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consciousness, and feeling. In Greek, for example,psyche includes both breath and mind, as does the related term pneurna.9 In Sanskrit, prana encompasses both breath and soul. In many other languages, terms for breath are closely associated with terms for feeling and emotion (e.g., Onians 1954; Wellenkamp 1988; Roseman 1990).

The interrelationships of "mind," emotion, and breath that figure in such linguistic conceptions seem to mirror the complex anatomical and physiological connections that in fact link the human respiratory system and other bodily systems. These interconnections can be understood partly through the fact that the respiratory, cardiovascular, and other organ systems all "share7' the autonomic nervous system, which with the limbic and hypothalamic areas of the brain is of key importance in emotion.1° Variations in breathing patterns are thus linked to variations in feeling states, both processes being mediated by the autonomic nervous system. Emotional expressivity is also associated with autonomic changes. Ekman, Levenson, and Frieson (1983) have shown that changes in facial expression, even quite mechanically generated ones, correlate with different patterns of autonomic activity, and the work of Lanzetta has demonstrated that there is a correlation between increased autonomic activity and increased facial expressivity (Lanzetta, Cartwright- Smith, and Kleck 1976 cited in Brown 1991, p. 26)."

Respiration provides a framework within which to address the simultaneity of behavioral and autonomic processes, for respiratory mechanisms are harnessed to both "autonomous," internal processes and "external," socially mediated processes. This happens because respiration is under both "voluntary" and autonomic or "involuntary" neural control. The skeletal muscles attached to ribs and between ribs and sternum, which serve to raise and lower and thus expand or contract the rib cage to draw in or expel air, are subject to voluntary control, as can be experienced by intentionally taking a deep breath. These muscles are also innervated by branches of the autonomic nervous system that further provides the major innervation of the smooth (rather than skeletal) muscle of the diaphragm. Breathing is thus also "automatic" as can be experienced by remembering that we do not have to think to breathe. Respiration is the only autonomic function of the body so mediated (although cardiovascular function also may be mediated to a small degree by voluntary mechanisms). Breathing thus serves both metabolic and behavioral systems (Plum 1970, p. 159). Particular respiratory patterns can come to be associated with particular feeling states both by convention and by conditioning, and can be used in the direct manipulation of physiological and subjective states. Further, respiratory patterns and their accompanying manifestations are communicative both in a surface and a deeper sense. They can reveal to an observer clues as to the physiological and subjective state of the person. They are also one of the chief mechanisms mediating the establishment of common interactional rhythms and synchronous behavior in groups.

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The point here is that breath is one pathway through which this interrelationship between body, emotion, and social being is constituted and through which it can be explored. It provides an ideal example in that the respiratory function is fundamental to being, that is, is at all times "engaged," and is at all times a reciprocal pathway of communication between bodily and social being. It is further implicated in the production of speech, song, all forms of bodily movement, facial expression, and so forth. Respiratory patterns thus cannot be isolated from the wider bodily and psychosocial context of which they are a part. The shared neuroanatomical links with emotion make clear the intimate connections between respiratory patterns and subjective experience without necessitating a concern with arguments about specificity of those relationships. However, this implicate relationship is so much part of our being both physical and sociocultural, and is so rarely within our conscious awareness it is difficult to consider at all. The fact that ventilation patterns are continually responding "automatically" as well as being acted on, modulated, or manipulated through our actions within various sociocultural contexts, makes it even more difficult to represent.

Respiratory Physiology

The physiology of respiration has been well described in the scientific literature. A very brief introduction is given here to provide necessary factual background for subsequent material on the implications of respiratory patterns for emotion. Following this I draw on material from medicine, psychology, and psychiatry. It is here that the question of the interrelationship between respiration and emotion becomes apparent, although not always entirely directly. Clinical models exert their own contraints through emphasis on the definition and delineation of abnormal states, such as the association of "abnormal" respiratory patterns with what are defined as physical or psychological pathologies. Most emphasis in this literature is given to ventilatory forms such as hyperventilation, that is, "overbreathing," and its frequent association in clinical contexts with anxiety or panic states, as well as a whole range of physical manifestations. The very considerable literature on hyperventilation is useful, however, for it addresses the question of the interlocking of respiratory functions and emotion.

Respiration provides for the regulation of gas exchange that provides a supply of oxygen adequate to the metabolic needs of the body and that removes excess carbon dioxide preduced in those metabolic processes. The air moved through the lungs comes into proximity to venous blood moved through the lungs by the circulatory system so that gas exchange can take place. Normal breathing (termed eupnoea) is that which meets metabolic demand for the supply of oxygen and the removal of carbon dioxide in reference to the level of activity of the body.12

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Carbon dioxide, not oxygen, is the primary stimulus in the functioning of the respiratory system. That is, raised or lowered carbon dioxide levels cause physiological responses. Even small increases in carbon dioxide levels, as for example in underbreathing, cause an increase in ventilatory response (Slonim and Hamilton 1976, p. 133). Thus, if we try to breath shallowly and infrequently or hold the breath, we eventually experience a powerful urge to take a breath. This urge is due to the build up of carbon dioxide, rather than the lack of oxygen, and the effects this increased carbon dioxide level has on the nervous system. The threshold for hypoxia, oxygen deprivation, is very high and has little effect on ventilation. This can be (dangerously) demonstrated by rebreathing expired air in a closed system in which carbon dioxide is continually removed or absorbed by a chemical filter, for example, using a gas mask, commonly available in army surplus stores. In the absence of a build up of carbon dioxide in the rebreathed air, there is little sense of oxygen deprivation until hypoxia is well advanced (Slonim and Hamilton 1976, pp. 136-140). However, the resultant hypoxia will eventually cause increasing impairment of function and ultimately unconsciousness. This was dramatically demonstrated on camera by Jonathan Miller in an episode of the British documentary series "The Body in Question," during which Miller used a closed gas mask with carbon dioxide filter to demonstrate his progressive loss of function and eventual near loss of consciousness.

