Paper presented at the 8th APMRN Conference, 26-29 May, 2007, Fuzhou, China

Environmental Concerns and Population Displacement

in West China

Yan Tan National Institute of Labour Studies

Flinders University, Australia Email: yan.tan@flinders.edu.au

Fei Guo

Department of Business Macquarie University, Australia

Email: fguo@efs.mq.edu.au

(DRAFT)

Abstract

One of the areas in migration studies in China that has not been adequately understood is

population displacement as a result of environmental deterioration. This paper offers a

comprehensive review of recent literature in this area. It focuses on people displacement

produced by accelerated environmental deterioration in West China. It briefly reviews the

literature on environment-related migration and then discusses the distribution and features of

the major ecologically fragile zones. Following is an examination of poverty as an important

factor in initiating migration. It examines the processes and some consequences of

environment-related displacement and resettlement. Finally, some suggestions on how best to

cope with issues of people displacement are addressed.

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1. Introduction

Population migration, especially labour migration, has become an increasingly important part

of China’s rapid economic development in recent decades. It was estimated that by the end

of 20th century, between 80 and 120 million people moved across county boundary for

various reasons (Liang, 2007). It has also been identified that the main patterns of migration

in China have been from interior to costal regions and from rural to urban centers (Fan, 2005;

Guo and Iredale, 2004; Liang 2001). However, most migration studies focused on a number

of main migration streams – labour migration, family and marriage migration, and

employment-related migration. One important migration stream in contemporary China –

environment-related population displacement – has not been examined adequately.

Environment-related migration has been an important dimension of population movements in

China, especially since the beginning of the 21st century. This dimension is of large scale and

significance, particularly in its connection with environmental regeneration and anti-poverty

programs in China. Due to the impetus to carry out environmental protection and

rehabilitation in China, west China in particular, and the complexity and difficulty associated

with doing so, research on environment-related migration is certain to increase in scope and

depth. Issues of environmental protection and rehabilitation, alleviation of poverty in the

ecologically fragile zones, construction of nature reserves, and conservation of biodiversity

have attracted the attention of scholars both in China (e.g., Hou, 2002, 2006; Niu, 2001;

Wang, 2004, 2006; Wang, 1998) and overseas (e.g., Lai, 2002; Moneyhon, 2003; Tan &

Wang 2004).

Nevertheless, knowledge about how migration and environmental variables interact and

affect the social and economic transformations in China remains very limited. The present

paper seeks to address this gap in knowledge by focusing upon people displacement produced

by accelerated environmental degradation in China. This paper begins with a brief review of

the literature on environment-related migration. Section 3 discusses the distribution and

features of the major ecologically fragile zones. Section 4 considers poverty as an

independent variable in the environment-migration relationship. Section 5 examines the

processes and some consequences of environment-related displacement and resettlement.

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Finally, some of the policy responses to emergent issues of people displacement are

addressed.

2. Environment-related Migration

Since its first official mention in 1985 by El-Hinnawi (1985), the concept ‘environmental

refugee’ has appeared with increasing frequency in the literature on environment, migration

and development. Jacobsen (1988) defines ‘environmental refugee’ as referring to people

who have been forced to leave their origin area because of environmental disruption. He

estimated the number of environmental refugees in the world to be 10 million in the mid-

1980s, a figure that Myers (1997) put at 25 million by the mid-1990s.

Studies of migration caused by the gradual deterioration of the environments in which people

live have dominated the literature of environmental refugees since the 1990s (e.g., Black,

1998; Black & Sessay, 1997; Hugo, 1996; Millikan, 1992; Myers, 1997, 1995; Otunnu, 1992;

Ramlogan, 1996; Suhrke, 1994; Westing, 1994). These studies view ‘population pressure’

and an overloading of the land’s human carrying capacity (whereby population growth

increases demands for natural resources and thus causes environmental degradation) in the

origin areas of emigrants as the primary causes of environment-related migration. Despite the

lack of standing given to environmental factors among social scientists, many

environmentalists take it for granted that population growth, environmental deterioration, and

emigration are essentially correlated (e.g., Hermsmeyer, 2005). Increasing demands of the

environmental certainly lead to land competition and encroachment on ecologically fragile

areas, which in turn lead to the impoverishment of the local economy and society. The effects

of environmental deterioration are therefore manifested through the influences they have on

the local economy (Bates, 2002). Moreover, people residing in fragile environments are

characteristically poverty-stricken and their wellbeing is inherently tied to their immediate

environments. Since they are least likely to be able to relinquish immediate returns from the

environment for the purpose of long-term protection measures, they are highly vulnerable to

environmental degradation and its consequences. It is also not sufficient to consider the

migration-environment relationship only in terms of migration produced by particular

environment events. Richmond (1993, p.8) argues that ‘…when environmental degradation

leads to migration it is generally as a proximate cause linked to questions of economic

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growth, poverty, population pressure, and political conflict.’ These issues create difficulties

in treating this class of environment-related migrants in the same way as those that evacuate

due to direct environmental changes such as disasters and expropriations (also Bates, 2002).

With respect to methods of migration, environmental migration is, more often than not, the

purposeful, planned, organised, and orderly involuntary displacement and resettlement of a

population. In this sense, environmental migration is similar to another category of

involuntary migration produced by development projects such as dams, reservoirs, urban

expansion and transportation infrastructure (e.g., Cernea, 1990), but is essentially different

from refugees. Refugees are defined by the 1951 United Nations ‘Convention on Refugees’

and its 1967 Amendment as persons who escape from or are driven out of their original

regions by persecution arising from racial, religious, nationality, organizational, political or

other differences. Hence, refugees have difficulties in gaining assistance within their own

country and have to obtain external protection. There is no absolute distinction between

voluntary and involuntary migrations (Speare, 1974). Hugo (1996, p. 107) points out that:

Population mobility is probably best viewed as being arranged along a continuum ranging from

totally voluntary migration, in which the choice and the will of the migrants is the overwhelmingly

decisive element encouraging people to move, to totally forced migration, where the migrants are

faced with death if they remain in their present place of residence.

