epistemology, praxeology, & empiricism in the social sciences
TRANSCRIPT
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Epistemology, Praxeology, & Empiricism in the Social Sciences Will Porter 2/3/2014
The primary task of epistemology is to construct a theory of knowledge that describes its nature and
how it is attained.
Ludwig von Mises, the founder of the science of Praxeology and master of Austrian School economics,
delved into matters which had implications reaching beyond mere economics. Praxeology, the study of
the logical implications of human action, provides insight into other areas of philosophy and gives us a
foundation for epistemology by distinguishing between that which can be known a prioriand that which
can be known only a posteriori.
Apriori hererefers to something that is knowable prior to any particular experience, whereas a
posterioriknowledge is only known posterior to, or aftersome specific experience or empiricalobservation.
The ways in which we go about attaining knowledge are different for the two areas of truth. For
example, the claim that nothing can be both red all over and green all over at the same time is
something that can be knownjust by thinking about it. In the study of logic, this is known as the Law of
Contradictionand states that nothing can simultaneously be itself and its opposite. It is an example of
truth which is knowable prior to any given experience.
Knowledge derived through observation and testing is known to be a posteriori. For example, the height
of a building, the speed of a traveling bus, the weight of a stone. To discover the answers to thesequestions, it is necessary to go out and see for ourselves.
A priori knowledge, once established, holds true at all times and in all places, like the propositions of
logic, geometry and arithmetic. A posteriori truths, though, are hypothetical and tentative, meaning that
its possible for a future observation tocome along and refute them. In light of stronger evidence, new
data, or innovations in measuring capabilities, empirical knowledge can potentially always be
overturned with a better explanation.
Thus, knowledge may be divided into two distinct realms: a priori and a posteriori. This distinction willserve as the basis for a Dualist epistemology, I.E. one that demonstrates the fundamentally dual
nature of knowledge as such.
A priori knowledge is acquired through reasoning and reflecting on what is necessarily true. A necessary
truth is one that couldnt possibly be otherwise, like the logical Law of Contradictionmentioned
above.
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One could not imagine a situation in which an object or entity could be both exclusively itself and
exclusively its opposite. In this way, a priori truths are logically necessary. To dispute an a priori truth,
one must do so on the grounds of logical validity, rather than through empirical observations. This is also
true in basic mathematics. One would only demonstrate their own perplexity if they attempted to refute
2+2=4 withsome new cutting-edge data.
To avoid confusion, it should be noted that the building blocksof the concepts which we reflect on are
initially attained empirically through the senses. However, once such concepts are understood, the
possibility arises that they may be employedto discover and establish new propositions that are true a
priori. Language and concepts themselves are first grasped by experience, only after this does it become
possible to construct a proposition or truth-claim regardless of what type of truth it is.
(This is in line with Aristotles Peripatetic dictum: Nihil in intellectu nisi prius fuerit in sensu["Nothing
is in the intellect without first being in the senses"]. The a priori realm of knowledge was accounted for
and the dictum was revised by the Rationalist philosopher Gottfried Leibniz, who added:nisi
intellectus ipsi[except for the intellect itself] ).
A posteriori knowledge has to do with the mechanical material world whose governing laws must be
derived through empirical means. For instance, the laws of physics are discovered only through
empirical study and observation of some given phenomenon. Such laws are structured on a basis of
constantly-operating relations. Observational science assumes that there are constants, or factors that
can be expressed in definite quantities and predicted based on past-observations. In this sense, these
laws may be described as mechanical.
The degree of constancy may vary for empirical laws, however. Constants in physics, for example,
adhere to a strict regularity with essentially no possibility for deviation, whereas a study like biology may
only findfrequentregularities. Nevertheless, the basis for a posteriori naturalscience lies in induction,
where general laws are derived from specific observations. The constancy ofphysicallaws (especially)
provides a background of stability for the empirical sciences (and every-day experience) to make
successful predictions about the relations between causes and effects.
With the a priori-a posteriori division in mind, another important distinction is commonly made in
regard to analytic and synthetic propositions. An analytic claim is one that is purely a definition, such
as All bachelors are unmarried. Even though this is logically true, in learning this one can only find out
the definition of the word bachelor,this is purely a linguistic matter. A claim that yields nothing more
than a definition is called a tautology.In contrast, a synthetic truth is one that tells us something new
about reality. For example, the claim that Children prefer McDonalds to Burger King is not merely a
part of the definition of children or McDonalds/Burger King, but tells us something which we
couldnt discover by only examining the meaning of the terms themselves.
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If a claim is only analytically true, it doesnt give us anything new to go on andserves as an intellectual
dead-end for empirical discovery. If a claim is synthetically true, it tells us something relevant about
reality as we experience it.
In this chapter we will find out how certain knowledge can be synthetic (empirically meaningful), and,
at the same time, a priori(knowable before any particular experience). In the course of our discussion,
then, we will be referring to this type of synthetic a priori truth, rather than mere definitional claims.