Ventilation in excess of bodily metabolic requirements, that is "overbreathing" is termed hyperventilation or hypocapnia (from capnos for smoke referring to carbon dioxide as a byproduct of burning). Contrary to popular understanding, hyperventilation does not result in too much blood oxygen, but rather a lowered level of carbon dioxide. The overbreathing "washes out" carbon dioxide and results in a reduction in blood carbon dioxide levels, leading to a decreased partial pressure of carbon dioxide (partial pressure means the amount of one gas relative to that of other gases) in arterial blood. The blood partial pressure of oxygen is only slightly increased in this process. If hyperventilation continues, body tissue stores of carbon dioxide are also reduced."

Effects of overbreathing are rapid and diverse. Most of us have subjectively experienced minor effects of hyperventilation such as dizziness or a sense of lightheadedness when blowing up balloons or some other inflatable object. The repeated long exhalations used in inflation brings about a reduction in partial pressure of blood carbon dioxide that in turn acts on the nervous system to cause vasoconstriction of both arteries and veins supplying blood to the brain, partichlarly the neocortex. This leads, in effect, to a mild form of hypoxia, but a brain hypoxia associated with changes in circulation rather than with a deficiency of oxygen in inspired air. This vasoconstriction can be immediate, commencing after only a few seconds of hyperventilation, and is mediated by the central nervous system on which the carbon dioxide acts. Thus, carbon

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dioxide levels are associated with the control of cerebral blood flow, particularly to the forebrain (Lum 1976, p. 203).14 The emotional response often associated with hyperventilation is thought to be facilitated by lowered cortical control associated with reduction of blood flow to this area.

The regulation of gas exchange is under the control of the central nervous system, such as, the brain and spinal cord, as well as the peripheral nervous system including the autonomic nervous system. The autonomic nervous system originates in the brain in the hypothalamus and branches into two parts as it leaves the spinal cord, the sympathetic and parasympathetic chains. The autonomic system is responsible for the motor innervation of the heart, lungs, diaphragm, digestive tract, other viscera as well as glands and hair follicles. As we noted previously, the control of the respiratory system can be seen to be "automatic" in response to internal signals mediated in the lower regions of the brain, including the response to blood carbon dioxide levels. Control of the respiratory system is further subject to behavioral influences that are also mediated by autonomic pathways as well as higher centers of the brain (Plum 1970; 1974).

A discussion of more specific mechanisms of control cannot be attempted here. What is important is that respiratory patterns are determined by complex mechanisms involving both behavioral and neurochemical ~ o m ~ o n e n t s . ' ~ The neural centers implicated in basic functions such as respiration are also important in such processes as emotion, awareness, memory, learning, sensation, and motor control. Plum notes, for example, that in healthy, awake individuals, the cerebral hemispheres do much to control breathing rhythm and depth even when metabolic stimuli vary or are removed (1970, p. 166).16 This control of breathing is necessary in order to produce and maintain speech,17 for example, and is also involved in laughing and sobbing (Plum 1974, p. 208). It is the example provided by the behavioral implications of these interconnections with which we are concerned.

Subjective Associations of Variations in Respiratory Patterns

We have noted that the neurophysiological relationship that exists between respiratory stimuli and emotion is partly mediated by the brain and the peripheral nervous system, particularly the autonomic nervous system. We have also mentioned that while the latter is responsible for the routine control of the body's physiological adjustments including heart rate and respiration, it is also associated with what is often termed "emotional arousal" (LeDoux 1986, p. 308). Indeed, the autonomic nervous system and the endocrine system embody the principal mechanisms governing emotional response. It is the role of the autonomic nervous system in the mediation of the respiratory drive (via its various connections with other parts of the brain and peripheral nervous system that in turn act on endocrine secretions) that "provides the pathways

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necessary for the inclusion of altered breathing as part and parcel of emotional experiences" (Johnson 1967, p. 44).

One finds explicit treatment of the relationship between physiological and emotional dimensions of respiration in the clinical literature on hyperventi- lation. The concern with both physiology and the experience of emotion also figures in studies of catharsis and abreaction." The clinical literature on hyperventilation tends to divide into work concerned with the definition, description, and differential diagnosis of hyperventilation, and that concerned with what is often termed "hyperventilation syndrome", that is, hyperventi- lation as indicative of neurosis, primarily anxiety states.lg We are concerned primarily with the first.

The particular range of effects associated with hyperventilation was first described in the respiratory physiology literature by Haldane and Poulton in 1908 (Bass and Gardner 1985, p. 602; see Johnson 1967 for adescriptive review). Further, it has a long history of treatment in the medical literature (e.g., Kerr, Dalton, and Gliebe 1937; Engel, Ferris, and Logan 1947). Despite this early and detailed work, according to Lum (1976), contemporary medical texts rarely include adequate accounts of hyperventilation and its wide range of associated signs. Rather, emphasis is given to the rarely observed acute manifestations, with other signs and symptoms glossed under terms such as "anxiety state" (Lum 1976, pp. 196-197) or "panic attacks" (Bass and Gardner 1985, pp. 605), thus severing them from their association with patterns of respiration. The acute signs are, according to Lum, merely the "tip ofthe iceberg" of a problem that affects at one time or another a significant percentage of the population, for most cases do not present the signs typical of acute hyperventilation. In an editorial in the Journal of Psychosomatic Research, Lum states that the actual symptoms are frequently unrelated to those thought to be typical of hyperventilation and "may affect any past of the body, and any organ or any systemW(1975, p. 375): "Symptoms may show up anywhere.. .for we are dealing

-

with a profound biochemical disturbance, which is as real as hypoglycemia and more far-reaching in its effects" (1975, p. 375). As it so frequently goes unrecognized, "[sluch patients are often pursued relentlessly with every investigative device known to modem science, and end up with the label of 'anxiety state"' (Lum 1975, p. 375). Pfeffer notes that hyperventilation is said to affect between six and eleven percent of people seen by medical practitioners (1978, p. 47). It has been suggested that overbreathing may be linked to symptoms associated with chronic fatigue and other similar disorders.

