enwo nnachi j
TRANSCRIPT
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Agboeze Irene E.
SOCIAL SCIENCES
POLITICAL SCIENCE
UNITED STATES POLICY OF PREEMPTION AND SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1999-2014
ENWO NNACHI J.
PG/M.Sc./13/66256
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UNITED STATES POLICY OF PREEMPTION AND SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1999-2014
BY
ENWO NNACHI J.
PG/M.Sc./13/66256
A PROJECT REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA NSUKKA, IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER OF SCIENCE (M.Sc.) IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA
SUPERVISOR: PROF. A. M. N. OKOLIE
NOVEMBER, 2014
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UNITED STATES POLICY OF PREEMPTION AND SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST
1999-2014
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APPROVAL PAGE
This is to certify that this project report titled “United State policy of preemption and
security in the middle east, 1999-2014” has been examined and approved by the department of
political science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka for the award of Master of Science (M.Sc) in
political science (International Relations).
…………………………….. …………………………………
PROF. A. M. N. OKOLIE PROF. JONAH ONUOHA PH.D
PROJECT SUPERVISOR HEAD OF DEPARTMENT
Date ……………………. Date ……………………….
………………………………. ………………………………..
PROF. A. I. MADU EXTERNAL EXAMINER
DEAN OF FACULTY
Date ……………………. Date ……………………......
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DEDICATION
This work is specially dedicated to the Holy Trinity in one God. God the Father, God the
Son, and God the Holy Spirit.
Also to the loving memories of little Enyinnia-Inya Nnachi Enwo and my departed
Uncles; Uncle Kelvin, Uncle Chuks, Uncle Monk, Uncle O’brian, Uncle Scab and other faithful
departed souls from the entire Ezeogo Enwo family. Sleep on guys…
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Glory is the name of the Lord, for his grace upon my life. For the success of this work,
am highly indebted to many people in different places. First amongst who is Prof. Aloysius
Micheals Nnabugwu Okolie, a distinguished erudite Fulbright scholar, who despite his tight
schedules, supervised this work and went through all the pages diligently. Even when I wanted to
compromise your ethical standards, you drilled me academically and brought out the best in me,
am honoured to have passed through your tutelage. Sir, your tenacity and mentorship, I will not
forget in a rush.
Similarly, my profound gratitude goes to all the lecturers in political science department;
Prof. Ken Ifesinachi for his consistent lectures on research methodology, Prof. Obasi Igwe for
his fatherly advice, Dr. V. C. Onah who never hesitated to afford me with relevant materials, Dr.
Gerald Ezirim, the impact factor Doc; I appreciate you, and lastly, Prof. Jonah Onnoha, the head
of department, the good works speaks for you.
I will never forget to appreciate the loving kindness of Chief and Lolo Pedro Nnachi
Enwo; my parents for prayers and steadfastness throughout this study, indeed I couldn’t have
asked for better parents. Similarly and worthy to mention is the entire household of Chief and
Lolo Agbo Nnachi Enwo. You all have always believed in me, to Uncle Agbo; am yet to find a
word to express my level of gratitude and indebtedness towards your magnanimity, of course a
page won’t be enough. People like you are few in this generation, may the Lord continue to bless
you.
This page will not be complete if I forget to mention my great mother and Aunt in UNN,
Prof. Julie Ibiam of the Institute of Education, thank you Ma for looking out for me. And to you,
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Nnachi Agbo, it gives me joy seeing you grow according the expectation of your Dad; nice one
Bro!
Lastly, Uncle Mike Azubuike, thanks for the inspiration. Ethel, Cleo and Zogo my
siblings, you all are wonderful. To all my friends; Esomonn Jenifer, Okeke Roland, Clinton-Iyke,
MacBen, Mr Onukwai, and my Pals in Agniyi Ironsi, I appreciate you all. Frank Karikpo. J and
Ogbonna Confidence, you both made my stay in UNN worthwhile and eventful.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Title page ……………………………………………………………………………………i
Approval page ……………………………………………………………………………….ii
Dedication …………………………………………………………………………………....iii
Acknowledgment …………………………………………………………………………….iv
Table of contents …………………………………………………………………………….. vi
List of Table …………………………………………………………………………………..viii
List of Figure …………………………………………………………………………………..ix
List of abbreviations/acronyms …………………………………………………………………x
Abstract …………………………………………………………………………………………xii
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background of the Study …………………………………………………………………1
1.2 Statement of the Problem …………………………………………………………………6
1.3 Objectives of the Study …………………………………………………………………..13
1.4 Significant of the Study ………………………………………………………………….13
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW ………………………………………………17
CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY
3.1 Theoretical Framework …………………………………………………………………...50
3.2 Hypotheses ………………………………………………………………………………..62
3.3 Research Design …………………………………………………………………………..62
3.4 Methods of Data Collection ………………………………………………………………65
3.5 Methods of Data Analysis ………………………………………………………………..66
CHAPTER FOUR: THE INVASION OF SUSPECTED ‘AXIS OF EVIL’ IN THE
MIDDLE EAST BY THE UNITED STATES AND INCIDENCE OF INSECURITY
IN THE REGION.
4.1. The Afghanistan Invasion and the Rise of Conflict in the Middle East. …………………70
4.2. The Invasion of Iraq by the United States and the spate of Terrorism Attacks. …………80
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE UNITED STATES UNILATERAL USE OF FORCE AND
ATTACKS ON AMERICA AND HER ALLIES.
5.1. The Use of Drone Strikes in the Middle East and Radicalization of Individuals
in the Region. ………………………………………………………………………..90
5.2 Decapitation of Terrorist by American Troops and Attacks on America, its Allies
in the Middle East. …………………………………………………………………..99
CHAPTER SIX: THE UNITED STATES’ COUNTER TERRORISM POLICY AND
THE PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER.
6.1. The Unilateral Policy of the United States and the Use of Force Against Another
State and the United Nations Charter ………………………………………………107
6.2. Preemption Policy of Invading Suspected Enemy State and the Violation of the UN
Charter. ……………………………………………………………………………..112
6.3. Military Policy of Kidnapping and Killing of Suspected Terrorists and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. …………………………………………..116
CHAPTER SEVEN: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
7.1. Summary …………………………………………………………………………….. 122
7.2 Conclusion …………………………………………………………………………….. 126
7.3 Recommendations …………………………………………………………………….. 128
Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………………131
Appendix …………………………………………………………………………………..138
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 3.1: Location of U.S. military forces, September 2008 61
Table 3.2: Logical Data Framework 67
Table 4.1: Series of Attacks Targeted to the US or Americans in Different Parts of the World, 1998 – August, 2014. 74
Table 4.2: Operation Enduring Freedom/Afghanistan Coalition Military Fatalities by Year. 79
Table 4.3: The Iraq War and Jihadist Terrorism by Category, Before 09/11/01 to 20/3/03
and after 21/03/06 84
Table 4.4: the Iraq War and Jihadist Terrorism by Region, Before 09/11/01 to 20/03/03
and after 21/03/03 to 30/09/06 84
Table 4.5: Operation Iraq Freedom 86
Table 5.1: A Tabular Presentation of Selected Top Terrorist Leaders, who are Wanted,
Captured or Killed. 105
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 4.1: Boots on the Ground in Afghanistan and Iraq, 2001-2010 87
Figure 5.1: A Graph and Map Showing Deaths Caused By US Drones Attack. 94
Figure 5.2: Showing Number of US Drone strikes in Pakistan from 2008-2013 95
Figure 5.3: Types of deaths to by Drone strikes 96
Figure 5.2: A Graphical Scatter Diagram of the Trend of Deaths per Strike to Militants
and Civilians. 98
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS
ABMT - Anti Missile Ballistic Treaty
AL QAEDA - The Base
ANSF - Afghan National Security Forces
AQAP - Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
AQIM - Al Qeada in Islamic Magret
BMENA - Broader Middle East and North Africa Partnership Initiative
BSA - Bilateral Security Agreement
DOD - Department of Defense
FATA - Federal Administered Tribal Areas
GITMO - Guantanamo Bay Detention Centre
GWOT - Global War on Terrorism
ICJ - International Court of Justice
ICRC - International Committee on the Red Cross
IEDS - Improvised Explosive Devices
ISAF - International Security Assistance Force
ISIS/ISIL - Islamic State in Syria and Iraq and Islamic State in the Levant
ITT - Isreali Institute of Technology
MEPI - Middle East Partnership Initiative
MRBOLLAN - Party of God
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
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NNWS - Non Nuclear Weapon States
NSCI - National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
NSS - National Security Strategy
NWS - Nuclear Weapon States
OEF - Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF - Operation Iraqi Freedom
SOFA - State of Force Agreement
SOFA - Status of Force Agreement
UDHR - Universal Declaration of Human Eights
UMAV - Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
UN - United Nations
UNC - United Nations Charter
UNNC - United Nations News Centre
US - United States
USTR - United State Trade Representative
WMD - Weapon Mass Destruction
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ABSTRACT
The infamous attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, by Osama Bin Laden Led Al
Qaeda network marked a turning point in the relationship between the United States and the
Middle East Islamic world. This watershed event led to the United States policy of preemption
and the subsequent U.S invasion of Afghanistan (where Al Qaeda organization was harboured by
Taliban regime) and the subsequent unjustifiable invasion of Iraq. The argument that the united
state policy of preemption would ensure security in Middle East and stop subsequent attacks on
America and its allies necessitated this study. Therefore, the study examined the nexus between
United States policy of preemption and security in the Middle East and noted like in other studies
that the United State policy of preemption has not fully stabilized peace in the Middle East.
Hence, this study deduced that the invasion of suspected axis of evil in the Middle East
aggravated the security situation in the region. Therefore the study argues that though the
unilateral uses of force have been able to checkmate large scale attack such as 9/11, it has as well
triggered series of attack against American troops and Allies. Hence, the study further argues that
the counter terrorism policy of the United States is not in accord with United Nations charter.
The study posited that the high level of violence in the Middle East is as a response to the untied
state occupation in the region. The study made use of ex-post factor research design, qualitative
method of data collection, descriptive method of data analysis and also adopted theory of power
politics from the realist perspective. The study noted that the unilateral use of force should be
adopted after careful consideration and as a last resort. It recommended among others, the
importance of the United States allowing the Middle East region develop and govern its polity
with institutions conversant with them and not by enforcing democracy.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background of the Study
Unilateralism, preemption, Rogue states amongst others can be classified as what is today
referred to as “Bush Doctrine”. In other words; the bush doctrine refers to the United States
foreign policy principles under President George W. Bush. The phrase was first used by
Krauthammer in June 2001 to describe the Bush Administration’s unilateral withdrawals from
the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT) and the Kyoto Protocol. According to Krauthammer
(2008), there is no single meaning of the Bush Doctrine; in fact, there have been four distinct
meanings, each one succeeding another over the past eight years of his administration. Foreign
policies of different nation states, especially the super powers, have been very dynamic since the
demise of the cold war. States and its actors have constantly shaped its foreign policies to contain
the prevalent situation in the international arena. And among these prevalent issues is the rising
rate of terrorism, nuclear proliferation and greatly, security in the Middle East.
Preemption has been and remains a long leading concept of this decade, but despite its
ambiguity in public discourse and its policy relevance, it is a source of great confusion.
Preemption essentially is the response of the Bush administration to the attacks of 9/11 which
was indeed defining moment in both American foreign policy and the lives of millions of people.
The attacks were immediately condemned throughout the world and were regarded as the
beginning of the war on terrorism in the United States where President George W. Bush,
announced that America was ready to fight back (Dresser, 2009:281). By implication, the thrust
of preemption hinges on the basis that the United States can attack any country and dispose any
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political regime if they pose a security threat to the U.S. Based on the doctrine, the threat does
not have to be immediate, and the security threat can be either terrorism or the development of
nuclear weapons and other subsequent weapons of mass destruction. Having initially mentioned
the Bush doctrine, preemption just happened to be a segment of it. Preemption also is the
American justification for the invasion of Iraq. The issue of Rogue states was another highlight
of the ‘Bush Doctrine’ which was described by the administration as a strategy supporting
democracy all over the world, with special emphasis on the Middle East. The third set of
principles of the Bush doctrine refers to a diplomacy tending toward “unilateralism”; its
willingness to act without the sanction of international bodies such as the United Nations
Security Council or the unanimous approval of 16 allies (Kegan, 2003). However, the issue we
intend to address in this section is to trace the development and the subsequent enactment of the
policy of preemption by the United States under President Gorge W. Bush. The policy of
preemption as earlier asserted is the bulk of the Bush policy. The Bush doctrine was further
developed in the National Security strategy paper issued by the White House on September 17,
2002. This paper announced a new legal as well as strategic concept that would represent a
fundamental change from the past (Gardner, 2003:586).
Consequently, the height and uttermost importance of the Bush policy was geared
towards the policy of preemption with special emphasis to most states in the Middle East.
Similarly in an effort to demonstrate the relevance of the policy and in what may be seen as
effort to justify her actions, the United States equivocally maintained that:
The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt threats nor should nations use preemption as a pre-text for aggression. Yet in an age where the enemies of Civilization openly and actively seek the world’s most destructive technologies, the United
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States cannot remain idle while dangers gather The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Gardner, 2003:586).
It is pertinent to understand at this juncture that the great danger looming in the world,
which also happens to be one of the greatest fears of America, is the possibility of the elements
in “Rogue states” acquiring nuclear war heads. This is bearing in mind the capabilities of the
major terrorist groups in the world. Also considering that these groups have splinter cells and
sympathizers all over the world. Supporters of the policy of preemption, which is glaringly
pointed to the Middle East and its fragile security nature claim that nuclear weapons pose a
deferent threat to the United States, and that hopes for a stable and democratized Islamic world,
for example, may be short lived if Iraq or Iran want to acquire such a capability. We see already
how the tiny North Korean arsenal and its proclivities to proliferate could confound America’s
position as the guarantor of east Asian security and democracy (Donnelly, 2003:18) Going by
this development, it becomes imperatively clear that the United States acclaims herself as the
custodian of peace and security in the Middle East. Also considering the idea of spreading its
model of liberal democracy in the entire globe, America makes it a point of duty to preach
democratic rule especially in the Middle East. This also goes in accordance with its capitalist
oriented tendencies.
Despite all the effort by the United States to succinctly prove its policy of preemption,
and as well to convince most especially, the international community, many positively believe
that “American principles, interest and systemic responsibilities argue strongly in favor for an
active and expansive stance of strategic primary and a continued willingness to employ military
force (Dresser, 2009:282). As a contending issue, there are increasingly more voices which
support the idea that the preemptive war which lies at the heart of the Bush doctrine has long
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been viewed as immoral, illicit, and imprudent (Bacevich, 2007:70). In addition, the quick
economical, and decisive victory in Iraq which was achieved by the Bush administration has
produced mixed feelings with many apologists of United States viewing it as a necessary evil’
while on the other hand, it has also produced different consequences such as heightening the
anti-American hatred which already existed, and alienating American friends and former
supporters of American foreign policy.
However, it is based on this varying contending issues and arguments that the study seeks
to interrogate the United States policy of preemption as it pertains to the Middle East and its
security challenges. In taking cognizance of the importance of the policy especially, in
maintaining the American hegemonic tendency in the globe, the policy still remains relevant
even after the President Gorge W. Bush tenure elapsed. This can be properly evaluated in the
recent invasion of Iraq by the United States. Hence, in making his stand known, President Bush
(2002:15) equivocally averred that:
The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater the risk of inaction - and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will if necessary, act preemptively.
This assertion of the then President of America purely captured the motive behind the
United States’ policy of preemption. The United States as a country have dedicated much time
trying to justify and explain the actual meaning of the policy of preemption. This to a greater
extent many analyst and strategic theorist believe it was a policy specially drafted to protect the
United States hegemony, specifically in the Middle East. In a similar development, it became
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obvious that it was a plot to maintain and secure American allies in the Middle East. The threat
posed by some Middle East states such as; Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Syria etc. threatened the
survival of Israel, which over the century is the closest ally of the United States. Different states
in the world from time – to – time, seek and continuously review its policy to suit the dynamic
nature of political events. This in most cases is in relation to international politics and these
states relate to one another in a world, troubled by many chaotic events and spontaneous attacks
by different individuals, either as a state, or a terrorist organization.
Hence, it became imperative, that states, such as the United States, had to critically
examine its policy to contain the growing wave of not just security in the Middle East, but the
greatest danger of nuclear proliferation in the hands of these states, presumed to have links, or
support or sympathize with some international terrorist organizations. Drawing from my own
deduction and point of view, preemption is a child of necessity. In an effort to offer an
acceptable definition; Gray (2007) opined that “preemption is not controversial; legally, morally,
or strategically. To preempt means to strike first (or attempt to do so) in the face of an attack that
is either already underway or is very credibly, imminent”. But the problem is how one knows an
attack is imminent or already underway. But according to Wintz and Russell (2003:113):
It has already become a cliché to assert that 9/11 changed everything”. But like many clichés, this one holds a grain of truth. The 9/11 terrorist attacks did transform the way many Americans think about U.S foreign and defense policy, to say nothing about the likelihood and nature of war itself.
Many critics fault the United States policy of preemption but the 9/11 attack justifies any
action or policy geared towards curtailing it future occurrence. However, the international
community on its part condemns the policy of preemption but the article of the UN charter has
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brought about mixed reactions in this subject. Long a contentious doctrine under international
law, the claim to use preemptive measure has been taken to an even more controversial level by
the administration (Clark, 2003:89).
Based on the foregoing, the basic thrust of this study is to ascertain how the United States
policy of preemption has strived to maintain peace in the Middle East. This is bearing in mind
the United States interest in the Middle East and its allies. Similarly, the Arab spring, the volatile
and fragile nature of security in the Middle East states makes it paramount to trace this study
from 1999-2014. This particular region has been engulfed with serious security challenges
among which are cases of terrorism, kidnapping, violent protest, illegal arms possession, and
most importantly, the great fear that these ‘Rogue States’ or the cells operating in these states
may possess nuclear war heads. The study, among many other things shall, seek to examine the
extent at which these policy have worked in promoting peace in the Middle East.
1.2 Statement of the Problem
The Middle East has become the centrepiece of her drive for global hegemony.
America’s destabilizing impact on the region has deepened (Hinnebusch, 2007). Thus the United
States policy of preemption undoubtedly is geared towards the sustenance of America’s
hegemonic stance in the Middle East, and in the globe. This also is in a greater extent to protect
its allies in the Middle East such as Israel. In extant literature, scholars attributed the policy of
preemption to the events of 9/11. The United States policy of preemption can only be properly
understood by bringing together three levels of analysis. The US global strategy, the US strategic
position in the Middle East, and presumably the interests of Bush’s ruling coalition.
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However, in understanding the security challenges in the Middle East since 1999 till date
exposes the inner mainsprings of US Middle East policy and the region’s pivotal role in overall
US global strategy. In discussing the security challenges in Middle East, many instances are very
pronounced. Mindful among these are the Israel Hezbollah deterrence equation, the development
of the Syrian crisis, the Iranian nuclear issue, the evolution of Lebanese politics and the
notorious US Invasion of Iraq among other most recent security challenges in the Middle East,
prominent among them is also the Israeli – Hamas crisis and the Islamic terrorist (IS) terrorist
group activities. The 2002 national security strategy of the United States and the 2006 expanded
version describe the broad strategic goals that have become known as the Bush Doctrine:
military primacy, global transformation, preemption, and a willingness to act unilaterally.
Recently, the level of peace and security in the Middle East has been deepening. Though this
worsening situation have been attributed to many factors which most of them are due to
America’s interferences in regimes, like American critics of the Bush Doctrine, worry about the
unfortunate juxtaposition of the unachievable goal of completely ending tyranny throughout the
world, the confusion between preemptive war and preventive war, the use of 9/11 as a prospect
for unilateralism, and the documents preface declaring, this is a wartime national security
strategy (NSS, 2002:14). From the prospect of most traditional allies of the US, these overly
broad goals are in sharp contrast with the original doctrine of multilateralism and consensus.
These elements of the Bush Doctrine (Policy of preemption) have radically altered the extensive
post – 9/11 sympathy and support for the American response to the threat of terrorism.
However, the United States policy of preemption has been rigorously pursued since the
Bush administration with its subscribers trying to justify the policy. Many scholars and public
affairs analysts likewise, have criticized the policy as well. Hence this study seeks to explore
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how these policies of preemption have impacted on the security of live and properties, both in
America and in the Middle East at large. The United States policy of preemption is strongly
vested in the national security strategy (NSS) as it was first documented by the Bush
administration. In both the 2002 and the 2006 versions of the NSS the first reference in chapter
III, titled “strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against US
and our friends.” It is under this chapter that the United States laid down its motive to contain the
growing attacks on its citizens and allies. The 2002 version states:
We will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country (NSS, 2002:6).
Hence, a critical analysis of the United States policy of preemption can be understood by
making reference on the NSS. This document gave rise to the preemptive policy and the
subsequent “Bush Doctrine”. President George Bush in effort to articulate the policy went further
to assert that:
If necessary, however, under long-standing principles of self – defense we do not rule out the use of force before attacks occur, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the economy’s attack. When the consequences of an attack with WMD are potentially so devastating, we cannot afford to stand idly by as grave dangers materialize. This is the logic of preemption (NSS, 2006:8).
The logic of preemption is clear even though the term is confused with the more accurate
legal formulation: preventive war. The concept of preemption or the anticipatory use of force in
the face of imminent attack has been broadened in the NSS to encompass preventive war and use
of force when no evidence of imminent attack is present, but serious threats to US security may
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gather and over time. This unilateral declaration of when to use military force against another
state is the point where most Europeans and many Americans as well as middle east state,
diverge from the Bush Doctrine’s explicit rejection of deterrence.
Many scholars and few researchers have over time conducted a triage with a view to
ascertaining the most pressing challenges to global peace and security. The Middle East has
always topped the chat of the growing crisis in the world. Researchers, it appears, have always
neglected to trace the United State policy of preemption to the deteriorating security level in the
Middle East. Many strategic expert have argued that preempting attacks on perceived terrorist
groups or states will curtail or stop there groups from carrying out subsequent attacks on
America, and its allies. This fact is yet to be ascertained as the level of insecurity in the Middle
East is growing worse. The United State itself has constantly made efforts to strengthen its
hegemony in the Middle East but the reverse has been the case. The lessons learnt and taught by
the US invasion of Iraq have been glaring. The hegemonic strive in Iraq is not only open for the
United States or the European countries, but also to most middle east states such as Iran. A
recent report issued by Chatham House concluded, “It is Iran, not the United States that is the
most influential external power in Iraq, with an unparalleled ability to affect stability and
security across most of the country (Bahgat, 2007: 15).
Based on this, the researcher on discovering many lacunas and questions not properly and
sufficiently addressed, decided to investigate with a view to unravel the strategic challenge of
security in the Middle East. This investigation is primarily premised on evaluating the adequacy
of the united state policy of preemption drafted by the Bush administration to amongst all;
contain terrorist activities in the Middle East. Many researchers have carried out studies on both
the Middle East security and the united state policy of preemption. These studies highlighted the
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strategic implications of the United States preempting attack on perceived Rogue states’. I
however, discovered a research lacuna in the fact that the works I studied failed to factor in the
issue of preemption into the equation of the growing level of insecurity and stability in the
Middle East. They failed to appreciate the fact that the American invasion have eroded any atom
of sympathy evoked by 9/11 attack which gave rise to the policy of preemption, and hence, it
amount to what many refer to as an unjust war. There assertions was based on the assumption
that striking a perceived enemy state will guarantee the anticipated level of peace and security,
both in America, its allies, the middle east and the globe at large. They also highlight that the
policy of preemption could have checkmated the devastating 9/11 attack if in place, prior to the
attack.
However, contemporary trends associated with preemption points in the opposite
direction to the effect that many issues surrounding security in Middle East is mostly politically
motivated especially as the Middle East crisis have taken a different dimension like the case of
Syria. This study argues that the United States policy of preemption have resulted in spillover
effects on the deteriorating crisis in the Middle East. The volatility of the Middle East
geopolitical landscape is no secret. Inextricably entangled in a web of history and alliances,
Middle Eastern nations act as characters in a tragedy, doing a delicate dance of diplomacy, even
as each seeks to influence the balance of power in the region (Bruisbon, 2009:2).
We chose this topic – “united state’s policy of preemption and security in the middle east
1999-2014” – with a view to evaluating the challenges of security in middle east and the
adequacy or the relevance of the United State’s policy of preemption, the strive by America to
maintain its allies and hegemony in the middle east. In the same vein, we want to evaluate the
threat, if any, to Middle East security. The technological shift and change occasioned by nuclear
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renaissance and its relationship with contemporary international terrorism which the united states
and the world at large feels unsafe that these nuclear war head will proliferate within the middle
east. This constitute the most pressing challenge to global peace and stability, hence the urgent
need to evaluate it especially as previous researchers have paid negligible attention to it. Security
in the Middle East is a terminal issue devoid of the comfort of a learning curve, and imperious to
conventional deterrence.
