; Hill, 1967;Lomen, 1954; Evans, 1934a, 1934b, 1934c, 1934d, 1946).

Reindeer investigationsThe Great Depression which began in 1929 had

impacts on Alaska which are often overlooked byhistorians of the period. As the United States soughtits way out of its economic problems under theHoover and Roosevelt administrations, enough com-motion was stirred up about reindeer to bring a Fed-eral investigating team to Alaska virtually everyyear for the next ten years. Their reports and rec-ommendations span thousands of pages, most ofwhich lie neglected and forgotten on the dustyshelves of the National Archives in Washington, D.C.(Stern, 1977). Hearings in Washington into reindeermatters were also a significant factor in the even-tual purchase of all non–Native–owned reindeer andproperties by the Federal government in 1940. Pro-tests by members of the Reindeer Service aboutLomen activities, letters from the Native reindeerassociations, and letters from various church andmissionary groups throughout the 1930s pressuredthe Secretary of the Interior to take action.

Most protests centered on three main issues. TheLomens were charged with unfairly taking rangelands which belonged to Native herders based oncustomary use at Buckland, Teller (Igloo range), andGolovin, as well as other ranges beyond the SewardPeninsula. The Lomens and their agents werecharged with unfair range rules and practices, in-cluding the marking of mavericks to the Lomenherds, at the disadvantage of the Native herders.Lastly, the Natives regarded the non–Native own-ers as unlawful interlopers in an enterprise estab-

lished for their benefit.A principal point of conflict concerned the Lomen

occupation of ranges which Natives claimed. In eachof four contested ranges on the Seward Peninsula,the history of occupation shows that it was Lapps(Kotzebue) or Natives and missions (Buckland,Teller/Igloo, and Golovin) who first used these con-tested ranges for herding. The Lomens moved on tothese ranges as their herds increased and as theypurchased reindeer from Lapps, missions, and Na-tives. Once on the ranges, they refused to withdrawtheir reindeer, and further, charged Native herdowners a grazing fee for the use of the range whichthey had formerly occupied (Chance, 1930). The Re-indeer Committee of 1931 recommended the sepa-ration of the herds in the Teller and Buckland ar-eas, but by the time the Survey of the Alaska Rein-deer Service was released in 1933, this still had notbeen accomplished. The Trowbridge–Cillman Sur-vey concluded that the separation of Lomen and Na-tive herds on the Teller range was not necessarybecause of mutual agreements, and that the sepa-ration of herds on the Buckland range would resolvethe dispute in that area.

The Lomens were often charged with questionablepractices in the reindeer business. They were deal-ing with Native people who seldom had any formaleducation beyond a few years of elementary school.Punishment was still received for even speaking theEskimo language in classrooms. At reindeer han-dlings, Lomen company representatives claimedunmarked reindeer (calves and mavericks) on a per-centage basis of Lomen animals present at the han-dling. Ernest Walker Sawyer wrote to GovernorGeorge Parks that the net result of the applicationof the percentage marking system was to reduce thenumber of reindeer marked to Natives while thenumber of deer marked to the Lomens increased(Sawyer to Parks, October 3, 1930, see Appendix I).It was perceived that through the percentage mark-ing system, the Lomens marked to their herds farmore reindeer than they might actually have beenentitled to from their natural herd increases.

As previously noted, the Lomen companies wentthrough four separate corporate reorganizationswith their reindeer business. When the Lomen Re-indeer Corporation was organized in 1927, the stockwhich was issued for the company was allegedlyinflated beyond the assets held by the company, butthis was never substantiated by actual counts of theanimals on the range. Most importantly, the Nativesregarded the Lomens as unfairly competing withthem in an enterprise which had been establishedfor the Native’s benefit. The twin issues of unfairmarking practices and occupation of Eskimo claimedranges served, from the Native viewpoint, to justifythe charge of unfair competition.

29

The letters of C.L. Andrews provide a most vividdocumentation of this period of conflict between theLomens and Eskimos based on his familiarity withthe region and its problems. Andrews had served asa teacher at Kivalina and as a leader and reindeersupervisor with the Reindeer Service on SewardPeninsula. He had also been a Customs Agent inAlaska from 1897 to 1909, had been with the Dukeof Abruzzi on the Mt. St. Elias Expedition of 1897, anewspaper and magazine writer, and author of sev-eral books based on his Alaskan experiences(Andrews, 1926, 1935, 1938, 1939). While his view-points on the situation must be regarded as favor-ing the Eskimo position, his data and eloquentlywritten, lengthy letters of protest to the Indian RightsAssociation and the Department of the Interior pre-sented his case clearly. He saw himself protecting theinterests of a defenseless people against the:

deliberate plot (which) has been delib-erately and persistently pursued for thepast 15 years to break the Rules and Regu-lations of the Interior Service (sic Depart-ment) in Alaska ...violating the spirit of thecontracts of the Missions holding reindeerin Alaska, (in) trust for distribution to thenatives, and to appropriate lands which byright of occupation properly belonged to thenatives. (Andrews, 1930).

The letters of Andrews and others sympathetic tothe Eskimo’s position to the Secretary of the Inte-rior caused enough of a stir to prompt the latter tosend a special representative, Ernest Walker Saw-yer, to investigate matters. Sawyer had been in-volved in the management and planning for theAlaska Railroad, so he was generally familiar withthe Territory and its problems. In October, 1930, hereported his findings to Governor Parks (1930a).Sawyer believed that the Lomen marking practiceswere unfair to the Native herds (Sawyer, 1930b; seealso Appendix I).

Secretarial Order No. 380, signed by Secretary ofthe Interior Ray Lyman Wilbur in 1929, formallyplaced the responsibility for reindeer matters in thehands of Governor George Parks. This ended Bu-reau of Education involvement with reindeer at highadministrative levels, but still left local–level mat-ters in the teachers’ hands. Parks himself was a po-litical appointee and directly responsible to the Sec-retary of the Interior. With administrative respon-sibility for reindeer herding resting in his office,Governor Parks set out to reorganize the bureau-cracy responsible for reindeer in Alaska. Within sixmonths after administration was placed in his office,a document supporting the estimates for appropria-tions, an organizational chart, and a statement onthe current status of the industry were sent to E.K.Burlew, Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of

the Interior (Parks, 1930). Nineteen new positionswere proposed, to be filled over the course of fiveyears, including a general reindeer superintendent,four district reindeer supervisors, and fourteen re-indeer foremen. Operating on a budget of $122,590,these employees would take over the duties of thethen present personnel:

...two district supervisors on full time, 3district school superintendents on parttime, 38 Government teachers on part time,30 Government apprentices on full timecaring for 360,000 reindeer in 73 herds ex-tending along several thousand miles ofcoastline and grazing upon an area of100,000 square miles. (Parks, 1930).

Parks was also concerned that Government policy:...proceed with the work until such time

as the natives are competent to managetheir own affairs, (and in all fairness to thenatives) this seems to me to be the onlypolicy that can be followed, then it is mostessential that the teachers of the Office ofEducation be relieved of this extra work,and an organization created which will beable to administer the reindeer industry,that in a period of a few years, the nativeswill be able to carry on the work and theGovernment withdraw from the field. As-suming that the Government will continueto administer the reindeer herds in an ad-visory capacity to the natives, careful at-tention has been given to planning for thesmallest organization possible to carry thisinto effect with all possible expediency.(Parks, 1930).

In the plan for reorganization, (Tables 8 and 9),one sees clearly that Parks hoped to have the Na-tives fully in control of their reindeer with the Fed-eral role reduced to that of an advisor. Curiously,this is the situation which exists today: the Federalrole remains an advisory one with the Bureau ofLand Management responsible for range protectionand grazing–permit assignments.

The territorial governor thus inherited a long–standing problem from the Bureau of Education. TheLomens and other non–Native owners of reindeerhad been the targets of objections from Eskimo re-indeer owners and from sympathetic Bureau of Edu-cation and Reindeer Service employees for over adozen years. The original sale of reindeer to theLomens had been taken to court where it had beendeclared valid (Andrews, 1930).

While the legal statement closed the matter in theminds of the Lomens, the Eskimos and their sup-porters still believed that the Lomens were unfairlycompeting with the Native industry. As the local mar-kets decreased in the 1920s, the reindeer belonging

30

to individual Natives and to joint stock associationsincreased far beyond the local demand, and suchprotests became more vocal.

In order to determine the status of the reindeerindustry and the sources of the problem which werecausing so many protests, the Secretary of the Inte-rior conducted Reindeer Hearings in Washington,D.C., in February and March, 1931. The investigat-ing committee consisted of Senator John B. Kendrickfrom Wyoming, Representative Scott Leavitt fromMontana, and former Assistant Attorney GeneralCharles P. Sisson. (Kendrick, Leavitt and SissonCommittee, transcript of Reindeer Committee hear-ings, and transmittal to Secretary of the Interior, inElmer E. Rasmuson Library, Arctic Archives, Uni-versity of Alaska, Fairbanks, Alaska). At the con-clusion of the hearings, findings and recommenda-tions were forwarded to the Secretary of the Inte-rior and were accepted on March 30, 1931. Amongthe steps recommended by the committee were the

establishment of a Reindeer Council in Alaska andthe establishment of Range Rules. In addition, thecommittee recommended that roundups be held forthe purpose of establishing ownership and numbersof reindeer on the ranges, that reindeer be trans-ferred to separate Native and non–Native ranges,that marketing methods be made more equitable,and that the Reindeer Service be expanded.

Until there was an adequate supervisory force inthe Alaska Reindeer Service to handle the transferof reindeer from Lomen to Eskimo ranges, to super-vise roundups, to settle ownership disputes, and todevelop marketing outlets for Native–owned rein-deer, the recommendations of the committee couldnot be put into effect. To expedite the implementa-tion of the recommendations, three new unit man-agers were hired in August and September, 1931,bringing the Reindeer Service personnel to eight (in-cluding one temporary clerk at Nome), distributedas follows: General Reindeer Superintendent in

Table 8. Organization of the Alaska Reindeer Service in 1930.

Secretary of the InteriorGovernor

General Reindeer Superintendent (Mozee)HeadquartersOffice Clerk 5 District Supervisors in Field

Seward Peninsula Northwestern Southwestern Western CentralDistrict District District District DistrictSchmidt Morelander Gardner Rood Beck

(B of E) (B of E) (B of E)

131,519 deer 157,174 deer 16,459 deer 61,762 deer 2,529 deer11 teachers 10 teachers 7 teachers 9 teachers 1 teachers(B of E) (B of E) (B of E) (B of E) (B of E)

(Source: Parks, 1930).

Table 9. Governor Parks’ proposed reorganization of the Alaska Reindeer Service in 1930.

Secretary of the InteriorGovernor

General Reindeer Superintendent (Mozee) Headquarters 4 district supervisors in field Office Clerk Seward Peninsula Northwestern Southwestern Western

District District District DistrictNome Kotzebue Dillingham Bethel(Schmidt) (Rood)

6 Foremen 4 Foremen 1 Foreman 3 ForemenWales Barrow Dillingham Pilot StationNome Pt. Hope AkiakWhite Mtn. Kotzebue QuinhagakShaktoolik DeeringUnalakleetSavoonga

131,519 deer 157,174 deer 16,459 deer 61,762 deer (Source: Parks, 1930).

31

Nome; five unit Managers stationed at Nome, Teller,Bethel, Candle, and Egavik; and two clerks at Nome(one of them temporary). These eight civil servantswere expected to administer the estimated 500,000to 800,000 reindeer and 78 Native reindeer associa-tions with 5,878 members spread out over approxi-mately 100,000 square miles of the territory.

Compounding the difficulties of administering somany animals and people spread out over such avast area came the administrative transfer of theReindeer Service itself. The Reindeer Service wastransferred from the Bureau of Education of theAlaska Territorial Governor’s Office of the Divisionof Territories, Department of the Interior, effectiveNovember 1, 1929. This change was part of an in-ternal reorganization of the Bureau of Education,itself dissolved in 1931. The Alaska Division of theBureau, with its responsibilities for education,health, and welfare of Alaskan Natives, was trans-ferred to the Office of Indian Affairs (later the Bu-reau of Indian Affairs). During a brief but, as weshall see, crucial time lasting from February 1936to July 1937, the Reindeer Service was within theadministration of the Office of Territories and Is-land Possessions. Within the Division of Territories,the Reindeer Service received strong support fromErnest Gruening, then the Director of the Division.On July 1, 1937, reindeer administration was trans-ferred back to the Alaska Division, which had beenpart of the Office of Indian Affairs since 1931.

The findings of the Reindeer Committee (1931) hadfavored keeping the Lomens off Native ranges asmuch as possible. Lomen and Company proposed tothe newly established Reindeer Council that all thereindeer on the Seward Peninsula should be placedunder one management scheme (U.S. Departmentof the Interior, 1931). Returns from the herds wouldbe based on the number of female reindeer ownedby the various co–managers of the herds. This sug-gestion was turned down by the Reindeer Council.

The Reindeer Council met only a few times in 1931and 1932. Its major achievement was the adoptionof a set of Range Rules on June 23, 1931. These rulesdiffered little from the ones developed previously bythe Lomens for their own herds and they served towork for the Lomens’ benefit. The marking of calvesand mavericks to their herds was continued on thesame basis as before. The council was largely inef-fective in dealing with the problems of the industry,and, in fact, served as a vehicle to exacerbate some ofthe already existing problems. The Lomens’ influencewith the Reindeer Council is suggested in the RangeRules adapted by the council. When these rules arecompared with those used by the Lomen Companyprior to 1929, it seems apparent that rules pertain-ing to markings, stray ownership, and mixing ofherds were simply carried over from the Lomens’

own range rules to the Reindeer Council’s rules.Other interpretations are also possible, however. Acomparison of the adopted rules and the Lomen rulesis provided as Appendix II.

After only one year of existence, the ReindeerCouncil was stripped of regulatory powers in 1932but continued to function in an advisory capacity fora brief time. The inability of the council to handlereindeer matters effectively had two causes: the com-position of the council and the fact that it had noauthority to enforce its decisions. The council wascomposed of: the Governor of Alaska as ex–officiochairman, the Chief of the Alaska Division of theOffice of Indian Affairs, the General Reindeer Su-pervisor of the Alaska Reindeer Service, a represen-tative chosen by and from Eskimo owners, and a rep-resentative of the Lomen interests.

In addition, the council never had the support ofthe herd owners nor the trust of the Reindeer Ser-vice personnel. Native representation on the coun-cil was limited to two men who shared only one vote.Although the Reindeer Service had a representativeon the council with one vote, they resented the factthat the Lomen representative on the council alsohad one of the five votes. They maintained the posi-tion that a member from a private business enter-prise had no right to be on a government council inan enterprise established to help Natives.

Reindeer Act of 1937The political circumstances leading up to the pas-

sage of a Reindeer Act of 1937 were tremendouslycomplex. The Trowbridge Gillman report (Survey ofthe Alaska Reindeer Service, 1931–1933, releasedin February, 1933) was discredited by many of thesame parties who had originally questioned the Re-indeer Committee hearings (U.S. Department of theInterior, 1933). A large portion of the criticism camefrom C.L. Andrews, who sent written protests to any-one who would read them. A series of critical articlesalso appeared in the Indian Truth magazine. It wasreported that the results of the earlier KendrickCommittee (the 1931 Reindeer Committee) investi-gation and its recommendations, which were sup-posed to have been carried out by the Field Repre-sentatives Trowbridge and Gillman, were neverimplemented (Indian Truth, March, April, 1933). Anearlier article appearing in this same magazine inFebruary, 1932, entitled “Eskimo Reindeer SeriouslyThreatened,” caused many sympathetic missionaryand church groups to deluge the Secretary of theInterior’s office with letters and telegram of protestover the reindeer situation (Indian Truth, 1932).Thousands of these letters were answered with aform letter which told the protesters that a field party(Trowbridge, Gillman, and Brewster) was going “toAlaska to aid the Governor in a fair and orderly

32

re–organization and adjustment of the ownershipof the deer and expedite the making of range leasesas recommended by the Reindeer Committee...”(Wilbur, 1932).

Trowbridge and Gillman managed to antagonizeevery person they dealt with in the Reindeer Ser-vice, as evidenced in their reports. Their chargesagainst the General Reindeer Superintendent, BenB. Mozee, resulted in his being transferred to theAlaska Educational Service, a transfer he rejected,electing instead to serve as United States Marshallin Nome. Brewster was appointed General ReindeerSuperintendent, but the damaged relationship be-tween the Reindeer Service and the Natives contin-ued. Protests against him combined with ill healthforced him to retire to Montana in 1934. He was re-placed by Paul Stafford, the Teller Unit Manager,who served as the Acting General Reindeer Super-intendent from 1934 to January 1936. J. SidneyRood, the Nome–Golovin Unit Manager, became theActing General Reindeer Superintendent in Janu-ary, 1936, when Stafford was transferred to the Graz-ing Branch, Salt Lake City.

Legal opinion on the question of disposition of re-indeer to non–Natives through inheritance, sales,and other means came in 1932. In response to ques-tions posed by Field Representatives Trowbridge andGillman, in a letter to Governor George Parks, theSolicitor for the Department of the Interior, E.C.Finney, gave opinions for the following questions:

1. Is there any authority of law for employ-ees of the Reindeer Service to settle es-tates involving property consisting of re-indeer and make distribution of reindeerowned by the estate, considering the factthat all natives of Alaska are citizensunder the law?

2 Does Section 23 of the Reindeer Regula-tions authorize distribution of reindeerof estates of natives considering that saidsection clearly refers to “herders” andfurther, that many natives own reindeerwho have never been herders, havebought reindeer outright, and own rein-deer which were the result of the natu-ral increase from those given them by theGovernment, or increase from those theypurchased?

3 If the regulations are supported by law,as to the disposition ‘’ reindeer by the Re-indeer Service or any other branch of orthe Interior Department, does such au-thority cover instances where the estatesinclude other property and which mustbe probated by the courts of Alaska?(Trowbridge and Gillman, 1932).

Solicitor Finney replied, in part:

I am of the opinion, that question 1 mustbe answered in the negative. If the reindeerare owned by the native in his own right,altogether free from restriction, it is not acase where the Government should take anypart in the administration of the estate. Butif there be such restricted property, then thecase should be handled in the manner aboveoutlined or under such regulations as maybe adopted. But I do not think an employeeof the Reindeer Service could be authorizedto settle such estates. That function islodged in the Secretary of the Interior. Ques-tion 2 is substantially answered in the an-swer to question 1. Where the deceasednative owned the reindeer without restric-tion there is no authority for the Depart-ment to administer on them, that functionbeing appropriate for a local court. Ques-tion 3 seems to relate to cases where bothrestricted and unrestricted property is in-volved. In such case this Department canonly deal with the restricted property, leav-ing the free property for disposal under lo-cal law.

Regarding the general observations bythe said field representatives (author’snote–Trowbridge and Gillman) as to restric-tions in the regulations on the sale of rein-deer, reference is made to the authority forsuch regulations in section 39, title 48, U.S.Code... (Trowbridge and Gillman, 1932).

By establishing the technical legality of many ofthe Lomen purchases of reindeer, Trowbridge andGillman went on to conclude that “the Governmentshould not purchase existing reindeer marketingfacilities or establish competitive agencies” (U.S. De-partment of the Interior, 1933). At this particulartime, the Lomens had no wish to sell out to the gov-ernment. Drastically reduced market potentialwould cause the Lomens to change their mindswithin a few years.

It was immediately apparent when theTrowbridge–Gillman report was released in Febru-ary, 1933, that the recommendations contained inthe Reindeer Committee’s (1931) findings and theactions of the field representatives were very differ-ent. Superintendent Ben B. Mozee was fired fromthe Reindeer Service and replaced by LymanBrewster, who had been one of the investigators withTrowbridge and Gillman. In The Reindeer Problemin Alaska, privately printed for Mozee (1933) inNome, he critically evaluated the actions and rec-ommendations made in the Survey of the Alaska Re-indeer Service, 1931–1933. While Mozee’s point–by–point evaluation cannot be repeated here, Mozee’sbitterness at the unfair treatment which the Natives

33

received in the hands of Trowbridge and Gillman isclear (Mozee, 1933). A telegram to Ray LymanWilbur summed up his feelings. In that communi-cation, he charged that Trowbridge, Gillman, andBrewster conducted their investigations with preju-dice, that they failed to learn the terminology of thereindeer business, that they failed to spend enoughtime in villages to make adequate investigations,that they failed to review the records, and that theywere intentionally vindicating the Lomens at theexpense of the Native people whom the ReindeerService was supposed to serve (Mozee, 1933). In re-action to the storm of protests that followed the re-lease of the “Survey,” Mozee’s dismissal, and thecontinuing Lomen domination of the Seward Pen-insula, more investigations were undertaken.

The first investigation was conducted by the Di-vision of Education of the Office of Indian Affairs(OIA). The Alaska Division had responsibilities forIndian education, health, and welfare, and, prior to1929 and again after 1937, for reindeer. W. CameronRyan, Jr., Director of the Division of Education, OIA,submitted a confidential report on the reindeer situ-ation in Alaska to the Secretary of Interior, datedJune 7, 1933, in which he reviewed the history of re-indeer in Alaska and made the following comments:

The fundamental issue in the reindeercontroversy can be very simply stated: Isthe Government engaged in the reindeer en-terprise primarily for the economic and so-cial development of the Alaskan Native, orfor the benefit of private commercial inter-ests?. . .

There can be but one answer: TheAlaska reindeer enterprise, so far as theGovernment’s work with natives throughthe Department of the Interior is concerned,should be regarded as essentially a devel-opmental and educational enterprise pri-marily intended for the benefit of the Na-tives.... This fundamental principle hasbeen almost completely overlooked in recenthandling of reindeer matters. Those in con-trol have given considerable attention to thequestions of herd management and market-ing (and rightly so) but they have largelylost sight of the original purpose for whichthe reindeer industry was established. . . .The reindeer situation has been furthercomplicated by the type of private businessthat has been influential in it. It is impos-sible to read the testimony of the Lomensthemselves without coming to the conclu-sion that here is a group that were deter-mined by hook or by crook to get possessionof Native deer; that defied and denouncedgovernment representatives engaged in

protecting the interests of Natives; thatwould go to almost any lengths to achievetheir particular brand of business success.It is important to be fair to this group, butit is necessary to recognize it for what it is— an aggressive, domineering, cynical out-fit, made bitter by the partial thwarting ofmany of its grandiose schemes. (Ryan, 1933,emphasis in the original).

On June 9, 1933, Special Agent Roy Nash began asecond investigation of the reindeer industry for theSecretary of the Interior. On January 11, 1934, hisconfidential report submitted to the Secretary of theInterior was a “report adverse to the Lomen Rein-deer Corporation” (Nash, 1934). The report consistedof 140 pages of narrative with hundreds of additionalpages of appendices. In general, the report vindi-cated the people who had all along protested the ac-tions of the Lomens, as well as the actions of theField Representatives Trowbridge and Gillman.Nash submitted recommendations regarding theGeneral Reindeer Superintendent for Alaska on No-vember 15, 1933, even before his investigations werecomplete. Among the recommendations made, hesuggested:

I. Elimination of Mr. Brewster as GeneralReindeer Superintendent because ofNative opposition.

II. Reinstatement of Tom Lopp for two yearsto replace Brewster while his succes-sor is developed from the present UnitManagers, Stafford, Briggs, Mattickand Kendrick. Mr. Lopp was connectedwith the education of Natives in Alaskafor thirty years, part of which was spentas Chief of the Alaska Division.

III. If this is not approved, the reinstate-ment of former Superintendent Mozee.

IV. If neither II nor III is accepted, the pro-motion of District Manager Briggs tothe position of General Reindeer Super-intendent. (Nash, 1933).

In his formal report, Nash went further by stating:Since 1915, the Lomen Reindeer Corpo-

ration (now Northwestern Livestock Co.)has been invading ranges long occupied bygovernment wards; forcing Eskimos to runtheir reindeer with those of the corporation;piling up huge herding and managementcosts; taking restricted Indian property toreimburse themselves for whatever theyconsidered the Eskimos’ share of those costs.The corporation must be stopped in itstracks right now and a complete separationof white and Native herds effected.

Recommendations:Administrative: Approval applications

34

for grazing leases by Native companies onTeller and Buckland ranges; deny applica-tions of corporation for same, and orderTeller region vacated within twelve months;abolish Reindeer Council; transfer ReindeerService to Office of Indian Affairs; giveNunivak Islanders reindeer.

Legal: Determine titles to reindeer; de-mand of the corporation an accounting forthe whole period and recover for their mis-appropriation of restricted Indian property,by court action if necessary.

Legislative: Revise law on marks andbrands; suggest to Congress a comprehen-sive reindeer code.

International: Request Canada to checkearmarks and numbers in each mark whenreceiving reindeer at mouth of theMackenzie River this spring. (Nash, 1934).

Within the body of Nash’s report are careful justi-fications for each of the recommendations givenbriefly above. His insight into the reindeer contro-versy contrasts sharply with some of the previousinvestigators. With reference to abolishing the re-indeer council, he wrote:

Experience has not indicated that theReindeer Council fulfills any useful func-tion; I recommend it be abolished.

A Reindeer Service with power, ratherthan a committee for acrimonious discus-sion is indicated. With any frontier service,a maximum of trust and a minimum of redtape is desirable—so the original set–up besuch as to merit trust. (Nash, 1934, empha-sis ours).

By 1934, it was obvious to the Lomens that theywould not be able to operate their reindeer–herdingbusiness in the absence of large–scale markets inthe continental United States. With plenty of Na-tive– owned reindeer available locally, there was noAlaska market for Lomen reindeer. Lomens’ finan-cial backers, the Baldwins, offered to sell the hold-ings of the Lomen Reindeer Company to the UnitedStates. Interior Secretary Harold L. Ickes appointeda committee consisting of Assistant Secretary Os-car L. Shapman, E.K. Burlew, Harry Slattery (Per-sonal Assistant to the Secretary), Paul W. Gordon(Director of Education for Alaska), and J. KennardCheadle “to study and consider the question of policy in-volved in a proposed trust of certain reindeer operationsfor Natives of Alaska” (Chapman Committee, 1934).The Baldwins’ original proposal was made Decem-ber 27, 1933, but was rejected because a combinedNative–Lomen operation of the reindeer businesswould have entailed complicated legal and finan-cial considerations, and a complex administration.The Baldwins’ second proposal, dated June 26, 1934,

was accepted in principle by the Chapman Commit-tee. They believed that Eskimo control of market-ing was the solution to the reindeer problem andconcluded :

It is therefore proposed that the Gov-ernment secure for the use and benefit ofthe Natives such herds, range leases, abat-toirs, cold storage plants and range equip-ment as seem essential to return to the Alas-kan Eskimos control of this industry and torelease them from the present controversiesand tensions. (Chapman Committee, 1934).

The Lomens were successful in securing a loanapproval from the Reconstruction Finance Corpo-ration in 1933 to aid their declining operation. Gov-ernor Parks supported the loan application, whichhad mentioned the value of the Lomens’ operationas an employer of Eskimos. The basis for the RFCloan appears to have been a December 31, 1932,balance sheet by the Lomen Reindeer Corporation.The herds were valued at $4,325,000 and the prop-erty belonging to their various other reindeer en-terprises at $4,611,068.87. But despite RFC approvalof the $1,247,500 loan, it was never granted (Lomen,1954). Baldwin offered to sell all these assets for$950,000:

Accordingly, I hereby offer to cause to betransferred to the Government or its nomi-nee, free of all liens and encumbrances, thefollowing property:1. the entire herd of reindeer on Nunivak

Island.2. Warehouses, corrals, and other herd

equipment, store stock of merchandise,including accounts receivable from Na-tives, and equipment other than float-ing equipment.

3. All the reindeer belonging to the AlaskaLivestock and Packing Company inAlaska, wherever located.

4. All range equipment, including corralsystems, wherever located.

5. The cold storage plants located at:Egavik, Igloo Point, Baldwin, Teller,Golovin, and the cold storage barge“Trinder” now located at Baldwin.

6. The abattoirs located at: Egavik,Baldwin, Teller, Golovin, and all otherbuildings used in the slaughter or dressingof reindeer. (Chapman Committee, 1934).

Naturally, the Chapman Committee was curiousas to why nearly nine million dollars of assets wouldbe offered for sale for less than one million dollars.They recommended to Secretary Ickes thatBaldwins’ offer be accepted in principle, pending anauditor ’s and appraiser ’s investigation of theLomen holdings. In addition, the committee asked

35

for authorization to negotiate for the finances re-quired to undertake the purchase.

Louis M. Warren was charged with auditing therecords of the Northwestern Livestock Corporation.He examined only the records kept by the companyin Seattle, and noted that they were incomplete. Athorough examination would have required him totravel to Nome, which he did not do. In a January,1935, report, he estimated that the Lomens owned250,000 reindeer, a figure arrived at “by computa-tion based on statistics compiled in the early yearsof the industry” (Warren Report, 1935); in otherwords, on percentage increases in the herds. Therehad been no complete reindeer roundup for over fiveyears, despite the fact that the Reindeer Commit-tee (1931), Trowbridge–Gillman “Survey” (1933), andNash’s investigations (1934) had all recommendedthat one be held to determine numbers and owner-ship (Warren Report, 1935).

At the time of Warren’s audit and report, it wasapparent that the Lomens’ reindeer business mightnot survive.

The condition of the Northwestern Live-stock Corporation and subsidiary compa-nies, while not precarious, should be of greatconcern to the officers and stockholders ofthis enterprise. The companies have expe-rienced heavy losses, resulting in a deficitof over $500,000 for the period covered bythis report.

The causes of the present unfavorableconditions may be summarized as follows:

Insufficient volume of business.Too low a margin of gross profit; due in

a measure to the low meat prices that ob-tained throughout the period.

Insufficient production resulting in highunit cost.

Heavy fixed charges due to unproduc-tive and idle equipment.

Extraordinary losses.Borrowing of money with consequent

interest charges in order to furnish fundsfor these purposes.

In general, a protracted depression in thereindeer industry. (Warren Report, 1935).

In addition to the financial report on the North-western Livestock Corporation, the government un-dertook an appraisal of all of the physical structuresowned and operated by the Lomens. Architect N.Lester Troast surveyed the structures, preparedblueprints of them and their physical surroundings,and appraised their value (Troast, 1935). Troast’sand Warren’s reports constituted the basis for estimat-ing the amount of the appropriations needed to pur-chase the Lomen holdings within the next few years.

In the summer of 1936, the Senate Committee on

Indian Affairs held hearings concerning the statusof the reindeer industry and on general conditionsin Alaska. J. Sidney Rood, who had recently beenmade the Acting General Reindeer Superintendent,prepared testimony for the Committee. In his “State-ment to the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs Re-garding Reindeer in Alaska” (1936), Rood urged thatlegislation be introduced to grant authority to theReindeer Service to issue grazing leases, that Na-tive–owned reindeer be established as restrictedproperty, and that white ownership be eliminatedfrom needed ranges by fair and equitable means.

A third investigation into the condition of Eski-mos in northwestern Alaska, which included obser-vations and recommendations concerning the rein-deer industry, was prepared by Field Representa-tive Oscar H. Lipps of the Office of Indian Affairs in1936. Lipps was charged with evaluating the socialand economic status of Natives of northwesternAlaska to determine how the provisions of the In-dian Reorganization Act of May 1, 1936, could beapplied to them. Lipps noted the large numbers ofreindeer in the territory, the use the Natives madeof the animals, and the economic control which thetrading posts apparently had over the Eskimos“through extending credit until the Eskimos wereso deeply in debt that they are held virtually in asemi–economic peonage to the traders and are nolonger free agents.” He found in addition that theNative stores which had been organized in the past,sometimes as part of the joint–stock reindeer com-panies, to be “.. .under–capitalized and poorly man-aged.” In his recommendations regarding the appli-cation of the IRA to Eskimo villages, Lipps suggestedthat the Reindeer Service to coordinate its plans withthose of other social welfare, health, and educationprograms of the Office of Indian Affairs, and to uti-lize the teachers as local reindeer supervisors. Itwould also allow organized Native groups to “...se-cure loans from the revolving credit fund to financethis important enterprise” (Lipps, 1936).