The list of "symptoms" associated with overbreathing is so diverse as to make constructing a summary difficult. However, a selection of its effects is as follows: weakness, malaise, a sense of impending doom, excitement, apprehension, light-headedness, feelings of unreality ("floating'?, dizziness, ringing in the ears, blurred vision, feeling faint, tightness in the chest, inability to breathe deeply, frequent sighing and yawning, palpitation, precordial pain,

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tightness in the throat, dry mouth, epigastric distress, tingling and numbness in extremities and face, muscle cramps especially in the hands and feet, twitching tremor of extremities, cold moist hands and feet, and so forth (see Johnson 1967, p. 92; Lurn 1976, pp. 220-224). Symptoms reported, for example, by a study group of military recruits diagnosed as being hyperventilators were: feeling short of breath, difficulty in talking, feeling of breathing "too much," feeling excited for no reason, face numb or tingling, hands tight and hard to open, feeling that everything is unreal, crying for no good reason, laughing for no good reason, tongue numb or tingling (Lowry 1967c, p. 11 I)."

To determine clinically whether or not hyperventilation is associated with particular symptoms is regarded as difficult. This is generally accomplished through the intentional reproduction of the symptoms through forced breathing that the patient then recognizes as similar to the symptoms for which he or she sought medical aid (Lum 1976, p. 220). However, given the simultaneous voluntary and involuntary aspects of respiration, the process of clinical diagnosis itself is open to question, for it is often difficult to reproduce the range of symptoms. Lurn states that it is of limited use in that, as used, it generally relies on the presence of "the classic triad" of symptoms of hyperventilation, such as, "massive overbreathing, paraesthesiae and tetany" (Lum 1976, p. 375). The point here is not to be concerned with the definition of hyperventilation as a clinical entity, but to use this material to indicate the variety of subjective experiences associated with variations in respiratory patterns, in this casehyperventilation.

The clinical literature gives emphasis to negative correlates such as anxiety or panic, but Lurn argues that in fact anxiety is quite often the product of hyperventilation itself that may be triggered by any number of other factors that go unrecognized by physicians (Lum 1975, p. 380). For example, it has been suggested "that the loss of voice seen in singers and their conditions of anxiety and stress may be due to hyperventilation" (Lowry 1967b, p. 16). Or, the association of hyperventilation with crying observed in children who "thinking tears were warranted but finding them not quite spontaneous, facilitate crying by taking a few deep breaths" (Lowry 1967b, pp. 15-16). Further, the trigger for hyperventilation "is not necessarily associated with fear or anxiety" (Lum 1976, p. 198): "Laughter, pleasure, excitement or animated conversation may all do it+ven watching the television. Likewise exertion or the malaise of real physical illness. With frequent repetition the response takes on the characteristics of a conditioned reflex" (Lum 1976, p. 198).

In the previous section, we have drawn primarily on clinical and physiological accounts. We must reorient and extend these perspectives in order to see their more general relevance. The respiratory function is obviously fundamental to being. We need now to ask how our knowledge about the interrelationships of respiratory function and emotion can contribute to our understanding of the embodiment of social processes in a wider context. We

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begin with the question of the ways in which respiratory capacities may come to be structured or patterned in any given context.

RESPIRATORY FUNCTION, EMOTION, AND BODILY AGENCY

Habits of the Body

There is, as Mauss says, "a strong sociological causa1ity"in our bodily actions (1973, p. 85). In "Techniques of the Body" (1973), he takes up the influence of society, culture, and history on bodily being and action. The "habits" (habitus) of the body thus formed "do not just vary with individuals and their imitations, they vary especially between societies, educations, proprieties and fashions, prestiges. In them we should see the techniques and work of collective and individual practical reason" (Mauss 1973, p. 73). Mauss calls for a triple viewpoint of biological, psychological, and sociological facts and says that even if the action is primarily bodily or biological, it too is subject to the same forces of socialization, imitation, and authority that affect other aspects of social life. This includes the "habits" of breathing, to which Mauss devotes the last paragraph of his paper (1973, p. 87). The phenomenologist, Buytendijk, too, following Plessner, acknowledges in his notion of "encounter" the importance of the interrelationship of bodily action and social context: "The forms of (animal) movement are forms of behavior, since they carry visibly in themselves and "delineate" the relation of the body to the environment and conversely of the environment to the body" (Buytendijk and Plessner quoted in Grene 1968, p. 124).

In the case of respiratory patterns as "habitus," what the clinician may seek to see as "symptom" may equally be seen as habit of behavior formed and expressed in particular contexts (Lum 1975). Even the maintenance of a particular level of blood carbon dioxide is subject to habit. Lum cites the example of "borderline" overbreathing that acts to keep carbon dioxide levels low such that "any physical or emotional disturbance may trigger off a chain reaction of increased ventilation, rapidly producing hypocapnic symptoms, alarm engendered by the symptoms, consequent sympathetic arousal resulting in increased ventilation and increased symptoms" (Lum 1975, p. 380). With repetition, the association between a particular context or stimulus and overbreathing may with repetition take on "the characteristics of a conditioned reflex" (Lum 1976, p. 198). Even an individual's very sensitivity to carbon dioxide may be altered by conditioning and thus a factor in hyperventilation, as evidenced by patients who have breathing abnormalities associated with anxiety symptoms, and for whom "their hypersensitivity appears to be a disorder of conditioning rather than a biochemical alteration (Brown 1991, p. 171).

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Patterns of breathing are highly adaptable and readily formed. For the child, breath control is an important part of learning the forms of motor behavior necessary for communication through speech as well as other forms of expression in ways that are appropriate to the particular psychosocial context in which that child exists. As breathing is under voluntary control, "[wle may stop, start, vary rate, depth and rhythm, and use either diaphragm or thorax at will. The natural pattern of breathing may therefore be modified by voluntary control and training, and moulded to the dictates of custom, convention or erroneous ideas of 'health' and physical fitness" (Lum 1976, p. 219). The puffed out chest characteristic of military training is an example of the latter. The posture encourages overbreathing through excessive use of the thorax, a "type of breathing more appropriate to exertion, stress or anxiety," but that with continual use "will become as effortless and unconscious as the acquired skills of riding a bicycle, swimming or skating" (Lum 1976, p. 219).

