Equality Hypocrisy, Inconsistency, and Prejudice: The UnequalApplication of the Universal Human Right to Equality

Dominic Abrams, Diane M. Houston,and Julie Van de Vyver

University of Kent

Milica VasiljevicUniversity of Kent and University of Cambridge

In Western culture, there appears to be widespread endorsement of Article 1 of theUniversal Declaration of Human Rights (which stresses equality and freedom). Butdo people really apply their equality values equally, or are their principles andapplication systematically discrepant, resulting in equality hypocrisy? The presentstudy, conducted with a representative national sample of adults in the UnitedKingdom (N � 2,895), provides the first societal test of whether people apply theirvalue of “equality for all” similarly across multiple types of status minority(women, disabled people, people aged over 70, Blacks, Muslims, and gay people).Drawing on theories of intergroup relations and stereotyping we examined, relationto each of these groups, respondents’ judgments of how important it is to satisfytheir particular wishes, whether there should be greater or reduced equality ofemployment opportunities, and feelings of social distance. The data revealed a cleargap between general equality values and responses to these specific measures.Respondents prioritized equality more for “paternalized” groups (targets of benev-olent prejudice: women, disabled, over 70) than others (Black people, Muslims, andhomosexual people), demonstrating significant inconsistency. Respondents whovalued equality more, or who expressed higher internal or external motivation tocontrol prejudice, showed greater consistency in applying equality. However, evenrespondents who valued equality highly showed significant divergence in theirresponses to paternalized versus nonpaternalized groups, revealing a degree of

DOMINIC ABRAMS holds a PhD and is a professor ofsocial psychology and the director of the Centre for theStudy of Group Processes (CSGP) at the School of Psy-chology, University of Kent. He is co-director of the Eu-ropean Research Group on Attitudes to Age (EURAGE)and co-editor of the journal Group Processes and Inter-group Relations. His research interests include prejudiceand prosociality, social identity, intergroup and intragroupprocesses, social development, stereotype threat, and soci-etal attitudes to aging and social change.

DIANE M. HOUSTON holds a PhD and is a professor ofpsychology and dean of the Graduate School of the Uni-versity of Kent. Her research interests include processes ofdiscrimination, gender role attitudes, women’s work par-ticipation, and educational achievement.

JULIE VAN DE VYVER holds an MSc and is an ESRCCASE PhD student working collaboratively with the char-ity People United. Her research interests are the role ofemotions in prosociality, the development of group dynam-ics, and the application of methods to reduce prejudice.

MILICA VASILJEVIC holds a PhD and is a research asso-ciate at the Behaviour and Health Research Unit, Univer-sity of Cambridge. Her research interests include intereth-nic conflict and forgiveness, intergroup attitudes, and therelationship between social structure and social cohesion.

Her current research focuses on the design and implemen-tation of social-cognitive interventions to change people’sattitudes and behaviors.

THIS RESEARCH WAS SUPPORTED by the Women andEquality Unit and the Economic and Social ResearchCouncil (ES/J500148/1). We are grateful to AgeUK theEquality and Human Rights Commission, NATCEN, AmyCuddy, Susan Fiske, and colleagues at CSGP for contribu-tions to discussions and consultation in the preparation forthe research.

This article has been published under the terms of the CreativeCommons Attribution License (CC-BY, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribu-tion, and reproduction in any medium, provided the originalauthor and source are credited. Copyright for this article is re-tained by the author(s). Author(s) grant(s) the American Psycho-logical Association the exclusive right to publish the article andidentify itself as the original publisher.

CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING THIS ARTICLE should beaddressed to Dominic Abrams or Diane M. Houston, Cen-tre for the Study of Group Processes, School of Psychol-ogy, University of Kent, UK 1227 827475. E-mail:d.abrams@kent.ac.uk or D.M.Houston@kent.ac.uk

THIS ARTICLE HAS BEEN CORRECTED. SEE LAST PAGE

Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology © 2015 The Author(s)2015, Vol. 21, No. 1, 28–46 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pac0000084

28

hypocrisy. Implications for strategies to promote equality and challenge prejudiceare discussed.

Keywords: equality, human rights, prejudice, values

I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up,live out the true meaning of its creed: “We holdthese truths to be self-evident, that all men arecreated equal.”

—Martin Luther King, Jr. (1963)

The very first article in the Universal Decla-ration of Human Rights (UDHR) adopted by theGeneral Assembly of the United Nations Orga-nization in 1948 states that “All human beingsare born free and equal in dignity and rights.They are endowed with reason and conscienceand should act toward one another in a spirit ofbrotherhood.” Yet, Martin Luther King Jr.’sdream of equality is far from fulfilled. In thisarticle, we consider how and why people mayespouse equality as an important principle, yetnot apply that principle equally to all groups.We report an empirical test of this phenomenonusing a nationally representative survey ofnearly 3,000 adults in the United Kingdom.

Universal Conceptualization ofHuman Rights

Fifty years after the adoption of the UDHR,Willem Doise formally theorized and testedthe existence of social representations of hu-man rights. For example, across four cultures(Costa Rica, France, Italy, and Switzerland),Clémence, Doise, de Rosa, and Gonzalez(1995) demonstrated remarkable convergencein the understanding of what constitutes vio-lations of human rights (see also Doise,2002). In a more comprehensive test, Doiseand colleagues asked participants from 35countries to evaluate the 30 articles of theUDHR (Doise, Spini, & Clémence, 1999).The structure of the different rights was re-markably convergent across cultures, andclosely resembled the original structure pre-sented by the French jurist, Renée Cassin atthe United Nations General Assembly in1948.

In several studies, Doise and colleaguesshowed that people’s commitment to these prin-ciples is related to their wider values. For ex-ample, people who value universalism and self-

transcendence are more likely to be involvedwith human rights issues and to believe thatgovernments are not doing enough to protecthuman rights. In contrast, those who value con-servatism and endorse right-wing political ide-ologies favor restricting individual rights toguarantee the functioning of society (Doise etal., 1999; Spini & Doise, 1998). Moreover, theytend to endorse the power of governments andother institutions to decide upon the distributionof human rights (Moghaddam & Vuksanovic,1990).

Human Rights as a Function ofIntergroup Relations

In addition to these individual differences inconceptualizations of human rights, intergrouprelations research suggests that support for hu-man rights may depend on power and statusrelations between groups. For example, re-search has shown that intergroup ideologiessuch as social dominance orientation (SDO) andright-wing authoritarianism (RWA) negativelyaffect human rights support (e.g., Cohrs, Maes,Moschner, & Kielmann, 2007; McFarland &Mathews, 2005; Stellmacher, Sommer, &Brähler, 2005). People high in SDO prefer hi-erarchical (rather than egalitarian) relations be-tween social groups, while the opposite is truefor people low in SDO (Pratto, Sidanius, Stall-worth, & Malle, 1994). Similarly, people highin RWA tend to be less favorable toward ac-cording the same rights to all groups. This isbecause people high in RWA believe this wouldallow unwarranted means of social control tosocially subordinate groups (e.g., religious mi-norities).

There are also differences between minorityand majority groups’ emphasis on people’srights versus people’s duties. Specifically,members of minority or low power groups givehigher priority to their personal rights, whereasmembers of majority or high power groups givehigher priority to the duties that low powergroups need to enact (Moghaddam & Riley,2005). Moghaddam and Riley argue that such

29EQUALITY HYPOCRISY AND PREJUDICE

divergence was evident during the U.S. civilrights and women’s rights movements, wherebythese minority groups highlighted their humanrights, whereas majority groups focused on theduties of these minorities (e.g., to obey the law,at that time restricting the minorities’ rights).

Similarly, Azzi (1992) demonstrated that par-ticipants who belonged to, or were primed toidentify with, a minority ethnic group weremore likely to advocate equal distribution ofprocedural resources (i.e., political power) be-tween a simulated ethnic minority and majoritygroup. Conversely, participants who belongedto, or were primed to identify with, a majorityethnic group were more likely to advocate aproportional distribution of procedural re-sources.

In line with these findings, Louis and Tay-lor (2005) advocated a relativist advocated ofhuman rights, highlighting that affordance ofrights varies across contexts, time, the socialgroups people belong to, and the social iden-tities they espouse. People interpret humanrights relative to their ingroup, and so theinterpretation is affected by the group’s statusposition within the societal hierarchy (seealso Worchel, 2005).

The picture is rendered more complex whenwe consider that people typically have multiplegroup-based identities, hence more than oneingroup (Crisp & Hewstone, 2007). By impli-cation, people also have multiple outgroups to-ward whom their endorsement of human rightsmay also vary. This suggests that inconsistencyin rights endorsements could arise because dif-ferent ingroup-outgroup relationships involvedifferent frames of comparison.

