entering the posthuman collective in philip k. dick's 'do androids dream of electric sheep' - jill...

8/12/2019 Entering the Posthuman Collective in Philip K. Dick's 'Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep' - Jill Galvan

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ENTERING THE POST-HUMAN COLLECTIVE 413

Jill GalvanEntering the Posthuman Collective inPhilip K. Dick's Do AndroidsDreamof ElectricSheep?

Themorning air, spilling over with radioactivemotes, grayandsun-becloud-ing, belched about him, hauntinghis nose; he sniffed involuntarily he taint ofdeath. 1 Such is the atmosphere hat assails Rick Deckard,protagonistbountyhunter of Philip K. Dick's Do AndroidsDream of Electric Sheep?, as he setsout uponhis most lucrative-yet final-day in the business. Insidious, strange-ly menacing, the air Rick breathesconfrontshim with the perils of his world,a world increasinglytransformedby nuclear falloutand the forces of entropy.Additionally, it is a worldprogressivelypeopled-both literallyandfigurative-ly-by technological devices, amongwhichthe android,a solitarypredator,seems as greatly to endangerhuman survivalas the tainted environment(?3:31). Against the backdropof televisions, vidphones, and mood organs, Rickmeets head-onwith this consummate wenty-first-centurymachine,the human-oid robot that has murdered ts master in assertionof its liberty. Indeed, asmuch for its will to independenceas for its manifestviolence, the fugitiveandroid threatensa communityof authentichumansubjects:capableof mas-queradingas non-android, it blends in with mainstreamsociety, infringingupon the boundariesof the humancollective. In short, the machine, by declar-ing its right to live as an autonomous self, challenges the very categories oflife and selfhood-and, in turn, the ontological prerogativeof its creators.

For Dick, this fictional predicamentdoes not far exaggerate he conditionsof nonfictionalreality, of an existence progressivelyalteredby innovationsintechnology. In TheAndroid and the Human, a speechdelivered four yearsafter the publicationof Do AndroidsDream, Dick addresses ust this issue ofa progressivelyblurred distinction between humansandtheirown mechanicalcreations.[O]ur environment, and I mean our man-made world of machines, artificial con-structs, computers, electronic systems, interlinkinghomeostatic components-allof this is in factbeginning more andmoreto possess what the earnestpsychologistsfear the primitive sees in his environment: animation. In a very real sense ourenvironment s becoming alive, or at least quasi-alive, and in ways specifically andfundamentallyanalogous to ourselves. (183)

Andwhat can we glean from the growing animationof the things that surroundus? As much about theirbeing as aboutours, Dick says: Rather han learningabout ourselves by studying our constructs, perhapswe should make the at-tempt to comprehendwhat our constructs are up to by looking into what weourselves are up to (184). But as Dick goes on to explain, the two explora-


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414 SCIENCE-FICTIONSTUDIES, VOLUME 24 (1997)tions are not easily divisible:whetherwe accept t unquestioninglyr rebelagainst t, technology, n the handsof thepowers hatbe, hasacquired otsimply a life of its own, but a life thatsubstantiallynfiltrates ur lives,changingour charactern subtle yet meaningfulways. If we succumbunwittingly-or,worse, ndifferently-to he totalitarian echanizationf ourworld, we riskbecomingandroids urselves,reduced o humans f mereuse-men made nto machines 187).Todeny echnology's ervasiveole inourexistencemeans, hen,to denyreality-therealityof a world nwhichweareadvancinglymbricatedna mechanicalresence.Onlybyrecognizingowit hasencroachedponourunderstandingf life canwe cometo full termswiththetechnologieswe haveproduced.

Do AndroidsDreamtells thestoryof one individual's radual cceptanceof thesechanging arameters. bildungsromanor thecyberneticge,Dick'snoveldescribes nawakening f theposthumanubject.As Ihope o illustratein theremainder f this paper,RickDeckard'sxperience olicing heboun-dariesbetweenhuman ndandroideacheshimto questionhetraditionalelf-otherdyad,which affirmsa persistent umanmasteryover the mechanicallandscape.The androidsRickencounters,ogetherwith the numerousma-chinesby whichhe andothers nterfacewiththeirworld,blast heillusionofanexclusiveandempathicommunityf humans, neuncompromisedythetechnologieswith whichtheyshare heEarth.Do AndroidsDream hus nter-rogatesa fixeddefinitionof the human ubjectand at lastacknowledges imas onlyonecomponent f thelivingscene. Ineffect,thenarrativeepudiatesthe idea of a confinedhuman ommunity ndenvisionsa communityf theposthuman, n which humanand machinecommiserate nd comaterialize,vitallyshapingone another's xistence.Atthenovel'soutset,however,Rickhasyetto rethinkhedominantdeol-ogy of thejuridical ystem hatemployshim. He acceptswithout ontest heontologicalcategoriesof his culture,accordingo whichhumans'principaldifferenceromtheirandroidook-alikesies in theirability o feel empathy.Thiscredo,whichRickadheres o inorder o identifyhisandroid ictims,notonlynominally eparates uman rommachine,but alsohelpsto insulatehehuman ommunity:f humansalonehavethepowerto empathize,hentheironlyemotionally rofitable,mutually eneficial elationshipsccurwitheachother. The android'sdeficiencypatentlyexpelsit fromthe collective-anycollective, or thatmatter, venone of otherandroids.As thepartyinegoes,theandroid acksthecapacity or fellowfeelingfor its ownkindas muchasit does for humanbeings. Anandroid, Rickavers, doesn't arewhathap-pensto another ndroid ?9:101).Butas it getsplayedout in thenovel, thisreputed xistential istinctionruns nto rresolvableontradictions.otably,a few of theandroids ickdealswithexhibitwhatappearso be caring ortheirownkindandeven, in somecases,forthehumanswithwhom hey nteract.N. Katherine ayleshaspoint-ed out thatRachaelRosen, the androidwhomostpointedly allsRickto ac-countforhis actions,showsrealconcern orthesix escaped ndroids e hasbeencommissioned o retire. Afterseducinghim in order o detourhim