Mauss's point is important here because his concept of habitus indicates the inextricability of bodily and social being, that is, how the patterning of bodily processes are part of our social being. But we must focus Mauss's perspective further to clarify the place of emotion in the relationship between body and society. We have stated above that bodily components are an important aspect of emotion, that emotion must be understood as embodied, and that the example of respiration illustrates one aspect of that process of embodiment. The 'habits' of breathing entail a reciprocal relationship between body and behavior; they are a unified feature of being but one subject to modulation in both "directions." We return to our emphasis on the relational nature of emotion and the importance of the body in that process.

The "Capture" of Bodily Capacities by Emotion (and Vice Versa)

Tomkins states that "[tlhe breathing mechanism is continually being captured by the prevailing affective responses" as the "breathing patterns of normal human beings are continually modulated by such affects as fear, joy, depression, grief, startle, distress and anger" (Tomkins 1962, p. 48). This process, as Tomkins emphasizes, is an ongoing one, it is part of the "background" of being. The bodily experiences associated with alterations in respiratory patterns are therefore part of the embodied awareness of one's subjective state in any relational context, that is, part of emotion (cf. de Rivera 1984). We know also that the "dual" control of respiratory capacities means that particular techniques of breathing may be used to facilitate the generation of emotional experience.

The question of the relationship of the bodily components of emotion to emotional experience has theoretical implications that must at least be acknowledged here. The bodily and perceptual components of emotion cannot in fact be separated from within the domain of social action, for they are

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together partly constitutive of that action. The emphasis on the bodily aspects of emotion requires a reconsideration of ideas which are generally linked to William James. James associated the feeling of emotion with the bodily changes that accompany or follow the perception of some exciting fact (James 1892, p. 375). For example, the sense of heartswellimg or tears on listening to poetry or drama or music that moves us, or the sense of one's heart "stopping" or the breath catching when faced with some frightening object or form. Such bodily changes seem to preceed or be simultaneous with the perception of being moved. The experience of bodily awareness that preceeds conscious perception or interpretation of a particular emotion state can be best illustrated by recalling an instance of the experience of strong emotion that was apparently objectless. A common example is the rush of feeling triggered by some stimulus such as a particular odor or sound, which we can only later associate with some charged relational context. Such an approach to emotion sees "that an emotional state is, fundamentally, the awareness of changes in the state of the body" (Papanicolaou 1989, p. xiii). James' approach and its further developments under Lange, the so-called James-Lange theory, has been frequently dismissed in favor of cerebrocentric theories. Papanicolaou, who reexamined James' approach in the light of later evidence, found it to be supported (albeit in a somewhat modified form) and found the distinctions made between James' theory and the so-called Cannon-Bard theory (e.g., Cannon 1928) to be grounded in misunderstanding. He recast James' theory as a "somatic theory of emotion" giving place to both peripheral bodily and central sources of emotion: "'Somatic,'because the object of any emotional experience is the flesh in commotion and not because the brain is any less necessary for instigating that commotion and monitoring it than it is necessary for sensation, movement or external perception" (Papanicnlaou 1989, p. xiv)." The example provided by the role of the respiratory capacity in the genesis and experience of emotion supports the importance of such an integrated approach.

The modulation of breathing patterns is thus part of what constitutes emotion. Its role is implicated in most areas of human activity including major communicative acts such as talking, crying, singing. Even in sleep, this relationship pertains:

Asleep as well as awake, man's breathing reflects his emotional state. If something absorbs his interest, his breathing reflects his excitement.. . Indeed, the respiratory system is a major mode of expression for a variety of feelings. The breath-holding of temper tantrums or anger; the singing, humming, or whistling of happiness; the sighing of passion; and the sobbing and crying of sorrow or grief are only a few examples (Slonim and Hamilton 1976, p. 142).

Respiratory Patterns and Subjective States: Some Examples

Most sources dealing explicitly with the relationship between breathing patterns and emotion are concerned with unusual or abnormal states. As we

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have seen, clinical accounts are primarily concerned with how patterns of breathing may be associated with abnormal physical or psychological signs. The "abnormality" is seen to be located either in incorrect breathing patterns or in the psychological state that is seen to be capable of affecting or altering the respiratory pattern. Accounts from sources outside the clinical literature, for example, studies of religious expression, tend to focus on the implications of specific techniques of breathing for the achievement of particular subjective states in the context of group behavior. The emphasis is thus on how manipulation of the respiratory capactity may be used to "capture" or facilitate the experience of particular subjective states. There are accounts of therapeutic contexts where this is the case as well.

The relationship between respiratory patterns and emotion is most easily observed in sociocultural contexts in which unusual states are manifest. These states may be associated with the intentional use of a particular breath technique or simply with an action that acts to establish some respiratory pattern. Contexts that suggest themselves are those involving heightened emotion such as conversion or possession rituals or trance practices, or those involving states of calm or quiet as in certain meditation traditions. An obvious example of the latter are the Asian yogic and other meditative techniques in which breath regulation is highly developed.22

Most studies of meditation techniques have emphasized their psychological effects-the reduction of arousal and the facilitation of calm or restful states. Many yoga practices involve slow, near vital capacity breathing techniques with a pause after both insoiration and exviration. It has been demonstrated that "voluntarv

A

slowing of respiratory rate of subjects under stressful conditions reduced physiological arousal" (Bass and Gardner 1985, p. 606). Another study "provided evidence to support claims by yogi masters that a specific form of slowed respiration-that is rapid inhalation followed by slow exhalation at a reduced respiratory rate-was an effective technique for reducing physiological arousal when anticipating and confronting a threat" (Bass and Gardner 1985, p. 606; see also Gellhorn and Kiely 1972, pp. 402404). A similar pattern, that is, quick inhalation followed by temporary breath holding or the reduction of rate or depth of respiration is commonly observed when we feel suddenly frightened or anxious.