The period (1999-2014) has significance vis-à-vis the nexus of security in the middle east
and the united states policy of preemption which was a blueprint to the response of the 9/11
attack. In the realm of international terrorism, the emergence of mega terrorism became
confirmed, for instance, the 1998 simultaneous America embassies bombings in Nairobi, Kenya
and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania with daunting casualty rate, this was the beginning of the new
dimension of terrorism in the globe. The earlier mentioned September 11, 2001 terrorist attack
on the US homeland killed two thousand, nine hundred and eighty six people and injured more;
this could be referred to as the last straw that broke the camel’s back, and hence gave birth to the
‘policy of preemption’. The idea behind the policy is simply based on the fact that the 9/11 attack
would have been averted if the United State acted preemptively. The United States policy of
preemption has been disputed by many authors and analyst on the grounds of its legitimacy in
accordance with international law. America on its part have constantly strived to maintain its
policy. This was captured in the words of Hinnebusch (2007: 9):
As the Middle East has become the centrepiece of its drive for global hegemony, America’s de-stabilizing impact on the region has deepened; equally, the reaction from the Middle East to US policy carries important consequences for US hegemony globally. The Iraq war is the pivotal event around which these development centre.
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A contemporary trend in the United States policy of preemption proves the variety of the
aforesaid. The 9/11 attack on the United States and the subsequent response on the overthrow of
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the famous invasion of Iraq are all case in point.
However, one can fathom that researchers have not done justice to the issue of United States
policy of preemption vis-à-vis prospects and the efficacy of security of lives and property in the
Middle East. They failed to check whether the policy of preemption will address the decade long
conflict in the Middle East like the cold war period. They also failed to investigate whether the
policy of preemption has reduced terrorism and nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. They
also failed to examine whether the policy of preemption is in accordance with the United Nations
charter.
Consequently, in the light of the foregoing deficiencies discernible in researches
conducted by previous scholars, we have elected to contribute and enrich existing enquiries by
filling lacuna in the literature and proffering solutions to the security challenges in the Middle
East, by addressing the following research questions:
1. Has the invasion of suspected “axis of evil” in the Middle East states by the United
States reduced incidence of insecurity in the region?
2. Has the unilateral use of force by the United States reduced attacks on America, and her
allies in the Middle East?
3. Does the United States counter terrorism policy in accord with the provisions of the
United Nations charter?
13
1.3 Objectives of the Study
This study has its broad objective the strategic evaluation of the security situation in the
Middle East by appraising the adequacy of the United States policy of preemption to contain this
threat, which is worrisome to America, and to global security. With the preponderance of the
contemporary global security lapses in the middle east, it becomes imperative to evaluate the
growing security threats in the Middle East vis-à-vis the extent United State policy of preemption
which was drafted to relax the threat similarly, this is also bearing in mind the recent activities of
the Islamic state in Syria (ISIS) which has worsened the security in the Middle East. The study
shall access the united states policy of preemption and security in the Middle East between 1999-
2014. Thus, in specific terms, this study is embarked upon to:
1. Determine if the invasion of suspected “axis of evil” in the Middle East states by the
United States reduced incidence of insecurity in the region.
2. Investigate whether the unilateral use of force by the United States reduced attacks on
America, and her allies in the Middle East
3. Establish whether the United States counter terrorism policy is in accord with the
provisions of the United Nations charter
1.4 Significant of the Study
The significance of this study falls into two paradigms: theoretical and practical. This
means that its significance lies in its capacity to meet scholarly theoretical as well as
policymaker’s practical need. In the theoretical paradigm, the issue security in the Middle East
has consistently kept policy makers anxious as they are conscious of the strategic implication of
14
such a threat especially under globalization. The imperative of fighting the growing insecurity in
the Middle East on one hand and preemption policy on the other, or even attaining
comprehensive peaceful co-existence within the Middle Eastern states still remain top on the
agenda of meeting of scholars, policy makers and concerned global citizens. Thus, this study’s
theoretical significance hinges on exposing the intricacies and impediments to Middle East and
global peace and stability as could be discerned from the nexus of security in the Middle East
and the contemporary united state Policy of Preemption. The findings of this study, it is hoped,
will contribute to the plethora of existing opus of scientifically accumulated knowledge in
relation to the challenge posed by security in the middle east, against the background of the
united state policy and ‘Bush Doctrine’ to global peace and stability. Suffice it to note that, most
scholars, policy makers and even global citizens exhibit ignorance of the pressing need of
containing the security issue in middle east must, erroneously, still view the daily and detonating
security in middle east as a western or the regions problem in general, and the United States of
America in particular. This study thus stands to illuminate every gray area to aid in the
enlightenment of those still in the dark vis-à-vis the global threat of the volatile nature of security
in Middle East and its spill over effect.
More so, an inquiry into the current study shows that the sophistication discernible in
contemporary Middle East crisis has somehow created a profound awareness of the united state
policy of preemption. Linking these two, is an aspect which was ignored by earlier works as my
research revealed. But these works, with improved merits, came short by toeing the state centric-
realist approach to investigation thus leaving a yawning gap whose bridging this study intends to
achieve. As we apply social science methodologies to issues of strategic studies, theoretical
issues are availed of a bearing on the challenges of Middle East security. In line with the
15
foregoing, it is logically anticipated that the findings derivative of this auspicious investigation
stands to fill this yawning information lacuna. In the same vein, it stand to avail scholars of the
requisite context, incentive, focus and vent to advance research in strategic issues plaguing
humanity and capable of compromising existence.
In the practical paradigm, this study is set to expose and explain the neglected and gray
areas of this discourse. This is with a view to letting especially the actors in the international
system to appreciate constructively the real politick of other various and varied stances vis-à-vis
the terminal strategic challenges to global peace and stability. Scholars as well as policy makers
are bound to gain from the fallout of this investigation. In the practical paradigm, the global cost
of the Middle East crisis and its economic implications and the preemptive policy are prohibitive
on both sides of the evaluative coin. In the same vein, executing the preemptive policy costs
much in terms of finance, manpower and logistics.
In the light of the foregoing, the findings of this research stand to benefit all with a stake
in the international system that are desirous of its beneficial peace and stability. It stands to
benefit the African continent in general and Nigeria in particular especially as both grapple with
the tricky issue of security in a nuclear age under globalization. It must, however, be pointed out
here that Africa’s relative security in the global security system remains precarious, to say the
least. This is more so factoring in the fact that some African state such as Libya had witnessed
the presence of American soldiers on its soil, and to a minor degree, Nigeria having a dozen or so
US marines to coordinate the search and rescue mission of the abducted school girls. This is also
considering the fact that Africa is arguably composed mainly of failing states with nuclear
programs and reliable connections to major terrorist cells, mostly operating from the Middle
East. The continent is bearing the haven of global Jihadist terrorists who are leveraging its lapse-
16
security feature. So, this study stands to constitute the indispensable nation call to engender
security consciousness in Africa: the researcher’s primary location in the global equation.
In a more detailed down home analysis to my country, Nigeria, which has structural,
economic, and political challenges and a growing menace of terrorism, this study will help in
alerting Nigerians to the effect that terrorism and externalities of Middle East crisis have a great
spill over effect as Nigeria, an arguably failed state, in every strategic sense. Under the prevailing
circumstances, every strategic thinker is bond to hesitate before putting the Middle East security
beyond contemporary fundamentalist terrorists operating in Nigeria. Hence, this study, apart
from helping to enlighten Africa vis-à-vis its security threats stands also to alert Nigeria in
relation to its precarious relationship with dual threats of middle east crisis and the contemporary
united state policy of preemption which our policy makers evidently treat with levity and some
scholars so far erroneously appraise as issues alien to and beyond our domain. (Sado, 2011;
Ajibola, 2012; Ikuomola, 2011; Usman, 2011; Agekameh, 2011; Okechukwu, 2012).
17
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
The trust of this study is a strategic evaluation of the adequacy or otherwise of the place
of the United States policy of preemption as a major to curtail the security issues in the Middle
East between 1999-2014. In this chapter, great effort will be made to review important literatures
concerning the united state policy of preemption as well as the volatile nature of security in the
Middle East. Furthermore, we then to evaluate amongst all whether the united state policy of
preemption constitute threat to global peace. In view of the foregoing, the literature review to
this study evaluates the findings and arguments of scholars on the following research questions:
1. Has the invasion of suspected “axis of evil” in the Middle East states by the United States
reduced incidence of insecurity in the region?
2. Has the unilateral use of force by the United States reduced attacks on America, and its
allies in the Middle East?
3. Does the United States counter terrorism policy in accord with the provisions of the
United Nations charter?
1. Invasion of ‘Axis of Evil’ and Insecurity in the Middle-East
The possibility or otherwise of crisis, terrorism and nuclear proliferation, especially
under globalization, to a very large extent depends on the ability of the United States and the
global community to deny terrorist access to nuclear materials and weapons by all means
possible. The traditional hinge has always been nuclear deproliferation which nominally sustains
non-proliferation. The united nation and the United States has always featured in this onerous
task through atomic control by supporting nuclear programmes with civilian applications to the
exclusion and stopping of those with military applications. This thrust is further enhanced by the
18
provisions of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). This treaty, abused by the Nuclear
States and non-Nuclear states alike – constitutes the popular source of hope for containing the
daunting contradictions and externalities inherent in harnessing the quantum energy of nuclear
technology. Thus, the united states through the United Nations have strived to distinguish
between the civilian and military uses of nuclear technology capability. However, the tricky and
complicated nature of the nuclear technological process of harnessing and utilizing of atomic
energy blurs the line between its civilian and military applications. Thus, it becomes extremely
complex to draw a distinguishing line between the establishment and development of a nuclear
programe intended for domestic purposes or military hardware intentions. Hence other numerous
means of checkmating the proliferation of these heavy weapons exist, the united state feels
greatly unsafe and uncomfortable on the dangers of nuclear proliferation, especially these
nuclear war heads finding its way to the hand of terrorist groups, mostly situated in the middle
east.
This gives rise to the direction and importance of this review, precisely to view from
extant literature available if the invasion of major countries and regime in the middle east by the
United States had any effect on checkmating and curtailing nuclear proliferation and what may
referred also as nuclear terrorism. Scholars, leaders, policymakers and informed global citizens
are today worried over contemporary nuclear renaissance and the challenge of nuclear terrorism.
On the same vein, many strategic analyst are apprehensive on the dangers of these heavy
weapons reaching these terrorist groups, whom they believe won’t hesitate in using them on any
western polity of their choice. This renaissance constitutes ascension of concern since the
emergence of the nuclear age which started paradoxically on a military note in 1945. Kissinger
(2009:28) factoring on the foregoing, asserts that:
19
The danger pose by nuclear weapons is unprecedented. They should not be integrated into strategy as simply another, more, efficient, explosive. We thus, return to our original challenge. Our age has stolen fire from the gods; can we confine it to peaceful purposes before it consumes us?
The new shift in emphasis on preemptive and preventive uses of force is a response to the
terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, which brought home the necessity to address potentially
catastrophic threats before the country can be attacked. The first manifestation of this more
forceful attitude was the president's seminal Sept. 20, 2001, speech to a joint session of Congress
vowing to hold responsible the terrorists as well as those who harbor them. It paved the way for a
largely successful military campaign in Afghanistan and sent a clear warning to other state
sponsors of terrorism. Hence many authors and scholars share divergent views on the
effectiveness of these invasions in curtailing conflict, terrorism, and nuclear proliferation in the
Middle East. Apparently, the president George W Bush administration was determined to crush
any regime that was perceived or suspected to be sponsoring terrorism around the globe,
especially in the Middle East. To achieve and justify this unilateral response to post 9/11 United
States, the Bush administration drafted the New Security Strategy (NSS), which indoctrinated the
policy of preemption which is widely referred to as the ‘Bush Doctrine’. This assertion is
properly articulated by the view of Hinnebusch (2007:10), as he tried to point out the build-up of
the American-Iraqi invasion that:
The first hurdle the Bush administration had to clear was to legitimize war on a state that did not threaten the US. The issue of WMDs was hit upon as a way to turn the 'war on terrorism' against Iraq; to do so, Bush had to claim that Saddam Hussein was linked to al-Qaida and was actively developing weapons of mass destruction which he might turn over to terrorists or use on their behalf, and hence that Iraq represented an imminent threat to the US. These claims have not only been discredited but, additionally,
20
there is strong evidence that the war party in Washington deliberated exaggerated unreliable claims and knew Iraq was no threat to the US. At any rate, the threat was never that WMDs would be used against the USA but that they could constrain US freedom of action in the Middle East or threaten Israel.
Based on this assertion, the author is arguing from the fact that the invasion of Iraq by the
United States could not be justified on moral standings. However, in making a proper analysis on
the American-Iraqi occupation, it is imperative to view it from the angle of its causes and
consequences. To understand the real motives behind the war and why Bush saw an attack on
Iraq as the solution to US problems, we need to shift the focus from security threats to the US,
per se, toward threats to its strategic situation in the Middle East and its hegemony over the oil
market. While some authors completely believe that the invasion was pre-conceived by America
prior to the 9/11 attack, thereby attributing the war to oil politics, others quite share the opinion
that the attack was in an effort to stop further attacks on America by ‘Rogue States’ who were
tagged by the united states as state sponsors of terrorism. The “Bush doctrine” as American
foreign policy has been called, is essentially the response of the Bush administration to the
attacks of 9/11. Initially, it was used to describe the invasion of Afghanistan, but was later
broadened as to encompass the famous “policy of preemption” which was claimed to operate on
various levels. According to Dressner (2009:282) this strategy of preemption holds that the
United States can attack any country and depose any political regime if they pose a security
threat on the U.S. the author also went further to argue that the threat does not have to be
immediate, and the security threat can be either terrorism or the development of weapons of mass
destruction. This also justified the invasion of Iraq. Another set of principles of the Bush doctrine
refers to a diplomacy tending toward “unilateralism” i.e. “a willingness to act without the
sanction of international bodies such as the United Nations Security Council or the unanimous
21
approval of its allies” (Kagan, 2003:17). The Bush doctrine was further developed in the
National Security Strategy paper issued by the White House on September 17,2002. This paper
announced “a new legal as well as strategic concept that would represent a fundamental change
from the past” (Gardner, 2002:586): The NSS of the United State of 2002 according to Gardner,
(2002) states that: The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats,
nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression. Yet in an age where the enemies
of civilization openly and actively seek the world’s most destructive technologies, the United
States cannot remain idle while dangers gather. Similarly, many analyst have argued that the US
led invasion of Iraq was purely based on the premise of establishing a democratic regime in the
country which work in accordance with the dictates of western ideologies. This was properly
articulated in the words of Kuniholm (2009:435), who posited that:
One of the goals of the Bush doctrine is to spread democracy to the Middle East. In fact, the central claim that supporters of the Iraqi occupation have formulated is that the US troops are contributing to the creation of a stable and democratic Iraq. Moreover, they have argued that governments in neighboring countries could follow in the path of Iraq and adopt peaceful democratic regimes. This is however easily contradicted by a few historical and social considerations. Ethnic and religious cleavages prevent such a scenario from ever becoming reality. Since its creation, Iraq has been a nation torn between immense social inequalities and religious differences. The lack of education has also worsened the situation of the Iraqi people. In fact, this lack of education combined with extreme poverty account for the appeal of terrorism among common Iraqis. Moreover, Iraq has no experience in liberal and pluralistic government hence America’s attempt to create and impose such a regime is likely to fail. It is extremely difficult to craft a regime that will also function when put into practice especially when it is imposed through military intervention. A study conducted in 2003 has shown that only 4 of the 16 military operations through which the United States aimed at changing a government resulted in the establishment of democracy.
22
This argument brings home the fact that the America invasion of Iraq which also had the
primary reason of establishing a democratic government in the country, though was achieved but
has been generating many conflicts in Iraq. It has led to more tensed up Middle East as rebel
groups such as the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq has been angered by the military actions of
the United States in Middle East. The thrust of this review is to ascertain whether the quest by
America to preempt the Middle East has actually led to improved security in the Middle East. It
is not far-fetched maintaining that the invasion of some Middle East States by America was
indeed counter-productive. Most analyst of terrorism agree that it is impossible to completely
prevent terrorist attacks. (Karbo & Lee Ray, 2011:81). But this was not the view of the
Americans, as most of the regimes have constantly worked to prevent terrorism, especially on
America and its allies. According to Noel (2006) the direct link between the United States’
energy security policy and its military policy in the Persian Gulf can be traced back to the
formulation of the Carter Doctrine in the late 1970s and the subsequent creation of the Rapid
Deployment Force. Hence, the united state prior to the ‘Bush Doctrine’ has always maintained a
policy that protects its interest in the Middle East. To use a term from classical liberal political
philosophy, the US
Involvement in the Persian Gulf amounts to applying a “negative power”: it is meant at
preventing people from doing certain things more than it aims at shaping the region. The US has
made it impossible for Iran and Iraq, successively, to threaten the security of the production and
export facilities in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the EAU, as well as the sea lanes of the Gulf and
the straight of Ormuz. But the US has never tried to roll back the Islamist revolution in Iran, to
prevent Iraq and Iran from fighting, to topple Saddam Hussein from power or to push for
23
political reforms in the Gulf monarchies. The type of power that the United States has applied in
the Middle East since the late 1970s is that of a policeman, not that of a planner.
However, despite the varying views on the outcome of the invasions in middle east, many
observers are still of the opinion that American government had as well as achieved its good
intentions in the middle east. Writing about the US international economic policy goals in the
Middle East, Zoellick (2006:4) argues thus:
The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was meant as both a preventive war and as an attempt to create an example of democracy in the heart of the Middle East – an operation of regional political engineering. Even if the preventive aspect of the war is now known to have been – at least – overplayed by the US (and British) government, there is ample evidence that the Bush administration is seriously committed to overseeing the emergence and stabilization of democratic institutions in Iraq, from which they expect positive implications for the whole region. Apart from the war itself and a sustained effort of public diplomacy, the US policy of democracy promotion in the Middle East is being implemented through four main initiatives: the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) launched in 2002 by the US Department of State; the Broader Middle East and North Africa Partnership Initiative (BMENA), launched at the G8 summit in June 2004; a broad and sustained effort by the office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to negotiate trade and investment agreements throughout the Middle East the goal of negotiating a free trade agreement between the United States and the Middle East and North Africa region has also been announced by US officials; and finally the recently announced Foundation for the Future and Fund for the Future. These initiatives have little in common with the Iraq war, except their goal.
Consequently, many scholars have been preoccupied to counter the fact that the invasion
of some Middle East states, Libya to an extent was or was not for energy purposes which the
United States, undoubtedly needs for its growing domestic purposes. Similarly, most scholars
believe that by preemption, the American government and its allies we be able to stop such large
scale attacks on American soil such as the 9/11 attack. This argument is properly understood by
24
the views of most western scholars who argue that a preemptive attack on the Taliban regime
would have averted the 9/11 catastrophe. This view that is greatly shared by many western
apologists was also pronounced in the National Security Strategy of the United States, (NSS)
thus:
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objective of today’s adversaries. . . .The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction-and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. . . . The United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.”
Furthermore, scholars are divided over the effectiveness of the American Invasion into
Middle East states, especially Iraq. Many critics, for instance, use the case of Libya as a pointer
to the fact that the preemptive policy of the US is a lame duck and not a watchdog. The United
States’ President George W. Bush and Prime Minister, Tony Blair announced on December 19,
2003 that the then Libya’s leader, Colonel Muammar al Qaddafi, had agreed to give up his
pursuit of acquisition of WMDs-biological, chemical and nuclear. He, they said, has
unconditionally agreed to open Libya up for unhindered inspection by the United Nations
weapon inspectors. President Bush believed that the action was informed by a dire appreciation
of the mayhem going on in Iraq against Saddam Hussein (New York Times, December 20, 2003).
Puvis and Walter (2004:12) observe that:
Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi’s apparent decision two weeks ago to come clean on his fledging weapons programme could be a major achievement in the world’s bid to rein in rogue nuclear nations. But it has also shown how far there still is to go. Since 1980, inspectors from the international Atomic Energy (IAEA) have visited Libya, a signatory of the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and routinely reported back that they found no evidence of a nuclear-weapons program…
25
But after Libya’s Colonel Muammar Gaddafi came clean on his weapons programme, the
inspectors went back to Libya in January 2003. Obviously, they came across more than 9 new
nuclear sites, most for the first time, according to Purvis and Waller (2003:12), and were
surprised to find ongoing efforts to design and build the centrifuge technology required to
produce nuclear weapons fuel. The forgoing, critics believe, shows that despite the initial fear by
Libya on the mayhem that was witnessed by Iraq may befall them, it never stopped them from
embarking on their nuclear programme. Hence, it is obvious that even preemption on the whole
cannot be able to maintain peaceful coexistence in the Middle East. The suspected ‘rogue state’
feels that the only way to protect itself from spontaneous attack from America is to be a nuclear
power. The policy of preemption and to a lesser extent the ideology behind it that attacking first
will reduce or stop nuclear terrorism or maintain peace in the Middle East is failed assumption.
Many observers are of the opinion that despite the fact that the whole world stood behind and
sympathized with America over the 9/11 attack, such emotional attachment was completely
eroded by the unilateral response of America by invading Iraq without the due ratification of the
United Nation Security Council. Equally by so doing, the action has not ended the hostility in the
Middle East especially targeted to the west.
However, it is very obvious that the United State in quest to get an answer and probably a
revenge of 9/11 failed to consider the spill over effect which its aggression might lead to in the
foreseeable future. Indeed, the increasing rate of conflict in the Middle East has shown the
invasion distorted the traditional leadership of most Middle East states such as Sunni in Iraq and
Taliban in Afghanistan. In describing this, Kwan Yee (2007:22) wrote that:
The United States did not realize, moreover, the depth of the fault lines in Iraqi society -- between Kurds and Arabs, Sunnis and Shiites, and the members of different tribes and local religious groups. These tensions were contained during four centuries of
26
Ottoman rule, and the British, who took over from the Ottomans in 1920, put Iraq under strong Sunni control, and centred on Baghdad. Now, because of the destruction of the old Iraqi society, for the first time in centuries, power is in the hands of the Iraqi Shiites. With Sunni control of Iraq removed, Shiite Iran is no longer checked from extending its influence westward. And by allowing the emergence of the first Shiite-dominated Arab state, the United States has stirred the political aspirations of the 150 million or so Shiites living in Sunni countries elsewhere in the region.
The strongest argument for making sure that Saddam Hussein never acquires nuclear
weapons is that, if he possessed them, he would be less constrained and therefore would become
much more dangerous in the region. He might, for example, attack the Kurds or seize oil fields
on his disputed border with Kuwait, believing that his weapons of mass destruction protected
him from a U.S. response (or at least from a U.S. invasion to overthrow him). He might still be
deferrable even with the bomb, but certainly the risks of deterrence failure could be expected to
increase. Instead of this, the US opted for a more hostile confrontation, rather than banking on
the hope that deterrence will be feasible. The problem with the Middle East conflict is one which
the US never envisaged in the near possible feature. The President Bush regime was so
determined to invade Iraq and didn’t really bother on the implication this invasion will have on
the region. Iraq and Iran over the years have been struggling for supremacy over the region and
an American occupation in Iraq will led to Iran assuming its place in the region. As Martin
Indyk, a former US Ambassador to Israel argues, "After a decade of being on the defensive, the
regime in Tehran now feels that its moment has arrived. This shows how prone the US left the
Middle East region, as many states who felt threatened by the Saddam regime decided to jostle
for dominance, either by fast tracking their ambitions or by upgrading its arsenal. According to
Baghat (2004:44) he averred that:
27
For decades US policy in the Persian Gulf sought to balance Iran and Iraq against one another. The two states had traditionally been stronger than the other six gulf monarchies that share this oil-rich region. The removal of Saddam Hussein and failure to restore political and military stability in Iraq has opened the door for Iran to aggressively pursue its claim of regional leadership. The United States anticipated that the rivalry between Iraqi and Iranian Shias would be more intense than that between Iraqi Shias and Sunnis. However, developments in Iraq since 2003 seem to prove these expectations wrong. The rise of sectarian strife has gradually eroded the hoped-for sense of nationalism and has, in fact, reinforced sectarian identity. Thus, the sectarian violence in Iraq is driving Iran and the Iraqi Shias closer, while Iraqi Sunnis and Arabs are allying.