Compatibility of Universalist andRelativist Approaches

It seems to us that the universalist (Doise et al.,1999) and relativist (Louis & Taylor, 2005;Worchel, 2005; cf. Kymlicka, 2001) positions canbe reconciled. There could be a universal concep-tualization of human rights, but these principlescan be applied differently due to the hierarchicalnature of human societies, and the intergroup re-lations they embody. Therefore, we consider thatpeople’s endorsement of the value of equality maynot translate into application to specific groups,because social identities, power hierarchies, and

ingroup norms come into play, all of which mightplace greater value on some groups than others.

Defining Equality Hypocrisy

Empirically, individuals in Western societ-ies generally support the abstract goal of hu-man rights. For example, in 2002, poll resultsshowed that 90% of Americans rated humanrights as a goal that is very important orsomewhat important (Chicago Council onForeign Relations, 2002, cited in McFarland& Mathews, 2005). McFarland and Mathewsargue that this may reflect social desirabilityconcerns because endorsement of rights is anessential part of North American, and moregenerally Western, ideology. The researchersfound that when comparing people’s prefer-ence for human rights versus national self-interest goals, “promoting and defending hu-man rights in other countries” was rankedonly as 12th out of 15 goals. This reveals thatindividuals may preach human rights morethan they are prepared to practice them, atleast when choosing between the importanceof global rights versus national priorities.

Staerklé and Clémence (2004) explored in-consistency between values and application intwo schools in Switzerland. Adolescents whovalued human rights highly judged sanctionsthat violated human rights to be less accept-able when applied to a murderer than to apedophile rapist, when applied to a thief thanto a drug dealer, and when applied to “hand-icapped” children rather than to immigrantchildren. In studies using minimal groups,Maio, Hahn, Frost, and Cheung (2009)showed that varying the situational salienceof equality values could also affect whetherthey were applied to resource distribution be-tween groups.

Support for the human right to equalitylogically implies support for equality for ev-eryone regardless of their race, gender, reli-gious affiliation, sexual orientation, age, andphysical ability. Despite evidence that manypeople agree with the notion that all humanbeings should be treated equally, research onintergroup prejudice leads us to expect that,when asked more concretely, people will dif-ferentiate which groups most “deserve” theserights, thereby revealing equality hypocrisy.Specifically, equality hypocrisy occurs when

30 ABRAMS, HOUSTON, VAN DE VYVER, AND VASILJEVIC

people express strong support for equal rightsfor all, but then differentially favor equalrights for some groups above those of others.We believe that equality hypocrisy is inherentin many, possibly all societies. The presentstudy explores its forms and possible influ-ences in the United Kingdom—a country thatis usually regarded as relatively modern, pro-gressive and liberal.

Intergroup Prejudice

Intergroup relations research has long estab-lished that people are prone to express ingroupbias, and that this might result from ingroupcommitment (Brewer, 1999), intergroup com-petition (Sherif, 1966) or the motivation to self-enhance and establish positive ingroup distinc-tiveness by evaluating ingroups more favorablythan outgroups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Peo-ple’s ingroup commitment might simply meanthat they view all outgroups as less deservingthan the ingroup. Potential intergroup competi-tion may motivate people to deny equality togroups that are viewed as competing with theingroup (either ideologically or materially).Moreover, people may garner positive ingroupdistinctiveness, self-esteem and competitive su-periority by ensuring that lower status groupsare not afforded the same “rights” as a majorityingroup. Although these ideas have been testedwith regard to single specific outgroups (seeAbrams, 2015; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010;Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002), there doesnot appear to be any existing research thatshows whether people apply ingroup preferencewhen they apply their values in the context ofmultiple outgroups, or whether the type of out-group would necessarily affect how they applythe value of equality. This is surprising giventhat most people live in societies that do presentmultiple outgroup categories.

Motivations to Control Prejudice

Research has shown that the personal andsocial motivations to control prejudice stronglypredict its expression toward specific outgroups(e.g., Butz & Plant, 2009; Crandall & Eshle-man, 2003; Devine & Monteith, 1993; Gon-salkorale, Sherman, Allen, Klauer, & Amodio,2011; Plant & Devine, 2009). People who arehigh in internal motivation to control prejudiceshow lower prejudice in public as well as pri-

vate contexts. This is because they want to befree of prejudice (Plant & Devine, 2009). Peo-ple low in internal motivation but high in ex-ternal motivation to control prejudice only showlower prejudice in public, but not in private,contexts. This is because they want to be seen asunprejudiced, but not necessarily to be free of it(Plant & Devine, 2009). For example, Legault,Gutsell, and Inzlicht (2011) showed that, com-pared to a control condition, when people wereprimed with autonomous motivation to regulateprejudice (i.e., internal motivation) they showedless explicit and implicit prejudice whereaswhen primed with the societal requirement tocontrol prejudice (i.e., external motivation) theyexpressed more explicit and implicit prejudice.

Although motivation to control prejudice iscompatible with advocacy of equality, and al-though a liberal interpretation of such motiva-tion is that it is consistent with a free and fairsociety, these concepts are not necessarily syn-onymous. For example, it is possible to envis-age that someone could be unconcerned abouttheir own prejudice but still advocate the prin-ciple of equality for all, perhaps for religious,moral, or material reasons. Moreover, it is plau-sible that someone who is highly motivated notto be prejudiced could still be perfectly willingto accept that society should tolerate inequality.Finally, someone whose primary concern is notto appear prejudiced may be motivated eitherbecause they value equality or because theyprefer inequality but do not wish to be seen todo so. Whether these motivations to controlprejudice similarly affect the ascription of rightsto different types of group, and whether they doso independently of equality values, are inter-esting and unexplored questions in both inter-group relations and human rights research.

Minority Groups

Why might we expect uneven affordance ofequality to different minority groups? Differentsocietal groups are perceived and stereotypeddifferently. Seminal work by Fiske and col-leagues (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002) inthe United States demonstrated that groups areevaluated along two primary characteristics:warmth and competence. The combination ofthese two primary characteristics gives rise tothe perceived stereotypicality of groups and todifferential qualities of prejudice. Thus, groups

31EQUALITY HYPOCRISY AND PREJUDICE

that are seen as high in warmth and low incompetence are more likely viewed with pityand to suffer so called benevolent, or paternal-istic prejudice (e.g., the “elderly,” “house-wives,” “disabled,” and “blind” people). Groupsthat are considered low in warmth but high incompetence are on the receiving end of envyand envious prejudice (e.g., the “rich,” “Asian,”“Americans,” “Jews,” men). Groups that areconsidered low in both competence and inwarmth elicit contempt (e.g., the “poor,” “wel-fare recipients,” “Hispanics”), and groups thatare considered high in competence and inwarmth elicit admiration; these are often major-ity status ingroups (e.g., “Christians,” “middleclass,” “White people,” “students”). Of course,there are various blends of moderate levels ofthese qualities, forming a middle cluster. In theUnited States these include “migrant workers,”“gay men,” “Arabs,” “Muslims,” “blue-collarworkers,” and “southerners” (Cuddy, Fiske, &Glick, 2007; Fiske et al., 2002). Numerous stud-ies have demonstrated that different groups areevaluated in terms of the warmth-competencestereotype dimensions, which in turn informspeople’s emotional and behavioral reactions to-ward these groups (e.g., Cuddy & Fiske, 2002;Cuddy et al., 2007; Glick & Fiske, 2001).Cross-cultural examinations have also sup-ported the four clusters of stereotype contentrelated to specific groups (see Fiske & Cuddy,2006; Cuddy et al., 2009).

The Present Research

For the purposes of this research we examinewhether participants assign the human right ofequality differentially to different status minor-ities as a function of the evaluative implicationsof stereotypes associated with these groups. Weexpect status minority groups that are known tobe stereotyped as warmer but less competent(hence paternalized) will be judged differentlyfrom status minorities that are stereotyped ascolder, or potentially more threatening (hencenot paternalized).

Policy Context

In 2005, the U.K. Labour government pre-pared to merge the roles of distinctive commis-sions (e.g., Commission for Racial Equality,Disability Rights Commission, Equal Opportu-

nities Commission) with those of other NGOsrepresenting age, sexuality and religion underthe umbrella of a new Equality and HumanRights Commission. To better understand theimplications of this merger, the Women andEquality Unit within the Department for Tradeand Industry for the “Equalities Review” com-missioned and conducted this research, whichprovided part of the foundation for establishingthe Equality and Human Rights Commission(The Equalities Review, 2007). It was the firstsingle piece of integrated U.K. research to at-tempt to understand prejudice and values abouthuman rights in relation to all six “equalitystrands,” corresponding to gender, age, disabil-ity, ethnicity, religion, and sexuality. This pro-vided a unique opportunity to discover how,across a whole population, views about therights of these distinct groups would relate tooverall values about key human rights.