To understand how this kind of truth is possible, we must further distinguish our two branches of
knowledge.
These two realms may also be referred to as the Causal (a posteriori) and the Teleological (a priori). Any
change in observable reality can be described as either a Causal phenomenon, a part of natureitself,
or as a Teleological one, caused by some conscious entity that interferes in the natural course of
events. (Note that I here refer to the term nature only to mean that which occurs in the absence of
any changes created by a sentient-conscious entity. In no way does this imply that humans,as
conscious beings, are unnatural, or somehow separate from the natural world that, in a way,
produced them.)
The realm of a posteriori, or empirical, knowledge can tell us about observable relations found in
external reality. Physical laws, like gravity, operate on a constant basis of cause and effect, and so are
referred to as being Causally-structured. Knowledge about physical and empirical laws is gained through
experience and the inductive scientific method (hypothesis, test, affirm/falsify, revise, re-test). Future
observations may also falsify conclusions derived from past observations because empirical knowledge
is only hypothetically true. Cause and effect govern the events that take place in the external, material
world.
From Mises: It is impossible for the human mind to think of uncaused change. Man cannot help
assuming that every change is caused by a preceding change and causes further change. (Theory &
History, pg. 177)
The realm of a priori knowledge is concerned with the Teleologically-oriented, or the internal realm of
concepts, thought, and the mind. These things are not observable, Causally-structured, or even tangible,
and can only be understood when rational beings reflect on what is logically necessary to their own
nature.
Teleology is the branch of philosophy which deals with purpose. Purpose is demonstrated through the
human act of choice-making, otherwise known as action. When a person makes a choiceregarding his
behavior, he shows that he values that course of action over his available alternatives. In regard to
choice, then, humans engage in purposeful action, consciously making decisions to guide theirown
behavior.
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(The term rational action is commonly used as synonymous with purposeful action, but rational in
this sense simply means choice-making behavior. In common usage, rationalrefers to someone who
makes relatively goodchoices, however in Praxeology; it simply means that someone makes choices at
all.)
The statement that humans act must be considered to be in the realm of a priori knowledge because
it is true by necessity, and also tells us something beyond mere definitions. If one attempts to deny this
claim, he must affirm it in the course of his denial by choosingto deny. Thus, he can be said to be
engaged in action, thereby refuting his claim that humans dontact. This is known as a performative
contradiction. When one demonstrates the validity of a claim through the very act of arguing, the claim
becomes axiomatic.One cannot deny an axiom without thereby engaging in self-refutation. The
Action Axiom provides a foundationfor the science of Praxeology and many logical corollaries can be
deduced from it.
In basic terms, human action is comprised of means and ends. In the vocabulary of Ludwig von
Mises, these are referred to as categories of actionand are the logical implications of choice-making.
(The term category can be used interchangeable with the term essential element.)No purposeful
conduct could be detached from the means-ends framework.
An actor has desires or goals; these are described as his ends. For means, an actor employs various
skills, tools, and scarce resources to reach his ends. For example, if my end is to go to the library, I might
choose to use a vehicle, various roads, and technical know-how all as means to help me get there. If one
dwells on this insight, he will see that any conceivable action can be described in the terms of choice,
means, and ends, thus making them essential elements(categories), of action.
The two realms of knowledge are distinct, but are also inextricably linked to one another. While thought
is indeed conceptually separate from external reality, the Causal world could not be interacted with or
understood without a purpose-driven (Teleological) entity there to observe it. Nothing about the Causal
realm could ever be known if there werent a conscious, choice-making being there to experience it.
At the same time, action requires a Causally-structured external reality for it to take place in. When we
make choices and act on our preferences, we implement causesinto the world to create effects.If
the physical world didnt operate on constant causal laws, action would be near-impossible. We could
never hope to predict the effects of our acts based on past experiences, and therefore achieving our
ends would be incredibly difficult, or functionally undoable. In acting, human beings must assume a
relative constancy in the causal relations which govern their environment.
From Hans Hoppe: In so understanding causality as a necessary presupposition of action, it is also
immediately implied that its range of applicability must then be delineated a priori by that of the
category of teleology.(Economic Science & The Austrian Method, pg. 32)
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Since human action is Teleological in nature, it is not directed by the Causality that governs external
reality. The concept of action is unique in that it doesinflict cause and effect into the empirical world,
yet it is guidedby thought, which is not itself constrained by any constant Causal factors.
Because there are no constant Causal-relationships to be observed in the realm of thought, in attaining
knowledge about human action, we cannot do so by examining observable data alone. Where empirical
science can assume a background of observable constant factors, the study of action cannot. This serves
to delineate the range of applicability of empirical science or knowledge.