The security in the Middle East under evaluation against the background of
contemporary United State policy of preemption is a very delicate issue and appears scary. The
sophistication attained or demonstrated by contemporary terrorists comes on even more daunting
against the background of the American policy towards the Middle East. The policy which
undoubtedly is geared towards the further escalation of the Middle East crisis and to an extent to
protect the interest of America, its allies and citizens in the middle east. The fragile nature of the
Middle East conflict is becoming worrisome as contemporary discourse centers on the effect that
contemporary terrorists could acquire nuclear weapons and apply them in their attacks. Though
the recent dimension that the Middle East crisis have attained has shown that the contemporary
terrorist groups, operating from the region need not bother about nuclear weapons to perpetrate
and achieve their aims and objectives. However, in the strategic circle, the assumption remains
that as far as these nihilistic terrorists are concerned, possession of nuclear weapons equal to its
application. This questions the adequacy of the united state policy of preemption and subsequent
campaigns in some states in the region, in curtailing and checkmating this ugly trend. Thus, the
indispensability of the American invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq becomes established and their
failings one of global and terminal concern. Suffice it to conclude that the global community has
28
a job to do by addressing the Middle East crisis and not leaving it in the doorstep of the United
States whose much effort are still not yet enough and have rather deteriorated the already fragile
region.
2. Unilateral use of force and Attacks on the United States and her Allies
Despite the motive behind the United States redefinition of its foreign policy to contain
the growing menace and hostility meted out to the US establishment abroad especially in the
Middle East, the fact still remains that America is still struggling to consolidate its hegemony in
the world, especially in the Middle East. The idea behind the preemptive use of force by America
and the subsequent use of force sequel to the unilateral policy of the United State hinges on the
premise that these policies will be able to secure American citizens and interest abroad.
According Thabit (2006:18) the US invaded Iraq under the pretext of uncovering Iraq’s Weapons
of Mass Destruction (WMDs), making Iraq comply with UN resolutions and saving Iraqis from
decades old tyranny of Saddam Hussein. The United States government justifying the unilateral
policy of the use of force to checkmate terrorism is of the view that the new dimension will
checkmate the sporadic attacks against America. They still argued that the new wave of terrorism
has to be marched with new measures. In his speech at West Point on June 1, 2002, President
Bush notably demoted deterrence and containment. He maintained that:
For much of the last century, America’s defense relied on the Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment. In some cases, those strategies still apply. But new threats also require new thinking. Deterrence-the promise of massive retaliation against nations-means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nations or citizens to defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons as missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies.
29
The President insisted that “we must take the battle to the enemy.” And he announced
that “our security will require transforming the military you will lead-a military that must be
ready to strike at a moment’s notice in any dark corner of the world. And our security will
require all Americans to be forward looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when
necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.” “Remarks by the President at 2002
Graduation Exercises of the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York.”
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/print/20020601-3.html, accessed June 1, 2002.
In less than a year later, with the US’s inability to discover any WMDs, all three
justifications presented by the US were proven wrong amidst a backdrop of rising violence,
breakdown of political and economic reconstruction and intensifying sectarian divisions. Iraq
therefore proved the need to consolidate peace rather than merely win wars. It became obvious
that winning the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, to an extent other middle east states is dose not
really assure that America or its allies, citizens or establishment in the middle East will be
safeguarded. In short, the unilateral decision of the United States brought about contending
issues within the United Nations Security Council. Based on the doctrine of unilateralism,
preemption and militarism, the United States proposed and decided to invade some states
perceived to be sponsoring and harbouring terrorist. Increasingly, international terrorism is
recognized as a threat to U.S. foreign, as well as domestic security. Both timing and target
selection by terrorists can affect U.S. interests in areas ranging from preservation of commerce to
nuclear non-proliferation to the Middle East peace process. Considering how the terrorists
groups operates from the region, it becomes imperative to understand that prior to invasion of
middle east or the enactment of the preemption policy, the middle east have constantly stood in
opposition to the policies of the United States. Hence, it is better off to understand why the US
30
will always make tremendous effort to safeguard its citizens both on and outside America. The
idea of invading the Middle East was not for any special purposes but to forestall and preempt
such attack like the 9/11. Al Qaeda’s political motives behind the September 11 attack are
presumably related to these objections to U.S. policy are earlier mentioned. According to Rourke
(2009:306) most people believe that Security is best achieved by disarming, not arming, and that
creating collective security forces is better than traditional self-reliance. In this case, the United
States opted to make efforts to disarm the terrorist cell operating from the Middle East to curtail
the security crisis in this region and abroad which is frequently targeted to western facilities and
citizens. However the attacks on United States did not start from the incident of 9/11, many
terrorist groups prior to al Qaeda have had many reasons to attack the country. Islam
undoubtedly has been perceived to be grounds for the growing level of terrorist activities as the
west and the Middle East region have been having issues and disagreements over policies.
According to Long (2006:102) while there is some truth to the notion that Islamism is the leading
doctrinal ideology among terrorists today,…the political dynamics of the Islamism terrorist
groups are overwhelmingly nationalist and ethnic in scope. The origins of al Qaeda terrorism, for
example, are decidedly political. Members of al Qaeda, particularly those with roots in Egypt,
were first fighting quite authoritarian and repressive regimes, backed by the United States. Hence
the US at one time or the other has supported some regimes in the Middle East region that
worked in a favorable pattern to its foreign policy. Similarly, it is important to understand that
the September 11 attack on America was not the first time that the country is been hit by a
terrorist group. Hence subsequent counter measures by the US to curtail these threats has been
difficult to achieve, the new post 9/11 American foreign policy was a response to the new face of
terrorism in the millennium. According to Rice (2002), she maintained that:
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A broad-based doctrine of preemption carries serious risks. The Bush administration was right to take a strong stand against terrorists and extremist states, but it had already accomplished this goal with its early words in the period after the September 11 attacks and its actions in Afghanistan. It did not need a formal doctrine of preemption to drive the point home. Rather than enunciate a formal new doctrine, it would have been better to continue to reserve the preemptive military tool for a narrow, rare class of situations where inaction poses a credible risk of large scale, irreversible harm and where other policy tools offer a poor prospect of success. Given that the doctrine has now been promulgated, the Bush administration should clarify and limit the conditions under which it might be applied. (Rice, 2002:61)
Going the above assertion, it argues that after the administration declared its readiness
and commitment after 9/11, a new policy of preemption was not necessary as it will deteriorate
the already sensitive situation. Undoubtedly, the United State have really done so well in
checkmating and responding to security issues targeted on its citizens but it is obvious that most
of these efforts have been counterproductive. Meanwhile, the security problem in the Middle
East is not exclusively about the American invasion of Iraq or Afghanistan, it also boils down to
the relationship that exists within these Persian Gulf states. According to West point military
academy (2014) asserts that the United States will use military force, unilaterally if necessary,
when the US core interests demand it, when our people are threatened, when our livelihoods are
at stake, when the security of our allies is in danger. In these circumstances, we still need to ask
tough questions about whether our actions are proportional and effective and just. International
opinion matters, but America should never ask permission to protect our people, our homeland,
or our way of life. Arguing from the point that the policy of preemption is seen as a doctrine
promulgated in the famous ‘Bush Doctrine’, it is important to understand that the United State
will and has always assumed its place as the custodian of world peace. This is not withstanding
the views of scholars and critics that the new security policy of the United States is exclusive to
32
President George W Bush. In an effort to re-affirm the commitment and the readiness of America
towards the fight against terrorism, and the hostile response of the middle-east to the west,
subsequent regimes in Washington have maintained the affirmation of the United States towards
world peace. In a similar view Obama (2014) posited that:
In addition to the profound threat that it poses to Israel, one of our strongest allies in the world; in addition to the outrageous language that has been directed toward Israel by the leaders of the Iranian government - if Iran gets a nuclear weapon, this would run completely contrary to my policies of nonproliferation. The risks of an Iranian nuclear weapon falling into the hands of terrorist organizations are profound. It is almost certain that other players in the region would feel it necessary to get their own nuclear weapons. So now you have the prospect of a nuclear arms race in the most volatile region in the world, one that is rife with unstable governments and sectarian tensions. And it would also provide Iran the additional capability to sponsor and protect its proxies in carrying out terrorist attacks, because they are less fearful of retaliation
The president of the United State is concerned that an Iranian nuke might fall into the
hands of terrorists. But his list mostly consists of indirect threats to the U.S. and American lives:
the security of Israel; nonproliferation; regional stability and an emboldened regime in Tehran.
Those are all valid concerns. But the rationale for bombing Iran, if it comes to that, will be more
abstract than the one that was used to justify the American invasion of Iraq. The Bush doctrine,
however, has met with significant criticism. The arguments against the doctrine, expressed both
before and since the invasion of Iraq, accuse it of leading the United States to act unilaterally and
to behave arrogantly. The United States risks alienating world opinion, critics of the doctrine say,
thereby jeopardizing the international cooperation essential to hunt down terrorist organizations.
The doctrine of preemptive war, these critics add, is likely to encourage rather than discourage
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and if adopted by other nations, could increase
the likelihood of regional conflicts. This justifies the fact that in as much as the Bush doctrine is
33
geared towards the protection of America and its allies, it’s a very fragile means to peace as it is
threatened by the same means that was designed to curtail it. According to Boot (2009:44).
After 9/11, many wondered why the United States had not taken military action in Afghanistan earlier to avert the deaths of more than 3,000 innocents. It was the same question many asked after 9/1 -- that would be Sept. 1, 1939, the date when Germany invaded Poland. The evil intentions of the Nazis, like those of al Qaeda, had been clear far in advance. Why had the civilized world not intervened before tragedy struck? Why had those in a position to act not listened to the anguished, urgent warnings coming from the likes of Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden in the case of the Nazis, or from Richard Clarke, Reuel Gerecht, and others in the case of the Islamists? The answer is almost impossible to fathom in retrospect once we are aware of the consequences of inaction. Indeed, so convinced was U.S. President George W. Bush of the need to avoid making the same mistake in the future that he promulgated a doctrine of preemption that roiled traditional foreign-policy circles. Citing threats such as a terrorist attack with weapons of mass destruction, the president's 2002 National Security Strategy vowed, to forestall or prevent such hostile acts by [its] adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising its inherent right of self-defense.
The United States has intervened in the affairs of other nations, or seriously considered
intervening, primarily to prevent or foil anticipated attempts by powers on other continents to
gain a foothold in the Western Hemisphere from which they might mount an attack on the United
States. It has also intervened to maintain power balances among nations in Europe and Asia so
that no single nation or combination of nations might become strong enough in these regions to
launch an assault on the Western Hemisphere from abroad. Occasionally, the United States has
also intervened to establish American strategic and economic bases abroad in order to protect its
vital connecting routes to other parts of the world. Similar to this, most nations from time to time
seek stronger alliances within its region to match the growing hegemony of America. Analyzing
the threat faced by the United States from other Middle Eastern states such as Pakistan, Boot
(2009) still maintained that:
34
There are even greater potential pitfalls associated with a serious attempt to stamp out terrorism emanating from Pakistan. Preemption like -- the current approach of picking off terrorist leaders with armed Predator drones -- can help to weaken and slow the Jihadists, but it can hardly defeat them. That would, in all likelihood, require an invasion of western Pakistan, perhaps accompanied by preemptive airstrikes on Pakistan's nuclear installations. That is an undertaking so daunting as to make even the most hawkish of analysts turn dovish. Pakistan is, after all, a country of 160 million people with nuclear weapons and more than 600,000 active-duty military personnel. Even if most of its armed forces could be convinced not to resist a large-scale, U.S.-led incursion (and that is by no means a certainty), the invading troops would have to deal with the nightmarish prospect of pacifying the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. This region is home to more than 6 million Pashtuns living amid treacherous, mountainous terrain that has never been fully brought under control by any outside power. Next door is the North-West Frontier Province, which has a population of 20 million and has also become a playground for Jihadists. Sending U.S. troops to take on such a difficult task would be virtually unthinkable, barring another tragedy on the scale of 9/11. Perhaps we will not live to see a major attack, emanating from Pakistan or Iran, on our soil or the soil of an allied country. Perhaps we will indeed dodge the bullet -- or, more aptly, the bomb. Or perhaps not. In a prosperous democracy it is all too easy for our leaders to succumb to the same soothing narcosis as the general populace, content to imagine that problems do not really exist because they have not yet fully materialized. That is the illusion that Churchill fought against in the 1930s and Clarke in the 1990s. They both failed. Now, as the United States and our allies fail to act decisively against present-day dangers, we know why. (Boot, 2009:18)
However, it is pertinent to understand that the threat to America within and outside the
country has frequently been changing from the way the attack is carried out, to the group
carrying out such an attack, down to the motive behind the attack. In an address on Middle East
and North Africa, Obama (2011) stated that:
For decades, the United States has pursued a set of core interests in the region: countering terrorism and stopping the spread of nuclear weapons; securing the free flow of commerce, and safe-guarding the security of the region; standing up for Israel’s security and
35
pursuing Arab-Israeli peace. We will continue to do these things, with the firm belief that America's interests are not hostile to peoples' hopes; they are essential to them. We believe that no one benefits from a nuclear arms race in the region, or al Qaeda's brutal attacks. People everywhere would see their economies crippled by a cut off in energy supplies. As we did in the Gulf War, we will not tolerate aggression across borders, and we will keep our commitments to friends and partners.
It has become commonplace to observe that the Islamic world and the West appear to be mired
in an intensifying cycle of political and cultural conflict, and that the most
Significant source of rivalry is the profoundly unsettled nature of American relations with
the Muslim Middle East. The United States in times of war and peace have always re-affirmed
its commitment to protect its citizens allies even across borders. There is no gainsaying that the
unilateral actions of the United States led to the conflict between the west and middle east or vice
versa. In a recent survey by the Gallup Organization, Muslims identified as ‘political radicals’
said their greatest fear was U.S. occupation/domination and that Islam itself was being
threatened (The Wall Street Journal, 2006). This perception of invasion by a predominantly
Christian country has been repeatedly exploited in the media by Osama Bin Laden and serves as
a rallying point for Islamic extremists. Speaking prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003,
Bin Laden stated, “We are following up with great interest and extreme concern the crusaders’
preparations for war to occupy a former capital in Islam, loot Muslim wealth and install an agent
government... (Huntington, 2006:3). It then becomes imperative that United States war on terror
is intractable, as the terrorist groups keep a tab on the advances of the west towards the fight
against terrorism such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq. According to Young (2006:88).
Two common questions currently concerning homeland security are: “Is our country safer now than five years ago?” and “Are we winning the war on terror?” The answers to those questions like most questions of this nature are highly dependent upon the
36
respondent’s political views and the respondent’s perception of national security issues. But these questions are pertinent because since the events of September 11, 2001, our nation has been involved in a so called war on terror that has lasted longer than WWII, albeit without costing as many American lives. Given the longevity of this so-called war and the fact that there is no centralized adversary, why is it that this war seems to perpetuate itself? What issues or factors exist that contribute to a seemingly endless stream of suicide bombers or an extremist recruitment pool?
Nevertheless the question above appears to be rhetoric, its expected response can be
seen in the reaction of Muslims to blasphemous cartoons of the prophet Muhammad or the
shameful treatment of Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib. Answers to these questions are woven into
the fabric of the Middle East and Islamic culture, and its exploratory relationship with modernity.
Hence, we begin to understand the place of culture in ongoing face off between the west and the
Middle East, as both sides sees each other as completely different people from another planet due
to the cultural difference and contending ideologies. As earlier noted in this chapter, some Arabs
continue to identify the West as modern day Crusaders or as a society trying to impose its
cultural values on Muslim society. This cultural dilemma manifests itself in today’s trend toward
globalization. Arab cultures are caught between their traditions and the need for modernization
just to maintain economic and political pace with the modern world. According to D’Arcy and
Levi (2005) the Middle East and Muslim states generally lag behind global standards in
economic, human, and political development, but even further behind in developing the science
and technology that will keep it apace of the rest of the world for future growth. Moreover, Haim
Harari (2004), stated simply that the root of the trouble is that the Muslim region was totally
dysfunctional, further adding that this would have been so even if Israel had joined the Arab
league and an independent Palestine had existed for several past generations. Continuing, Harari
said that the Arab world has only itself to blame for its current condition and lists four factors as
37
contributing to the current world conflict: (a) suicide murder (b) words or disinformation (c)
money and (d) disrespect for laws. Huntington (1993) postulated that world politics was entering
a new phase and hypothesized that the fundamental source of conflict will be cultural and not
ideological or economic. He went further to maintain that we are currently seeing the results of
religious extremism based on Western-Muslim cultural differences. While one may have to
believe that Huntington is correct to a certain extent, it is imperative to understand that religious
based terrorists are not only attacking Western institutions in the name of Allah in Europe and
the United States but are operating in the Philippines, China, Africa, and the former Soviet
Union. In fact, there are few non-Muslim countries in the world not experiencing some level of
conflict with their Muslim minority populations. This goes a long way to establish the fact that
these terrorist group will always carry out attacks wherever its ideology is threatened and the
unilateral decision of the use of force by the United States has not really or may not do much to
curtail these cells on rampage. According to Carafano & Rosenzweig (2005):
Widespread conflict between minority Muslim populations and their host countries does not represent a unique Western/Muslim conflict. Malaysian’s an example of a Muslim nation prospering in the modern world because it has adapted and adjusted to a globalized economy while holding to its Muslim culture. Therefore, the problem(s) lies not necessarily in a cultural gap because cultures can adapt to each other given willingness of both sides. The problem lies between modernity and fundamentalist Islam and the threat that modernity and globalization pose to Islamic fundamentalists. Thus, the Muslim world can no longer rely on the cultural crutch to further justify their anger toward the West. (Carafano & Rsenzweig, 2005: 18).
The United States, unlike Europe, has continued to play a central role in the Arab world.
During the Cold War, the United States' interest in the region lay chiefly in countering the
growing Soviet influence, such as in Egypt and Syria. Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. troops
38
have appeared occasionally in the region, either as part of joint peace missions (as in Lebanon in
1982-83) or to rescue or protect Arab governments from their neighbouring enemies (as in
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in 1990-91). But many in the Arab world -- and in the broader Islamic
world -- have seen these activities as blatant U.S. imperialism. According to this perception, the
United States is simply the successor to the now-defunct French, British, and Soviet empires and
their various Christian predecessors, carrying out yet another infidel effort to dominate the
Islamic world. In a similar development, Lewis (2009) postulated that:
Increasing U.S. involvement in the Middle East led to a series of attacks on U.S. government installations during the 1980s and 1990s. At first, Washington's response to the attacks was to withdraw. After the attacks on the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983 and on the U.S. component of a United Nations mission in Mogadishu in 1993, Washington pulled out its troops, made angry but vague declarations, and then launched missiles into remote and uninhabited places. Even the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, in New York City, brought no serious rejoinder. These responses were seen by many as an expression of fear and weakness rather than moderation, and they encouraged hope among Islamist militants that they would eventually triumph. It was not until 9/11 that Washington felt compelled to respond with force, first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq, which were perceived as the sources of these attacks.
Discussing the United States unilateral policy on the Middle East and its outcome
towards the security challenges in the region, it is pertinent to understand the initial approach if
the U.S prior to the 9/11 catastrophe. In the same vein, emphasis should be made about the
different approaches adopted by the two regimes (Bush and Obama) which controlled
Washington within the period of this study. It is obviously seen that the party ideological tenets
of these two leaders really had an impact on the unilateral use of force by the United States. It
was not surprising when many argued that the decision by the Obama administration to withdraw
American troops from Iraq was too early and will leave the Middle East very fragile and hostility
39
may resume in due course. However, the decision by the Obama administration to go soft on the
region, thereby not committing the U.S marines to areas of great danger has not either
maintained peace within the region.
To understand narratives of confrontation between the West and Muslim peoples, we
must be attentive not only to history and contemporary politics, but also to subtleties of human
psychology and intercultural relations. As analysts of ethnic conflict recognize, members of
communal groups tend to define their identity not only through the affirmation of positive
qualities that are said to be manifest among their group’s members, but also through contrasting
these positive qualities with the putatively inferior traits of out-group members (Cohen, 1985;
Northrup, 1989; Stein, 2001). The issue between the west (united states) and the Middle East has
undoubtedly taken another dimension. This new dimension analysts share divergent view if the
unilateral approaches of the United States have contributed to security in the region or whether is
undermined it. Similarly, many analyst argue that the growing menace of the Islamic State (IS,
aka the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL/ISIS) is a product of the U.S presence in the
Middle East. Some sources allege that operatives for the Islamic State and its antecedents have
benefited from evolving financial and security arrangements with Damascus that started during
the 2003-2011 U.S. military presence in Iraq Katzman (2014). This goes a long to buttress the
fact the United State Unilateral response to security challenges both in Middle East and on
American soil has led to the springing up and sophistication of other splinter terrorist cells. The
precise nature of ISI’s relationship to Al Qaeda leaders from 2006 onward is unclear. In recent
months, Islamic State leaders have stated their view that their group is not and has never been an
offshoot of Al Qaeda, and that, given that they view themselves as a state and a sovereign
political entity, they have given leaders of the Al Qaeda organization deference rather than
40
pledges of obedience Knights (2004). It will not be misleading to argue that the United States led
invasion of Iraq has greatly led to the continuous threat to its citizens, allies and facilities abroad.
In this direction Carafano & Rsenzweig, 2005: 18).captured the message of the IS spokesperson
thusly:
In July 2012, Al Baghdadi warned U.S. leaders that the mujahidin have set out to chase the affiliates of your armies that have fled.... You will see them in your own country, God willing. The war with you has just begun. In January 2014, Al Baghdadi threatened the United States directly, saying, “Know, O defender of the Cross, that a proxy war will not help you in the Levant, just as it will not help you in Iraq. Soon, you will be in direct conflict-God permitting-against your will.
Conclusively, it must be pointed out here that scholars are almost unanimous vis-à-vis the
concern that the unilateral use of force by the United States against the background of the
growing attacks on its citizens and allies is founded and real. The United States undoubtedly has
made tremendous effort to protect its citizens from hostilities especially arising from different
parts of the world, mostly from the Middle East axis. The ‘Bush Doctrine’ which represents the
effort of the United States under President Bush towards its fight to maintain security in the
Middle East and the American state has been met with many criticisms. While others believe that
the present trend in Middle East considering the activities of the Islamic state (IS) is due to the
premature withdrawal of American troops from Iraq, many believe it is as a response of the
initial invasion itself. This notwithstanding, many scholars have thus argued that the use of force
by the United State to curb attacks on its citizens will not ensure security in the middle east
neither will it end hostility toward Americans. Against the backdrop of the United State policy of
preemption, this study strives to join the debate towards ensuring the peaceful co-existence as
well as the security of life and property of Americans both in the Middle East and beyond as
41
argued by scholars like: Boot, (2009); Carafano (2005); Harari,(2005);Lewis,(2009); Levi,(2006)
and Young,(2006). These studies offer a comprehensive debate with informed conclusions on
this issue of lapse security challenges in the Middle East as it affects the United States and its
allies.
3. United States’ Counter Terrorism Policy and the United Nations charter
Obviously, if Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) was the acronym and concept of
choice in the U.S. defense community in the 1990s, so preemption has threatened to supersede it
in the 2000s. The trouble is that officials and many analysts have confused preemption, which is
not controversial, with prevention, which is. It is also very important to reconcile with the fact
that some foreign governments and international institutions appear ready to condemn any
United States military action regardless of the legal arguments that the United States makes.
Even close allies from time to time have disagreed with military actions that the United States
has attempted to justify under the U.N. Charter. The term “rogue nation” has no official
government definition. But as used by prominent politicians, the term generally refers to
tyrannies that lack normal diplomatic relations with the United States and other democracies and
engage in or threaten to engage in international terrorism or aggression. The President and
members of Congress from both parties cite Iran and North Korea as examples of rogue nations.
This has led to the United States government to consistently explore any available option
towards curtailing the perceived capabilities of these ‘rogue nation’. One of the obvious facts
under the legitimacy of the United States policy of preemption draws largely from the United
Nations Charter, hence the arguments ensuing on this ground springs from the stance of the UN
on preemption. Many other writers already have addressed the question of preemptive strikes on
nuclear weapons development facilities. These writers appear to fall into three schools of
42
thought. First, most writers assert that preemptive strikes are not permitted because Article 51
only recognizes a right to use military force in response to an actual “armed attack.”
Accordingly, these writers believe that the United States cannot engage in a preemptive strike
against rogue nations’ nuclear weapons development facilities. Second, some writers believe that
Article 51 permits a nation to use force in response not just to an actual armed attack, but also
when facing an “imminent armed attack.” However, this broader view still would not justify a
preemptive strike unless the United States or its allies faced an immediate threat of attack. Third,
still other writers, including the President, express a different opinion, and argue for an expanded
right of “anticipatory self-defense” that would allow armed attacks, at least against nuclear
weapons development facilities. All these views put into consideration has questioned the legal
justification of the U.S counterterrorism policies. The U.S in an effort to expand and project this
strategy wrote in the NSS (2002) thusly:
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction-weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning.
The NSS 2002 concludes that “the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by
our adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not permit” the option of waiting until an attack already
has occurred. The NSS 2002 therefore endorses the use of preemptive force to prevent threats
from arising. Subsequently, the U.S counterterrorism strategy have been justified by the
government and the controversies surrounding this doctrine arise from the global community
specifically, the UN. The UN Charter is the primary instrument guiding the use of force in
international relations. It provides a codified version of the international community’s
43
condemnation of recourse to war as an instrument of national policy, sentiments which have
existed since the end of the First World War and the implementation of the Kellog-Briand Pact.