The passage of the Reindeer Act on September 1,1937, (P.L. 50, Stat 900) came only after some tre-mendous opposition on the part of some congress-men. The basic objection to the bill centered on theauthorization of $2,000,000 to purchase privateproperty in Alaska at a time when economic condi-tions in the United States were not secure. Somecongressmen did not think that the additional moniesspent to purchase reindeer and processing equip-ment were called for when an appropriation formanaging reindeer affairs already existed. The re-marks of Representative Rich of Pennsylvania to theHouse on August 20, 1937, were typical.

Mr. Speaker, it is a mighty fine thing tobe a Santa Claus, but Santa Claus shouldcome only on Christmas. We have been a

36

pretty good Santa Claus to the citizens ofAlaska. We have also seen a pretty goodSanta Claus to the Eskimos of Alaska.When we had the Interior Department ap-propriation bill up before the House, andwhen the Delegate from Alaska (Mr.Dimond) was before the Committee, hemade a special request to take care of theEskimos of Alaska. In that appropriationbill we gave $33,500 to the Reindeer Ser-vice in Alaska. They requested that we in-crease the amount this year by $5,000. Wemade an increase in the Interior Depart-ment appropriation bill in order that wemight furnish reindeer enough to take careof the Eskimos in Alaska, and I thought wehad done so, according to the request of theDepartment.

Let us see now what this bill actuallydoes. A private corporation has been formedin Alaska. This bill provides for the pur-chase of cold–storage plants, an abattoir, asystem of corrals for these reindeer, and alot of camps and camping equipment. Thebill also provides, and this is in accordancewith the statement of a representative ofthis corporation himself, for the purchaseof the corporation in which is included250,000 reindeer. This is what he told me.I asked what the value of these reindeer is,and he said $3 apiece. Three dollars times250,000 is $750,000. You are going to pay$750,000 for reindeer, and you are going tofurnish $1,250,000 to buy up a lot of thisequipment and put the Government in theslaughterhouse business. This is what youare going to do. (U.S. Congress. House ofRepresentatives, 1937).

Administrative responsibilities for reindeer weretransferred to the Alaska Division of the Office ofIndian Affairs on July 1, 1937. With the ReindeerService in the Office of Indian Affairs, and with theauthority of the Reindeer Act behind it, the Rein-deer Service set about reorganizing itself into aneffective agency. From February 13, 1936, to July 1,1937, the Reindeer Service had been operatingwithin the Interior Department under the Divisionof Territories and Island Possessions. Paul W. Gor-don, then Chief of the Division, had been a powerfulally of the Reindeer Service in its efforts to extin-guish non–Native ownership of reindeer. In a“Memorandum Regarding the Reindeer Service ofthe Office of Indian Affairs” (1937), Rood summa-rized the situation by the end of 1937. Native–ownedreindeer totaled 364,480 (67%) and non–Native–owned totaled 179,520 (33%), for a total estimate of544,000. The number of reindeer supposedly on all

ranges was reported. The need for special Nativeassistants with all herds to carry out constant herd-ing was stressed, as were the needs to appoint im-mediately a General Reindeer Superintendent, de-velop outside markets, fill funded Reindeer Servicepositions, and purchase non–Native–owned reindeerand property as authorized by the Reindeer Act.

In order to determine the actual number of rein-deer and the value of the improvements owned byall non–Natives, Congress authorized a committeeto study and estimate these figures in the summerof 1938. The Reindeer Appraisal Committee (alsoreferred to as the Rachford Committee) investiga-tion report was submitted to Congress (RachfordCommittee, 1938). It was rather curious that Con-gress appointed an independent committee to assessnumbers of reindeer rather than asking the Rein-deer Service for the data. The Rachford Committeeworked closely with members of the Reindeer Ser-vice in Alaska to carry out their task. Congress tookuntil August, 1939, to appropriate the money autho-rized under the Reindeer Act. Instead of the$2,000,000 authorized, only $720,000 was appropri-ated for the purchase of non–Native owned reindeerand facilities and $75,000 for the administrativeexpenses to extinguish the non–Native equity. Theseamounts grew out of the work done by the RachfordCommittee in the summer of 1938. The appraisalcommittee had only been able to find approximately180,000 head of non–Native owned reindeer com-pared with the claims of more than 500,000 animalsmade by the non–Native owners in their declara-tions of ownership following the passage of the Re-indeer Act. The Rachford Committee’s estimate of180,000 reindeer was apparently accurate at thetime it was made (summer 1938), but for the laterReindeer Acquisition Unit, additional roundups werenecessary. Four dollars a head was set as the maxi-mum average cost for the purchase of animals.Nunivak Island reindeer were exempted from thismaximum and higher prices could be paid onNunivak for individual animals. Chas. G. Burdickwas appointed Special Representative of the Secre-tary of the Interior on November 1, 1939. Burdickwas given the responsibility for carrying out the pro-visions of the Reindeer Act. Walter J. Clark was sentas the Fiscal Agent from the Office of Indian Affairs.Edward C. Kelly, Special Assistant to the AttorneyGeneral, was added to the staff in February of 1940to handle the legal aspects of the purchasing pro-gram and to examine property titles. One fulltimeand one part–time clerk–stenographer were alsoadded to the staff. From the field, Burdick reportedthat negotiations with some of the non–Native own-ers were somewhat difficult.

Each wanted as much money as possible.With few exceptions, claims submitted in

37

1958, pursuant to the act of September 1,1937, were greatly in excess of reindeer onthe range. Points of ten or more years’standing were brought up by various own-ers and settled. Questions of previous mark-ings, reindeer gathered and driven to newranges by the government or others withno check on ownership or recompense to theclaimants, Native killing of white–owned re-indeer for food, fox–bait, or dog food, driftof reindeer from range to range, co–owner-ship on ranges where a stray ownership sta-tus only was enjoyed, value of reindeer,number of reindeer, decrease in white–owned deer where no killing was done andincrease of Native ownership in the sameherds when the Natives were killing manydeer, allowance for the spring fawn crop of1940— all were discussed, worked out andsettled as equitably as possible for both thevendor and the Government. (Burdick, 1940).

The roundups and purchases were finally com-pleted during the winter of 1939–1940. In contrastto the 500,615 reindeer claimed in declarations ofownership provided in 1938, and the 180,000 esti-mate of the Rachford Committee in 1938, only 84,001were actually rounded up and purchased by the gov-ernment. The Alaska Livestock and Packing Com-pany, claiming 260,000, sold only 25,000. TheNunivak Development Co. (Northwestern LivestockCo.) claimed 15,000, and actually sold 17,000. Otherclaims were six to eight times higher than the num-bers eventually found and sold. The winter of 1938–1939 had been an especially severe one, with heavysnowfall, intense predation, and spring storms. How-ever, it seems unlikely that a real reduction from500,000 animals to 84,000 actually took place. Amore satisfactory explanation is that the originalclaims were exaggerated in the hope that the gov-ernment would purchase reindeer based solely onthe numbers claimed, without conducting a roundup.The figures provided by the Rachford Committeewould tend to support this conclusion.

For nearly $500,000, the Federal governmentended the non–Native involvement in the produc-tion and processing of reindeer in Alaska. “With ourwithdrawal from the industry, we could think onlythat it would be interesting, and doubtless not a littleheart rending, to sit back and watch how the Govern-ment would deal with the problem” (Lomen, 1954).

Burdick’s report (1940) of the Reindeer Acquisi-tion Unit summarized the actual expenditures:

Appropriation $795,000.00Reindeer purchased 333,003.00Improvements purchased 112,925.72Administrative costs 45,673.48

Total actual cost of acquisition program $491,602.20

Decline in reindeer herds is probably the chiefcharacteristic of the 1930s. The reasons for the de-cline in reindeer during this time and in the 1940sare numerous. While some authorities place greateror lesser emphasis on one or another reason, it ismost reasonable to assume that all the factors incombination were operating to reduce the herd size.Predation by wolves, and in a few reported cases bycoyotes, was intense on some herds (U.S. Fish andWildlife Service, n.d.). Changing migration routesand the increasing numbers of animals in the west-ern Arctic and other caribou herds of the territorytook away many reindeer. Since reindeer tend to joincaribou herds which move through their range, thisevent was not unexpected. Informants recount thatthe thousands of caribou which passed through sim-ply swallowed up the reindeer herds as they passed.The herds between Cape Krusenstern on the west,the Noatak River on the east, and Wainwright onthe north were particularly impacted by caribouduring the 1930s.

In addition to predation and caribou losses, someadditional causes can be found for the decline of thereindeer industry, such as disease, poor herd man-agement which resulted in straying, and overgraz-ing. The inability to fulfill reward expectationscaused many persons to abandon their herds, espe-cially when confronted with massive losses of ani-mals from causes that appeared to be beyond theircontrol. During the Great Depression, the incomefrom fox trapping also decreased and caused manyherders who had trapped while tending their own(or company) herds to abandon this practice as wellas to move into established villages (Burch, 1975).

By 1936, reindeer were distributed from BarterIsland to the Yukon–Kuskokwim delta area and be-yond. Table 10 and Figure 4 show the distributionof reindeer in northwestern Alaska, including theSeward Peninsula and the various ranges allocatedto the various herd owners by the United States Re-indeer Service. Data for Figure 4 and Table 10 aretaken from an original map in the National ArchivesBuilding (Record Group 75, Records of the Bureauof Indian Affairs), prepared by J. Sidney Rood.

Chapter VNative ownership andthe period ofreconstruction: 1940–1977

Following the purchase of non–Native–owned re-indeer by the United States Government in 1940,reindeer herding moved into an entirely new phasewhich lasts through the present. The policy of the

38

Bureau of Indian Affairs has been to encourage thedevelopment of individual ownership, based on aLapp–like model of ownership and herd management.

The reindeer industry we hope to createfor the future is this: one which is similarto Lapland’s, namely individual enterpris-ers and their herder–partners, maintainingvigilant custody of such breeding–stock asthey can manage, grazing their stock withinnatural grazing units under Governmentauthority on a head basis. The number ofhead they will attempt to manage with asingle herding crew will be 3,000 or less be-cause they themselves will find the law ofdiminishing returns operative if they at-tempt handling more. Keeping within theamounts of reindeer which the Governmentpermits herders to graze, the number andsize of herds will be lim-ited by the rewards whichherders are able to obtainfrom herd crops: supplyand demand. This willcause some to fail, othersto thrive. Competition be-tween herding crews willexist; they will be actuatedby fear of losing money bylosing strays, by hope ofextra rewards for espe-cially good management,by pride in demonstratingtheir efficiency to otherherders, by shame shouldthey fail. We hope to developthe Natives to develop rein-deer so that, little by little,the Government can reducesupervision to the mini-mum needed to protectpastures, acquaint ownerswith more efficient tech-niques, and give ownersfreedom — to do what theyought with regard to therights of others. (Rood,1943, original emphasis).

It is ironic to note that it hastaken up to the present time toreach these goals. The grazingunits are now government deter-mined and controlled through asystem of grazing permits issuedby the Bureau of Land Manage-ment. The reindeer industry nowconsists largely of individualownership of herds. The Reindeer

Herders Association, through its contract with theBureau of Indian Affairs, attempts to acquaint own-ers with more efficient techniques. In all thesethings, the government, both state and Federal, hasreduced its role to the minimum needed to protectpastures.

During World War II, the reindeer industry waslargely ignored in the face of global conflict. Someexperimental clothing was manufactured, so that fora brief time the demand for calf skins and leggingswas high. By the end of World War II, Alaska’s herdswere reduced to less than 100,000 animals. The gen-eral overall effect of the war years on the Natives ofAlaska cannot be ignored either. For the first timein their lives, many young men traveled great dis-tances beyond their local regions. They saw the manymodern conveniences of the outside world, learnedof different living conditions elsewhere in the United

39

States, and were taught new skills. As many of thesenewly acquired skills could not be used in the vil-lages, some never returned and others who did comeback were dissatisfied with the life and conditionsthey found there. The increased use of airplanes andthe establishment of health facilities, radio, and all–weather landing strips in virtually every villagecaused further changes in the values of the Eski-mos of northwestern Alaska.

As discussed previously, the administration of re-indeer had been transferred from the Office of the

Governor of Alaska to the Alaska Division of the Bu-reau of Indian Affairs in 1937. Within the BIA, theDivision of Education had administrative responsi-bility until March 1941, when reindeer administra-tion was internally transferred. This time, the movewas from the Division of Education to the Divisionof Extension and Industry and the Division of For-estry and Grazing. “This transfer placed adminis-tration of the reindeer industry on the same basisas that prevailing for the Indian range and livestockresources on the various reservations located in theStates” (Arnold et al., 1941).

The 1940sIn the summer of 1941, L.D. Arnold, Director of

Forestry; A.C. Cooley, Director of Extension and In-dustry; Frank B. Lenzie, Regional Forester at Spo-kane; and John M. Cooper, Director of the SheepBreeding Laboratory at Fort Wingate, New Mexico,visited Alaska to observe and report on the statusand management of reindeer in Alaska (Arnold etal., 1941). Their report contained an itinerary of theirtravel, a brief history of the reindeer industry, andthe current state of knowledge concerning reindeerhusbandry, grazing, range requirements, losses,range management, research, and administration.They accepted Sheldon Jackson’s original premisethat reindeer were introduced for the benefit of theNatives who were in dire need of food to replace theanimals lost to Euro–American whalers and the cari-bou decline. They note that “. . the policy of the Gov-ernment is to assist the Natives in the conduct of theirbusiness on a subsistence basis” (Arnold et al., 1941).

Among the conclusions reached and recommen-dations made by the investigators, great emphasiswas placed on improved herding and husbandrymethods. Based on their experiences with grazingand range management in the lower 48, the investi-gators believed that for the reindeer industry:

...the most effective steps that can be takento halt reindeer losses are: (1) Constant herd-ing; (2) An intensive campaign for the controlof wolves; (3) Improved corral handlings; (4)Improvement in methods of handling andslaughter of deer; and (5) Research on rangeand stock management, the control of para-sites, and the utilization of meat, skins, andslaughter by–products. (Arnold et al., 1941).

Two other problems facing the industry were alsoaddressed: association ownership and administra-tion. It was recommended that ownership of rein-deer by the associations be continued, “...but thatevery effort should be made toward (a) future op-eration that will insure an improvement in deermanagement, maintenance of range, and a greaterincome in terms of meat and skins to the Nativestockholders” (Arnold et al., 1941). The investigating

Table 10. Reindeer herd operations in northwestAlaska, 1936.Northwestern District:

Barrow Unit1. Brower Brothers Herd2 Farthest North Reindeer Co. herds3. Wainwright Reindeer Co. herds4. Pt. Hope Reindeer and Trading Co. herds5. Kivalina–Noatak Reindeer Co.6. Kotzebue Sound Reindeer Co. herds7. Noorvik Reindeer Co. herds

Buckland Unit8. Selawik Reindeer and Trading Co. herds9. Shungnak Reindeer and Trading Co. herds10. Alaska Livestock and Packing Co.,

Kotzebue herd11. Alaska Livestock and Packing Co. and

Buckland Eskimo Reindeer Co. herds12. Deering Reindeer Co. herd13. Nuglunuktuk Reindeer Co. herd

Seward Peninsula District:Teller Unit

14. Shishmaref Reindeer Co. herd15. Allockeok herd16. Cape Reindeer Assoc. herd17 Alaska Livestock and Packing Co. and

native herd (Teller)18. Inland Reindeer Assoc. herd19. Igloo Reindeer Assoc. herd

Nome–Golovin Unit20. Nome–Douglas Reindeer Assoc. herd21. Council Native Reindeer Assoc. herd22. Alaska Livestock and Packing Co. Golovin herds23. Alaska Livestock and Packing Co.

Upper Koyuk herds24. Elim Reindeer Assoc. herd Egavik Unit25. Koyuk Reindeer Assoc. herd26. Shaktoolik Reindeer Assoc. herd27. Alaska Livestock and Packing Co. Egavik herd

Unalakleet Unit28. Unalakleet Grazing Assoc. herd

Numerous additional herds were located south of the areacovered by figure 4. These herds fall beyond the geographicscope of this report and are not illustrated.

40

committee also found the administrative set–up ofthe Reindeer Service: “...logical, and will work to ad-vantage providing adequate facilities and person-nel are furnished to carry it on” (Arnold et al., 1941).These two problems were both resolved as an un-planned consequence of the American entry intoWorld War II.

It was apparent to some people in the ReindeerService, even in 1942, that the stock associationswere a failure. Rood, the General Reindeer Super-intendent, observed that the associations were ruledby “indifferent owners,” who by their large numbersand votes could very democratically send their as-sociations towards ruin and create disharmony be-tween small owners and good herders.

These incompetent association–debatingsocieties, governed by the votes of untutoredpeople who knew nothing about shares, per-centages, accounts, taxes, dividends, pa-pers, or intricate business of any formaltype, and most of whom evinced no desireto manage herds properly, created a disas-trous balance of nature (when the wolvesfound reindeer to be an easy prey in the1930s). We should allow these associationsto die by hurrying conveyance of their re-maining reindeer to whatever individualstockholder will manage them. (Rood, 1943).

Rood also stated that the government erred in urg-ing the formation of stock associations. In his opinion,it was a “re–enunciation of an earlier faulty policy ofdistributing reindeer to all Natives” (Rood, 1943). Roodobserved that not all Natives would make good herd-ers, and that ownership should be confined to a fewindividuals and their herder–partners. Others nowshare this same opinion (Olson, 1969).

Rood (1943) presented some good comments andinsights, which are worth repeating, into the prob-lems facing the industry at the start of World WarII. Based on excerpts from letters of local schoolteachers, who were also the local reindeer supervi-sors, and Rood’s own comments, the following prob-lems could be listed:

1) No close herding has been done in the BeringUnit (Seward Peninsula) for several years.

2) Absentee ownership discouraged goodherding practices. Absentee ownership of57.5% at Wales, 44.3% at Igloo, 44% atDeering, 16.4% at Inland Association,23.5% at Shishmaref, and 33.3% at Tellerwere reported.

3) Wolf predation took substantial numbersof animals.

4) Good reindeer were slaughtered from allherds as feed for dog teams.

5) Lack of year–round herding, with accom-panying lack of interest is herd welfare,

resulted in indiscriminate killing (No. 4above) and a failure to return butcheringpermits (illegal killing).

At the start of World War II, the military activi-ties at Nome were substantially enlarged. A goodmarket was therefore created locally for reindeermeat. Both the military and civilian defense work-ers provided the market. Merchants could not storeenough meat in their cold storage facilities to meetthe demands as such facilities had been built forthe lower prewar demand. Ironically, attempts toround up animals for sale in this newly establishedand lucrative market were largely unsuccessful. Thiswas due primarily to the Native’s more intense in-terest in obtaining wage labor, hunting, and/or fish-ing rather than tending to the herds. A few associa-tion members did go out and butcher for meat sales.As it developed, they very often made good moneyfrom animals which were not entirely theirs. Find-ing competent herders was also nearly impossibleas wages for longshoring and other jobs offered aminimum of $1.00 per hour.

Increased labor expenses for herding made it dif-ficult to attract and hold qualified herders withinthe government herds as well. The General Rein-deer Superintendent wrote to Claude M. Hirst, theGeneral Superintendent of the Alaska Indian Service:

In March, 1941, constant herding was com-menced (with the Golovin Government herdof 3,000 reindeer). The best Native herdersin the region were engaged. They quit inJune, 1941, to take advantage of opportuni-ties for high wages at longshoring, freight-ing and mining. Other able–bodied, energeticNatives in this region had also procured sum-mer and fall work at high wages. We tried tohire Elim Natives; they were engaged by theCAA on the Moses Point airfield at $6.50 perday.... The only way we could hold them (theoriginal herders hired back in the fall) wouldbe to increase their pay to at least $600 permonth for the staff. (Rood, 1942).

In private industry, semiskilled laborers were able toearn up to $540 per month. The government reindeerherds could not afford to compete with such wageswith their budget constraints. At this time, govern-ment herds existed at Escholtz Bay (6,000), Golovin(3,000), Naknek (2,500–3,000), Nunivak Island(19,650), Hooper Bay (1,500), and Egavik (1,000).An overall management plan needed to be devel-oped to place all government–owned reindeer intoNative hands. “The Government’s aim is not to op-erate a Government reindeer business” (Rood, 1942).Providing financing aid to interested Natives and bet-ter management of breeding stock already in Nativehands were crucial to setting the reindeer industry onits feet after the elimination of non–Native owners.

41

Wartime inflation reduced the effective operating bud-get of the Reindeer Service and additional fundingor administrative support was not forthcoming.

After the purchase of non–Native herds was com-pleted in 1940, the Reindeer Service attempted to re-organize itself and to establish the range rules andregulations as authorized in the 1937 Reindeer Act.The proposed rules and regulations caused much de-bate within the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Some criti-cized the proposed regulations as being too detailedand not providing enough general policy guidelines forthe industry and its development. Other critics con-tended that the proposed rules and regulations madeit too difficult for interested Natives to obtain the newlyacquired government reindeer. The central issue in thedebate focused on the direction in which the govern-ment was going in the distribution of reindeer to Na-tives and not so much on the appropriateness of therules and regulations for the management of the rein-deer industry in Alaska. It was not until the late 1940sthat a definite policy on the lending of reindeer to quali-fied individuals was formulated.

When the government acquired thousands of re-indeer in 1940, the plan was to use some as modelherds and to lend the remainder to individuals whoshowed an interest in and an ability in herding. Apolicy of lending small herds of 300 to 800 animalswas started with the provision that the loan was tobe repaid after a number of years. From 1947 to1953, the government ran a herd at Escholtz Baywhich served as the primary source for loan deer.Chester Sevick, an experienced herder, was placedin charge of this particular herd (Sevick,1973).

Starting in 1944, the Bureau of Indian Affairs be-gan a “repayment in kind” program. Reindeer fromthe Government–owned herds were lent to individu-als who wanted to operate a reindeer herd. After aperiod of years, the herd operator was required topay back to the government the same number of ani-mals he had been lent to start his herd. From 1944to 1952, 2,356 head were lent directly to Natives onthe Seward Peninsula and in the Kotzebue Soundregion. Animals were taken from the Escholtz Bay

Government Herd to start seven new herds (seeTable 11).

Seventeen small herds were started during the1950s, but by 1960 only ten (including governmentherds) contained more than 1,000 reindeer. Theherds on the periphery of the expanding cariboupopulation’s grazing areas lost more animals to themigrating caribou than were born (compare Figures5 and 6). Between 1947 and 1952, thousands of re-indeer were lost: Barrow, three herds lost, 1950–51;Wainwright, 1,100 head lost in 1947; Point Hope,250 head lost in early 1948; Kivalina herd completelylost, 1947; Mickey Thomas’ herd borrowed fromKugruk Company placed with Escholtz Bay herdupon his death in 1950; Topkok herd lost to wolvesand over butchering 1950; Nelson Island herd lostto wolves and over butchering in 1947; GovernmentEgavik herd transferred to St. Michael after wolflosses in 1948; and Hooper Bay herd, suffering heavylosses in 1947–1948, was moved to St. Michael in1950 (Anon., 1953). Throughout the BIA AnnualLand Operations reports for the 1950s there werepleas for additional money and personnel so thatthe program could be made effective (U.S. Govern-ment, BIA, 1950–1960).

Figures 5, 6, 7, and 8 and Tables 12, 13, and 14require some explanation. Not all of the herds ex-tant in Alaska for the years 1948, 1958, and 1968,respectively, are listed. Only those herds in the geo-graphic region of concern relevant to this report arelisted, that is, northwest Alaska. Secondly, Figures7 and 8 and Table 14 are limited to the Seward Pen-insula and do not show herds at Shaktoolik orStebbins. Next, the column indicating the numberof years in operation may be a confusing number.The years given are the number of years the owner/operator has had control of that particular herd. Theherd may have existed in that village or region un-der different ownership/management prior to gov-ernment purchase or loan. For example, the EscholtzBay Government herd “...was started with 4,500 re-indeer from Teresa Creek corrals from the old Lomenherds in 1941. In 1942, an additional 1,500 headwere driven from the Deering range to the Kotzebuerange. During the first winter, the herd suffered aloss from straying of 1,500 head” (Rouse et al., 1948).Lastly, some herds have been consolidated or other-wise recombined during the ten year intervals be-tween the various figures. For example, the rem-nants of the Stalker herd at Noatak/Kotzebueformed the basis for the Government Demonstra-tion Herd based at Nome starting in 1965. In thefall of 1974, this herd was turned over to NANA Re-indeer Enterprises, Inc. The NANA herd ranges onthe Baldwin Peninsula, the northern shores ofEscholtz Bay, and the Kiwalik River area, all ofwhich was formerly under permit to Lawrence Gray

Table 11. Herds established 1944–1952.Date Owner Number loaned

1946 Lawrence Gray 500 head1951 Charley Clark 850 head

1944 York Wilson and Henry Weber 1,066 head1948 Ross Stalker 856 head

1945 Siegfried Aukongak 500 head1950 Johnny Kakarak 500 head

1952 Andrew Skin 868 head(Anon., 1953).

42

and Charlie Clark, respectively.Figure 5 and Table 12 illustrate the location of

reindeer herds in 1948; Figure 6 and Table 13, 1958;and Figure 7 and Table 14, 1968. A comparison ofFigures 5, 6, 7, and 8 shows the changing distribu-tion of reindeer throughout the last 40 years. Onthese maps, the areas indicated as not having herdswere not totally without reindeer at this time, par-ticularly on the Seward Peninsula. Scattered rein-deer belonging to the old company herds roamed un-attended throughout the Seward Peninsula. A fewEskimos rounded up the remnants of these scatteredherds and they were used as the nucleus for privateherd operations during the 1940s and 1950s. Thenumbers in parentheses after the “village or region”designation in Tables 12, 13, and 14 refer to the lo-cations of the herds as shown in the Figures 5, 6,and 7 for the years 1948, 1958, and 1968, respec-tively. The boundaries of the locations are approxi-mate and are taken from descriptions of the herds’locations given in the various Bureau of Indian Af-fairs Land Operations reports (BIA, 1958, 1968) andthe Rouse, Mountjoy and Belcher (1948) report. TheBureau of Land Management did not assign grazingpermits for the modern herds until 1962, although theold General Land Office had taken applications and

issued some grazing permits for reindeer in the1920s and 1930s under the authority of the AlaskaGrazing Act of March 4, 1927 (44 Stat. 1452).

Between 1944 and 1945, the Reindeer Service wasagain reorganized. When the Service was originallyplaced under the administration of the Division ofExtension and Industry and the Division of Forestryand Grazing (1941–1944), seven administrativeunits were used for the management of the reindeerindustry. These seven were reduced to three: ArcticUnit, Bering Unit, and Yukon–Kuskokwim Unit.This change reflected the decreasing number of ani-mals in the territory and the declining governmentsupport for the industry during World War II. Between1944 and 1947, the supervisory personnel workingwith reindeer were further reduced from a staff offive (one Reindeer Supervisor and four Unit Man-agers) to one Unit Manager.

The newly purchased government reindeer werekept in several herds during World War II. TheEscholtz Bay herd became the nucleus for many Na-tive loans, the first of which was made in 1944. Gov-ernment–operated herds were also located atGolovin, Egavik, Hooper Bay, Nunivak Island, andSt. Michael–Stebbins (a mixed government/privatelyrun herd) (Rouse et al., 1948). A number of herds

Table 12. Reindeer herd operations, government and private, 1948.

Village or Years in Estimatedgeographic area Operator operation herd size

Nunivak Island Government 8 purchased10,000

Hooper Bay Government 15 500(Niles Smith, Chief Herder)

St. Michael–Stebbins Mixed government and privately owned 8 400(Dan Boucher, Chief Herder)

Egavik (1) Government 8 220Escholtz Bay (2) Government 8 3,750

(Chester Sevick, Chief Herder)Golovin (3) Government loan to Siegfried Aukongak 2 1,177Kiwalik (Candle) (4) Mickey Thomas 2 600Kotzebue (5) Henry Weber and York Wilson 4 2,600Selawik (6) Charlie Smith 3 1,332Shungnak (7) Lawrence Gray 3 400Point Hope (8) Point Hope Reindeer Co. ca. 25 250Kivalina–Noatak (9) Kivalina–Noatak Reindeer Co. ca. 25 100

(remnant herd)Wainwright (10) Wainwright Reindeer Assoc. ca. 25 300Cape Halkett (11) Cape Halkett Assoc. reindeer borrowed 2 400

by Steven ReubenBarrow (12) Albert Hopson reindeer borrowed from 2 600

Northern Frontier Assoc.Barrow (13) Tommy Brower 44 1,250Teller (14) Fred Topkok (Topkok Reindeer Co.) 4 650(The numbers in parentheses refer to Figure 5). (Source: Rouse, Mountjoy, and Belcher, 1948).

43

under Native control also continued to operate dur-ing World War II. By 1948, of the seventeen herdsunder various forms of management and control, sixwere government owned or were newly establishedloan herds, one was a mixed government/privatelyowned herd, and the reminder were in private hands(see Figure 5 and Table 12). Range conditions werereported as generally good. Problems with wolveswere reported as less serious than they had been adecade, or even five years earlier (Rouse et al., 1948).

Uncertainty about the best course for Governmentpolicy caused much examination of the reindeer in-dustry in the early 1950s. An internal memorandumof the Bureau of Indian Affairs is worth quoting atsome length. While phrased in somewhat ethnocen-tric terms concerning the Eskimo’s cultural behavior,the problems identified are, to a certain extent, theproblems which continue to confound reindeer herd-ers and resource managers innorthwest Alaska today.

In addition to the problemof reduced supervisory person-nel, the newly establishedherds faced social and eco-nomic difficulties as reportedin the 1953 Bureau of IndianAffairs manuscript:

Generally it is difficultto get new borrowersstarted. They have nomoney, very few items ofthe equipment which isneeded, and no funds topay labor. Either theymust have a Nunivakloan for butchering toprovide cash, or theymust be permitted tobutcher some of the bor-rowed deer immediately.They lack an adequatesense of money manage-ment. Money on hand isto be spent without ad-equate consideration ofpossible needs next weekor month. Borrowers arereluctant to take herdsinto a strange grazing areawith the possibility of nothaving extra help availablewhen needed.

Current Problems1. It is difficult to get

the people to constantlydo a good job of herding.This is partly due to a

carry over from management practices of anearlier day and partially due to the problemof getting people to change a way of life froma hunting and fishing economy to a pastoraleconomy.

2. Other jobs are more attractive, payhigher wages, and the people can live in thevillages with their friends.

3. Good winter range is scarce. There areareas where good winter feed is available butgenerally it is far inland where herders donot want to take herds or there is danger ofcaribou taking the herd.

4. Young men are not particularly inter-ested in reindeer. They will work for a whileat herds but are not interested in making alife’s work of reindeer.

5. The elements are difficult to combat.

44

Table 13. Reindeer herd operations, government and private, 1958.

Years in EstimatedVillage or region Operator operation herd sizeNunivak Island Nunivak Development Project 18 10,349

(government owned)Stebbins Stebbins Community Assoc. 18 2,700Unalakleet and Egavik (1) John Kotongan 4 650Selawik and Kotzebue (2) George Keats and Lawrence Gray plus 13 2,065

government–owned Escholtz Bay reindeer herdGolovin (3) Siegfried Aukongak 12 5,231Candle (Kiwalik) (4) Charlie Clark 7 3,500+Noorvik (5) Louis Commack 2 900Selawik (6) William Sheldon 1 1,000Selawik (7) Andrew Skin 3 1,800Buckland (8) Paul Hadley 5 1,500Deering (9) Edward Karmun and Elmer Thomas 0.5 1,100Cape Espenberg (10) Harold Dimmick and Fred Goodhope, Sr. 0.5 1,562Teller(ll) Johnny Kakaruk 8 2,250Noatak (12) Ross and Johnson Stalker 2 1,097

(The numbers in parentheses refer to Figure 6). (Source: Bureau of Indian Affairs, 1958).

Summer herding must be on foot and themosquitoes are numerous. Winter cold, snowand blizzards are to be contended with.Permanent camps or houses cannot very wellbe constructed due to the high cost and thefact that the herds should be kept on the move.

6. Herders with children should have thechildren in school. Yet a herder if he is to re-main in camp wants his family with him. Aman without a woman in camp to cook andkeep his clothing repaired is in for a tough time.Also, they are unable to attend church services.