Paternalistic stereotypes depict social groupsas pitied and instigate feelings of compassionand sympathy and a desire to help these needygroups. Paternalized groups are those that aretargets of “benevolent” prejudice, which ac-cords those groups low status and competencebut relatively high levels of warmth. As a resultthey are treated as dependent and needy, deserv-ing of sympathy, but are effectively pinned tolow status and power positions. The dilemmafor these groups is that they lose the “benefits”of patronage and charity if they challenge forhigher status positions. Such prejudice is by nomeans benign. For example, female victims ofacquaintance rape are more likely to be blamedby perceivers who are higher in benevolent sex-ism (Abrams, Viki, Masser, & Bohner, 2003).Based on the stereotype content model (Fiske etal., 2002; Cuddy, 2004, personal communica-tion), among the six equality strands in theEqualities Review, we expected people to applythese stereotypes to women, older people, anddisabled people. In contrast, Black, Muslim,and gay people were expected to pose varioustypes of threat (culturally or materially) and asliable to be viewed as competitors vis-a-vismajority White British society. Thus, we clas-sified these as nonpaternalized groups. We hy-pothesized that the representative sample wouldassign equal rights more readily to paternalizedthan to nonpaternalized groups. The present re-search examines how equality values and moti-vation to control prejudice relate to equality

32 ABRAMS, HOUSTON, VAN DE VYVER, AND VASILJEVIC

hypocrisy, equality inconsistency and prejudice.We examine the following issues in relation tojudgments involving women, people over 70,disabled people, gay and lesbian people, Mus-lims, and Black people.

Societal Equality Hypocrisy

If, on average, people in society claim tovalue equality as a universal right more thanthey are willing to attach importance to thewishes and equality of opportunity for specificsocial groups this suggests that the society man-ifests what we term equality hypocrisy. Thehypocrisy arises because valuing equality morehighly for some groups than others is logicallyincompatible with valuing universal equality.Our first question is whether there is societalevidence that the level of endorsement of equal-ity values is not matched by support for equalityfor specific groups in society (equality hypoc-risy).

Individuals’ Equality Inconsistency

Societal hypocrisy could exist because allindividuals favor certain groups more than oth-ers. However, these average societal differencesdo not reveal a further aspect of equality hypoc-risy—some individuals may differentiate levelsof importance they attach to the equality rightsof different groups more than other individualsdo. That is, individuals may differ in the extentto which they show equality inconsistency.Such inconsistency is potentially hypocriticalbecause it seems perverse to advocate greaterequality for some groups at the expense of oth-ers. Therefore we consider the extent to whichindividuals attach different importance to satis-fying the wishes, and ensuring equal employ-ment opportunities for each group (equality in-consistency). We propose that, matching thesocietal level differences, individuals’ equalityinconsistency will expose a contrast betweenpaternalized and nonpaternalized groups,whereby the latter are liable to be regarded asless deserving of equality.

Prejudice

We examine a measure of prejudice in thecontext of employment: expressions of comfortin having a boss who is from each minoritygroup (a specific form of social distance; Bog-

ardus, 1933). Because of their common link interms of intergroup relations, we expect equal-ity inconsistency to be mirrored by a similarpattern of preferences in social distance. Wealso investigate the extent to which equalityinconsistency and prejudice are predictablefrom an individual’s support for the value ofequality and their internal and external motiva-tion to control prejudice.

In summary, we expect that while peoplemay agree with the general value of equalitythey may not support equality equally for allminority groups (equality hypocrisy). Further-more, on the basis of intergroup relations theorywe expect that people may place higher valueon equality for paternalized than nonpaternal-ized groups (equality inconsistency). We expectthat the gap in importance attached to equalityfor paternalized versus nonpaternalized groupsshould be lower among individuals who valueequality for all, and who are internally or exter-nally motivated to control prejudice.

Method

Participants and Design

Data were collected as part of a speciallycommissioned representative national survey inBritain in 2005 (Abrams & Houston, 2006), atime when Britain had a Labour (left-wing)government led by Tony Blair that had wide-spread popular support and was strongly pro-moting universal human rights. The samplecomprised 1,289 men (44.5%) and 1,606women (55.5%); total N of 2,895. Age rangedfrom 16 to 93 years (M � 46.07, SD � 19.14).The majority of participants (87.5%) wereWhite British, 4.8% were Black, 6.4% wereAsian, and 1.3% was coded as missing. Further-more, the majority of participants (92.5%) werenon-Muslim, nondisabled (78.3%), and hetero-sexual (88.7%). Of the participants, 35.2% werein full-time employment, 11.3% were in part-time employment, 21.9% were unemployed,25% were retired, and 6.7% were in full-timeeducation. Of the participants, 60.3% had leftfull-time education before 18 years of age,13.2% held qualifications up to 18 years (“A-level”), 13.5% had completed a university de-gree, and 13% had completed another type ofcollege qualification (e.g., Business and Tech-nology Innovation Council, BTEC). Politically,

33EQUALITY HYPOCRISY AND PREJUDICE

the sample was slightly left of center (on a6-point scale that ranged from 1 � definitely leftto 6 � definitely right, the mean was 3.35, SD �1.30). Data reported in this article were from alarger survey that assessed a range of societalperceptions and attitudes (see Abrams & Hous-ton, 2006, for details and descriptive statistics).

To keep the survey to a manageable length,and because we had high statistical power dueto sample size, three versions of the survey wereadministered to separate nationally representa-tive samples each comprising approximately1,000 respondents. All versions included mea-sures of equality values, measures of the impor-tance of equality, and motivation to controlprejudice, but the different versions includedspecific questions about opportunities and so-cial distance for two target groups only. Specif-ically, each version asked about one group thatwe considered subject to paternalistic prejudiceand one that was more likely to be subject totraditional nonpaternalistic prejudice. VersionA asked these questions in relation to womenand homosexuals, Version B asked these ques-tions in relation to people over 70 and Muslims,and Version C asked these questions in relationto disabled people and Black people.

Procedure

Data were collected between May 20 andJune 1, 2005, among �16-year-olds from Eng-land, Scotland, and Wales. The survey was ad-ministered by a polling company, TNS/Omnimas, in their omnibus face-to-facecomputer-assisted personal interviews surveysto a nationally representative sample. Left- andright-scale anchor points were counterbalancedbetween participants (e.g., agree and disagreewere anchored alternately on the left or rightend of a scale for Likert scale items), and itemorders were rotated within sections of the sur-vey.

Measures

Equality value. Participants were asked torate their agreement with the statement, “Thereshould be equality for all groups in Britain.”Responses ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to5 (strongly agree).

Motivations to control prejudice. Weused two items to measure internal and externalmotivation to control prejudice. These were se-

lected on the basis of factor analyses of pilotstudy data involving over 400 British partici-pants. The items were the highest loading itemson the internal and external factors from Plantand Devine’s (1998) scales. Participants weretold, “People sometimes make an effort not tobe prejudiced. To what extent would you dis-agree or agree that each of the following reasonsdescribes your view?” The item for internalmotivation to control prejudice was, “I at-tempt to act in nonprejudiced ways towardother groups because it is personally impor-tant to me.” The item for external motivationto control prejudice was, “I try to appearnonprejudiced toward other groups in order toavoid disapproval from others.” Participantsresponded from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5(strongly agree).

Group rights. Participants were informed,“Not all groups in society want the same thingas the majority. How important do you feel it isthat the particular wishes of each of the follow-ing groups is satisfied?” Participants respondedfor each of the six groups (i.e., women, peopleover 70, disabled people, Muslims, Black peo-ple, lesbian women, and gay men). The re-sponse options were 1 (not at all important), 2(not very important), 3 (neither important norunimportant), 4 (quite important), or 5 (veryimportant).

Group equality. Participants were asked totick a box to indicate whether they believed“attempts to give equal employment opportuni-ties to [relevant minority group, depending onversion] in this country have gone too far or notfar enough?” The response options were 1 (gonemuch too far), 2 (gone too far), 3 (about right),4 (not gone far enough), or 5 (not gone nearlyfar enough).

