entelec spring 2013 slide 1 leaving legacy, moving to next generation communications presented by:...

Entelec Spring 2013 Slide1

Leaving Legacy, Moving to Next Generation Communications

Presented by:Motty AnaviVP Business Development

Entelec ConferenceSpring 2013


Agenda

• Utility Network Migration Process• Factors and Influencers on Migration• Migration Options

– Process– Technology– Looking at the New Technology– Reliability– Services

• Still Outstanding• Summary


The Legacy Utility Network

• Only TDM based • Strict and well known and tested protocols• Cyber Security in not a major concern• Delay is not an issue• Ubiquitously supported by carriers and service providers

ADM

ADM

Tele-ProtectionC37.94

RTURS-232

Sub-Station

T1/E1PBXMultiplexerT1/E1

ADM

RTURS-232

Sub-Station

4WPhone

Control Console

Power Line

Control Center

Multiplexer

Server

NMS

PBX


Migrating to Packet Networks

• Obsolescence of equipment• Lack of support for 4W service• Improving and streamlining of Telecom network• New standards for Sub Station Services

– IEC61850– M2M communications

• New challenges with Packet Networks– Cyber Security– New Characteristics of transport (More Delay, Compatibility)


The Evolving Telecom Network

ADM

ADM


RTURS-232

Sub-Station

T1/E1PBXMultiplexerT1/E1

ADM


RTURS-232

Sub-Station

T1/E1PBXMultiplexer

Switch

Control Console

Power Line

Control Center

PBX

Server

NMS

RTURS-232

PMU/ Small SS

RF-3080

Multiplexer

Packet Network


Challenges: Next Generation Migration Uncertainty

Challenges in switching to All Packet• Not all critical application capable of migration• Maintain smooth operation of current networks, despite

discontinued vendor products• Avoid over-burdening network operations and

management due to TDM/PSN transport co-existence• Reconcile required investment in SDH/SONET equipment

with decommissioning plans• Avoid CapEx hikes related to increase in number of

network devices:– Continue using legacy installed-base while introducing

IP/Ethernet devices– Ensure service quality for mission critical apps (e.g.,

Teleprotection)


Challenges: Next Generation Migration Technology Aspect

Smart Communications over Packet• Service assurance for mission critical apps in PSN

environment:– Low end-to-end delay – High Availability– SDH/SONET-level Resiliency

• Differentiated quality of service for SCADA, video surveillance, voice, Teleprotection, radio and data traffic

• Remote operations, administration and maintenance (OAM) for fault management and lower OpEx

• Efficient connectivity for IEC 61850 intelligent electronic devices (IEDs)


The Migrated Telecom Network


RTURS-232

Sub-Station

T1/E1PBX

ADM


RTURS-232

Sub-Station

T1/E1PBXNext Gen MS

Control Console

Power Line

Control Center

PBX

Server

NMS

PS Network

Next Gen MS

Firewall

Firewall

RTURS-232

PMU/ Small SS

Firewall

MS Gateway


The Challenges

• Selecting the “winning” packet network• Not all applications can be transported over packet

– Application issues– Security concerns

• Upgrading ancillary equipment to be “Packet Compatible”– Or making adjustment to the network

• Training or retraining of workforce• Massive capital expense with a complete upgrade• Complexity of maintaining two or more networks• Buying more equipment with a short usability timeframe


Addressing the Challenges: The Options

•High operating costs

•Low scalability•Not flexible

Keep my legacy forever!•Utilize existing assets•Deterministic performance

•No learning curve

•High equipment costs•Non-deterministic•Steep learning curve

Move everything to packet!•Flexible & scalable•Low OpEx•Future support

•Asset lifespan•Gradual migration•Guaranteed performance

•Moderate learning curve

•Future ready design

Evolution instead of Revolution…


The Core Replacement Choices

• IP/MPLS– Added deterministic paths to IP– Used as a core Technology– No Built-in Security Mechanism– Still untried as access technology

• CoE (aka Carrier Ethernet)– Mature Technology– Enhanced and updated– Established Security Protocol support– Connection Oriented Ethernet


IP/MPLS Highlights

• Mature Technology• Widely used• Deterministic routing• No Built-in Security• All paths for packets setup on connection establishment• Well established resiliency mechanisms• No built-in security (very susceptible for cyber attacks)• Different in architecture than existing SONET/TDM• Fairly unaffordable


CoEthernet Highlights

• Mature Technology• Newly enhanced Connection Oriented Ethernet technology• Built in Security including Source authentication• Similar to SONET/SDH in terms of architecture and

Terminology• CoE developed mechanisms for:

– Deterministic network performance– Detection of Network failure– Measurement of network performance– Very fast restoration of service (Sub 10ms)

• Very affordable


An IP/MPLS Based Network

• Architecture is very different than SONET/SDH (Similar to IP)– New set of addressable values– Each device now requires new management connection

• Training is a challenge• Susceptible to cyber attacks with no source authentication• Network performance is predictable• In network delay is manageable and could be designed to

be low• Extremely high equipment costs• Built in fast resiliency


A CoE Based Network

• Architecture similar SONET/SDH– Connection based virtual circuits– Similar OAM terms (AIS/RDI etc….)