Although a general association between levels of "arousal" and breathing patterns pertains, particular subjective states cannot be "matched" with particular breathing techniques and their autonomic consequences. Such states are simultaneouslv a function of manv factors including sociocultural context.23 - No single physioiogical variable c k be said to correlate with any particular level of "arousal" (Stein 1967, p. 148). Even the respective equation of underbreathing and overbreathing with the reduction and enhancement of "arousal" is crude as is apparent from detailed studies done on meditation (e.g., Gellhorn and Kiely 1972, p. 402; Cappo and Holmes 1984; Schwartz, Davidson, and Goffman 1978; Wallace 1970).

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The other side of techniques of breath control used in meditation are those that aim to enhance emotional arousal, generally for some putative therapeutic gain. Many western, somatic-based, emotive therapies that emphasize the efficacy of emotional expression, such as ~ e i c h i a n ~ ~ or so-called "neo- Reichian" or "neo-Gestalt" therapies, commonly explicitly utilize particular breathing techniques, primarily hyperventilation. A deep, rhythmic combination of diaphragmatic and thoracic breathing is used, for example, in "rebirthing" and "primal therapy" to facilitate the recall or reexperiencing of emotions and the open expression of these. "Connected" breathing, "holotropic" breathing, and "pneumocatharsis" are terms that have been used for such techniques.25 Such therapies are frequently grounded in "hydraulic" approaches to emotion which emphasize the necessity for emotional "release" or catharsis. Hyperventilation, through the reduction of blood carbon dioxide levels and the consequent reduction (through vasoconstriction) of blood flow to the forebrain, is implicated in reduced neocortical control. This fact, which apparently reduces the ability of the "conscious"mind to "override" or integrate emotion within everyday action, enables a more focused and intense experience and expression of emotion, and is thus seen as useful in ennabling or enhancing the process of emotional "release." However, the examination of such techniques and the bases of their "efficacy" needs to be undertaken within the contexts in which they are used.

There are many other relatively mechanical uses of particular breath techniques that could be mentioned. The Lamaze method of breathing used in childbirth to help control pain and facilitate uterine contractions is one. Women using the technique commonly report unusual sensations and feelings that may be associated with autonomic changes induced by lowered blood carbon dioxide. It should be noted also that over- or underbreathing is always subject to manipulation for particular social effects as well. It is said, for example, that Charles Darwin and Florence Nightingale both exploited the effects of overbreathing to bring on apparent states of syncope or collapse (Lum 1975, p. 220 citing Pickering 1974).

an^ forms ofritual illustrate the place of alterations in respiratory patterns in the generation of group feeling. Published accounts that directly comment on bodily aspects of ritual activity are generally concerned to find some explanation for what are seen to be unusual states, for example, ecstasy or trance. William Sargant, a psychiatrist, addressed directly the use of overbreathing and other "physiological weapons," as he termed them, in religious conversion and possession states: "Fasting, chastening of the flesh by scourging and physical discomfort, regulation of breathing, disclosure of awesome mysteries, drumming, dancing, singing, inducement of panic fear, weird or glorious lighting, incense, intoxicant drugs-these are only some of the many methods used to modify normal brain functions for religious purposes (Sargant 1957, p. 79).

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In The Mind Possessed: A Physiology of Possession, Mysticism, and Faith Healing, Sargant documents instances of overbreathing in various ritual contexts such as the rhythmic overbreathing used by men of the Samburu and Mole tribes in northern Kenya to bring them to a state of trance during dancing, and the chanting and overbreathing techniques among certain Arabs for trance purposes, the effects of which he compares to those induced by hyperventilation in Western patients (1973, pp. 115-1 18). In a further example, he discusses practices associated with Pocomania, an African-Christian sect in Jamaica and Barbados, who use "tromping" or rhythmic overbreathing in order to "bring down the Holy Ghost" (Sargant 1973, p. 166). Sargant's studies stress the importance of emotional excitation and its resolution in forms of abreaction often leading to collapse.26 He notes: "Some sects pay more attention than others to a direct stirring up of emotions as a means of affecting the higher nervous system; but few wholly neglect it" (1957, p. 79).

Studies of healing rituals among the !Kung Bushmen provide a clear example of the use of overbreathing (Katz 1982). Katz sees the breathing and other techniques of the rituals as generating the "transformation of consciousness" considered necessary by the !Kung for obtaining healing power (Katz 1982, p. 3 4 ~ ) . ' ~ The dancers exhibit rapid deep breathing with long exhalations, show trembling and tetany, and are reported to experience sensations of searing pain in the area between the diaphragm and the waist, feel light, tremble, and feel fear. Katz (1982, p. 349) says that "!Kia intensifies emotions, be they fear, exhilaration, or seriousness."

But, we do not need to invoke examples of dramatic expressive states to reveal the establishment and use of common respiratory rhythms in group action. Almost any ritual or other activity that involves organized coaction provides the opportunity for common bodily and affective experience. Roseman, writing on healing rituals among the Temiar, rainforest dwellers in peninsular Malaysia, describes the beating of bamboo tubes that resonate with or mimic bodily and natural rhythms, the effects of which include entrainment or synchronization of bodily rhythms. The sound, she says, "gains affective power through its rootedness in the rainforest and the body" (Roseman 1990, p. 241). Another example is provided by the respiratory patterns observable in many forms of song and chanting. Also, the bodily postures used during song or verbal praise in many Christian churches, for example, the raising of arms to reach up and out, affect respiratory patterns for the posture increases chest capacity and encourages a deeper and more open breathing pattern and which may also have further subjective implications.28

These examples provide evidence of the relationship between emotion and respiration in particular sociocultural contexts. But we need not appeal to special cases of ritual and therapeutic uses of respiratory capacities in the facilitation of the experience of emotion, nor to abnormal respiratory or subjective states in clinical accounts. As we have shown, the relationship

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between respiration and emotion is foundational, is part of the "background" of our being in the social world. We need to acknowledge the role this association may play in the establishment and maintenance of social relationships.