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ENTERING THE POST-HUMAN COLLECTIVE 415from his task, for example, Rachael confesses to Rick thatshe and one of hisvictims had been close, very close friendsfor almost two years (?17:199).Moreover, in both word anddeed, Rachael ntimatesher affection for a human-for Rick himself. After Rick succeeds in killing the last three andys,Hayles notes,

he returns home to discover that Rachael has pushed [his] goat off the roof.Why? Because she is jealous of his love for the goat, or in revenge for hiskilling her friends...? Whichever interpretation ne chooses, the action is notconsistent with the official picture of androidpsychology, which like Dick'sessays insists that androids are incapableof feeling loyalty or indeed feelinganythingat all.2And if on the one hand androids reveal their ability to feel compassion, thereaderbegins to surmise, on the other hand, thatwhat passes for empathyamong humans derives far more from a cultural construction than from anycategorical essence. The Voigt-Kampff scale-which, because it measuresempathy,Rick uses to ensurethe android dentityof his potentialprey-throwsinto relief the contrivednatureof this putativelymostbasicof humanqualities.Almost all of the scenarios Rick poses to his respondentsstage some incidentof animal cruelty-a live lobster in a pot of boiling water, a stag's headmounted on a cabin wall, a nude woman lying on a bearskinrug. Yet onequickly identifies these hypothetical situations for what they really are:instancesof brutality andexploitation,yes, but not uncommonin many socialcontexts-in fact, too commonto triggerconsistentempathicreactions n mosthumanbeings. As JudithB. Kermanaptly puts it, the scenariosthat Rick prof-fers to his androidsuspectswould not, should they generatean apatheticre-sponse, differentiate[androids]from modem Americans (71).The Voigt-Kampff scale refersin large partto incidents of animalmistreat-ment because live animals, in a post-nuclearera which finds themscarce, havebeen fetishized as the repositories of human empathy. Additionally, thoughpurchasingone entails a considerableexpense, a live animalmarks the buyeras a zealous adherentof Mercerism. The legendaryeponymof this widespreadphilosophy/religion, a figure persecutedby the authoritiesfor bringing deadanimals back to life, encouragesanimalownershipas a sign of his followers'moralsolidarity.Thosewho regularlysubmitthemselves to Mercerist fusionendure the utmost in humanempathy:in grippingthe handles of the empathybox, they experience the pain of Wilbur Mercer-whose screen image toilsceaselessly up a desert mountainto extracthimself from the tomb world towhich he has been sentenced-as well as the emotions of every other Mercerdevotee.By the close of the narrative,though, WilburMercerhas been exposed asa sham-a bit player named Al Jarryhired to lend his image to the empathybox. Behind the facadeof the new messiahlies only a hackactor, an alcoholicnow living in Indianaamid a welter of entropic kipple. Buster Friendly-another cultural icon, who happensto be an android,unbeknownst to hisown fans-clearly revels in his humanaudience'smisplacedidolatry: WilburMerceris not human,does not in fact exist. The world in which he climbs is


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416 SCIENCE-FICTIONTUDIES,VOLUME 4 (1997)a cheap Hollywood, commonplace ound stagewhich vanished nto kippleyears ago. And who, thenhasspawnedhis hoax on the Sol System?Thinkabout hat or a time, folks ?18:209).Having aised hepossibility f a massconspiracy, owever,BusterFriendly oesnot stop here.Hegoeson to indictnot simply he theologyof Mercerism, ut an entireethicof human mpathy.Askyourselves, he demands f his TVviewers, what t is thatMercerismdoes. Well, if we're to believe its manypractitioners,he experienceuses...men andwomen hroughouthe Sol System nto a singleentity.But anentitywhich s manageable y the so-called elepathic oice of 'Mercer.'Mark hat.An ambitious oliticallymindedwould-beHitlercould- (?18:209).As BusterFriendly nsinuatesn his ownheavy-handedashion,Mercerismandtheideologyof empathy hat s its mainstay,arfromappealingo innatehuman haracteristics,unctionmerelyas the meansby which he governmentcontrols an otherwise unwieldy populace. Earlier n the narrative,JohnIsidore-a brain-damagedalloutvictim,whocovets hehumanompanionshipthathis chickenhead abel precludes-speculatesonfusedlyaboutBusterFriendly'sevidentantagonismowardsMercerism. sidorecannotreconcileBuster's ttitudewiththe officialendorsementshetheologyhasreceived: Noone else seemedbothered y it; even the U.N. approved.And the AmericanandSovietpolicehadpublicly tated hatMercerismeducedrimeby makingcitizens moreconcerned bout heplightof theirneighbors.Mankind eedsmore empathy,Titus Corning,the U.N. SecretaryGeneral,had declaredseveral imes (?7:74-75).But it is notjust Isidorewho hasbought ntothecompelling ffigyof theplaintiveWilburMercer. ndeed,hegovernmentasmanaged o foist this image off any numberof gullible citizen-consum-ers-among whomRick'swife Iran iguresprominently. ikeanevangelistitup by her own fervor,Irandescribes o Rick herlatestexperiencewith theempathybox in decidedlyenthusiasticerms: ...I rememberhinkinghowmuchbetterwe are, how muchbetteroff, whenwe're withMercer.Despitethepain. Physicalpainbutspiritually ogether; felt everyone lse, all overtheworld,all whohad fusedatthesame ime (?15:173).Butalthoughheempathy ox servesostensiblyobringdisparatendividu-als intoemotional ommunity,Rick,forhispart,noteswithsadness hesepar-ationit effectsbetweenhim andhis wife: Goingoverto theempathy ox,she quicklyseatedherselfand oncemoregrippedhetwinhandles.She be-cameinvolvedalmostat once. Rickstoodholding hephonereceiver,con-scious of hermentaldeparture.Conscious f his own aloneness ?15:176).Indeed, his aloneness xactly ulfills theprojectof theempathy ox, as thatmechanisms manipulated y the government:n interpellatinghepoliticalsubjectandfixingherpassivelybefore hescreen,Mercer'smageserves hepurposenot of socialsolidarity utof disintegration-an utcomewhichdra-matically educes hepotentialorpublicunrest.Inhis discussion f sciencefictionand media n thepostmodern ge, ScottBukatmanollows the leadofGuy Debord n emphasizingust this totalitarianxploitation f the screenimage:


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ENTERiNG THE POST-HUMANCOLLECTIVE 417The fundamentof the spectacle is its unilateralism.... The citizen/viewer, nolonger participating in the production of reality, exists now in a state ofpervasive separation, cut off from the producers of the surrounding mediaculture by a unilateral communication and detachedfrom the mass of fellowcitizen-viewers.The spectacle controls by atomizing the population and reducing theircapacity to function as an aggregate force.... (36)

Fragmented, solated, andtransfixedby the spectacleof a latter-daySisyphus,the Mercerist stands beyond the pale of the social collective. Furthermore,because it claims that Mercer, the emblem of its authoritativeapparatus,suffers eternallyfor having brokenrulesoutlawing revivification,thepoliticalorder accommodates into its own structuresa safety valve for sedition. Ineffect, in being called upon to fuse with Mercer, the political subject is en-couraged to empathizewith a noble criminal,to vent lurking feelings of rebel-lion, but only in the controlled space of her own living room. The empathyboxthus operates as the state's optimal homeopathic remedy: it recuperates hecitizen's transgressioninto bounds where it can have no consequences.Further,should an official commendationof Mercerism ail to habituate heindividual to her empathy box, the simulation itself-which always defersliteralgratification-keeps hercoming back for more. In Do AndroidsDream,the government, the main producersof Mercer's screen likeness, abideby acapitalist advertising strategy to intoxicate and then ensnare the citizen/con-sumer. Again invoking Debord, Bukatmandescribesthe phenomenonof im-age addiction as anothercomponentof the political scheme to segregatethemasses:The spectacle is infinitely self-generating;it stimulates the desire to consume(the only permissible participation n the social process), a desire continuallydisplaced onto the next productand the next.In the society of the spectacle, all images are advertisements or the statusquo. The commodityis replaced by its own representation,and the fulfillmentof need is replaced by pseudo-satisfactionof desire. A citizenry alienated bythe industrial-capitalistmode of productionis granted an illusion of belongingand participation; he fragmentationof the productiveand social realms is re-placed by the appearance of coherence and wholeness. (37)

The pure artifice of the spectacleholds the viewer more greatlythandoes itscontent;it is the commodifiedillusion, the enchantment f unattainability, hatpiques the viewer's desire. That desire applies, Bukatman ells us, notjust tothe thing advertised,but to the advertisement tself: one begins to crave it forits own sake, as much as, or even more so than what it depicts. In otherwords, by exalting the product t represents(here, humancompanionshipthrough empathic fusion), the processed image perpetuatesits own raisond'etre, since it always tantalizes more than it fulfills the consumerappetite.Thus the spectacle addicts its viewer by continually engenderinga surplusdesire; Mercer's image creates a longing for Mercer's image.Television, which Isidore anxiously clings to as a surrogatefor humaninteraction,offers the individuala similar fix, in that its screen simulationssalve-but only temporarily-the anguishof social dislocation. Isidore'sbroken


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418 SCIENCE-FICTIONTUDIES,VOLUME 4 (1997)TV set broadcasts nly the channel hegovernmentasnationalized, plat-form or variousplugsfor its Marscolonizationrogram.Notwithstandinghemonotonyof his viewing experience, sidorerealizes hat in order o avoidfeelingsof seclusion,he has no choice but to endure heserepetitive ds foremigration ads which, to add insult o injury,pointedly xcludehimdue tohis special tatus).Without he benefitof television,he cannotbreak reefromhis loneliness.He is overcome y a silence hatdescends pon notonlyhis ears but his eyes; as he stood by the inertTV set he experiencedhe si-lence as visible and, in its own way, alive (?2:20). As holds true for theimage that summons ranto the empathybox, TV's simulations eckontoIsidorewith the promiseof company,disguisingmomentarilyhe fact of hissolitude.As these examplesdemonstrate,echnology ften acts in Dick's novel asthe ongarmof thegovernment,urtively reachinghebounds etween ublicandprivate.Moreover,nmaintaininghe llusionof asocialnetworkhat heyinfactforestall,both elevisionand heempathy oxcovertlydispersendivid-uals, dramatically upturinghe humancollective. This rupture roves,ofcourse, especially ronicin the case of the empathybox, whichdespite tsnamemoreundermineshan acilitatesheexperiencef emotionalommunity.Andby extension, he acceptednotionof empathy,hepurportedmarker fhumanity,allsunder hesamesuspicionas does the devicethathaspresum-ably enabled it. If the empathy one exercises when fusing with Mercerdividesrather handraws ndividualsogether,henwhatdoes thatsayfor anacceptedunderstandingf humanbeings,as differentiatedromandroids ynatural ffective nterconnections?The electronicmagebrings hisquestiono thefore,andfurthert revealsthefirmboundariesf thehuman ollectiveaswhollyfictional.Dick'shumancharactersnaively pride themselves on theirempathicunity andderogatetech-nological onstructssinherentlyecondaryobiological nes-as forexamplein the case of Rick's electronicsheep, the ownershipof which he finds gradu-ally demoralizing ?1:9). Yet aswe haveseen,machines avenotonlyinfil-tratedthe humancollective,but have also become an integralpartof theestablishment-an ineradicable element of human day-to-day existence.Technology husdrastically ompromisesn insulated uman ommunityntwo ways: it separatesthe individual from humancontact;but more signifi-cantly, it makes her dependent upon-addicted to-the life of the machine.Hooked up to her empathy box, entrancedby the simulationof the televisionscreen,the humanhasalready,n fact,become heposthuman.Butby enunciatingndpublicizing n ethicof empathy,hepoliticalorderconceals this dependenceon the mechanical; t maintains he fallacyof a cohe-sivefraternityf autonomousuman ubjects. ndeed,only by prolonginghepublic'sbeliefin Mercerism nd n an essentialhuman mpathyan the stateobscurehow muchtechnologyhas invaded ndividual ives-how muchthemediatedpectaclepermitshegovernment checkon its citizens'activities.It is thus nthe best interest f thepoliticalauthoritiesoostracizeheandroid,since the android-a fully animatedand thoroughly ntelligentcreature-