7. Although they are born and raised inthe country, Natives do not like the cold, thestorms, etc., any better than anybody else.They do not like to herd out of the immedi-ate area where they know the country.

8. They do not care for the continuous re-sponsibility and grind of herding. They preferto hunt and fish but they do this when theweather conditions and the mood suits them.

9. Although wolves are not numerous theydo kill deer and make herding more difficult.They are worse in the winter probably dueto scarcity of other food. (Anon., 1953).

Although an attitude of wanting to help “rehabili-tate” the reindeer industry was present in the Bu-reau of Indian Affairs in the late 1940s, a counter–attitude existed also.

We believe there is another point thatshould be given careful consideration, andthat is the need of reindeer by the Natives.There is no question but that at the time thereindeer herds were established, they werebadly needed by the Natives. Since that time,

however, there has been a substantial changein the economy of the Natives, especially dur-ing the past 5 or 6 years. The various activi-ties of the armed forces and other agenciesof the Federal government in Alaska havegreatly increased the employment opportu-nities of the Natives. The establishment ofairports and an efficient radio system havegreatly facilitated transportation and com-munication. These improvements no doubthad a material effect on the economy of theNatives and their dependence on the wild-life resources for subsistence and clothing.We believe that the survey which the Gen-eral Superintendent now proposes to conductin cooperation with the Fish and WildlifeService should determine whether the rein-deer herds are an essential part of theeconomy of the Natives of all parts of Alaska.(Arnold, 1948).

The proposed survey was undertaken by CharlesH. Rouse, biologist, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service;Charles R. Mountjoy, Director of Native Resources,Alaska Native Services; and Dale M. Belcher, Assis-tant Director of Native Resources, Alaska NativeServices (Rouse et al., 1948). Conditions seemed fa-vorable for a revitalization of the industry. The re-indeer survey, made jointly by the U.S. Fish andWildlife Service and the Alaska Native Service in1948, concluded that:

There is sufficient foundation stock withwhich to build and range conditions are suf-ficiently good to allow for some expansion.There is a definite need for reindeer prod-ucts and the market for these products in a

45

limited amount within the Territory ap-pears stable. Since the establishment ofnew herds is dependent largely upon thenumber available from Government ownedherds, it will be possible to control the num-ber of herds and the range allotments whichthey occupy. In order to prevent a recur-rence of the too rapid development of thereindeer herds, it appears advisable to limitthe number of herds that can be establishedand also see that each operator limits hisherd to a number he can adequately carefor. This should ordinarily not be over 2,000head. If the herds are maintained near theprincipal markets along the Bering Sea andArctic coasts it should be possible to dis-pose of surpluses readily and at sufficientprofit to provide a reasonably good liveli-hood for a limited numberof families engaged in rais-ing these animals. To facili-tate the orderly develop-ment of this industry, an ad-ministrative force of the fol-lowing personnel is recom-mended: Assistant Directorof Native Resources, RangeExaminer, Agricultural Ex-tension Agent, Fieldmen (2).As the industry develops itmay be necessary to expandthis force to keep pace withthe work required. (Rouse etal., 1948).

The 1950sBy 1953, thirteen years after the

government had acquired thenon–Native interests, some offi-cials in the BIA felt that it wouldbe best for the bureau to withdrawfrom its activities connected withthe reindeer industry. A conferenceconcluded:

1 The Reindeer Act of 1937should be amended to allowfor greater flexibility in de-veloping the reindeer indus-try and not restrict it to Na-tives only.

2. Present Governmentowned reindeer on the main-land of Alaska should beloaned, if possible, and rangepermitting, to the presentNative reindeer operatorsfor the purpose of building

up their herds into economic units and for loansto carefully selected new applicants in estab-lishing themselves in the reindeer business.

3. Loans are to be made on a cash basisand not “in kind”.

4. A program to be worked out for turningthe reindeer on Nunivak Island over to theNative people as soon as possible.

5. Arrangements are to be made for all Gov-ernment owned reindeer on the other islandsto be loaned to selected Natives or turnedover to the Fish and Wildlife Service, if in-terested, otherwise sold to the highest bidders.

6. Control of the ranges to be establishedand the agency responsible for it determined.

7. Director Wade on his return toAlaska...to work out tentative legislation forit which would enable the Bureau of Indian

46

Affairs) to carry out the foregoing conclu-sions. (U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 1953b).

By and large, all of the goals outlined at the con-clusion of the conference were achieved by 1970,without any additional legislation, with the excep-tion of the amendment to the Reindeer Act. NunivakIsland reindeer were turned over to Mekoryuk Na-tives (Bering Sea Reindeer Products) in 1970. In1968, in a cooperative agreement with the State ofAlaska, the BIA, and the Bureau of Land Manage-ment, the latter agency undertook the supervisionof ranges.

During the 1950s an occasional flight for the pur-pose of shooting wolves was made by the UnitedStates Fish and Wildlife Service predator controlagents. The Territorial Division of Game was basi-cally reluctant to use public funds to assist indi-vidual business enterprises. This attitude of view-ing the reindeer herders as businessmen on a parwith the cattle ranchers of the continental UnitedStates has continued to the present day within someagencies of government.

Starting in 1959, the BIA and the United StatesFish and Wildlife Service undertook a cooperativeagreement to operate an airplane based in Kotzebuefor predator control. The predator control agent ofthe United States Fish and Wildlife Service work-ing with the Range Conservation Officer of BIA aidedthe herders by shooting wolves and dropping poi-soned bait. Herders themselves reported consider-able predation on herds. They also shot wolves withsome regularity. Grizzly bears were also shot by theherders, especially in the spring calving season. AtNunivak Island, the Bureau of Sport Fisheries andWildlife also aided BIA’s Nunivak Island Develop-ment Project through the aircraft cooperative agree-ment. In 1965, the Bureau of Sport Fisheries andWildlife did not receive an appropriation to continuepredator control in Alaska. Consequently, the BIA

undertook to fund the program. In 1966, knownlosses to Seward Peninsula herds from wolves, foxes,bears, and wolverines were estimated at 615 calvesand 440 adult reindeer. A federal ban on aerial wolfhunting went into effect in 1971. With the excep-tion of a short–lived, aerial hunting program in thewinter of 1976–77, predator control has been entirelyin the hands of the herders since the late 1960s. Onsome ranges, predation has been a persistent prob-lem over the last 20 years. The eastern ranges onSeward Peninsula seem especially prone to wolf pre-dation, possibly by wolf populations which gener-ally prey on the western Arctic caribou herd.

During the same period from World War II to theearly 1970s, caribou returned in ever increasingnumbers to the regions of northwestern Alaskawhere they had been previously unsighted for de-cades. Ranges occupied by reindeer were increas-ingly being traversed by the returning caribou herds.Many reindeer were quickly lost to these migratingherds. Because of the loose or “open” herding whichwas practiced, losses to caribou continued to be amajor cause for the herd failures throughout the1950s and 1960s (see Tables 13, 14). By the mid–1960s, active reindeer herds were no longer presentnorth or northeast of Kotzebue Sound. Losses tocaribou and wolf predation were identified as themajor causes for the decline of herds in that area.The increased numbers of caribou created a two–fold problem for the herders. On the one hand, themigratory caribou tended to “steal” reindeer whojoined with the moving caribou. On the other hand,the presence of caribou, and a year round, open hunt-ing season with no limit on caribou take until the fallof 1976, decreased the market potential for reindeer.

Despite the failure of many herds located betweenNoatak and Barrow, the Kobuk and Selawik Rivers,and south of Norton Sound during the 1950s, a num-ber of newly established herds did survive. This

Table 14. Reindeer herd operations, government and private, Seward Peninsula, 1968.Years in Estimated

Village or region Operator operation herd sizeNunivak Island (Mekoryuk) Government 28 10,200Golovin (1) Siegfried Aukongak 22 4,500Candle (2) Charlie Clark 17 984Selawik (3) Lawrence Gray 23 1,250Buckland (4) Paul Hadley 15 1,947Deering (5) Alfred Karmun and James Moto, Jr. 5 1,914Shishmaref (6) Fred Goodhope, Sr. 10 2,782Teller (7) Johnny Kakaruk 18 2,957Teller (8) Ralph Kugzruk 3 600Nome (9) Lawrence Davis 1.5 525Nome (10) Government Model Herd 3 643Koyuk(ll) Archie Henry 7 517(The numbers in parentheses refer to Figure 7). (Source: Bureau of Indian Affairs, 1968).

47

48

trial–and–error herd establishment period resultedin the emergence of several relatively stable herds.Most of these herds are owned by older men withaccumulated reindeer experience since their earlychildhood. They and their families manage theherds, usually as part of a diverse number of activi-ties. With few exceptions, reindeer herding is not

the sole enterprise of herd owners. In an attempt tomake a living, subsistence hunting, fishing, andgathering are often done in connection with herd-ing activities. Seasonal and permanent employmentis also sought after and entrepreneurship usuallycontributes to the reindeer owner’s household in-come. This is not necessarily a recent pattern of

Table 15 Annual estimates of total reindeer numbers in Alaska, 1891–1977.Year Number Source Year Number Source

1891 16 Jackson, 1902 1936 594,000 Hanson, 19521892 171 " 1937 544,000 Rood, 19431893 346 " 1938 544,647 Palmer, 1944a1894 588 " 1939 377,712 "1895 891 " 1940 252,550 "1896 1,100 " 1941 206,785 "1897 1,466 " 1942 169,000 "1898 2,062 " 1943 128,700 "1899 2,837 " 1944 N/A1900 3,323 " 1945 N/A1901 4,412 " 1946 N/A1902 5,148 " 1947 N/A1903 6,282 Jackson, 1903–1908; 1948 32,623 Rouse et al., 19481904 8,189 Skoog, 1968 1949 27,920 "1905 10,241 " 1950 25,000 BIA Annual Reports,1906 12,878 " 1951 27,245 1950 to 19711907 15,839 " 1952 26,700 "1908 19,322 " 1953 26,200 "1909 22,915 U.S. Bureau of Education, 1954 25,200 "1910 27,325 1909 to 1927a 1955 28,500 "1911 33,629 " 1956 36,200 "1912 38,476 " 1957 39,800 "1913 47,266 " 1958 49,300 "1914 57,872 " 1959 43,200 "1915 70,243 " 1960 43,500 "1916 82,151 " 1961 39,900 "1917 98,582 " 1962 40,000 "1918 N/A 1963 38,600 "1919 145,000 " 1964 38,540 "1920 180,000 " 1965 35,269 "1921 216,000 " 1966 37,248 "1922 259,000 " 1967 33,150 "1923 300,000 " 1968 30,794 "1924 350,000 " 1969 31,038 "1925 350,000 " 1970 30,251 "1926 N/A 1971 N/A1927 N/A 1972 27,399 BLM data and1928 321,116 " 1973 N/A author’s notes1929 599,825 " 1974 N/A1930 468,000 Palmer, 1944a 1975 29,100 "1931 510,000 " 1976 N/A1932 641,000 Hanson, 1952 1977 24,100 "1933 N/A1934 N/A1935 N/A

49

household (family) organization. Among some fami-lies who are now or used to be herd owners, there isa history of experimenting with a variety of new op-portunities for cash income and adopting novel meth-ods of resource exploitation.

The 1960s–1970sDuring the 1960s, the introduction of the snow

machine into northwestern Alaskan Eskimo culturecaused substantial changes in the winter activitiesof people. Accompanied by other forces of accultura-tion (widespread public health sen•ices, increasedaccess to goods and services from urban Alaska andthe continental United States and increased cash–income opportunities, to name but a few), the snowmachine has remained an outstanding symbol of thedirection and magnitude of socioeconomic change inthe Arctic. The initial acceptance of the machineswas slow, based in part on a “wait and see if theywork” attitude. Once their performance and reliabil-ity proved that their advantages outweighed theirdisadvantages compared to dog traction, purchasesof new and used machines increased (Hall, 1971).

In 1965, tracked vehicles were reportedly used bythe reindeer herders for the first time, and a photo-graph of a snow–machine pulling a sled loaded witha live reindeer appears in the BIA Land OperationsReport (BIA, 1965). By 1969, every herd owner onSeward Peninsula used snow machines for herdingoperations, as well as other winter activities. Tech-niques were developed to conduct winter roundupsusing the new technology. Many of these paralleledthe experiences among Lapp herders in Scandinaviain adapting the new technology and the changingsocioeconomic conditions of reindeer herding to therequirements of the animals and the geography ofthe range (Pelto, 1973; Pelto and Muller–Wille, 1972;Pelto et al., 1968; Muller–Wille and Pelto, 1971). (Seealso Chapter VI).

The 1968 cooperative agreement made the Bureauof Land Management responsible for range assign-ment and protection through the issuance of graz-ing permits and monitoring of range conditions. TheBLM had already begun a program of issuing rangepermits in 1962, under authority of reindeer graz-ing regulations contained in 43 CFR. Reindeer–graz-ing permits on the public domain were issued forten–year periods. BIA personnel cooperated to ex-plain the permits to herd owners, while BLM person-nel attempted to assess the range quality and carry-ing capacity. Until research was done on relativelysmall localities in the late 1960s (Pegau, 1968, 1970a,1970b), no scientific data were available on reindeerrange quality for Seward Peninsula. NANA Rein-deer Corporation’s recent survey of its range, donein conjunction with USDA Soil Conservation Ser-vice and University of Alaska Geophysical Institute

personnel, is a first step in the application of mod-ern range management techniques to reindeer herd-ing (George et al., 1977).

Up to 1968, the BIA continued to manage theranching and training aspects of reindeer herding.Since then, BIA’s role in reindeer herding haschanged substantially. The bureau is now withdraw-ing from an active role in reindeer herding. Its rolenow is largely confined to the distribution of the fewremaining government–owned reindeer and the col-lection and loaning of any deer which are returnedto their custody. Most importantly, they provide mon-ies to operate the Reindeer Herders Association,incorporated in 1971 (formerly the NorthwestAlaska Reindeer Herders Association, organizedin 1964) through a grant to Kawerak, Inc., the non-profit social services arm of the Bering Straits Na-tive Corporation.

At the state level, several agencies regularly in-teract with the herd owners. The Alaska Departmentof Fish and Game (ADF&G) has field offices in Nomeand Kotzebue. Game biologists and Alaska Depart-ment of Public Safety, Wildlife Protection officers(game wardens) are stationed in both towns. As live-stock owners, reindeer owners are entitled understate law to protect their herds against predators.From World War II to 1971, the Bureau of SportsFisheries and Wildlife (later United States Fish andWildlife Service) cooperated with the BIA in a pro-gram of predator control which included aerial hunt-ing of wolves on Seward Peninsula and other rein-deer ranges. Herd owners often complain about whatthey view as a lack of cooperation from ADF&G tohelp them with their predation problems. They ap-parently do not realize that ADF&G is not in thepredator control business for their benefit in thesame way that the Bureau of Sports Fisheries andWildlife/BIA were with their predator control assistance.

The Alaska State Department of Commerce andEconomic Development has also assisted the herdowners in the past. With its aid, a reindeer slaugh-tering and processing facility was constructed atNome in 1969, and operations began there in 1970.Several other state agencies also deal with the rein-deer herders with some regularity. The Alaska StateDivision of Agriculture gathers economic statisticsfrom the herds through the Reindeer Herders Asso-ciation. Researchers from the University of Alaskainteract with the reindeer herd owners in the courseof special research, development, and experimentalprojects. The Government Demonstration Herd(Model Herd) at Nome represented one such project.The Cantwell Reindeer Research Station was devel-oped in 1967/68 and facilities were provided on theUniversity of Alaska campus at Fairbanks to pro-vide baseline data on reindeer physiology, metabo-lism, parasites, brucellosis control, and husbandry.

50

General summary – reindeer inAlaska

A brief recapitulation of the major themes pre-sented in this historical treatment of reindeer herd-ing is in order here. Four major trends or character-istics can be found in the history of reindeer herd-ing. It is clear from government policy, legislativeaction, and appropriations, that it has been thegovernment’s intent to provide a self–sustainingNative industry for the benefit of Alaskan Nativesthrough the introduction and support of the rein-deer industry. Secondly, the period of non–Nativeinvolvement in reindeer herding, particularly on acorporate basis competing with local Native inter-ests, has been detrimental to the welfare of the Na-tive aspect of the industry. Government action toterminate non–Native involvement with reindeerherding clearly recognized this fact. Thirdly, thechanges in administrative authority and govern-ment policy have not been combined to provide anysense of continuity in the specific policy or directionfor the reindeer program. This, combined with highturnover in personnel and the very real difficultiesfaced by village Alaskans in the areas of health, edu-cation, and welfare, has created an atmosphere ofsuspicion and distrust of most government officials.On the frontier, an individual is known by the ac-tions he takes and the trust which he inspires overa long period of time. The reindeer program has beenplagued by some of the worst of these problems, asthe disruptive events cited in the reports of the 1930sinvestigations show. This is also reflected in the cur-rent uncertainty by the reindeer herders over fu-ture policy on the part of various Federal land man-agement agencies.

Last, but not least, there has been insufficientfeedback between the research programs funded byvarious state and federal agencies on reindeer biol-ogy, ecology, and physiology, and the needs and de-sires of the Native herders. While much researchhas added substantially to our baseline knowledgeof reindeer, most has failed to improve the lot of thereindeer herder in any significant way. This researchis a two way street. In order to make optimal use ofall of the data accumulated through research, theherder must have an adequate education, particu-larly if he is to make use of the research to improvehis herding and husbandry efforts. Thus, improvedreindeer handling will only come about in the con-text of a general improvement in the education andwelfare of village Alaskans in general.

Throughout this historical treatment of reindeerherding, reference has been made to the increasing,and during the 1930s and 1940, the decreasing, re-indeer herds. These changes are depicted in Table15, which covers the total number of reindeer inAlaska from 1891 through 1977. In Table 16, the

numbers of reindeer found on the Seward Peninsulafrom 1951 through 1977 are given. At one time in1932, 127,331 reindeer were estimated to be graz-ing on the Seward Peninsula. Of this number, 32,523were Lomen owned.

For the remainder of this report, the Seward Pen-insula is defined as that area lying west of theInglutalik River, west of the South Fork of theBuckland River, west of the Mangoak River, includ-ing all of the Baldwin Peninsula. Herds based outof Selawik are not included in the Seward Penin-sula totals with the exception of the government–operated herd of Escholtz Bay which ranged in theSelawik Hills during its years of operation (1945 toearly 1950s). Herds based at Shaktoolik, Savoonga,Stebbins, and Unalakleet are not included in theSeward Peninsula totals.

Chapter VIReindeer herders andsocial relationships

The network of relationships between the herdowners, the villagers, and the merchants is a com-plex one. The village orientation of the herd ownersis a major limiting factor in the ability of the rein-deer industry to produce more meat than is currentlyavailable. This village orientation is in some ways afortunate one from the point of view of range con-servation because it restricts most herd owners fromseeking to expand herd size up to or beyond the car-rying capacity of the present ranges. Although ac-curate and timely surveys of carrying capacity arenot available for all ranges, it is generally true thatmost ranges are stocked below the current estimatedcarrying capacity. This less–than–capacity utiliza-tion is the result of a number of factors, but the mostsignificant one which must be taken into account isthe finite production objectives of the herd owners.This is to say that, although most herd owners wouldlike to increase their stock on the range, they arenot motivated to do so. They are motivated more bythe desire to increase their relatively small incomesfrom herding in order to satisfy village and personalneeds with greater certainty than to fill potentialmarkets which may exist outside the villages. Thisorientation is a common characteristic in societieswhich are organized along domestic modes of pro-duction (Sahlins, 1972).

In terms of the relations between herd owners,the territorial perspective of the Eskimo herder isan important factor. The village identification of aherd owner is the label by which other people knowhim and interact with him. Secondarily, his person-ality and individual characteristics are his distin-guishing features. The local orientation of the herd

51

owners and the inability of the Reindeer HerdersAssociation to function aggressively are interrelated.Because it is a recently formed, voluntary associa-tion, and because Eskimo culture traditionally lackssocial mechanisms for permanent, nonkin–based, in-stitutional interaction, the Reindeer Herders’ Asso-ciation is not yet a strong lobbying force on behalf ofthe herders. It is reasonable to expect the efficiencyof the association to increase in the future as skillsand more experience in dealing with a non–Nativebureaucracy are obtained. This is part of a generaltrend of increased extra–village awareness whichis leading toward a regional approach in problemsolving and management.

Historical overview: SewardPeninsula social organization

Villages on the Seward Peninsula today are theproducts of recent economic and social pressures aswell as of a socioeconomic system that has its rootsin antiquity. In the nineteenth century, the villageswere part of a region–wide, economic and social sys-tem. Ray (1964) argues that each village had a ter-ritorial region associated with it; and that certainmajor, large villages functioned as territorial cen-ters. Smaller villages located within these “tribal”territories were used on only a seasonal basis. Ma-jor villages tended to be located at river mouths whilethe smaller ones, often consisting of only a couple ofhouses, were located at strategic resource–extract-ing points. While many families lived in the largervillages and were linked by common residence andvarying degrees of kinship, the small villages wereoccupied mainly by closely related kin. The distri-bution of Native Allotment parcels on Seward Pen-insula reflects this pattern of common winter resi-dence in a large village with outlying parcels of sub-sistence–related lands. For the nineteenth century,the units were:

Buckland River (Kangyik); Deering (Inmachukor Kugalik, in the nineteenth century this alsoincluded people of the Kiwalik River);Tapkakmiut (in the nineteenth century thisincluded Shishmaref or Kikkiktuk, CapeEspenberg or Tukutat, and Goodhope Riveror Pittak); Wales (Kingegan); Little DiomedeIsland (Ingalik); King Island (Ukuivuk); PortClarence (principally Sinramiut, also in-cluded Nook); Kauwerak; Nome (the largestvillage was Ayasayuk at Cape Nome, alsoincluded Sledge Island, or Ayak); Golovin(Chinik); Fish River (Irathluik); and Koyuk.(Ray, 1964) (Figure 9, and Table 17).

In the early phase of Burch’s (1975) transitionalperiod (1850–1890), three major changes took placein northwest Alaska which caused changes in thestrategies and patterns of affiliation by which a

person endeavored to acquire wealth. The first ma-jor change was the drastic decrease in the numbersof animals which represented wealth: the bowheadwhales, walrus, and caribou. With depleted naturalresources, most people had to turn their attentionto working simply at survival, and the accumula-tion of wealth was not possible. Second, the reducednumbers of people and the accompanying changesin distribution and settlement patterns simply al-tered the chances of successfully accumulatingwealth. Epidemics and diseases undermined thework undertaken to organize an efficient group offollowers which every wealthy man needed to in-sure his rise to wealth and power, and once there tomaintain it. The third major change which occurredinvolved a “shift from the accumulation of food re-serves to trade in skins, furs, and whale bone (ba-leen) as the primary source of wealth” (Burch, 1975).Burch further notes that this shift in emphasisplaced greater importance on relationships withpartners and non–Natives and less importance onaffiliation with kinsmen.

For the intermediate phase of Burch’s transitionalperiod, (1890–1940) wealthy Eskimos were virtually

Table 16. Reindeer on the Seward Peninsula,1951–1977.Year Total reindeer Reindeer on

in Alaska Seward Peninsula1951 27,245 6,5701952 26,700 7,6751953 26,200 8,4701954 25,200 8,9971955 28,500 8,9501956 36,200 10,4411957 39,800 13,8961958 49,300 17,2081959 43,200 17,9791960 43,500 18,5291961 39,900 16,4051962 40,000 17,9401963 38,600 18,8801964 38,540 20,4491965 35,269 18,9441966 37,248 22,1681967 33,150 18,7951968 30,794 16,3691969 31,038 17,0091970 30,251 20,2921971 N/A N/A1972 27,399 19,8281973 N/A 17,3971974 N/A N/A1975 29,100 20,6001976 N/A 17,4251977 24,100 17,800

52

nonexistent in Northwest Alaska. A few men were in the process of accumu-

lating considerable capital in the form of do-mesticated reindeer herds during the 1920s,and some of them might have become ex-tremely well–to–do in time. However, for aset of reasons too complex to go into here,this possibility was eventually denied them.(Burch, 1975).

The complexities relate largely to U.S. Govern-ment policy, which was opposed to the expansionof individually owned herds. (Burch, 1975).

While it is true that government policy in the1920s favored the establishment of communally op-erated herds, there was no effort to undermine theindividually owned herds. Large herd owners wereto benefit most by the creation of association herds.They were able, at least for a short period of timebefore the reindeer declined, to recruit labor fromthe associations. As the herds declined inthe 1930s, not even the large ownerscould offer sufficient inducements to beable to recruit labor.

Burch (1975) points out three factorsthat changed the conditions favoringpopulation dispersal during the GreatDepression. First, during the 1930s theprice of furs dropped drastically. Thus,the stimulus to live in “small local familyunits” for the purpose of trapping wasremoved. Secondly, the small, indepen-dent, white traders who had lived in ornear the small, dispersed communities byand large went out of business. They had beena main source of food, supplies, and cash in-come based on the furs that were traded withthem. Their going out of business, and theconsequent lack of such a local source offood, supplies, and cash income, inducedmany Eskimo families to move out of thebush and into the mission/school /storevillages. Lastly, the decline in the rein-deer herds and the disappearance of anygood reason to practice “close” or “inten-sive” herding motivated many herd own-ers to locate more or less permanentlyback in their villages. The Native rein-deer companies could not afford to paywages to their herders, and by the mid–1930s the Lomens and other non–Native–owned herds could not export enoughmeat (the lower 48 markets having dis-appeared in the early 1930s) to make itprofitable for them to keep herders per-manently on their payrolls.

In addition to changing the conditionswhich stimulated population dispersals,

the depression created a number of conditions whichmade relocation in villages more favorable than ithad been. The government supported many of theschools and village stores during this period, andthey were the only ones which remained solvent. Theteacher or some other government agent located inthe villages disbursed welfare funds which becameavailable. Lastly, the Civilian Conservation Corpsmake–work projects began in the mid–1930s. Theseincluded shelter–cabin construction, wolf–huntingprograms, trail improvements, and road construc-tion or improvement. These CCC projects were alsoadministered through the government agents lo-cated at the mission/school villages (Burch, 1975).

During the “recent” period, as identified by Burch,(1940–1970), the way in which one acquires wealthin northwest Alaska has become the same as thatwhich dominates Euro–American society moneybuys the material possessions which represent

Table 17. Northwestern Alaska regional groupings, circa 1850.Map Estimated 1850number Designation population

1 Colville River 5752 Ikpikpak River, Barrow3 Meade River, Barrow4 Barrow

(Barrow proper area total) 7005 Northwest Coast 4756 Utukok River 2007 Point Hope 9758 Kivalina 3509 Upper Noatak River 45010 Lower Noatak River 30011 Central Brooks Range 30012 Kobuk River 97513 Kobuk Delta 27514 Kotzebue 42515 Selawik River 95016 South Kotzebue Sound 32516a Buckland16b Deering16c Candle17 Tapquq 37518 Wales 75019 Diomede Island 30020 Port Clarence 27521 Kauwerak (Kuzitrin River) 20022 Nome (including Sledge Island) 90023 King Island 27524 Fish River undetermined25 Koyuk River undetermined26 Shaktoolik undetermined27 Unalakleet undetermined(Koyukon Indian groups on the Koyukuk Kiver are not shown)(Burch, 1975; Burch and Correll, 1972; Ray, 1964, 1975; and others).

53

wealth. In order to acquire money, one must have ajob, and this in turn implies associating with nonkinand non–Natives. It can be seen that the values andexpectations inherent in the kinship system havechanged over time in response to the changing en-vironmental and social conditions.

In fact, by the recent period, close affilia-tion with large numbers of kin was some-times disastrous for people with ambition.No matter how hard one worked, and nomatter how much money he earned, his kinwould be sure to spend it.... Here, we havethe final irony: the accumulation of wealthfor most northwest Alaska Eskimos in therecent period meant either the absence orthe rejection of the very sort of relationshipsthat had been so essential to its attainmentin the traditional era. (Burch, 1975).

Factors beyond mere economic success producesocial status and prestige for an individual in Alaskavillages. These factors have changed during the pe-riod of contract with Euro–Americans, just as theyno doubt did under changing conditions during theprehistoric period. In the traditional period, it waspossible for some individual Eskimos to acquirewealth which exceeded that of other Eskimos.

The means used to acquire this wealth dependedon the aspiring person’s success in manipulating hisrelationships with the “right” people (most of whomhad to be kinsmen), his luck, and his personal quali-ties. The accumulation of wealth through affiliationwith the “right” people could be a complex, lifetimeprocess, with no guarantee of success. The flexibil-ity of Eskimo social organization offered great lati-tude in the strategies of affiliation which the aspir-ing person could choose. This flexibility is revealedin case histories and analyses which show the func-tioning of augmentation, extension, and multipleconnections which serve to increase the number ofindividuals with whom an aspiring wealthy personcould interact to reach his goals (Burch, 1975).

Contemporary social organizationThe primary residence unit of the Eskimo on the

Seward Peninsula is the household. Within this con-cept of household lie two related concerns. One cen-ters on the physical dwelling in which the house-hold unit lives while the other focuses on the per-sonnel who constitute the household.

The physical dwellings vary widely. It is not uncom-mon in villages to see sod–covered houses, log struc-tures, frame houses, while at the same time prefabri-cated module units, and even trailer homes are all usedas residences. Housing is a major concern of all villageresidents. Alaska State Housing Authority homes aresupplied through Federal and state housing programswith a minimal cost to qualified applicants. Although

these houses are grossly underinsulated for winterconditions in the Arctic, most people hope to acquireone. Fuel costs may range from 200 to 400 dollars(1977 figures) per month yet, the desirability of anew house for social prestige overrides the economicdisadvantages. The addition of indoor plumbing andrunning water through Public Health Service wa-ter projects to the villages makes the new houseseven more desirable.

In the general region outside the villages, thereare an equally large number of different dwellings.The size, location, and condition of these places (vari-ously called “camps,” “the old place,” “my land,” or“my cabin”) depends on their utilization. During theyearly cycle of activities, people will travel to thesecamps for periods ranging from one day to weeks ormonths. In summer, a canvas tent is usually erectedover a wooden frame for eating, cooking, and sleep-ing. A tent affords summer protection from the ele-ments and insects and is more comfortable andeasier to regulate the temperature in than a well–insulated winter cabin. Tents are usually made of10– to 14–ounce white cotton canvas with four footwalls, and are usually either 8x10 or 12x14 feet insize. Virtually every household has at least one suchtent, often more if it is a large household.

In such camps, parents prefer to let the teenagershave their own tent as well. It might also be well topoint out that, during the summer in villages, it isnot uncommon to see a tent pitched beside a perma-nent dwelling. Teenagers, young adults, or visitorsmore often tend to use them since their summer noc-turnal habits may interfere with the adult house-hold routine. At one summer reindeer handling,eight men slept in one of the tents while couplesand children slept in two other tents. This is an in-teresting persistence of the tradition of placing singlemales and visitors under one roof. In traditional times,this roof would have been that of the village kazgi.

The house of most Seward Peninsula Eskimos issmall by North American standards. Most housesmeasure 16 to 14 by 24 to 32 feet. Older houses oftenhave had many alterations such as new rooms added,heating/cooking stove locations changed, insulationand paneling upgraded, etc. Within each house,there is at least one large multipurpose room. It ishere that most food preparation and consumption,equipment manufacture and repair, and visitingtakes place. At night, it may become a sleeping room.Partitioned off from this main room by either cur-tains or walls are the usual sleeping areas. Withinthe sleeping area, a bed and often a dresser or somesort of storage container will be found. Access to thehouse is generally through a storm–shed, or porch.The double–door system (arctic entryway) minimizesdrafts in winter. The storm–shed is also the deposi-tory for tools, raw materials, and small equipment.

54

When cold enough in winter, it serves as a safe placeto store foods. Many households which can afford afreezer do not have room for it within the house, soit is often placed in the storm–shed. A curtained–offarea is provided for honey–bucket facilities in olderhouses, while in the newer houses there is a bath-room complete with sink, flush toilet, and bathtub–shower stall. Since running water is not yet avail-able in any village except Nome and Kotzebue, theflush toilet is superfluous, and a honey bucket nor-mally rests in its place.