The present day prohibition on the use of force arises in Article 2(4) of the Charter, which states
that:
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. (United Nations Charter).
The purposes of the UN are enshrined in Article 1(1) of the Charter, the primary purpose
being to:
Maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace. (United Nations Charter)
These provisions apply equally to both members and non-members of the UN, and
prohibit all recourses to force, whether unilateral acts of aggression or multilateral efforts to
protect human rights or to conduct humanitarian intervention Dinstein (2001: 74).
Notwithstanding these provisions however, there are two exceptions to the general rule against
the use of force. The first of these relates to acts authorized by the UN Security Council. Article
42 of the Charter permits the Council (and by extension UN members) to take any such actions
to maintain and restore international peace and security, where non-forcible measures would, or
have proven to be, inadequate (United Nations Charter). Absent any specific authorization
however, the use of force would be unlawful, and it is not for individual states to determine when
threats to the peace have occurred. The Security Council alone has legal authority to authorize
44
forcible military actions Dinstein (2001: 85). The second exception to the general rule is the use
of force in self-defense. Article 51 of the Charter provides for this exception, stating in part that:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. (United Nations Charter).
It is commonly agreed that the words ‘armed attack’ in Article 51 strictly limit the extent
of self-defense under the Charter, and indicate that the right cannot be justification for pre-
emptive or anticipatory military strikes. Dinstein (2001) for example, has stated that “Article 51
permits self-defense solely when an ‘armed attack’ occurs (2001: 165). This proposition was
similarly supported by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the 1986 Nicaragua v The
United States of America case, where the court stated that ‘the exercise of this right is subject to
the State concerned having been the victim of an armed attack’ (ICJ Reports 1986: 103). The use
of force outside such an instance would therefore be unlawful.
Despite the varying views of authors and scholars on the legality and justifications of the
counterterrorism policies of the United States, this ambiguous subject arose from the
complicated provisions of the UN charter, which has brought scholars on the verge of making
valid arguments in support or against the Bush Doctrine. However, it becomes very logical, any
side of the argument as both school of thought especially the western scholars have always and
consistently made effort to justify the legality of the US actions in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Invariably, many analyst share divergent views on the United States use of force and whether it
is in line with the United Nations charter. This varying argument recently heated up because of
the American invasion of Iraq, which of course twisted the perception and analysis of the legality
45
of the United States justification of it actions in Middle East. Many strategic analyst and scholars
are of the view that the American occupation in Afghanistan was against Al Qeada terrorist
group operating from the country. Notwithstanding how this logical this postulation may appear,
the American Invasion of Iraq eroded and destabilized this fact, hence our argument here is the
legality of the American exploits in the Middle East. There is little doubt that the response to the
tragic events of September 11 has tested accepted understandings of the international law
regarding the use of force. Many would dispute certain of the legal conclusions set forth above
that a terrorist group can mount an ‘armed attack’; that a series of terrorist attacks can be treated
as a single ongoing attack; or that the United States were justified in forcibly crossing into
Afghan territory on October 7, 2001. Indeed, this dimension has concluded that use of force
directly against the Taliban is difficult to fit within traditional understandings of attribution of an
armed attack, but the contention that exists within this framework of UN and the US suggest that
the action of the US is either legal or illegal.
Such unease has led some to pronounce the traditional normative system dead in fact, if
not in law. For instance, Glennon, (2002: 539) has opined that:
The rules concerning the use of force are no longer regarded as obligatory by states. Between 1945 and 1999, two thirds of the Counter-Terrorism and the Use of Force in International Law members of the United Nations, 126 states out of 189 fought 291 interstate conflicts in which over 22 million people were killed. This series of conflicts was capped by the Kosovo campaign in which nineteen NATO Democracies representing 780 million people flagrantly violated the Charter. The international system has come to subsist in a parallel universe of two systems, one de jure, and the other de facto. The de jure system consists of illusory rules that would govern the use of force among states in a platonic world of forms, a world that does not exist. The de facto system consists of actual state practice in a real world, a world in which states weigh costs against benefits in regular disregard of the
46
rules solemnly proclaimed in the all but ignored de jure system. The decaying de jure catechism is overly schematized and scholastic, disconnected from state behavior, and unrealistic in its aspirations for state conduct. The upshot is that the Charter use of force regime has all but collapsed . . . I suggest that Article 51, as authoritatively interpreted by the International Court of Justice, cannot guide responsible U.S. policy makers in the U.S. war against terrorism in Afghanistan or elsewhere
Thus Glennon (2002) argues that the use of Force in international law has completely
collapsed but this does not prove the legality of the action. It is the constant abuse if these law
that endangers it to near or complete collapse. Similarly, the face off between the international
community and the United States as regards to its counterterrorism principles have affected the
united state foreign policy especially when brought a par with other states. The constant
ambiguity of the US in the international community have also led to many questioning the
supremacy of the United nation in policing the world as America has constantly from time to
time decide which doctrine to obey and which to violate. The damage created by the US invasion
of Iraq in 2003, and the problematic subsequent occupation has had a significant impact of the
future of foreign policy. Its unpopularity has created an “Iraq syndrome”, drawing a parallel to
the impact that Vietnam had on future US foreign policy (Mueller, 2005). However, significantly
Graubard (2009) highlights that it is an exaggeration that no other time has been more dangerous
than the present, as Bush junior claimed. Rather the impact of the Iraq war on US foreign policy
has led to revert to realism which fits into the ongoing waves which usually occur in US foreign
policy (Hunt 1987). Lieven (2008) argues that as a result of the United Nations charter and US
policy involved with Iraq and Afghanistan, the US will now be more cautious when it comes to
radical actions or especially intervention. However, he specifically argues that this does not
mean that it will learn from past mistakes, but rather it will “drift” (Lieven 2008:434) until a
47
major crisis occur that demands action. Mueller (2004) supports this by noting that after
Vietnam, congress `reduced the ability of the White House to go on even modest anti communist
ventures, with the exception of Latin America. This highlights a shift back to realism.
Mueller (2005) argues that the next president will portray himself as stark contrast from
the Bush administration, more specifically a distinction away from the Bush doctrine. This
means moving away from unilateralism, pre-emption and preventive war. Indeed the Bush
doctrine which underpinned the invasion of Iraq created damage in relations between the US and
the international community. Graubard (2009) argues that the US will now have to use the
international forum for it to deal with other threats such as Iran. This means to deal with threats
collectively with allies using economic and political pressure. Again this shows a clear move
away from neoconservatives to re-establish the US’s international position. In a similar
development, Beard (2002:18) went further to opine that:
The case for Americans forcible response to the September 11 attacks as being fully consistent with the inherent right of self defense under customary international law and Article 51 of the UN Charter is very strong. The unanimous condemnation of the attacks by the UN General Assembly, the affirmation of the right of self defense by the Security Council, the growing consensus in the international community to hold states accountable for terrorist actions, and the repeated condemnation by the Security Council of the Taliban Regimes support of terrorists in particular, clearly help establish an appropriate framework under international law for the exercise of self defense by the United States
This argument can undoubtedly go on and on with different individuals viewing the
legality of the United States counter terrorism measures as legal and conforming to the articles of
the United Nation Charters. This study thus, based on the extant literature reviewed subscribe to
the ongoing debate that the United States counterterrorism policies is not in accord with the
48
International community as other states may as well tow this line thereby making the
international polity anarchical. The United States under NATO invaded the Afghanistan; this
was not the same circumstance as the event of Iraq has shown. The NATO charter invariably
allows for collective effort among the nineteen (19) nation member states in what that can be
best described as ‘injury to one, injury to all’. Consequently, the Article 42 of the UN charter
(1945:10) clearly states that:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.
The provision of the article 42 as stated above is making reference to the previous article
i.e. article 41 of the charter which specifies the grounds at which the United Nations will provide
arm contingent to or for any state or region whom its peace and security is troubled. Going by
this, it holds that the UN as the harbinger of peace already has arrangements to address any
attack or threat arising from any part of the world. Invariably, the same UN Charter adjourned
states to defend itself and citizens from any external aggression such as terrorist attacks. This is
the root of the debate as this study strives to fill in the gap by joining the debate on the provisions
of the United Nations towards peaceful coexistence between states and another. Similarly, the
North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) special press release 124 (2001) specifically states that:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the
49
other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
Based on the foregoing, this review seeks to evaluate the place of the legality of the
United State policies of preemption, unilateralism, and militarism as it relates to the doctrines of
international law. These divergent views we showcased in the works of some contemporary
authors such as: Distin (2007), Glenon (2001) and in some official documents such as the UN
Charter, NATO special release, etc.
Gap in Literature
In both the struggle to maintain its hegemony in the Middle East and the entire globe by
America, many available literature demonstrate a reliance on the United State Policy of
Preemption vis-à-vis security in the Middle East. However, the snowballing spate of worrisome
security threats in the Middle East under globalization logically puts a question mark on the
adequacy of aforementioned policy vis-à-vis the invasion of suspected Middle East states and the
unilateral use of use. Previous researchers, to us appear to have relied on or trusted the two
majors, though with modifications.
Evidently, no researcher within the bracket of those encountered by the researcher, saw
the need of subjecting the two majors adequacy or otherwise to scrutiny or empirical verification.
The imperative of avoiding the pitfalls of an unverified reliance on or trust in previous
researches, partly informed the reason d’être of this study. Thus we decided to fill this gap in
literature by going further to subject the adequacy or otherwise of the American invasion and the
unilateral use of force in Middle east to scrutiny especially now that the security in Middle East
have taken a new dimension. Hence, this study was also stretched to analyze legality of the
counterterrorism policies of the United States.
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY
The study like any academic research is guided by a methodology which according
to Manion (1980) is the specific technique and objective procedure employed in carrying out
scientific investigations. According to Kaplan (1964:18) cited in Ogban-Iyam (1998)
methodology is regarded as techniques and the scientific procedures used in a given science or in
particular context of inquiry in that science. It deals with the problem, prospects, assets and
liabilities of techniques. However, the methodology for this study contains; the theoretical frame,
hypotheses, research design, method of data collection, method of data analysis and logical data
framework
3.1 Theoretical Framework
International Relations as a field of study have traditionally focused on the activities
of state actors in the international system. However contemporary opus tends to suggest a shift
from the state actors to also reckon with other actors who are these days given prominence in
functions, reckoning and discourses. The shift does not, however, relegate the state actors to the
inconsequential background in the scheme of things. All actors in the system are primarily
citizens of one state or the other. There, in fact, remains the traditional status of the state actors
even in the face of a forceful drive by other actors to displace and replace it vis-à-vis relevance.
These other actors are state-based, thus pointing out the indispensability of the state in the
international system. The foregoing state-centric bent or thrust explains why most theories of
International Relations are state-centric even in the face of the sweeping or eroding effects of
globalization on the dominant features of the state. Thus, we see other actors competing
effectively with the nation-state for relevance in the charged international system.
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A clear appraisal of the issues discernible in Middle East security, which has attained a
critical mass in nuclear renaissance points to the quest for power, leverage and dominance. It
points to the issues of deterrence, national interest and coercive diplomacy since the quest for
power especially in the nuclear age remains derivative in nature. Under the contemporary
international system overtaken tremendously by globalization, anarchy as the scholars of the
realist school of thought asserted as the dominant feature of the international system prevails
rather more profoundly. This anarchic situation is only taken to the hilt by the advance and gains
of contemporary international terrorism which as asymmetrical warfare is informed principally
by realist school of thought. Strategies are currently concerned by the threat of the security
situation in the Middle East as this threat hinges on the capabilities of these groups going
nuclear. This worry or concern is founded especially if the aforementioned issues of nuclear
proliferation and international terrorism are not checked or contained by preemption for the time-
tested reason that every contemporary technology has always affected or determined how
warfare is conducted.
Thus, the theory adopted for this investigation is the theory of power politics from the
realist perspective. This decision is based on the informed assumption that it is best equipped to
aid in the explanation and understanding of the totality of factors and issues involved in this
discourse. Thus, the aforementioned theory have the deconstruction of the present as its raison
d’être. It is only after disentangling the tricky loops of the cord of global politics by this theory
that one could in any sustainable sense of the word point the way to the indispensable future.
The theory of power politics from the realist perspective constitutes the staple of the tools
of analysis of global politics. Proponents of this theory are classified as realists. They fall into
two groups of the traditional realists and the neo-realists who in spite of their myriad points of
52
divergence still share convergence which on analysis outstrips the divergence. Backed by
scholars such as Nicolo Machieveli, E. H Carr, Henry Kissinger, Hans Morgenthau, Martin
Wright, Thomas Hobbes and Karl Deutsch, all of the early or traditional realist school, the theory
of power politics has the distinction of affinity to all political theories mainly because politics
tend to be appraised mainly through the prism of power. The neo-realists also view politics
theoretically through the power prism as the traditional realists. The modifications discernible in
their portrayal of the theory of power represent the input of the very circumstances that moderate
their appraisal. The neo-realist worldview is made manifest in the input of such scholars as
Fareed Zakaria, Richard Little, Charles Jones, Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Krasner, Barry Buzan
Robert Gilpin, among others. The realist tends could be discerned, for example, in the works of
Carr (1939), Morgenthau (19766), and Waltz (1979) among others.
The theory of power politics has remained a very important tool for the conceptualization
and understanding of the plethora of intricacies in international relations and politics. Power
remains the indispensable tool of choice at the disposal of actors in the international system. It
remains the determinant and purveyor of rights, privileges, and dominance. This explains the
attendant resilience manifested in its pursuit, acquisition, and ultimate application. The quest by
terrorist groups and some ‘Rogue States’ to go nuclear represents a quest for political power as
leveraged by technological quantum leap and the attendant grandeur and deterrence capability it
is bound to bestow on the beneficiary. Stephen M. Walt, a noted American realist, identified two
basic criteria to judge any theory: (a) the explanatory powers of a theory to account for any
developments within its field, and (b) the theory’s internal fertility (Walt, 2002: 202). While the
first criterion is about the powers of a theory to explain events happening in the real world, the
second criterion is concerned with the ability of the theory to refine and expand itself to cover
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the range of phenomena that fall within its theoretical grip. Put together, the two theoretical
criteria are all about how powerfully a theory can provide explanations to anomalies or critical
objections that might arise from time to time and whether a theory would be in a position to
repair itself to address the anomalies and critical objections. Judged against these two criteria,
realist theories, Walt opines, remain important and quite powerful to cover most developments in
international politics. Hence this justifies the adoption of the realist theory of power politics as a
political microscope through which we can view and analyze many variables in this study,
especially the United States relation and hegemonic stance in the Middle East. However, just as
every theory, the realist power theory has some fierce critiques labelled against it after the
disintegration of the Cold War and the resultant transition from a bipolar to a unipolar world. A
group of scholars (for example, Kegley, 1993, 1995; Lebow, 1994; Koslowski and Kratochwil,
1994; Rosecrance and Stein, 1993; and Vasquez, 1997), at the end of the long persisting Cold
War by the early 1990s and in the absence of a strong rival to America, questioned the basic
premises of the realist theories and found them irrelevant to explain developments in the post-
Cold War world. The academic obituaries to realist theories were soon rejected by many realist
theorists. Walt(2002), for example, persuasively argues that despite the collapse of the Cold war
structures in East – West relations, realist theories would still remain valid to explain the feelings
of insecurity of states and their responses to changes in the distribution of powers in the
international system. This is exactly because states assess their positions vis-à-vis their rivals and
attempt at enhancing power at the cost of actual or potential rivals. The inability of states to
engage in extensive collaboration to produce mutual gains brings home the point that military
force remains a fact of international political life. The struggle for survival through the
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enhancement of power positions vis-à-vis rivals is a well-calculated rational game and would
continue indefinitely (Walt, 2002: 198).
Admittedly, the range of explanatory powers of the realist theories remain quite strong to
account for issues in power politics involving great and major powers. Traditionally, the issues
of war, peace and conflict have been the exclusive focus of the realist theories of international
relations. Originally articulated by Thucydides, Thomas Hobbes, E.H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau
and subsequently further modified and enriched by Kenneth Waltz (1979), the realist theories of
international relations depict a gloomy picture of international system as anarchic, treats nation-
states as the primary constituent units in that system and promotes the view that states are
fundamentally engaged in the struggle for survival through maximization of power. The
existence of numerous states in the anarchic international system renders an acute problem of
insecurity for each one of them and thus encourages a constant competition for power,
particularly between the major and great powers. International relations thus viewed as a self-
help system where every state must strive to ensure its own security and survival. If one state
emerges as the most powerful at any given time, other major and great powers would tend to
counter that powerful state by forming a counterbalance of power. Many scholars of the realist
camp (particularly Buzan, Jones, and Little, 1993) accuse Waltz of being immune to change in
the international system; the liberal scholars find his emphasis on anarchy and systemic
determinants historically inaccurate (Ruggie, 1983; Schroeder 1994) while the post structuralists
interpret his theory as an attempt to legitimate a dangerous discourse of power politics (for
example, Ashley, 1984). The criticisms have encouraged many other realist scholars to further
improve and build on Waltz’s theory of structural realism or simply neo-realism. Stephen Walt
(2002: 204) classifies and characterizes the new generation of structuralist or neo-realist scholars
55
into two broad camps – the defensive realists and the offensive realists. Despite the varying
contending issues, critics and divergent issues revolving round the realist power theory,
Nuruzzaman (2005:8) summarizes the basic tenets of the realist power approach as thus:
o Anarchy is an autonomous force of the international system and
war is a constant possibility in anarchic conditions;
o Great and major powers always suspect each other’s intentions
and are deeply engaged in endless competition for power to
improve their relative power positions and thus ensure survival;
o Unequal distribution of powers in the international system
contributes to an unstable international order. Systemic inequality
in power distribution may encourage great powers to undertake
aggressive and costly wars to strengthen their positions vis-à-vis
their perceived or real rivals.
It is based on the above mentioned tenets and point of agreement from the realist
perspective of power theory that we are anchoring our analysis of the United States Policy of
Preemption and security in the Middle East 1999-2014.
Application of Theory
Most international relations scholars and commentators share the view that the
international security environment has undergone qualitative changes in the post-September 11,
2001 attack on New York and Washington, D.C. Shortly after the attack, President George W.
Bush delivered his Sate of the Union speech and declared a war on terror. This was a new kind of
war aimed at defeating terror and getting the world rid of fear for good. The President
emphatically said:
Great harm has been done to us. …….. Freedom and fear are at war. The advance of human freedom – the great achievement of our time, and the great hope of every time – now depends on us. Our nation – this generation – will lift a dark threat of violence from our people and our future. We will rally the world to this cause by our efforts, by our courage. We will not tire, we will not falter, and
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we will not fail….. The course of this conflict is not known, yet its outcome is certain. Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them (Bush, 2001: 27).
The war on terror primarily meant a major war to dismantle the organizational networks
of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and deny the Qaeda leadership any foothold elsewhere. The rationale
of the war on terror was outlined in a militarily very significant document- The National Security
Strategy of the United States of America- issued in September 2002. This document, which is
also known as the Bush Doctrine, is, in reality, a compilation of President Bush’s different
speeches delivered after the catastrophic attack. Chapter V: “Prevent Our Enemies from
Threatening Us, Our Allies and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction” outlines the
Bush Administration’s use of force approach and policy. It defines threat as the combination of
“radicalism and technology”. In the words of President Bush:
The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology, when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons (National Security Strategy, 2002:13).
The adoption and application of power politics theory from the realist perspective
basically remains the best workable theory in understanding the United States Policy of
preemption. The American invasion of Afghanistan preceded the invasion of Iraq; this
undoubtedly portrayed the fact that the US will always use the last resort to maintain the
Unipolarity it achieved at the end of cold war. The official U.S. policy was to remove Saddam
Hussein and his regime from power. After September 11, U.S. focus was first and foremost to
secure the physical well -being of the American people. Since Iraq was believed to possess
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WMD, the removal of these became the top priority for the U.S. government. By and large, the
United States was operating with two simultaneous goals: the elimination of both the (alleged)
WMD and the Iraqi Regime.
Saddam Hussein’s goals can be summarized as follows. According to realist theory the
survival of Iraq as a power in the Middle East was of utmost importance. This entailed securing
the regime and handling regional threats. But Saddam Hussein also wanted to rise to the status of
a modern Saladin, which could be achieved by successfully standing his ground against the
‘crusader states’. A confrontation with the U.S. could be described as a double-edged sword. If
the U.S. was ‘hard line,’ Saddam risked being ousted from power by following his policy of
showing WMD-ambiguity. For the Iraqi leader, however, there were real dividends to be gained
by letting his enemies believe he possessed WMD. And if the U.S .was a mere ‘paper tiger’
Saddam could achieve becoming the undisputed leading figure of the Arab world by not giving
in to the crusaders, thereby becoming the major power in the middle east which pivotal to
America. This was a clear fight of power of how will dominate the political landscape of the
region.
The five veto-wielding members of the United Nations’ Security Council are so
principally because of their nuclear capability. Thus it is on record that the five actors use
nuclear capability as a bullying tool to cow members of the United Nations in the Non Nuclear
War State (NNWS) category. Members of the NNWS have also come to appreciate the leverage
bestowed on the NWS in global politics; hence many of them are on the march to acquire nuclear
capability under myriad guises to the discomfiture and resentment of the NWS who are alert to
the strategic implication of the realization of such a prospective balance of terror. This balance of
terror, if attained, stands to alter tremendously the contemporary global strategic equation. The
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nations in the NNWS are bound to exercise their sovereignty to the hilt given that nuclear powers
do not fight each other except by proxy. On the flipside, the NWS would respect the sovereignty
of the NNWS as dictated by realpolitik. The United States, for example, would not have invaded
Grenada (1983), Panama (1989), Haiti (1994), Afghanistan (2001), and Iraq (2003), were those
nation-states nuclear powers. This explains why the United States did all it could to distort the
nuclear ambition of Iraq, to maintain the balance of power as prescribed by the power theory.
Furthermore, actors are much aware of the important of power especially the debilitating
strives of Middle Eastern States, which consistently believe that the only way to equate the west
is to deter them with nuclear capabilities. Based on the contemporary world order, any nation
that becomes nuclear capable has invariably elevated itself as a nation to reckon with. Scholars
have also articulated this notion as valid in many opus, past and contemporary. Oyebola
(1976:177-118), for instance, sees nuclear capability as the ultimate bestower of power, clout and
influence and warns vis-à-vis Nigeria that:
Another important step Nigeria must take if she is not to betray the black race is to become an atomic power as soon as possible. If France and India had been so desperate in becoming one. For one thing, our need is greater than that of France and India. For another, with our explosion of nuclear bombs, especially if we explode ours before South Africa does it, Nigeria would put the black race everywhere on the threshold of a new era. We would also frighten South Africa more than our military strength today frightens her and her allies. And Nigeria is in a strong position to become a nuclear power. We have the money and we have Nigerians with a touch of genius. With the acquisition of atomic power, Nigeria will also record other spectacular achievement in science and technology and destroy the sad fact that it is only the black race that has not joined the atomic power club. The Mongolian race joined through the Chinese and lately the Indian atomic explosions. It may be argued that Nigerians are so poorly fed, poorly clothed and poorly housed that it would be unwise to divert our resources to nuclear experiments; I believe it is a serious mistake to under-extricate the importance of nuclear capabilities to Nigeria. It would give Africa and the black race a new identity. It would also give us a leap forward.
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The security challenges in the Middle East and the place of the United States is basically
informed by the imperative of that leap forward expressed in the acquisition of nuclear status
with the attendant power. Thus, it suffices to recall here the elation inherent in nuclear capability.
The Chinese tested their first nuclear bomb on October 14, 1964. Marshall Nie Jung – Chan, the
overall head of Chinese atomic weapon development, told 353 scientists from 43 countries of the
world in Peking (Beijing) in 1964: “Modern science, is no longer the monopoly of Western
countries” (Oyebola, 1976:118). Thus, the Libyan leader, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi concurs
that, as Libyans, years before giving up his programme “we should be like the Chinese – poor
and riding donkeys, but respected and possessing an atomic bomb” (Manning, 1998:75).
Furthermore, on a more worrisome note, terrorists are bent on going nuclear with a view
to acquiring the power and grandeur thereof. The prospect of terrorist acquisition of WMDs has
been a worrisome subject of concern especially among strategists, scholars and policymakers.
The leader of AI Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, in an apparent faux pas admitted what many have
always feared but wished away. Asked by an expert, in an exclusive interview purportedly
conducted in one of his caves in Afghanistan in 1998 about reports that he was trying to acquire
nuclear and chemical weapons he replied: “if I seek to acquire these weapons, I am carrying out
a duty. It would be a sin for Muslims not to try to possess the weapons that would prevent the
infidels from inflicting harm on Muslims (Time, October 15, 2001:49)”.