Action is only learned about through a priori reasoning (reflection). Discovering anything beyondthe
concept of action must be considered the task of observational, a posteriori science. No other
phenomena butaction is guided by thought, and thus everything else falls to the realm of empirical
knowledge, which assumes observable constant relationships from which general laws can be derived.
Hoppe continues: Indeed, both categories are strictly exclusive and complementary. Action
presupposes a causally structured observational reality, but the reality of action which we can
understand as requiring such structure, is not itself causally structured. Instead, it is a reality that
must be categorized teleologically, as purpose-directed, meaningful behavior.(Ibid.) [Emphasis mine]
Teleological phenomena are not observable. If one attempts to observe an instance of human action, he
will only see an entity behaving in some particular way. Nothing about choice, means, or endswill
be made apparent.
It is only by examining the conceptual nature of action that one can learn about what actually guidesit;
purpose, knowledge, and preferences. It is only because we ourselves are actors that we can
contemplate the meaning of action, and nobody butan actor could have access to such information.
It is only because we are actorsthat we can have this unique insight into what it means to act. Internal-
reflection, or understanding,is the only available means for discovery in the study of action. Any truth
derived from such an exercise would have to be knownpriorto any specific experience.
Moreover, since all experiences are necessarily those of choice-makingactors, one couldnt engagein
any empirical observation ofaction without already assuming the existence of purpose-guided action in
the first place. Experience, like action, is also not itself observable. The only way somebody could
understand the meaning of experience is by being an experiencerthemselves. In the same way, the
meaning of action is discovered only by reflecting on our own nature, reasoning on what it means to be
a choice-making entity.
Conversely, one could not learn much of anything new by merely reflecting on the nature of a stone, or
a tree, because we are indeed not stones or trees. To discover the existence, and the specific nature of
othersorts of non-acting entities, we must engage in the empirical scientific method.
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The concept of action can be said to be the intermediary through which the Teleological meets the
Causal, I.E. where thought meets external reality. It is the externalimplementation of our internal
knowledge in a purposeful manner for the sake of transforming some aspect of the world to bring about
a more preferable state of affairs. Action is completely unique in that it operateswithinthe Causal realm
of reality, and yet isnt itself guidedCausally.
Since the rest of physical reality can only be known about empirically, action is the only conceivable
phenomenon that creates observable effects withoutitself being guided by Causal laws. This opens up
the possibility for truths which can be known by inner-reflection alone, yet at the same time are
empirically meaningful to external reality. It is because action marks the boundary between the mental
(Teleological) and the physical (Causal) realms that contemplating its nature can provide universal a
priori insights that concern observable reality (I.E. that are synthetic).
Any other a priori truth is purely analytic and is empirically meaningless, and any other empirically-
meaningful truth can only be known through observation. Thus, it may be postulated with certainty that
action is conceptually distinct from all other phenomena in that it can be learned aboutpriorto anyspecific experience while still telling us something relevanttoexperience, or relevant to the world which
is revealed to the mind via experience.
The notion of a synthetic apriori truth now becomes viable, and indeed inescapable, once one begins
to examine the nature of purposeful behavior. We could not undo the truth of these claims, since we
implicitly demonstrate their validity in any attempt to deny them.
With the idea of human action elucidated, we will next explore the vital role that knowledge itself plays
in action, as well as the role that language, proposition-making, and truth-validity play in knowledge.Knowledge is the product of a rational mind sorting out sensory data, merging it into integrated
experience which allows a being to consciously navigate and understand his environment, utilizing
means to reach ends and to sustain his own life.
Without this kind of knowledge, purposeful action would be impossible. Before one engages in action he
must first identify his current situation, determine a more preferable state of affairs, and finally discover
how he might reach such a state through his behavior (I.E. discovering the proper causes/means to
reap their desired effects/ends). Doing this involves filtering sense data through the rational mind to
extract the relevant information about relationships and connections, or causes and effects (more on
this below in regard to categories and the similarities of Praxeological and Kantian accounts of
Epistemology).
There is always the possibility that incorrect extractions may be made and certain causal chains may in
fact not hold true. But nevertheless, knowledgeright or wrongis more than just sensory stimuli, but
sensory stimuli interpretedin some way by a rational being, hopefully in a way that will yield information
to help him attain an end, or goal.
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The only way to formulate and express knowledge is by means of language, particularly by verbal or
symbolic-textual truth-claims, commonly known as arguments. It is difficult to imagine rational thought
totally detached from language, as language gives expressible form to concepts by attaching their
meaning to signs, symbols, and sounds. A language-using entity essentially cannot escape the use of
language in formulating their ideas; language is their primary faculty of expression of any knowledge,
information, or concepts at all. Besides verbal-written language there are forms of gestural
communication, but only insofar as such gestures can play the same role as words in effectively carrying
the meaning of ideas or concepts can a truth-claim be expressed in this way. A truth-claim is a bit of
knowledge which asserts or negates the existence of some facet of reality or some causal relationship.