Surrounding the houses, there are various out-buildings: outhouses, storage sheds, and sometimessmall workshops. These types of structures are typi-cally constructed from delivered scrap lumber or anyother material that might be available. The high costof new lumber delivered to villages makes most vil-lagers cautious in the use of it. New lumber and ply-wood is used in the construction of boats and housesbefore other projects. The “winterization project”brings many board feet of materials to the villagesat little cost. These materials are destined to go intoimprovements on currently standing structures toinsulate them better and bring down the costs ofwinter heating. Plans are being made for the con-struction of, new cabins, improvements to olderhouses, and other projects, to make use of this inex-pensive building material.

The houses of reindeer–herd owners are not radi-cally different from those of their neighbors. Al-though people say that the reindeer herd owners arerich, it is not possible to distinguish them on thebasis of their housing in most cases. One herdowner’s home has running water from an internalstorage container in the basement that is pumpedthrough the shower and sink systems (but not thetoilet). His grandchildren fill the tank with ice inwinter, and from jerry jugs of water in summer. Thisframe house was constructed by the herd owner andhis family in the last couple of years, but it will beonly a short matter of time until most other qualifiedvillage residents will receive equivalent new housing.

What becomes of old dwellings when new housingis put into a village is interesting. Categories of usetend to disguise the variation. Storage, housing forboarding students, teenage children, rental to teach-ers or nonresidents who must remain in the villagefor a period of time, demolition and re–cycling ofthe salvagable materials, or relocation to anothersite in the village are but a few uses. The generaltrend in housing is to replace a few multipurposerooms with more single–purpose rooms. This spaceutilization is derived from the dominant culture(non–Native North America) and is not the tradi-tional Eskimo model. Agencies which are planningthe introduction of modern housing and buildingtechniques would be wise to examine the experiencesof Canada and Lappland before repeating mistakesmade in other parts of the world (Ingold, 1976; Kerri,1977; Zrudlo, 1975).

Household personnelThe concept of household referred to in the pre-

ceding section refers to “any set of individuals liv-ing in one house” (Burch, 1975). In actuality, thereare two levels of household organization. Burch, fol-lowing Carrasco (1963), calls these two levels “do-mestic families” and “local families.”

A domestic family is defined as a familyorganization whose members occupy asingle dwelling.

A local family, by contrast, would be a fam-ily whose members occupy different dwell-ings, but whose members still operate interms of a single overriding family organi-zation (Burch, 1975, original emphasis).

Figure 10 illustrates the difference between a do-mestic and a local family based on field data. Theparents of (A), (B), (C), and (D) were reindeer herdowners. (B) was born in a reindeer camp in the earlyyears of this century. (B) grew up with reindeer herdsand would have taken over his father’s herd, butthe Great Depression and declining markets forcedhim to seek employment in the mines and stores ofthe mining towns. When his brother (A) started a

55

herd after World War II, (B) eventually went intopartnership with him, until (A) retired, due to illhealth. (B)’s sons were old enough to manage thereindeer by then. Currently, (G) is in charge of han-dling daily affairs of the herd, and it is he who sellsthe meat to villagers. (B)’s role with the herd islargely administrative, handling records and offer-ing advice to his sons. (B) and (G) occupy new houses,built around the older house which (B) built afterworking many years as a store clerk and miner. (B)and (G)’s old houses now function as a store andstorehouses, respectively. (B)’s niece, (E), wasadopted by (B) and his wife after (B)’s sister (D) died.(E) no longer lives in the village. Because of the largesize of (G)’s family and the proximity of (B) and (G)’shouses, two of (G)’s children and their adopteddaughter (born to one of (G)’s unmarried children)usually eat and sleep in (B)’s house. (B)’s daughter(I) lives in a town with her husband and children,but usually returns to her home village during thesummer and at holidays. The unmarried son (F) livesalone in a small house. (C), (B)’s younger brother,lives in the same town as (I) and her family, withhis family. Thus, there are five domestic families liv-ing in the one village–(A), (B), (F), (G), and (H)–whointeract as one local family.

The pattern of domestic families interacting as lo-cal families occurs throughout the Seward Penin-sula. It is not only evident among the reindeer herd–

owning families, but can be found in the other workgroups that combine to hunt, fish, or build. On aday–today basis, the individuals of a domestic fam-ily group interact with their relatives, affines orconsanguines who make up other domestic familyunits. The type of work to be performed, how wellindividuals are getting along, and the location ofhouses determines the formation and dissolution ofthe work groups, whose members may or may notbe part of a local family.

In the towns in northwestern Alaska (Barrow,Kotzebue, Bethel, and Nome) there are signs that aNative elite is emerging from the previously ranked(not egalitarian) society. The members of this elitetend to be better educated, extensively travelled, andinteract more with non–Natives than do their peers.While they are usually bilingual, some do not evenspeak Inupiat. Most of this elite tend to aspire to-wards the dominant middle–class Euro–Americanvalues of upward social and wide geographic mobil-ity, with its attendant houses, cars, and materialpossessions. At the village level, this elite is not yetquite so obvious in its material manifestations. Inone village, members of two local families engagedin reindeer herding and other businesses accountfor three of the five trucks in town. The other twobelong to two brothers, each of whom operates astore. The one, large, stake–bed truck belonging toone of the reindeer–owning local families is used

56

mostly in connection with their duties as the localrepresentative of the air carrier.

Village organizationThe general trend during the transitional period

(1850 to the present) has been the centralization ofpopulations in permanent villages. Many of the vil-lages are located where there was a precontact vil-lage, but the “modern” villages differ in several ways.Whereas the large, pre–contact villages were “per-manent” in the seasonal round of the time, they werelargely unoccupied during the summer months whenthe population dispersed in pursuit of summer fish,berries, and other resources. The modern villagesare occupied year round but seasonal movementsare still made out of the village. The traditional vil-lage existed at a particular location because it wasclose to a major food resource, as fish at river mouthsor access to marine mammals (e.g., Wales). The mainreason for the existence of most modern villages isthe location there of government or the services ofgovernment agencies, as well as missions andchurches. Trading posts, schools, and reindeer herdscame to the villages during the late nineteenth cen-tury and the early years of the twentieth century.The establishment of these institutions enforced thecentralizing tendency. Mining was locally importantat various times. While this picture varies greatlyin detail from village to village, in general it reflectswhat has happened over the past century.

Villages are composed of households. Householdsoccupy houses distributed along paths and road-ways. At an outsider’s first glance, the village is anunorganized conglomeration of houses placed at ran-dom. Nevertheless, there exists a tight socio–spa-tial organization of houses and their occupants. Theimpression of unorganization disappears once theobserver comes to know the houses and the peoplewho inhabit them.

Village institutionsThere are a large number of institutions within

any village. All of these are necessary to operate andmaintain the various functions of the village. In asense, they are all overlays on the traditional socialorganization of the village, since their presence istraceable directly to the presence of Euro–Ameri-can institutions and their requisites. Through time,however, these overlays have been integrated intothe contemporary social organization of the village.Through a feedback process, they have affected andbeen affected by the village social organization, thepersonalities of the individuals who occupy positionsof power and responsibility, and representatives ofthe various agencies concerned.

In addition to reindeer herding, the following is apartial list of new institutions present in most

Seward Peninsula villages today: the Indian Reor-ganization Act (IRA) Council, Alaska Native Indus-tries Cooperative Association (ANICA) store, otherstores run by private parties, school board, villagecorporation, city council, regional corporation,church and church council, Alaska Department ofFish and Game (ADF&C) advisory board, NationalGuard, health–care programs, and village police andfire services. From this partial listing, one sees anenormous proliferation of jobs and of administra-tive positions, most of which have been created inthe past 15 years. The villagers who are active onthe various boards, committees, and councils tendto be part of the educated, rising elite described pre-viously. Through their participation in these activi-ties, they are able to use their positions for further-ing the welfare of their fellow villagers, as well asfurthering their own careers. This often creates con-flicts of interest which are resolved in various ways.Resigning from the position, or abstaining from thedecision–making are common ways. In the formercase, the individual is usually reelected or appointedto the position, simply because there is no one elsewho can or who wants to fill it. In the latter case, adecision is usually already made prior to any for-mal abstention from the decision making. As oftenas not, the conflict of interest is simply overlookedin the interests of expediency. Non–Natives view-ing the operation of these supposedly “democratic”institutions often react with surprise at the autocracywith which they function. The important point is thatthey do function, not that they fail to operate alongthe democratic principles espoused by the observer.

It is in the operation of these institutions that onesees the reindeer herd owners interacting with othervillagers in an extra kinship context. This is not tosay that kinship is not a factor in the operation ofthe institutions, but it is not supposed to be. In thisparadox, the forum for tremendous conflict is estab-lished. The “great tradition” or dominant culture (inthis case, of course, Euro–American) introduces in-stitutions which are adapted to the demands ofAmerican society. When they are transferred in tototo the “little tradition” (Eskimo society), it shouldnot be unexpected that they will be modified to suitthe culture into which they are placed. For example,the National Guard armory in most villages is sup-posed to be a building used solely for the defensetraining of Guardsmen and the storage of supplies.In reality, the buildings are used for a number ofpurposes. At various times, the armory may serveas a theater, courtroom, dining hall, dormitory, ormeeting hall, all functions above and beyond theoriginal scope of its purpose. This is not to say thatsuch functions are improper; indeed, most are in linewith the National Guard’s purpose in public services.But anywhere else where other specialized structures

57

and institutions were available, such uses of the ar-mory would probably not be tolerated (cf Redfield1953 for a further discussion of “little” and “great”traditions).

When the reindeer herd owner (or members of hislocal family) are present in these institutions, hisrole may not be that of the village reindeer herder.He is, as it were, wearing another hat at such times.But the villagers are always aware that the herdowner is not acting solely out of a motivation to fa-cilitate the greatest good for the greatest number atsuch times. He is acting both for the interests herepresents and his own. As noted above, conflicts ofinterest may be resolved in a number of ways, in-cluding being overlooked (or denied). Status in theseinstitutional settings is derived from factors of sex,age, seniority, and personal charisma, as well as thevested authority from the position which a herderoccupies. The herd owner’s leadership abilities maybe most severely tested in a situation that pits hiskindred and him against the other factions of vil-lagers in one or more of the village institutions.

Thus, there is great variability in the roles whichthe various reindeer herd owners play, both in theirown villages and in the regional context of the rein-deer industry. This variability has at least three prin-cipal sources. Some variability comes from the sizeof the herd. Different herd sizes require differentamounts of time and labor to manage. Anothersource of variability comes from the herd owner’sown management “style.” This, in turn, is related tosuch factors as the presence of roads, which allowsome herd owners to sell live reindeer on the hoof tobuyers who then slaughter, process, and transportthe animals. Additional factors may stem from theplace of reindeer herding in the household economicstrategy, or the individual herd owner’s current fi-nancial and political needs and desires. A third fac-tor involves the size, location, and condition of therange to which the herd owner is assigned. As wehave noted, reindeer on the Seward Peninsula tend todrift westward (along the coast) during the summermonths as they seek relief from insects. Herds thustend to receive reindeer from the eastern neighbors.In their totality, all of these factors combine to pro-duce the behavior of the herd owner in the frame-work of other village institutions.

Most of the non–Natives who reside permanentlyin villages are attached to one or more of these in-stitutions. With the phasing out of state–operatedschools in most villages, and the construction andoperation of Rural Education Attendance Area(REAA) high schools in most villages, non–Nativevillage residents are mostly attached to the schoolsand their operation. A pastor/missionary and hisfamily also live in most villages. Temporary residents,or short–term visitors who remain from several weeks

to a few hours, make up the remainder of the non–Native population. Most of these non–Natives arespecialists of one sort or another in health services,human services, construction, or research.

As businessmen, the herd owner/operators mustinteract with an increasingly larger number of non–Natives. These include state and Federal agenciesor their representatives; businessmen in the townswhere quantities of meat may be sold, supplies pur-chased, or services sought; and increasing numbersof researchers (the authors of this report included)who come to the villages and Reindeer Herder Asso-ciation meetings for various purposes and lengthsof time. While Nelson could write in 1969 that thetwo most frequent questions a newcomer to a vil-lage could expect were “What are you here for•” and“When are you planning to leave•,” a third questionarises in the post–ANCSA period. “Who do you rep-resent!” is not an uncommonly heard question(Nelson, 1969).

Since 1964, many of the herd owners have beeninvolved with a San Francisco–based Korean busi-nessman. This individual purchases velvet antlerfrom the herd owners, which is then processed byhim and sold as a tonic to the oriental market. It isthis individual who has helped to develop the mar-ket, the processing, and the procuring techniquesfor Seward Peninsula velvet antler to the mutualbenefit of himself and the herders. The effects ofantler harvest are poorly understood. Some biologi-cal questions concerning the effect of velvet–antlerharvesting on the social structure and the healthand nutrition of the herds are currently being re-searched by the University of Alaska (Luick, 1977).At least one herd owner feels that the use of a smallhelicopter to round up the animals in late June/Julyfor the antler harvest is an unacceptable practicebecause the reindeer are herded at a run, and thecalves may not be able to keep up with the olderreindeer or may be trampled. While the helicopteris viewed as an increase in efficiency by antler buyers,it is viewed as undesirable by some herd owners.

The herd owner as employer in thevillage

Within the villages, which are often home to oneor more reindeer owners, the herd owners are viewedin different ways. To some people, the herd ownermay be father, father–in–law, brother, uncle, or son.The kinship relationship between any two people isan important sociocultural factor in all interactionsbetween people in northwestern Alaska. Burch notesthe strong role which family relationships still playin social interactions (1975). These family relation-ships play no less an important role in those socialrelationships involving reindeer herding. In thelarger, more accultured villages such as Nome,

58

Kotzebue, and Barrow, where Natives have numer-ous interactions with nonkin and non–Natives, kin-ship relationships as a means for structuring socialorganization are not as strong (or at least perhapsnot so readily observable) as in the smaller villag-ers, kinship is still overwhelmingly the organizingprinciple. Thus, the herd owner as employer, andhis social role in village life as a herd owner and leader,are affected by his kinship ties with other villagers, aswell as by his personal attributes and abilities.

The organization of domestic families and localfamilies as social and work groups has been dis-cussed. At various times during the year, reindeerherding requires additional personnel that exceedthe number of competent and available kin that canbe called upon to help without expecting to be paiddirectly. When this happens, the herd owner/opera-tor must become an employer. In addition to the kinwho are hired, some nonkin may be engaged to aidwith roundups, marking, and butchering. At somehandlings close enough to the village to be reachedeasily by snow machine or boat, there may be morepeople present than are actually necessary to performthe work. A happy, almost holiday atmosphere pre-vails at these times, with food, coffee, and sometimesaccommodations being provided by the herder/owner.

The herd owner oversees the operations at a han-dling. It is he who calls the earmarks and age/sex ofanimals being counted through a chute. He may del-egate this authority to a son or other qualified per-son. With the advice and general mutual consent ofother adult males, he decides when to commence thehandling, when to take a break, and which malesare to be castrated or butchered. Often a father oruncle who has had reindeer experience offers ad-vice on particular animals. This person may actu-ally do the castrating or butchering, or one of the“hired hands” may perform this task.

Specific individuals may be hired by the herdowner at an hourly rate of $4–$6, or a daily rate of$45, if they are good workers and fast skinners andbutchers. Food, coffee, accommodations, sometimesfuel, and even cigarettes are included as part of the“salary.” In lieu of cash, the worker may requestwage payments in the form of meat. Some herdersdo not consider the use of meat as wages as part oftheir overall herding costs. They tend to be gener-ous when, for example, a reindeer quarter valued at$26 (30 pounds at 85 cents per pound) is paid outfor only a few hours work. If there is not enoughmeat available, the herd owner may offer to pay theworker at some time in the future when meat isavailable. In the context of patron client relations,this serves to extend the period of time in which theclient is in the sphere of the patron’s influence. Dur-ing this time, the client may draw on his credit withthe patron, as happens when the herd owner also

handles retail items as a small entrepreneur. Sev-eral herd owner/operators do run small stores.

Members of the herd owner’s immediate familyare important assets to him in the herding opera-tions. During roundups, the wife and daughters maycook and clean up after crews whose numbers canrange from two to twenty. At large holdings, addi-tional women and girls are employed as cooks andcleanup crews. As often as not, those women are re-lated to the herd owner’s wife (sisters or cousins)and the younger girls are friends and relatives ofhis children. There is some contrast between sum-mer and winter handlings in this regard. During thewinter/spring handlings, teenagers are most oftenaway at school and thus unavailable for hire. In thesummer, reindeer camp is an opportunity to get awayfrom the village for a short time and earn a bit of money.

The male relatives of the herd owners are oftenretained not only to aid in the reindeer handlings,but for regular checks on the herd during the win-ter. This entails a snow machine ride to locate, bunchup, and drive the reindeer to the point on the rangewhere the herder wishes to have them graze. De-pending on the weather conditions, ease or difficultyof locating all the animals, mechanical troubles withthe snow machines, and other factors, such a searchand roundup trip may take one to five days. Duringthis time, the herder’s food, fuel, spare snowmachineparts, and accommodations will be provided by theherd owner. If the task takes considerably longerthan was expected, the herders are not paid “over-time” but can expect a bonus of reindeer meat orsupplies from the herd owner, in addition to theiragreed–upon salaries. Herd owners earn a reputa-tion for stinginess if they withhold more than theirworkers think they should receive, or are consid-ered generous if they give “bonuses” without hesi-tation. Spencer (1959) reports that stinginess andgreediness are abhorred in Eskimo culture. It is notuncommon to hear parents admonishing their chil-dren “Don’t be stingy”, when the children protestsharing candy or some other food or toy. Generosityis praised, and this cultural value is inculcated inchildren during the socialization process.

Figure 11 presents the kinship network of one herdowner, (E), in a Seward Peninsula village. This kin-ship chart represents only a portion of the affinaland consanguineal relations of the individual. With-out presenting the actual chart of connections, thisherd owner is related to a number of other herdersbesides (K), his father–in–law. (E) cooperates withtwo other herd owners from another village in han-dlings, markings, and slaughterings. The coopera-tion is reciprocal between the three. Although (E)has a relatively small herd, he has a number of otherenterprises in the village, including a small storewhich operates out of the front room of his house,

59

the management of two houses which are rented tothe school teachers, and helping his father, (C), whois the local commercial airlines representative in thevillage. In addition to all these cash income–gener-ating activities, (E) hunts, fishes, and has been anivory carver in the past. His wife, (F), maintains thehousehold with two children and high school stu-dent boarders during the winter. She also fishes, andgathers berries during the summer. Her brother,(I), is gradually assuming the operation of hisfather’s herd, and he and (E) get along relativelywell, although actual cooperation in the manage-ment of their herds, which occupy adjacent ranges,will not likely occur until the father–in–law (K) haspassed from the scene. Relations between (K) and(E) are not smooth. (K) claims (E) still owes him re-indeer which were loaned to him to start his herd,and this charge is exacerbated by (K)’s drinking. (F)manages to keep tensions to a minimum and she andher brother (I) serve to keep the two local families incommunication concerning affairs of mutual concern.

Since virtually every villager on Seward Penin-sula can trace a real kinship (or a fictive augmenta-tion of kinship) with other villagers, it is conceptu-ally difficult to separate relatives from nonrelativesin the Euro–American sense of these concepts. Manyyoung people do not know the Inupiat terms for allof the cousin classifications, yet unhesitatingly call

distant relatives “cousins” in English. In the emerg-ing political area of pan–Eskimo identity, this“cousin” concept is more akin to “brotherhood” thanactual affinal or consanguineal kinship. Herders hiredistant relatives for various herding tasks at vari-ous times in addition to hiring them in connectionwith their own entrepreneurial activities.

Few non–Natives are employed directly by theherd owner in his operation. The non–Natives whoare employed are largely employed indirectly. Forexample, the air–taxi operators who are hired toscout for reindeer are directly employed by the herdowner, whereas they may receive employment indi-rectly when the antler buyer charters aircraft to flythe antlers to Nome from the corralling sites. Theair taxi pilots give information on herd locations,sizes, and movements freely to the herders. In re-turn, they can expect to be called to work for theherd owner either as spotters and drivers of the re-indeer with their airplane, or when the herder isshipping meat into one of the towns (Kotzebue orNome). In addition, individual herd owners havefriendly relations with one or more pilots and usetheir air taxi service more or less exclusively whenthey are traveling on nonreindeer–herding businessor pleasure trips. The commercial air carriers areemployed by the herd owners in the sense that theyoften utilize the regularly scheduled cargo and/or

60

passenger flights to ship meat or for travel.The income which accrues to the herd owner

through his herding operations and other businesses(if he has any) is disposed of directly in the form ofpayments for labor costs, supplies and services, andindirectly when it is spent on nonherding purchasessuch as food, fuel, housing, clothing, and other itemsinvolved in the operation of any family budget. Insummary, the herd owner is an employer by directlyengaging individuals, non–Natives and Eskimoalike, in his herding operations. He also serves tostimulate the village and regional economies by thevery presence of his herding operation and otherbusinesses by spending and investing his incomethrough the purchase of goods and services fromother businesses.

In some respects, the herd owner and the wealththat his herd and businesses represent have a his-toric analog in traditional Eskimo social organiza-tion. The position and power of the village umialikare reflected in some herd owners’ behavior. Theumialik was “a good and honest man who lookedafter the interests of his supporting crew” (Spencer,1959). English glosses of umialik include hunt groupleader, chief, rich man (Spencer, 1959) and, depend-ing on the context, boss, underwriter, creditor, em-ployer, and boat captain (Burch, 1975). The umialikrecruited his crew by the strength of his moral char-acter and resources. On the coast, this crew tookpart in the whaling activities and associated ritu-als. In the interior, the crew took part in cariboudrives and surrounds, and building and repairingthe caribou fences and stone cairns which were usedto drive the caribou into small lakes or narrowpasses. In these places, with their mobility re-stricted, the caribou were killed. Small kayaks wereused to pursue them in lakes, where the caribouwould be speared with a lance; or they would be shotwith bow and arrows at surprise surrounds in thecase of land hunts at passes. Interior Seward Pen-insula has many of these old caribou traps wherethe animals were driven into the lakes. Several areknown in the Kuzitrin Lake and Imuruk Lake area(Powers et al., 1975).

The resources which the umialik used to recruitand keep a group of followers were the products ofthe labor which he and his wife put into accumulat-ing them. These included a boat, a store of food sup-plies, and tools and weapons with which to outfitthe hunting group. Considerable energy is neededin order to accumulate these. Paralleling this situa-tion was the effort which the reindeer herd ownertoday must expend in both herd management andpoliticking. Most herd owners are active in local andregional politics through the participation in the vil-lage or regional corporation and other political insti-tutions, such as the IRA Councils and the Reindeer

Herders Association. The herd owner uses the ma-terial resources at his disposal (his herd, boat, snowmachine, etc.) as well as his group of followers (hiskindred and family) to achieve economic and politi-cal success. Since herding is not in most cases thesole source of income for the herd owner, he may beable to afford to take a loss in one reaches a sizelarge enough to be considered economical (as the sec-tion on production costs and revenues shows). Onthe other hand, one year’s loss, or several in a row,can lead to discouragement and abandonment ofherding as part of the household economic strategy.

Herd owner characterizationIt is not possible to paint a picture of a “typical

reindeer herd owner” for there is a great deal ofvariation among them. This is particularly true interms of their education, age, skills, or other factorswhich constitute their personality. Nonetheless, onecan and must make some generalizations about herdowners. They do tend to fall into two age groups:the younger men in their late 20s and 30s, and oldermen in their 50s and 60s. The younger men haveaccumulated experience with reindeer through theirfathers who were herders. The older men who areherders became so with their families at a youngage, or entered the reindeer business by acquiringherds, then developing their skills through trial anderror as they sought to build up their herds. Fig-ures have been provided which indicate the accu-mulated reindeer experience of many of the contem-porary herd owners (cf Tables 12, 13, and 14).

Generally, herd owners have less than a highschool education, but there are a few exceptions.Most are also skilled in other areas, such as heavyequipment operation and repair, retail sales, min-ing, or general labor. Some are accomplished politi-cians in local village government, or within the vil-lage or regional corporation. Some are even involvedat the inter–regional level. Cumulatively, they arenot atypical of other Eskimos of the region in theirassortment of job skills, experience, and upbring-ing. The only exception lies in the fact that they arereindeer herd owners.

The economic analysis of the reindeer herds willindicate that many herd owners do not generate suf-ficient income from reindeer herding to provide theirtotal yearly income or food supply (Chapter VIII).This being the case, a question can be posed as towhy they bother to herd reindeer at all. When thisquestion is posed, answers vary. Some say that theyenjoy the opportunity to be out of doors, which tend-ing to reindeer matters afford them. Others indi-cate that the income and meat provided for theirfamilies and their village motivates them to keepon herding. Within the context of the mixed economicstrategies which most households must rely on in

61

order to provide sufficient food, housing, and income,reindeer herding must be understood as only oneaspect of the overall strategy employed by eitherhouseholds or individuals. This means they musthave both inclination and the administrative abil-ity to secure the necessary grazing permit from theBureau of Land Management and a sufficient num-ber of reindeer to stock their assigned range. Oncethese two prerequisites are fulfilled, the aspiringherd owner must make do with low returns of meatand income from his herd for several years before itincreases in size to the point where it is economi-cally viable. The failure rate of herds which attemptto reach this level, somewhat over 1,000 reindeer, ishigh. Nevertheless, herd owners continue to aspireto develop an economically viable herd. Other en-trepreneurial activities of herd owners such asstorekeeping and housing rentals, as well as secur-ing steady employment in the villages (through theoutside institutions) reflects this aspiration to eco-nomic security, as well as representing the mixedeconomic strategy typical of village households.

It is necessary to explore some of the different cul-tural definitions of “success” in this regard. Obvi-ously, the management practices currently followeddo not conform with those necessary to a high–yield,profit–maximizing plan of operations. Yet reindeerherding operations have operated on a partial–sub-sistence, partial cash income basis for the thirty–odd years since reestablishing herds following WorldWar II. We suggest that this persistent pattern hasits roots in the expectations of the herders and theircollective experiences with reindeer herding. It hasbeen noted that a herd owner, ironically enough, maybe able to earn more income as a wage earner him-self than in supplying more meat to a communitywhich would be accompanied by increased demandson him. There are a few young men employed asherders today. The few who have their own herdsare exceptions, since Olson (1969) notes a generationgap between the older, experienced reindeer men, al-most all of whom are over fifty, and the younger menin their twenties and thirties. “Success” is taken tomean a wage job by most young Eskimos. Subsis-tence hunting takes on a recreational aspect sinceit affords time away from the village, home, and thetedium of a nine–to–five job. “Failure” is what hap-pens to a person who does not take care of his fam-ily, depends on welfare, drinks excessively, andabuses his family physically.

Chapter VIIMarketing of reindeerproducts

This chapter is concerned with the marketing ofreindeer products. Topics to be discussed include themarketing of reindeer meat, the marketing of vel-vet antler, and the combined value of all reindeerproducts sold or used in the home by herd owners.In our discussion of reindeer meat marketing, wewill consider the time of year and methods by whichreindeer are slaughtered and meat distributed, thequantity and value of the reindeer meat producedin Alaska and the Seward Peninsula from 1960 to1977, the prices received by herd owners for carcassreindeer meat, and the protein contribution of rein-deer meat to residents of northwest Alaska. Theanalysis of velvet–antler marketing will focus onantler–harvesting procedures, a summary of pricesreceived by herd owners for this product over thelast several years, and the quantity and value ofvelvet–antler production in Alaska for the years1975–1977. The last major topic, value of reindeerproducts, describes the quantity and value of all re-indeer products produced from all Alaska reindeerherds between 1972 and 1977 and gives the quan-tity and value of reindeer product sales from theSeward Peninsula for 1975–1977.

Marketing of reindeer meatThrough 1977, the main product from Alaska re-

indeer herds in terms of quantity and value of pro-duction was carcass reindeer meat. In 1977, Alaskareindeer herd owners produced 312,000 pounds ofdressed reindeer meat and sold 256,000 pounds(Alaska Crop and Livestock Reporting Service,1978). The remaining 56,000 pounds were used byherd owners in the home and as payment for laborused during normal herd operations. The mainsource of carcass reindeer meat is steers, althoughsome bulls, cows, and calves are included in anyyear’s total production. The bulk of the slaughter-ing activity occurs in October through February. Avariable number of reindeer can be slaughteredthroughout the year, however. Although a reindeercarcass can weigh 150 pounds and more, the totalrecent production figures for Alaska indicate an av-erage of approximately 120 pounds per carcass. (Thisaverage weight is based on field observation, individualherd records, and the U.S. Department of the Interior,BIA, Annual Land Operation Reports 1960–1971.)

Marketing methodsIn 1977, all herd owners on the Seward Peninsula

butchered and marketed their own reindeer, with

62

the exception of two who sold live reindeer and thebuyers butchered and marketed these reindeer. Anestimated 80 to 9O percent of the reindeer meat soldin the past few years from Seward Peninsula herdshas been consumed within the region. The remain-ing reindeer meat produced in recent years has goneto Anchorage and the “lower 48 states.” That por-tion going to Anchorage has been used in the mak-ing of sausage while the meat going to the “lower48” has been marketed as a specialty meat.

All slaughtering of reindeer on the Seward Penin-sula is done in the field. Even those reindeer car-casses that will leave northwest Alaska, and whichtherefore must be government inspected, are killedin the field and then brought to the Nome reindeerslaughter plant for inspection. The majority ofslaughtering takes place during the winter monthswhen herders have a mobility advantage over thereindeer. With the use of snow machines, herderscan move faster than reindeer over the snow–cov-ered ground. Two other reasons account for theslaughtering of reindeer during winter months.First, if the slaughtering can be accomplished dur-ing the first part of winter, the reindeer will be intheir best condition following summer weight gains.Second, slaughtering in subfreezing temperaturesquickly freezes carcasses for delivery to buyers. Forthese reasons, most of the reindeer slaughteringtakes place from October through February. Slaugh-tering does occur at other times of the year on a lim-ited basis, mainly for the owner’s home consump-tion. The exact time when each herd butchers de-pends on individual preference, the location of thereindeer, weather, and availability of labor.

As has been noted before, the production from in-dividual herds is distributed in a number of ways(Olson, 1969). At the village level, reindeer meat isdistributed: 1) as wage–meat payments; 2) as salesto village residents; and 3) as sales to village stores.Owners of the larger herds also sell meat to theregion’s two largest population centers, Nome andKotzebue.

The first of the village distribution channels in-volves wage–meat payments and herd owner homeuse. Many village residents receive part of theiryearly meat supply by working for a herd owner athandlings or butcherings and receiving reindeermeat as payment in lieu of cash. Herd owners valuereindeer meat as wages at current market price. Butoften herd owners will “overpay” workers by pro-viding them with more meat than they have earnedby their time actually worked. An explanation forthis behavior is herd owners acting as villageumialiks. (See Chapter VI).

Reindeer herds on the Seward Peninsula are basedat the villages of Shishmaref, Wales, Brevig Mis-sion, Koyuk, Golovin, Teller, Deering, and Buckland,

and at the towns of Nome and Kotzebue. The popu-lation of the villages is estimated to total 1,233people. In 1976, approximately 400 reindeer car-casses were used by herd owners in these villagesspecifically for home consumption and labor pay-ment. The per capita consumption from this methodof distribution amounted to approximately .32 rein-deer carcass (39 pounds) per village resident.

A second method of village distribution is salesdirectly to village residents. In one instance in thesummer of 1977, this took the form of a herd ownertaking orders for reindeer meat from the back of apickup truck as he was bringing the carcasses of fouror five reindeer into the village. Through August of1977, herd owners were selling reindeer meat to vil-lage residents for 85 cents per pound.

A final type of village distribution is the sale ofcarcasses to village stores. These stores usually sellreindeer meat as sides or quarters and ten cents perpound is added to the price exacted by the herdowner as a handling charge. In 1976 and the firsthalf of 1977, this produced a price at village storesof 95 cents per pound. Villages stores generally havereindeer meat only during the winter months sincethey have little or no cold storage facilities. It isdoubtful if reindeer meat would be available in thesummer even if more storage were available. Thereare basically two reasons for this. First, it is diffi-cult to slaughter reindeer in the summer because ofthe problems in getting close to them, and second,reindeer are in the best condition for slaughter inthe first part of winter.