3. Ecologically Fragile Environment in China

3.1 Distribution and features of the ecologically fragile zones (EFZs)

China is confronting serious environmental degradation (Fu et al., 2004; Li, 2004; Wang,

2004; Wang et al., 2004; Zhang et al., 2006). The most pressing environmental problems are

extensive soil erosion and desertification. An ‘ecologically fragile environment’ is an

environment with little resistance to external disturbance and poor stability under external

pressure. Its main characteristics are sensitivity and instability (Huang & Ai, 2003; Liu, 1993;

Xiao, 2003; Yang et al., 1992; Zhao, 1999; Zhao & Liu, 1996). Sensitivity refers to the

relationship of factors within the environment that is vulnerable to alteration such that any

disturbance may result in a series of reactions and have negative impacts on the environment.

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This means any alteration of a main element may lead to an immense environmental change.

Instability has a strong spatial and temporal dimension.

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Figure 1. Distribution of the ecologically fragile zones in China. Source: Modified from Zhao (1999, p. 24).

Note: 1. Semi-arid and semi-humid areas in north China; 2. Semi-arid areas in northwestern China; 3. Lime rock

mountains in southwestern China; 4. Mountainous areas in southwestern China; 5. Qinghai-Tibetan plateau; 6.

Plain areas in northern China; 7. Hilly areas in southern China.

An ecologically fragile zone (EFZ), which spans a large area, even crossing provincial

boundaries, is interrelated with the biophysical features, social conditions and economic

activities of that region/area. Fragility is not only indicated in the instability of its internal

structure and sensitivity to any external disturbance to the environment, but also in the low

capacity to support human socio-economic activities.

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3.2 Crucial environmental problems in the EFZs in west China

Serious water and soil erosion

Water and soil erosion has been the number one environmental issue in China. The area with

soil and water erosion is 3.56 million km2, accounting for 37% of the total land area of

China. Specifically, the eroded land area increases by 10,000 km2 a year. Water and soil

erosion causes a tremendous loss of soil, 5 billion tons a year, two-thirds of which is lost

from west China.1 In west China, soil erosion includes wind erosion in the northwestern parts

(e.g., Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Gansu and Qinghai provinces), water erosion in the

southwestern parts, and freeze-thaw erosion on Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau. Soil erosion occurs

mainly in Yunan, Guizhou, Sichuan, Chongqing and Hubei provinces in the upper Yangtze

River and Shanxi, Shannxi, Inner Mongolia, Ganshu and Ningxia provinces in the middle

Yellow River.

An increasing area of land in west China is exposed to water or wind erosion due to a

reduction in vegetation cover, little rainfall and severe droughts in arid areas in recent years.

Over-harvesting of trees, over-cultivation of arable land, irrational exploitation of inland

water resources and the neglect of soil conservation practices during implementation of civil

engineering are human-related causes for soil erosion. About 450,000 km2 (or 70%) of land

on Loess Plateau (mainly involving Gansu and Shaanxi) is prone to soil erosion. As the

originating places of sediment in the Yellow River, Loess Plateau has suffered the most

serious soil erosion in the world. In the upper and middle catchments of the Yangtze River,

about 550,000 km2 of land (35% of its total area) is affected by soil erosion. Soil erosion is

not only a threat to the life-supporting system, but also results in land degradation and leads

to siltation in rivers and lakes and floods downstream (Figure 2). Situated at an elevation of

over 3000m, Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau has about 1.04 million km2 of land threatened by

freezing-thawing erosion.

1 See www.peopledaily.ac.cn/GB/jingji/1037/2167467.html.

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Figure 2. Sediment accumulation due to soil erosion in Xichang prefecture,

Sichuan province, in 2001.

Aggregated desertification

Desertification refers to the degradation of arid or semi-arid land through water erosion,

sediment accumulation and salination. The majority (90%) of natural grasslands that can be

used (2.25 million km2) in China have been seriously deteriorated (Wang, 2006). The land

being increasingly desertificated is on an average of 20,000 km2 a year (Xinhua News

Agency, 10 November 2003). The provinces that have the largest area of desert land are

Xinjiang (1.04 million km2), Inner Mongolia (0.66 million km2) and Tibet (0.44 million km2)

(Wang & Zhang, 2002). China is still in a state of overall deterioration despite some

improvement in controlling desertification in some regions. Resulting natural disasters are

becoming more frequent and serious, and the loss via erosion bigger (Lu & Wu, 2007).

Taking Tibet as an example, an area of some 0.2 million km2 (or 17%) of land which is

suffering from desertification. Another 0.2 million km2 of land is threatened by

desertification (Development and Planning Commission of the Tibet Autonomous Region,

2003). Warming of the climate may trigger more serious and a larger area of desertification

in Tibet. A widening gap between the low carrying capacity of the land and the growing

population and livestock may lead to over-exploitation of land resources, which will further

aggravate desertification.

Specifically, the environment in the source regions of the Yangtze, Yellow and Nanchang

rivers on the Qinhai-Tibetan Plateau has worsened over the past four decades. This is

manifested in rapid desertification, serious vegetation degradation, lake shrinkage and

salinisation, wetland degradation and biodiversity reduction. Climate change and the

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alteration of glacial snow accumulation and the freeze-thaw process of the frozen soil, as

well as overgrazing and rodent damage are identified as the principal determinants (Wang &

Cheng, 2000). The headwater area of the three rivers has the richest biodiversity distributed

on high lands (an average elevation of some 4,000m) in the world. Its total area is

3.16x105 km2. Some wetlands and the ecologically sensitive convergence of the three rivers

are found here (Renmin Ribao, 2000a). Around 700,000 people (tripling the population in the

1950s) live in here. Moreover, there are 22 million of sheep equivalent livestock depend on

this land, with an actual carrying capacity of the grassland greater than 50-60% of the real

carrying capacity of the land.