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ENTERING THE POST-HUMAN COLLECTIVE 419directly challenges the individual's perceived biological mastery over themachines thatsurroundher in her quotidianenvironment.And besides alertingthe citizen to her already nfringedsubjectivity, a community n which humansandandroidsfreely coexist would resurrect he ultimatethreat o the totalitari-an state: that its diverse members, joined by mutualaffinities and demands,will rise up against the powers thatdominate them.With these considerationsin mind, the readerappreciatesmoreclearly theimperativesbehind Rick Deckard's duty as bounty hunter. As dictatedto himby the San Francisco Police Department,Rick's responsibilityis nothinglessthan to reclaim the disturbedhierarchybetween human and machine. In sodoing, he reclaims also the illusion of the liberal-humanistubject, of a citizenboth self-possessive andself-defining and who freely determines he course ofhis relationshipswith others.3Conversely, on Rick falls too the task of deny-ing these privileges to the android.Inthis sense, the Voigt-Kampffscalepavesthe way for the android'sannihilationon two fronts-as a living being and asa legitimate subject, one who might otherwisehave carried on a cooperativeexistence in a posthumansociety.When Rick attemptsto apply the scale to his androidsuspects, however,he findsthe results decidedly more ambiguousthan he hadexpected. Inpartic-ular, his encounter with LubaLuft, a fugitive posing as a Germanoperasing-er, throwsRick into muchconfusionabout the propertiesandrightsof androididentity. Inasmuch as it stages a humorousyet meaningfulattempt on LubaLuft'spartto elude Rick's authoritativehold, the conversationbetween the two,haracters s worth repeatingat length.

[Rick begins:] Now please listen carefully. These questionswill deal with socialsituations which you might find yourself in; what I want from you is a statementof response, what you'd do.... You're sittingwatchingTV and suddenly you dis-cover a wasp crawling on your wrist. ...What's a wasp? Luba Luft asked.A stinging bug that flies.Oh, how strange....Theydied out because of the dust. Don't you really know whata wasp is?Tell me the German word.... Wespe, he said, remembering the German word.Achyes; eine Wespe. She laughed. Andwhat was the question?I forgotalready.Let'stry another. Impossiblenow to get a meaningfulresponse. Youarewatchingan old movie on TV, a movie from before the war. It shows a ban-

quet in progress; the entree.. consists of boiled dog, stuffed with rice.Nobody would kill a dog, Luba Luft said....Before the war, he grated.Iwasn't alive before the war.... Was the movie made in the Philippines?Why?Because, Luft said, they used to eat boiled dog stuffed with rice in thePhilippines. I rememberreading that.Butyour response, he said. I wantyour social, emotional, moral reac-tion.To the movie?... I'd turn it off...


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ENTERING THE POST-HUMAN COLLECTIVE 421Next, he extrapolatesromhis general omments bout he media o locate nlanguage similar nstrumentf totalitarianontrol: n bothmethods f com-munication, he three-partircuit-its inescapable ialecticof speaker ersusauditor-upholdshepoliticalhegemony,nthat t utterly revents nexchangefounded n reciprocity.By insistinguponan inexorable ack-and-forth,an-guage preventsa simultaneous ilateralcommunication;nstead, t merelyenactsthe tyrannyof the unilateral tateorder.In the event, even, that theinterpellatedndividual everses he circuitandbecomes or a timethe trans-mitter nstead f the receiver, hedialectic tselfremainsntact,henceassertingthepowerof thosewho govern t. Similarly, message f would-be ebellionperformsts own cancellation, inceit by necessitypartakes f the authorita-tive code. InBaudrillard'schema, hen, language,iketelevision, s enoughto enforce he domination f thepoliticalorder, nasmuch s it does awaywiththepotential or authentic-becausemutual-communication.or him, theabsolutizationf speechunder he formalguise of exchange s the definitionof power 171).Viewed in this light, the Voigt-Kampffcale'slinguisticapparatustselfassures heandroid's ondemnation,part romany contentt may appearodeliver.In effect,it is not the scenarioshatRickposits hatmightproveLubaLuftguilty;rather, t theresolute elationshipf signifiers ndsignifieds-thevise-like tability f thedialectical ode-thatproclaimshe aw'sauthorityndthus alreadybrandsher a criminal.Deputizedo administerhe test, Rickinsists repeatedlyupon Luba's response, but in Baudrillard's iew, ofcourse, hatresponsewouldonlyconfirm heoperation f thehegemonic ode.To respondmeans o submit o the code's nherentackof reciprocity nd husto forfeitall chanceof dodging he totalitarianrder.Andyet Lubadoes here succeed n skirting he authority f the bountyhunter, f only for the moment-andshe cando sopreciselybecauseshe re-fuses to respond, o participaten a dialectic hatalreadyinds herculpable.In effect, she takes advantagef whatBaudrillardtates s the onlyout stillopento the subjectarraigned y language: hroughher numerousemanticevasions, he callsattentiono thealwaysunstableelationshipsetweenigni-fier andsignified,creatingtatic nanotherwise pparentlyucidandunprob-lematicmedium.She thus volatilizeshecategory f the code tself, expos-ing it as always enuous,nevernatural, ndas imposedas thepoliticalorderit sustains 184).Luba'sandroid evoltdependsuponhercapacityo destabilizeanguage,insucha way that hrowsntoquestion for Rick,her nterlocutor)reviouslyunexaminedtructures f power.As Baudrillardouldhave it, furthermore,Luba'sactionshighlight he inherenthegemonyof not only the mediumoflanguage,but of media in general,sinceevery technology hat transmitsmessagemustby its very operation phold hetotalitariantate.Accordingothistheory, elevisionand heempathy ox cannothelpbutsubservehedomi-nantorder,no more han he mostarticulateevolutionary anifesto anhelpbutreinforce hevery governmentt seeksto overturn. nspiteof everygoodintention,Baudrillardoncludes,all mediahave intrinsically tendency o