Herd owners with less than 1,000 reindeer gener-ally distribute all their reindeer meat in the villagethrough either home consumption, wage–meat pay-ments, sales to village stores, or sales to village resi-dents. Larger herd owners, besides using these samechannels, also sell reindeer meat to the two popula-tion centers of northwest Alaska: Nome andKotzebue, and at times also make sales out of theregion. In 1976, Nome stores sold approximately100,000 pounds of reindeer meat, while stores inKotzebue sold approximately 54,000 pounds of re-indeer meat. During the winter of 1976–1977, rein-deer retail cuts sold for approximately $1.70 perpound as stew meat, $1.90 per pound as shouldercuts, and $2.00 per pound as hind cuts in Nome andKotzebue. Prices for a competing source of proteinin Nome, Alaska, were given in the March 1977Quarterly Food Price Index. They were $2.99 perpound for beef round steak, $2.04 per pound for beefchuck roast, and $1.79 per pound for beef hamburger(Thomas, 1977). As with village stores, reindeer meatis generally available only in Nome and Kotzebuestores during winter months. These stores would liketo carry reindeer meat on a year–round basis; how-ever, production is not large enough to meet this de-

63

sire. Freezer facilities in the towns are sufficient tohold a large supply of reindeer meat during the sum-mer months. These towns are also not subjected tothe frequent power outages which the villages ex-perience.

In the winter of 1976–1977, in contrast to otherowners, two herd owners marketed their excess re-indeer as live reindeer, thus eliminating the prob-lems of butchering and making marketing arrange-ments. These two herd owners received $70 per headfor these live reindeer. If the reindeer averaged 120pounds per carcass, these owners received 60 centsper pound for the dressed meat. However, they didnot pay any costs of slaughter. This marketing op-tion may be currently available only to these twoowners as they manage their herding operations onthe one area of the Seward Peninsula which has aroad system. This makes it relatively easy and in-expensive for meat buyers to reach the reindeer.

Alaska reindeer meat production:1960–1977

Total production, sales, and home and herd use ofreindeer slaughtered by Alaska reindeer herd own-ers for the years 1960–1977 are provided in Table18. This period was characterized by generally in-creasing production until 1968, at which time a gen-eral decline can be noted. From 1960 through 1968,except for the years 1962 and 1967, total produc-

tion increased yearly. In 1968, total productionamounted to 754,000 pounds of dressed reindeermeat, 608,000 pounds of sales, and 146,000 poundsof reindeer meat used in home and herd operations.During this same period, the value of production gen-erally increased, with the value of production esti-mated to be $324,000 in 1968.

From 1969 through 1977, production generallydeclined with 1976 being the low point when only286,000 pounds of production occurred: 234,000pounds of sales and 52,000 pounds of home and herduse. In 1977, production rebounded over the previ-ous year as 312,000 pounds of production was ac-complished. The value of production followed thequantity of production through 1972. However, in1973, although production was lower than the pre-vious year, the value of this production was $16,000greater. Again in 1974, production fell but the valueof the production increased over the previous year.The largest slaughter since 1971 occurred in 1975.This factor, combined with increased meet prices,raised the value of reindeer meat produced in Alaskato $308,000, a figure only exceeded by the value ofthe 1968 production. The 1968 slaughter was409,000 pounds greater than the quantity of rein-deer meat produced in 1975. In both 1976 and 1977,meat production was below the level of 1975 withper pound carcass meat values remaining relativelystable in these years.

As with total reindeer numbers inAlaska, the overall decline in reindeermeat production between 1960 and 1977was caused largely by the decline of theNunivak Island reindeer herd, instead ofa general decline in reindeer numbers inall areas of Alaska. In 1960, the Nunivakherd totaled 16,000 reindeer, of which1,625 were butchered. In 1964, this herdtotaled 13,200 reindeer, and of this num-ber 2,826 were butchered; while in 1968the herd totaled 10,200 and 1,749 reindeerwere butchered. However, in 1976, thisherd had decreased to 4,000 reindeer, ofwhich only 301 were butchered. The 1977slaughter consisted of 187 reindeer. If thesecarcasses averaged 120 pounds, Nunivakaccounted for 195,000 pounds of the rein-deer meat slaughter in Alaska in 1960,339,120 pounds in 1964, 209,880 poundsin 1968, 36,120 pounds in 1976, but only22,440 pounds in 1977.

Seward Peninsula reindeermeat sales: 1960–1977

Reindeer meat sales by herds on theSeward Peninsula for the years 1960–1977are given in Table 19. This table does not

Table 18. Production and sale of reindeer meatby Alaskan reindeer herders, 1960–1977.

Home andTotal production Sales herd usePounds Value Pounds Value Pounds Value

Year dr. wt.a ($)b dr. wt.a ($)b dr. wt.a ($)b

1977 312 275 256 225 56 501976 286 243 234 199 52 441975 345 308 287 257 58 511974 300 205 220 150 80 551973 324 182 261 144 63 321972 328 166 239 121 89 451971 456 235 365 188 91 471970 615 300 479 241 136 591969 585 277 458 219 127 581968 754 324 608 260 146 641967 692 265 517 188 175 771966 701 249 546 190 155 591965 637 242 522 200 115 421964 660 254 504 195 156 591963 490 179 394 138 96 411962 482 182 372 139 110 431961 485 181 364 136 121 451960 450 180 330 132 120 48adr. wt. = dress weight (in thousands of pounds).b (in thousands of dollars).Source: Alaska Crop and Livestock Reporting Service 1973–1978.

64

include the reindeer meat used by herd owners inhome and herd operations. (Except for 1976, homeand herd operation information has not been avail-able since 1971. In 1976, approximately 400 car-casses [48,000 pounds were used for these purposes.)The quantity of meat sales by Seward Peninsulaherds did not decline from beginning to end for theperiod 1960–1977, although a decline was seen inproduction by Alaska reindeer herds as a whole. Thisoccurred because reindeer numbers have remainedrelatively constant on the Peninsula since 1960,varying from a high of 22,168 in 1966, to a low of16,369 in 1968. In 1976, the estimated number ofreindeer was 17,425; while in 1977, reindeer wereestimated at 17,800 animals.

The value of reindeer meat sales on the SewardPeninsula showed an overall increase during thisperiod. In 1960, the value of reindeer meat sales toherd owners on the Seward Peninsula amounted to$38,064. In 1977, the value of reindeer meat saleswas estimated at $201,380, the highest value in allthe listed years.

Price received by herders: 1960–1977The average price per pound received by Alaska

reindeer herd owners for reindeer meat for the years1960–1977 is provided in Table 20. From 1960through 1968, the price per pound remained rela-

tively stable, averaging 37 cents per pound. In 1969,the price rose 6 cents over the 1968 price of 42 cents.In the period 1970–1973, the price rose slowly, reach-ing 55 cents in 1973. The period from 1974–1977was one of rapid changes. The 1974 price rose 15cents. In 1975 and 1976, the price rose 5 cents and10 cents, respectively, over the preceding year. In1976, herd owners received 85 cents per pound fortheir reindeer meat. This price prevailed until theend of August, 1977.

There are a number of reasons suggested in eco-nomic theory for the increase in price received byAlaska reindeer herd owners for carcass reindeermeat (Burk, 1968). The following factors havetended to increase the consumer demand in north-west Alaska: population growth in the region, in-creased earned incomes of region residents, in-creased transfer payments such as food stamps, aperceived preference for reindeer and caribou meat,general price increases of substitutes for thesemeats, and the demise of the Western Arctic Cari-bou Herd. In 1974, the NANA Regional Corpora-tion estimated that the region’s residents consumed14,000 caribou annually (Mauneluk Association,Inc., 1974). During the winter of 1976–1977, state–imposed hunting restrictions limited the harvest to3,000 caribou. On the supply side, supplies of rein-deer in northwest Alaska, as evidenced by numbersof animals annually slaughtered, although showing

some variation up and down,have remained relatively stablesince 1969, averaging an annualsale of 1,835 carcasses fromSeward Peninsula reindeerherds. Increasing demand witha comparatively stable reindeersupply has put upward pressureon prices.

Protein contributionof reindeer

As noted earlier, the percapita consumption of reindeermeat on Seward Peninsula fromwage–meats (400 carcasses) in1976 was .32 carcasses per vil-lage resident per year (1,233residents in the eight villageswith herds) or approximately 39pounds of reindeer meat. Salesto village residents and to vil-lage and town stores totaled ap-proximately 1,550 animals in1976, which, at an average of120 pounds each, would repre-sent some 186,000 pounds ofmeat. Combining the town

Table 19. Reindeer meat sales by Seward Peninsula reindeer herders,

1960–1977.Est. no. reindeer Number Pounds Value

Year on Seward Pen. carcasses sold meat sold (dollars)1977 17,800 1,974 236,920a 201,3801976 17,425 1,820 218,400a 185,6401975 20,600 1,766 211,920a 158,9401974 n/ab 1,164 139,680a 97,7761973 17,397 n/a n/a n/a1972 19,828 n/a n/a n/a1971 n/a 2,263 271,560 141,2111970 20,292 2,168 260,160 130,0801969 17,009 1,792 215,040 103,2191968 16,369 3,505 420,600 176,6521967 18,795 2,434 292,080 105,1481966 22,168 2,790 334,800 113,8321965 18,944 1,527 183,240 69,6311964 20,449 1,266 147,120 51,4921963 18,880 1,043 125,160 46,3091962 17,940 1,339 160,680 59,2291961 16,405 912 109,440 40,4921960 18,529 688 82,560 38,064aCarcasses assumed to average 120 pounds, actual figures not available.bn/a= data not available.Sources: U.S. Dept. of the Interior, BIA, Annual Land Operation Reports 1960–

1971, Alaska Crop and Livestock Reporting Service 1973–1978, Reindeer Herd-ers, BLM Case Files.

65

(Nome and Kotzebue) population figures with thoseof the villages (6,249 people, 1975 figures) and to-taling all reindeer meat consumed regardless of bywhat means it was obtained (approximately 234,000pounds), yields a per capita consumption figure of37 pounds for the Seward Peninsula. Thus, percapita consumption of reindeer meat in the townsand in the villages on Seward Peninsula from bothwage–meats and purchases was about equal.

The figures for the villages reflect the payment ofmeat as wages to villagers. In the towns, there arefew people who earn reindeer meat in this manner.Additionally, the figures for Nome and Kotzebue re-flect a higher percentage of non–Natives in the popu-lation than do the figures for the villages. The non–Native buyers are probably following meat consump-tion patterns developed in the “lower 48,” so theybuy the customary meats rather than reindeer,which is a novelty to them. This implies that theper capita Native consumption of reindeer meat inthe towns may actually be higher than in the vil-lages. Part of the reason may be that people livingin villages have a greater opportunity to obtain othertraditional foods.

Recent studies of the impacts of Eskimo accultura-tion in terms of diet are reported by Draper (1977).Although direct comparisons are not possible, thereexists the high probability that Seward Peninsulavillages are roughly comparable to Wainwright andPoint Hope, where data are available. At these vil-lages, a study of diet in 1971 and 1972 concludedthat:

Wainwright adults obtained nearly half oftheir calories from native sources and aboutthree–quarters of their protein. At PointHope, where dietary acculturation is more ex-tensive, less than one–quarter of the caloriesin the adult diet were obtained from indig-

enous foods, which nevertheless providedover half of dietary protein. The proportionof native foods in the diet of children, on theaverage, was about half that in the diet ofadults. (Draper, 1977).

Since caribou were present near both of these vil-lages in the two years studied, we assume that theymade up a portion of the diet. Caribou and reindeerare virtually identical in composition and nutritivevalue (University of Alaska, 1973). Granted theseassumptions and having already indicated that thereis a high per capita consumption of reindeer onSeward Peninsula, it is suggested that reindeer rep-resent a significant contribution to the protein in-take and, consequently, the overall health of theSeward Peninsula population.

Table 21 is presented to show comparative nutri-tional data for reindeer and other meat products. Acomparison of the figures in Table 21 shows thatreindeer is a high–protein, red–meat source, low infat and high in calories. Its lower cost relative tothese other meats has been discussed. Coupled withthe fact that it is a locally desired product, one cansee the value of reindeer meat as a protein sourcefor northwest Alaska.

The study by Draper (1977) contains implicationsfor the health of the residents of this region.

While the primitive Eskimo was beset byserious nutritional crises, these problemsarose not from deficiencies in the quality ofhis native diet but from periodic breakdownsin his food supply as a result of naturalforces.... He ate a balanced diet for one simplereason: there was little else to eat. The mod-ern Eskimo has for the first time the oppor-tunity to make significant food choices. Pre-sented with an array of exotic new foodswhich he is not equipped by personal experi-ence or education to evaluate, he tends tochoose badly. In general, the items he selectsare below the average quality of the U.S.mixed diet and of the foods they replace inhis native diet. His nutritional status is de-teriorating, in terms of both undernutritionand overnutrition, in direct relation to theproportion of processed foods in his diet.(Draper, 1977).

On the basis of this and the data obtained in thisstudy, reindeer can be viewed as important to thediet of Seward Peninsula peoples and if excludedcould accelerate the current undesirable decline inthe nutritional status of these people.

Conventional wisdom of modern nutritionists rec-ommend a mixed diet consisting of foods from fourgroups: cereals, fruits and vegetables, meat, anddairy products. The precontact diet of most Eski-mos consisted almost entirely of meat and fish. This

Table 20. Price per pound received by herd ownersfor reindeer meat, 1960–1977.

Price per pound Price per poundYear (cents) Year (cents)1977 85a 1968 421976 85 1967 361975 75 1966 341974 70 1965 381973 55 1964 351972 51 1963 371971 52 1962 371970 50 1961 371969 48 1960 40aJanuary–August.Sources: U.S. Dept. of the Interior, BIA Annual Land Op-

eration Reports 1960–1971, Alaska Crop and LivestockReporting Service 1973–1976, Reindeer Herders.

66

Table 21. Composition of foods, 100 grams, edible portion.Moisture Food energy Protein Fat

Meat (percent) (calories) (grams) (grams)Beef, good grade, raw, 100% leana 72.1 139 21.8 5.1Chicken, light meat without skin, rawa 73.7 117 23.4 1.9Pork, fresh, carcass, raw, fat class 33.4 553 9.1 57.0(total edible 41% lean, 59% fat)a

Reindeer, raw fleshb 70.1 117 26.6 1.2aData from Watt et al., 1963: Table 1.bData from University of Alaska, 1973.

paradox suggests that Eskimos have made certainmetabolic adjustments in order to sustain life andhealth in the rigorous arctic environment. Many ofthese metabolic adjustments have been investigated(Milan, 1962; Milan and Evonuk, 1967; Milan et al.,1963), but the exact nature of the relationship be-tween Eskimo diet and metabolism is still imper-fectly understood.

Marketing of reindeer velvet antlerReindeer velvet antler is sold for use in oriental

medicines. Although the supposed power of antlersfrom several deer species, including reindeer, havegained wide notoriety as aphrodisiacs, most antlerbuyers insist that reindeer antlers are not sold asaphrodisiacs. Rather, antlers are seen as having theability to restore and strengthen the body. To prac-titioners of oriental medicine, antlers are useful intreating, for example, convulsions, vaginal hemor-rhage, and bladder stones. In this view, any sexualenhancement results from better health, not fromthe antler itself. Most of the reindeer velvet antlerharvested from Alaskan reindeer herds is destinedfor final sale in the Orient, with South Korea beingthe largest consuming country. It appears that deerantlers are used by older people in these countries.Buyers have expressed concern that the youngermembers of these populations may not adopt the useof antlers as have their parents. This can only beviewed as speculation at this time because no de-mand studies for antler have been undertaken.

Harvesting of reindeer antlerVelvet antler can be harvested only at summer

handlings. In order to overcome the traditional dif-ficulties of summer herding, the herds are nowdriven into the corrals for antler harvesting by ahelicopter swinging back and forth behind the rein-deer. This is a faster method than the herding onfoot which was used until a few years ago. Once aherd is corralled, the reindeer are pushed single filethrough a chute at the end of the corral. As eachadult reindeer moves through the chute it is held byfour men and most of its antler is removed using ahand–held cutter. A rubber band is twisted around

the remaining antler to prevent excessive bleeding.The smaller calf antlers are left intact.

Antler is harvested at the end of June or duringthe first part of July because it is during this periodthat the antler is most desirable: it is the largestsize possible, but the inside of the antler still has aspongy texture. If the antler is allowed to continueto develop, it eventually becomes completely ossi-fied. For this reason, antler buyers prefer not to pur-chase antler after the middle of July.

Price historyThe price per pound received by reindeer herd

owners for velvet antler has increased steadily inrecent years. In 1969, herd owners received $1.00per pound. In 1972, the price rose to $3.50 per pound;in 1975, to $4.32 per pound; and by 1976, the pricehad risen to $5.58 per pound. These price increaseslikely are a result of additional buyers attemptingto purchase reindeer antlers. In 1977, two differentprices were received. Except for one herd, all own-ers on the Seward Peninsula were under a multi–year contract and received $8.00 per pound. Oneherd received $23.76 per pound for its velvet antlerproduction in 1977, the result of competitive bid-ding.

The sale of reindeer velvet antler has become anincreasingly important source of income to Alaskareindeer herd owners. Based on information suppliedby buyers and herd owners, the pounds and the valueof sales for all Alaska reindeer herds for the years1975–1977 are presented in Table 22. During thesethree years the quantity sold remained relativelystable. Price received, however, increased yearly, towhere, in 1977, the value of sales more than doubledthe 1975 level. The Seward Peninsula (Table 23) ac-counted for all sales of velvet antler from Alaska forthe years 1976 and 1977. In 1975, antler sales fromNunivak Island accounted for $5,310 (8 per cent) oftotal sales.

Value of reindeer productsIn 1977, the value of sales and home use of rein-

deer products from all Alaska reindeer herds wasestimated to total $471,000 (Alaska Crop and Live-

67

stock Reporting Service, 1978). Of this total, 95 per-cent ($446,673) was derived from reindeer meat andvelvet antler. Five percent ($24,327) came from theproduction of hides, leggings (lower leg skins usedfor making mukluks), and meat by–products. On theSeward Peninsula, the value of the 1977 meat andantler sales was estimated to total $373,053.

The value of all reindeer products produced inAlaska for the years 1972–1977 is presented in Table24. This production value includes reindeer meatand meat by–products, velvet antler, and reindeerhides and leggings. It includes meat and meat by–products used in the home and/or for herd opera-tions. For the years 1972–1977, with the exceptionof 1977, the total value of all production increasedyearly. This increased value was due largely to in-creased prices for reindeer meat and velvet antler.Reindeer meat production from all Alaska herdsactually showed a downward trend in the years1972–1977, as was discussed previously.

The value of reindeer meat sales and velvet ant-ler sales on the Seward Peninsula for the years 1975through 1977 is provided in Table 25. (This tablewas constructed with data from interviews gatheredby interviewing herd owners and antler buyers, andthe examination of BLM case files.) The value ofhides and meat by–products is not available, butlikely accounted for only an additional four to fiveper cent of total value. Sales in 1977 were $108,313greater than in 1976, an increase of 41 per cent. Mostof the increase was due to higher antler prices be-tween 1976 and 1977. Antler production increasedby approximately ten per cent while the value ofantler production rose by $92,573, a 117 per centincrease.

Chapter VIIISocioeconomics ofreindeer herding

The analysis of the socioeconomics of reindeerherding presented in this chapter is based prima-rily on research conducted in 1976 and 1977. In afew instances, literature published after 1977 hasbeen included in an attempt to update the chapter.Nevertheless, because it was impossible to cover allthe socioeconomic changes which occurred more re-cently in the Alaskan reindeer industry, the pictureof reindeer herding which emerges from this chap-ter is principally of the earlier period.

Production and herd managementHerd Sizes

In early 1977, thirteen individuals and one Na-

tive corporation had permits to graze reindeer onthe Seward Peninsula, not including the herd atShaktoolik. Based on the reindeer which overwin-tered, total reindeer numbers were estimated at17,800 animals. Herds could be divided into four sizeclasses: less than 1000 reindeer, between 1000 and2000 reindeer, between 2000 and 3000 reindeer, andover 4000 reindeer. Six herd owners had less than1000 reindeer each, two of these herds numberedless than 100 reindeer per herd. The remaining fourherds in this category averaged 600 animals. Therewere five herd owners with between 1000 and 2000reindeer, an average of 1300 reindeer per herd. Twoherd owners had between 2000 and 3000 reindeereach. These herds averaged 2400 reindeer. One herd,however, was estimated between 4000 and 4500 ani-mals.

HerdingWith the exception of one herd, reindeer herds on

the Seward Peninsula are not herded year–roundbut are left untended for much of the year. The great-est amount of herding occurs during the winter andspring calving season, with little or no herding tak-ing place during the summer. Even during the win-ter, herding is generally limited to checking the herdcondition and location, as the reindeer, for the mostpart, select their own range. This may take the formof observing the reindeer daily, simply checking ontheir whereabouts three or four times a week, oronly occasional observation of the reindeer’s where-abouts during the winter. The majority of herd own-ers employ one or two herders from November toMay to help with this herding. Another function ofwinter herding centers on attempts to return straysto the main group. However, as herding is currentlypracticed, it is almost impossible to keep bulls withthe main herd after the fall rut, as they tend to stayaway from the females. Other winter–herding choresinclude determining the availability of forage wherethe herd is grazing and watching for predators. Iflittle forage is available, the herd may be moved. Ifpredators are near the herd, attempts are made to

Table 22. Velvet antler sales—Alaska, 1975–1977.Year Pounds Sale Value1977 15,037 $171,6731976 13,661 79,0851975 15,058 65,829

Table 23. Velvet antler sales—Seward Peninsula, 1975–1977.Year Pounds Sale Value1977 15,037 $171,6731976 13,661 79,0851975 14,173 60,519

68

eliminate them.Although herding is not constant during the win-

ter and herders are not with the reindeer continu-ously, it should not be assumed that herders do notknow the location of the reindeer most of the time.The reindeer are checked often enough for ownersto know the general location of the herd. Herd own-ers also receive reports of reindeer whereabouts frompilots and villagers who see the reindeer in thecourse of travel and subsistence activities away fromthe village.

During the months of June through September,reindeer move about as they please, seeking theirown range. They are not herded during this periodexcept for one handling in late June or early Julyfor velvet–antler harvesting. On the Seward Penin-sula, reindeer tend to graze into the prevailing west-erly winds during the summer in an attempt to staycool and avoid summer insects. Since they are notherded, reindeer are free to move from one range toanother. Unless a herd owner has a barrier on thewestern edge of his grazing permit, such as the coastor mountains, some of his reindeer can and do driftto his western neighbor’s range. Part of several own-ers’ success has come from receiving stray reindeerfrom eastern neighbors. Although the adult reindeerhave been earmarked by their rightful owners, thecalves have not and will become additions to thewestern neighbor’s herd. Failure to notify anotherherder about strays or failure to return strays is asore point between some herd owners.

Herding is extremely difficult during the summerbecause reindeer have greater mobility than herd-ers. Reindeer move faster across the summer tun-dra than men on foot. Herding reindeer on foot is

Table 24. Value of reindeer production—Alaska, 1972–1977.

Antler, hides andYear Reindeer meat meat byproducts Total1977 $275,000 $196,000 $471,0001976 243,000 258,000a 501,0001975 308,000 83,500 391,5001974 205,000 60,000 265,0001973 182,000 34,000 216,0001972 166,000 49,000 215,000aIncludes sale of live reindeer.Source: Alaska Crop and Livestock Reporting Service

1973–1978.

Table 25. Value of reindeer product sales—SewardPeninsula, 1975–1977.Year Reindeer meat sales Antler sales Total1977 $201,380 $171,673 $373,0531976 185,640 79,100 264,7401975 158,940 60,500 219,440

the traditional method of summer herding. Evenwhen all–terrain vehicles are used, it is still diffi-cult to keep up with reindeer as much of the terrainis covered by water. Reindeer swim easily across themany bodies of water on the Seward Peninsula whileall–terrain vehicles are less versatile. They do notfloat and have questionable mechanical reliability.

Besides straying, several other problems arisefrom allowing reindeer to move about untended. Onewriter has observed the following :

A herd that is left untended for much ofthe year is more wild than domestic; virtu-ally impossible to locate in its entirety formarking, castrating, and slaughtering; andselects its own range. This makes it impos-sible for a herder to attempt to achieve a bull–to–cow ratio he may desire, or to slaughteron the basis of complete knowledge of herdcomposition. (Olson, 1969).

Allowing reindeer to select their own range causesthe overutilization of some ranges and theunderutilization of other ranges. Inefficient use ofrange can reduce reindeer weights, calf crops, andrange carrying capacity.

One herd is handled differently on the SewardPeninsula. Its reindeer are kept together using full–time herders who stay with the reindeer virtuallyyear–round. Each day, during the winter, an attemptis made to bunch the herd and return strays to themain herd. During the summer, although herdermobility is reduced and the herd cannot be kept asclose together as in winter, the herders still campnear the herd, attempting to return strays to themain herd and watching for predators.

Employee turnover appears to be high with full–time herding. Generalizing from the experience ofthe one herd using full–time herders, and from thecurrent cycle of seasonal activities which most vil-lagers still practice on the Seward Peninsula, it maybe difficult to attract and retain herders. Even then,the herders may prefer a less routinized cycle of ac-tivities. Indeed, one of the complaints voiced aboutfull–time herding is that it is boring and not variedenough to suit the challenges and changes whichEskimos enjoy.

SlaughteringMost commercial slaughtering takes place during

the months of October through February. As dis-cussed in Chapter VII, this is the preferred time ofyear for several reasons. First, during this period,herders have a mobility advantage over reindeerwith the use of snow machines. Snow machines canmove faster over snow than reindeer, allowing thereindeer to be approached. Second, reindeer are intheir best condition in the first part of winter. The

69

green pastures and warm temperatures during thesummer have allowed the reindeer to add fat to theirbodies in preparation for the long, Arctic winter. Inaddition, since the reindeer are field slaughtered andfield dressed (hides and internal organs removed),there is little need for cold storage when transport-ing carcasses. The carcasses freeze quickly in thesubzero temperatures and the danger of spoilage isreduced.

Most commercial slaughtering takes place with-out the herds being corralled. When slaughtering isto take place, the usual procedure is for a work crewto ride snow machines to within a short distance ofthe herd. The reindeer are then shot and dressed. Ifthe carcasses are to go to the herd owner’s villagethey will be transported normally by snow machine.Shipments to stores in Nome and Kotzebue will mostoften be sent by airplane with the meat buyers pay-ing the transportation charge, 6 to 12 cents perpound in 1977, according to the distance. Depend-ing on the size of the slaughtering crew, the locationof the reindeer, and the Arctic weather, between 20to 30 reindeer can be killed and dressed per day.

The slaughtering of reindeer in the field is not al-ways the simple process it may first appear to beand the actual quantity of meat obtained from theslaughtering may result as much from circumstanceas plan. A herd owner may plan to butcher a certainnumber of steers and old bulls during a winterslaughtering. However, this may not be possiblesince (1) inclement weather may interfere withroundup activities, (2) the herd may be scatteredand difficult to locate, or (3) females may be locatedmore easily as they group together. These problemsmay result in the slaughtering of fewer reindeer thanintended, or slaughtering reindeer of the wrong age,size, or sex such as productive females.

Information from BLM case files, herd–ownerrecords, and BIA Annual Land Operation Reports1960–1971 give approximations of slaughter num-bers. Between 1970 and 1976, herd owners with lessthan 1000 reindeer slaughtered an average of 10 percent of their herds yearly. Herd owners with between1000 reindeer and 2000 reindeer slaughtered an av-erage of 18 per cent of their herds annually, whileherd owners having between 2000 and 3000 rein-deer slaughtered an average of 16 per cent of theirherds. For average herd sizes of 600 reindeer, 1300reindeer, and 2400 reindeer, this results in an an-nual slaughter of 60 reindeer, 234 reindeer, and 384reindeer.

It is important to understand that these annualslaughter percentages were not developed from com-plete herd counts. It is rare that a herd owner canbring together all of his animals at one time. Thismeans that herd slaughter estimates may be highor low. We have no estimate of annual slaughter for

a herd of 4000 or more animals, the owners of theonly herd of this size on the Seward Peninsula dur-ing our field investigations was attempting to in-crease the herd number and in 1976 onlyslaughtered 150 reindeer culls. However, with con-stant herding it is likely that at least 20 to 25 percent could be slaughtered annually without decreas-ing herd size (Palmer, 1934).

CorrallingsMany herds are corralled twice a year, in Febru-

ary or March, and again in late June or early July.During the February or March handling, the rein-deer are tallied, unmarked reindeer earmarked, andnonbreeding bulls castrated. Some butchering mayalso occur, but most of these carcasses are for wage–meat payments, with few carcasses sold. From fieldobservations, it appears these handlings need ap-proximately 15 workers to handle the reindeer.Workers are needed to fill the corral pockets, to pushthe reindeer from pocket to pocket, and to hold thereindeer at the end of the chute for earmarking, cas-trating, and counting. Wages for labor in 1977ranged from $4 to $6 per hour, with the exact wagevarying from location to location. Wages may actu-ally take the form of cash, meat, or skins. The ac-tual handling takes from 1 to 2 days to complete,but several days may be spent beforehand by theherd owner and a small crew in clearing the corralof snow that has accumulated in the precedingmonths. Often the corral pockets have been com-pletely filled with snow.

The late June or early July handling is conductedfor one basic reason – the sale of velvet antler foruse in oriental medicines. In the past few years, thereindeer have been herded into the corrals with theuse of a small helicopter provided by the antlerbuyer. This has taken the place of the traditionalmethod of summer herding, with men on foot driv-ing the reindeer into the corrals. Once in the cor-rals, the reindeer have most of their antler removedusing a hand–held cutter. The amount of antlerwhich is removed depends on the degree of antlerdevelopment; the parts of the antler which have os-sified are not taken. At this handling, calves will beearmarked and the herd tallied as well. Some herdowners also castrate nonbreeding bulls at this han-dling and a few reindeer may be butchered.

Herds with less than 1000 reindeer produced anaverage of 1.1 pounds of velvet antler per reindeerin 1977. Herds with between 1000 and 2000 rein-deer produced an average of .93 pound of velvet ant-ler per reindeer, while herds of between 2000 and3000 reindeer produced an average of .84 pound ofvelvet antler per reindeer. The herd of 4000 rein-deer produced an average of .81 pound of velvet ant-ler per reindeer. These herd estimates include calves

70

which were not dehorned and reindeer that werenot corralled. Luick (1979) found that in 1978 theaverage antler harvest for reindeer actually havingantler removed was 1.82 pounds per reindeer. Indi-vidual reindeer antlers can be of greater weight. Bullantler weights of 2 to 10 pounds have been recorded(Luick, 1978).

CalvingReindeer calving season lasts from approximately

April 15 to May 31, with the peak period about May1. This is one of the most important times of theyear for a herd’s continued success. Herders are withthe reindeer as much as possible at this time of yearsince the herds are especially vulnerable to preda-tors. Based on BLM case files and herd ownerrecords, the percent of calves to adult females ob-served at summer handlings on the Seward Penin-sula averaged 57 to 64 per cent between 1970 and1976. This calf–to–cow ratio averaged 64 per centfor herds of less than 1000 reindeer; 57 per cent forherds of 1000 to 2000 animals, and 58 per cent forherds of between 2000 and 3000 head. Calf summersurvival for the herd of 4000 reindeer was 55 percent in 1975 and 85 per cent in 1977.

Although herders are generally with the herd dur-ing the actual calving period, a recent study of theMackenzie Delta (Canada) herd suggests that calfmortality is greater during the months of June andJuly than during the actual calving period (Nowosad,1975). If this study is applicable to Alaska, then thepercent of calves to adult females at summer han-dlings (late June or early July) might be increasedwith additional summer care of the herds. However,labor may not be available even if herd ownerswished to do this, since herding wages may not besufficient to entice potential employees to forego sub-sistence activities or other employment opportuni-ties.