Social distance. The measure of social dis-tance gauges respondents’ anticipated emo-tional responses to varying levels of closenesstoward members of different target groups. De-pending on version, participants were asked,“How comfortable or uncomfortable do youthink you would feel if a suitably qualified[target group person] was appointed as yourboss?” They responded using a scale from 1(very uncomfortable) through 3 (neither com-fortable nor uncomfortable) to 5 (very comfort-able). To some extent this measure may also taprespondents’ willingness to work for membersof the relevant social group, and therefore has

34 ABRAMS, HOUSTON, VAN DE VYVER, AND VASILJEVIC

implications for potential prejudice or discrim-ination in the workplace.

Results

Preliminary Analyses

Correlation analyses revealed some signifi-cant but small relationships between partici-pants’ equality value or motivations to controlprejudice on the one hand and gender, ethnicity,age, religion (whether Muslim), sexual orienta-tion (whether heterosexual), but not disability,on the other (see Table 1). Analysis of covari-ance (ANCOVA; controlling for demographics)tested for differences between versions (A, B,C). These revealed no significant effect of ver-sion on equality value, F(2, 2,892) � 2.67, p �.069, �2 � .002, nor on internal, F(2, 2,892) �.45, p � .638, �2 � .001, or external, F(2,2,892) � .05, p � .956, �2 � .001, motivationsto control prejudice. To adjust for the relation-ships in subsequent analyses all demographicvariables were included as covariates.

Equality Hypocrisy: Equality Value VersusGroup Rights

Our first goal was to establish whether therewas evidence of equality hypocrisy. We exam-ined the percentage of respondents who selectedeach response option for the equality valuesitem and the group rights items. Figure 1 showsthat, whereas 84% of respondents claimed theyvalue or strongly value equality for all groups,

fewer than 65% considered it quite important orvery important to satisfy the needs of Blackpeople, fewer than 60% considered it quite orvery important for Muslims, and fewer than50% considered it quite or very important forhomosexual people. Descriptively, this amountsto an equality hypocrisy gap of between 15%and 30%.

Equality hypocrisy can be evaluated statisti-cally by comparing the mean responses ofequality value levels with mean levels of grouprights and group equality for specific groups.Because the response scales for equality valueand the other measures differ, we are cautiousabout making direct comparisons, but they seemmeaningful to the extent that the highest scorefor all measures (5) reflects a high priority forequality, whereas a midscale score reflects aneutral preference. With these caveats in mind,pairwise comparisons between equality valueand each of these other measures were all highlysignificant (df � 801, ts � 4.15, ps � .0001).Compared with equality value, respondentsjudged the group rights of paternalized groupsto be closer to the maximum, whereas theyjudged the group rights of nonpaternalizedgroups to be further from the maximum. Thus,some respondents clearly do not attach equalimportance to the rights of different groups.Overall, these descriptive differences showclearly that people’s willingness to espouseequality as a value is greater than their willing-ness to ascribe the same rights and equality todifferent groups.

Table 1Bivariate Correlation Coefficients Depicting the Relationship Between the MainVariables of Interest and Group Membership Variables

NInternal motivationto control prejudice

External motivationto control prejudice Equality value

Age .006 �.04† �.09���

Female 1,606 .06�� �.03 �.01Disabled 626 �.03 �.02 �.006Asian 184 �.007 .08��� .08���

Black 140 �.001 .02 .08���

Muslim 128 .003 .07��� .06��

Christian 1,950 .04� �.02 �.04�

Homosexual 327 �.09��� .05� �.04�

Note. N � 2,895. Age is continuous; all other demographic variables are dummy coded (1vs. 0).† p � .10. � p � .05. �� p � .01. ��� p � .001.

35EQUALITY HYPOCRISY AND PREJUDICE

Equality Inconsistency

The group rights data indicate equality hy-pocrisy vis-a-vis equality values, but they alsoreveal differences in the application of rights todifferent groups (equality inconsistency). Thenext analyses examined group rights, groupequality, and social distance judgments to es-tablish whether there were systematic statisticaldifferences between different target groups (i.e.,equality inconsistency). We hypothesized thatparticipants would place greater importance onequality for paternalized groups (women, peo-ple over 70, and disabled people) than for non-paternalized groups (Muslims, Black people,and homosexuals).

Group rights. A six-level (target group:women, people over 70, disabled people, Mus-

lim people, Black people, and homosexuals)repeated measures ANOVA was conducted.The effect of target group was significant, F(5,13,830) � 20.32, p � .001, �2 � .01. Allpairwise differences were significant at p �.0001 aside from a nonsignificant differencebetween women and people over 70. Grouprights were rated highest for disabled people(M � 4.22, SE � .02), then for women (M �4.15, SE � .02), people over 70 (M � 4.14,SE � .02), Black people (M � 3.78, SE � .02),Muslims (M � 3.62, SE � .02), and finally,homosexuals (M � 3.38, SE � .02). Impor-tantly, consistent with our hypothesis a plannedcomparison between the three paternalized andthree nonpaternalized groups showed a highlysignificant difference. Group rights were ratedhigher for paternalized (M � 4.16, SD � .81)

Figure 1. Means for strength of endorsement of the value of universal equality (“equality forall groups”) and of importance of the rights and advocacy of greater equality of opportunityfor specific groups. Higher means represent stronger endorsement. The equality value re-sponse scale is from strongly disagree to strongly agree; the group rights scale is from not atall important to extremely important; the group equality scale is from gone much too far tonot gone nearly far enough. Error bars depict standard errors.

36 ABRAMS, HOUSTON, VAN DE VYVER, AND VASILJEVIC

than for nonpaternalized (M � 3.59, SD � .96)groups, t(2,894) � 38.38, p � .0001, d � .64.

Group equality. Because advocacy ofequal employment opportunity for differentpairs of groups was measured in different ver-sions of the survey, we analyzed these judg-ments using a 2 (Type of Group: Paternalized,Nonpaternalized) � 3 (Version: A [women, ho-mosexuals], B [people over 70, Muslims], C[disabled, Black people]) mixed analysis ofvariance (ANOVA) with survey version as abetween participants factor.

Results revealed a significant main effect oftype of group, F(1, 2,454) � 12.72, p � .0001,�2 � .01. As predicted, paternalized groups(M � 3.73, SE � .02) were rated higher thannonpaternalized groups (M � 3.02, SE � .02).There was also a significant main effect of sur-vey version, F(2, 2,454) � 5.41, p � .005, �2 �.004, whereby advocacy of group equality wasrated higher in Version C (Black people anddisabled people) than in Version A (women andhomosexuals; p � .008), and compared to Ver-sion B (people over 70 and Muslim people; p �.003).

There was also a significant type of Group �Version interaction, F(2, 2,454) � 16.37, p �.001, �2 � .01. Simple effects of type of groupwithin version showed that, regardless of surveyversion, group equality scores were signifi-cantly higher (all ps � .0001) for the paternal-ized groups (women, people over 70, and dis-abled people) than for the nonpaternalizedgroups (homosexuals, Muslim people, andBlack people, respectively).

Within the paternalized groups, group equal-ity scores were higher for people over 70 (M �

3.30, SE � .03) and for disabled people (M �3.34, SE � .03) than for women (M � 3.18,SE � .03; p � .003 and p � .0001, respec-tively), but there was no significant differencein group equality ratings for people over 70 anddisabled people (p � .314).

Within nonpaternalized groups, advocacy ofgroup equality was rated significantly lower forMuslim people (M � 2.70, SE � .03) than forhomosexuals (M � 3.07, SE � .03) and Blackpeople (M � 3.08, SE � .03; ps � .0001).There was no significant difference betweenadvocacy of equality for homosexuals andBlack people (p � .820).

Is Equality Inconsistency Dependent onEquality Value?

A plausible reason for equality hypocrisyacross the population as a whole might be thatthose who more strongly value equality for allwill indeed espouse greater equality for anyparticular group. Those who value equality lessmay express more divergent views about theimportance of equality for different groups. Totest this idea we divided the sample according towhether their general equality value scores wereat the midpoint or below (not valuing equality)or above the midpoint (valuing equality). Wethen examined the scores on dependent vari-ables for the paternalized versus nonpaternal-ized groups. These analyses employed mixedANOVAs (Equality Value: High vs. Neutraland Low) � (Type of Group: Paternalized,Nonpaternalized). We examined responses tothree dependent variables, group rights, group

Table 2Analyses of Variance for the Effect of Equality Value (High vs. Low) and Target Group (Paternalized vs.Nonpaternalized) on Group-Specific Measures of Equality

Variable

M (SE)

F 2,850 df (�2)High equality (N � 2,432) Low equality (N � 463)

Paternalized Nonpaternalized Paternalized Nonpaternalized Target groupEquality

value

TargetGroup �Equality

Value

Group rights 4.19 (.02) 3.66 (.02) 4.08 (.04) 3.24 (.05) 23.23 (.01) 42.19 (.02) 56.99 (.02)Group equality 3.29 (.02) 3.07 (.02) 3.18 (.04) 2.81 (.04) 13.35 (.01) 27.56 (.01) 9.57 (.004)Social distance 3.75 (.02) 3.58 (.02) 3.61 (.05) 3.23 (.05) 2.51 (.001) 30.07 (.01) 13.74 (.005)

Note. N � 2,895. SE � standard error; df � degrees of freedom. All main and interaction effects were significant at p �.05, excluding the target group main effect on social distance (boss), which was nonsignificant (p � .113).