Deforestation

Forests have played a fundamental role in environmental conservation. Any action to damage

forests may contribute to soil erosion, floods and occurrences of sandstorms. By 2005, the

other provinces in northwestern China had a forest coverage rate below the average level

(18.2%) in China, except for Shaanxi (32.6%). The forest coverage rate was about 4.4%,

2.9%, 6.1%, 6.7% in Qinghai, Xinjiang, Ningxia, and Ganshu, respectively (National Bureau

of Statistics of China, 2006). The total area of forests in northwestern China (excluding

Shaanxi) was only 114,126 km2, accounting for only 6.5% of the total area of forests (1.75

million km2) in China.

Southwestern China once enjoyed abundant forestland, but forests have been progressively

destroyed (Figure 3). Sichuan province, for instance, experienced a decline of forest coverage

rate by more than 60% from the 1930s to the 1980s. In the 1950s its forest coverage rate was

20%, but it declined to the lowest level of 9% in the 1960s. Data show that the drastic flood

on the Yangtze River in 1998 was closely related to losses of forests in upstream regions

(Yang & Chen, 2003).

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Figure 3. Cleared forest in western Sichuan, in 1999.

Water scarcity

Except for Sichuan, most areas in west China face the problem of scarce water resources. In

northwestern parts where annual rainfall is often less than 400mm and average annual

evaporation is as high as 1,200mm, there is a big shortage of supply and demand for water.

The water shortage rate in recent years, in these areas, has reached 8.7%. Water scarcity is

more severe in some areas, such as Guanzhong district in Shannxi, oases in Xinjiang, Hexi

(i.e., west of the Yellow River) Corridor district and the Shiyang River watershed in Gansu

(Li, 2005; Yang et al., 1994; Yang et al., 2006). Although rainfall in southwestern China is as

high as 1,000mm, the water storage capacity is small, as mountains and hills are widely

spaced. It is also excessively difficult to build reservoirs in mountains and hills. Qinghai-

Tibetan Plateau enjoys a great number of lakes, of which the total area is 36,900 km2, making

up 52% of the total area of all lakes in China. Yet, many lakes are facing the problem of

becoming dry. In addition to climatic change and the decline in the groundwater level,

human activities have also increased thereby exacerbating environmental problems.

Degradation of grassland

Besides climate change, over-grazing is an important factor in causing the degradation of

grasslands. The majority (90%) of grassland in China suffers from degradation. The

proportion of grassland suffering from overgrazing is 36%, double the figure for the 1980s.

Degradation of grassland in northwestern parts is more serious than in any other places in

China. For instance, the proportion of degradation in Ningxia, Shaanxi, Ganshu and Tibet is

as high as 97.4%, 58.8%, 45.2% and 30.4%, respectively. One of the five major pasturelands

in China, northwestern Sichuan has experienced a rapid degradation since the 1960s. The

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desertified land in this region expands at a drastic rate. According to a survey by Sichuan

Agricultural Academy, about 40,000 km2 of grassland has suffered from rat epidemics over

the last decade, which leads to an annual loss of fodder reaching 1 billion kilograms.

Moreover, over-harvesting of herbs has negative impacts on grasslands.

4. Poverty-stricken Population

There is a widening disparity in the levels of economic development between the western

areas and eastern regions of China. By 2005, the population in west China accounted for

about 30% of the total population in China; per capita GDP and per capita net income of

farmers was approximately 40% and 50% of that in east China, respectively (Wen, 2005). Of

the 592 national poverty-stricken counties, as defined by the State Council in 1994, 383

counties are located in west China. Up till 2006, there were still 21.5 million rural people

living in absolute poverty in China.2 More than half of them (54.7%) live in west China,

compared to 32.8% in central and 12.5% in east China (China Information Newspaper, 10

April 2007).

The geographical distribution of China’s poverty-stricken population is highly correlated to

the EFZs (see Figures 8 and 1). There is high incidence of poverty occurring in the EFZs,

where more than three quarters (76%) of the counties are poor. These counties account for

73% of all poverty-stricken counties in China. Accordingly, 74% of people residing in the

EFZs live in poverty-stricken conditions. Most poverty-stricken counties in west China are

situated either in remote mountainous regions (258 counties) or in areas dominated by ethnic

people (210 counties). 3 These areas are characterized by difficult accessibility of

transportation and information.

2 The absolute poverty-stricken rural population is defined as farmers whose annual net income was less than

200 yuan in 1985 when China set up poverty line for people’s basic food and clothing problems. For later years, the standard of poverty only varies by price index. It was 693 yuan in 2006. In terms of this criterium, the poverty-stricken population was reduced from 250 million in 1978 to 21.48 million in 2006. The provenance rate, ratio of poor people whose basic food and clothing are not solved of the total rural people, decreased from 30.7 to 2.3 per cent over the same period. Note that the figure of poverty-stricken population was under-estimated when compared to the international standard for poverty, by which the annual net income was 924 yuan in 2006. In line with the international criteria, the poverty-stricken population in China would be 80-100 million by 2006.

3 Fifty of the total 55 ethnic groups of population in China live in the western parts, accounting for 75% of the total ethnic population in China. By 2005, the poverty-stricken ethnic population was 11.7 million, nearly half (49.5%) of the total poverty-stricken population in China (Xinhua News Net, 29 March 2007).

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Figure 4. Distribution of national poverty-stricken counties.

Source: State Council Leading Group Office of Poverty Alleviation and Development (2003).

The fast growing rural population is an important reason for the poverty seen in the EFZs. In

four of the five northwestern provinces, the average annual population growth rates were

greater than the national average over a decade to 2000. The growth rates in Xinjiang, Gansu,

Ningxia and Qinghai were 2.34, 1.65, 0.95, 0.40 percent, respectively, with an exception in

Shannxi (–0.55%) (Li & Cheng, 2007). These rates reflect the fact that the rural population in

northwestern China grows rapidly in absolute and relative terms, but the process of

urbanization is comparatively slow.