Discernible in the foregoing is the fact that power determines everything. International
terrorism is perpetrated by actors desirous of acquiring power for the purpose it is bound to
bestow on them. The enviable purpose of being in control of affairs, many experts opine is the
struggle for power, and I think rightly so, that power determines trends among actors in the
international system and the opposite. These experts are mainly the realists who view power as a
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dominant tool for the analysis of relations between two or among multiple actors. Since power
remains preponderant in all spheres of political evaluation, suffice it to add that the canvass is
now enlarged to factor in more actors – MNCs, terrorists, NGOs, eminent personalities – other
than the hitherto dominant nation-state. The crux of the power theory by realists is that so long as
states exist in an international system that is anarchy – ridden, these states as actors in the
volatile system ought to use their power exhibited in terms of force to assert themselves and sort
out their problems. Hence, according to Deutsch (1978), power is that ability to prevail in
conflict and to overcome obstacles. Schuman (1969) views power through the same prism as the
ability to win friends and influence, to evoke sympathy to command obedience, to employ
effectively all the devices of coercion, propaganda, and material indulgence and deprivation
likely to induce respect and co-operation.
Morgenthau (2006) defines it as man’s control over the minds and actions of others. The
foregoing views buttress the realist’s conviction to the effect that the determinant of the modus
operandi and by extension the modus Vivendi vis-à-vis an actor’s relation with another or others
in the international system is force. This is more so especially when push comes to shove as it
want to in any system as chaotic and anarchic as the international system. The conviction that
might is right informs this; hence a more powerful actor with the requisite good measure of
dominant capability or force could with relative ease exert co-operation, respect and compliance
from one or others with the antidotes of deterrence.
Furthermore, Hans Morgenthau cited in Echezona (1993) sees power through his own
prism, though ending up propagating the same point of view as others. Freedom, prosperity,
security and power itself may constitute the sought issues of statesmen and peoples. Their
objective could be appraised via the philosophical, economic, religious or social parameter or
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scale of evaluation. Whatever these objectives are, they could only be realized by the acquisition
and possession of power; hence the frantic pursuit of power. Among actors in the international
system the most indispensible factor is military power and domination of others by the wielder.
This, for example, explains why the US has troops deployed on all the continents, and fleets on
all the oceans of the world as shown in Table 1.1 below:
Table 3.1: Location of U.S. military forces, September 2008
Region Personnel Distribution of forces abroad
United states 1, 100, 000 -
Western Europe 94, 500 24%
Japan/Pacific 75, 000 19%
Russia/Eastern Europe 2, 200 1%
Middle east 212, 500 55%
Latin America 2, 000 1%
Africa 1, 700 0%
Total Abroad 388, 000 100%
Source: US Department of Defence as cited in Goldstein, Joshua S. and Pevehouse, Jon C.
(2008) International Relations, New York: Pearson Longman
Finally, we conclude with the power theory from the realist perspective by pointing out
that the power theory is a framework of analysis suffices for the binary issues of my discourse -
united state policy of preemption and security in the Middle East. In the case of nuclear
terrorism, one can empirically proffer or volunteer that international terrorism is partly informed
by a turf war characterized by a bitter struggle for power among actors with grudges seeking
clout, turf, and dominance in the international system. Power can explain but not excuse
terrorism though it is a type of warfare-asymmetrical. This blacklisting is shown when alleged
and actual practitioners of terrorism are apprehended and treated as common criminals.
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Otherwise, the Geneva Convention on conduct of warfare would have designated captured
terrorists as Prisoners of War (POWs). The terrorists have the Machiavellian philosophy at the
back of their minds since they believe in not only that might is right but more importantly that
the end justifies the means. In terrorism, all actions possess one form of political objective or the
other. Since politics is power-centric in definition and application, it thus suffices to evaluate the
American-Middle East relation using the power theory as a tool of evaluation.
3.2 Hypotheses
Using empirical data and qualitative analysis, this study will test the following hypotheses:
1. The invasion of suspected “axis of evil” in the Middle East states by the United States has
not reduced incidence of insecurity in the region.
2. The unilateral use of force by the United States has not reduced attacks on America, and
her allies in the Middle East
3. The United States counter terrorism policy is in accord with the provisions of the United
Nations charter.
3.3 Research Design
A research design can be viewed as a plan that assists the researcher in his collection,
analysis and interpretation of observations. Research design constitutes a logical method of proof
that permits the researcher to draw inferences concerning causal relations among variables under
investigation. It conceptualizes the domain of generalization. This denotes whether the obtained
interpretation can be scientifically supplied to a larger population in a different circumstance
(McNabb, 2005). It is not, however, lost on us that “…the research design must be flexible
enough to permit the consideration of many different aspects of a phenomenon.” Hence, we have
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accordingly broadened the scope and thrust of this research to accommodate all views and
opinions related to the subject of discourse.
Since this research in typology falls into the qualitative and non-experimental, the
method adopted for this study is the explanatory research method with emphasis on document
analysis based on the single case ex-post fact design. (Cassel and Symon, 1997; Strauss and
Corbin, 1998; Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; Lee, 1999; Marshall and Rossman, 1999). In this
chosen explanatory method “…data are coded, placed in some intelligent order, interpreted, and
used for explaining and/or predicting future interrelationships in similar circumstances”
(McNabb, 2005:105).
Essentially, the research design creates the foundation of the entire research work. Hence,
research design is a comprehensive plan for data collection in an empirical research project; this
specifies how data should be collected and analysed. It is the structuring of investigation aimed
at identifying variables and their relationships to one another (Asika, 1991:27). In other words, it
is an outline or a scheme that serves as a useful to the research in his effort to generate data for
any study. It is used for obtaining data to enable a researcher test / prove hypotheses or answer
research questions. This study is based on a single-case ex-post-facto analysis of documentary
evidences because it is basically qualitative and non –experimental. Ex-post-facto (otherwise
known as after the-fact) research design is based on the examination of the independent and
dependent variables after the events have taken place and data already in existence. In this
design, the test of hypotheses involves observing the independent and dependent variables at the
same time because the effect of the former on the later has already taken place before the
investigation.
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According to Kerlinger (1977) defines the ex-post-facto design as a form of descriptive
research in which an independent variable has already occurred and in which an investigators
start with the observation of a dependent variable, then studies the independent variable in
retrospect for its possible relationship to cause and effect on the dependent variable.
Furthermore, Cohen & Manion (1980) notes that the phrase ex-post-facto mean after the fact or
retrospectively, and refers to those studies which investigate possible cause and effect
relationship by observing an existing condition and searching back in time for plausible casual
factors. The single-case facto design assumes the form of an experimental design where an
existing case is observed for some time in order to study or evaluate it. The single-case design
can be symbolically represented thus:
X
Where:
= Random assignment of subjects
= Before observation
= After observation
= Independent variable
= Dependent variable
The analytical routine involved in testing structural causality based on the single case ex-
post-facto analysis of the independent variable (X) and the dependent variable (Y) is based on
R B1 B2 B3 A1 A2 A3
B
X
Y
R
A
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concomitant variation. This is to demonstrate that (X) is the factor that determines (Y). This
implies that whenever (X) occurs, there is likelihood that (Y) will follow at some point later. The
criteria for inferring causality have been summarized by Selltiz et al (1974) as follows:
Co-variation between the pressured and presumed effect;
Proper time order, with the cause preceding the effect; and
Elimination of plausible alternative explanations for the observed relationship
In testing the hypotheses, independent variables (X) have concomitant effects on dependent
variables (Y). The empirical referents of (X) and (Y) are stated in the logical data framework.
The explanatory analytical method based on the single case ex-post facto design adopted in the
testing of the hypothetical inductions in this study is premised on the relative variation of
independent variable (X) and the dependent variable (Y). This logically shows that the united
state policy of preemption (X) is a factor that determines the outcome of security in the Middle
East (Y).
3.4 Methods of Data Collection
This research typology falls into the qualitative and non-experimental (Schwandt, 1997;
Patton, 1980; Miles and Huberman, 1984; Devine, 2002; Berg, 1998). The method of data
collection adopted and applied here is the qualitative method of data collection. This explains our
use of the observation method. This is simply the study of documented evidence with a view to
discovering the various data and information relevant to our discourse. It is a content analysis of
available literature relevant and applicable to the study (Peil, 1982; Obasi, 1999). Thus the
researcher relies on material from books, newspapers, journals, special publications, documents
and electronic media files such as the internet which avails one of the information first hand.
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This thrust logically makes this work scientific as required by our field of study. This is so
because by the application of reliable published documents to research, generalization based on
them most often are reliable and empirical and accepted as a given because more than one person
authorize them.
3.5 Methods of Data Analysis
This study adopted the explanatory qualitative method of data analysis. The qualitative
method of data analysis is concerned with identifying and understanding the attributes, basic
tenets and traits of the phenomenon under investigation. This method of data analysis according
to Asika (1991) has to do with the verbal summary of the information generated in research, so
that appropriate analytical method can be used to further discover relationships among variables
and is very relevant to our study given the nature of the phenomenon under investigation. In this
case, it studies cause and effect relationships by observing an existing condition and searching
back in time for plausible casual factors (Obasi, 1999).
This method is mainly associated with textual and contextual analysis of already existing
information on the phenomenon being investigated. It involves the presentation, reading,
prognosis, analysis, critique and elaborate discussion of relevant information gathered from the
different categories of sources, from which conclusion can be drawn (fraser,2004). Therefore, the
use of this method of analysis is informed by the simplicity with which it can summarize, expose
and interpret relationship implicit in a given data by giving a qualitative description of the
variables under study. This method is used in this study to examine, criticize, make prognosis,
analyze, and make inferences concerning United State policy of Preemption and Security in the
Middle 1999-2014.
67
Table 3:2 Logical Data Framework
Research question Hypothesis Variables Main indicators Data sources Method of
data
collection
Method of
analysis
Has the invasion of suspect axis of evil in the Middle East by the United States reduced incidence of insecurity in the region?
The invasion of suspected “axis of evil” in the Middle East states by the United States has not reduced incidence of insecurity in the region.
(X)
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE The invasion of suspected middle east states by the united states.
• The invasion of Afghanistan by US. Over 350 thousand American Troops were deployed in the invasion of Afghanistan from 2002-2012 (theGuardian UK, 2012).
• The invasion of Iraqi by US. Over 350 thousand American troops were deployed in the invasion of Iraqi from 2003-2012 (Nordhaus, 2013).
• Books and journal publication;
• Official documents;
• Conference proceeding;
• Internet sources
Qualitative method and field research
Single case ex-post-facto design; power politics theory from the realist perspective; Qualitative explanatory analysis; logical inductive inference.
(Y)
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE
Reduced incidence of insecurity in the region.
• The rise of conflicts in the Middle East such as ISIL insurgency in Iraqi and Syria after the post-US Iraqi invasion and The insurgency of Taliban in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of American troops (CNN, 2013).
• The increase in the spate of terrorism attacks. Since the pullout of American in December 2011 in Iraq 12, 653 deaths have been recorded in terrorists related bombings/killings. (Iraqi Body Count, 2013). Taliban launched 525 terrorist attacks that killed 1,842 people in Afghanistan (CNN, 2013).
• Books and journal publication;
• Official documents;
• Conference proceedings;
• Internet sources.
Qualitative method and field research
Single case ex-post-facto design; power politics from the realist perspective theories; Qualitative explanatory analysis; logical inductive inference.
68
Research
Question
Hypothesis Variables Main Indicators Data Sources Method of
Data
Collection
Method of
Analysis
Has the unilateral use of force by the United States reduced attacks on America, and its allies in the Middle East?
The unilateral use of force by the United States reduced attacks on America, and its allies in the Middle East
(X)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE Unilateral use of force by the united states.
• The use of drones strikes in the Middle East by the US to bomb targeted terrorists and their strongholds.
• Decapitation of terrorist in the middle East by US troops, such as Osama Bin Laden in 2011.
• Books and journal publications
• Official documents;
• Conference proceedings;
• Internet sources
Qualitative method and field research
Single case ex-post-facto design; power politics theory from the realist perspective theories; Qualitative explanatory analysis; logical inductive inference.
(Y)
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE Attacks on America and her allies in the middle east.
• The radicalization of civilians in the Middle East to take up arms and engage in art of terrorism or even participate in armed conflicts.
• Attacks on American allies in the Middle East such as the control of some key towns in Iraqi by ISIL like Mosul and Anbar. Constant fighting of the Afghanistan government by the talibans
• Books and journal publications;
• Official documents;
• Conference proceedings;
• Internet sources
Qualitative method and field research
Single case ex-post-facto design; power politics from the realist perspective theories; Qualitative explanatory analysis; logical inductive inference..
69
Research
question
Hypothesis Variables Main indicators Data sources Method of
data
collection
Method of
analysis
Does the United States counter terrorism policy in accord with the provisions of the United Nations charter?
The United States counter terrorism policy is in accord with the provisions of the United Nations charter.
(X)
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE Counter terrorism policy of the United States.
• Unilateral policy such as the use of Drone Strikes in the middle east
• Preemption policy of invading suspected enemy state
• Military policy of illegal detaining and killing of suspected terrorists in the Middle East.
• Books and journal publications;
• Official documents;
• Conference proceedings;
• Internet sources
Qualitative method and field research
Single case ex-post-facto design; power politics theory from the realist perspective. Qualitative explanatory analysis; logical inductive inference.
(Y)
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE
Provisions of the United Nations Charter.
• The threat or the use of force against a state by another state in article 2(4) of the UN charter
• The use of preemptive actions by the US is a violation of the article 41 and 42 of the UN charter (Cohn, 2002).
• Illegal detaining and killing of suspected terrorist is against international human rights laws such as Article 3 of UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (2014).
.
• Books and journal publications;
• Official documents;
• Conference proceedings;
• Internet sources.
Qualitative method and field research.
Single case x-post-facto design; power politics theory from the realist perspective; qualitative explanatory analysis, logical inductive inference.
70
CHAPTER FOUR
INVASION OF SUSPECTED ‘AXIS OF EVIL’ AND INCIDENCE OF INSECURITY IN
THE MIDDLE EAST
In order to interrogate our first hypothesis which is that ‘Invasion of suspected ‘axis of evil’
in the Middle East by the United States reduced incidence of insecurity in the region’, a number
of empirical indicators were identified and the indicators were selected from X and Y variables
of the hypothesis, and as stated in the logical data framework.
4.1. The Afghanistan Invasion and the Rise of Conflict in the Middle East.
Categorically speaking, the US led invasion of Afghanistan has undoubtedly tensed up the
security situation in the entire Middle East and Arab world which spans through most states in
Northern Africa. The bane of the US occupation in most Middle East states can be traced to the
terrorist attacks targeted at the west such as the United States embassy bombing in Libya, the
attack on the USS Cole, and famous 9/11 attack . This brought to the limelight the capability and
extent these terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda could go in inflicting damage and attacking the
west, United States precisely. Thirteen years ago, the events of 11 September 2001 threw two
global cultures together in the most dramatic way possible. The United States led the
international community’s response, launching extensive military operations in Afghanistan. Yet,
Afghanistan represented a window of opportunity for the international community to
successfully collaborate in a powerful and far-reaching manner with an Islamic state. Its stated
commitment to removing the perpetrators of terrorism in Afghanistan generated a largely
enthusiastic welcome from the Afghan people, providing the international community with an
excellent chance to address the real and immediate needs of Afghans. In turn, this could have
71
positively influenced the perceptions of the global Islamic community, opening a window for
further collaboration to address the root causes of extremism. According to Halliday (2002:88).
There is a growing perception among Afghans that the presence of the US led international community in their country is part of a broader, global war against Islam. They accuse the international community of looking for revenge because of 9/11. This vision is relayed with success by Taliban propaganda which calls on Afghan people to resist the “invaders”. Such a perception is further endangering the NATO-ISAF mission because all foreign troops are considered “American”
The above scenario properly captures the situation in the entire Middle East as regards to
the hostility and the perception of the people towards the US led occupation in the region.
Afghanistan’s security situation is unraveling. Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan was
a coalition of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) which comprises most European countries, and the US Forces. These three
combined forces make up the Operation Enduring Freedom Contingent. Ironically, the Afghan
populace sees all the foreign forces as American soldiers and thereby increasing the continuous
hatred targeted to the United States by the entire Middle Eastern states. The international military
coalitions have failed to realize the expectations they created in 2001. Both US-led Operation-
Enduring Freedom and NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (NATO-ISAF) have
missed the opportunity to bridge the gap between the Western and the Muslim worlds. On the
contrary, they are currently fuelling frustration and resentment among the Afghan population
who increasingly distrust the US and NATO-ISAF forces they first welcomed with hope. In
focusing excessively on aggressive military missions, the international community, especially the
United States, lost the battle for Afghans’ “hearts and minds”. As a result of the low level of
education and awareness, the Taliban heavily relied and was winning the war of propaganda in
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Afghanistan. In the words of a Senior British Officer in Afghanistan as captured by Chauhan
(2006:12): thus
The Taliban are winning the propaganda war. Taliban propaganda shows a growing sophistication and modernization. There are developing a strong capacity to influence and recruit new people to serve their cause. Their methods take benefit from the strategic errors made by Operation Enduring Freedom senior commanders and the hatred they have generated among the Afghan population.
Over the years since international military operations began, Afghanistan’s security
situation has deteriorated significantly. After a period of relative calm during the first few years
that followed the removal of the Taliban, violence is spreading once again throughout the
country. As a consequence, many Afghans now perceive their country to be less secure than it
was in 2001. Although “democratic government” is now in place, the Afghan population has not
yet experienced many of the promised economic and social stability benefits of peacetime.
Specifically, international military operations have failed to achieve their main objective which
was to assure security and stability in Afghanistan, both essential foundations for democracy and
economic development. The future has always been hard to predict in Afghanistan, but
uncertainty has never been greater than now, as the international military effort winds down and
a resilient insurgency demonstrates its clout countrywide, particularly in rural areas. (Asia
Reports, October 12, 2012: 21). According to the UN Security Council Report (2009) on
mandate cycles, most international forces are scheduled to depart by 31 December 2014, with the
expiry of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mandate. The numbers have already
been sharply reduced from ISAF’s peak strength of about 132,000 personnel in 2011 to roughly
55,000 in early 2014. At the end of January 2014, there were 36,500 American and some 19,000
other foreign troops. ISAF’s bases in Afghanistan have shrunk from about 800 in 2011 to around
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one tenth that number. The U.S. and NATO are discussing plans with the Afghan government for
a post- 2014 mission, Operation Resolute Support, which the U.S. military has described as a
combined force of perhaps 8,000 to 12,000 international troops. It remains in doubt because of
President Hamid Karzai’s reluctance to sign a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the U.S.
and an associated Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with NATO. (New York Times, 29
January, 2014) These agreements would provide a framework for the continued presence of
foreign troops, which most Afghans and many experts consider important for the sustainment of
Afghan forces. Similarly, either side of the coin; if US and other foreign troops are maintained or
withdrawn, the security in Middle East still tends to be a precarious situation. This is considering
the arrangement which the Western world have already put in place in the Middle East
(Afghanistan) which needs to be maintained. The country’s military capacity are still incapable
of fighting the Taliban that have resurfaced recently and are patiently waiting for the withdrawal
of the foreign troops to extend its stronghold from the southern part of the country to Kabul, the
capital. Hence it becomes imperative to understand that the security challenges in the Middle
East and the subsequent United States led invasion cannot proffer a definite solution to peace in
the region. With rising insurgent violence in 2013 and the first months of 2014, and no sign of a
negotiated peace in the short term, an assessment of the security environment in places where
international troops have already transferred the security lead to the Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF) is important to understand what might lie ahead and devise policy accordingly.
There are some positive signs. Rejecting the electoral process, the Taliban threatened to attack
electoral workers, voters and security personnel during the last presidential and provincial
council polls. According to Reuters (2014) the Taliban’s March 11 statement stated that:
All fighters are given orders to disrupt these sham elections by full force and bring under attacks election
74
workers, activists, volunteers and those providing security everywhere. If someone takes part in this [election], they will be responsible for the bad consequences themselves. (Reuters, March 10, 2014).
This goes a long way to showcase the fact that the continuous presence of the US marines
in the Middle East soil will always be faced with total hostility from the militants. This
worsening security challenge has also shown that the level of violence and hostility in the Middle
East is worse than what was seen in pre-Operation Enduring freedom (OEF). As earlier noted in
this chapter, the issue of security in the Middle East and the United States concern over these
‘axis of evil’ is deepening. As a result of the United States policies in Middle East, the US on its
part have suffered more attack than it has witnessed prior to the 9/11 catastrophe. The table
below shows series of attacks targeted at the US or against Americans in different parts of the
world in response to presence of foreign soldiers in the Middle East.
Table 4.1: Series of Attacks Targeted to the US or Americans in Different Parts of the
World, 1998 – August, 2014.
S/N Date Place of attack Place of target Means of attack Casualties
1 August 7, 1998 Nairobi, Kenya, and Des es salam
U.S Embassies Truck bombs exploded simultaneously
224 Dead (213 in Kenya and in Tanzania
2 October 12, 2000 Aden, Yemen U.S Navy destroyer (US Cole)
Boats loaded with explosives exploded alongside
17 sailors died, US Cole badly damaged
3 September 11, 2001 New York City Arlington, via, and Shanks vile, pg
Twin towers of world trade centre pentagon and a rural field in Pennsylvania
Hijackers crashed four jet on US soil
2892 dead. 2749 in New York, 12, 20 184 at the pentagon. 40 in rural field in p.v plus 19 hijackers
4 June 14, 2002 Karachi. Pakistan American Consulate in Karachi
A timed Bomb Explosion in a car
12 Killed
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5 May 12, 2003 Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
Housing compound for Westerners.
Suicide Bombers 34 killed including 8 Americans
6 May 29-31, 2004 Rigadh, Saudi Arabia
Khubar, a Saudi oil company in Saudi Arabia
Hostage taking of foreign oil workers
22 people dead, including American
7 June, 11-19 2004 Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
Paul Johnson Jr An America in Saudi Arabia
Kidnap/Execution/Gun attack
2 other Americans and BBC camera, man killed
8 December 6, 2004 Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
US consulate in Saudi Arabia
Gun attack 5 consulate employees dead, 4 terrorist dead
9 November 9, 2005 Amman, Jordan 3 American hotels, Radission, Grand Hytt, Days Inn
Suicide bombing 57 people killed
10 September 13, 2006 Syria, Damascus American Embassy in Syria
Gun men attack Attack foiled
11 January 12, 2007 Athens, Greece U.S Embassy in Athens
Missle Attack Damaged building no casualties
12 December 11, 2007 Algeria Algeria constitution council/United Nation Office
2 cars loaded with explosives detonated
60 people killed, 11 UN staff
13 May 26, 2008 Iraq Tarmiya/ U.S soldiers
Suicide bombing on motorcycle
Killed six US soldiers, wound 18
14 June 24, 2008 Iraq Karmah/Bagthdad meeting between shek and American
Suicide Bombing 20 people killed, including 3 US marines
15 June 12, 2008 Afganistan Kunar province American Base
Gun attack 9 US solders 15 NATO troops died
16 August 18, & 19, 2008
Afghanistan Camp salerno 15 suicide Bombers, 30 militants
No US troop casualty recorded
17 September 16, 2008 Yemen U.S Embassy Yemen
Car Bomb, Rocker strike
16 people killed including 4 civilians
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18 November 26, 2008 India Mumbai, train stations, hospitals, hotels, cameras etc which attract tourists and Americans.
Series of attack Gun raid, suicide attacks, bombing etc.
300 people are wounded and 190 dead including at least 5 America
19 February 9, 2008 Iraq Iraq, a police check point
Suicide Bomber. Four America solders killed
20 April. 10, 2009 Iraq Iraq checkpoint Suicide Bomb 5 American soldier killed, 2 Iraq policemen
21 June, 2009 Little Rock Akansas
Memphis Abdulkahum Mohamedia covert from Memphis shot 2 soldiers
1 killed
1 injured
22 December 25, 2009 Detriot, U.S.A U.S flight from Amsterdam to Detriot
Improvised explosive by a Nigerian with Al-beda inks
No casualty
23 December 30, 2009 Afganistan American citizens Suicide Bombers a double agent from Jordan
8 American civilian of 7 were CIA
24 May 1, 2010 New York City Car bomb Times square Bomb was disarmed
25 September 11, 2002 Libya Benghazi, US Embassy
Aircraft weapons grenades by militants
Killed 5 people, including Christopher sterns, the US ambassador to Libya
26 August, 19 2014 Syria American in Syria Beheading of James Forley
Source: Adapted from inforplease.com, 2014 and compiled by the Author.
It can be inferred from the table that these attacks rose astronomically from 1998 which
was a build up to the September 19, 2001 attack. Consequently, as a response and as a means to
curtail the attack, the United States invaded most ‘rogue states’ in the middle east which
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invariably brought about a higher series of hated and violent clandestine attacks on America and
its allies having a fair share of the cake.