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422 SCIENCE-FICTIONSTUDIES, VOLUME 24 (1997)oppress the individual, andonly by demolishingthe machinery tself-as Lubahas done-can one hope to get out fromunder the thumbof the political order.Yet in the final estimation, Do AndroidsDream does not bear out Baudril-lard's somewhat Ludditeperspectiveon the problemsof an advancedtechno-logical society. InDick's narrativeversionof mass-mediaculture, the faultliesnot with a totalitarianessence in the media itself; rather, all blame falls uponthe authoritarian orces who bringthe imageto life. Onthis matter,then, Dickwould most likely disagreewith Baudrillard,as with MarshallMcLuhanbeforehim: the medium is not the message; it simply provides a venue-in itselfneutral-for the affirmationof political power. Dick makes the point explicitin The Android and the Human, in which he theorizes about the real-lifepossibility of a technological backlash that would thwart the government'sfascistic maneuvers:

The continued elaborationof state tyranny such as we in science fiction circlesanticipate in the world of tomorrow...-as we thoroughlycomprehend, this evilprocess uses technology as its instrument.... Like all machines, these universaltransmitters, recording devices, heat-patterndiscriminators, don't in themselvescare who they're used by or against.... Before the absolute power of the absolutestate of tomorrowcan achieve its victory it may find such things as this: When thepolice show up at your door to arrest you for thinking unapprovedthoughts, ascanning sensor that you've bought and built into your door discriminatestheintrudersfrom customary friends and alerts you to your peril. (196-97)The electronics-savvyrenegade that Dick postulateshere-an individual whoco-opts machineryfor his own purposes-is adumbratedn the BusterFriendlyof Do AndroidsDream, who we recall has establisheda media following ri-valed only by that of WilburMercer. In maintaininghis presenceon both TVand radio an impossible twenty-three hours a day, the android Buster hasmanagedto squeeze in on the audience that the government, by exploitingMercer'simage, otherwise securesfor itself. Buster'soften vocalizedcontemptfor Mercerismleads even John Isidore to guess at what the two pop idols arebattling for: Ourminds, Isidoredecided. They're fighting for controlof ourpsychic selves; the empathybox on the one hand, Buster's guffaws andoff-the-cuffjibes on the other (?7:75).As Buster Friendly's media imperialismmakes evident, the technologiesDick imagines in his fiction are the exclusive instrumentsof no one power.That is to say, as Bukatmanhas said for the author'soeuvre as a whole,4 thatDick's novel finds the mediaitself ideologicallyneutral-a merecanvas for theviews of those who use it. Of course, Buster's intentionto conquerthe mindsof his audience members strikes us as hardlymore palatablethan the state'sown attemptsat prosthetic control. Yet the android'ssuccess bodes well, ifnothingelse, as a sign thatcurrentlydupedcitizen/consumershave themselvesthe capacity to chip away at the government's technological dominion. Weshouldnote also that the methodof Buster's concealedandroidrebellionpoint-edly contradictsLuba Luft's: whereas she has circumvented he stateapparatusby smashing the mediumwith which it asserts itself, Buster, for his part,manipulatesthe medium to his own advantage,and in direct defianceof the


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424 SCIENCE-FICTIONSTUDIES, VOLUME 24 (1997)fold, for in desire resides the very safeguardof the humanego-its character-istic mastery over the objects that surround t.

At this point in the narrative, Rick accepts Resch's explanation for hisemotions and, as if to further assure himself of his privilege as a desiringsubject, seeks to gratify his commercial ust as well. Having alreadypocketedthe money earnedfrom his first threekills, Rick finally indulgeshimself in thecommodity he has long been craving-a live sheep, to replace the electronicone thatgrazes upon his roof. Rick enters animalrow with hopes of subdu-ing a new and horribly unique depression : Inthe past, anyhow, the sightof animals, the scent of money dealswith expensive stakes,haddonemuchforhim. Maybe it would accomplish as much now (?15:167). In this regard,other suggestions in the novel-e.g., BusterFriendly'seventualexpose-onlyconfirm what this scene makes manifest, namely that live animals do not somuch indicate their owners' devotion to Mercer as showcase their wealth andculturalcachet. In short, Rick's animalpurchasereinforceshis position in thesocial order in two importantways. The high rateof interestcompels him tocontinue bounty hunting-a pointwhichhe expresslyconsidersinjustifyinghisdecision: But I had to do it, he said to himself. The experience with PhilResch-I have to get my confidence, my faith in myself and my abilities,back. Or I won't keep my job (?15:170). Second, by at last fulfilling hisdesire for a live animal,Rick reestablisheshimself as a self-determiningpoliti-cal subject, in contrastto the diverse creatureswhich it is his right to com-mand and possess.To more fully illustratehow desire might function for Rick as the markerof the autonomoussubject, I'll turnmy attentionnow to FranciscoJ. Varela,Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch's The EmbodiedMind, which suggeststhat Western science should begin to reformulate ts cognitive notions of theego-self. It can only do justice to this task, The EmbodiedMind claims, bythoroughly considering our day-to-day perceptionsof the world, perceptionsthatoftentimes belie the neatpronouncements f philosophy. The authorsover-view numerous Western cognitive theories-most of which markedlyexcludeanexaminationof phenomenologicalexperience-and conclude that we shouldbearin mind the discoveries of Buddhisttradition f we areto get a more com-plete pictureof the embodiedself. Self, thatis, in a nominalsense only: forin fact what we call self is, accordingto Buddhistpractices,no more thanan epiphenomenon,a fictional constructthat results froma continuouspatternof grasping. Constantlyone thinks, feels, and acts, the authorswrite,