Liu & Wang (2001) constructed a relational model to quantify the links between population

distributions, physical elements (e.g., precipitation, elevation, landforms) and socio-economic

variables (e.g., cultivation ratio of land, human development index, per capita GDP,

expenditure of residents, total fixed capital investment, built areas in cities, and area of arable

land). They modeled the optimistic or theoretical distribution of population in each province.

The comparison between the real and modeled densities of population provides an indication

of the degree of pressure on the human carrying capacity of the environment (Table 1). The

actual human supporting capacities of the lands in western provinces are all higher than the

theoretical values. Ningxia is in the worst situation to support its population. The deviation of

the actual and modeled carrying capacity of the environment also varies by region within a

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province. For example, in Dingxi prefecture 4 of Gansu province, the supporting capability of

the environment is estimated to be 7-8 persons/ km2, but the real population density reached

128 persons/ km2 in 2002.5 By contrary, the modeled carrying capacities in some eastern

provinces are far greater than the actual capacities. For instance, the real carrying capacity is

only one-quarter of its theoretical capacity in Guangdong. This suggests that there might be a

potential for these provinces to receive some migrants displaced from western provinces.

Table 1. Population density in west China and selected eastern provinces: actual vs. modeled.

Province Actual population density (persons/km2) (1)

Modeled population density (persons/km2) (2)

Ratio of (1)/(2)

In west China:

Ningxia 102.9 1.79 57.42

Guizhou 200.3 15.69 12.76

Gansu 60.8 7.94 7.66

Qinghai 6.8 1.17 5.77

Yunnan 106.2 23.47 4.53

Sichuan 203.7 52.46 3.88

Shannxi 169.6 51.52 3.29

Xinjiang 10.3 6.92 1.49

Guangxi 194.2 141.66 1.37

Inner Mongolia 20.0 19.69 1.02

Tibet 2.0 0.00 -

In east China

Guangdong 410.0 1421.04 0.29

Jiangsu 718.4 1486.54 0.48

Helongjiang 83.1 169.48 0.49

Liaoling 291.2 547.42 0.53

Shandong 565.9 871.85 0.65

Zhejiang 445.7 668.78 0.67

Source: adapted from Liu & Wang (2001, p.36).

Note: Chongqing was excluded in the modeling as it was a part of Sichuan before 1997.

In the poverty-stricken areas in west China, people are used to the traditional ways of

production. This way of production may lead to the over-exploitation of natural resources

when there is a rapid increase of population. As a result, environmental degradation and a

decline in land productivity is inevitable. Once population growth increases the pressure on

4 Dingxi prefecture administers 6 counties and 1 district, with total population of 2.96 million in 2006 and a total

area of 20,300 km2. 5 See http://www.envir.gov.cn/info/2002/10/1030119.htm.

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agricultural land, more serious degradation will eventuate, which in turn leads to greater

poverty. Thus, people are trapped in a vicious circle: destruction of ‘environment – poverty –

more destruction of environment – more poverty’. Since most poverty-stricken counties in

western China are situated in EFZs, it is more rewarding to wage anti-poverty campaigns in

combination with environmental conservation and reconstruction.

5. Environment-related People Displacement in West China

5.1 Grand development in West China

Raising the living standards of the people, from simply having enough food and clothing to a

relatively comfortable life, has become a guiding principle of socio-economic development at

this stage of China’s modernization (Jiang, 2002a). In March 2000, China officially initiated

the ‘Grand Development in West China’ strategy, starting the spatial transformations of

social and economic development from east to west (Renmin Ribao, 2000b). This strategy

involves all dimensions of development (economic, social, environmental, and security). It is

being implemented through a range of programs: infrastructure construction, resource

development (especially water resource and energy), environmental protection and

rehabilitation, industrial restructuring, human capital, rural development and social welfare of

the people (Renmin Ribao, 2002). Four key environmental measures have been implemented

to halt the deterioration of fragile environments in China. These include: ‘afforestation’,

‘natural forest protection’, ‘control of sandstorm sources’; and ‘returning degraded

pastureland to grass’. The country explicitly sets forth the following aims:

• to achieve a breakthrough in basic infrastructure construction and the environmental

rehabilitation of West China in 5-10 years’ time;

• to do a good job in the protection of natural forests, management of sand movements,

rehabilitation of cultivated land at steep slopes with a gradient of 25 degrees or

greater to forest or grassland; and

• to pay close attention to combining the rehabilitation of cultivated land to forest or

grassland with the capital construction of cultivated land, establishment of power

supply in rural villages, environmental migration and restructuring of the agricultural

and animal husbandry industry (Jiang, 2002b).

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5.2 Environmental migration

A typical feature of an ecological fragile environment is its low carrying capacity of

population. Environmental migration has been taken as a lever to adjust the population size

of an area and to reduce the population pressure on the fragile environment. Living in harsh

environments in the EFZs in west China, many people will never be able to rise above

poverty. Moving some people out of the fragile environments is perceived by the Chinese

government to be an effective strategy for relieving the pressure on the environment,

rehabilitating the deteriorating ecosystem, and eradicating poverty. There are three types of

environments in which people are needed to be displaced:

(1) Environments where primary environment is not suitable for people to live in, such as

high altitudes with low temperatures and scarce water, or severely arid areas where it

is very hard for people to find water sources;

(2) Environments where the ecosystem is in the process of regressive evolution although

they used to be a sound primary environment, such as grasslands that have suffered

serious desertification, the areas that are vulnerable to mountain hazards (e.g.,

landslide and debris flow), and areas that suffer from severe soil erosion;