Although the events of 11 September 2001 are perceived by many in the Muslim world
as embodying the clash of two global cultures, recognition of this underlying cultural clash has
not been evident in the international community’s subsequent responses in Afghanistan. There
has been a profound failure on the part of the international community to appreciate that the
majority of Afghans have a completely different “world view” to that of the ‘Western’ world.
The Afghan population identifies itself first and foremost as Muslim, and its sense of cultural
identity is very closely tied to Islam and the global Islamic community. The US Administration
lacks understanding of this Afghan world view, and has failed to appreciate the reality Afghans
are experiencing: that aggressive security-focused stabilization and ‘nation-building’ responses
are perceived as a war against Afghan culture and religion. The implications of such a world
view are enormous, and disinterest of this view is proving increasingly deadly for international
security forces in the country. There is a widespread and growing perception among Afghans
that the international communities in Afghanistan are crusading “Christian invaders,” waging
war on Afghan Islamic culture. (Burke, 2004:62) This perception has strengthened support for
the insurgency in southern Afghanistan, and has informed Afghans’ views of suicide bombings
in the country. Previously unheard of, suicide bombings against international military forces are
increasingly accepted as a valid means of ‘self-defense’ against attacks on Muslims. Further,
support for the central government institutions established by the international community is
rapidly decreasing. Afghan perceptions of the West have crystallized around a `Muslim versus
Christian’ grid, which also plays to the advantage of the Taliban who now paint themselves as a
Muslim liberation movement similar to insurgent groups in Iraq and in southern Lebanon. It can
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logically be argued that it is perception that led to series of export crisis giving rise to the havoc
displayed by the Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL). This is because whatever crisis in
Afghanistan that the US led force want to quell, must be faced with resistance by the entire
Middle East as they see themselves as the Islamic world; a different world from the West.
Counter-productive policies like forced opium poppy eradication are a core factor in the increase
of violence. They also provide a tactical advantage to the Taliban who present themselves as
being on the side of farming communities who have suffered through the eradication of their
poppy fields. According to a study conducted by SENLIS, a research body focusing on Middle
East crisis, the study observed that:
Despite the international community’s concerted five-year focus on military operations, the security situation in Afghanistan is worse than in 2001. The Taliban now has a strong grip on the southern half of the country. Afghans perceive that the US and NATO-ISAF troops in southern and eastern Afghanistan are being defeated by the Taliban. The legitimacy of the international community’s presence in Afghanistan is undermined by its incapacity to protect the Afghan population. The international military coalition forces operating in Afghanistan have failed to achieve their 2001 objectives: guarantee a secure and stable Afghanistan. The country is neither secure nor stable. Rather, it is on the verge of collapse. Attacks are perpetrated on a daily basis, while many previously safe provinces are being ravaged by suicide bombings, murders and ambushes. Originally a peace-keeping mission, NATO-ISAF is now engaged in an unanticipated war, and Afghanistan is once again a hotbed for terrorists-in-training. (Afghanistan: Ten years Later, 2011:18).
However, in the final analysis, the US led invasion in Afghanistan which was suppose to
be stabilization mission has escalated to full fledge war, which the west has been struggling to
maintain peace in the entire Middle East as well as curtail attacks against the US precisely. As
the US plans to pull out its entire forces from the Middle East region, leaving only a handful of
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troops, the security situation in Middle East has shown that the invasion has left an unfinished
war which some terrorist groups such Islamic State in Iraq and in the Levant (ISIS, ISIL) has
picked up to perpetrate against the West, especially the United States.
In spite of somewhat primitive arsenal, negligible number of fighters and without the
support of any known ally of the kind that Afghanistan Mujahideens received from the United
States during the Soviets occupation in 1980s, the lowly Taliban fighters continue to put up a
stiff resistance. In January 2009, President Barack Obama deployed additional 17,000 more
troops to join roughly 294,000 foreign troops out of which approximately 90,000 were American
troops to face the insurgence Taliban (Doronsoro, 2009). Determined to fight a just war and end
future terrorism emanating from Afghanistan, President Obama deployed another 30,000 troops
to the country (Isreali News, December 4, 2009). By October 2010, the U.S. troops alone had
surpassed 100,000 (Hanlon, 2010). Nevertheless, the number of United States casualties
continues to rise. The table below shows the trend of casualty figures.
Table 4.2: Operation Enduring Freedom/Afghanistan Coalition Military Fatalities by Year.
Year U.S UK Others Total
2001 12 0 00 12
2002 49 3 18 70
2003 48 0 10 58
2004 52 1 7 50
2005 99 1 31 131
2006 98 39 54 191
2007 117 48 73 232
2008 155 51 89 295
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2009 317 108 98 521
2010 499 103 109 711
2011 4 7 7 38
Source: Icausalities.org.Retrieved, 7 October, 2014. http://icausalities.org.
4.2. The Invasion of Iraq by the United States and the spate of Terrorism Attacks.
Many years after the infamous September 11, 2001(better known as 9/11), there had
been no serious national debate in the United States on the root causes of the rising global
terrorism for fear of one being labeled anti-American or sympathizer of Islamic fanatics
orchestrated under the neoconservatives-dominated Bush administration. Yet, the burning
question still remains: Why do the Islamic radicals hate America so much to the point of
applying suicide terrorism? While the former President George W. Bush‘s publicly repeated
answer was that they attacked the United States because ―they hate our freedoms,. Osama Bin
Laden, the Al Qaeda leader, in several well-known statements and interviews cited their
grievances for the attack against the United States which include the injustice done to the
Palestinians, the cruelty of prolonged sanctions against Iraq, the presence of American troops in
Saudi Arabia, and the repressive and corrupt nature of U.S.-backed gulf governments. How can
these compelling positions be reconciled? Do the continued U.S. occupations of Afghanistan and
Iraq help to combat global terrorism? And do the occupations bridge the gulf between the
Islamic world and the United States? These rhetorical questions indeed points to the direction of
the conflict in the Middle East as it affects the United States directly and indirectly. It is obvious
that the distraction caused by conflict export which transported the Middle East crisis to other
parts of region, led to the resurgence of most terrorist groups operating from the region. The 9/11
attack undoubtedly changed everything concerning the American-Middle East relations, to the
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citizens from each part of the region, to the different kinds of hostilities meted out on Middle
East citizens by American citizens. In the words of Irogbe (2001:81):
The 9/11 legacy has aggravated the persecution of Muslims in the United States. A survey conducted by the Pew Research Center has found that a majority of respondents place Muslims as the persecuted religious group in the U.S. Fifty-eight percent of Americans polled said that Islamic faith promotes violence more than other religions. This is why two women dressed in traditional Islamic clothing were recently harassed and threatened at a gas station in New York a city where there is growing opposition for Muslims to build a mosque near Ground Zero, the site of former World Trade Center in violation of the U.S. Constitution. Racial profiling also remains a concern after high profile Bollywood actor Shahrukh Khan (an Indian citizen) was detained and questioned at an airport because of his Muslim name. Ironically, Khan was in the United States to film a movie on discrimination against Muslims in the post-9/11 world. In short, since 9/11, Muslims have been under siege. They are picked up and jailed with hardly any probable cause; the majority is basically living in virtual internment camps. The conditions of Muslims today in the United States are very much analogous to that of Americans of Japanese descent in 1942 during World War II.
This shows the level of racism that was also orchestrated by 9/11 attack as well as the
United States counterterrorism policies towards the Middle East. The persecution of Muslims
have become much easier because of the dubious role played by the corporate media, apathetic
citizenry, hate-filled public utterances by well-known figures on such cable channels like Fox
News, CNN, and BBC. The oppression of the Muslims in the United States and elsewhere does
not only undermine democracy, but it also radicalizes possibly thousands of Islamic youth, many
of whom study at Islamic fundamentalist Madrassa schools around the world, particularly in the
Middle East. It further makes them more Anti-American and force them to become in alliance
with Al Qaeda network. Indeed the world is becoming increasingly unsafe as counter terrorist
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strategies led by the US appear to reproduce more unregulated, dispersed and hydra-headed
terrorism (Okolie, 2005:3). The terrorist attacks of 9/11 stunned and horrified Americans that
used to believe that the strategic location of the United States, protected by the Atlantic Ocean
was sufficient to deter potential enemies from any attacks. Most Americans had largely lost
interest in global politics after the end of the Cold War a decade earlier. Now they have realized
that the U.S. is no longer invincible or untouchable. While the vast majority of Americans rallied
behind the Bush administration, supported by the United Nations and the global community, in
its military retributive campaign against the Al Qaeda, neither the United Nations nor the
American public was willing to signal the green light for the United States to widen the war on
terror. But after declaring mission accomplished in December 2001, President George W. Bush
swiftly moved on to a larger campaign, condemning the axis of evil that included Iraq, Iran, and
North Korea and called for the largest American defense build-up in history.
The United States foreign policy under the Bush administration can better be understood
by studying the Bush Doctrine. The doctrine is a phrase used to describe various related foreign
policy principles of President Bush. It includes such components as preventive war (preemptive
strikes), which held that the United States should depose foreign governments that represented a
potential or perceived threat to the security of the United States, even if that threat was not
imminent; a policy of spreading democracy around the world, especially in the Middle East, as a
strategy of combating terrorism; attacking countries that harbor terrorists; and a willingness to
unilaterally pursue United States military interests in achieving its political and economic
objectives. (Swanstrom, 2005:397). To reaffirm the doctrine and its seriousness, Vice President
Cheney in June 2003 boasted in a speech as stated by Gowans (2007) “If there is anyone in the
world today who doubts the seriousness of the Bush Doctrine, i would urge that person to
83
consider the fate of the Taliban in Afghanistan and of Saddam Hussein‘s regime in Iraq”
(Gowans, 2007: 23). It is under these prevailing circumstances that the American government
started the raging wars in Middle East which undoubtedly have been counterproductive as the
security in the region is escalating. Hence since the ‘Bush Doctrine’ came into practice in full
force, it has been greeted with series attacks, either targeted to America, it allies, or its facilities
abroad.
According to the Director of American Central Intelligence Agency cited by SENLIS
(2011), “the Al Qaeda leadership structure charted after September 11 is seriously damaged, but
the group remains as committed as ever to attacking the US homeland”. The Director further
submitted that “as we continue the battle against Al Qaeda, we must overcome a movement – a
global movement infested by Al Qaeda’s radical agenda”. He concluded that “in this battle, we
are moving forward in our knowledge of the enemy, his plans, capabilities and intentions”
(SENLIS, 2011:62). It can be deducted from the above assertions above that the fears and views
expressed above are germane. The American led counter offensive against global terrorism is
further complicated by the involvement of terrorist – including Ansar al-Islam (AI) and al-
Zarqwi – and many other apologists of Islam and Jihadist even from the west as seen in the case
of ISIS, all moving to different parts of middle east to wage jihad. On the other hand, the
casualty figures also have continued to escalate to a very high level in the midst of mounting
strategies employed by the coalition forces. Even these strategies appear to intensify the
incidence of terrorism. The tables below present vividly data on Islamist terrorism and fatalities
in the years before and after the US military invasion of Iraq in 2003.
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Table 4.3: The Iraq War and Jihadist Terrorism by Category
Before 09/11/01 to 20/3/03 and after 21/03/06
Category Attacks Attacks/year (%
change)
Fatalities Fatalities/year
(% change)
Worldwide before invasion 43 28.3 762 501
Worldwide after invasion 199.8 +607% 5,824 1,691 +237%
Not Iraq before invasion 688 27.6 755 496
Not Iraq after invasion 42 37 -35% 2,709 787 +589%
Not Iraq/Afghanistan before invasion 387 7.2 755 496
Not Iraq/Afghanistan after invasion 42 9.0 25% 1,907 554+12%
Anti US/Allies before invasion 128 291 191
Anti US/Allies after invasion 11 683 198 +4%
Source: Bergen and cruickshank, (nd:7)
Table 4.4: the Iraq War and Jihadist Terrorism by Region
Before 09/11/01 to 20/03/03 and after 21/03/03 to 30/09/06
Region Attacks/
Year Before
Attacks/
Year After
% Change Fatalities/
Year Before
Fatalities/
Year After
% Change
Iraq - 99 - - 906 -
Afghanistan - 63.6 - - 233 -
Russia/Chechnya 1.3 2.6 +99% 154 144 6%
India/Pakistan/Kashmir 12.5 15.1 +21% 120 142 +19%
Europe/NATO - 1.7 - - 86 -
Middle East (not Iraq) 2 10.7 +445% 11.8 105 +783%
Southeast Asia 10.5 3.5 -67% 201 62 +69%
Source: Bergen and cruickshank, (nd:7)
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The information as shown in the tables indicates significant increase in the number of
Jihadist terrorism and the consequent fatalities in the aftermath of the US military invasion and
occupation of Iraq
The fact is that the lies about Iraq and the subsequent invasion and occupation of the
country have resulted to the killings of more than one million Iraqis and caused about 4 million
to leave homes, half of whom are displaced internally and half externally (Iruogbe, 2011). The
invasion has strengthened Iran an ‘axis of evil’ and made the country to become less
compromising in its desire to acquire WMD for its defense against U.S. aggression. This justifies
the assertions and views of realist power theorist about the anarchical nature of states in the
International System. The dominance and perceived hegemonic quest by America has led most
Middle East states to strive for nuclear capability in other to be able to deter and stand against
America in the International arena. Similar from the assumptions and tenets of power theory,
which has to do with States seeking dominance over another, the case of Iraq and Saddam
Hussein as a rational or irrational leader was very necessary in the game. Iraqi governments
double stands about whether or not it was in possession of WMD means that the country
preferred been feared as a nuclear power and at same time using the plot to command hegemony
within the region which Washington completely detested. This invariably has created a
generation of Islamic fundamentalists or Jihadists worldwide. On every front, by America‘s own
tawdry standards, the Iraq war has been an unmitigated disaster for the hegemonic lone
superpower. Its failure is not just humiliating for the United States neocons, militarists and
republicans but for those who gave the U.S. cover, including the British and Australian
governments (Younge, 2009).
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Table 4:5: Operation Iraq Freedom
Iraq Coalition Military Fatalities by Year.
Year U.S UK Others Total
2003 486 53 41 580
2004 849 22 35 906
2005 846 23 28 897
2006 822 29 21 872
2007 904 47 10 961
2008 314 4 4 322
2009 146 1 0 150
2010 60 0 0 60
2011 6 0 0 6
TOTAL 4436 179 139 4754
Source: Icausalities.org.Retrieved, 7 October, 2014. http://icausalities.org.
From the table above, the Operation Iraqi Freedom Military Fatalities have started to
decline since 2009, due to the decision of a new administration led by President Barack Obama
to reduce troops and extend the occupation of Iraq as of 2011, but leave indefinitely up to 50,000
non combatant troops in the country. How can 50,000 troops be considered - non combatants in a
known hostile environment? This suggests that the hegemony has no intention of relinquishing
or vacating its occupation of Iraq in the foreseeable future, especially when it is considered that
the U.S. has opened its $700 million embassy in Iraq, the largest and most expensive embassy
ever built the compound is six times larger than the United Nations compound
(www.foxnews.com/story/0,293,476464.html).
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According to the Department of Defense (DOD), In December 2009, after a second
review in response to further pressures from military commanders for additional troops
continuing to cite worsening security, President Obama approved an additional increase of
30,000 troops bringing the total number of U.S. total to 98,000 by the end of 2010. This means
that the occupation and invasion of Iraq which was supposed to be a peace keeping and
stabilizing war has escalated into a full blown war as both parties strengthen its alliances in the
front. The figure below shows the increasing and decreasing number of boots on ground in
Afghanistan and Iraq between 2001- 2010.
Figure 4.1: Boots on the Ground in Afghanistan and Iraq, 2001-2010
Source: Department of Defense (2011) Boots on the Ground Reports to Congress.
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From the figure above, we are able to deduce the reason for the increase of troops and the
subsequent decrease most times, which is notwithstanding the earlier pledge by President Obama
to reduce and withdraw drastically the number of troops in the region. It can be inferred that
between 2002-2006 when the US mission in the region expanded into many cities, the number of
troops increased by 20,000 amidst low levels of violence. In the years 2007-2008 which
witnessed high rate of violence, the increase of the number of troops rose steadily to a staggering
45,000 troops commensurate to the growing rate of violence in the region.
Considering the number of troops that the United States commit to the conflict in the
Middle East, it can be understood that hegemonic dominance and maintained Unipolarity of the
United States is very paramount to Washington as prescribed by power theory. In its quest to
pursue this goal, the United States have invariably aggravated the rate of terrorism attacks to
itself as well as the Middle East region which America has great allies that it will go at any
length to protect. According to Onah (2011) clearly pointed out that:
The United States has witnessed an increase in terrorist attacks with the unfolding of the contemporary phase of globalization. The targets of the terrorist attacks suggest that the US government as a major sponsor of the present globalization is viewed with hatred in various quarters. However, it must be borne in mind that the issues of imperialism which has given fillip to revolutionary idealism and international terrorism are still visible and thus begs for justice under globalization. Thus, the September 11, 2009 and pockets of resistance in the Middle East can be perceived as the demonstration of frustration in the struggles against the persistent injustice in the present wave of globalization and American-led imperialism (Onah, 2011:124).
The penetration and occupation of Iraq by the US in the aftermath of September 11, 2001
has convinced the terrorist organizations, especially the Al Qaeda that dominance and complete
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hegemony is all the United States is seeking over their territory considering the regime change
and the fostering of western tailored democracy. Specifically, it shows the weakness of the
strategies adopted in search of solution to the Middle East problem and the contradictions of the
prevailing global regime (Ifesinachi, 2004:136).
In all the above examples, it is glaring that the invasion of Iraq by the United States
increased the rate of terrorist attacks directed to the United States and in the Middle East region.
The US policy was not able to checkmate the security challenges in the region as it has rather
worsened the situation, as the terrorist groups in the region has formed a formidable force against
the US troops, launching series of attacks ranging from suicide bombings to hostage takings. All
these has rather heightened the security the security situation as the Middle East region is now a
special part of the globe, reckoned with refuges, sectarian crisis, violent protest, and the recent
havocs perpetrated by ISIS and the resurgence of Al Qaeda.
Therefore, from our preceding arguments and analysis on the invasion of suspected “axis
of evil” in the Middle East by the United States, it is safe to say beyond all reasonable doubt that
the invasion did not proffer solutions to the security threats in the Middle East nor protected the
US from future attacks rather it snowballed into series of conflicts in the Middle East. Therefore,
we reject and invalidate our first hypothesis which states that the invasion of suspected “axis of
evil” in the Middle East states by the United States has not reduced incidence of insecurity in the
region.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE UNITED STATES UNILATERAL USE OF FORCE AND ATTACKS ON
AMERICA AND HER ALLIES.
In order to verify our second hypothesis, a number of empirical indicators were identified
and examined. These indicators were specifically selected from the X and Y variables of the
hypothesis, as contained in the logical data framework.
5.1. The Use of Drone Strikes in the Middle East and Radicalization of Individuals in the
Region.
The United States first used an armed drone to conduct a targeted killing on November
17, 2001. It was a strike on a housing compound in Kabul, Afghanistan against Mohammed Atef,
an Egyptian al Qaeda militant who planned the 1998 embassy bombings in Nairobi, Kenya, and
Dar es-Salaam, Tanzania (Dawoud, 2001:51).The Atef strike marked a sea of change on how the
U.S. would conceive of the use of force: up to that point, officials had been reluctant to use
manned aircraft to conduct strikes (Clarke, 2012:1). Systematically, new era in warfare had
begun
The central justification for US drone strikes is that they are necessary to make the US
safer by disrupting militant activity. Proponents argue that they are an effective, accurate, and
precise tool to that end. However, serious questions have been raised about the accuracy and
efficacy of strikes, and the publicly available evidence that they have made the US safer overall
is ambiguous at best. Considerable costs also have been documented. The under-accounted harm
to civilians–injuries, killings, and broad impacts on daily life, education, and mental health is
also worrisome regarding the effort of the United States aim to reduce terrorism in the world as
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well as peace in the Middle East. In addition, it is clear that US strikes in Pakistan foster anti-
American sentiment and undermine US credibility not only in Pakistan but throughout the
region. There is strong evidence to suggest that US drone strikes have facilitated recruitment to
violent non-state armed groups, and motivate attacks against both US military and civilian
targets. Further, current US targeted killing and drone strike practices may set dangerous global
legal precedents, erode the rule of law, and facilitate recourse to lethal force.
A significant rethinking of current policies, in the light of all available evidence, the
concerns of various stakeholders, and short and long-term costs and benefits, is long overdue.
According to Admiral Mullen (2011), he observed that:
Each time an errant bomb or a bomb accurately aimed but against the wrong target kills or hurts civilians, we risk setting out strategy back months, if not years. Despite the fact that the Taliban kill and maim far more than we do, civilian casualty incidents such as those we’ve recently seen in Afghanistan will hurt us more in the long run than any tactical success we may achieve against the enemy (Mullen, 2013:28)
This assertion above by US Admiral holds that the drone strikes which presumably are
targeted to terrorist hide outs often times, hits the wrong targets, which are mostly are civilians
and un armed citizens. This invariably has led to the US inciting the youths and attracting more
hatred to the West. It is clear from polling and our research team’s interviews that drone strikes
breed resentment and discontent toward the US, and there is evidence to suggest that the strikes
have aided militant recruitment and motivated terrorist activity (Living under Drones, 2013). US
drone strikes are extremely unpopular in Pakistan. A 2012 poll by the Pew Research Center’s
Global Attitude project found that only 17% of Pakistanis supported drone strikes. And
remarkably, among those who professed to know a lot or a little about drones, 97% considered
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drone strikes bad policy. (Bergen, 2013:18). It has been noted that prior to the Drone attacks by
America in Pakistan that a great number of Pakistan citizens never knew or heard of America,
but the Drone strikes has not only popularized America, but increased the hatred of America by
an average man in the region. This has led to radicalization of these average individuals which
most of them have suffered loses of their relations to the American unmanned aerial vehicles.
One man, who has lost relatives in drone strikes, expressed his deep-seated anger toward the US,
declaring that “we won’t forget our blood, for two hundred, two thousand, five thousand years
we will take our revenge for these drone attacks.” A Waziri who lost his younger brother in a
strike stated that there would be revenge: “Blood for blood. . . . All I want to say to them is . . .
why are you killing innocent people like us that have no concern with you?” (Kilcullen,
2009:42).
In a similar development, the radicalization of Muslim youths in the Middle East can be
traced to many policies of the Unite States, but none has been much tensed as the effect of Drone
attacks by the US. The people affected in this region have no heavy presence of the United States
Military on their soil as in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq, unlike the effects on these two states
mentioned, the anger which leads to the radicalization is pointed directly towards the United
States. However, the idea of using Drone attacks in this region is heavily concentrated in
Pakistan and Yemen which are now safe heavens for splinter cell terrorist groups, most of them
sharing great affiliation with major terrorist groups such as the Al Qaeda. In an effort to paint a
clearer picture of radicalization in the region as a result of the US policy of using unmanned
aerial vehicles to target terrorist bases, Mothana (2012) posited that:
“Drones are causing more and more Yemenis to hate America and join radical militants; they are not driven by ideology but rather by a sense of revenge and despair . . . .
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Rather than winning the hearts and minds of Yemeni civilians, America is alienating them by killing their relatives and friends. Indeed, the drone program is leading to the Talibanization of vast tribal areas and the radicalization of people who could otherwise be America’s allies in the fight against terrorism in Yemen.” (Mothana, 2012:18)
Dennis Blair, former Director of National Intelligence, described how unilateral
American drone attacks in Pakistan are eroding US influence and damaging ability to work with
Pakistan to achieve other important security objectives like eliminating Taliban sanctuaries,
encouraging Indian-Pakistani dialogue, and making Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal more secure.
Cameron Munter, who announced his early resignation as US Ambassador to Pakistan in May
2012, reportedly revealed to colleagues that he “didn’t realize his main job was to kill people
(Crilly, 2012:18). In previous interviews, he criticized the US use of drones, arguing that the
attacks need to be more “judicious (Rosenburg, 2011:23). The New York Times reported in May
2012, “Some officials felt the urgency of counterterrorism strikes was crowding out
consideration of a broader strategy against radicalization. In a similar development, the United
States president addressing students of a Defense college in America maintained thus:
The use of force must be seen as part of a larger discussion we need to have about a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy, because for all the focus on the use of force, force alone cannot make us safe. (Obama 2013:14).
The New York Times reported in 2012 that the United States was focused on killing or
capturing about “two dozen” AQAP operative leaders in Yemen, not an entire domestic
insurgency (Schmitt, 2013:67). Despite the accuracy and precision of the US drone strikes, the
unforeseen casualty is the worrisome aspect of it. According to Johnsen (2013), he lamented that:
A lot of people are dying in those strikes. Yet the head of AQAP is still alive, his military commander is still alive,
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and its top bomb-maker is still alive. The fallout from all of these deaths is something the US doesn’t seem to quite take into account. Some if not many of those killed by the United States outside AQAP’s core membership may have been fighters in the domestic insurgency against the Yemeni government. But as a policy matter, such killings risk doing the United States more harm than good by alienating large segments of the Yemeni population. Any backlash in Yemen is compounded because even when strikes hit AQAP fighters who may be lawfully targeted in an armed conflict situation, they are usually killing members of tightly knit families and tribes, not fighters from outside their communities. “The United States can target and kill someone as a terrorist, only to have Yemenis take up arms to defend him as a tribesman (Johnsen, 2013:15).