When two language-users reach a disagreement on a claim to truth, they engage in argumentative
exchange in an attempt to resolve it. Both sides give their own account and each weighs the others
claims against some standard of validity to reach a conclusion.
Argumentation is the necessary result of our ability to identify things and distinguish ideas into a
conceptual frameworkas is required in the course of any actionand to express these concepts usingsound and symbol which other rational beings can understand as meaningful. If one tried to dispute the
fact that truth is possible to attain and that language has meaning, he would find himself in a
performative contradiction. His act of objecting would directly contradict the content of his objection.
Even if he merely uttered or thought this to himself, he would still have to implement his conceptual
framework of knowledge, expressed via meaning attached to language. Since the existence or ability of
argumentation is argumentatively indisputable, we may deem argumentations existenceas axiomatic.
As well as being incontestable, an axiom is a truth which can serve as a sound starting-point to derive
further truths from.
In the same way that one cannot claim with any logical coherence that one does not act, one also could
not argue that one cannot argue. It therefore becomes equally impossible for one to deny that he knows
the meaning of truth-validity, because contained in his very act of denial he demonstrates his possession
of such knowledge. To dispute any claim in the course of argument, a person must make use of a truth
claim to support his own position, or to undercut the position of his opponent. The meaning of truth-
validity must already be known if one is to make a case for, or against, anything at all.
The propositions made during an argument are verified or refuted on the basis of the (a priori) laws of
logic. Such laws serve as the basic standard for all truth claims. Implied in the meaning of truth-validityare the logical laws of Existence (somethingexists), Identity (A is A,orthings that exist have particular
properties that distinguish them from all other existing things), and Contradiction, (A cannot be
exclusively A and Non-A at the same time).
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When we say something is true, we mean most fundamentally that it is in accord with the basic laws
of logic. Additional empirical data may be required to verify a particular claim, but if any claim is at
variance with the laws of logic, it can be immediately rejected as false. These logical laws may be said,
then, to be implied in the very concept of argumentation, which is a particular subset of action. This is
consistent with the notion that only action and its logical corollaries can yield any meaningful a priori
truths.
Argument is the special class of action where actors formulate claims to truth and attempt to justify
their validity on the grounds of, at the very least, the three logical laws just mentioned above.
This act of justification has significant ethical implications, but as the topic at hand is a theory of
knowledge, this must be saved for a later discussion. In attempting to claim truth to a proposition in the
course of an argument, an actor demonstrates, or at least assumes, that there is some objectively-
ascertainable standard of truth. If each person could have his own truth, it would be meaningless to
argue over the validity of any proposition. Arguments are only meaningful at all when the participants
realize that claims to knowledge must be consistent with some basic standard of verifiability, not based
in their own subjective whims. Since nothing whatsoever could be said or claimed without
argumentation, it must be considered to be a particularly unique type of action, where knowledge can
be expressed, and the validity of such knowledge can be disputed on the grounds of some rigorous and
objective standard; the basic tenets of logic.
In arguing anything at all, one cannot conceivably avoid assuming that existence exists, existence is
more than just one homogenous object or entity, and that in regard to the inherent diversity of things,
objects/entities cannot exhibit 100% of one property and 100% of another mutually-exclusive property
at once, I.E. that contradiction cannot occur in reality. No matter how hard one tried, any argument
would implicitly assume the validity of these three laws.
Argumentation, like action, clearly assumes the existence of knowledge, and one may additionally say
that knowledge plays a role as an action-category. Truth-validity determination is an essential element
of how choice-making is guided, regardless of whether or not our determinations turn out to be right
or wrong. Were it not for our capacity to distinguish between truth and falsehoodto some extent, we
would be unable to tie our own shoes, unable to formulate arguments, nor could we engage in any
choice-making behavior at all.
We may conclude here that the ultimate role of human knowledge is to make (successful) action
possible. Similar to means and ends, knowledge is a category of action because no specific action
could be conceived of that didnt contain knowledge as a necessary ingredient. Furthermore, because
knowledge is subject to validity-verification, it serves an activeor positive function in choice-making.
Means and ends are neutralcategories in that all that can be done with them is to fill them with the
particular content of a given action. Knowledge, on the other hand, is true or false, right or wrong,
correct or incorrect, and determining its validity is an essential part of making choices and acting on
them.
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Knowledge is only useful insofar as it can provide actors with causally-effective means to achieve their
ends. When one acts on incorrect knowledge about the effectiveness of a means, the likelihood that he
will actually achieve his end severely diminishes. An actorsmeans, ends, and preferences are all
determined based on what they knowabout their own values as well as the current situation they find
themselves in.
Restated, the task of epistemology has traditionally been to inquire on the nature of knowledge. From
the preceding discussion we have shown how mans fundamental nature as a choice-maker gives
knowledge its real function. We use knowledge to navigate between truth and falsehood for the sake of
enabling effective action to take place. One may also formulate knowledge into a truth-claim expressed
by language, and such a claim is verified or refuted primarily on the grounds of unavoidable logical
axioms, and if necessary, empirical evidence as well.