• Training simple• More resilient to cyber attacks with source authentication• Network performance guaranteed by CoE OAM

measurements• In network delay can be designed to be low• Relatively low equipment cost – regardless of network size

or number of nodes• Built in fast resiliency


Comparing The Technologies

• Connection Setup– SONET : Hard coded paths mapped through ADMs– CoE: Hard coded EVCs mapped through Switches with pre-

determined priorities– MPLS: Dynamic path setup based on IP addressing and

exchanging routing tables• Vulnerability of connections

– SONET: All connections are initiated by NMS– COE: All connections are initiated by NMS– MPLS: Connections made dynamically and are vulnerable to

errored/malicious routing information


Comparing The Technologies

• Troubleshooting– SONET : Comprehensive troubleshooting built in with OAM

bits propagating faults– CoE: Comprehensive troubleshooting built in with OAM

packets propagating faults– MPLS: No built-in OAM mechanism for localizing faults relies

on other overlays to initiate backup paths• Resiliency

– SONET: Ring resiliency to a predetermined path– COE: Ring and path resiliency to a pre-determined path

within 10ms– MPLS: Ring or Mesh resiliency depending on topology


Comparing Security

• Source Authentication:– MPLS – No source authentication, once entering an CE/PE –

local id is erased.– Ethernet – Universal address is maintained (MAC address),

Standard for source authentication 802.1X• Snooping / Scouting:

– MPLS – LSPs used as transparent pipes from one location to another.

– Ethernet - Individual frames screened at global level (MAC) for validity

• Control Plane:– MPLS - BGP and other routing protocols very susceptible for

attacks that can crash entire network– Ethernet - Control plane isolated and access controlled by

corporate access control


The Future: IEC 61850

• Standard design for Sub Station Communications• Establishes standard:

– Architecture (Process/Station Bus)– Protocols and formats (e.g. Goose)– Open interconnection points– Equipment requirements– Common communications: Ethernet


Comparing the Contenders

• CoE has the advantage over the other packet technologies when it comes to similarity to SONET/SDH which make this technology the technological and business winner

IP/MPLS CoE SONET

Simplicity Training

Resiliency Cost

Security Longevity


Ethernet OAM


Drivers for Ethernet OAM

• OAM benchmarks– Set by TDM and existing WAN technologies

• Operational Efficiency– Reduce OPEX, avoid truck-rolls– Downtime cost

• Management Complexity– Large Span Networks– Multiple constituent networks belong to disparate

organizations/companies


Fault ManagementFault DetectionFault Verification Fault IsolationFault RecoveryFault Notification

Configuration ManagementPerformance Management

Frame Loss Measurement Delay Measurement Delay Variation Measurement Availability Measurement

EthernetOAM

Ethernet OAM Capabilities


Ethernet OAM

• IEEE 802.1ag– Connectivity Fault Management (CFM)– Also referred as Service OAM

• IEEE 802.3ah (clause 57)– Ethernet Link OAM– Also referred as 802.3 OAM, Link OAM or Ethernet in the First

Mile (EFM) OAM• ITU-T Y.1731

– OAM functions and mechanisms for Ethernet-based networks


Standards: Ethernet OAM

A summary of available Ethernet OAM mechanisms

End-End/Last Segment

Performance Monitoring Type Fault Propagation ETX Implementation

IEEE 802.3-2005 (formerly 802.3ah) Single Segment No Link No Standard

IEEE 802.1ag End-to-End No Connectivity No Standard

ITU-T Y.1731 End-to-End Yes Service Yes Standard


Ethernet SLA Tools ExampleConnectivity Verification

•IEEE 802.3ah heartbeat•IEEE 802.1ag CC•IEEE 802.1ag LB, MAC Ping

Fault Detection & Isolation•IEEE 802.1ag LT, MAC Trace-route•IEEE 802.1ag LB, MAC Ping•L3 Ping and Trace-route

Fault Propagation•Subscriber port shutdown•ITU-T Y.1731 RDI•IEEE 802.3ah Dying Gasp, SNMP Trap

Diagnostic Loopbacks• L1 loopback• IEEE 802.3ah loopback• L2/L3 loopback, MAC Swap, per EVC/VLAN/Src. Add.