as thoughone had a self to protectandpreserve. The slightestencroachmenton theself s territorya splintern thefinger,a noisyneighbor)rouses earanddanger.Theslightest opeof self-enhancementgain,praise, ame,pleasure)rouses reedandgrasping....Such mpulses re nstinctual,utomatic, ervasive, ndpowerful.(62)Yet when we recognize this graspingfor what it is-an attitude iterally self-ish, in thatit alone createswhat we think of as self-we recognizetoo thatourindividual identity has in truth no solid ground, that we instead emerge,momentto moment, from our physical interactionswith the world. Likewise,


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ENTERING HEPOST-HUMAN OLLECTIVE 425the world itself takes its contours from our own; our presence affects theworld as much as it affects us. The embodied self is thus always in process,as is the environmentwith which it is materiallycoupled:the two cooriginatein an unceasing interweaving, an entre-deux hatcontradictsall notions ofa Cartesiansubject-objectdiad.Once we comprehendselfhood in this way, we can betterunderstand henature of Rick's anxieties about bounty hunting, as well as his tendency toalleviate those anxieties by assertinghis sexual and commercial desires. Thisgrasping after what he pretendswill fulfill him allows Rick to retain the illu-sion of an insulated self; and conversely, it casts the objects of his desire asother, as things merely out there in the world. By acting on his desire, Rickrecapitulates onventional deas abouthis social significanceas abountyhunterand-more generally-as a human being. In this way, desire reinforces theimaginaryperimetersof Rick's own personas muchas of the humancommun-ity, which by definitionjettisons the android as disconnectedand foreign. Intheir own account of collective identity, the authorsof The Embodied Minddescribe such clannishnessas a dangerouslydivisive planetaryfact:

Grasping an be expressednotonly individuallys fixationon ego-selfbutalsocollectivelyas fixationon a racialor tribal elf-identity,s wellas graspingoraground s theterritoryhat eparatesnegroupof people romanother r thatonegroupwouldappropriates its own. Theidolatry f supposing otonlythat hereis a groundbut thatone canappropriatet as one'sownacknowledgeshe otheronlyin a purelynegative, xclusionaryway.Therealization f groundlessnesssnonegocentricesponsiveness, owever,requireshatwe acknowledgeheotherwith whomwe dependentlyooriginate. 254)

Accordingto this vision, the principal problemwith group mentalityrests inits appealto ideology. Such ideology will not educate the individualas to hercodependency with others in her environment,because it simply insists onanotherground for the self. The individual maintainsa false sense of a non-permeable ego or group so long as she grasps onto an abstracttheory orphilosophy and fails to examine herself as experiential actor in the world. Inexperience alone can she come to an awarenessof her existential continuitywith the other. Whyshould it makeany difference at all to experience? heauthorsquery. The answer.. is that as one becomes mindful of one's ownexperience, one realizes the power of the urge to graspafter foundations-tograsp the sense of foundationof a real, separateself, the sense of a foundationof a real, separateworld, and the sense of foundation of an actual relationbetween self and world (225).And what ensues when one abandonsphilosophyandbecomes mindfulofone's phenomenalexistence?-Compassion, the authorsrespond,a compassionthat enacts itself as respect and concern for the well-being of the other. Butthis compassion, it is important o remember,must arise solely from experi-ence, for a prescriptivephilosophy, as we have seen, always re-grounds thefleeting subject. In brief, spontaneouscompassion shuns axiomaticethicalsystem[s] and pragmaticmoralinjunctions, as metaphysicaldogmaoblivi-ous to the continually emergententre-deux of self and other (250).


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426 SCIENCE-FICTIONTUDIES,VOLUME 4 (1997)In my view, it is thisnotionof compassion-orempathy-thatwe shouldhave nmindwhenwe attempto interpret ick'schanging erspectivesn his