Epistemology also asks whether there is more than one type of knowledge, and if so, distinguishing
where one ends and the other begins. We have discovered how, aside from analytic truths which can
yield no information beyond definitions, human actionis the only area of study that can be known aboutin an a priori manner. This further illustrates an epistemological Dualism, asa priori knowledge about
action is fundamentally distinct from all other synthetic knowledge about observable reality.
With the concept of action at hand, the age-old Empiricist-Skeptic charge that this Dualism leads to an
epistemic Idealismcan now be successfully addressed. Idealismin this context simply claims that the
objects of physical existence are somehow dependent on, or created by, the mind.
Depending on ones interpretation, the Traditional Rationalists, like Gottfried Leibniz and Immanuel
Kant, seemed to imply that external reality conforms to our knowledge, rather than the other way
around. This would entail some sort of Idealism, where thought either creates or distorts reality.
In contrast to the David Humeian Empiricist-Skeptic model of the mirror-likemind, where all
knowledge comes purely from sensory information, the Rationalist model was one of an active mind
which met reality with its own structure of a priori knowledge. This mental structure was referred to
by Immanuel Kant as the categoriesof thought.An example that Kant gave of such a category would
be the Principle of Causality.
Kant thought, and correctly so, that the general existence of cause and effect was not something to be
observed through the senses, but rather understoodprior to any specific observation as being
necessary to experience-observation itself. As quoted from Mises above, the human mind cannot
imagine an observable change that was not the effectof some prior cause. The Rationalist accounts
for Causality by deeming it part of the logical structure of the human mind, rather than something to be
seen, heard, or felt. For Kant andMises, then, the human mind cannot avoid experiencing reality in any
other way but as structured by cause and effect.
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In the same way that Praxeology uses the term category to mean an essential element, the
Traditional Rationalist notion of categories also consists of truths that are necessary ingredients for
understanding anything attained through the senses. Along with Causality, Kant deemed Time and Space
as categories of thought as well.
Because the nature of observational data is simply that of light photons, sound waves, etc., no part of it
is inherently logical or conceptual in any way. And since the concepts of Causality, Time, and Space are
nowhere to be observed in this hurricane of sense data, Kant claimed that the meaning of these
concepts must be found in the logical structure of human thought instead. Kants categories are
concepts which allowed the mind to structure sense data into something rationally understandable.
In other words, a rational being does not merely utilize sensory data alone. His mind is conceptually
structured to grasp sense data on the basis of the categories of thought. Contained in this is the very
meaning of rationality itself, a faculty of understanding which goes beyond mere sensuous stimulation.
The essential Rationalist claim was that the human mind must meet observational reality with its owntoolbox. Kant referred to this as our Manifold of Apperception, where the mind processes
perceptual input through the categories of thought, resulting in unified conceptual understanding. In
order to render the plethora of data we are always bombarded with into something vaguely coherent,
Kant thought the mind must, from the outset, order our experience as Causal, Temporal, and Spatial.
The Empiricist-Skeptic would object that if such an a priori structure of thought was in place,
independent of or prior to experience, how could it be said to have any relevance to external reality?
If the Rationalists were correct, the Skeptics charged, this would mean that the human mind would have
to create our reality, or that the mind distorts reality,orthat itsjust a miraculous coincidence thatthis structure of thought could help us in navigating or understanding realphysical reality in any
meaningful way. In short, the Empiricist-Skeptic claimed that the only way for the Rationalist to proceed
was adopt an Epistemological Idealism, which clearly has some strange and seemingly-incorrect
implications.
However, in light of Praxeological theory, we can further elaborate on the notion of an activemind as
being that of the Praxeological actor. With this idea, we can now answer the Skeptics skepticism. As
shown above, action, unlike all other phenomena, is unique in that it simultaneously has a foot in both
the Teleological realm of thought and the Causal realm of reality.
The categories of action, like Means, Ends, Knowledge, and Causality, are unavoidably true once the
meaning of action is formulated and expressed. Rather than being free-floating figments of the mind
with no foundation in reality, the categories of thought are merely the logical implications of the
existence of action.
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From this we can now see that Kant's Idealistic categories of thought become, for us, the Praxeological
categories of action. Action is guided by thought, so many of Kants insightsregarding the categories
still apply here. But the fundamental difference is that the Praxeological account puts vital emphasis on
the notion of purposeful behavior. The traditional Rationalists focused more exclusively on the nature of
reason and human thought, where Praxeology gives rational thought itsfunctionin action, rooting it in
the concrete reality which action must navigate.