Performance Management •ITU-T Y.1731/RFC2544: Packet Loss, PD, PDV, •Per EVC.cos Statistics


Pseudowires


What is Pseudowire (PW)?

• Pseudo = Simulated, Seemingly• Emulation of a native service over a Packet Switched

Network (PSN). • The native services can be ATM, TDM, Frame Relay or ETH,

while the PSN can be ETH, IP or MPLS.• Supports voice, data and video• Provides a transparent tunnel through the PSN• Provides clock distribution and synchronization over PSN


What is Pseudowire (PW)?

SCADA

Analog

TDM

PW-GW PW-GW

PSN NetworkSCADA

Analog

TDM


Timing


IEEE 1588

Defines a Precision Time Protocol (PTP) designed to synchronize real-time clocks in a hierarchical distributed system

Intended for LAN using multicast communications

Targeted accuracy of microseconds or sub-microsecond (v1)

v1 approved in September 2002 and published November 2002

v2 approved in June 2007

IEEE-1588 is a standard for a Precision Clock Synchronization Protocol for Networked Measurement and Control Systems


What is IEEE1588v2?

• IEEE1588v2 is designed to distribute frequency and time to a higher accuracy and precision, to the scale of nanoseconds and fractional nanoseconds.

• The protocol operates over packet switched networks. The standard is currently defined to run over IEEE 802.3, UDP/IPv4, UDP/IPv6, DeviceNet, ControlNet and PROFINET.

• Designed to operate automatically to establish master slave hierarchy for time distribution. (not for Telecomm industry)

• Introduces “Transparent Clocks” to overcome the network’s delay variation.

• C37.238 Power Profile based on IEEE-1588v2 required for Syncrophasor accuracy


Protection Over Ethernet - G.8031


G.8031 Protection

• Protection as per ITU-T G.8031

– 1:1 Mode

– Unidirectional Only

– Using APS messages

• Triggers

– Port Signal loss

– CCM LOC , ETH-AIS

• Protection time

– 10ms protection for one pair of EVC

– As low as 40ms protection 4 pairs of EVCs

• Topologies

– EVC protection with one fiber (both EVC’s running on the same Fiber)

– EVC protection with 2 fiber each path on different fiber (dual link)

– EVC protection with dual fiber working with MC-LACP to dual PE

– EVC protection with Dual NTU (Future development)


G.8031 Applications – End to End path protection• Redundancy on S-Tags in the network• APS is running over one standby EVC only• Revertive and Non revertive modes• End to end service shell be maintained

– TLS , Accesses to L3 VPN • CCM or ETH-AIS is used to trigger protection event

Slide 35

Metro /VPLS

L2PE

L2PE

L2PE

End to End path protectionOnline EVC Redundant EVC

NID CPE

Customer PremisesX

NID

Ethernet

Customer Premises

CPE


Teleprotection

• Deliver Teleprotection signals with mission-critical accuracy over dedicated fiber, TDM or IP• C37.94-compliant Teleprotection communication channels allow reliable transmission by minimizing data errors due to EM and RF interference, or ground potential rise (GPR)•Ultra-low end-to-end propagation delay supports immediate delivery of Transfer Trip commands from protective relay/contact transfer to remote-end substations•Maintain performance levels when migrating to packet networks with hard QoS, as well as robust latency and jitter protection


Teleprotection Requirements

• Very strict delay – 80ms total– 40ms for network

• Differential Teleprotection– Constant delay– During failover – Delay could change

• Packet solutions do not factor differential delays on redundancy


The Ideal Migration Strategy

• Select a new technology– Reliability– Longevity– Affordability

• Selectively migrate application– Check availability of solutions– Migrate only when application validate– Minimize cyber security threat

• Complete migration within timeframe


Migration Steps

AccessAccess Aggregation

Required Services

Infrastructure

Legacy to SDH/SONETSDH/SONET

Aggregation NetworkNMSVoIP

DataETH to PSNPSN

ETH to SDH/SONT

Legacy to PSN


Summary

• The energy industry is being forced to migrate to packet technologies

• Caution should be used when selecting a new technology• Established Standards such as IEC61850, C37.238 (IEEE-

1588v2) use Ethernet as their transport of choice• An evolutionary approach to migration can ease the pain• Some applications may not be suitable today for migration

to NGN• Migrating to NGN is unavoidable and should be designed

today to optimize available funds and reduce future issues


Questions ?


www.rad.com

Thank You For Your Attention

For More Information:Motty AnaviVP of Business [email protected](201) 378-0213

mailto:[email protected]

entelec spring 2013 slide 1 leaving legacy, moving to next generation communications presented by:...

Documents

entelec spring

teleprotection slide

compatibility slide

outstanding summary

winning packet network

legacy utility network

number of network devices

gen ms firewall rtu