An additional area of research might be mentioned here. Our references to the structuring or patterning of respiratory function in the context of social relations might be seen to bear some relationship to discussions of the concepts of rhythm and synchrony in studies of nonverbal communication, the microanalysis of interaction, and in physiological sociology more generally (e.g., Barchas 1976; Barchas and Mendoza 1984; Byers 1976; Davis 1982; Hall 1983; Kiritz and Moos 1974). Such studies hold that social life has rhythmic properties. "Rhythm" in this sense is a form of temporal patterning grounded in both biological and social functions. It is a property of structures, not an entity in itself (Mathiot and Carlock 1982, p. 176). "Rhythm produces the expectation of continuity and changes in rhythm signal new experiences" (Brown 1991, p. 45). Byers sees rhythms as a conceptual tool. For him, rhythms "are process, and they are relationships" (Byers 1982, p. 139).

My argument is not that respiratory functions merely aid in the establishment of interactional rhythms, although in fact respiratory co-rhythm is a function of group interaction. Breathing rhythms of group co-members do come to be in some synchronous relationship to a dominant rhythm (Johnson 1967, p. 71). And, this synchronous relationship has communicative functions, both in itself and because it is implicated in other aspects of behavior such as speech rhythms and intonation patterns. But our concern is with how emotion is implicated in the mediation of bodily and group processes. Given the intimate interrelationship between respiratory function and emotion, the process of the establishment of the respiratory co-rhythms must also have affective consequences (and vice versa). The particular respiratory rhythms and their affective consequences are thus a function of the structure of the social relationships in which they pertain. Such a view does not restrict our inquiry to the level of small group or face to face interaction. It can be seen to pertain at any level of social relationship, for emotion is part of, is embedded in, the act of being in relationship itself. In emphasizing the place of emotion in social life in this way, we can avoid an implicit reliance on a consensus model of social ~r~aniza t ion . '~

THE BODY AND "AFFECTIVE ORDER"

The notion of an "epidemiology of emotions" has been used to refer to the distribution of emotion experience within and across cultures (Thoits 1989, p. 321). It raises the question of what structures and what conditions give rise to the differential experience and expression of emotion in different

The Example of Respiration 101

sociocultural contexts. The concept of the epidemiology of emotions may be conceptually extended to include the bodily dimensions of the distribution of emotion experience within given contexts, for persons in relation are also bodies in relation (Collins 198 1).

As we have demonstrated in preceding sections, the modulation of respiratory function in any context is intimately connected with emotional experience. We have seen how respiratory patterns may be structured and organized within particular emotional contexts, and how they may also act in the generation of the experience of emotion. From the perspective of a "bodily epidemiology of emotions," alterations in respiratory patterns thus may be seen to be one of the most important bodily mechanisms through which physical and emotional being are shaped or "tuned" in the context of social relations. This mechanism is therefore fundamental in the establishment and ordering of social relationships.

Emotion organizes human behavior, and it does so in ways that go beyond what may be understood through concepts such as motivation. Durkheim saw that action in groups engendered what he termed a "moral force." Such a force, for Durkheim, is partly grounded in emotion, emotion which has its origins in particular social forms. These emotions or collective sentiments are the basis of the productive power, the efficacy, of society (Durkheim 1915 (1965), p. 406). Durkheim was concerned primarily with the social ontology of emotions. It is the social ontology of emotion that is our concern here also, but from the perspective of the place of bodies in this process. Our treatment of respiration has been an attempt at understanding how social processes, through emotion, are embodied. Respiration is one bodily capacity that acts to establish an "affective order" among persons and bodies and therefore is a component in the establishment of social relationships themselves. It provides a bodiy mechanism through which both individual and social dimensions of emotion are made manifest.

The implications of the "capture" of respiratory functions by social conditions (and vice versa) are thus far greater than concepts such as "emotional engagement9'or "arousal" can indicate. "Arousal" for example, gives emphasis to individual subjective experience or response within a given environment. It is insufficient because it cannot indicate how emotion is implicated in individual and group agency in the social lie. The continual modulation of respiratory capacities in any given social context provides evidence of how one bodily mechanism is a part of the organization of human behavior simultaneously at both the individual and group levels and how emotion

-

mediates this process. This affective organization is thus grounded in the interaction of physical, psychological, and social factors.

NOTES

1. The term respiration includes both the physiological and mechanical processes associated with breathing. Webster's New Twentieth Century dictionary gives the following: "In physiology,

102 MARGOT L. LYON

the act, process, or function of breathing; in higher animals, the act by which are is drawn in and expelled from the lungs."

2. Scherer, a psychologist, for example, lists the following: "(a) the component of cognitive appraisal or evaluation of stimuli and situations; (b) the physiological component of activation or arousal; (c) the component of motor expression; (d) the motivational component; including behavior intentions or behavioral readiness; and (e) the component of subjective feeling state" (Scherer 1984, p. 294). The conception of multiple components, in Scherer's terms, is associated with multiple functions, for example, evaluation of the environment, regulation of the physiological system, preparation for action, communication of intention, and reflection and monitoring (Scherer 1984, p. 297).

3. As Scherer notes, the flexibility of behavioral adaptation in higher animals "is largely due to the emotion systems"(l984, p. 295). The existence of emotions has made it possible to "decouple" behavioral reaction from the events that give rise to them so that a cognitive evaluation process is inserted.

4. Joseph de Rivera, in "The Structure of Emotional Relationships" (1984) describes what he sees as the three main approaches to the study of emotion: the psychological, the phenomenological, and the sociological. The first "conceives of emotion as a process occumng within an organism located in an environment" (p.116). The second takes the view that "human emotions are not processes that oecur within organisms situated in an objective environment" but rather "different ways of being-in-the-world" b.117). The third perspective, the sociological, for de Rivera, is concerned with how persons exist in relationship with others: "[Elmotion is viewed as a characteristic of the relationship between two people" b.118).