(3) Nature reserves where all inhabitants, particularly those in the core areas, must be

resettled outside the reserves so that landscapes and biodiversities could be better

conserved.6

In 1983, people displacement was initiated in order to reduce poverty in some impoverished

areas, such as in Dingxi prefecture and Hexi7 district of Gansu and Xi-Hai-Gu8 district of

Ningxia. These three areas have been the poorest in China. Some 283,000 people were

displaced from the mountainous region in south Ningxia by 1998 (Song, 2000). People

displacement is carried out in accordance with the following four principles: the willingness

of the people to move, near resettlement, relocation within one’s capability, and being

granted appropriate subsidies (Renmin Ribao, 1994). In 2001, the State Council selected the

6 For example, in Gansu, 70,000 farmers were displaced from the national nature reserves in Qilian mountain

ranges and from the protected grasslands from 2001 to early 2007 (Gansu Ribao, 20 April 2007). 7 Hexi is a geographical region, located to the west of the Yellow River. This region, with some 270,000 km2,

encompasses the prefecture of Jiuquan and four prefecture cities (Zhangye, Wuwei, jiayuguan, Jingchang). 8 The district of Xi-Hai-Gu encompasses 7 national poverty-stricken counties in the southern part of Ningxia

autonomous region: Xiji, Haiyuan, Guyuan, Pengyang, Jingyuan, Longde, Tongxin. About 1 million Hui nationality people live in this area, which is the largest region where the Hui nationality people reside in China.

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provinces of Ningxia, Yuannan, Guizhou and Inner Mogonior in which to practice

experimental displacement and resettlement of environment-related migration. Since then,

emigration has gradually spread to other provinces.

However, the country had no direct compensation or funding for people relocation prior to

2002. Available but limited funding was usually connected with other aid programs,

primarily the ‘aid-the-poor’ program. According to the ‘Development-Oriented Poverty

Reduction Program for Rural China’ (Information Office of the State Council of China,

2001), the nation supports and encourages the poverty-stricken population in regions of

adverse environment and impoverished living conditions to explore new avenues of solving

their food and clothing problems through migration, including opening up and development

of new communities. As such, the central government stresses that the impoverished people

who volunteer to move away can not only enjoy the preferential policy of the ‘aid-the-poor’

program, but the local authorities also formulate specific policies and measures to provide

various favorable terms to ensure that each household moved out will be kept warm and fed.

It was not until 11 April 2002 that environment-related migration came to the policy of the

central government of China. The State Council put forth Some Suggestions about Further

Improving Afforestation Policy and Its Implementations (Official Document no. 10 [2002]).

The government stresses that environment-related migration needs to be incorporated with

the national major environment projects such as ‘afforestation’, and that the central

government will provide financial subsidies for the building of basic infrastructure to assist

migrants’ livelihood and production restoration. The government plans to displace some 7

million environmental migrants within 10 years or so. The country will arrange 3-5 billion

yuan each year for environment-related displacement and resettlement.

Around 2 million poverty-stricken people were relocated over the period from 1983 to 2006.9

Of these, 1.02 million people were displaced from the fragile environments in west China

over the period 2000-05 (West China Development Leadership Office of the State Council,

2005). At least one-third of them were from Gansu, Ningxia, and Inner Mongonia.10

9 See http://www.china.com.cn/zhuanti2005/txt/2006-03/07/content_6146011.htm. 10 Environment-related migrations are especially marked in the three provinces. In Gansu, 208,000 poverty-

stricken people from 73 counties in 12 prefectures were displaced from 2001 to 2007, at a total cost of 910 million yuan (Gansu Ribao, 20 April 2007). In Ningxia, 76,000 emigrants were displaced from 2002 to 2005 (http://www.china.com.cn/zhuanti2005/txt/2006-03/07/content_6146011.htm). In Inner Mongolia, 45,000 migrants displaced from the grassland in Xilinguole during the period of 2000 to March 2006 (http://www.chinawest.gov.cn/web/NewsInfo.asp?NewsId=30452).

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5.3 Resettlement measures

The mainstream of the environment-related migrants are involuntary and displaced by the

government-organised schemes, while a smaller number of people are voluntarily displaced

by themselves, as the evidence in Yunnan (Wen et al., 2005) and Sichuan (Li, 2007)

suggests. Some people are resettled within the vicinity of their origin county, while some are

resettled beyond their origin counties or even in other province. The majority of people are

settled in the agricultural sector, while some are settled in non-agricultural sectors in urban

areas. Resettling migrants in urban or peripheral areas provides more opportunities for these

people to establish their production after removal. This measure meets many migrants’

excessive expectations in improving social and economic status through displacement and

diverse income sources (non-agricultural and agricultural) to sustain living and production by

their families. This measure also facilitates urbanisation. Some migrants are resettled in

villages of host people, some are settled in newly established villages, and the others are

resettled in county or township sites.

The government in some areas creatively makes adjustments to environment-related

displacement policy and plans, based on the changing and real situations of resettlement

practice. They actively seek more workable approaches to lead people displacement towards

development-oriented resettlement. An innovative approach, in combination with

‘government-organised’ and ‘voluntarily scattered’ displacement and resettlement schemes,

is being advocated and practiced in the Three Gorges reservoir area. 11 This approach aims to

tackle the issues related to the different categories of migrants to be relocated. It enables

migrants to be resettled in wider areas, which do not confine them in the countryside through

land- or agricultural-based resettlement schemes, but motivate some people to resettle by

voluntary self-employment schemes, settling in urban areas to engage in secondary or tertiary

industry activities.

11 The Three Gorges reservoir area, produced by the Three Gorges dam project, is situated at the lower section

of the upper reaches of the Yangtze River. It involves Chongqing municipality and Hubei province. More than 1.3 million people will be displaced by the completion of 17 years of dam construction in 2009.