The situation in part of the Middle East region is challenging to the United States who
depend on these targeted killings to stop the growing rate of terrorism in the region. The table
below is a combination of graph and marked map showing the level of drone strikes and its
correspondence to the civilian and militant casualties.
Figure 5.1: A Graph and Map Showing Deaths Caused By US Drones Attack.
Source: BBC Urdu Services in the Middle East (2014).
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The map shows the high rise of attacks by Islamic militants which is as a result of the
civilian casualties orchestrated by the Drone strikes. In the FATA regions, the number of militant
operations is also considerably high. The graph and map, showing high incidence of militant
attack against the drone, also suggest that the Drone attacks have not been able to curtail the
attacks by militant groups to the Yemeni- US backed administration. Below is a figure showing
the number of US drone strikes in Pakistan.
Figure 5.2 Showing Number of US Drone strikes in Pakistan from 2008-2013
Source: New America Foundation (2014), www.newamerica.org/images
According to the figure above, in 2013, there have been six drone strikes in Pakistan.
Within the years 2004-2007, there were no drone strikes and subsequently, the citizens and
tribesmen collectively stood against the AQAP and the Talibans who crossed over from the
border between Afghanistan. From 2008-2013 when drone strike was the dominant United States
means of force also ushered in reprisal attack and radicalization from the people because of the
high casualty civilian deaths from the attack. Complaining that drone strikes has increased as
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well as the level of radicalization within the region, Exum (2013), categorically pointed out that
nevertheless, every one of these dead noncombatants represents an alienated family, a new desire
for revenge, and more recruits for a militant movement that has grown exponentially even as
drone strikes have increased. The figure below shows the categories of casualties to drone
attacks in the Middle East.
Figure 5.3: Types of deaths to by Drone strikes
Source: New America Foundation (2014),www.newamerica.org/images
From the figure, we can infer that though the Drone strikes succeeded in targeting the
militants and there hideouts, it has not been precise on its target, the “civilian casualties” leads to
radicalization by bereaved relations who grow up and foster anti- Americanism. Deriving from
the graph in the above in figure, it can be understood that an average of annual targeted strikes
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by the US drone records a number of civilian casualties. Between the years 2004-2007, the
number of civilian casualties was almost more than the targeted militants. Other subsequent
years also recorded reasonable non combatant casualties. In a situation were non combatants are
caught between cross fires, the people from this region are prone to join radical elements who
oppose the US backed government in this region.
In the final analysis, it will be pertinent to understand that the United States for instance,
considers Middle East (Yemen and Pakistan) popular support to be important in its operations
against AQAP, reducing civilian casualties should be a top priority, regardless of whether the
civilian deaths were the result of violations of international law. The United States learned this
lesson after US and NATO airstrikes against Taliban forces killed hundreds of civilians in
Afghanistan. As the senior US military commander in Yemen acknowledged in 2010 that “If we
kill civilians or damage their property in the course of our operations, we will create more
enemies than our operations eliminate (Centre for Middle East and Atlantic Studies, CMEAS
2009). The above analysis points to the fact that the unilateral use of Force by the United States
such as the adoption of Drone strikes and targeted killings of terrorist groups hierarchy is
undoubtedly counterproductive as these strikes record civilian casualties which tend to radicalize
the citizens.
The strikes have poisoned the bilateral relationship with Pakistan even though the
government privately consents to strikes; its public statements have used them to deflect
criticism onto the United States. Pakistan is hardly more secure now than when drone strikes
began in 2004, and militants have recently begun attacking Pakistan’s nuclear weapons
facilities.(Walsh: 2012) As a consequence, anti-Americanism is higher than ever while the
Pakistani government is as dysfunctional as ever. In Pakistan, opposition to the drone strikes has
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become an issue of national politics, with an entire political party organized around ending their
use.(Masood, 2012) In Yemen, there is a growing body of anecdotal evidence that drone strikes
are driving anti-Americanism and opposition to the central government (Hammond, 2012). More
broadly, airstrikes in Afghanistan some of which come from drones have stirred protests from
both the government and from the population (Laura, 2012). Below is a scatter diagram of
drones attack in the Middle East
Figure 5.2 A Graphical Scatter Diagram of the Trend of Deaths per Strike to Militants and
Civilia
ns.
Source: The New America Foundation (2014), www.newamerica.org.
From the diagram above, it can be conclusively stated that drones attack on civilian
population no matter how negligible have contributed in no small measure in the radicalization
of civilians in the Middle East. In summary, this section of the study which concludes with the
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above graphical presentation of the different types of death caused by Drone attacks in the
Middle Eastern states of Yemen and Pakistan, shows that the high level of civilians and unknown
casualties in the unilateral use of Drone Force by the US have done more harm than good to
American interest in the Middle East despite its inherent advantage of being cost effective.
5.2 Decapitation of Terrorists by American Troops and Attacks on America, and her Allies
in the Middle East.
Leadership targeting has become a key feature of current counterterrorism policies. Both
academics and policy makers have argued that the removal of leaders is an effective strategy in
combating terrorism. However, leadership decapitation is not always successful, and existing
empirical work is insufficient to account for this variability. Late in the evening of May 1, 2011,
President Barack Obama announced to the nation that Osama bin Laden was dead. Earlier that
day, the president had ordered a team of elite military forces deep into Pakistan to kill the
mastermind behind the September 11 terrorist attacks, which had shocked the country and the
world nearly ten years before. During his speech, President Obama said that he had told his new
director of central intelligence, Leon Panetta, that getting Bin Laden was the number one priority
in the United States’ counterterrorism strategy against al-Qaida. The United States had over time
strived to either capture or kill terrorist who perpetrate clandestine operations either to the
homeland, American Facilities or its allies. The basic aim of this section of the study is to
measure how far this effort has reduced the attacks on America and its allies in the Middle East.
Decapitation tactics, which are designed to kill or capture the key leader or leaders of a
terrorist group, feature prominently in the counterterrorism strategies of many states, including
Israel and the United States. Some scholars argue that targeting the group’s leadership reduces its
operational capability by eliminating its most highly skilled members and forcing the group to
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divert valuable time and limited resources to protect its leaders (David, 2002) Decapitation
tactics are also intended to disrupt the terrorist group’s organizational routine and deter others
from assuming power (Byman, 2012). Nevertheless, the adoption of decapitation to tackle the
menace of terrorism especially in the Middle East has resulted to the increased attack on
America and its allies in the form of retaliation. Several states, including Israel and the United
States, have put decapitation tactics, which seek to kill or capture leaders of terrorist
organizations, at the forefront of their counterterrorism efforts. The vast majority of scholarly
work on decapitation suggests, however, that leadership decapitation is ineffective at best and
counterproductive at worst. Contrary to this conventional wisdom, leadership decapitation
significantly increases the mortality rate of terrorist groups, although the results indicate that the
effect of decapitation decreases with the age of the group, even to a point where it may have no
effect at all. The important fact to notice here is that despite the age of the terrorist group, the
decapitation of terrorist leaders no doubt leads to retaliatory attacks.
Similarly, organized terrorist groups such as the al Qaeda is well structured
hierarchically, hence the decapitation of its leaders leaves nothing or no harm to the group. For
instance, the Decapitation of Osama Bin Laden, the founder and head of the Islamist militant
group al-Qaeda did not lead to the collapse of the terrorist group. Instead, the Decapitation leads
to the group portraying itself as becoming much determined to revenge the attack and killing on
American soil. Leadership decapitation removes insurgent leaders from direct influence over
their organizations, but the second and third order effects of the tactics used to eliminate
insurgent leadership affect the ultimate outcome of counterinsurgency operations. According to
Staeheli (2010),
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Insurgent leaders, knowing they are targeted by government forces, must make the critical decision to name a successor or not to name a successor. Many insurgent leaders name a successor to prevent internal power struggles or infighting when the leader is killed or captured. The presence of a second-in-command allows the insurgent leader to transfer his leadership legitimacy to his successor and also facilitates the continuation of insurgent operations once the leader is captured or killed by government forces. However, by naming a successor, the leader allows government forces to target the second-in-command as well as the leader. In organizations where no successor is named, new leaders must establish themselves in the hierarchy which results in delays in operations (Staeheli, 2012:19).
In the aftermath of 9/11, leadership targeting of terrorist organizations has become a key
feature of counterterrorism policies. The 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
(NSCT) claims that leaders are essential to terrorist activity and that their removal is likely to
result in organizational collapse. This same particular view and strategy was also reaffirmed by
President Bush that it can as well lead to these groups regrouping and decentralize its system of
hierarchy and administration. In his view as contained in the NSCT, (2003) Bush equivocally
asserted that:
The terrorist leadership provides the overall direction and strategy that links all these factors and thereby breathes life into a terror campaign. The leadership becomes the catalyst for terrorist action. The loss of leadership can cause many organizations to collapse. Some groups, however, are more resilient and can promote new leadership should the original fall or fail. Still others have adopted a more decentralized organization with largely autonomous cells, making our challenge even greater (NSCT, 2003: 6).
While emphasizing the importance of terrorist leaders, the NSCT recognizes that the
effectiveness of leadership decapitation is variable and that some organizations are resilient to
leadership attacks. The killing of Osama Bin Laden didn’t mark the end of Al Qaeda, rather it
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lead to the groups re grouping and re-strategizing its modus operandi to avenge the death of its
charismatic leader. This situation leads for much to be desired from the idea of decapitating
terrorist leaders as it has only proved to a retaliatory measure and not a checkmating strategy.
Basically, it can be deductively stated that younger and smaller organizations are more likely to
cease activity after the removal of a leader. Religious organizations are re-salient to decapitation
while ideological organizations are more susceptible to collapse (Jordan, 2009). Based on the
understanding of the growing spate of attacks, it can be understood that the groups that
perpetuate attack on the US are the Islamic based fundamentals. Hence, for this religiously based
organization, it is an indoctrinated way of life to fight and die for their belief, it is a jihad. The
decapitation of any leader is rather seen as a blessing and not a punishment or a measure that is
capable of deterring them. Most attacks on the US have always been as a reprisal attack of the
actions of the US troops or its policies from Washington.
However, the argument here is not to ascertain if Decapitation leads to the collapse of
terrorist groups, rather it is to find out if such a strategy will curtail the attack on America and its
allies. Based on the foregoing, we understand that when Decapitation is by arresting a leader of a
terrorist group and the subsequent trial and conviction, the group resorts to a more violent attacks
to afford them a possible negotiation of its convicted member. The counterproductive effects of
Decapitation have been obscured by politicians’ desire to reduce the cost of fighting while still
being seen to be taking action. Opinion polls in the US and Israel show that popular opinion
supports targeted killing, even if they believe it makes them more likely to be attacked (Hafez,
2011:13). Popularity seeking politicians may therefore support targeted killing, giving
insufficient consideration to its counterproductive effects. The killing of Osama bin Laden
boosted President Obama’s popularity in the US considerably, though whether it contributes to
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making America safer is unclear (Mina, 2011). Similarly, another problem faced by the United
States as it strives to maintain peace in the Middle East is the displacement of these militant
group leaders as they migrate to urban region to escape targeted killings. This has invariably led
to the spread of instability to these region were the militant run to in other to avoid drone attacks
and surveillance. In this regard, Evans (2009), writing for the London Times Magazine opined
that:
Targeted killing displaces insurgents as they seek safe havens, widening the zone of instability. Studies of Decapitation in both the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and United States Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan have shown that targeted killing drives insurgents into urban areas, where they hope to be harder to find. Many senior Al-Qaeda leaders have been arrested in Pakistan’s urban areas, where they were trying to avoid aerial surveillance by drones. Their movement, along with a similar migration of the Pakistani Taliban, has destabilized large areas of Pakistan. In Chechnya, foreign troops targeted killing and security force pressure has displaced Chechen insurgents from the cities, to the mountains, forests and sympathetic towns in neighboring provinces (Evans, 2009: 22).
In final analysis, it is instructive to affirm at this instance that Decapitation as strategy by
the Unites States to maintain peace in the middle has not worked out successfully, rather it has
led to increase in the attacks directed to America and its allies. Targeted killing aims ultimately
to reduce the number and lethality of insurgent attacks. This can initially be achieved in cases
where an organization has limited support and vulnerable hierarchical command. Over time the
effect of each killing will reduce and in time it may be counter-productive as groups become
more resilient, evasive and effective through a process of evolution and adaptation. Reflecting on
the theoretical foundation of this study, proponents of power theory such as Morgenthau (1976)
argue that war does not end in the battlefield, meaning that further deliberations and agreements
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is needed to take place during the war period and after the war. Based on this argument, it faults
the adoption of the strategy of Decapitation as the primary target remains the leaders of these
terrorist groups, with whom an agreement would have to be made when the time to talk arrives.
Empirically, the following examples show how targeted killing can reduce insurgent
technical capabilities, but they also demonstrate its limitations. In 1999 Israel killed Yahya
Ayyash, nicknamed ‘the Engineer’ for his expertise in creating improvised explosive devices for
suicide bombers. Colonel Roni Amir, head of doctrine for the Israeli Air Force, judges that the
killing substantially reduced Hamas’ capabilities for some time. In July 2008, United State forces
in Afghanistan killed Mullah Sadiq, a Taliban commander from Sangin, Helmand (Keith, 2013).
Sadiq was believed to be behind a shift in Taliban tactics towards a greater reliance on IEDs,
Mark Carleton-Smith, Commander Task Force Helmand at the time, states that in the aftermath
of Sadiq’s death, there was a notable decline in the sophistication, and consequently the lethality,
of the Taliban’s IEDs around Sangin (Katz, 2002).
Yahya Ayyash’s killing may have temporarily reduced Hamas’ capabilities, but there was
an immediate backlash, four suicide bombings killed 60 Israelis in the days that followed, and
there has been no lasting effect. Suicide bombings against Israelis increased in frequency and
sophistication despite his killing. According to UK ministry of defense, in the month after
Mullah Sadiq was killed, British casualties to IEDs in Helmand fell dramatically, but they had
returned to similar levels by May the next year and surpassed those two months later. The
reduction in lethality of attacks may have been a consequence of the loss of Mullah Sadiq, and
with him the loss of some of the Taliban’s technical capability, but the effects were short-lived.
The effect of killing Sadiq should have been heightened by US killing of close to the entire
Taliban leadership in Kandahar and Helmand province in the five months that followed, and the
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ever-increasing tempo of targeted killings in the area. Instead, the continuing casualties in the
south of Afghanistan from IEDs suggest the killing of facilitators had no lasting effect on the
Taliban’s ability to build bombs. In the case of both Ayyash and Sadiq, targeted killing may have
caused a temporary drop in insurgent technical capability, but it did nothing to reverse the
tactical and technical trend. Killing ‘experts’ has limited effects in part because the level of
expertise they require to be effective is so low that many can quickly learn the required skills. As
Professor Ehud Keinan of the Israeli Institute of Technology has described, the manufacture of
suicide vests is an ‘embarrassingly easy’ process (ITT, 2011). Below is a tabular presentation of
top terrorist leaders who are wanted, captured or killed.
Table 5.1: A Tabular Presentation of Selected Top Terrorist Leaders, who are Wanted,
Captured or Killed.
S/N Terrorist leader Wanted Killed Captured/ Detained Group
1 Ayman al-Zawahiri - √ - Al-Qaeda
2 Saif al-Adel √ - √ Al-Qaeda
3 Abdul Ghani Barado - - √
4 Muatapha Ahman al Hawasawi - - √ Al-Qaeda
5 Walid Bin Attash - - √ Al-Qaeda
6 Alial Aziz Ali - - √ Al-Qaeda
7 Al Rahim al Nashiri - - √ Al-Qaeda
8 Hambali - - √ Al-Qaeda
9 Anas al-Liby √ - - Al-Qaeda
10 Ibrahim Al-Asiri √ - - AQAP
11 Adnan al Shukrijumah √ - - AQAP
12 Hakimullah Meshud √ - - AQAP
13 Abu Yahga al-Libi √ - - Al-Qaeda
14 Osama Bin Laden - √ - Al-Qaeda
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15 Muhamed Atof - √ - Al-Qaeda
16 Abu Musah al-Zarqawi - √ - Al-Qaeda
17 Atiyah Abd al-Rahma - √ - AQI
18 Siyeed al-Masri - √ - Al-Qaeda
19 Abu Obediah Masri - √ - Al-Qaeda
20 Khalid Sheik Mohamed - - √ Al-Qaeda
Source: Adapted from CNN security Clearance; 2014 compiled by the Author.
N/B: √ Indicates positive
- Indicates Negative
The above table reveals that a sizable number of terrorist leaders have being killed and
captured yet the Middle East is still embroiled in conflict. Their deaths or capture did not in any
way reduce the capabilities of their group or make the region safer. According to a US study of
the Afghan conflict in 2011 the targeted killing of bomb-makers does not significantly reduce
insurgent use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) or decrease the lethality of each device.
Consequently, from the above analysis and arguments on the unilateral use of force by the
United States reduced attacks on America, and its allies in the Middle East, it is safe to say
beyond all reasonable doubt that the unilateral use of force did not proffer solutions to the
security threats in the Middle East nor protected the US from future attacks rather it snowballed
into series of conflicts in the Middle East. Therefore, we validate and accept and accept our
second hypothesis which states that “the unilateral use of force by the United States has not
reduced attacks on America, and its allies in the Middle East”.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE UNITED STATES’ COUNTER TERRORISM POLICY AND THE PROVISIONS
OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER.
In order to verify our third and last hypothesis which is that ‘that the United States
Counter Terrorism Policy is not in accord with the provisions of the United States charter’, a
number of empirical indicators were identified and examined. These indicators were selected
from the X and Y variables of the hypothesis.
6.1. The Unilateral Policy and use of force by the United States and the United Nations
Charter
Whether states can use force against terrorists based in another country is much discussed
and argued based on the provision of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which states
thus:
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations (UN Charter, 1945:14).
The relevant provisions of the UN Charter do not provide a conclusive answer, but have
to be interpreted. Similarly, running such an interpretation depends on which angle the analyst
wish to interpret the doctrine from. The ban on the use of force is widely held to be peremptory
in nature, and has often been described as one of the basics in modern international system. The
United States over the period have constantly rallied behind the UN as an umpire in the
international system, especially in their relationship other states. Jean-Allain (2004) strongly
affirmed the dimension of the US posture in the international arena that:
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Since the end of the Cold War, therefore, the United States has increasingly sought to assert its dominant position internationally, acting with the consent of the UN Security Council where it could manage its support; but progressively choosing to act beyond the UN Charter where it lacked the co-operation of the Security Council. (Jean-Allain, 2004: 249)
In the wake of the United States’ use of force outside the parameters of the UN Charter,
has followed a number of jurists who have sought to justify American actions as being legal, by
recourse to either a widening of the notion of self-defense or by developing new exceptions to
permissible use of force, most notably that of “humanitarian intervention”. Short of having
established a treaty which incorporates this expanded notion of the use of force, what would be
required to establish the normative value of such an expansion would be the creation of
customary law which is based on state practice but this has not been the case. However, the point
still remains that based on the provisions of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, the United States
moved unilaterally to adopt the use of force in its international relations with the Middle East
region. As conceived in 1945, the United Nations Charter allows for three situations in which the
use of force is permissible. Of these three exceptions, the provisions regarding ‘enemy states’ no
longer holds, as they are dead-letter law (Jean-Allain, 2004). Going by this assertion, it therefore
has it that both the States been referred or tagged as ‘enemy state’ or ‘axis of evil’ all now belong
to the same umbrella organizations; hence the same law is applicable to all.
However, the specification of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter remains basically clear as
to its caution against the use of force by member states against another. This part of the charter
though has been a subject of great debate as a result of other provisions subsequent in the UN
charter, which many jurist has interpreted as exceptions to the use of force. Consequently, our
position concerning this on-going debate is based on the premise that the Article 2(4) of the UN
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Charter is exclusive on its position on the use of force by a state against another. Hence, other
subsequent exceptions to the provisions of the Article rest on the table of the Security Council
which the United State of course, has moved unilaterally without the approval of the Security
Council or its traditional allies. Based on the position of our analysis, this study explores the
three exceptions on the use of force against another state, by maintaining that the United Nations
as a body has vested the Security Council the duty to determine when the use of force is the last
resort in relations among member states. In the case of the American invasion of Iraq especially,
the US moved unilaterally without the approval of the Security Council, who by not only
disapproving the invasion failed also to stop the US. Considering the spate of terrorist actions
targeted to the United State homeland, the aim here is not to ascertain the moral right of the US
government in its invasions, rather to ascertain how it failed short of the UN Charter provisions.
The first exception to the use of force is Article 51 of the Charter which provides for an
inherent right to self-defense, either individually or collectively, but does so under the ultimate
control of the United Nations Security Council. Article 51 reads:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security (UN Charter, 1945:34).
As a result, even in situations where a state is acting in self-defense, it must ultimately
yield to the international order as established by the United Nations Charter, and the dictates of
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the UN Security Council. Though one must emphasize that such dictates do not vitiate a state’s
“inherent right” of self-defense if the Council does not act effectively (Jean-Allain, 2004). It is
this assumption that brings the ambiguity in the ‘use of force’ in the United Nations Charter. One
of the exception to the use of force has already been clarified in Article 51of the charter ‘until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security’. The
argument here is thus based on the fact the united States have moved unilaterally to invade some
states in the Middle East. Similarly, citing Article 51 for its reason to invade the territory of
Afghanistan and Iraq, the Article was clear on its phrase about ‘armed attack’. Though the UN
Charter was not specific on what it referred to as an ‘armed attack’, the fact also remains that
numerous terrorist attacks targeted by the US cannot be termed as an armed attack as outlined in
the Charter.
Despite the fact that the UN Charter is a living document that has been modified in
notable ways, by subsequent practice of states, the interpretation of the provisions of Article 51
have remained static. Custodians of these laws who are invariably the member states have been
skeptical towards the frequent and unwarranted amendments of this age long Charter binding the
action, interest and international relations among states. In a similar development, Jason-Allain
(2004) went ahead to instruct that:
The legal parameters of self-defense remain those outlined in Article 51; primarily that self defense can only legally take place when an armed attack takes place against a state. Short of that, call it what one may, states have been unwilling to accept it as self-defense under international law (Jason-Allain, 2004:249)
In a similar affirmation, Grey (2000) emphatically stated thus:
The right of self-defense arises only if an armed attack (French: aggression armée) occurs. This right is an exception to the prohibition of the use of force in Article
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2 (4) and therefore should be narrowly construed (Grey, 200:86)
In the final analysis, the provisions of the United Nations Charter under Article 2(4)
admonishes all member states to refrain from the use of threat or force from its international
relations with other states, consequently, the so called ‘axis of evil’ of evil are now also member
of the United Nations. Article 51 of the UNC which its provisions has complicated that of Article
2(4) explicitly made it clear, that the issue of self defense would only arise in the instance of
‘armed attack’. The fact that the UNC never specified what constitutes an armed attack shows
the ambiguity of the Charter and subsequent states, like the US has decided to bend the
interpretation towards its favor, claiming it is invading the territory of some Middle Eat as an act
of self defense. And analysts from all works of life are yet to ascertain or agree if the US has
actually suffered an armed attack from the invaded States in the Middle East. Despite
controversy and disagreement over the scope of the right of self-defense, there is an indisputable
core and that is the competence of states to resort to force in order to repel an attack (Malcolm,
2003:35).
To further expose out the parameters of self-defense, consideration should be given to
both what constitutes an “armed attack” and what would be the legal response to such an act. It
becomes easy to understand this argument considering the position of Article 2(4) and the
narrow provision of Article 51 which allows for self defense to take place on the condition of
armed attack and approval of the Security Council. Reckoning with the fact that one of the
origins of law is from age long practices and judgments, it will be worthy to mention the
Nicaragua case which revolved around the issue of the use of force by the United States and
paramilitaries as against this Central American State during the 1980s, the ICJ (1986) stated
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plainly that: “In the case of individual self-defense, the exercise of this right is subject to the
State concerned having been the victim of an armed attack”. The Court then goes on to say:
There appears now to be general agreement on the nature of the acts which can be treated as constituting armed attacks. In particular, it may be considered to be agreed that an armed attack must be understood as including not merely action by regular armed forces across an international border, but also ‘the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed forces against another State of such gravity as to amount to’ (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces, ‘or its substantial involvement therein’. This description, contained in Article 3, paragraph (g), of the Definition of Aggression annexed to General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX), may be taken to reflect customary international law (ICJ Reports, 1986: 103).