37EQUALITY HYPOCRISY AND PREJUDICE

equality, and social distance. Results are de-picted in Table 2.

All three ANOVAs revealed a significant in-teraction between equality value and type ofgroup. For all three dependent measures, pair-wise comparisons showed that all four meansdiffered from one another (ps � .05). The pat-tern is consistent across dependent variables.Respondents who valued equality more highlydid indeed advocate higher group rights, groupequality, and desire less social distance for eachspecific group. However, even though these re-spondents valued equality highly, they signifi-cantly favored paternalized groups over nonpa-ternalized groups, meaning that equalityhypocrisy persists. Indeed, when we inspectedthe mean scores on group rights and groupequality among respondents who had selectedthe strongly agree option for equality values,even these respondents significantly favored pa-ternalized groups over nonpaternalized groupson both measures (ps � .001). For the socialdistance measure, the difference was highly sig-nificant among those who agreed (p � .001),and nonsignificant (though in the same direc-tion) among those who strongly agreed (p �.131).

Motivation to Control Prejudice andEquality Inconsistency

To examine the predictive effects of individ-ual differences in motivation to control preju-dice and equality value on equality inconsis-tency we computed within-person variancescores from ratings of paternalized and nonpa-ternalized groups. For the group rights variablewe were able to compute variance using ratingsof all six target groups. For the group equalityand the social distance variables the varianceswere computed using the target pair in the rel-evant survey version (i.e., women and homo-sexuals; disabled and Black people; people over70 and Muslims). Whether or not version wascontrolled for (by creating two dummy vari-ables) made no difference to the findings. Be-cause these scores tap within-respondent vari-ance in judgments about the different groups,higher scores reflect greater inconsistency.

We hypothesized that internal motivation tocontrol prejudice should be associated withlower equality variance. Second, given that sur-vey responses were observable (by the inter-

viewer) we also expected external motivation tocontrol prejudice to be associated with lowerequality variance. Therefore, equality value andboth types of motivation to control prejudiceshould be associated with lower equality vari-ance. In principle, if all three are high, thereshould be no equality variance because some-one who values equality for all, and who doesnot wish to be or be seen to be prejudicedshould view the rights and equality of all groupsas equally important. We also propose, there-fore, that equality variance should be maxi-mized if equality value and both types of moti-vation to control prejudice are all low.

To test whether internal and external motiva-tion to control prejudice moderated the relation-ship between general equality values and equal-ity variances for each measure, we used Hayes’(2013) PROCESS macro (Model 3 for multiplemoderation). In separate analyses of the within-person variance of each dependent variable(group rights, group equality, social distance),equality value was the independent variable andinternal and external control were separate mod-erators.

Group rights. Higher internal motivationto control prejudice (B � �.15, SE � .03, p �.0001) and higher equality value (B � �.15,SE � .03, p � .0001) significantly predictedlower variance in group rights. There was asignificant Equality Value � Internal Motiva-tion to control prejudice interaction (B � .05,SE � .02, p � .018) and a significant EqualityValue � External Motivation to control preju-dice interaction (B � .05, SE � .02, p � .034).

Simple slopes analyses (Model 1) wereconducted to probe the Equality Value �Internal Motivation to control prejudice inter-action. External motivation to control preju-dice was also retained in the model and en-tered as a covariate. This revealed thatequality value only predicted variance ingroup rights at low levels of internal motiva-tion (B � �.17, SE � .02, p � .0001) but notat high levels of internal motivation (B ��.04, SE � .03, p � .118; Figure 2a). Im-portantly, the effect of internal motivationwas smaller when equality value was high(B � �.05, SE � .02, p � .022) than whenequality value was low (B � �.17, SE � .02,p � .0001).

Similarly, simple slope results for theEquality Value � External Motivation inter-

38 ABRAMS, HOUSTON, VAN DE VYVER, AND VASILJEVIC

action (with internal motivation as a covari-ate) revealed that equality value only pre-dicted variance in group rights at low levelsof external motivation (B � �.17, SE � .03,p � .0001) but not at high levels of externalmotivation (B � �.05, SE � .03, p � .073;Figure 2b). Moreover, when equality valuewas low external motivation had no effect onvariance (B � .005, SE � .02, p � .816).However, when equality value was high, re-spondents with higher external motivationalso showed greater variance in their re-sponses (B � .10, SE � .02, p � .0001).

To summarize the overall pattern, we notetwo points. First, the variance was greatestwhen equality value, internal motivation, andexternal motivation were all low. Variance wassmallest when equality and internal motivationwas high but external motivation was low. Sec-ond, the relationship between levels of equalityand variance was strongest when both internaland external motivations were low and smallestwhen both were high. Post hoc inspection of thesimple slope for equality value within levels ofinternal and external motivation showed theywere significant (ps � .05) except when bothinternal and external were high, B � �.03,SE � .04, p � .347.

Group equality. Results revealed thatgreater equality value (B � �.12, SE � .03,p � .0001) and higher external motivation(B � �.22, SE � .04, p � .0001) separatelypredicted greater consistency (lower vari-ance) in advocacy of group equality. Further-more, there was a significant EqualityValue � Internal Motivation to Control Prej-udice interaction (B � .10, SE � .03, p �

.0006) and a significant Equality Value �External Motivation to Control Prejudice in-teraction (B � .14, SE � .03, p � .0001).However, this was qualified by a significantthree-way interaction between EqualityValue � Internal Motivation to Control Prej-udice � External Motivation to control prej-udice (B � �.05, SE � .02, p � .008).

Simple slopes for the three-way interactionshowed that the effect of equality value wasgreatest when both external and internal mo-tivations were low (B � �.25, SE � .04, p �.0001). However, equality value no longerpredicted group equality when internal moti-vation was high (B � �.07, SE � .04, p �.093) or external motivation was high (B �.04, SE � .06, p � .466), or when bothexternal and internal motivations were high(B � .02, SE � .05, p � .616). Similarly, onlywhen the equality value was low did internalmotivation (B � �.15, SE � .03, p � .0001)and external motivation (B � �.20, SE � .04,p � .0001) significantly relate to variance ingroup equality. To summarize the overall pat-tern, the variance was large when equalityvalue, internal motivation, and external moti-vation were all low. Variance was smallest ifany one of these variables was high. Therelationship between levels of equality andvariance was stronger when both internal andexternal motivation were low than when ei-ther were high (see Figure 3).

Social distance. Higher internal motivationto control prejudice (B � �.21, SE � .05, p �.001), higher external motivation to controlprejudice (B � �.13, SE � .05, p � .010), andhigher support for the equality value (B � �.15,

Figure 2. Plots for the Equality Value � Internal Motivation to Control Prejudice interac-tion and the Equality Value � External Motivation to Control Prejudice on variance in grouprights. Low and high refer to values 1 standard deviation below and above the variable’s mean,respectively.

39EQUALITY HYPOCRISY AND PREJUDICE

SE � .04, p � .002) significantly predictedlower variance in social distance. There wasalso a significant Equality Value � InternalMotivation to Control Prejudice interaction(B � .11, SE � .03, p � .001). Simple slopesanalysis (Model 1 with external motivation en-tered as a covariate) revealed that equality value

only predicted variance in social distance at lowlevels of internal motivation (B � �.18, SE �.04, p � .0001) but not at high levels of internalmotivation (B � .06, SE � .04, p � .181; seeFigure 4). Similarly, internal motivation onlypredicted variance at low levels of equalityvalue (B � �.21, SE � .04, p � .0001). Stated

Figure 3. Plot for the Equality Value � External Motivation to Control Prejudice � InternalMotivation to control prejudice interaction on variance in advocacy of group equality. Lowand high refer to values 1 standard deviation below and above the variable’s mean, respec-tively.