Time, Space, and Causality are all concepts to be understood as directly implied in the means-ends
framework of human action. An end is accomplished only temporally-after some means are employed;
creating an effect from a cause, and this all must take place in some physical environment,
understood by any actor-observer to be spatially-structured.Navigation through space is a
fundamental aspect to any conceivable action. Even if reaching ones end didnt involve much actual
bodily movement, all action at least assumes that an actor physically exists somewherein space to even
make it possible that he interact with any thing, object, or entity (which themselves must have definite
form and take up definite space).
Time, Space, Causality, as well as the aforementioned three Logical Laws are all synthetic a priori truths
which are logically deduced from the concept of human action. All actors must assume in every action
that existence exists, existence has identity, existence cant/doesnt contradict, existence is structured
spatially, temporally, and causally. Mises, like Kant, referred to these unique truths as laws of thought
as well as categories.
But the categories must also fundamentally reflect realityand the way things truly are, as action itself
takes place in precisely this reality. Action is the conscious-directing or adjustment of aphysicalbody
through space and time. Thus, the Rationalists are correct in claiming that certain truths can be known a
priori, but it is only the concept of action that can ground the meaning of these truths to empirical
reality and give them any concrete synthetic significance. Since action is guided by thought, yet also
inflicts change into the external world, the categories of action arent only laws of thought, but laws
of reality as well. (This serves to reconcile the small quarrel between Ludwig von Mises and Murray N.
Rothbard. The latter maintained that Praxeology furnished existential laws, whereas Mises claimed they
were Epistemological laws. This reconciliation opens the possibility for an action-based theory of
Metaphysics, but that will, along with ethics, have to wait.)
Action takes place in a definite, scarce world. If it is to be successful in any instance, we not only require
a capacity for knowledge in general, but particular a priori knowledge about existence as well;
knowledge that cannot itself be derived from experience. Knowing what it means to act, by virtue of
being an actor, gives one implicit understanding of the a priori categories of action.
While they may not be, and often arent, explicitlyunderstood, once these truths are stated they cannot
be meaningfully denied. In this sense they are not self-evident, but rather logically incontestable after
they have been formulated into a truth-claim and expressed in the course of an argument.
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This gives us a very Realisticepistemology, rather than an untenable Idealist one that either assumes a
mere coincidence in the structure of thought matchingreality, or that reality is created by such a
structure. Thought guides action and action makes observable changes in reality, any logical implications
of action must be seen to not only reflect the logical structure of thought, but also general truths about
empirical existence.
Now that we understand the why and the how ofthe action categories as legitimate synthetic a
priori truths, we can further contemplate the nature of action and figure out the what inderiving a list
of such categories.
We have already established the categories of Knowledge, Existence, Identity, Contradiction, Causality,
Space, and Time, but this list must also include Choice, Means/Ends, Cost/Price, Profit/Loss, and
Value/Preference. All of these concepts, or categories, begin to mark the a priori limits of what can be
known about action without having to delve into empirical observation.
In fact, no empirical observation could ever conceivably disprove or refute these things. To do so would
be to engage in action and to affirm the truth of the categories just listed.
To walk the reader through this, we can see that in the very act of observation (and any act at all) one
would have to devise an End which they Value. One aims to accomplish this End by employing some
number of Means. In doing so, one must also make a Choice and set something else aside, thereby
incurring a Cost of a foregone opportunity. From the Costs incurred by choosing one course of action
over another, the Price of each opportunity emerges in respect to the persons set of Preferences. If the
actor accomplishes his End and satisfies his Preference, he can be said to have Profited (not in the
strictly monetary sense, but in the general sense of fulfilling ones own desires).
If not, he takes a Loss. Also, implied in the categories of Means and Ends are the categories of both Time
and Causality. An actor reaches an End only when he inflicts a Cause into the world to create an Effect.
Since a Cause must come beforeits subsequent Effect, this must be assumed to happen over some given
period of Time. All of this choice-making behavior is guided by the actors Knowledge about himself, his
values and preferences, and the world around him. Finally, all of this must imply an Existence made up
of Space and various entities with their own Identity which cannot be Contradictory.
It is possible that there are additional logical consequences of action, and so our list may not be totally
exhaustive, but this conceptual structure of action categories constitutes what must be possible to be
known a priori, I.E. what knowledge may be extrapolated from reflecting on our very nature as actors.
Any particular action imaginable can be expressed or described in terms of each of the categories above,
includingthe act of attempting to deny their validity.
Again, these are not merely tautologies or definitional claims but offer a plethora of meaningful
information about reality. As will be shown below, the discoveries furnished by Praxeology are
applicable to various branches of science, beyond the realm of Rationalist philosophy.
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Because we are rational, acting beings, we can reflect on the nature of such rational action and apply
our reflective findings to other rational-acting entities; other people. A priori knowledge is possible
concerning human action because we, being human, have the capacity to reflect on human nature.
It has often been disputed whether there truly isa human nature, or universal properties applicable to
all people, but the universal nature of human actionjust may be precisely those properties. It would
seem to follow from this that any scienceinvolving the study of human behavior would have to be in
accord with this universal nature. Praxeology, in its explanation of action, lends credence to the notion
of a human nature.