16

To reduce the strain of the inadequate human carrying capacity of the land in the Three

Gorges reservoir area, the Chinese government has arranged for the removal of rural

residents from the reservoir area and resettled them in distant locations since 2000. By the

end of June 2006, some 164,000 rural residents had been moved out of their origin counties

in the reservoir area and resettled in 11 designated provinces or municipalities (some 95,000)

and in other non-flooded counties in the reservoir area (some 69,000). Taking into account

some 25,000 migrants who voluntarily moved out the reservoir area and resettled in 26

provinces nationwide in earlier years (mainly from 1996 to 2000), some 189,000 rural

migrants have moved out of their origin counties in the reservoir area and resettled in distant

locations (Tan, 2007). Nevertheless, in the Three Gorges reservoir area, the present

population density is as high as 302 persons/km2. This more than twice the average in China

(Nanfang Baoye, 19 March 2007). Moreover, more than 470,000 people from 130,000

households still live below the national poverty line in Chongqing municipality. These people

are distributed among 2,000 villages in mountainous areas, characterised by deteriorating

environments, underdeveloped local societies, scarce resources and poor accessibility. The

municipal government plans to displace these people in the next 15 years to 2020. During the

‘11th Five-Year Plan (2006-11)’ period 90,000 people from 25,000 households were planed to

be displaced (Chongqing Shang Bao, 2 March 2007).

The other new initiative to motivate more people to move out of the reservoir area by

themselves, rather than being organised by the government, is in the pipeline. People with

strong survival capabilities or capable of settling themselves in non-agricultural sectors are

encouraged to move out. Eligible people consist of those: who have worked outside their

hometowns over a long term; who have relatives working and living in urban areas; who

serve the army; who study in higher education or professional institutions; and who are

acquiring skills for the purpose of labour export. The objective of this initiative is to reduce

the population in the reservoir area at a relatively lower cost. An estimated, 1.7 million

farmers from the reservoir area have experience of working outside the reservoir area for 3

months or more. This indicates the possibility for these migrants to consider giving up their

rights on holding farmland and residential land in their villages, and resettling themselves and

their families in urban areas.

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5.4 Issues of environmental migration

Inadequate Preparation

An understanding of the numbers of people to be displaced and their social, economic and

demographic characteristics is essential for designing suitable relocation policies and

schemes (Operation Evaluation Department, 1998). However, the precise numbers and

characteristics of people affected by different environmental factors are not accurately

known in China. Baseline data provides an important foundation for setting criteria on

eligible migrants, compensation and rehabilitation. Such data constitute a baseline against

which the incomes and standards of livelihood and reconstruction of production of

migrants may be measured after physical removal.

Potential resettlement areas, infrastructure situations, reclamation of waste land and

improvement of low yielding land, non-agricultural employment opportunities in any

resettlement community, are important factors in human resettlement planning. These aspects

can be included in an social impact assessment or environmental impact assessment, or the

report of a resettlement implementation project. The generic principle for the environment-

related relocation in China is to resettle people in agricultural sectors, providing each migrant

with a plot of land to restore their livelihoods and reconstruct production. Yet land is scarce

in most areas, especially in economically developed or urban regions. It is becoming

increasingly difficult to adjust farmland from host people in the resettlement communities

because land-use rights are guaranteed by the country under the second, 30-year, term of land

tenure.

The government has put forwarded some broad policies to encourage people displacement,

but specific policies tailored for environment-related displacement and resettlement are still

lacking. This leads to difficulties in implementing resettlement schemes. Specific polices to

solve migrants’ problems such as land provision, household registration, school enrolments,

and access to medical services are imperative. Many farmers/herdsmen lack the techniques

and skills to cope with changes in livestock farming and other agricultural activities,

production modes and tools in the resettlement areas (Bao & Meng, 2005; Liu, 2002). Skills

training and job creation are big issues in successfully sustaining migrants’ livelihoods and

production after their physical displacement.

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In the ecologically fragile areas or migrant sending areas, it is crucial to understand the

process, mechanism, extent and degree of land degradation or deterioration of the

environment. It is important to model the human carrying capacities of various types of land

and analyze the status of rehabilitation of the degraded land. Such quantitative analysis and

modeling provide convincing data and indications on whether or not environmental migration

is needed and the scale of displacement if it is needed. With respect to the migrant receiving

communities, research into the effects of settling migrants on the local environment is equally

important. Receiving migrants should not run the risk of bringing about adverse impacts on

the environment in the resettlement communities.

Inadequate Funds

The displacement of people from their customary habitat involves substantial hardship and

suffering. There are social and psychological costs which cannot be quantified using

available analytical tools. Certain types of intangible assets or social capital losses cannot be

calculated in monetary terms, such as production relationships, culture, kinship networks, and

employment opportunities. Shortage of capital resources is another crucial problem in the

implementation of environmental migration. There are three financial sources in connection

with the country’s environmental regeneration and poverty alleviation. One is derived from

the environmental protection projects (e.g., ‘afforestation’, ‘natural forest protection’ project

in the upper reaches of the Yangtze and Yellow rivers). The other comes from the nation’s

‘aid-the-poor funding’, and ‘work-relief funds’ (yi gong dai zhen) 12 . The Chinese

government puts aside part of the ‘national bond for west China development’ (3–

5 billion yuan per annum) for environmental migration. Yet, the aid for people displaced for

reasons of environmental sustainability is usually lower than that for making way for

transportation, urban expansion or hydro projects in China (Tan et al., 2003). The aid for

relocating a migrant from the central financial sources, the major source of aid for

environmental migration, is on average 4,000–5,000 yuan per migrant, but the actual cost

totals at least 10,000 yuan per capita. The gap is huge concerning resettling people in distant

communities. The surveys of grassroots officials in Inner Mongonia, Hebei and Ningxia

12 This kind of fund is essentially a form of governmental functions, which dates back to the Ming (A.D. 1368–

1644) and Qing Dynasties (A.D. 1644–1911) in China. The government aided the areas suffering from disasters, through offering income to the labourers in traditional industrial sectors and in return the victims of natural calamity provide labourers to rebuild the disaster areas. This strategy has played an important part in the battle against poverty since its initiation at the end of 1989 in China.