Figure 4. Plot for the Equality Value � Internal Motivation to Control Prejudice interactionon variance in social distance. Low and high refer to values 1 standard deviation below andabove the variable’s mean, respectively.

40 ABRAMS, HOUSTON, VAN DE VYVER, AND VASILJEVIC

differently, variance was higher when both in-ternal control and equality value were low thanwhen either variable was high. There was alsoa marginal Equality Value � External Moti-vation to Control Prejudice interaction onvariance in social distance (B � .07, SE �.04, p � .068), which followed a similarpattern. Although the three-way interaction ofEquality Value � Internal Motivation to Con-trol Prejudice � External Motivation to Con-trol Prejudice on group rights was nonsignif-icant, B � �.06, SE � .04, p � .124, weconducted post hoc tests of simple slopes forcomparison with the effects on group equal-ity, the relationship between equality valueand group rights was significant only whenboth internal and external were low, B ��.27, SE � .06, p � .001. In summary, aswith group equality, the variance in socialdistance was large when equality value, inter-nal motivation, and external motivation wereall low. Variance was smaller when any oneof these variables was high. The relationshipbetween levels of equality and variance wasstronger when both internal and external mo-tivation were low than when either were high.

Discussion

Can a society in which a large majorityclaims to value the human right of equality forall regard itself as meeting the requirements ofArticle 1 in the UDHR? From this study of theUnited Kingdom during one of its more liberaleras, the answer appears to be that espousing thegeneral value of equality is not sufficient. Thepresent research exposes clear evidence ofequality hypocrisy because people were lesswilling to endorse equal rights for specificgroups than they were for all groups. More-over, this hypocrisy was manifested both atthe aggregate level characterizing society as awhole (see Figure 1), and within individualswho chose to prioritize the equal rights ofparticular groups more than other groups(showing equality inconsistency).

Evidence for Equality Hypocrisy

Whereas previous research has highlighted thepotential mismatch between overall human rightssupport and application to specific groups (e.g.,Staerklé & Clémence, 2004), the present research

examined whether people apply their equality val-ues to the same extent across different intergroupcontexts and different types of minority groups.Arguably, this is a stronger test of equality hypoc-risy as it determines whether people do apply theprinciple of equality equally across different typesof minority. Our findings showed clear support forthe existence of equality hypocrisy. Specifically,respondents advocated equality as a value morestrongly than they advocated equality for nonpa-ternalized minority groups. They also judged therights of some groups to be more important thanthe rights of others. Strikingly, 22% were preparedto assert that equality had gone “too far” for Mus-lims.

Evidence for Equality Inconsistency

We proposed that differences in the applicationof equality to different groups would reflect dif-ferences in paternalistic stereotypes associatedwith each group (Fiske et al., 2002). In particular,we expected that because paternalized groupspose little threat to the status or power of othergroups, respondents would be more willing togrant equality to those groups than to nonpater-nalized groups. Specifically, we proposed andfound that respondents advocated equality morestrongly for women, older people and disabledpeople, than for Blacks, Muslims and homosexualpeople. Importantly, differential equality in favorof paternalized groups occurred regardless ofwhether respondents were asked to consider all sixof these groups or whether they were asked toconsider one of three different pairings of thegroups. This evidence suggests strongly thatequality inconsistency in favor of paternalizedgroups is not an artifact of demand characteristicsor measurement procedures, but is a robust effect.

Predicting Individual-LevelEquality Inconsistency

We then pursued the question of why equalityinconsistency between paternalized and nonpa-ternalized groups exists and whether it shares acommon basis with intergroup prejudice. Wereasoned that people who value universal equal-ity more highly should be more consistent intheir application of equality across differentgroups. In addition, prior research has estab-lished that people may moderate their expres-sions of prejudice depending on both their per-

41EQUALITY HYPOCRISY AND PREJUDICE

sonal (internal) motivation to be unprejudiced,and social (external) motivation to be unpreju-diced. If application of equality values is relatedto intergroup prejudice then these two motiva-tions should also result in greater consistency inthe application of equality across specificgroups. However, we could not be sure whetherequality values would subsume prejudice moti-vations, whether these different motives andvalues would have independent additive effectsor whether they would interact. As far as we areaware this issue has not been explored in pre-vious research.

Across different measures, the results showedthat the motivations to control prejudice andequality values had interactive effects. Eitherhigh equality value or high internal motivationsto control prejudice were sufficient to reduceinconsistency in judgments of the rights of dif-ferent groups. Similarly, consistency in socialdistance (prejudice) responses was greater ifeither equality value or internal motivation tocontrol prejudice were high, than if both werelow. We note that the main effect of externalmotivation to control prejudice differed acrossmeasures. Future research may need to considerwhy this might be.

Taken together, these findings are both en-couraging and concerning. It is encouraging thatwe have identified three possible ways to pro-mote greater application of Article 1 of theUHDR. One is to simply reinforce the basicvalue of equality. Another is to promote moti-vation to be unprejudiced, and the third may beto reinforce the idea that being seen to be prej-udiced is highly undesirable. The latter strategyimplies that people may in fact remain preju-diced, but simply not show this publicly. How-ever, reducing public prejudice may have ben-eficial indirect effects through changing socialnorms (cf. Aronson, 1992; Berkowitz, 2005).

Less encouraging is the persistence of signif-icant equality inconsistency even among peoplewho we might expect to show none. Specifi-cally, even those who most highly valued equal-ity showed equality inconsistency. We believethat this reflects the pervasiveness and power ofsocietal intergroup relations and stereotypes,and indicates a need for future research to ex-plore ways to break the social and psychologicalbarriers in the treatment of these different kindsof groups. Our findings suggest that it may behelpful if equality and diversity training can

promote equality consistency through multipleroutes, including appealing to people’s equalityvalue and also their motivations to be unpreju-diced. The findings also highlight the impor-tance of incorporating an intergroup relationsperspective within equality and diversity train-ing. For example, one promising strategy en-courages people to think of multiple counterst-ereotypic social categories, thereby leading togreater egalitarianism and lowered generalizedprejudice toward a multitude of both paternal-ized and nonpaternalized groups (Vasiljevic &Crisp, 2013).

Another promising intervention is the valueself-confrontation technique, which aims to ei-ther change or stabilize people’s beliefs, atti-tudes, values, and behavior (Grube, Mayton, &Ball-Rokeach, 1994; Rokeach, 1973, 1975).Rokeach’s classic studies asked participants torank a number of values, among which wereequality and freedom. Freedom was usuallyranked high, and equality rather low, whichserved as the main point given in the feedback,whereby Rokeach drew people’s attention to thewide discrepancy in valuation of freedom andequality. Rokeach surmised that participantswould be dissatisfied with this discrepancy,which would lead them to change their values,attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. The value self-confrontation technique has been extensivelytested and results have been promising, espe-cially considering the longitudinal effects ofthis technique (Altemeyer, 1994; Ball-Rokeach,Rokeach, & Grube, 1984; Rokeach, 1973). Itwould be interesting and promising to apply thisself-confrontation technique to equality incon-sistency.

Based on intergroup relations theories, weproposed that equality hypocrisy and equalityinconsistency could arise for several reasons.Equality hypocrisy (the general failure to applyespoused equality values) may reflect ingroupbiases due to ingroup commitment, intergroupcompetition, or social identity distinctivenessand esteem motivations (Abrams, 2015;Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Ellemers, Spears, &Doosje, 2002).

An Important Applied Issue:Relevance to Policy

Our research shows how attitudes to humanrights are expressed in ways that appear incon-

42 ABRAMS, HOUSTON, VAN DE VYVER, AND VASILJEVIC

sistent with people’s core values. We testedthese questions in a social and political policycontext that was actively promoting equality,and that was engaged with the goal of protectingand advocating human rights. After the 2007–2008 world banking crisis, the Labour Govern-ment was succeeded by a Conservative/Liberal-Democrat coalition. One of the coalition’searliest acts was to cut the budget and size of theEquality and Human Rights Commission dra-matically. The coalition government launchedsustained criticism of the judgments of theEuropean Court of Human Rights, and be-moaned the imposition of undue “politicalcorrectness” from outside the United King-dom. In this rhetoric a sustained theme hasbeen that of undeserving groups (those es-pousing different values, foreigners stealingBritish jobs, welfare scroungers, fecklessyouth, and so on). Politicians have argued thatequal rights should only be granted to thesegroups if they assume equal “responsibilities”(an economic and structural impossibility).We consider that the success of these rhetor-ical strategies lies in their capacity to activateintergroup motives and to drive a wedge be-tween the rights of minority status groups thatare paternalized versus nonpaternalized. Nar-ratives that contrast the deserving and unde-serving groups or subgroups (among the poor,immigrants, etc.) are particularly insidious asthey are likely to combine paternalistic prej-udices (e.g., benevolent sexism) with nonpa-ternalistic prejudices to sustain the status quo.Paternalistic prejudice can ostensibly demon-strate tolerance and consideration of humanrights, while nonpaternalistic prejudices dem-onstrate defense of ingroup values and free-doms. Yet, in this type of rhetoric, support forminorities is conditional on their posing nothreat and remaining dependent, while denialof rights to nonpaternalized minorities is jus-tified with more overtly “hostile” forms ofprejudice that focus on the threats to ingroupculture, economy or security posed by suchgroups.