Of course, it must be said, studies such as human biology and bio-chemistry are empirical sciences. As
such, not allknowledge related to human beings is a priori or reflective, that would be absurd. But
determining the conceptual nature of thought and human action is a unique a priori, or apodictic,
discipline. Apodictic refers to something that is immediately and demonstrably true; an axiomatic
truth that cannot be meaningfully denied. This word sufficiently captures the status of the logically-
certain existence of human action and all of its necessary implications.
The Empiricists & Social Science
There are schools of thought that actively seek to refute the existence of such synthetic a priori truths as
the Action Axiom. Primarily during the late 19ththrough the 20thcentury, the German Empiricist and
Logical Positivist academic circles were prominent voices that objected to the notion that anyone could
deduce a corpus of epistemological philosophy purely through a priori axioms.
Such a philosophical foundation would establish the potential legitimacy of scienceconducted on the
basis of a priori truth, rather than by observation alone. It was, in fact, discovered by Ludwig von Mises
that the study of economicscould only deal with the logical implications of human action. Working on
somewhat conventional assumptions of his Austrian forebears, Mises revised economic method to fit
into the framework of Praxeology. Contrary to the popular fashion of his time (and ours), Mises
concluded that economics was necessarily a study of action, and could not be based in the traditional
Baconian scientific method. In economics, observations can only be interpretedwith the help of
Praxeology. Action is only understood when seen through the categories of means, ends, etc.
To the idea of apodictic, or absolute, truth, the Empiricist-Positivist objects that the only two possible
kinds of truth are analytic definitions (tautologies) and tentative empirical hypotheses.
This essentially states that we cant be certain about anythingand introduces skepticism on the human
capacity for attaining genuine knowledge. These academics claimed that the realm of a priori knowledge
was exclusively comprised of mere linguistic conventions, representing only arbitrary transformation
rules of various symbols (language and/or mathematics).
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For example, if observing Experiment A at time T1 is to have any relationship whatsoever with
observations made during Experiment B at time T2, what must be true for this relationship to exist?
What is to bind these observations to one another, so to speak, and allow a scientist to apply
information gathered about past events when making predictions about the future?
In other words, why is it not simply that at T1 we see one thing happen and at T2 we see another? Whyshould there ever be a problem? Why is it true that T2s results could falsify or confirm the results
from T1? Without the use of any a priori knowledge about Causality, this question could not be
coherently answered. Any set of observations would have to be seen as simply logically
incommensurable with any other set and no hypothesis could ever be tested.
But it would seem quite ridiculous to deny the acute success of the observational sciences. The
astonishing advances in technology and scientific understanding over the 20th
century aloneclearly
demonstrate the practical validity of assuming the existence of a causally-structured reality.
The assumption made by Empiricists that physical reality operates on constant and stable relations overtime is notjustified under the Empiricist framework of knowledge. Because of this stability, it allows
scientists to make successful and accurate predictions about empirical events based in what we know
from past observation.
To use the empirical method in the first place, the Principle of Causality is already assumed to be valid.
Contrary to Empiricist doctrine, then, Causality decisively must be taken to be a meaningful synthetic a
priori statement. No empirical science could be done without this basic, non-observable assumption of
cause and effect.
Do not, however, mistake any of the above claims as attempts to render the scientific methodillegitimate or invalid, quite the contrary. Rather, the question concerns theparameters of applicability
for the scientific method. Where the Empiricists physical science ends, Praxeological social science
begins. The traditional scientific method may still prove useful for us here, but the implications of
Praxeology must be taken as our primary methodological tool. Data in the social sciences can only be
interpretedon the basis of a theory, and so theoretical insights are required. It is this that Praxeology
provides.
(To quickly address the objection that Quantum Physics somehow disproves the idea of a stably-
structured reality, one can only answer that as far as human action and (macro-scale) scientific
predictions are concerned, the principles that apply to the macro-scale are the only relevant ones.Quantum Physics may tell us something is mysterious or seemingly-contradictory in the must minute
fabric of reality, but so long as human action and science take place on the level of the macro, we have
no reason to assume that Causality is invalid, at leaston this scale. For all intents and purposes, Causal
laws are functionally-constant. Quantum Physics could not refute the fact that there is a significant
degree of stability in the world that we act in, and that we implement and observe definite causes to
reap [and study] their effects.)
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The social sciences involve the study of human action and human actors. In the realm of human action,
there are no constantly-operating, time-indifferent causes. While action takes placeina Causally-
structured reality, action itself is guided not by Causal laws, but by subjective motivations, purposes, and
evaluations. These desires are always in flux; changing and evolving as each of an actorsends are
realized and produced anew. They are not at all constant. One may change his mind at any given
moment for any given reason.