mechanicalnvironment. ot untilhe has forfeited moredoctrinal efinitionof empathy-thatpromulgatedy the governmentn Mercerism-canRickcountenancehepossibilityof aposthumanommunity,nein whichhumansand androids oexist andcooriginate.Not surprisingly,his revelation tartsto takeform almost mmediately fterhis eye-opening ncounterwith LubaLuft.Returningomefrom hisexchange nd romhis foray ntoanimal ow,Rickentertains ew suspicionshat he officialconcept f empathymayserve,at bottom, argelyutilitariannds: Butnow he hadbegun o sense,for thefirsttime, the valuethatpeoplesuchas IranobtainedromMercerism. ossi-blyhisexperiencewith thebountyhunterPhil Reschhadaltered omeminutesynapsisnhim,hadclosedoneneurologicalwitchandopened nother ?15:174). Small wonderthat Rick imagineshis mentalprocesses n cyberneticterms: hislanguage etrayshis creeping pprehensionhathe forms ustoneelementof the technological andscape.And in turn, thatapprehension-broughtabout,as he himselfrealizes,by his experiencewith Phil Reschandwith Luba Luft-guides him closer to a more sincereempathy or thehumanoidobots n his world.But givenhis growingcompassionor the creaturese hasbeenconsignedto hunt,whydoes the narrativeequire, inally,thathecomplete is mission?How can we trulybelieve n Rick'sreformation-inhis recognitionf a post-human ommunity-whenhe bears he taintof six android illings?To answer hesequestions,we maylook to Rick'sown evaluation f themurders he has committed: But what I've done, he thought;that's becomealien to me. In facteverything boutme has becomeunnatural;'vebecomean unnaturalelf' (?21:230).As Rickhimselfrealizes,bountyhuntingnolongerfortifies an inheritednotionof himself as subject; ndeed,it ratherchallenges all that he understandshimself to be. Now that he has carried outthe task he has been appointedto, he finds himself defeated n some obscureway (?21:230).Yet thatdefeat-of an oldunderstandingf selfagainstworld-also marks,paradoxically,Rick'striumph: is new awarenesshathe livesinfluidconjunction iththetechnologieshatpopulate is environment. hereis no human elf, Rick has discovered, hat s not alsoother,andno androidother hatdoesnotpartake f self.Yet Rick couldnothavehadthis realization ithout hefullbenefitof hisbounty-huntingxperience, nexperiencehathas takenhimagainandagaininto close proximitywith the androidshe has been assigned o kill. Onlyhavinghad this contact an he feelcompassionor theostracized ndroid,nwaysthatmakehimsensible hat hatcreature ompromisesisself-ishhumanego. Insum,Rickcannot eehimselfaspartof a posthumanommunityntilhe has abjectedhimself, in aspectsbothfigurative ndliteral-until he hashorrifiedhimselfas a murderernd, by thisact, acknowledgedimselfas anon-subject.For their own part,the authors f The Embodied Mind call suchan ac-knowledgmentof the fictional self the very imperativeof modern existence:


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ENTERING THE POST-HUMAN COLLECTIVE 427If our task in the yearsahead..is to build and dwellin a planetaryworld,thenwe must earn o uprootandrelease hegraspingendency, speciallyn

its collective manifestations 254). Dick's novel expressly ormulateshissame sentiment-but its speaker s, strangely nough,none otherthanthedebunkedWilburMercer: It'sthebasiccondition f life, he informsRick,to be requiredo violateyourown identity ?15:179).We canonlymakesense of this narrativerony-that the mostimportanttatement f thebookcomes fromthe icon of an ersatz heology-whenwe considerhowpersonalexperiencehas graduallyaltered Rick's conceptionof empathyand, byassociation,of the figurewho representsmpathy s well. By novel'send,Mercerhas become hespokespersonot of thegovernment'shauvinisticallyhumanversionof empathy,but of a versionwhich,as Rick hasdiscovered,encompassesboth human and android ogether.This semanticchangeinMercer's haracters borneoutby thefactthathe continueso appearo Rickeven thoughBusterFriendlyhas uncoveredhim as a fraud,as a politicalexpediento corral he masseswhohave usedwithhim. ForRicknonetheless,WilburMercerremains he emblemof compassion-butof a compassionradically efigured y his practical wareness f theposthumanommunity.Infact,so greatlyhasRick'sbounty-huntingxperiencenriched is appre-ciationof empathyhatalthough ehasevinced omepriordubiousness bouttheefficacyof Mercerism, e imagineshimself,soon after he last threekill-ings, lockedin a perpetual usion with WilburMercer.Notably,the eventtakesplace n a wasteland esert,milesaway rom hespurious mpathy ox,in a locationwhere Rick may disavow the official empathyhat has onlyabasedanddivided he human ollective.The drasticgeographicalhiftper-mitsRick anemotional ne aswell, andconsequently,e respondso reportsof BusterFriendly'srecentexposewithanunmitigatedncredulity. Mercerisn'ta fake, he announcesn short. Unless ealitys a fake ?21:234).Andin fact,as it refers o his ownreconceptionf reality,Rick'sstatements themostnecessary f truths: he life of theplanetdependsuponWilburMercer,as thepreserver f a nonpartisanndall-englobing ompassion.To reiterate:Rick'snewappreciationf theempathy hatWilburMercerincarnates erivesfromthe graveexperiences e hasundergone, s it nevercouldhavefrom heempathymadepopularnMercerist octrine.To be sure,we could ascribe his difference o theunderhanded otives hegovernmenthashad forpublicizing formalethic of empathy; utjust as likely, it stemsfromthe inadequaciesf metaphysicstself, as contrastedo the embodiedperceptionhatVarela t al. set forthasanessentialprerequisiteorauthenticcompassion.5hilosophy lonewill notsufficeto makeRickcognizant f hismaterialoextensionwith theandroid ther.Hemustratherubmithimself oa phenomenologicalxperience-anexperience hatteacheshim anempathythatis unmistakablyeal, insofaras it grows outof his understoodntimacywithhis technological nvironment.Accordingly,n thenovel'slastpages,Rickverbally enouncesheideol-ogy of a living community estricted o humansandhumansalone.Havingfound n the desertwhathe believesto be a naturaload,Rickhurrieshome