Limitations and Future Directions

The present research has several limitations.One is that we did not use identical responsescales to measure equality value and equalityjudgments relating to specific groups. Although

the response anchors were necessarily different,and may have introduced differences in itemdifficulty, these differences might also be con-strued as a virtue in the sense that they reducedthe risk of common measurement effects andreduced likely social desirability effects interms of trying to appear consistent.

We are aware that it is preferable to usemultiple items to measure constructs in psycho-logical research. Single items are likely to yieldsmaller effects and this may account for some ofthe small effect sizes in the present research.However, the advantage of a very large repre-sentative sample and the use of pretested itemsthat are representative of particular constructs isthat what is lost in measurement error is par-tially compensated for in statistical power. Inaddition, small effect sizes can sometimes un-derpin important substantive effects (Prentice &Miller, 1992). The social relevance and gener-alizability of our findings are greatly enhancedby use of a large and nationally representativesample, but we recognize that additional exper-imental research could help to explore the rel-evant processes and mechanisms in greater de-tail.

An empirical limitation is that the researchwas conducted only in one cultural setting.Kymlicka (2001) argues that whereas Westerncultures can ideologically accommodate bothindividual freedom and group rights under theumbrella of “equality,” the same is not true inall cultures. Notwithstanding that caveat, wehave several reasons for believing that the find-ings and general processes at work will gener-alize, at least to most Western cultures. First,there was some cultural heterogeneity withinour national sample, and the findings emergedwhen multiple demographic variables were ac-counted for as covariates. Second, the generalphenomenon of equality hypocrisy, which weobserved across different types of group, echoesthe findings from other cultural contexts thatinconsistency exists between general equalityvalues and application to a single minority.Third, the general principles underpinning thestereotype content model have been shown tohave good cross-cultural replicability (Fiske &Cuddy, 2006; Cuddy et al., 2009). Therefore,even if the particular groups that are more pa-ternalized differ between cultures, we wouldstill expect that people would more willinglyendorse equality for paternalized groups. It

43EQUALITY HYPOCRISY AND PREJUDICE

would be very useful for future research toexplore cross cultural differences in equalityhypocrisy to illuminate the generalizability ofthe role of paternalization. Related to this ques-tion is whether there are important nuances anddifferences in equality hypocrisy as applied tononpaternalized groups, and particularlywhether there are situations in which they canattract perceptions of being highly competentwithout also posing a threat to majority groups.

There are several other interesting avenuesfor future research. One would be to investigatehow other values articulate with group motives,and how moral principles may be strategicallyincorporated into group-based judgments (cf.Abrams, Rutland, Ferrell, & Pelletier, 2008;Abrams, Randsley de Moura, & Travaglino,2013; Haidt, 2007; Rutland, Killen, & Abrams,2010). Another is to test whether equality in-consistency can be reduced by priming specificmotives and values (cf. Legault et al., 2011;Maio et al., 2009). Finally, although our mea-sure of social distance implies certain behav-ioral orientations and emotional responses tominority group members (Kraus, 1995), itwould be useful if future research could exam-ine behavioral outcomes more directly. To con-clude, we hope that the present research pro-vides a unique source of evidence and newinsight into equality hypocrisy and that, extend-ing earlier work (Doise et al., 1999; Moggh-adam & Riley, 2005), this will invigorate fur-ther social psychological research in this area.

References

Abrams, D. (2015). Social identity and intergrouprelations. In M. Mikulincer & P. R. Shaver (Eds.),APA handbook of personality and social psychol-ogy: Vol. 2. Group processes (pp. 203–228).Washington, DC: American Psychological Associ-ation. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/14342-008

Abrams, D., & Hogg, M. A. (1988). Comments onthe motivational status of self-esteem in socialidentity and intergroup discrimination. EuropeanJournal of Social Psychology, 18, 317–334. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420180403

Abrams, D., & Houston, D. M. (2006). Equality,diversity and prejudice in Britain: Results from the2005 national survey. Report for the Cabinet Of-fice Equalities Review October 2006. Retrievedfrom http://kar.kent.ac.uk/4106/1/Abrams_KentEquality_Oct_2006.pdf

Abrams, D., Randsley de Moura, G., & Travaglino,G. A. (2013). A double standard when group mem-bers behave badly: Transgression credit to ingroupleaders. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-chology, 105, 799–815. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0033600

Abrams, D., Rutland, A., Ferrell, J. M., & Pelletier, J.(2008). Children’s judgments of disloyal and im-moral peer behavior: Subjective group dynamics inminimal intergroup contexts. Child Development,79, 444 – 461. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2007.01135.x

Abrams, D., Viki, G. T., Masser, B., & Bohner, G.(2003). Perceptions of stranger and acquaintancerape: The role of benevolent and hostile sexism invictim blame and rape proclivity. Journal of Per-sonality and Social Psychology, 84, 111–125.http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.84.1.111

Altemeyer, B. (1994). Reducing prejudice in right-wing authoritarians. In M. P. Zanna & J. M. Olson(Eds.), The psychology of prejudice: The Ontariosymposium (Vol. 7, pp. 131–148). Hillsdale, NJ:Erlbaum.

Aronson, E. (1992). Stateways can change folkways.In R. M. Baird & S. E. Rosenbaum (Eds.), Bo-gotry, prejudice and hatred: Definitions, causesand solutions (pp. 185–201). Buffalo, NY: Prome-theus.

Azzi, A. (1992). Procedural justice and the allocationof power in intergroup relations. Personality andSocial Psychology Bulletin, 18, 736–747. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167292186010

Ball-Rokeach, S. J., Rokeach, M., & Grube, J. W.(1984). The great American values test: Influenc-ing behavior and belief through television. NewYork, NY: Free Press.

Berkowitz, A. D. (2005). An overview of the socialnorms approach. In L. Lederman & L. Stewart(Eds.), Changing the culture of college drinking: Asocially situated health communication campaign(pp. 193–214). Creskill, NJ: Hampton Press.

Bogardus, E. S. (1933). A social distance scale. So-ciology & Social Research, 17, 265–271.

Brewer, M. B. (1999). The psychology of prejudice:Ingroup love and outgroup hate? Journal of SocialIssues, 55, 429 – 444. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0022-4537.00126

Butz, D. A., & Plant, E. A. (2009). Prejudice controland interracial relations: The role of motivation torespond without prejudice. Journal of Personality,77, 1311–1342. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.2009.00583.x

Clémence, A., Doise, W., de Rosa, A. S., & Gonza-lez, L. (1995). La représentation sociale des droitsde l’homme: Une recherche internationale surl’étendue et les limites de l’universalité. Interna-tional Journal of Psychology, 30, 181–212. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00207599508246565

44 ABRAMS, HOUSTON, VAN DE VYVER, AND VASILJEVIC

Cohrs, J. C., Maes, J., Moschner, B., & Kielmann, S.(2007). Determinants of human rights attitudes andbehavior: A comparison and integration of psycho-logical perspectives. Political Psychology, 28,441– 469. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2007.00581.x

Crandall, C. S., & Eshleman, A. (2003). A justifica-tion-suppression model of the expression and ex-perience of prejudice. Psychological Bulletin, 129,414 – 446. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.129.3.414

Crisp, R. J., & Hewstone, M. (2007). Multiple socialcategorization. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances inexperimental social psychology (Vol. 39, pp 163–254). Orlando, FL: Academic Press.