Reindeer enterprise budgets Costs

The major annual costs for reindeer–herding op-erations are for labor, snow machines, gas and oil,air charters, food, corrals, and cabins. Costs pre-sented in Tables 26–29 are from 1976 and 1977 andare basically from herd owners estimates and fieldobservations, since records are not generally avail-able. With some exceptions, herd owners are poorrecord keepers. These estimates of costs should,therefore, be thought of as minimums because somecost items may not have been identified.

Labor was the largest cost to most herd ownerswhether they employed only part–time labor at han-dlings and butcherings, or handling and butcheringlabor plus one or two winter herders, or full–time

herders. Part–time labor at handlings andbutcherings received $4 to $6 per hour dependingon herd location. Wages were higher if the herdswere located near Nome and Kotzebue. These wageswere paid in the form of cash, meat, skins, or in com-bination. Winter herders (November–May) receivedapproximately $250 per month plus food and sup-plies, which was estimated to bring the total bill to$500 per month. The one herd employing full–timeherders spent over $28,000 per herder per year onsalaries, taxes, and benefits.

No charge was included in the budgets for ownerlabor. If owner–operators had foregone activitieswhich would have returned positive benefits duringthe time they were engaged in reindeer herding, thena charge should have been included to reflect theselost opportunities, implying that labor costs mayhave been underestimated in the budgets in Tables26–29. The difficulty arises in allocating family in-come from subsistence activities to one member or,in this case, the reindeer herd owner. It can be ar-gued that nonreindeer oriented family members areat least capable of generating the subsistence por-tion of household income.

A major change in herding in the last 12 years isthe replacement of dog teams and foot travel forherding with snow machines. Depending on herd lo-cation, these machines cost from $2,000 to $2,300in 1977. The further from Nome or Kotzebue a ma-chine is shipped, the greater the expense. Herd own-ers purchase new machines annually as this ischeaper than paying for repairs to a year–old ma-chine. Given this practice, approximately $200 amachine was spent annually in minor repairs andmaintenance. Herd owners estimated at least $3,000per year was expended for gasoline and oil for snowmachines, pickup trucks, boats, etc. In northwestAlaska, gasoline cost from $1 to $2 per gallon. Gaso-line shipped to individuals in villages in 55–gallondrums was the most expensive; bulk fuel purchasedfrom village stores was less expensive.

Herd owners provided food for workers at han-dlings, in 1977 estimated at $600 to $1,000. Thisfigure does not include the value of reindeer meatslaughtered and used for camp food, and conse-quently lost as revenue.

With the limited herding that takes place withmost herds today, the use of airplanes to locate scat-tered reindeer is important. If reindeer are scatteredand cannot be located by snow machine for handlingsand slaughterings, chartered aircraft are used to findthe reindeer. Once spotted, herders can then ride tothe reindeer on snow machines. Air charters costtypically over $100 per hour in 1976 and 1977.

The majority of herd owners had one corral forhandling their reindeer and one range cabin. Theestimated costs of these corrals and cabins was be-

71

tween $5000 and $10,000 each. Repairs to corralsand cabins was estimated to average $200 each peryear.

There was one more major cost. Except for oneherd, herd owners were charged $2 by the antlerbuyer for every pound of antler harvested as pay-ment for providing a partial handling crew in thesummer, providing a helicopter to drive the reindeerinto the corral, and shipping the antler from the fieldto Nome. One herd owner organized all these tasksindependent of any buyer.

Yearly costs for typical herds of 600, 1300, 2400and 4000 reindeer (the average size herd within eachsize class) are provided in Tables 26, 27, 28, and 29.Again, these costs are for the winter of 1976–1977and the summer of 1977. The value of wage–meatpayments are included in the costs. The straight–line method of calculating depreciation was used forcorrals and range cabins. Additionally, an invest-ment charge was included for each corral or cabin.A 6 per cent interest rate was used in calculatingthe investment cost. This rate was charged for in-termediate–term and long–term loans from theAlaska State Agricultural Revolving Loan Fund in1977.

Annual costs for a herd of 600 reindeer includedonly hired labor as part–time labor for handlingsand butcherings. One new snow machine was pur-chased yearly. For 1300 reindeer, one winter herderwas employed from November through May and twosnow machines were purchased annually. For 2400reindeer, two winter herders were employed and twosnow machines were purchased each year. Fulltimeherders were used only with the 4000–reindeer herd.

This herd in 1977 was managed for expansion andlimited slaughter to culls.

However, to show this herd at full production, anannual slaughter of 800 reindeer was assumed.Other differences in budget categories can be ob-served. Food and fuel information are only avail-able as a combined cost. This herd provided all labor,herding, and shipping for its velvet–antler produc-tion and there was no charge from the antler buyerfor these items. It was assumed that this herd pur-chased three snow machines yearly. Two corrals wereused during handlings. A $1000 per year land rentalcharge was also included.

Costs for a typical herd of 600 reindeer totaledslightly less than $12,000. For the representativeherd of 1300 reindeer, costs were approximatelydouble. The major increases were from the additionof one winter herder and the purchase of a secondsnow machine. Costs for an average herd of 2400reindeer increased to approximately $33,000. Costsfor the herd of 4000 reindeer were almost five timesgreater than for a herd of 1300 reindeer. This dra-matic increase is due to the use of full–time herd-ers. It can be viewed as a different system of reindeerproduction and the per–reindeer costs are not di-rectly comparable to the smaller herds.

RevenuesRevenues for the four herd sizes used previously

are given in Table 30. The average annual meat pro-duction and the 1977 velvet antler production fordifferent herd sizes as described earlier is used inthis analysis. Slaughter is comprised primarily ofsteer carcasses weighing an average of 120 pounds

Table 26. Costs–600 reindeer.Annual ownership costs

Item Original cost Life Depreciationa Investmentb Total1. Corral $5,000.00 20 yrs. $250.00 $150.00 $400.002. Cabin 5,000.00 20 yrs. 250.00 150.00 400.00

Subtotal $800.00Annual cash costs

Item Cost/year1. Part–time labor for winter and summer handlings $1,500.00c

2. Food for handlings 600.003. Snow machine purchase – 1 @ $2,200 2,200.004. Gas and oil 3,000.005. Snow–machine repair 200.006. Corral repair 200.007. Cabin repair 200.008. Air charter 1,000.009. Labor to butcher 60 reindeer 600.00c

10. Charge by antler buyer for herding, labor, shipping 1,320.00Subtotal $10,820.00

Total cost/year $11,620.00aStraight line method: Original cost bOriginal cost

life 2cValue of meat–wage payments included.

x 6%

72

(U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Af-fairs, 1960–1971). Reindeer carcasses are assumedto sell for 85 cents per pound. Because of the varia-tion in prices received for velvet antler in 1977, weused three antler prices in developing Table 30: $8per pound, $12 per pound, and $23.76 per pound.Any revenues herd owners might gain through thesale of reindeer skins, leggings, or meat byproductsare not included. An optimistic prediction would bethat revenues could increase by 4 or 5 per centthrough the sale of these items. We have no esti-mate of the additional costs incurred in obtainingthis additional income.

Net herder incomeAs one would expect, for herds of between 600 and

2400 reindeer, income increases as herd size in-creases (Table 31). However, for the herd of 4000reindeer, income was less than for a herd of 2,400reindeer at all antler prices. Does this mean that aherd of 4000 reindeer is economically less advanta-geous? This is not likely for two reasons. The presentanalysis did not taken into consideration the in-creased efficiencies that are likely to come throughyear–round herding. Second, our 4000 animal herdis modeled after a herd that has only been in exist-ence since 1975 and it is being expanded throughreduced herd harvest. In a recent study (Arobio etal., 1980), firm net incomes were found to increaseas herd size expanded.

Regional ConsiderationsThe reindeer industry is a small part of the total

economy of northwestern Alaska in terms of thepeople it employs and the wages and salary pay-ments the industry makes. Nonetheless, at the vil-lage level, herding is an important part of the localeconomy.

Regional EmploymentIn 1976, the average, monthly, nonagricultural

wage and salary employment in the Kobuk andNome labor market areas was estimated at 2952persons (Alaska Statistical Quarterly, 1976). Accord-ing to interviews with herd owners, between 25 and30 individuals received a major portion of their em-ployment from reindeer herding on the Seward Pen-insula in 1976–1977. This figure is comprised of herdowner–operators, full–time herders, and winterherders. Employment within the region, with theaddition of the relatively full–time herding employ-ment, totalled approximately 2979 workers in 1976.Reindeer herding accounted for only 0.9 per cent ofthe total employment within northwest Alaska.

In terms of part–time employment, a larger num-ber of residents or the region are employed typicallyduring a year. Approximately 250 people are em-ployed yearly on a part–time basis during handlingsand butcherings. For an individual this would pro-vide normally from 2 to 12 days of annual employ-ment. At the wage scale described earlier, $4 to $6per hour, an individual working 2 days, 8 hours aday, would earn from $64 to $96. An individual work-ing 12 days a year, 8 hours per day, would earn from$384 to $576. These wages would be paid in cash,meat, or in combination.

Table 27. Costs–1300 reindeer.Annual ownership costs

Item Original cost Life Depreciationa Investmentb Total1. Corral $5,000.00 20 yrs. $250.00 $150.00 $400.002. Cabin 5,000.00 20 yrs. 250.00 150.00 400.00

Subtotal $800.00Annual cash costs

Item Cost/year1. Part–time labor for winter and summer handlings $2,250.00c

2. Food for handlings 750.003. One winter herder – $250/month/7 months 1,750.00c

4. Food and supplies for herder – $250/month/7 months 1,750.005. Snow–machine purchase – 2 at $2,200 4,400.006. Cas and oil 3,600.007. Snow machine repair – 2 at $200 400.008. Corral repair 200.009. Cabin repair 200.0010. Air charter 3,000.0011. Labor to butcher 234 reindeer 2,340.0012. Charge by antler buyer for herding, labor, shipping 2,418.00

Subtotal $23,058.00Total cost/year $23,858.00

aStraight line method: Original cost bOriginal costlife 2

cValue of meat–wage payments included.

x 6%

73

Regional personal incomeAccording to data supplied by herd owners and

estimates based on Table 31, reindeer herding onthe Seward Peninsula generated an estimated (in-cluding value of reindeer meat consumed by herdowners and paid to labor) $309,000 of aggregate per-

sonal income to reindeer herd owners and laboremployed directly in herding operations in 1976.This income is the combination of net income (grossincome of reindeer product sales minus productioncosts) from individual herds plus the payments theseherds made to labor. The income can be disaggre-gated into labor income of approximately $162,000and herd–owner income of $147,000. Of the total,

Table 28. Costs–2400 reindeer.Annual ownership costs

Item Original cost Life Depreciationa Investmentb Total1. Corral $5,000.00 20 yrs. $250.00 $150.00 $400.002. Cabin 5,000.00 20 yrs. 250.00 150.00 400.00

Subtotal $800.00Annual cash costs

Item Cost/year1. Part–time labor for winter and summer handlings $3,000.00c

2. Food for handlings 1,000.003. Two winter herders – $250/month/7months 3,500.00c

4. Food and supplies for herders – $250/month/7 months 3,500.005. Snow–machine purchase – 2 at $2,200 4,400.006. Gas and oil 4,000.007. Snow–machine repair – 2 at $200 400.008. Corral repair 200.009. Cabin repair 200.0010. Air charter 4,000.0011. Labor to butcher 384 reindeer 3,840.0012. Charge by antler buyer for herding, labor, shipping 4,032.00

Subtotal $32,372.00Total cost/year $33,172.00

aStraight line method: Original cost b Original costlife 2

cValue of meat–wage payments included.

x 6%

Table 29. Costs–4000 reindeer.Annual ownership costs

Item Original cost Life Depreciationa Investmentb Total1. 2 Corrals $20,000.00 20 yrs. $1,000.00 $600.00 $1,600.002. Cabin 5,000.00 20 yrs. 250.00 150.00 400.00

Subtotal $2,000.00Annual cash costs

Item Cost/year1. 3 full–time herders (including taxes and benefits) $85,000.002. Land rental 1,000.003. Snow–machine purchase – 3 at $2,000 6,000.004. Snow–machine repair – 3 at $200 600.005. Corral repair – 2 at $200 400.006. Cabin repair 200.007. Food and fuel 4,500.008. Shipping and freight 500.009. Air charter 8,000.0010. Labor to slaughter 800 reindeer 8,000.00

Subtotal $114,200.00Total cost/year $116,200.00

aStraight line method: Original cost bOriginal costlife 2

cValue of meat–wage payments included.

x 6%

74

$40,800 (13 per cent) came from wage–meat pay-ments and herd owner home consumption. Approxi-mately 400 reindeer carcasses were used in thismanner in 1976.

The above is not all of the personal income thatresulted from reindeer herding on the Seward Pen-insula in 1976. It does not account for net incomewhich accrued to retailers from the sale of reindeermeat or antler, nor does it account for the additionto net incomes of firms which sold products or ser-vices to reindeer–herd owners. In addition, thewages these firms paid to labor that was needed toconduct business with reindeer–herd owners werenot estimated.

Village considerationsAlthough reindeer herding is of relatively minor

importance to the regional economy of northwestAlaska in terms of the wages and salaries it gener-ates, the case is much different for an individualvillage where a reindeer herd is located. The contri-bution of reindeer herding to village employment,wages, and salaries, and in meeting the village pro-tein requirements is of greater relative importancethan its contribution to northwest Alaska as a whole.As an example, a brief analysis of a representativevillage located on the Seward Peninsula would beinformative. This village has a population of 87. A

reindeer herd of between 1000 and 2000 reindeer isheadquartered here. The herd is owned and oper-ated by a local family.

The village has approximately 20 employed indi-viduals. Seventeen of these residents are employedon a full– or part–time basis in the following occu-pations: construction, government services, educa-tion, retail trade, and domestic services. Threevillage residents (the herd owner, his son, and onewinter herder) receive a major share of their yearlyemployment from reindeer herding. This amountsto 15 per cent of the village employment, comparedwith 0.9 per cent of regional employment in 1976.At handlings and butcherings, up to an additional15 of the village residents (17 per cent) are employedon a part–time basis. Some of these people may onlywork for 1 to 2 days, while others may receive up to12 days of yearly employment. As described earlier,this can result in yearly part–time income per indi-vidual of from $64 to $576.

In 1976, this herd paid approximately $4590 (in-cluding value of wage–meat payments) in wages topart–time workers. In addition, the winter herderreceived approximately $3500 in wages and supplies.This herd provided a net income of approximately$10,000 to the herd owner and his family in 1976.The approximate, aggregate, personal income gen-erated by this herd to village residents (including

Table 30. Reindeer herd revenues.Reindeer meat revenuea Antler revenue

Herd size $8.00/lb. $12.00/lb $23.76/lb Total600 60 carcasses x 120 lbs = 660 lbs. =

7,200 lbs x 85 cents/lb = $5,280.00 $ 11,400.00$ 6,120.00 660 lbs =

$7,920.00 14,040.00660 lbs =

$15,681.60 21,801.601,300 234 carcasses x 120 lbs = 1,209 lbs =

28,080 lbs x 85 cents/lb = $ 9,672.00 33,540.00$23,868.00 1,209 lbs=

$14,508.00 38,376.001,209 lbs =$28,725.84 52,593.84

2,400 384 carcasses x 120 lbs = 2,016 lbs =46,080 lbs x 85 cents/lb = $16,128.00 55,296.00

$39,168.00 2,016 lbs =$24,192.00 63,360.00

2,016 lbs =$47,900.16 87,068.16

4,000 800 carcasses x 120 lbs = 3,240 lbs =96,000 lbs x 85 cents/lb = $25,920.00 107,520.00

$81,600.00 3,240 lbs =$38,880.00 120,480.00

3,240 lbs =$76,982.40 158,582.40

aValue of home meat consumption included.

75

the two owner–operators) totaled $18,000. Not in-cluded was income received by regional commercialairlines and air–taxi operators for herding andfreighting services or others who provided productsor services to the reindeer herd.

In 1976, 64 reindeer carcasses were used by theherd owner as payment to labor or for home con-sumption. These carcasses had an approximatevalue of $6530. Most villagers receive a combina-tion of meat and cash for part–time work. A villageris likely to receive reindeer meat as payment whenworking at winter butcherings and cash when work-ing at a spring or summer handling. For example,in the fall of 1976, 10 villagers were hired to help ata butchering. Wages were $4 per hour; however, allthe workers desired to be paid in meat. For this work,they received 1.5 reindeer carcasses each. Later, inMarch of 1977, 15 village residents were hired tohelp with the handling. At this handling, everyonewas paid in cash. Each received $68 for two dayswork.

In 1976, approximately 100 reindeer carcasseswere sold by the herd owner to village residentsthrough a store run by another of his sons. This meatsold for 95 cents per pound. In meeting the proteinrequirements of the village residents, 164 reindeercarcasses were consumed in 1976. This is a per–capita consumption of 1.9 reindeer carcasses per vil-lager. The village herd provided approximately 229pounds of meat per resident.

Reindeer industry potentialReindeer herding as traditionally practiced in

Alaska has been a part of both the subsistence andcash economies because most herd owners operateon a partial subsistence basis generating minimumprofits. Generally, herds have been smaller than al-lowed by grazing permits. Herd owners have notspecialized in the herding of reindeer. Other activi-ties in which they participate include subsistencehunting, fishing, gathering, wage labor (fire–fight-ing is of importance), and entrepreneurial enter-prises such as owning small stores or renting houses.

Nevertheless, it appears that meat and antler pro-

duction and firm incomes have the potential to in-crease with more intensive herd management. Thiscould result through 1) expanded herd numbers, 2)improved management practices, or 3) changes inproduction orientation.

In 1976, the Fairbanks Office of the Bureau ofLand Management permitted the grazing of 32,000reindeer on the Seward Peninsula. This figure doesnot include the herd at Shaktoolik, on the edge ofthe peninsula, which had a permit for 1200 animals.In 1977, it was estimated that only 17,800 reindeergrazed on the Seward Peninsula. This was 55 percent of the permitted number. By doubling the 1977production of reindeer meat and velvet antler, anapproximation can be made of potential productionfrom herds at their maximum permitted level. Ofcourse, this assumes no increase or decrease in pro-duction on a percentage basis for individual herds.Regional meat production under this scenario wouldamount to approximately 473,840 pounds and ant-ler production 30,074 pounds. At the prices receivedby the majority of herd owners in 1977, gross meatrevenues would equal $402,764, and antler revenueswould total $240,592. At $23.76 per pound, antlerrevenues would be $714,558. These figures are grossrevenues, not net returns; still, the aggregate per-sonnel income to the region would increase sharplyabove the levels reported earlier.

Even without expanded herd numbers, individualherds may well have the ability to increase produc-tion and incomes through improved managementpractices. The practices described below assume thatthe current emphasis of steer production for meatcontinues. If herders shift their production orienta-tion from emphasizing meat to antler production,then some of these management changes may notbe applicable.

Production could increase in individual herds withimprovements in animal husbandry practices, in theshort run by decreasing the slaughter of productivefemales, increasing calf survival; and in the long runwith improved selection of breeding stock, improvedsex composition of herds, and more efficient rangeuse. For an individual herd these improvements

Table 31. Net herder income.a

Antler and meat revenue IncomeProduction

Herd Size $8.00/lb $12.00/lb $23.76/lb Costs $8.00/lb $12.00/lb $23.76/lb600 $11,400.00 $14,040.00 $21,801.60 $11,620.00 ($220.00) $ 2,420.00 $10,181.601,300 33,540.00 38,376.00 52,593.84 23,858.00 9,682.00 14,518.00 28,735.842,400 55,296.00 65,360.00 87,068.16 33,172.00 22,124.00 30,188.00 53,896.164,000 107,520.00 120,480.00 158,582.40 116,200.00 (8.680.00) 4.280.00 42.382.40

aThree estimates of revenue and three estimates of income for each herd size are provided. In all estimates, meatsells for 85 cents per pound. Meat revenues are combined with antler revenue using three antler prices: $8.00, $12.00,and $23.76 per pound; to give the estimates of total revenue for each herd size. Income estimates are total revenuesminus production costs.

76

would be shown in increased carcass weights andan increased percentage of the herd which could beslaughtered annually.

Increased carcass weights could come from a num-ber of sources. This could happen immediately byonly butchering steers, old bulls, and old cows, in-stead of butchering any group of reindeer which canbe located and may include productive females.

Herders sometimes slaughter females whensteers and bulls are difficult to locate. According toPalmer (1934), there are significant differences inweights between male and female reindeer. Duringfield work for this research, differences in weightswere also observed. For example, in one instanceduring the winter of 1976–1977, 18 reindeer car-casses, most of which were female, were observedbeing shipped. They had an average carcass weightof 115 pounds. In another instance, the slaughter of8 bulls was observed. These reindeer averaged 145pounds per carcass.

Herders prefer not to slaughter females, but insome instances it is easier to locate females thansteers and bulls. During the course of the field work,one researcher was present at the slaughtering of15 reindeer. All reindeer butchered were pregnantfemales, since these were the most easily locatedreindeer. A change in production techniques thatwould help to increase the percent of steers and bullsin the yearly slaughter is to butcher at a corrallingconducted in the early winter, instead of slaughter-ing without corralling the herd, which is the presentpractice. At the same time, the herd could be tal-lied, bulls castrated, and reindeer earmarked, thuseliminating the need for a spring corralling. Thismay be a wise decision in any case, since corrallingin the early winter would remove much of the prob-lem of snow–filled corrals which are prevalent inthe spring. With the reindeer in a corral, the herderwould have an opportunity to select the reindeer hewanted to butcher. In addition, since rifles wouldnot be needed to kill the reindeer, inadvertent kill-ing of reindeer through poor marksmanship wouldbe eliminated.

Some herders have argued that reindeer acquirea gamey taste after being corralled for several hours.If this is a problem, a method to overcome this diffi-culty might be to slaughter after the reindeer havebeen released from the corral for a few days. Ani-mals scheduled for slaughter could still be selectedwhile the herd was corralled. These reindeer couldthen be kept together until slaughter.

In the long run, carcass weight could be increasedthrough the selection of the superior reindeer forbreeding and eliminating inferior bulls and cows.According to a 1946 reindeer management guide,adult carcasses at that time averaged 125 pounds,while ten years previously they had averaged 150

pounds (U.S. Department of the Interior, Office ofIndian Affairs, 1946). Poor sire selection was citedas the major reason for the decline. At present, theonly sire selection criterion appears to be for coatcolor, not size. Spotted reindeer are preferred fortheir hides in making parkas and mukluks, whilealmost completely white reindeer are desired for thehelp this color gives the herder in spotting reindeerfrom a distance during the summer when the groundcover is predominantly green. Sires should be se-lected on the basis of size (U.S. Department of theInterior, Office of Indian Affairs, 1946).

More efficient range use could have a major affecton reindeer weights. Klein (1967) has shown the de-creases in weights, as well as productive ability ofherds, when reindeer overgraze their range. Themost efficient use of range would require more herd-ing than is currently employed. Pegau (1968) hasapplied Siberian studies to Alaska and has suggestedthat only the top 1/4 to 1/3 of the lichen podetium begrazed and then the herd moved. Although he ap-plied this to increasing per acre carrying capacities,it seems that better use of range could increaseweights of existing reindeer, if herd sizes were notincreased.

For the production alternative examined here,herds would also benefit in the long–run from im-proved sex composition. Currently, bull–to–cow ra-tios range from 1 to 5, to 1 to 10 with the majority ofherds near 1 to 5. Herds would benefit from elimi-nating some of these bulls and replacing them withfemales. Bull–to–cow ratios are recommended to bebetween 1 to 10 and 1 to 15 (Department of the In-terior, 1946; Zhigunov, 1968). The ideal number ofbulls may even be lower since Skuncke (1969) sug-gests that a virile bull can serve 30 to 40 cows.

A second source of increased meat production couldresult from increasing the percent of a herd whichcould be slaughtered annually. Herd owners in theperiod 1970–1976 slaughtered 10 to 18 per cent oftheir herds yearly. It is possible that this could beincreased to between 20 and 25 per cent with bettermanagement. It has been show that herds in Alaskacan increase yearly by 25 to 33 percent in better–managed herds (Palmer, 1934).

A technique to increase slaughter is to emphasizecalf survival. If calf mortality in Alaska follows thesame pattern as reported for Canada (Nowosad,1975) and is significant immediately following thetime herds leave the calving grounds, it would ben-efit herd owners to stay with the herds themselvesor to hire a herder to stay with the herd during themonth of June. Difficulties in implementing thisimprovement include scheduling conflict with sub-sistence activities in the spring, wage–labor oppor-tunities, and traveling over the terrain during springbreak–up which overlaps the calving season and the

77

critical period for calves during June.Another method to increase slaughtering percent

is to make sure reindeer which have drifted to an-other reindeer owner’s range are returned. Thiswould require attending neighboring herder han-dlings and returning reindeer to their proper range.This is not an unknown practice, as it is occasion-ally done now, but not consistently.

It is difficult to determine accurately how muchproduction and net incomes could increase with theimplementation of improved management practices.However, if slaughter could be increased to 20 percent of the overwintering herds in 1977 and carcassweights increased to an average of 125 pounds, meatproduction would equal 445,000 pounds. For 32,000reindeer, meat production would total 800,000pounds. At 1977 prices, this meat would providegross revenues to herders of between $378,250(17,800 reindeer) and $680,000 (32,000 reindeer). Asummary of potential meat production resultingfrom increased reindeer numbers on the SewardPeninsula or improved management practices ispresented in Table 32. We have little basis on whichto determine whether per–animal antler productionwould increase under these practices.

Again, the above are estimates of added gross rev-enues, not net gains, and for these herd manage-ment practices to be of benefit to herders, theadditional costs of these improvements must be lessthan the added revenues. Additionally, the imple-mentation of these procedures may require full–timeherding and thus may only be practical for largeherds.

Two recent studies have examined the economicpotential of the reindeer industry under alternativeproduction orientations. Luick (1978) estimated thegross revenues for four alternative herd manage-ment options for a herd of 2,000 reindeer and findsthat structuring a herd to maximize the productionof wet–velvet antler provides the largest gross rev-enues. On a herd basis, potential gross revenues areestimated at $327,935 if antler sells at $10/poundand $471,875 with antler selling for $20/pound.These are significantly above the revenues receivedcurrently by herders.

In a second study, Arobio et al. (1980) examinedoptimum herd structure using a mathematical pro-gramming technique. Again, maximizing wet–vel-vet antler production was found to be themanagement option that provides the largest re-turns. Using the most commonly received meat andantler prices for 1977, potential net returns for herdsof 1000, 2000, and 3000 reindeer are estimated at$30,000, $62,000, and $106,500 respectively. In thisanalysis estimated variable production costs werededucted from gross revenues in an attempt to esti-mate potential firm incomes. Although problems

were noted with the data used in this analysis, andthus some level of error is likely associated with es-timated net returns, the conclusion drawn from thisstudy is that reindeer herds have the highest po-tential to increase incomes through alternative herdorganization.

At this point, it is useful to summarize some ofthe general conclusions that can be drawn from thepreceding analysis. First, it seems that per–herdmeat and antler production and firm incomes canincrease through changes in production practices orchanges in herd orientations. Exact increases in in-come are difficult to determine at this time becausebetter data on carcass and antler weight, reindeermortality, calving percentage, production costs, for-age requirements, etc. are needed. Next, a herdstructured to maximize antler production will de-crease its meat–producing capability. This couldhave a serious effect on regional meat supplies if allherds adopted this option without an increase inherd size. If herds expanded, meat production couldbe enhanced even under this management alterna-tive. Finally, expanded numbers of reindeer on theSeward Peninsula have the potential to provide ad-ditional fulltime employment, increased hours ofpart–time employment, and regional incomes.

We have already indicated that herd owners areoften considered “rich” by village standards. In-creased production and its attendant increase in in-come may exacerbate this perception. In alllikelihood, however, the network of generalized reci-procity among kin in the village probably will serveto see that some portion of the increased income isdistributed throughout the village. This probablywould not take the form of direct cash gifts, but giftsof new material items or food, or gifts of reindeermeat and byproducts are likely, just as such thingsare given today.

The previous discussion has been based upon con-stant and increased herd sizes. Under conditions ofdecreases in herd size, reduced income from herd-ing operations can be expected. It is shown earlierin this chapter that herds with less than 1,000 ani-mals have difficulty in producing returns above to-tal annual costs. When interest in tending a smallherd declines, the herd is usually lost to caribou,other reindeer herds, or becomes feral. Thus, herdowners strive to at least keep a minimum herd size,and, under favorable circumstances, to increase theirherd size. Factors which lead to herd decreases havebeen discussed in the historical section. Predation,disease, losses to caribou, poaching, adverse weatherconditions, losses in available range land, and rangequality are just some of these factors. To these rea-sons, we might add the possibility of straying causedby National Preserve visitors or hikers who disturbthe animals. In the worst of all possible worlds, or

78

what is sometimes referred to as the maximum cred-ible event by disaster planners, all of the reindeeron Seward Peninsula could be lost. For the owners,this would mean that an important source of incomeand meat would be unavailable to them. The meatwould be lost to the people of the region. Wages paidto labor by the reindeer industry would disappear.

More realistically, one can predict that, underpresent conditions and management, certain herdsare going to increase for periods of time while oth-ers will decline. This suggests the possibility, in lightof relatively steady numbers of animals on theSeward Peninsula over the last 20 years, that un-der current management practices the region hasreached an equilibrium in reindeer numbers rela-tive to the range and its carrying capacity. More in-tensive herd management, however, could increasethe number of reindeer on the Peninsula.

Chapter IXReindeer herdingand landAlaska land issues

The passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settle-ment Act (P.L. 92–203, 85 Stat. 688) in 1971 has

forced the reindeer herders increasingly to come togrips with political issues and the often divergentinterests of other groups, Native and non–Nativealike. This settlement act, or ANCSA as it is com-monly abbreviated, is the culmination of years ofstruggle on the part of Alaskan Natives to securetheir land claims and rights to traditional ways oflife. It is beyond the scope of this study to describeall the provisions of ANCSA or the political and cul-tural struggle which went on to secure its passagewithout running the risk of oversimplifying someaspects or omitting others. Several excellent ac-counts have already undertaken this task, and theinterested reader is referred to those sources(Arnold, 1978; Case, 1978; Hanrahan andGruenstein, 1977). Consequently, only those portionsmost relevant to reindeer herding will be reviewed.

The Alaska Statehood Act (72 Stat. 399) passedCongress on July 7, 1958, and was signed into lawby President Eisenhower on January 3, 1959. Theact entitled the 49th state to select and receive titleto some 104 million acres of “vacant, unappropri-ated and unreserved” Federal lands in Alaska. Ad-ditional millions of acres of tidal and nontidal“submerged lands” vested in the state, many ofwhich have still to be identified. Since nearly 99 percent of Alaska’s 375 million acres was in Federalstewardship at that time, selection of the land en-titlement seemed a straightforward task. Soon af-ter state officials made their initial selections of landand received tentative approval to them, protestsby Natives surfaced. While the state had made itsselections based on the potential of recreational gas,oil, and other natural resources, Natives were con-cerned about the impacts of the state selections ontheir hunting, fishing, and trapping grounds. TheU.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) was asked toturn down the state selections.

Faced with Native protests over state land selec-tions, most authorities agreed that only Congresscould adequately address the Alaskan Native landclaims. Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall in-voked a “land freeze” in 1966. The freeze stoppedthe tentative approval and patent of state–selectedFederal lands to the State of Alaska until Congresscould act upon the Native land claims issue.

Starting in 1967, a Land Claims Task Force com-prised of state representatives, Native leaders, theyear–old Alaska Federation of Natives (AFN), andDOI representatives was formed and prepared a bill.Introduced by Senator Ernest Gruening (D–Alaska)in 1968, it was supported generally by then Gover-nor Walter J. Hickel. One of Secretary Udall’s lastacts as Secretary of the Interior was to formalizethe land freeze by Secretarial Order before leavingoffice after Richard Nixon’s election in 1968.

Alaska Governor Walter Hickel was nominated by

Table 32. Potential meat production for sale fromSeward Peninsula reindeer herds.

Actual production for 1977:Total Herd – 17,800 headMeat for sale – 296,920 lbs.

Potential production for 1977, assuming herd numbersequal to BLM limit, with 1977 management practices:

Total herd – 32,000 headMeat for sale – 473,840 lbs.