5 . For a critique of anthropological perspectives on emotion, (see Lyon 1994 forthcoming). For a treatment of the place of emotion in social theory (see Lyon and Barbalet 1994 forthcoming).

6. Within the biological sciences also there have been attempts at integration of sociological and biological perspectives. In the history of biology, there were those who advocated "holist" approaches as opposed to reductionist or mechanistic approaches, and who sought an understanding of "the integrative, regulative functioning of physiological systems in ways which required them to think holisticauy about livingorganisms"(Benton 1991, pp. 16-17). J.S. Haldane, an early researcher or respiratory function, could be included among those scholars working from holistic perspectives.

7. While for Merleau-Ponty (1962), the body is an agent in world construction through lived experience, this experience being the basis of all knowledge, his account of the foundations of being needs extending to encompass the place of emotion in this agency. Emotion has figured more prominently in phenomenological psychology, for example, in the work of Gendlin (1962), a phenomenological psychologist who has written on what he terms Yelt meaningmas opposed to verbal or cognitive meaning. This "directly felt, experiential dimension" is responsible for guidimg action and is the basis of meaning, for nothing means except as it "interacts with felt experiencingm(Gendlin 1962, p. 1). Gendlin gives emphasis primarily to the concious experiencing subject but his notion of experience is concrete: "[R]egardless of the many changes in what we feel-that is to say, really, how we feel-there always is the concretely present flow of feeling.. . we always have concrete feeling, an inward sensing whose nature is broader [than any] specifc idea, wish, emotion, perception, word, or thought" (1962, p. 11). Although he deals with it only in a restricted sense, it is clear from Gendlin's examples (pp.24-29) that this feeling is bodily, for the body is in interaction with objects in the environment in ordered way;: "These objects may or may not be present, yet the body order includes the patterns of interaction that could obtainifthey were present3'(1962, p. 25). The idea of simultaneity of body sense and emotion is precisely the point I develop here.

8. The term "arousal" implies that such states represent an obsemable change in reference to "ordinary" or "resting" states. Its manner of use frequently implies a homeostatic model of emotion wherein emotion is seen as disruptive of "normal" homeostatic states.

The Example of Respiration 103

9. See'The Stuff of Consciousness"(Chapter 111) of Onians (1954), for a discussion of Crcek and Roman conceots of breath and the relatianshio of breath to thoueht and emotion. -

10. The importance of autonomic intercannections for the endocrine and immune systems could also be mentioned here. thus extendine our discussion to the areas of health and illness. - On immune networks, ace for example Blalock (1984) and Varela, Coutinho, Dupire, and Vaz (1988). See also Lvon 1993 for a review of some of the models of immune svstem interactions.

1 I. The close neurola&al relationship between respiration and facial expression is sounded in the common phylogenetic relationship between the muscles used in facial expression and those ofthegills in lower animals(Bell1844, cited in Darwin 1965; Brown 1991, p. 26 citing Rinn 1984).

12. Normal resting breath averaas 13 to 17 breaths om minute with a tidal volume r'deuth" of breath; amount of& moved) of approximately 500 Aliliters per breath. This gives ;normal resting volume of 7.56 liters (BTPS) per minute (Sloning and Hamilton 1976. p. 47). Under conditions of muscular exercise, ventilation increases both in frequency and tidal volumc.

13. Of the gases that are stored in the various tissues and fluids of the body, carbon dioxide comprises the largest, with major stares in bane and bady fluid. A person of 70 kilograms would have approximately 35 liters of stored carbon dioxide, an amount that would equal the bodily metabalic production of carbon dioxide over a period of 140 minutes (Slonin and Hamilton 1976, pp. 92-93). If a person hyperventilates so that the total volume of air moved uast the alveoli in the lung, a doubled, then ihr partial prcsurc of alvcaolar carhon dioxide ( ~ a ( 0 2 ) wlll be halbnl cvmlually (after bod" ,tore, reach A new Icvcl) (\Ionin and Hamtxtun 1976, pp. SU:93).

14. Reduction in cerebral blood flow i s&o related to eiectroenccphalographic changes. Lowry, citingworkdone by Engel, Ferris and Lozan says: 'They found adiren connection between . . blood carban dioxide tekion and the frequency of brain waves. An average subject was able to slow his brain to four cycles per second by rapid breathing of sea level air far 150 sewnds. Electroencephalogram slowing was most marked when the carbon dioxide level dropped rapidly, when blood sugar was low, when inspired air contained less oxygen than usual, when the paticot stood, and following the administration of amyl nitrate and nitroglycerin. With equal amounts of hyperventilation a patient with a high blood sugar level tends to hyperventilate until tetany appears while a subject with a low blood sugar level tends to have marked alterations of consciousness and an earlier spontaneous cessation of hypervenfilation" (Lowry 1967b, pp. 16- 17).

15. These interactions are mediated by the neoconex as well as by lower centers in the brain and neivou system. For example, lower areas of the brain in the brain stem (medulla and pons areas) are in synaptic contact with cranial and spinal nerves, so that the muscles of face, throat, chest, and diaohramn are wardinated for ourooses of resoiration. But these lower reflex . - . . mechanisms include also mechanisms oriinating in the peripheral nervous system and the cardiovascular svstem, these latter mechanisms being themselves subien to influences that have . . - their origins in higher centers, that is, subject to wnical control.

16. The control of behavioral and metabolic functions in resoiration, though eenerallv . . represented as separate, are in Iact closely integrated physiological calystems operatkg in "parallel." These 'parallel structures" funnion ac most levels of the brain, with the behavioral portions of control mainly in somatomotor and limbicforebrain structures (Plum 1970, pp. 159,174).

17. Different farms of speech entail differenl breathing patterns. According to Brawn: 'An . . important function of the rhythm of speech is to allow us to continue to breathe while speaking. We require a complex pattern of breathing movements to madiiy our respiration so that speech can be produced. This includes movements of the abdomen and chest as wcU as of the larynx and upper airway. Our breathing must coordinate with the duration and intensity of what wc wish to say, and all these factors must be taken into account before we begin to speak" (Brown 1991, pp. 39-40).