From Ludwig von Mises, empirical prediction is impossible regarding human action because: there
areonlyvariables and no constants. It is pointless to talk of variables when there are no invariables.
(Theory & History, pg. 12 [Emphasis mine])
In the study of physics (our favorite example), one can use equations and mathematics to represent
constant factors and phenomena which operate indifferently to time. The trajectory of a falling rock will
be subject to all of the physical laws and constants that a falling tree will. The trajectory of an acting
human being, based on ever-changing knowledge and subjective valuation is, however, a categorically
different matter.
Since all action is guided by knowledge, and sincefutureknowledge can never be known with certainty
in the present moment, (if it were, it would no longer be future knowledge, but now knowledge) no
systematic scientific predictions about future action can be made.
To observe past behavior, guided by past knowledge, and project this into the future as a prediction
would be to ignore the fact that all future action will be guided by knowledge which the actor has not
yet attained, knowledge which no predictor could ever guess. If one could consistently and accurately
predict what he willknow, but does not yet know, then he would necessarily already know it; this of
course is a logical impossibility. Clearly, future knowledge is unknown until the moment that we attain it(at which point the future becomes the present).
It would, in fact, be absurd to claim the ability to predict future states of knowledge, as the entire
purpose of empirical science is to learnfrom the future outcome of an experiment. If one could
accurately predict future states of knowledge, he could also predict the outcome of experiments,
thereby defeating the point of the experiment in the first place; to learn what was not before
understood. Therefore, it is demonstrably true that knowledge and action are based in causes that are
ultimately unknowable, rendering human action scientifically unpredictable. All that canbe known is
that subjective preferences guide action, and no legitimate predictions may be made about an actors
future subjective evaluations.
However, while accurate empirical prediction is not tenable, we actually cansay that some predictions
are inherently untenable. Any prediction that is at variance with the a priori truths derived from action
can be said to be systematically flawed. For instance, one could not reasonably predict that an actor will
notemploy the first unit of a given set of homogenous goods toward his currently most-valued end (and
the second to his second-most valued end, and so on).
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This is known as (part of) the Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility, but all that must be understoodhere
is that this law is derived, a priori, directly from the Action Axiom. This axiom, then, serves to constrain
the range and scope of legitimate prediction in the study of action.
With the above in mind, it becomes quite clear why strictly empirical science has no place in a disciplinelike economics. The modern mainstream orthodoxy must constantly make all sorts of impossible
predictions using statistics, or econometrics. The empirically-oriented economists are using an
altogether incorrect and inappropriate method, treating acting human beings like mechanical particles
or molecules. Human behavior and action cannot be stuffed into a mathematical formula to crank out
any kind of reliable prediction, no matter how sophisticated the equations and regressions are.
One who takes data about the past and lumps it into a statistical aggregate can only yield a historical
account of past economic relations. Never can one use such aggregates to predict future economic
phenomena. Attempting to do so would be akin to Ptolemaic astronomy trying to force math and
science to fit the incorrect notion of an Earth-centric universe. Such an exercise can only result in overly-complicated falsehoods that serve to muddy the waters for rational inquiry.
Conclusion
Human action must be examined with tools which are attained through reflective contemplation of our
own nature as choice-makers. Only its logical ramifications can provide information useful for social
science. While the action-categories dont allow forspecific predictions, they do allow us to fruitfully
analyze all action to attain scientific insights as well as more fundamental insights about the nature of
human knowledge. Action is an altogether unique concept, and therefore yields a unique type of truth inits implications.
Epistemological Dualism allows one to distinguish between the two areas of knowledge and/or science.
Economics, history, sociology, and the like, all involve human action as their primary subject matter, and
so require a different method than that of the physical sciences. The fundamental distinctions made by
Rationalist philosophy have carved the way for an action-based epistemology; one that recognizes the
fundamental difference between a priori-Teleological and a posteriori-Causal knowledge. This provides a
rock-solid edifice, from which an entire science of market exchange (economics or catalactics) can be
derived.
In closing, Praxeology offers more than just epistemological truth, but truth regarding the nature of the
social sciences and economic methodology. No longer is economics a discipline which aims to employ
the methods of the physicist, but one that has its own toolbox to deal with its own unique set of
considerations.
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With the conceptual framework of action established, one may proceed into the realm of economic
science well-equipped. Economic relations are now understood to be relations between actors with
means and ends, knowledge and preferences. It is action which ultimately grounds our theory of
knowledge, and it is action as well that grounds economic theory.
The age-old quarrel between the Rationalist and the Empiricist framework of knowledge can now finally
be laid to rest. Whether for physical or social science, one cannot avoid the necessity of employing
meaningful a priori knowledge. Rationalism, as espoused by Immanuel Kant, Ludwig von Mises, and
Hans Hoppe, has validated the realityof reason, and the human capacity to grasp genuine existential
truths; truths concerning the marvels of the rational mind and the universe that surrounds us.