19

provide evidence in case (Jiang et al., 2006). The compensation is inadequate for providing

basic infrastructure and facilities. Lacking stable sources of income after displacement is an

imperative issue that most migrants are confronting. For example, some 80,000 people were

displaced from 2001 to 2006 in Ningxia, but three quarters of these people have not solved

basic food and clothing problems. One reason is that the majority of land allocated to the

migrants in the resettlement communities is newly reclaimed waste land, which needs a few

years before crops will grow due to the infertility of the soil. They have little money left to

invest in the new land after spending a large portion of their savings and subsidies on house

building in the resettlement areas. Migrants find it had to get loans from any financial

agencies; when they do successfully receive a loan, it is usually very small and on a short

term (usually 1 year). Some migrants have even returned to their origin areas.

Some migrants have been displaced under the national ‘afforestation’ program since 2001.

The country committed to compensating the farmer families for their loss in the returned

cultivated land for 8 years. For example, farmers residing in the upper reaches of the Yangtze

River and Yellow Rover can get a grain subsidy of 150kg plus 70 yuan (50 yuan for seedlings

and 20 yuan for health care and education) (US$ 1 = RMB 8.27 yuan as of October 2004) for

each mu (1 ha = 15 mu) of cultivated land which has been returned to forest or grassland for

as long as required.13 People affected by this program will face the imminent ‘big issue’ of

how to effectively sustain their basic living after the end of aid.

Land provision

Land is an essential resource for agricultural production and is the basic means upon which

most migrants’ livelihoods depend. Several factors result in limited capability of the land in

resettlement communities. First, most migrants are resettled within their origin counties or

provinces where the carrying capacity of land is considerably low. Second, in the areas where

afforestation has been carried out, there is no land to resettle people who fully returned their

cultivated land at steep slopes to forest or grassland. Third, the current land policy ensures

farmers 30-year land-use tenure rights on their contract land. Local government or any other

institutional organisations in the resettlement communities do not have rights to adjust 13 On 9 March 2000 the Forestry Bureau, the State Planning Commission and the State Financial Ministry issued

the ‘Circular on Carrying out Preparatory Work of Returning Cultivated Land to Forest or Grass in the Upper Reaches of the Yangtze River and in the Upper and Middle Reaches of the Yellow River’ (Government document No. 111 [2000]). To achieve the objective, China adopted the policy of returning farmland to forests and pasture, closing off mountains to logging, growing samplings, substituting grain for poverty aid, and signing contracts with individuals.

20

farmland from host farmers under the national Land Administration Law (2004 Revision).14

Fourth, since 2006 the Chinese government has exempted agriculture taxations, which has

been levied on farmers for more than 2,000 years. This beneficial policy greatly enhances

farmers’ awareness of the significance of farmland. Engaging in agricultural production can

generate some income for their families. Consequently, resettling migrants through an

agriculture or land-based approach becomes more difficult than ever before.

Social integration

Displacement causes the disruption or termination of people’s social and production networks

in their original areas. The social and cultural integration of migrants with the host people in

the resettlement communities is seen as a long-term process. Displacement influences and

shapes the ways in which migrants interact with their new environments, the types of social

structures and relationships they build and participate in, and the values and norms they hold.

As Bartolome et al. (2000) correctly stated, involuntary relocation usually results in people

being transferred from a social environment in which they were primary actors to one in

which they are aliens. Displacement and resettlement also result in a painful and traumatic

experience of socio-cultural dismantling. People displaced via a near resettlement approach

can retain some of their existing social networks and continue to use some of the current

production systems, paying lower costs (both social and economic) compared with the distant

resettlement approach. The people resettled in distant communities pay higher social costs in

terms of adapting to their new society. Their kinship and neighborhood networks disappear

completely. Former social networks are lost and anxiety in the process of distant resettlement

is prevalent. Creating new social capital and building new social networks requires some

time. Most people, especially older people, do not want to displace their families via

resettlement in distant communities. Social integration is a focal issue of social re-

establishment and development. It is a process integrating various factors and parts of a

society in a harmonious way. Policies and schemes of environmental migration need also to

consider the distinctive characteristics of diverse ethnic groups (Wu, 2003, 2006). For

minority groups of people who are resettled in urban or peri-urban areas in the ethnic regions,

changes in production activities, culture, language, lifestyle and customs are substantial and

they confront a variety of problems in their new environments.

14 The Land Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China (2004 Revision) was passed by the National

People’s Congress of China on 28 August 2004 and has come into effect since then.

21

6. Some Suggestions for Coping with Emerging Issues

6.1 Policy response to people displacement People displacement is a logical and immediate response to environmental deterioration, but

it is rarely a medium or long-term solution to environmental problems. This will be only be

achieved by controlling the growth of rural population at low levels through continuing to

carry out family planning policy and adopting ecologically sustainable ways of using the

environment and natural resources. Both of these goals will only be achieved via eradicating

poverty and inequality among the people living in areas subject to environmental

deterioration and hazards. Only through creating income generating opportunities for people,

improving health, education, human rights and enhancing the status and roles of women in all

societal and economic spheres can long-term sustainability be achieved.

Further reforming the family household registration system (hukou) to enable some migrants

and their families to resettle in distant resettlement areas or urban areas is an important

strategy for coping with the increasing difficulty in displacing environment-related migrants.

For those that have worked or lived in urban areas for a long period, they and their family

members should not be restricted from transforming their agricultural hukou status into non-

agricultural status (i.e., urban citizenship).