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428 SCIENCE-FICTIONTUDIES,VOLUME 4 (1997)to tell his wife, only to have her reveal to him thatthe toad is mechanical.Butin reacting to the news, we remark,he explicitly contraverts he creed of theandroid-huntingpoliceman: The electric things have their lives, too. Paltryas those lives are (?22:241). Thus describes the situationthat an interactionwith the mechanical andscapehas broughtto Rick's attention: hat technologyis indeed a vital part of the planetaryenvironment.To have overlooked thisreality has meant denying the basic entre-deux between self and world-anddenying, specifically, the establishedpresenceof diversemachines, ones mate-rially intertwined into the lives of the novel's characters.As Rick at lastconceives it, technology always already impinges on the humansubject, al-ways already cooriginates with him. It is up to the individual, merely, toacknowledgethat fact: to relinquisha self that hasoutgrowntraditionalhumanbounds-to be subsumed, in other words, into the posthumancollective.NOTES1. Philip K. Dick, Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? (1968; New York:BallantineBooks, 1975) ?1:8. All future references to this work will be parenthetical.2. Hayles explains this paradox in Rachael's android characterby appealingto atrope that recurs throughoutDick's fiction-an oscillation between the dark-hairedgirl (theemotionallywarmfemale whose archetypeis Dick's deadtwinsister)andtheschizoid woman (the stolid and unfeeling female, modeled after the author'saffectively detached mother). Hayles identifies Rachael as a character oddly splitbetween these two alternatives. Of course, this split patentlycomplicates the novel'sostensible ontological categories: neither fully empathicnor patently cold, Rachael'sliminal statuscalls into question the formal parametersof humanity.3. For a more detailedexplicationof this notion of the liberal-humanistubject,seeC.B. MacPherson, ThePolitical Theoryof Possessive Individualism:Hobbesto Locke(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1962).4. While Dick may evidence a profound suspicion of technology, it must beremembered that the technological societies of his fiction are overwhelminglycapitalisticand largely fascistic. It is less technology per se than the mythifyingusesto which it is directedby the forces of an instrumental easonthatserve as the targetsof Dick's satire (Bukatman53).5. In this connection, it's worth noting that Peter Fitting, in his analysis of five ofDick's novels, has similarly proposed that the author's oeuvre repeatedly stagescharacterswho discover thatideology has misrepresentednotjust their own identitybutall of reality as well. According to this account, in many of his works, Dick'scharactersaccept for a time a set of metaphysical deasagreed uponby the collectivity;at some eventualpoint in the novel, however, they realizeby their own experience thatthese ideas have played them false. Fitting reads in this patternan epistemologicalcritiqueof the dominant positivist view of empiricalreality as an objective 'world offacts' which can be apprehendedby the knowing subject (92). He concludes that therepetitionof this tropeexpresses theauthor'suneasiness andambivalencetowards themetaphysical solution. The possibility of an answer 'behind' phenomenal reality ismore of a temptationthan a resolution . . . (95).WORKS CITEDBaudrillard,Jean. For a Critiqueof the Political Economy of the Sign. Trans. CharlesLevin. St. Louis: Telos Press, 1972.Bukatman,Scott. Terminal dentity:The VirtualSubject n PostmodernScienceFiction.Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1993.


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ENTERINGTHE POST-HUMANCOLLECTIVE 429Dick, PhilipK. TheAndroidandthe Human. The ShiftingRealities of Philip K.Dick. Ed. LawrenceSutin.NY: PantheonBooks, 1995. 183-210.. Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? NY: Ballantine ooks, 1968.Fitting,Peter. Reality s IdeologicalConstruct: Reading f FiveNovels by PhilipK. Dick. SFS 10:92-110, #30, July 1983.Hayles, N. Katherine. SchizoidAndroid:BoundaryWork in the Mid-Sixties Novelsof PhilipK. Dick. Chicago:U of ChicagoP, forthcoming ookchapter.Kerman, udithB. PrivateEye: A SemioticComparisonf the FilmBlade Runnerandthe BookDo AndroidsDream of Electric Sheep? Patternsof the Fantastic II.Ed. DonaldM. Hassler.Mercer sland,WA: Starmont, 984.69-75.MacPherson, .B. The Political Theoryof PossessiveIndividualism:Hobbes to Locke.OxfordandNew York:OxfordUP, 1962.Varela, FranciscoJ., Evan Thompson,and EleanorRosch. TheEmbodied Mind.

Cambridge,MA and London:MITPress,1991.ABSTRACT. As staged in Dick's novel, the android nauguratesa crisis of subjectivi-ty. Whatdoes it mean to be humanin an era wherein humanconjoins with machine,biology withtechnology, naturewithmanufacture?-Clearly, it is aquestion confrontedby Rick Deckard, protagonistbountyhunterof the twenty-first-centuryyborg. Rick'sability to empathize with other creatures-the defming aspect of humanity,accordingto thejuridicalsystem thatemploys him-leads him to anethicalconundrum:he beginsto empathize with the android,the very creaturehe has been consignedto exterminate.Far from reassuring him of his existentialprivilege as human, then, Rick's empathyunderscores the speciousness of that hierarchy. It throws into relief the contrivedontological imbalancebetween self and other, humanand android.My paper explores this failure of empathyto secure Rick's prerogativeof humanselfhood. Extrapolating rom ideasexpressed in FranciscoJ. Varela,Evan Thompson,and Eleanor Rosch's TheEmbodiedMind, I argue that Rick's new respectfor androidlives stems not from the ethic of empathypromulgated in the narrative'sMerceristtheology, but from another, more authentic form of empathy, one that dramaticallychallenges traditionalnotionsof existence. This version of empathy (or compassion,as The EmbodiedMind names it) is sensed by one who conceives his self as, in fact,a non-self-as a being thatamountsto no more thana sequence of embodied experi-ences. Such a being does not (as Rick has been told to do) insulate himself fromexternaldepreciations,but ratherperceives himself in an existentialcontinuitywiththeother thatmateriallyshares his world. It is this eventualunderstanding hatprovokesRick's empathy for the android, one of the many technologies with which he residesin a state of mutualdetermination.Indeed, humansubjectivity,as the novel posits it,has always already been infringed upon by these technologies-the television and theempathy box most notably. This fact is hyperbolized in the human community'sdependency upon them, a dependency that I explicate in terms of Scott Bukatman'sdiscussion of image addiction. In effect, Rick's experience of this broadtechnologi-cal landscape awakens him to his basic planetarycontingency-to the cooperativematerializationof humanand machine in the posthumancollective. (JG)

entering the posthuman collective in philip k. dick's 'do androids dream of electric sheep' - jill...

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