Potential production for 1977, assuming actual 1977herd number, with improved herd–managementpracticesa

Total herd – 17,800 headMeat for sale – 445,000 lbs.

Potential production for 1977, assuming herd numbersequal to BLM limit, with improved herd–managementpracticesa:

Total herd – 32,000 headMeat for sale – 800,000 lbs.

aImproved herd–management practices:1. Improved Selection of Breeding Stock2. Decreased Female Slaughter3. Rotational Grazing4. Increased Herding5. Return of Strays from Neighboring Herds

79

the newly elected President to serve as Interior Sec-retary. In trouble with environmental groups at hisconfirmation hearings because of hisprodevelopment orientation as governor, he wooedAlaskan Native interests to support his nominationin return for a continuation of the land freeze untilDecember of 1970. The continued land freeze boughttime with which to prepare further legislation tosettle the land claims. A major point of dispute wasthe issue of revenue sharing of mineral estates.While the principles that the settlement would in-clude land and cash were settled, the exact provi-sions remained open. The state oil lease sales atPrudhoe Bay in 1969 showed dramatically how rela-tively small tracts of land could be worth large sumsof money. Various oil companies paid over $900 mil-lion to the state for the right to develop the PrudhoeBay oil and natural gas deposits on Alaska’s NorthSlope. The publication of the massive volume, AlaskaNatives and the Land by the Federal Field Commit-tee for Development Planning in Alaska, under-scored the bleak economic, health, and socialconditions in most of Alaska’s Native villages(Fitzgerald et al., 1968). The validity of Native landclaims was thus reasserted at the same time thatthe political and economic climates favored passageof a bill.

The AFN’s proposal in May of 1969 provided a 40–million acre land settlement, a $500 million appro-priation for disbursement, a share in perpetuity fromrevenues produced on state lands relinquished bythe Natives, and the creation of corporations tohandle the settlement at village, regional, and statelevels. The continuing land freeze was delaying theconstruction of a pipeline to transport crude oil fromPrudhoe Bay to the ice–free, southern terminus atValdez. The interested oil companies, contractors,the state, AFN, and DOI all recognized that the con-struction of the trans–Alaska pipeline would notbegin until legislation settling the land claims hadbeen passed. By late 1971, both the House and Sen-ate had passed slightly differing bills; the differencesbetween the two bills had to be resolved in one ac-ceptable to both bodies. A joint conference commit-tee undertook the task of producing a compromisebill; and a 29–page bill, largely favorable to the AFNposition emerged. The settlement was accepted; andon December 18, 1971, President Nixon signed theAlaska Native Claims Settlement Act (85 Stat. 688as amended) into law.

The major provisions of ANCSA must be under-stood in order to make sense of the current politicaland economic happenings in Alaska. Basically, theact provides for a cash and land settlement. Some215 Native Village Corporations are entitled to se-lect 22 million acres of land, in addition to the selec-tion by 12 Regional Corporations of some 16 million

acres under a complex land–loss formula. The exactacreage entitlements are determined by the num-bers of Natives enrolled in a village and region. Com-pensation for the enrollees amounts to $962.5 milliondollars paid over a number of years by funds fromthe Federal treasury, with an initial payment of some$462.5 million dollars. The remainder of the cashsettlement comes from a 2 per cent royalty chargepaid into the Alaska Native Fund (of the Federaltreasury) from mineral development on state andFederal lands until the full $500 million remainderis paid into the fund. Village Corporations receivefee simple title to the surface estate of selected lands,while the regional corporation receives title to thesubsurface estate of both village and regional se-lected lands, as well as the surface estate of the re-gional lands. Some exceptions exist: villages insoutheastern Alaska receive title to only one town-ship (23,040 acres) regardless of their enrollment.The 1959 award of the Tlingit–Haida claims settle-ment justified this smaller land award. “Section 19reservations” could opt to receive title to the sur-face and subsurface estates regardless of enrollment.

Native land selections made within certain Fed-eral reserves, such as the National Petroleum Re-serve–Alaska (KPR–A, formerly the NavalPetroleum Reserve No. 4, or Pet 4) on the NorthSlope, and existing wildlife refuges administered bythe U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (U.S. DOI) weresubject to certain limitations. Special Native Cor-porations organized in the non–Native cities of Ju-neau, Kenai, Kodiak, and Sitka were entitled tolands, as were Native “groups” of less than 25 per-sons. The Alaska Native Allotment Act of 1906,which allowed for up to 160 acres in four parcels toany bona fide Native, was repealed. Cemetery andhistoric sites could be selected by the Regional Cor-porations and fee title received. Title to the surfaceestate of a “reindeer–husbandry headquarters” canbe acquired by herders from village corporationslands (Section 14(c)(l)). The total land settlement issome 44 million acres, none of which is subject totaxation until 1991. In the meantime, nearly threetimes that amount of land remains withdrawn bythe Federal government, subject to valid existingrights, from all forms of appropriation under thepublic land laws, including the mining and mineral–leasing laws, and from selection under the provi-sions of the Alaska Statehood Act.

In a fashion, ANCSA has continued the land freezeof the 1960s by prohibiting most economic develop-ments in the state until the Native lands were se-lected and conveyed. Although the act was meant to“be accomplished rapidly, with certainty, in confor-mity with the real economic and social needs of Na-tives, without litigation, with maximumparticipation by Natives in decisions affecting their’

80

rights and property, without establishing any per-manent racially defined institutions, rights, privi-leges or obligations...” (Section 2(b)), theimplementation of the act under these terms hasbeen slow. Litigation has delayed many aspects ofthe implementation process.

Finally, but not least in significance, Section 17d(2)of ANCSA directed the Secretary of the Interior towithdraw up to 80 million acres of unreserved pub-lic lands for study “for addition to or creation as unitsof the National Park, Forest, Wildlife Refuge, andWild and Scenic River Systems” provided that thestate and Native Corporations could continue tomake selections and obtain patents on such with-drawn lands. The 95th Congress of 1978–1979 failedto act on a d(2) lands bill prior to the expiration ofthe d(2) withdrawals on December 18, 1978. Withthe expiration of the d(2) withdrawals, pressure wasmounted by Native groups and environmental or-ganizations and prodevelopment interests alike tokeep these lands in some type of planning and non-development status. On November 16, 1978, Secre-tary Andrus withdrew over 98 million acres of landunder the Federal Land Policy and Management Actof 1976 and placed them into three–year study ar-eas under Section 204(e) of the act. In a further ac-tion, President Carter on December 1, 1978, usedthe authority granted him under the 1906 Federal

Antiquities Act to place 56 million acres of land with-drawn under Section 204(e) into National Monu-ments. Thirteen new units and additions to theNational Monument system administered by theNational Park Service, two new monuments, admin-istered by the National Forest Service and two newNational Monuments administered by the UnitedStates Fish and Wildlife Service were created onDecember 1, 1978 (Federal Register, 1979).

The first session of the 96th Congress failed to passan Alaska national interest lands bill and in early1980 most of the land withdrawn under Section204(e) and not designated as National Monumentsbecame 20–year withdrawals under Section 204(e)of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of1976. The Selawik Wildlife Refuge in NorthwestAlaska was created from this withdrawal.

As 1980 neared an end, Congress finally passedd(2) legislation as the second session of the 96thCongress neared adjournment and the bill wassigned into law by President Jimmy Carter on De-cember 2, 1980. Except for one change, the four d(2)proposals described in Chapter I and which formedthe basis for this study remained essentially thesame under the passed legislation. The one signifi-cant change was that the area on the Seward Pen-insula originally proposed in 1977 as theChuckchi–Imuruk National Monument became the

81

Bering Land Bridge National Preserve (from Decem-ber 1978 until passage of the d(2) legislation, thisarea was one of the thirteen National Monumentsin Alaska created by President Carter and was des-ignated the Bering Land Bridge National Monu-ment). Figure 12 is presented to show the land statuson the Seward Peninsula as of late 1980.

Focusing now more closely on the Seward Penin-sula, an examination of the administrative and po-litical boundaries reveals the following. Thenorthern portion of the Seward Peninsula is part ofNANA Regional Corporation Inc.’s domain, while thesouthern two–thirds is part of the Bering StraitsNative Corporation’s (BSNC) area. Both of these in-stitutions are regional profit–making corporationsincorporated and organized under ANCSA. The re-gional corporations were mandated to be for profit,while the Village Corporations could opt for eitherprofit, or non–profit status under ANCSA.

Both regional corporations have nonprofit armswhich are involved with health, welfare, social, cul-tural, and recreational activities for their respectiveregions. Mauneluk, Inc. represents the NANA areafor these matters, while Kawerak, Inc., is the BSNCcounterpart. The Reindeer Herders Association Inc.operates through grants and contracts based atKawerak’s headquarters in Nome.

In the NANA region, 10 of the 11 village corpora-tions which originally organized under ANCSAmerged with NANA Regional Corporation in 1976.This action left Kikiktagruk Inupiat Inc., theKotzebue village corporation, as the sole village cor-poration in the region. Kotzebue is the largest vil-lage in the region, and serves as a regional serviceand distribution center. Accordingly, business oppor-tunities are greater; and the financial success of thevillage corporation is already established. NANARegional Corporation has done well financially sincethe passage of ANCSA, especially when comparedto most of the other regionals. By investing in di-verse businesses such as oilfield catering, pipelinesecurity, waste–disposal systems, banking, lumber,hardware, fuel supply and distribution, as well asreindeer herding, NANA has achieved an enviableportfolio, at the same time largely avoiding the bick-ering which early after ANCSA’s passage character-ized relations between the village corporations andtheir regional big brothers.

The Bering Straits Regional Corporation (BSNC)on the other hand, has not fared as well. Faced withwidespread, numerous (20 as opposed to NANA’s 11),small villages, agreements on land selections havebeen slow. At the same time, poor investments andmanagement resulted in multimillion–dollar lossesto the corporation over its first few years. Recentchanges in the board of directors and presidentcoupled with sounder financial strategies appear to

have placed the corporation on a firmer economicfooting. Nome’s village corporation, Sitnasuak Na-tive Corporation, has acquired the grazing permitfor the former BIA Model Herd permit area just out-side of Nome, and intends to establish a herd in thearea.

As described above, the NANA villages mergedwith the regional corporation. However, the indi-vidual herders based at Buckland and Deering didnot surrender any of their autonomy in the merger.Mergers, or joint ventures, are being considered asare joint management schemes between NANA andadjacent herders. Because NANA’s herd is increas-ing, it is seeking additional winter grazing lands.Each of the individual, or subsistence herders arefaced with a potential conflict with their regionalcorporation over herding territory. While joint herd-ing ventures are economically sound, they may notbe completely socially acceptable to family– and vil-lage oriented herders.

In the BSNC portion of the Seward Peninsula, themember villages are not yet in the position of com-peting for range resources. Herders report that thereis a great deal of interest in joint ventures usingvillage lands and privately owned reindeer to forgea viable economic alliance where land ownership ormanagement patterns require it. Every village willeventually gain title to a large block of land sur-rounding the village itself. Elim village chose to ac-quire its entire former reserve, and could utilize itto graze reindeer if they so choose. Interim convey-ance of the Norton Bay Native Reservation (Elim)lands was completed by the U.S. DOI’s Bureau ofLand Management in summer 1979.

Rather than waiting for Congress to act on theAlaska national interest lands issue, the Alaska Fed-eration of Natives approached the State of Alaskaand the U.S. Department of Interior and Agricul-ture in 1978 to establish a cooperative planning body.The resulting Alaska Land Managers CooperativeTask Force was brought together by a Memorandumof Agreement among these four groups. A number ofsubcommittees were established including one onreindeer herding. The Land Managers Task Forceprovides a forum for dialogue among the affectedgroups. The subcommittee chairmen report to themembers of the Task Force directly. To date, the Re-indeer Subcommittee has been able to help fund andcoordinate range surveys undertaken by the SoilConservation Service (U.S. Department of Agricul-ture) similar to the one done in 1977 (Preston, 1977).Permit regulations and procedures for grazing onU.S. DOI lands once administered by BLM, but nowunder NPS and USF&WS jurisdiction, are beingstandardized.

State of Alaska concerns are being anticipatedthrough the subcommittee, as the state will eventu-

82

ally receive title to several million acres of land onthe Seward Peninsula. Updates on the land statusof national interest lands legislation are presentedat subcommittee meetings. Because representativesof the Reindeer Herders Association are on the sub-committee, this information gets disseminated rap-idly among the herders for their consideration. Inaddition to pragmatic concerns such as range sur-veys, a major product of the Reindeer Subcommit-tee is policy recommendations for reindeer grazingon differing land jurisdictions. While no membersare bound by these policies, they form working guide-lines for internal policy development within the vari-ous agencies.

Significant amounts of real estate on the SewardPeninsula are claimed by or patented to individualsand corporations under mineral entries, especiallyplacer gold mining. The state has selected severallarge blocks of land for their mineral and grazingpotential. These state land selections lie south ofDeering and Candle, to the east of Wales, and northof Teller and Brevig Mission. A major Federal hold-ing is the 2,590,000–acre Bering Land Bridge Na-tional Preserve. The Preserve is administered by theNational Park Service and lies in the northcentralportion of the Seward Peninsula. The changing landownership and management patterns on the SewardPeninsula have major implications for the reindeerherding industry.

Policy considerations and mitigatingmeasures

We will conclude this chapter with a brief analy-sis of several policy areas because the future of re-indeer herding will depend upon the policies ofvarious land owners and managers in addition tothe desires of the reindeer herders themselves. Thesepolicies are not presented as being comprehensiveand inflexible, but rather to identify key issues whichmust be resolved for the future well–being of thereindeer industry. While no individual or organiza-tion is likely to agree completely with this section,it reflects the different agency mandates, institu-tional directions, and personal preferences of theaffected parties, rather than (we hope) shortcom-ings in the analyses themselves. We have chosennot to address issues that are clearly peripheral toherding, but which can and, ultimately do have animpact on the herding industry.

Fitzsimmons (1976) writes that at least three vari-ables contribute significantly to development in Na-tional Park Service areas: “(1) the financial, in termsof obtaining funds for park projects; (2) the esthetic,in terms of containing development below somethreshold of excessive scenic depreciation; and, (3)the social, in terms of striking a balance among di-

vergent visitor expectations and opinions.” It is notimpossible for the National Park Service or the U.S.Fish and Wildlife Service to function as required bytheir Congressional mandate while at the same timemaintaining reindeer herding within park, preserve,refuge, or monument lands. Since “reserve designa-tion would allow existing grazing to continue to theextent that it could fill the niche of the extirpatedcaribou” (U.S. DOI, 1974), ways and means shouldbe explored to see that the activities of the Federalagencies and the reindeer herders continue to be co-ordinated. For example, shelter cabins that mightbe erected for National Preserve visitors and agencypersonnel could also double as range cabins. Visitorexpectations and opinions regarding reindeer herd-ing and Native life in general could be positivelyemphasized with information and promotional lit-erature which describe the role and significance ofreindeer herding in the village economy and inpeople’s lives. It remains to be seen whether prom-ises made to continue to permit reindeer herding onnational– interest lands will be kept.

The socioeconomic impacts of increased, constant,or even declining herd sizes on the herders, the vil-lages, the range, and the region do not take placeindependently of other biological, social, and eco-nomic factors. Prominent among these factors arethe changing land–ownership and land–manage-ment jurisdictions on Federal lands in northwestAlaska, and the policies and management regula-tions being developed for these lands. Additionalfactors relating directly to management policies onpublic lands include: subsistence and wildlife man-agement, fire control policy, aircraft use, and all ter-rain–vehicle (atv) use, to mention but a few. We willcomment briefly on these.

Changing land ownershipChanging land–ownership and management pat-

terns over northwestern Alaska is a major problemwhich reindeer herd operators currently face. Theemerging checkerboard pattern of ownership andmanagement is viewed by some as the foremost prob-lem facing herding for it means that some form ofcooperative agreement must be secured by the rein-deer herders with adjacent private, corporate, state,and Federal land owners and managers. Since all ofthese parties have somewhat different and often con-flicting attitudes, policies, and regulations for herd-ing, the individual owner is often in a quandaryabout how to resolve the conflict. The Reindeer Herd-ers Association successfully sought assurances thatreindeer herding would continue to be allowed bypermit on Federal lands on the Seward Peninsulain the legislative language of the recently passedd(2) bill.

The Alaska Department of Natural Resources

83

(DNR) is responsible for the management of rein-deer herding on state lands, among its other myriadfunctions. Responsibilities toward reindeer herdinghave only recently been recognized and, directed ac-tion is only beginning. A threefold breakdown of stateresponsibilities is now in effect. The Division of For-est, Land, and Water Management is responsible forthe management of the range resource which theherders use, the granting of reindeer permits orleases, and the establishment of permit (or lease)sizes and locations. This latter function will be car-ried out in conjunction with the Division of Agricul-ture which will also work with the herders onmarketing techniques and extension and educationservices. Coordination of the education and devel-opment activities will take place with members ofthe University of Alaska who are involved in rein-deer–related research. Last, the Division of Researchand Development, DNR, will formulate general statereindeer policy, evaluate and recommend which statelands should be set aside for reindeer grazing, andcoordinate state participation with the reindeerherders.

Subsistence and wildlife managementpolicy

Policy regarding subsistence and wildlife manage-ment will affect reindeer herding. If subsistence uti-lization of resources is restricted or prohibited,reindeer may have to provide a greater portion ofthe village nutritional requirements. This could pro-vide increased revenues for herd owners since pricesreceived would be expected to increase under condi-tions of increased demand and stable supplies.

It currently appears to be the intent of the De-partment of the Interior to permit subsistence ac-tivities to continue on National Preserve lands. Ifthese activities are allowed to continue at currentlevels, the effect on reindeer herding will be to per-petuate the status quo of the reindeer industry whichis located on those Federal lands. A situation some-where between complete curtailment of subsistenceactivities and the continuation of current harvestlevels seems most likely to develop. Demand for re-indeer meat and byproducts will increase regard-less of the restrictions placed on subsistenceutilization of public lands on the Seward Peninsula.The increased demand will come with increasing hu-man population in the region, increasing costs forother meat products, and a preference among mostresidents of the region for reindeer over other red–meat products.

Under wildlife management considerations, twomajor areas of concern emerge. First, some preda-tor control is necessary to protect the reindeer herds.Until recently, herd owners were aided by the Bu-

reau of Indian Affairs and the U.S. Fish and Wild-life Service in their predator control efforts. Wolvescan scatter a herd far and wide, in addition to kill-ing the reindeer. Bears, ravens, and other preda-tors, including man, also kill or harass reindeer. Ifall predator control is eliminated on Federal landson the Seward Peninsula, reindeer herding will beadversely impacted. During the fall and early win-ter of 1977, more wolves were reported on the east-ern Seward Peninsula than in recent years. Herdersalso reported wolf kills, in addition to scattered andlost reindeer.

Predator control in general, and of the wolf in par-ticular, is a highly emotional topic. Wolves are notan endangered species in Alaska. The decline in theWestern Arctic Caribou Herd has been attributedto some extent to predation by wolves (Greiner,1976). It would appear at this time that limited,uniform predator control will be necessary on theSeward Peninsula in order to allow reindeer herd-ing to continue at all. This may develop into a po-litical compromise whereby predator control toprotect reindeer herds would be allowed on one unitof national–interest lands, for example the BeringLand Bridge National Preserve where reindeer aregrazed, and not allowed on another where caribouare present. Thus, potential prey and habitat forwolves would be available, but not at the expense ofthe reindeer herds.

Another alternative has been suggested to resolvethe conflict between reindeer and bear predation.Under this proposal, herders would notify AlaskaDepartment of Fish and Game officials in Nome orKotzebue whenever they are experiencing bear pre-dation. Since bear predation takes place largely inthe spring when there is a legal open season, ADF&Gofficers could instruct registered guides to take aclient to the area, and allow the client to shoot theproblem bear. While this arrangement has yet to becompletely considered and implemented, the herd-ers see several difficulties such as the slow responsetime of the ADF&G/guide/client link; no resolutionof the immediate problem of the predacious bear;and logistical difficulties in contacting ADF&G fromfield or village locations and directing the guide/cli-ent to the precise location of the problem. Nonethe-less, this is a positive approach by ADF&G to a veryreal problem faced by the herders. This in itself isencouraging given the long history of less–than–amiable relations between the Native subsistenceusers and the state agency charged with preserva-tion of game and enforcement of the fish and gamelaws.

Another area of concern for wildlife managementis the interaction of reindeer with birds during theirnesting season. This coincides more or less in bothtime and space with the summer antler harvesting,

84

roundup activities. Research funded by the NationalPark Service and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serviceover several years has provided data on the nestingbirds and their habitat, abundance and distribution,reindeer foraging and foot placement, and reindeerand nesting bird interactions (Wright, 1978). Dur-ing the research, “few direct interactions betweenreindeer and nesting birds were observed” althoughprobably many interactions were not observed dueto distance of the observers from the herds (1978). Aliterature review did not find that eggs were a sig-nificant part of reindeer or caribou diets. The effectof indirect impacts caused by reindeer grazing suchas foliage depletion or range deterioration was notfound to be significant on the bird populations. Tominimize impacts of reindeer grazing on bird life,Wright suggests that the timing of herding and cor-ralling and the routes used during the summer op-erations should take nesting–bird distributions andactivities into account (1978).

Management or grazing permits could stipulatethat reindeer be kept away from nesting areas suchas salt grass meadows, coastal tundra, and low–me-dium willows. Research should be continued to de-termine the long–range effect of reindeerinteractions with birds and other wildlife for opti-mum management of these public resources.

Fire–control policyFire–control policy will affect reindeer operations,

but because the role of fire in the tundra ecosystemis still imperfectly understood, one cannot accuratelypredict the impacts other than in a most generalway. NANA Regional Corporation sponsored a two–day meeting in November 1977 to discuss the im-pacts on the region of the severe tundra fires in thesummer of 1977. At these meetings, some expertssuggested that fire may have beneficial effects inboth the short and the long run by releasing nutri-ents and promoting succession in the plant commu-nities which reindeer and caribou graze. If thebiologists are correct, then a policy of allowing natu-rally caused tundra fires to burn themselves out mayhave advantages over suppression efforts by increas-ing the amount of available forage.

On the other hand, adverse effects of large tundrafires may outweigh this benefit. Distribution of ex-isting reindeer ranges, increased stream siltation,with resultant loss of fish habitat or damage to prop-erty, unaesthetic appearance of the environment,and hazardous flying conditions all may occur. In-come from fire fighting would be foregone to the resi-dents of the region if fires were allowed to burnwithout suppression efforts. Policy regarding firesuppression should be made on the biological, so-cial, and economic merits of alternatives.

Aircraft policyRestrictions on aircraft use have potential for ad-

versely affecting herding operations. Aircraft arecurrently used extensively by herd owners. Meat isshipped to markets by air, although most of theseflights utilize the village landing strips. During theantler harvest season, aircraft are used to haul theantler buyers, his crew, and the velvet antler. At thistime of year, landings are made by wheel–equippedplanes on beaches and gravel bars. During the win-ter, wheel– and ski–equipped planes are used to lo-cate the herds and to keep track of herd movements.Landings are made often on snow covered, frozenlakes. Only two herders have airplanes themselves,but others express interest in learning to fly. All herdowners utilize chartered aircraft in their herdingoperations to some extent throughout the year. Themajor antler purchaser used a two–man helicopterto locate reindeer in the summer and drive theminto the corral for antler harvesting until a crashduring a 1978 roundup resulted in the loss of theaircraft and pilot. Another model helicopter has beenused in subsequent roundups. The elimination orrestriction of use of a helicopter on Federal landswould substantially increase the difficulty, and thecost of antler harvesting could probably not be re-covered. Since antler sales are a major portion ofherd owners’ income, this would have an undesir-able effect on herd owners.

All–terrain vehicle (ATV) policyChanges in current herd–management practices

could result from various Federal and state regula-tions affecting Seward Peninsula lands. For ex-ample, the total ban on the use of snow machines onpublic lands would probably have the effect of put-ting the herd owners out of business. The snow ma-chine has been adopted by Eskimos because it is apractical and efficient alternative to dog teams un-der current conditions (Hall, 1971). A return to dogteams may be held by some people as a romanticideal. To force such a return by regulation or lawwould impose the need for procuring, raising, train-ing, feeding, and maintaining the teams upon peoplewho have changed to a more economical alternative.These same observations also hold true for draft re-indeer under current conditions. Partial restrictionson snow machine use, such as limiting them to snow–covered ground and to the winter season, would prob-ably not adversely affect herd operations.

One herd owner uses a small tracked vehicle tomove to his summer range and a corral that wasused for summer handlings up to 1976. The tracksfrom this activity run through national interestlands from the Deering–Utica road, west along thedivide between the Immachuk and Goodhope River.This corral is still used for winter handlings, but

85

snow machines are used to travel to it in the winter.Other herders own various all–terrain vehicles

besides the ubiquitous snow machines. High pur-chase and operating costs combined with mechani-cal problems have led to their infrequent use inrecent years. Concern over the possible adverse im-pacts to vegetation led the National Park Service tosponsor research on this question. Results reportedby Racine (1979) indicate that natural revegetationrates vary with the degree of disturbance to the tun-dra. The use of light–weight atv’s was found to causelittle or no severe tundra disturbance under mostconditions. Mitigation of the impacts could be un-dertaken by 1) selecting the most environmentallysafe atv’s available; 2) selecting certain travel routeswhich minimize tundra disturbances; and 3) usingmodified or alternative roundup methods during thesummer (Racine, 1979).

SummaryThis chapter has brought the reader to the present

in the ongoing evolution of the reindeer industry andits role in the lives of the people of northwesternAlaska. The emphasis has been on the contempo-rary situation, one which owes most of its problemsas well as its potential to the passage of the AlaskaNative Claims Settlement Act. The institutional ve-hicle used in ANCSA to deliver the money, lands,and services of the settlement has been the Nativecorporation. Because the corporate and not the tribalconcept was used, the experience of Alaskan Nativeswith the Federal government has been both pro-foundly different from the experiences of otherAmerican Indian groups, and distressingly familiarin other ways. Areas of similarity are found in theunreasonably long time it has taken for the Federalgovernment to respond to the pressing social, eco-nomic, and political needs of Natives under the trustrelationship which the Federal government holdswith Native Americans. Another area is in the ex-emptions in various pieces of legislation for Nativesto protect their subsistence needs. The Reindeer Actfor example, was passed in part to provide a “meansof subsistence for the Eskimos and other Natives ofAlaska” (25 USC 250 et seq 1970). Last, AlaskanNatives have been considered United States citizenssince 1924; they were extended the right to acquiretitle to lands which they utilized under the 1906Alaska Native Allotment Act, to acquire townsite lotsin 1926, and to acquire the lands, economic develop-ment, and local government powers provided by the1934 Indian Reorganization Act provided by the IRAAlaska amendments passed in 1936.

Differences in the relationship can be traced to thehistorical treatment of Alaskan Natives by thecourts, the different sociocultural integration of mostNative groups compared to the tribes of the conti-

nental United States, and the legal construction ofANCSA as “Native” legislation which only termi-nated those titles and claims base on aboriginal titleor use and occupancy. The various reports on ANCSAprior to its passage and other sections of the act in-dicate that it was Congress’ intent to protect Nativesubsistence in other ways. ANCSA’s passage did notand was never intended to terminate Native’s rightsand privileges under other applicable state and Fed-eral statutes, a point frequently disregarded in theoften emotional debates concerning access to andthe allocation of ever–diminishing resources. The re-lationship of the Federal government to Natives willcontinue in four major areas, portions of which havebeen touched upon in other parts of this volume.These are: 1) the settlement of Native land claimsand the subsequent protection of those lands; 2) theprovision of various human services (health, educa-tion, welfare); 3) the protection of subsistence ac-tivities under applicable Federal (and state) laws;and, 4) the promotion of Native government (cf. Case,1978).

A final point concerning contemporay reindeerherding will be made. The geopolitical map of Alaskatoday is crisscrossed with state, Federal, Native,borough, private, and military holdings in a check-erboard fashion that is underscored by the fact that,in 1959, at statehood, some 99 percent of the landwas in Federal stewardship. Reindeer, birds, andother animals, including humans have traveled overthe lands without regard for the location of town-ship and section lines on status plats. Each landowner and manager has a different philosophy aboutthe highest and best uses of the land. Inevitably,pressure on the resources, renewable and non–re-newable alike, is going to increase. The political andeconomic maneuverings to control larger land hold-ings, crucial ranges, and greater numbers of rein-deer for the commercial market pose a dilemma fortraditionally family– and village–oriented herderswhose subsistence lifestyle is already assaulted byforces beyond their comprehension and control. Al-ready burdened with the twin problems of access tothe lands and waters for subsistence purposes, andthe regulation of species types, numbers, and man-ner and time of taking, subsistence–oriented Alas-kans and the reindeer herders alike will have tobecome more intensively involved in the politicalarena to continue being permitted to derive theirliving from the resources and lands of their ances-tors.

BibliographyAlaska Crop and Livestock Reporting Service. 1973.

Alaska Agricultural Statistics. Palmer, Alaska.—. 1975. Alaska Agricultural Statistics. Palmer,

86

Alaska.—. 1976. Alaska Agricultural Statistics. Palmer,

Alaska.—. 1978. Alaska Agricultural Statistics. Palmer,

Alaska.Alaska, State of, Department of Economic Develop-

ment. 1974. Report by the Department of Eco-nomic Development to the Legislature on the 1973Reindeer Appropriation. Juneau.

Alaska, State of, Department of Labor. 1976. AlaskaStatistical Quarterly. Office of the Commissioner,Research and Analysis Section. Juneau.

Alonso, W., and Rust, E. 1976. The evolving patternof village Alaska. Federal–State Land Use Plan-ning Commission for Alaska: Anchorage. Com-mission Study 17.

Anonymous. 1953. Reindeer history and proposedpossible programs. Manuscript on file at USBIA,Juneau, Alaska.

Andrews, C.L. 1926. Reindeer in the Arctic. PacificNorthwest Quarterly 17:14–17. January.

—. 1930. Letter to E.W. Sawyer of May 23, 1930.File 9–1–3 3, Part No. 3 Alaska– Game– Rein-deer– Lomen Reindeer Corporation, ClassifiedFiles, 1907–1951. Records of the office of Terri-tories and Island Possessions, Record Group 126,National Archives Building.

—. 1935. Driving reindeer in Alaska. Pacific North-west Quarterly 26: 90–93. April.

—. 1938. The Story of Alaska. revised ed. Caldwell,Idaho: The Caxton Printers, Ltd.

Arnold, L.D. 1948. Letter to Division of Extensionand Industry and Division of Forestry and Graz-ing.

Arnold, R.D. 1978. Alaska Native Land Claims. 2nd

ed. The Alaska Native Foundation. Anchorage.Arobio, E.L.; Thomas, W.C.; and Workman, W.G.

1980. Mathematical programming for consider-ing management options in Alaska reindeerherding. In Proceedings of the 2nd InternationalReindeer/Caribou Symposium, eds. E. Reimers,E. Gaare, and S. Skjenneberg, 1979. Roros, Nor-way.

Bockstoce, J.R. 1977a. Steam Whaling in the West-ern Arctic. New Bedford Whaling Museum andOld Dartmouth Historical Society. New Bedford,Massachusetts.

—. 1977b. The arctic whaling disaster of 1897. Pro-logue, The Journal of the National Archives9(1):27–42. March.

Brevig, T.L., and Johnson, J.W., compiler. 1944.Apaurak in Alaska, Social Pioneering Among theEskimos. Translated and Compiled from theRecords of the Reverent Tollef Larason Brevig,Pioneer Missionary to the Eskimos of Alaska.Philadelphia: Dorrance & Company.

Burch, E.S., Jr. 1972. The caribou/wild reindeer.

American Antiquity 37(3):339–368. July.—. 1975. Eskimo kinsmen: changing family relation-

ships in northwest Alaska. American Ethnologi-cal Society, Monograph No. 59. St. Paul, SanFrancisco: West Publishing, Co.

Burch, E.S., Jr., and Correll, T.C. 1972. Alliance andconflict: Interregional relations in north Alaska.In Alliance in Eskimo Society, ed. Lee Guemple.Proceedings of the American Ethnological Soci-ety, 1971 Supplement.