18. The clinical literature on the intentional generation of emotion using respiratory stimulus is generally located within work an the u e of catharsis or abreaction is therapy. Both Lowry

104 MARGOT L. LYON

(1976b) and Lum (1976) cite 0.1. Lewis on the relationship of hypervenlilation to emotion. Lewis found that when he reproduced the symptoms of hyperventilation in patients by pushing on the lower part of the chest to encourage thoracic breathing, after first putting the patient in a similar state i f mind to that in which the oriinal attacks occurred, in nearly all "there was a marked emotional catharsis with weeping and revelation of important historical material" Lewis cited in Lowry 1967b, p. 20).

19. Bass and Gardner (1985) in a review of emotional influences on breathing point out that it is verv difficult to define"hvoerventilatian syndrome" and to distinguish it from hypewentilation . . itself ((985, p. 601). Thcy note that the term was introduced by K&, Dalton, be (1937) to cover an array of symptoms resulting from both anxiety and hypervenfilation (Bass and Gardner 1985, p. 602). They state that "[mlost of the clinical and physiological features of hyperventilation svndrome can occur in the absence of detectable psychiatric abnormality" and prefer the term . ~

"idiopathic symptomatic hyperventilation" (Bass and Gardnei 1985, p. 602). 20. The effects of hyperventilation are generally divided according to whether they are a n u a l

(e.g., alteration of blood gases, cerebrovascular changes, changes in acid-bau balance) or peripheral effects (e.g., vasomotor effects such as vasoconstriction of vessels in the skin especially the extremities, reduced blood flow to the gut, etc.). For example, activation of the sympathetic nervous system produced by hyperventilation over a few minutes shows itself in dilated pupils, cold extremities, sweatingof palmsand axiuae, and tachycardia(Lum 1976,pp. 206,210). Whatever the physialagid effects, however, it is clear that there is wide swpe to the types of subjective experiences associated with these changes.

21. There have been other. earlier arguments for the value of the James-Lange approach. Wengcr ta 1950, argued lot an integration ofthe findings ol Canon and Bard with tho% of Jamcs and Lanxc a!d for their tunher de\:lopment "tholion would be ronunuoui, becauu autunomlr - activity is continuous, while the state of homeostasis would be regarded as a state of emotion, and we would speak of increased or decreased emotion from this basic pattern" (Wenger 1950, P. 5).

22. For an early mtroductian to this, see for example A.H. Ewing, The Hindu Conception of the Functions of Breach: A Study in Early Hindu Psycho-Physics.

23. Yoga traditions themselves emphasize the importance of concentration, contemplation. scriptural &dy, and other practices in pursuit of goals, not just physical techniques which by themselves may lead to 'quite unforscen and disturbing results such as mental disequilibrium" . ~~ .. , U. Wilhelm Reich, a psychoanalyst concerned with the somatic bases of neurosis, dwelaped

the eanceot of the location of nsvcholoeical wnflict or trauma in the musculoskeletal system as . . - revealed in the carriage and expressions of the bady (Kavcl 1976, p. 130). Bodily manipulation could helo make a oatient aware of how conflicts are held in the body and aid in their emotional exprcwon, as well as the recmcrgencc dearly memuncr. Rctch wed overbreahng in cumbution uith phyr~cal porturcr ur rxercws to a d in theexpansrunuf thechea. Lowcn, astudcnl of Keich's. . . . statn. Tor Rcich. then. the h t sup in thc therapeutic procedure wastogfl the pauent to breathe ealsll) and dapl ) The mend war to mubihc whrlever emotional expression was nlosl cvidcnt in the patienti f;ra ur manner" (Lowen 1975, p. 19). Ikscribing hir own therapy with R&h, he sa)s: '.I would lie on the bed and breathe as freely as I could. trylng to allow a d a p rxpuaion to o&. 1 was directed to give in to my body and not control m y expression or impulse that emerged" (1985, p. 19). Many schools of thcrapy utilize principles described by Reich, often in modified form. Freud and Breuer also, working before Reich, utilized techuiques(mainly hypnosis) designed to achieve abreaction of past trauma in patients.

25. One need onlv consult the free catalogs or directories of alternative therapies that are - s \ ahS lc in any large tit) fur cvidcna of the many therapeulic techniques utili7jng the hrcath. Grof119R8 0". 170-IX4l contiunr adexnptton ufthe use of'intense breathing." which hc terms . ... "holotropic" breathing in the wntext of his own pmicular therapeutic perspective.

The Example of Respiration 105

26. There are many studies of abreaction and catharsis in the psychological literature (see Nichols and Zax 1977; Scheff 1979 for surveys). Scheff (1977; 1979), for example, developed a theory of ritual based on catharis, that is, that ritual performs the function of providing a context for "the appropriate distancing of emotion" such that individuals can cope with "universal emotional distresses" (1977, p. 484). He sees ritual in terms of how it fundions in emotional exoression: "Effective ritual is the solution to a seemindv insoluble arohlem, the management -. -

of collectively held, othenvise unmanageable distress. Ritual is unique in that it meets individual and collective needs simultaneouslv. allowinn individuals to discharee accumulated distress and . . - - creating social solidarity in the process"(Scheff 1977, p. 489).

27. A dance is performed that is said to activate n/um or energy in those who are healers. The intensification of this energy leads the dancer-healers to experience an enhanced consciousness called !kia durine which they are able to heal others. -

28 l h w posture mirror< the bodily dispositbon oithe child who reaches up and outuard lo tmbra;r or bc cmhradrd. Such posturer thcm\e!\es hase affrrt~vc corrclatr~ that rh~u ld becundrrrd part oithccomplcx of bodill forms ~mpl~catr mcmotiun. Scc dc R1vera11984j on the buddy dispuulmn of the lnfant as m e b a h ior a typology of cmutiun, 3s socidl . . relations.

29. As Scheff (1988) has shown in his discussion of the social conformity studies, to be out of 3ynch" with the group of which one is a pan can result in shame.

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