Going by the provisions on the phrase concerning an act of an ‘armed attack’, it has been
contentious to determine if the United States has actually suffered an armed attack from any of
the Middle East states. Be that as it may, the 9/11 tragic incident on American soil, as
devastating and barbaric the attack was, claimed the deaths of 2,996 people, including the 19
hijackers and 2,977 victims. The victims included 246 on the four planes (from which there were
no survivors), 2,606 in New York City in the towers and on the ground, and 125 at the Pentagon.
Despite this outrageous havoc, and considering what is referred to as an armed attack by Article
51 of the UNC, it is obvious that it fell short of an armed attack. Hence the subsequent actions of
the United States on the premise of self defense can be viewed as a retaliatory measure, triggered
by personal vendetta. If the United States led invasion of Afghanistan can be understood based
on such grounds, the issue of Iraq still remains a questionable debate under the United Nations
Charter.
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6.2. Application of policy of Preemption and violations of the UN Charter.
International law has long held that the use of force between states is illegal. There are
only two exceptions to this general rule, being Security Council authorization for the use of
force, and that done in self-defense. The latter exception has been subject to much debate,
particularly in the interpretation and application of Article 51 of the United Nations (UN)
Charter, which today provides statutory authority for the use of force in self-defense. More
recently however, the debate has revolved around the so-called doctrine of pre-emption; that is,
whether military force that is employed pre-emotively can be justified under the rubric of self-
defense. The United States (US) for example, in its recent National Security Strategy, has
instituted a policy of using pre-emptive self-defense to ‘forestall and prevent hostile acts’ by
terrorist groups and rogue states using weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) (The White House
2002: 15). In light of this current policy and the international reaction to it in the wake of the Iraq
War, the extent to which the US can employ a doctrine of pre-emption that conforms with, and is
permitted by, international law, is an important question for analysis. The U.N. Charter is a
multilateral treaty that the United States, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and most other nations of the
world have ratified.
This treaty generally forbids members of the United Nations to use military force against
foreign countries. Article 2, paragraph 4 insists that all members of the United Nations “refrain
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations.” This restriction is sometimes controversial, but no one doubts its meaning.
Absent some exception, bombing or firing missiles at a foreign country’s nuclear weapons
development facilities clearly would fall within its ambit. The U.N. Charter provides or
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recognizes two exceptions to the general prohibition in Article 2, paragraph 4. First, the U.N.
Security Council can authorize military force if necessary to maintain or restore peace. Second, a
nation may act to protect itself or its allies in self-defense. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter
maintains that:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security (UN Charter, 1945:31).
However, in analyzing the legality of the United States policy of preemption under the
UN Charter, the basic focus is directed to the American Invasion of Iraq, which the United States
invaded preemptively. Unlike the US led invasion of Afghanistan, the occupation of Iraq
questions the act, if the United State acted according to the provisions of the United State
Charter. Articles 41 of the United Nations Charter clearly specify that:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations (United Nations Charter, 1945:31).
The provision from Article 41 of the UNC has it that the authority to use military action
against another state is exclusive to the security council, and similarly, the council decides what
type of punitive measure to adopted in such instance. The US decision was a preemptively
carried out by the US troops, and thus, remains a violation of the Article 41 of the chatter. In a
similar development, the Article 42 of the charter maintains that:
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Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations (United Nations, 1945).
Article 42 of the UNC still admonishes that it still remains the prerogative of the Security
Council to determine the adequacy of any procedure adopted to restore international peace and
security. In the case of Iraq which happens to be our point of analysis, it becomes imperative to
understand that the US did not suffer any armed attack neither did it rely on the Security Council
to address what it believed is a threat to international peace. The UN collective security
mechanism requires first a determination that a situation exists what constitutes a threat to the
peace, or a breach of peace, or an act of aggression. Article 39 of the Charter, which is called the
key article to UN enforcement action - is the authority for such determination. The article states
that:
the Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with article 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security (United Nations Charter, 1945).
Article 41 permits the Security Council to impose non-military sanctions against the
aggressor or peace-breaker while article 42 allows use of force in order to re-establish peace.
Article 39 is important because it corresponds to the exception of non-intervention principle –
the principle, which is a pre-existent “super customary” norm in international law and, is also
embodied in article 2(4) of the UN Charter, as discussed previously. The Charter, therefore,
empowers the Security Council to find a formal determination as regards the violation of article
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2(4). Such violation could be confirmed under article 39 of the Charter in order to take further
action through enforcement mechanism. A direct relationship is then found between “threat or
use of force” under article 2(4) and a “threat to the peace”, “breach of peace” and “act of
aggression” under article 39, which grants the Security Council jurisdiction under Chapter VII.
In other words “threat of force” corresponds with “threat to the peace” and “use of force” is
equivalent to a “breach of the peace” and “act of aggression.”
In the final analysis, an examination into the legality of use of force against Iraq by the
US finds it unconvincing that any such right under the present framework is available where use
of force in advance is permitted. Unlike 1990, Iraq did not commit an armed attack against the
territorial integrity of other State this time, nor did it act in breach of the fundamental principles
embodied in the Charter. As a matter of fact, it had fully complied with the obligation under
resolution 1441, and was under the strict supervision of the UN inspection authority for its
disarmament programs. Thus, the attack led by the US, itself was in violation of article 2(4) of
the Charter. On the other hand, the US may not justify its action as under article 51, firstly
because there had not been an “armed attack” by Iraq, nor a threat of imminent attack; secondly
the issue had been dealt by the Security Council as until then. Therefore, the US led invasion in
Iraq had been in clear violation of international law within the present structure of international
order.
6.3. Military operations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Within slightly less than three years of the withdrawal of the last US combat troops,
America is carrying out a new military campaign in Iraq. Once again the Persian Gulf country
tragically makes the headlines because of its unstable government and the risk of collapse of the
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entire state under pressure from extremist insurgents. We’re often tempted to think of US
military efforts in Iraq as a sort of family business, propelled by oil politics- Bush dynasty and a
bunch of ideologues against Saddam Hussein. As a matter of fact, however, since the end of the
Cold War no American president has found a way to avoid military interventions in
Mesopotamia. Massive oil reserves, a fragmented ethnic and sectarian composition, a bad
neighborhood, and a troubled history have made Iraq a focal point of instability in the Middle
East as well as a source of concern for a global power such as the United States. In an effort to
maintain its hegemony both in the Middle East region and the entire globe, the United State has
committed most of its military strength abroad. This policy has consequently led to the US armed
forces accused of abusing the human rights of the citizens in their host countries as enshrined in
the Universal Human Right Declaration of 1948.
The Universal Declaration of Human Right (UDHR) under its Article states that:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person (UDHR, 1948). Since the US led
invasion of suspected ‘axis of evil’ in the Middle East, it has been reported from various quarters
that the United States through its military has grossly violated the rights of citizens in the Middle
East. The United Nations News Centre (2010) has once affirmed that:
The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, has stated that the leaked US documents on the war in Iraq point to serious breaches of international human rights law. Pillay is urging US and Iraqi authorities to investigate all the allegations, which include summary executions of civilians and torture of detainees, to bring to justice to those responsible. This would be in accordance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other obligations to which both countries are parties (UNNC, 2010:8).
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During the past century and a half, the world has witnessed almost 100 attempts to
implement international agreements that would constrain the violence of war (Ted, 2004). While
many, if not most, of those conventions have fallen by the wayside through general disregard, a
few have served to ameliorate the suffering caused by armed conflicts. What separated relevant
from irrelevant agreements was pragmatism. The authors of the 1949 Geneva Conventions were
realists who recognized that by attempting to ban everything, they would stop nothing. Despite
the United States strive to maintain and protect the Universal Human Rights of individuals, the
country is faced with many challenges as regards to its fight against terrorism in the Middle East.
Distinction between permissible and impermissible violence is the keystone of
international humanitarian law. The international consensus that certain weapons and tactics
should be outlawed depends upon this distinction. Chemical weapons, for example, are clearly
illegal. The practical implementation of the rules depends upon soldiers' ability to discriminate
between what is military and what is not. In the words of an International Committee of the Red
Cross educational pamphlet (2004), it is a basic principle of international humanitarian law that
persons fighting in armed conflict must, at all times, distinguish between civilians and
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives. It this aspect of the US
occupation of some states in the Middle East that have contravened must declaration on Human
Rights as recognized by the United Nations. The extra-judicial killing and kidnapping of
suspected terrorist in the region has sparked different levels of violence in response to the
dimension of human right abuse by the US led forces in the region. Similar to this is the illegal
detaining and height of noncombatant casualties in the war against terrorism by the US Marines.
The Guantanamo Bay holding facility, for instance has constantly been debated as a subject of
international human right abuse by the US military. In an attempt to paint a clear picture of the
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Human Right incidence in Middle East, Iraq precisely, the Washington Post (2004) in a dispatch
publication highlighted that:
Hundreds of unclaimed dead lay at the morgue at midday Monday -- blood-caked men who had been shot, knifed, garroted or apparently suffocated by the plastic bags still over their heads. Many of the bodies were sprawled with their hands still bound (Washington Post, February 28, 2006:11)
Meanwhile the London Independent of March 1, 2006 also reported that hundreds of
Iraqis are being tortured to death or summarily executed every month in Baghdad by death
squads working out of the Ministry of the Interior. The Washington Post reported on November
3, 2005 that the United States has used secret detention facilities in Eastern Europe and
elsewhere to illegally hold terrorist suspects without rights or access to counsel. Citing U.S.
government concerns, the article did not identify the locations in Eastern Europe. On a similar
account, the Human Right watch also pointed accusing fingers to US, affirming that the United
States are running illegal detention camps in some parts of Europe. Thus, the Human Right
Watch (2005) in a statement maintained that:
Specifically, we have collected information that CIA airplanes traveling from Afghanistan in 2003 and 2004 made direct flights to remote airfields in Poland and Romania. Human Rights Watch has viewed flight records showing that a Boeing 737, registration number N313P – a plane that the CIA used to move several prisoners to and from Europe, Afghanistan, and the Middle East in 2003 and 2004 – landed in Poland and Romania on direct flights from Afghanistan on two occasions in 2003 and 2004. Human Rights Watch has independently confirmed several parts of the flight records, and supplemented the records with independent research. Human Rights Watch has obtained information that several detainees who had been held secretly in Afghanistan in 2003 were transferred out of the country in September and October
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2003. The Polish intelligence service maintains a large training facility and grounds near the Szymany airport (Human Right Watch, 2005:3).
Conclusively, the kidnapping, detaining, torturing, and extra judicial killing of suspected
terrorist in the Middle East has prompted many to question the legitimacy of such action and its
relevance in tackling the security crisis in the region. However, the US Military policy which
undoubtedly took another dimension in the post 9/11 United States started gradually and later
escalated into a full blown crisis and since then have been taking different alarming dimension
such as the rise of the Islamic State in the Syria/Iraq and the Islamic State in the Levant.
(ISIS/ISIL). In a period when the United States are making efforts to withdraw its troops from
the Iraq and Afghanistan, the western backed Afghan government are in what seems to be a
diplomatic disagreement originating from Human Right Issues to the fate of Afghan citizens held
by the US in illegal detention camps. According to Rahiem (2004):
President Hamid Karzai accused British and U.S. forces of continuing to operate "illegal" detention facilities in the country and infringing they Rights, another volley in the rancorous disagreement between the Afghan leader and his foreign backers over what to do with captured Taliban suspects (Rahiem, 2004:6).
The Bush United States claim of authority for military tribunals has not gone
unchallenged. Legal battles over the detention of “illegal combatants” at the US naval base at
Guantánamo Bay began very shortly after the arrival of the first detainees early in 2002. The
continuing legal chaos’s caused by the government’s actions at Guantánamo Bay are partly a
result of the base's location and the process of holding suspects in the facility. Guantánamo lies
in the legal twilight where US global dominance meets a world still divided into independent
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nation-states, while the world’s growing interdependence demands transnational political and
legal identities and institutions that are still lacking.
Therefore, from our preceding arguments and analysis on the United States counter
terrorism policy is in accord with the provisions of the United Nations charter, it is safe to say,
beyond all reasonable doubt that the United States counter terrorism policy is not in accord with
the provisions of the United Nations charter. The end result of this policy is the rise of anti-
Americanism in the Middle East and in the long run the UN charter will not be binding on
member states which may sadly lead to the demise of the United Nations. Therefore we reject
and invalidate our third hypothesis which states that “the United States counter terrorism policy
is in accord with the provisions of the United Nations charter”.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
7.1. Summary
The study examined some empirical indices and indicators of the United States Policy of
Preemption with particular reference to Security in the Middle East. The study investigated
factors that account for the present security issues and crisis within the Middle East region and
the role of the United States in the seeming unending conflict from 1999-2014. To adequately
interrogate the problem under study, the study was divided into six chapters. The first chapter of
the study was basically the introduction. However, deducting from our broad objective stated
above, we outlined some specific objectives which were:
1. Determine if the invasion of suspected “axis of evil” in the Middle East states by the
United States reduced incidence of insecurity in the region.
2. Investigate whether the unilateral use of force by the United States reduced attacks on
America, and its allies in the Middle East
3. Establish whether the United States counter terrorism policy is in accord with the
provisions of the United Nations charter
Consequently, adopting our specific objectives as a guide and frame work, the following
research questions were posed:
1 Has the invasion of suspected “axis of evil” in the Middle East states by the United States
reduced incidence of insecurity in the region?
2 Has the unilateral use of force by the United States reduced attacks on America, and her
allies in the Middle East?
3 Does the United States counter terrorism policy in accord with the provisions of the
United Nations charter?
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The above research questions thematically guided our review of pertinent literatures on
the study in chapter two. The empirical, classical and conceptual views of scholars on themes
related or associated with Preemption Policy and Security and Security in the Middle East were
examined and analyzed. The works of organisations and scholars like UN Charter (1945),
Kissinger (2009), Hinnebusch (2007), Kagan (2003), karbo & Lee Ray (2003), Zoellick (2006),
Baghat (2004), Thabit (2006), Rourke (2009), Long (2006), Rice (2002), Boot (2009), D’Arcy
and Levi (2005), Carafano & Rsenzweig (2005), Dinstein (2001), Glennon (2002), Graubard
(2009), Beard (2002), Distin (2007), Glenon (2001) , among others were interrogated in the
process of historicizing, explaining and examining the United States Policy of Preemption and
Security in the Middle East. The study concurred with the dominant view among these writers
that the United States Policy of preemption in the Middle East have been counterproductive
leading to a new level of threat to the Western World but took a departure from the works of
some contemporary scholars like Graubard (2009) by arguing that the unilateral use of force by
the Unites States has eroded any amount of sympathy attracted by the 9/11 attack on United
States and thus this has led reprisal attack from Middle East region and the US holding its
ground to contain such threats. This basically informs the gap in the literature.
However, chapter three examined the methodological approach employed in the study.
The study adopted the analytical framework of Power theory from the from the realist
perspective as expounded by scholars such as Carr (1939), Morgenthau (1976), and Waltz (1979)
among others. The central focus of the theory is on understanding the real politik and inter play
manifest in the relations between one state and another in their international arena. Informed by
the tenets of power theory that state engage in relations with another state to promote and pursue
it interest first, the power theory believe that power is might. Hence deducing from the realist
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perspective, the theory is consequential on the premise that the international arena is anarchical
in nature and states strive to emerge more powerful in the outcome of the inter-play. Survival
dictates that the primary concern of every state should be its own survival and perpetual
existence. It is thus prudent for states not to rely on other states or international institutions to
interfere on their behalf. In the face of threat, states are expected to engage in military build-up
and should the threat be in a form of a much larger states, the threatened state may form an
alliance with other “smaller” states to restore the balance of power and vice versa.
In addition, the power theory from the realist perspective as a tool of analysis helped us
to understand and explain the reality of international political dynamics as states interact with
one another. The framework brought into focus the continuous struggle and quest by the United
States to maintain its Unipolarity attained from the aftermath of the cold war. Similarly, it also
portrayed the hegemonic quest of some states in the Middle East such as Iraq which pose a direct
threat to the interest and survival of America and her allies. It then becomes pertinent that the
United States and its subsequent Presidents, despite party ideology, will always strive to pursue
those vital interests of the US which are abound in its relations with the Persian Gulf region.
The hypotheses adduced from our research questions in order to arrive at a satisfactory
answer to our research questions include:
1 The invasion of suspected “axis of evil” in the Middle East states by the United States
has not reduced incidence of insecurity in the region.
2 The unilateral use of force by the United States has not reduced attacks on America, and
its allies in the Middle East
3 The United States counter terrorism policy is in accord with the provisions of the United
Nations charter.
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This study adopted the single-case ex-post facto research design which is also known as
‘after-the-fact’ design. And it is based on the examination of independent and dependent
variables after the events have occurred and the data already in existence. However, the
qualitative method of data collection was also employed in the study, relying heavily on
secondary sources of data such as text books, journals, official publications, seminars,
conference and workshop papers, magazines, newspapers, among others. The descriptive method
of data analysis was adopted to give descriptive explanations or interpretations to tables and
figures in our study and also to demonstrate the validity and reliability of the findings of this
study.
Moreover, in the chapter four, we tested our first hypothesis which showed that the
invasion of suspected ‘axis of evil’ in the Middle East region by the United States has brought
the US and its allies into a direct conflict terrorist groups operating from the region. That from
the events of the September 11 attack on America by the Al-Qaeda terrorist group operating
from Afghanistan were the then Taliban regime in the country allowed the safe heaven, the
American policy towards the region has been hard lined. Hence in response to the gruesome and
devastating attack, the policy of preemption was enacted by the United States government as
enshrined in the NSS, 2001. This policy allowed for the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq and the
consequent unilateral actions of the United States such as the ‘coalition of the willing’ and the
recourse by America in its ‘war against terror’ against terror without the age long traditional
allies.
Again, in our chapter five, we x-rayed our second hypothesis which showed that the
United States had to resort to the unilateral use of force and military action to curtail the high rate
of insecurity in the Middle East which was most often targeted at her citizens and facilities in the
126
region. Hence in an effort to promote peace in the region, the United States had to deploy troops
in Iraq and Afghanistan and made use of unmanned aerial vehicles to target terrorist hide outs in
areas such as Pakistan and Yemen were the US had no standing Army. In line with the following
development, the US had to resort to drone strikes and targeted killing of terrorist groups and
leaders who are hiding in the mountainous terrain of the region. Considering the administrative
structure of the terrorist groups, the US made use of Decapitation tactics which was aimed at
eliminating the leaders of these groups either by killing, arresting or detaining of such leaders.
The second chapter of this study brought into limelight the new trend of the United States
response to the growing spate of terrorism in the world, Middle East precisely.
Finally, in our chapter six which is the last analysis of the study, we verified the third
hypothesis which showed the relationship between the United States Counter terrorism policies
and the United Nations Charter. The chapter ascertained the grounds at which the United States
might carry out an attack against a terrorist group operating from another territory and the
position of the UN Charter on armed attack and on self defense. The chapter ascertained the
legality of the policy of preemption, unilateralism and militarism as a self defense policy
employed by the United States to fight terrorism in the Middle East. It concluded with an
assessment of the Universal Human Right Declaration as adopted by the United Nations and its
relations with the US Counter terrorism policies.
7.2 Conclusion
In this study, we have evaluated the United States Policy of Preemption and its effect on
Security in the Middle East from 1999-2014. The study noted that the Counterterrorism policy of
the United States have succeeded in evading the occurrence of another catastrophic attack on the
US homeland that is near the magnitude of the September 11, 2001 attack by the Osama Bin
127
Laden led Al Qaeda terrorist group. This notwithstanding, the study tried to posit that despite any
achievement recorded by the US adoption of the preemption policy to tackle terrorism in the
middle east, it has led to high level of hatred and radicalism from the region as US is still faced
with terrorist threats. Hence, a thorough analysis of the ongoing crisis in the region evidently
shows that the United States are still targeted by terrorist groups from the region. The idea of
regime change in the region has also escalated violence as the Western tailored democracy still
remains alien to the people. Similar to this is the fact that the United States does not consider the
customs and cultural heritage of Middle East states, which seems to be monarchical and
oligarchic before enforcing democracy down their throat. In such a situation, the outcome
sectarian crisis such as the Shiite and Sunni.
Finally, the study also concludes that it is appropriate that the use of force under any
circumstances should come only after a very careful consideration of all the alternatives, and in
the case of preemptive force, the arguments in favor of great caution are particularly strong. The
threat or use of preemptive force is neither a magic bullet nor an anathema. In an effort to strike a
balance, we also tried to assert in this study that some threats simply cannot be addressed by
waiting until they become actual or “imminent” as traditionally understood. The stronger the
institutional mechanisms, and the broader the political support for a given use of force, the more
likely it will not only be seen as legitimate, but also that the adverse consequences can be
limited. The unilateral use of preventive force therefore should truly be seen as an in extremis
policy choice, as the United States policy of preemption have not been able to secure vital level
of peace in the Persian Gulf. On the basis of the analysis above, we state the following findings:
• The United States Policy of Preemption has not reduced incidence of insecurity in the
Middle East
128
• The unilateral use of force by the United States has led to the increase in radicalization of
civilian population in the Middle East
• The United States counter terrorism policy is not in accordance with the UN charter and
has contributed to the increase in the abuse of fundamental human rights worldwide.
7.3 Recommendations
In the light of the above findings of the study, we put forward the following
recommendations to policy makers, stakeholders and researchers in United Nations, Washington
and the Middle East countries.
• American should allow countries develop based on their individual imperatives and this
entail that the US should endeavor not to interfere in the internal happenings of countries in
the Middle East. Democracy should not be forced down on any countries throat in the
Middle East.
• Force should not be the major instrument in ending terrorism especially in the Middle East.
Other alternatives like negotiations and mutual understanding should be considered and
adopted by United States of America. The socio-cultural values of the region should be
respected and valued by United States of America.
• The United Nations should put appropriate modalities to ensure that the letter and the spirit
of its charter are respected and obeyed. The flagrant disregard for its charter especially that
pertaining to fundamental human rights should be abhorred and such guilty nations
punished.
129
• The countries that make up the Middle East should coming together to form a synergy on
how to curtail the spread of radical and militant Islam. Concerted effort should be made to
see to the eradication of such tendencies. The use of propaganda and indoctrination to
radicalize unsuspecting and willing youths should be checkmated. If the fight against terror
comes from the inside, then such effort will go a long way in winning the war terror.
• The need to interrogate how conflict is exported in the Middle East should be properly
investigated and interrogated. Such an area of research should be of interest to researchers
who are concerned with burden of providing lasting solution to the Middle East crisis.
• Despite its many challenges, the united nation should assume its place as umpire in world
politics and indicate that, as a matter of policy, the use of preemptive force should be
undertaken in the absence of imminence only with the approval of the Security Council.
Such a policy should ensure multilateral support for such action and would likely prevent
the opening of flood gates to unilateral preemptive action by other states.
• Similar to the previous recommendation, the United States should acknowledge that
existing international law relating to the use of force is highly problematic and seek,
through the Security Council, to move toward the development of legal regime that would
truly be authoritative and controlling state behaviour. This may be a daunting task, and
United States may prefer the law be left as it is. Nevertheless, if the legal regime for the
recourse of force is to return to something move closely resembling a stable order, the
united state-as the super power in the international system-needs to take the lead both in
acknowledging the deficiency in the current legal structure and pointing the way to its
improvement.
130
• As regards to use of force, U.S. government needs to provide better data about how and
why it conducts drove strikes to bolster public confidence in the grogram. While the
openness with which officials have discussed the highly classified program is noteworthy,
such talk has not provided data to substantiate the broad claims officials have made-such as
extraordinary low civilian casualties. The scattered reporting about drone strikes would
chance the public debate and build support for the program drone strike will be effective if
combined with broader policies to handle their many effects. Developing those policies will
be subject of future research.
• Lastly, policy makers in the United States should understand that America will likely be
unsuccessful in the war against terrorists through military superiority alone. A doctrine of
pre-emption needs a substantial non military effort to compliment such efforts. In practice
as much as in policy, America’s defense doctrine must include, as the national security
strategy outlines, mort sophisticated and nuanced diplomatic initiatives and humanitarian
programs, efforts designed to reduce the underlying funding and sources of terrorist
motivation and recruitment. The present Obama administration should work aggressively
and sincerely to win not only military engagements but clash of ideas and values, to win the
support of world leaders and the people they govern, and to win back the hearts and minds
of those who on 11 September stood shoulder to shoulder with America.
The above recommendations if taken into cognizance and implemented will not only go a
long way in improving security in the Middle East, but also in safeguarding America’s
interest, facilities, and allies abroad.
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Appendix 1
Map of Afghanistan showing the different regions in the country
Source: Congressional Research Service
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Appendix 2
Map of the Middle East.
Source: National Geospatial Intellegence Agency.
140
Appendix 3
Map of Yemen showing areas and dates of US strikes
Source: Long war journal 2010
141
Source: Long war journal 2010
142
Map of Pakistan showing its neighbours in East Asia
Source: Magellan geographic, 1999