Burdick, C.G. 1940. Report to the Secretary of theInterior, Reindeer Acquisition Unit, FY1940.Alaska Native Service, Juneau.

Burk, M. 1968. Consumption Economics: AMultidisciplinary Approach. New York: JohnWiley and Sons.

Campbell, J.M. 1968. Territoriality among ancienthunters: interpretations from ethnography andnature. In Anthropological Archeology in theAmericas, ed. B.J. Meggers, pp. 1–21

Carrasco, P. 1963. The locality referrent in residenceterms. American Anthropologist 65(1):133–134.

Case, D.S. 1978. The Special Relationship of AlaskaNatives to the Federal Government. An Histori-cal and Legal Analysis. The Alaska Native Foun-dation. Anchorage.

Chapman Committee 1934. Memorandum to theSecretary of the Interior, Harold C. Ickes, July10, 1934. File 9–1–33 Part No. 3, Alaska– Game–Reindeer– Administrative, Classified Files,1907–1951. Records of the Office of Territoriesand Island Possessions, Record Group 126, Na-tional Archives Building.

Churchhill, F.C. 1906. Reports on the condition ofeducational and school service and managementof reindeer service in Alaska, with commentaryfrom Educ. Bur. on same. June. 176 pp., map.(S. Doc. 483, 59th Cong. 2st Sess., in v. 23; 4931.)

Courtright, A.M. 1959. Range Management and thegenus Rangifer: A Review of Selected Literature.M.S. Thesis, University of Alaska, Fairbanks.

Draper, H.H. 1977. The aboriginal Eskimo diet inmodern perspective. American Anthropologist79(2):309–316. June.

Eisler, D. Subsistence resource use in the proposedChukchi–Imuruk National Reserve. Preliminaryreport. Ms. on file with National Park Service,Fairbanks.

Espmark, Y. 1964a. Rutting behavior in reindeerRangifer tarandus L. Animal Behavior12(1):159–163.

—. 1964b. Studies in dominance–subordination re-lationship in a group of semi–domestic reindeerRangifer tarandus L. Animal Behavior12(4):420–426.

—. 1971. Antler shedding in relation to parturitionin female reindeer. Journal of Wildlife Manage-

87

ment 35(1):175–177. January.Evans, A.R. 1934a. Meat. The story of the four year

trek of the Canadian government reindeer herd.The Beaver Outfit 264, Number 4:26–28, 64.March.

—. 1934b. Meat. The Beaver Outfit 265, No. 1:25–27, June.

—. 1934c. Meat. The Beaver Outfit 265, No. 2:14–17, 64. September.

—. 1934d. Meat (concluding installment). The Bea-ver Outfit 265, Number 3:22–25. December.

—. 1946. Reindeer Trek. Toronto: McClelland &Stewart, Ltd.

Federal Register. 1978. The President: Alaska Na-tional Monument Proclamations. 43(234):57009–57132 December 4.

Federal Register. 1979. Department of the Interior,National Park Service. Alaska National Monu-ments: General Management Regulations – Pro-posed. 44(126):37732–37751. June 28.

Fitzgerald, J.H., et al. 1968. Alaska Natives and theLand. Federal Field Committee for DevelopmentPlanning in Alaska. Washington, D.C. US GPO.

Fitzsinlmons, A.K. 1976. National Parks: the di-lemma of development. Science 191(4226):440–444. February 6.

Foote, D.C. 1964. American whalemen in northwest-ern arctic Alaska. Arctic Anthropology 2(2):16–20.

—. 1965. Exploration and Resource Utilization inNorthwestern arctic Alaska before 1855. PhDDissertation, McGill University, Montreal.

Foote, D.C., and Williamson, H.A. 1966. A humangeographical study. In Environment of the CapeThompson Region, eds. N.J. Wilimovsky, andJ.M. Wolfe, pp. 1041–1107. U.S. Atomic EnergyCommission, Division of Technical Information.

George, T.H.; Stringer, W.J.; Preston, J.E.; Fibich,W.R.; and Scorup, P.C. 1977. Reindeer range in-ventory in western Alaska from computer–aideddigital classification of LANDSAT data. Paperpresented at AAAS meeting, September, 1968,Anchorage, pp. 98–115.

Greiner, J. 1976. Tomorrow came too soon. AlaskaMagazine. May,: pp. 4–8.

Hall, E.S., Jr. 1970. The late prehistoric/early his-toric Eskimo of interior northern Alaska. Anethnoarchaeological approach? Anthropology Pa-pers of the University ofAlaska. 15(1):1–12.

—.1971. The “Iron Dog” in Northern Alaska.Anthropologica, N.S. Vol. 13, nos. 1–2:237–254.

—.1975. The Eskimo Storyteller. Folktales fromNoatak, Alaska. Knoxville: The University ofTennessee Press.

—.1977. Howard glimpses era’s end. In Alaska Geo-graphic 4(2):66–111.

Hanrahan, J., and Gruenstein, P. 1977. Lost Fron-

tier: The Marketing ofAlaska. New York: W.W.Norton & Co.

Hanson, H.C. 1952. Importance and developmentof the reindeer industry in Alaska. Journal ofRange Management 5(4):243–251. July.

—.1953. Vegetation types in northwestern Alaskaand comparisons with communities in other arc-tic regions. Ecology 34 (1):111–140.

Hickey, C.G. 1976. An economic view of adaptation.In Contributions to Anthropology: The interiorpeoples of northern Alaska, ed. E.S. Hall, Jr.,pp. 235–298. National Museum of Man MercurySeries, Archaeological Survey of Canada PaperNo. 49. Ottawa: National Museums of Canada.

Hill, R.M. 1967. Mackenzie Reindeer Operations.Ottawa: Northern Coordination and ResearchCenter.

Hinckley, T.C. 1966. The Presbyterian leadership inpioneer Alaska. The Journal of American His-tory 52(4):743–756.

Hippler, A.E. 1969. Some observations on the persis-tence ofAlaskan Native village populations. In-stitute of Social, Economic and GovernmentResearch, Research Note Al. University ofAlaska, Fairbanks.

—.1971. Patterns of migration, urbanization and ac-culturation. In Alaska Public Policy, ed. G.S.Harrison, pp. 307–313. Institute of Social, Eco-nomic and Government Research, University ofAlaska, Fairbanks.

Indian Truth Magazine 1932. February, vol. 9(2).—.1933a. March, vol. 10(3).—.1933b. April, vol. 10(4).Ingold, T. 1976. The Skolt Lapps Today. Cambridge,

New York: Cambridge University Press.Jackson, S. 1903. Twelfth annual report on the in-

troduction of domestic reindeer into Alaska.192(1) pp., 42 pl., map. March. (S. Doc. 70, 57th

Cong., 2nd Sess., in vol. 14:45999.)Jochim, M.A. 1976. Hunter–Gatherer Subsistence

and Settlement, A Predictive Model. New York:Academic Press.

Keithahn, E.L. 1963. Eskimo Adventure,AnotherJourney into the Primitive. New York:Bonanza Books.

Kerri, J.N. 1977. A social analysis of the human el-ement in housing: A Canadian case. HumanOganization 36(2):173–185.

Klein, D.R. 1959. Saint Matthew Island reindeer–range study. U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service,Special Scientific Report: Wildlife no. 43. Wash-ington, D. C.

—.1964. Range–related differences in growth of deerreflected in skeletal ratios. Journal of Mammal-ogy 45(2):226–235. May 20.

—.1967. Interactions of Rangifer tarandus (reindeerand caribou) with its habitat in Alaska. Finn-

88

ish Game Research 30:289–293.—.1970. Tundra ranges north of the Boreal Forest.

Journal of Range Management 2 3(1):8–4.—.1971 Reaction of reindeer to obstructions and dis-

turbances. Science 173(3995):393–398. July 30.Lantis, M. 1950. The reindeer industry in Alaska.

Arctic 3(1):27–44. April.Leeds, A. 1965. Reindeer herding and Chukchi so-

cial institutions. In Culture, Man, and Animals,eds. A, Leeds and A. P. Vayda, pp. 87–128. Pub-lication no. 78 for the American Association forthe Advancement of Science, Washington, D.C.

Little, A.D., Inc. 1963. An evaluation of the feasibil-ity of Native industry in northwestern Alaska,report to U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs C–54870,Cambridge, Mass.

Lomen, C.J. 1954. Fifty years in Alaska. New York:D. McKay Co.

Lomen Family Collection. Papers of the Lomen Fam-ily Archives. Elmer E. Rasmusson Library, Uni-versity of Alaska, Fairbanks.

Lipps, O.H. 1936. Eskimo villages along the coastand on the islands of the Bering Sea. A reporton their economic and social condition. A reportby a field representative of the Commissioner ofIndian Affairs. Records of the BIA, Entry 797RG75, National Archives.

Luick, J.R. 1973. The Cantwell reindeer industry,1921–1928. The Alaska Journal, 3(2):107–113.Spring.

—.1977. Research activities for the reindeer indus-try, spring and summer, 1977. Reindeer Herd-ers Newsletter, Institute of Arctic Biology,2(1):1–4. March.

—.1978. Presentation made at Alaska Rural Devel-opment Council meeting. May 1.

Luick, J.R.; Lent, P.C.; Klein, D.R.; White, R.G., eds.1975. Proceedings of the first international re-indeer and caribou symposium. Biological Pa-pers of the University of Alaska, Special ReportNumber 1. September.

Mauneluk Association, Inc. 1974. The NANA Region,its Resources and Development Potential.Kotzebue.

Milan, F.A. 1962. Maintenance of thermal balancein arctic Eskimos and Antarctic sojourners. InInternational Symposium on Antarctic Biologyand Medicine, Paris. pp. 529–534.

Milan, F.A., and Evonuk, E. 1967. Oxygen consump-tion and body temperatures of Eskimos duringsleep. Journal of Applied Physiology 22(3):265–567. March.

Milan, F.A.; Hannon, John P.; and Evonuk, E. 1963.Temperature regulation of Eskimos, Indiansand Caucasians in a bath calorimeter. Ameri-can Journal ofApplied Physiology 18:378–382.

Miller, M. 1935. The Great Trek: The Story of the

Five–Year Drive of a Reindeer Herd through theIcy Wastes ofAlaska and Northwestern Canada.Doubleday, Doran & Co.

Mozee, B.B. 1933. The Reindeer Problem in Alaska.Nome, Alaska.

Muller–Wille, L., and Pelto, P.J. 1971. Technicalchange and its impact in Arctic Regions: Lappsintroduce snow machines into reindeer herding.Polarforschung 7:142–148. November.

Nash, R. 1933. Recommendations regarding theGeneral Reindeer Superintendent for Alaska,November 11, 1933, File 9–1–33, Part No. 4,Alaska– Game–Reindeer– Investigations– Gen-eral, Classified Files, 1907–1951, Records of theOffice of Territories and Island Possessions,National Archives Building.

—. 1934. Report adverse to the Lomen Corporation,January 11, 1934, File 9–1–33, Alaska– Game–Reindeer– Investigations, Classfied Files, 1907–1951, Records of the Office of Territories andIsland Possessions, Record Group 125, NationalArchives Building.

Nelson, R.K. 1969. Hunters of the Northern Ice. Chi-cago: University of Chicago Press.

Nowosad, R.F. 1975. Reindeer survival in theMackenzie Delta herd: birth to four months. InProceedings of the First International Reindeerand Caribou Symposium eds. J. R. Luick et al.,pp. 199–208. Biological Papers of the Univer-sity of Alaska, Special Report Number 1.

Odum, E.P. 1971. Fundamentals of Ecology. 3rd ed.Philadelphia: Saunders.

Olson, D.F. 1969. Alaska reindeer herdsmen. A studyin Native management in transition. Instituteof Social, Economic and Government Research,University of Alaska, Fairbanks. SEC ReportNo. 18.

Oquilluk, W.A. 1973. People of Kauwerak. Legendsof the Northern Eskimo. Anchorage: AMU Press.

Paine, R. 1964. Herding and husbandry: Two basicdistinctions in the analysis of reindeer manage-ment. Folk 6(1):83–88.

—. 1972. The herd managemen of Lapp reindeerpastoralists. Journal of Asian and African Stud-ies VII: 76–87.

Palmer, L.J. 1923. Letter to Chief of Bureau of Bio-logical Survey, E.W. Nelson, December 8, 1923,Central Files, General Correspondence, Recordsof the Bureau of Biological Survey, Record Group22, National Archives Building.

—. 1924. Letter to E.W. Nelson, Chief of Bureau ofBiological Survey, February 15, Central Files,General Correspondence Records of the Bureauof Biological Survey, Record Group 22, NationalArchives Building.

—. 1926. Progress of reindeer grazing investigationsin Alaska. Contribution of the Bureau of Bio-

89

logical Survey, October.—. 1934. Raising reindeer in Alaska. U.S. Depart-

ment of Agriculture Miscellaneous PublicationsNo. 207. Washington, D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office.

—. 1944a. Alaska Reindeer. U.S. Office of Indian Af-fairs, Alaska Native Service. Juneau. Field Re-port.

—. 1944b. Food requirements of some Alaskan gamemammals. Journal of Mammology 25(1):49–54.

Palmer, L.J., and Rouse, C.H. 1945. Study of Alas-kan tundra with reference to its reactions to re-indeer and other grazing. U. S. Fish and WildlifeService Research Report 10. Washington, D. C.:U. S. Government Printing Office.

Parks, C.A. 1930. Letter to E.K. Burlew, April 8,1930, File 91–33, Part No. 3. Alaska– Game–Reindeer– General, Classified Files 1907–1951,Records of the Office of Territories and IslandPossessions, Records Group 126, National Ar-chives Building.

Pegau, R.E. 1968. Reindeer Range Appraisal inAlaska. M.S. Thesis University of Alaska, Col-lege, Alaska.

—. 1970a. Succession in two enclosures nearUnalakleet, Alaska. The Canadian Field–Natu-ralist 84(2):175–177. April–June.

—. 1970b. Effects of reindeer trampling on lichens.Journal of Range Management 23(2):95–97.

Pelto, P.J. 1973. The Snowmobile Revolution: Tech-nology and Social Change in the Arctic. MenloPark, California: Cummings Publishing Com-pany, Inc.

Pelto, P.J.; Linkola, M.; and Sammallahti, P. 1968.The snowmobile revolution in Lapland. Jour-nal of the Finno– Ugri Society 69:3–42

Pelto, P., and Muller–Wille, L. 1972/1973. Reindeerherding and snowmobiles: aspects of a techno-logical revolution (Jtsjoki and Sevetti–jarvi,Finnish Lapland). Folk 14–15, 119–144.

Porsild, A.E. 1929. Reindeer grazing in northwestCanada. Report of an investigation of pastoralpossibilities in the area from the Alaska–Yukonboundary to Coppermine River. Ottawa: King’sPrinter.

Powers W.R.; Plaskett, D.C.; and Godfrey, A. 1975.1974 Chukchi Imuruk Archaeological SurveyFinal Report. University of Alaska, Fairbanks.

Preston, J.E.; Fibich, W.R.; Thomas, G.H., andScorup, P.C. 1977. Range sites and soils of theKotzebue Sound area, Alaska. Anchorage: U.S.Department of Agriculture, Soil ConservationService.

Racine, C.H. 1979. Tundra disturbance and recov-ery resulting from off–road vehicle use for sum-mer reindeer herding and a 1974–1975 winterdrilling operation in the northern Seward Pen-

insula, Alaska. Final Report to the NationalPark Service, Alaska Area Office. Wolcott, Ver-mont: Center for Northern Studies.

Ray, D.J. 1964. Nineteenth century settlement andsubsistence patterns in Bering Strait. Arctic An-thropology 2(2):61–94.

—. 1965. Sheldon Jackson and the reindeer indus-try of Alaska. Journal of Presbyterian History43(2):71–99.

—. 1975. The Eskimos of Bering Strait, 1659–1898.Seattle and London: University of WashingtonPress.

Redfield, R. 1953. The Primitive World and Its Trans-formations. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Redmyer, H.E., Arestad, S., trans. and ed., 1951.Reindeer in Alaska. Pacific Northwest Quarterly42(3):211–223. July.

Rogers, G.W. 1971. Alaska Native Population Trendsand Vital Statistics, 1950–1985. Institute of So-cial, Economic and Government Research, Re-search Note. University of Alaska, Fairbanks.

Rood, J.S. 1936. Statement to the Senate Commit-tee on Indian Affairs Regarding Reindeer inAlaska. U.S.B.I.A., Nome, Alaska.

—. 1937. Memorandum Regarding the Reindeer Ser-vice of the Office of Indian Affairs. U.S. Office ofIndian Affairs. Nome, Alaska.

—. 1942. Letter to General Superintendent ClaudeM. Hirst, June 10, 1942. Records of the Bureauof Indian Affairs, Record Group 75, National Ar-chives Building.

—. 1943. Narrative re: Alaska Reindeer Herds forCalendar Year 1942, with supplementary data.U.S.B.I.A. Nome, Alaska. pp. 151.

Rouse, C.H.; Mountjoy, C.R.; and Belcher, D.M. 1948.Reindeer Survey–1948. U.S. Fish and WildlifeService and Alaska Native Service .

Ryan, W.C., Jr. 1933. The Alaska Reindeer Indus-try. Confidential Report by the Director of Edu-cation, Bureau of Indian Affairs U.S.Department of the Interior. June.

Sahlins, M. 1972. Stone Age Economics. Chicago:Aldine Publishing Co.

Sawyer, E.W. 1930a. Letter to Governor George A.Parks, October 3, 1930, File 9–1–33, Part No. 5,Alaska– Game– Reindeer General, ClassifiedFiles, 1907–1951, Records of the Office of Terri-tories and Island Possessions, Record Group 126,National Archives Building.

—. 1930b. Letter to Secretary of the Interior RayLyman Wilbur, May 3, 1930. Classified Files,1907–1951, Records of the Office of Territoriesand Island Possessions, Record Group 126, Na-tional Archives Building.

Scotter, G.W. 1972a. Reindeer ranching in Canada.Journal of Range Management 25(3):167–174.May.

90

—. 1972b. Reindeer journey on the rim of the Arc-tic. Alaska Journal 2(2): 57–60. Spring.

Selden, A.A. Correspondence, File 9–1–33, Alaska–Game– Reindeer– Selden, Classified Files,1907–1951, Records of the Office of Territoriesand Island Possessions, Record Group 126, Na-tional Archives Building.

Sevick, C.A. 1973. Longest Reindeer Herder. ArcticCircle Enterprises.

Skoog, R.O. 1968. Ecology of the caribou (Rangifertarandus granti) in Alaska. PhD dissertation.Berkely: University of California.

Skuncke, F. 1969. Reindeer Ecology and Manage-ment in Sweden. Biological Papers of the Uni-versity of Alaska, Number 8, February.

Spencer, R.F. 1959. The north Alaskan Eskimo, Astudy in ecology and society. Bureau of Ameri-can Ethnology, Bulletin 171. Washington, D.C.:U.S. Government Printing Office.

Stager, J.K., and Denike, K. G. 1972. Reindeer Herd-ing in the Mackenzie Delta Region: A Social andEconomic Study of a Northern Resource Indus-try. U.S.C.: Department of Geography.

Stern, R.O. 1977. A selected annotated bibliographyof sources on reindeer herding in Alaska. Occa-sional Publications on Northern Life No. 2, In-stitute of Arctic Biology. Fairbanks: Universityof Alaska.

Thomas, M.E. 1977. Quarterly report on Alaska’sfood prices. Cooperative Extension Service. Uni-versity of Alaska, Fairbanks.

Troast, N.L. 1935. Appraisal– Cold Storage Plants,Abattoirs, Chilling Houses, Corrals, RangeEquipment, Fixed Equipment and Machinery ofNorthwestern Livestork Corporation atBaldwin, Egavik, Golovin and Teller, Alaska.January 17, 1935, File 9–1–33, Alaska– Game–Reindeer– Administrative, Classified Files,1907–1951, Records of the Office of Territoriesand Island Possessions, Record Group 126, Na-tional Archives Building.

Trowbridge, C.R., and Gillman, H.M., Jr. 1932. Let-ter to George A. Parks, June 19, 1932, File 9–1–33, Part No. 1, Alaska– Game– Reindeer–Adminstrative, Classified Files, 1907–1951,Records of the Office of Territories and IslandPossessions, Record Group 126, National Ar-chives Building.

U.S. Bureau of Education, Alaska School Service.1912. Report on Education of the Natives ofAlaska and the Reindeer Service, 1910–1911.Whole Number 484. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov-ernment Printing Office.

U.S. Bureau of Education. 1917. Report on the workof the bureau of education for the Natives ofAlaska, 1914–1915. Bulletin, 1915, no. 47. Wash-ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

—. 1918. Work of the Bureau of Education for theNatives ofAlaska,1916–17. Bulletin, 1918, no. 5.Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government PrintingOffice.

—. 1919. Work of the Bureau of Education for theNatives of Alaska, 1917–18. Bulletin, 1919, no.40. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print-ing Office.

—. 1921. Biennial Survey of Education, 1918–20. Thework of the bureau of education for the Nativesof Alaska, Bulletin, 1921, no. 35. Washington,D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

—. 1923. Biennial Survey of Education, 1920–22. TheWork of the Bureau of Education for the Nativesof Alaska in 1923, no. 45, by William Hamilton.Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Of-fice.

U.S. Congress, House of Representatives 1937. Con-gressional Record–House, August 20, 1937.p.12120. Washington, D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office.

U.S. Department of the Interior, Alaska PlanningGroup, National Park Service 1974. ProposedChukchi–lmumck National Reserve Final Envi-ronmental Impact Statement. Washington, D.C.:U.S. Government Printing Office.

U.S. Department of the Interior 1931. Hearings ofthe Reindeer Committee in Washington, D.C.February to March, 1931. (Mimeo).

—. 1933. Survey of the Alaska Reindeer Service.Trowbridge– Gillman report. Washington, D.C.:U.S. Department of the Interior.

U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of LandManagement 1976a. Current Reindeer Permits.Fairbanks District Office, Bureau of Land Man-agement, Fairbanks, Alaska.

—. 1976b. Environmental Analysis Record, NANAReindeer Grazing Application in the Kotzebue–Noatak Area. Fairbanks District Office.

U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Indian Af-fairs. 1946. Reindeer Management Handbook.

—. 1951. Annual Report for the year ending June30, 1951 – Native Resources Division.

—. 1952. Annual Report for the year ending June30, 1952 – Resources Division.

—. 1953a. Annual Report for the year ending June30, 1953 – Resources Division.

—. 1953b. Letter from Branch of Extension to Com-missioner Utz, March 6, 1953. Records of theBureau of Indian Affairs, Record Group 75, Na-tional Archives Building.

—. 1954a. Annual Extension Report, January 1, 1954December 31, 1954.

—. 1954b. Annual Report of Division of Resources,Fiscal Year 1954.

—. 1955. Annual Report of Division of Resources,Fiscal Year 1955.

91

—. 1956. Annual Extension Report – Branch of LandOperations, Calendar Year January 1, 1956 –December 31, 1956.

—. 1957. Annual Extension Report – Branch of LandOperations, Calendar Year January 1, 1957 –December 31, 1957.

—. 1958. Annual Extension Report – Branch of LandOperations, Calender Year January 1, 1958 – De-cember 31, 1958.

—. 1959. Annual Extension Report – Branch of LandOperations, Calender Year January 1, 1959 – De-cember 31, 1959.

—. 1960. Annual Report – Branch of Land Opera-tions, Calendar Year 1960.

—. 1961. Annual Report – Branch of Land Opera-tions, Calendar Year 1961.

—. 1962. Annual Report – Branch of Land Opera-tions, Calendar Year 1962.

—. 1963. Annual Report – Branch of Land Opera-tions, Calendar Year 1963.

—. 1964. Annual Report – Branch of Land Opera-tions, Calender Year 1964.

—. 1965. Annual Land Operations Report 1965. Ju-neau Area Office, Bureau of Indian Affairs.

—. 1966. Annual Land Operations Report 1966. Ju-neau Area Office, Bureau of Indian Affairs.

—. 1967. Annual Land Operations Report 1967. Ju-neau Area Office, Bureau of Indian Affairs.

—. 1968. Annual Land Operations Report I968. Ju-neau Area Office, Bureau of Indian Affairs.

—. 1969. Annual Land Operations Report 1969. Ju-neau Area Office, Bureau of Indian Affairs.

—. 1970. Annual Land Operations Report 1970. Ju-neau Area Office, Bureau of Indian Affairs.

—. 1971. Annual Land Operations Report 1971. Ju-neau Area Office, Bureau of Indian Affairs.

—. Records on file with the Reindeer Herders Asso-ciation, Nome, Alaska.

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. Records of the U.S.Fish and Wildlife Service, Record Group 22, Na-tional Archives Building.

Ward, K. 1955. A study of the introduction of rein-deer in Alaska. Journal of Presbyterian History

33(4):229–237.—. 1956. A study of the introduction of reindeer in

Alaska. Journal of Presbyterian History34(4):245–256.

Warren Report 1935. Report by Louis M. Warren,Project Auditor, Northwestern Livestock Corpo-ration, January 8, 1935. File 91–33 Game– Re-indeer– Administration– Audit– Warren, RecordGroup 126, Records of the Office of Territoriesand Island Possessions, National Archives Build-ing.

Wilbur, R.L. 1932. Letters to various groups, 1932,File 9–1–33 Game– Reindeer– Protests, Classi-fied Files, 1907–1951, Records of the Office ofTerritories and Island Possessions, RecordGroup 126, National Archives Building.

Wright, J.M. 1978. Reindeer grazing in relation tobird nesting on the northern Seward Peninsula.Final report to U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serviceand U.S. National Park Service. Fairbanks:Alaska Cooperative Wildlife Research Unit, Uni-versity of Alaska.

Zhigunov, P.S., and Fleischmann, M., translated by.1968. Reindeer Husbandry (Severnololenevodstvo). 2nd ed. Jerusalem: Israel Programfor Scientific Translations.

Zrudlo, L. 1975. User designed housing for the Inuitof Arctic Quebec. The Northern Engineer 7(3):36–44.

92

Appendix 1MEMORANDUM

Juneau, AlaskaOctober 3, 1930

For Governor Parks:Suppose 5,000 Native deer go over to a Lomen range in January, 1930, and their increase is 1,500.Suppose they join a Lomen herd of 20,000. The Lomen increase, if taken at 30 per cent, would be 6,000.The total deer on the range are now 32,500.A roundup occurs September 1, 1930, and 8,000 adults are brought in.These 8,000 would have with them 2,400 fawns.If both the Native and Lomen deer had been fully marked, then the Natives should be entitled to 20 per

cent of the 2,400 fawns, or 480.This roundup of 8,000 out of 25,000 would be a 32 per cent roundup.Sixty–eight per cent of the Native deer would still be on the range.Sixty–eight per cent of the Native fawn increase would in 1931 be mavericks which Lomens would claim

under the existing custom.Now suppose there is no roundup in the spring of 1931, and a roundup occurs in July, 1931.The Native has 5,000 marked adults

1,500 unmarked yearlings1,950 fawns unmarked

Total Native 8,450Lomens should have 20,000 marked adults

6,000 unmarked yearlings7,800 unmarked fawns

Total Lomen 33,800There is now on July 1, 1931, a total of 42,250 deer on the range.If a complete roundup would occur July 1, 1931:Lomen would get 20,000 marked

7,500 yearlings (mavericks)and a percentage of fawns, as follows: 80 per cent of 9,750, or 7,800.The Lomen total is, on July 2nd, 35,300 and the Native total is 6,950.The Native percentage of ownership has been reduced from 20 per cent to 16.4 per cent in one year, and

the Native not only has lost 1,500 deer but his future percentage is 18 per cent less than it should be.What usually happens is something like this:5,000 of the Native deer join a Lomen herd in January, 1930.The Native deer are perhaps 20 per cent marked and the Lomen deer are perhaps 75 percent marked.4,000 unmarked Native deer1,000 marked Native deer (including 500 females)The 20,000 Lomen deed would be:

15,000 marked (7,500 female)5,000 unmarked

The increase is over 30 per cent, or 7,500 fawns for the herd.Lomen’s tally would show they now own 20/21 of 32,500 and the Natives now own 1120/21,280 or 5 per

cent of the herd instead of 20 per cent. The co–owners with Lomen would profit by this transaction, butLomens have bought out many of their big co–owners until they own the big percentage of their herds.

Ernest Walker Sawyer

93

Appendix 2Comparison of Reindeer Council Range Rules and Lomen Corporation Range Rules(1931)Reindeer Council Range Rules.“(1) Marking Notification. The herd manager shall notify, in writing, the owners or agents of all border-

ing herds, as designated by the General Reindeer Superintendent, as to the time and place of the markingof a herd, at least two weeks in advance of such marking, so that representatives of such bordering herdsmay be present at the marking. The Reindeer Service will have a representative at every roundup whensuch a representative is available.”

Lomen Reindeer Corporation Range Rules.“Marking, Notification. We will notify, in writing, the owners or agents of our neighbouring herds, as to

the time, and place of the marking of our herds, at least two weeks in advance of such marking so thatrepresentatives of such neighboring herds may be present at the marking of our herds, and they areinvited to be present at such markings.”

Lomen Reindeer Corporation Range Rules.“Marking Fawns to Stray Owners. ‘Stray’ owners in company herds will receive ten per cent less than

the percentage of fawn increase for the year, with a maximum percentage of 50 on two or more females,including yearling females, and increase will be given only on even numbers of such stray females. Theodd number will not receive increase when based on a 50% fawn increase.

“Any owner of stray deer, when such number exceeds one hundred females not satisfied with the fawnincrease on females, may, by written request to our Nome office, and by payment of pro rata of herdexpenses for the year, share in pro rata division of fawns.”

Reindeer Council Range Rules and Regulations.“(4) Marking Fawns to Stray Owners. Stray owners in a herd shall not pay herding fees, but will receive

a smaller percentage of increase than co–owners of a herd figured as follows: When the percentage ofincrease in the total herd, based on adult females, runs 60 or more per cent, the stray owners will receive50 per cent increase. Whenever the total fawn increase in a herd runs less than 60 per cent, based on adultfemales, the percentage of fawn due such stray owners shall be computed as follows: Take the per cent offawn increase of the herd for the year, based on adult females, and subtract therefrom the figure ten. Theresult will be the per cent of fawn due stray owners for that year. Percentages for stray owners will bebased on two or more adult females, and increases will be given only on even numbers of such strayfemales. The first fawn marked shall be a male. The odd number will not receive fawn increase. Mavericksshall be the property of the herd in which they are found.

“Overs and Shorts: When fawns or mavericks, either male or female, are marked to an owner, in excessof the number his percentage calls for, said owner is ‘over.’ When a smaller number of fawns or mavericks,either male or female, is marked to an owner than his percentage calls for said owner is ‘short.’ Correc-tions of such ‘overs and shorts’ are to be made in kind, male or female mavericks, at the next markingseason and females of such co–owner debited or credited prior to the establishment of new percentages insaid herd, and “overs and shorts” must balance in number and kind in order to be correct on the annualmarking return for said year.”

Lomen Reindeer Corporation Range Rules.“Herd Expenses by Co–Owners. Expenses may be paid co–owners, in cash, in labor,—when on company

payroll— or in reindeer on the hoof when ranging with a company herd. Hereafter, whenever a co–ownerdesires to pay herd expenses in reindeer, the Lomen Reindeer Corporation will accept same on the follow-ing basis and at the follwing value:

“When said deer range with our herd, we will credit any owner for reindeer re–marked to us or butch-ered, with $3.00 per head.”

Reindeer Council Rules and Regulations.“(21) The Standard Herding Fee per head per year for each adult female will be based on the coast of

herding prorated against the coowners on the basis of ownership of adult female deer in the herd ascounted during the current marking season except when a written agreement has been entered into.”

“(22) Herding Fees may include chief herder’s salary, wages and subsistence to herders, cost of markingroundup, cost of maintenance and wages of marking crew during marking, construction and maintenanceof marking equipment.

“A detailed cost account including all items constituting the herding fee for the past fiscal year endingJune 30 must be sent to the General Reindeer Superintendent on or before September 1, and a copy kepton file for inspection by any owner or owners.”