6.2 Establishing ‘ecological compensation’ and ‘later assistance’ mechanisms It is crucial for the country to establish the mechanism of ‘ecological compensation’ to

compensate the entire cost to people of displacement. Such a mechanism works through

mediating the interrelationships between regions where environmental deterioration must be

prohibited for the sustainable development of other regions and the whole country and

regions which benefit from environmental protection in the former regions. Such a

mechanism reflects the cost-benefit relations in western and eastern regions in China. This

implies that the provinces in eastern and coastal areas have responsibilities in resettling

migrants, and/or in providing adequate assistance to compensate people displacement and

resettlement in cash or kind (including preferential policies).

22

The weak basis of industries and a lack of economic development potency in many

resettlement communities in west China are the essential reasons why the ‘later assistance’ at

the transition stage after physical displacement is imperative for the environment-related

migrants. Due to the uncertainty of the source of funding and a lack of policies on the

programs for ‘later assistance’, it is difficult for any resettlement area to make effective plans

concerning livelihood rehabilitation. The central and/or provincial governments should set up

the time frame of the transition phase. Measures of ‘later assistance’ mainly include: setting

up ‘aid funds’ and preferential policies; arranging industrial projects; nurturing new

industries; and providing skills training for the displaced people. All the ‘later assistance’

measures aim not only to improve or at least restore the living, production and employment

conditions of the majority of the displaced people, but also to develop the economy in the

resettlement communities in the long run.

6.3 Strengthening skills training To tackle the current enormous difficulty in restoring livelihoods and production of displaced

people, it is crucial for local governments in the resettlement communities to work out a

‘migrant/labour training plan’ to help migrants re-skill themselves and enhance their

employability. Training should focus on the production techniques and skills required in the

resettlement areas, and on the increasing demand for the ‘export of (migrant) labour’.

Training programs need to be tailored to job opportunities and to the gender, age and

background of the migrants to be trained. Different individual (e.g., age, sex, marital status,

skills), familial (e.g., size, composition, structure) and societal factors (e.g., local

village/urban norms, cultural values, religion) can influence the participation of migrants in

skills training and the outcomes of their employment. These factors influence whether a

migrant likes training, what occupation-related training is preferred, in what occupations they

might work after training, and the outcomes of skills training. Gender distributions vary

substantially along the occupational spectrum, and between and within industry. Thus,

training program design should be gender-differentiated, to meet the different needs of

distinct groups of migrants.

There is often a mis-match between the skills that migrants have and the production activity

that they are engaged in. Individual migrants will have a feel not only for what they like and

are good at, but where the future job opportunities lie. Based on the available information, the

training sector should focus on identifying skills that are in increasing demand from those in

23

declining demand, and on skills where demand for manual-labour or intellectual-intensive

labour are likely to be large. To fulfil such a daunting task, the government needs to have an

overall assistance strategy and policy framework for training, which should: (1) bring

together relevant government departments at all levels, public/private sector, and various

employment and training institutions, in a concerted and sustained effort; (2) overcome the

mis-match between skills supply and demand; and (3) put together funds from different

sources for planned training uses. To make the training programs and employment of

migrants more efficient and productive, the government should consider the following

measures. These include:

• Establish a labour/employment monitoring system, becoming sources of information,

quickly picking up emerging trends and for responding to skills demand for migrant

workers in the relatively developed provinces or elsewhere.

• Where more detail is required, retain a nationwide focus and disaggregate by age, sex,

occupation and skill level or type;

• Use local information from existing recruitment agencies and like sources to refine

the broad demand for migrant labourers.

• Migrant individuals are encouraged to seek employment after training by themselves,

or through their own social networks.

7. Conclusion

The above analyses suggest that the environment-related population displacement in China

has increased in scale in response to the scale and pace of environmental deterioration has

increased in China in the past decades. Environmental degradation in west China, particularly

in the ecologically fragile zones, has become an important driving force of people

displacement. This factor is linked to the economic push being exerted by poverty, population

pressure on resources (land, water), poor accessibility to infrastructure (e.g., transportation,

information), and the broadened disparity of economic development between western and

eastern regions. Environment-related migration is being utilised as an important measure to

realise the development of population, resources, environment, economy and society in

China. This measure is envisaged by Chinese policy-makers and researchers as an effective

24

way to protect the environment from further deterioration and to relieve people from poverty.

For the sustainability of the environment, the Chinese government has planned to displace 7

million people from the ecologically fragile zones, nature reserves, or the poverty-stricken

regions where the environment cannot support the present population, within 10 years or so

(commenced in 2001). Around 2 million (1.02 million from west China) people have been

relocated since then. In practice, environment-related migration is incorporated with four

major environmental projects: ‘afforestation’, ‘natural forest protection’, ‘returning degraded

grasslands to grass’, and ‘control the sources of sandstorms’.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, environmental pressures have become increasingly

significant in producing a large body of people displaced in China. Environment-related

migration, intrinsically involuntary in nature, is an important dimension of involuntary

population displacements in China. This presents a considerable challenge to both

policymakers and researchers. The government has committed to being principally

responsible for planning, organising and financially assisting people’s displacement and

resettlement. The deeper underlying causes of environmental migration are not only the

aggravated severity and scale of environmental fragility and degradation, but also related to

economic, social and demographic processes in China. Thus policy responses need to

emphasise the more fundamental causes of this stream of people displacement rather than the

environmental factors that precipitate the migration. With the growing number of people

(mainly poverty-stricken, ethnic) to be displaced from the ecologically fragile environments,

it is imperative for the government at all levels (central, provincial, county, township) to

make better informed resettlement policies and schemes. Policy responses to a range of

emerging issues are of urgent need. These include adjustments to current policies on

compensation types and standards, land provision, and hukou transferability (from rural to

urban residency status). It is suggested that the country set up concrete policies for ‘later

assistance’ for both the displaced people and the affected regions. Emphasis needs to be

placed on plans to enhance the capacity for self-development of the migrants (especially

females). Providing skills training for migrants, income sources and employment channels,

and helping them integrate into the host communities are especially important for migrants to

rehabilitate their livelihoods and production after displacement.

25

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