Cuddy, A. J., & Fiske, S. T. (2002). Doddering, butdear: Process, content, and function in stereotypingof older persons. In T. Nelson (Ed.), Ageism: Ste-reotyping and prejudice against older persons (pp.3–26). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Cuddy, A. J., Fiske, S. T., & Glick, P. (2007). TheBIAS map: Behaviors from intergroup affect andstereotypes. Journal of Personality and SocialPsychology, 92, 631– 648. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.92.4.631

Cuddy, A. J. C., Fiske, S. T., Kwan, V. S. Y., Glick,P., Demoulin, S., Leyens, J.-P., . . . Ziegler, R.(2009). Stereotype content model across cul-tures: Towards universal similarities and somedifferences. British Journal of Social Psychol-ogy, 48, 1–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/014466608X314935

Devine, P. G., & Monteith, M. J. (1993). The role ofdiscrepancy-associated affect in prejudice reduc-tion. In D. M. Mackie & D. L. Hamilton (Eds.),Affect, cognition, and stereotyping: Interactiveprocesses in group perception (317–344). San Di-ego, CA: Academic Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-088579-7.50018-1

Doise, W. (2002). Human rights as social represen-tations. London, UK: Routledge.

Doise, W., Spini, D., & Clémence, A. (1999). Humanrights studied as social representations in a cross-national context. European Journal of Social Psychol-ogy, 29, 1–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0992(199902)29:1�1::AID-EJSP909�3.0.CO;2-#

Dovidio, J. F., & Gaertner, S. L. (2010). Intergroupbias. In S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey(Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (Vol. 2, pp.1084–1121). New York, NY: Wiley.

Ellemers, N., Spears, R., & Doosje, B. (2002). Selfand social identity. Annual Review of Psychology,53, 161–186. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.53.100901.135228

Fiske, S. T., & Cuddy, A. J. C. (2006). Stereotypecontent and relative group status across cultures. InS. Guimond (Ed.), Social comparison processesand levels of analysis: Understanding culture, in-

tergroup relations and cognition (pp. 249–263).Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J., Glick, P., & Xu, J. (2002).A model of (often mixed) stereotype content:Competence and warmth respectively follow fromperceived status and competition. Journal of Per-sonality and Social Psychology, 82, 878 –902.http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.82.6.878

Glick, P., & Fiske, S. T. (2001). Ambivalent stereo-types as legitimizing ideologies: Differentiatingpaternalistic and envious prejudice. In J. T. Jost, &B. Major (Eds.), (2001). The psychology of legiti-macy: Emerging perspectives on ideology, justice,and intergroup relations (pp. 278 –306). NewYork, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Gonsalkorale, K., Sherman, J. W., Allen, T. J.,Klauer, K. C., & Amodio, D. M. (2011). Account-ing for successful control of implicit racial bias:The roles of association activation, response mon-itoring, and overcoming bias. Personality and So-cial Psychology Bulletin, 37, 1534–1545. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167211414064

Grube, J. W., Mayton, D. M., II, & Ball-Rokeach,S. J. (1994). Inducing change in values, attitudes,and behaviors: Belief system theory and themethod of value self-confrontation. Journal of So-cial Issues, 50, 153–173. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.1994.tb01202.x

Haidt, J. (2007). The new synthesis in moral psychol-ogy. Science, 316, 998–1002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1137651

Hayes, A. F. (2013). An introduction to mediation,moderation, and conditional process analysis: Aregression-based approach. New York, NY: Guil-ford Press.

Hewstone, M., Rubin, M., & Willis, H. (2002). In-tergroup bias. Annual Review of Psychology, 53,575–604. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.53.100901.135109

King, M. L. Jr. (1963). I have a dream . . .. Retrievedfrom http://www.archives.gov/press/exhibits/dream-speech.pdf

Kraus, S. J. (1995). Attitudes and the prediction ofbehavior: A meta-analysis of the empirical liter-ature. Personality and Social Psychology Bulle-tin, 21, 58 –75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167295211007

Kymlicka, W. (2001). Universal minority rights?Ethnicities, 1, 21–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/146879680100100108

Legault, L., Gutsell, J. N., & Inzlicht, M. (2011).Ironic effects of antiprejudice messages: Howmotivational interventions can reduce (but alsoincrease) prejudice. Psychological Science, 22,1472–1477. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797611427918

45EQUALITY HYPOCRISY AND PREJUDICE

Louis, W. R., & Taylor, D. M. (2005). Rights andduties as group norms: Implications of intergroupresearch for the study of rights and responsibilities.In N. J. Finkel & F. M. Moghaddam (Eds.), Thepsychology of rights and duties (pp. 105–134).Washington, DC: American Psychological Associ-ation.

Maio, G. R., Hahn, U., Frost, J. M., & Cheung, W.-Y.(2009). Applying the value of equality unequally:Effects of value instantiations that vary in typical-ity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,97, 598–614. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0016683

McFarland, S., & Mathews, M. (2005). Who caresabout human rights? Political Psychology, 26,365–385. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2005.00422.x

Moghaddam, F. M., & Riley, C. J. (2005). Towards acultural theory of rights and duties in human de-velopment. In N. Finkel & F. M. Moghaddam(Eds.), The psychology of rights and duties: em-pirical contributions and normative commentaries(pp. 75–101). Washington, DC: American Psycho-logical Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/10872-004

Moghaddam, F. M., & Vuksanovic, V. (1990). Atti-tudes and behavior toward human rights acrossdifferent contexts: The role of right-wing authori-tarianism, political ideology, and religiosity. Inter-national Journal of Psychology, 25, 455– 474.http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00207599008247877

Plant, E. A., & Devine, P. G. (1998). Internal andexternal motivation to respond without prejudice.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75,811–832. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.75.3.811

Plant, E. A., & Devine, P. G. (2009). The activecontrol of prejudice: Unpacking the intentionsguiding control efforts. Journal of Personality andSocial Psychology, 96, 640–652. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0012960

Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle,B. F. (1994). Social dominance orientation: A per-sonality variable predicting social and political at-titudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-ogy, 67, 741–763. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.67.4.741

Prentice, D. A., & Miller, D. T. (1992). When smalleffects are impressive. Psychological Bulletin,112, 160 –164. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.112.1.160

Rokeach, M. (1973). The nature of human values.New York, NY: Free Press.

Rokeach, M. (1975). Long-term value change initi-ated by computer feedback. Journal of Personalityand Social Psychology, 32, 467–476. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0077077

Rutland, A., Killen, M., & Abrams, D. (2010). A newsocial-cognitive developmental perspective onprejudice the interplay between morality andgroup identity. Perspectives on PsychologicalScience, 5, 279 –291. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1745691610369468

Sherif, M. (1966). In common predicament: Socialpsychology of intergroup conflict and cooperation.Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.

Spini, D., & Doise, W. (1998). Organizing principlesof involvement in human rights and their socialanchoring in value priorities. European Journal ofSocial Psychology, 28, 603–622. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0992(199807/08)28:4�603::AID-EJSP884�3.0.CO;2-P

Staerklé, C., & Clémence, A. (2004). Why people arecommitted to human rights and still tolerate theirviolation: A contextual analysis of the principle-application gap. Social Justice Research, 17, 389–406. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11211-004-2058-y

Stellmacher, J., Sommer, G., & Brähler, E. (2005). Thecognitive representation of human rights: Knowl-edge, importance, and commitment. Peace and Con-flict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 11, 267–292.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrativetheory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S.Worchel (Eds.), The social psychology of inter-group relations (pp. 33– 47). Monterey, CA:Brooks/Cole.

The Equalities Review. (2007). Fairness and freedom:The final report of the Equalities Review. London, UK:HMSO. Retrieved from http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100807034701/http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/equalitiesreview/

Vasiljevic, M., & Crisp, R. J. (2013). Tolerance bysurprise: Evidence for a generalized reduction inprejudice and increased egalitarianism throughnovel category combination. PLoS ONE, 8,e57106. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0057106

Worchel, S. (2005). The rightful place of humanrights: Incorporating individual, group, and cul-tural perspectives. In N. J. Finkel & F. M.Moghaddam (Eds.), The psychology of rights andduties (pp. 197–220). Washington, DC: AmericanPsychological Association. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/10872-009

46 ABRAMS, HOUSTON, VAN DE VYVER, AND VASILJEVIC

Correction to Abrams et al. (2015)

In the article “Equality Hypocrisy, Inconsistency, and Prejudice: The UnequalApplication of the Universal Human Right to Equality,” by Dominic Abrams,Diane M. Houston, Julie Van de Vyver, and Milica Vasiljevic (Peace andConflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 28–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pac0000084), the copyright should have been “© 2015 TheAuthor(s)”. The author note also should have included the following licensestatement, “This article has been published under the terms of the CreativeCommons Attribution License (CC-BY, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in anymedium, provided the original author and source are credited. Copyright for thisarticle is retained by the author(s). Author(s) grant(s) the American Psycholog-ical Association the exclusive right to publish the article and identify itself asthe original publisher.” The online version of this article has been corrected.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pac0000115