enhancing the safety and public acceptance of nuclear ...enhancing the safety and public acceptance...

Enhancing the Safety and Public Acceptance of Nuclear Power in Japan

Tomoko (TOM) Murakami Manager, Nuclear Energy Group

The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan September 25, 2014

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Korea-China-Japan Joint Energy Conference for KEEI’s 28th Anniversary Celebration “Toward more integrated Northwest Asia Energy Cooperation” 25 September 2014, Sapphire Ball Room, Lotte Hotel Seoul

Förbättra säkerhet och allmänhetens acceptans för kärnkraft i Japan

Our Frequently Asked Questions and Contents

FAQs • How has the safety standard revised after Fukushima accident? • How can we get reliable information on nuclear safety and risk? • How safe is safe enough … ? Contents 1. Measures taken after Fukushima and the present status 2. Information disclosure and the public acceptance

2 Förbättra säkerhet och allmänhetens acceptans för kärnkraft i Japan

0. Nuclear Power Plants in Japan – all in shutdown status

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11 22Kashiwazaki-Kariwa, Tokyo Electric Power Company

Shika, Hokuriku Electric Power Company

Tsuruga, The Japan Atomic Power Company

Mihama, Kansai Electric Power Company

Ohi, Kansai Electric Power Company

Kaminoseki, Chugoku Electric Power Company

Genkai, Kyushu Electric Power CompanySendai, Kyushu Electric Power Company

Output

100MW and more1000MW and less500MW and less Planning

Under construction

In operation

68.15562Total

16.5529Planning

2.7563Under construction

48.84750In operation

Total output (GW)Units

68.15562Total

16.5529Planning

2.7563Under construction

48.84750In operation

Total output (GW)Units

11 22 11 22 33

33 44 55

22 33 4411

66 77 8855

3311 22

11 22

11 22

22 33 4411 55 66 77

2211

22 33 4411

3311 22

22 33 4411

Takamaha, Kansai Electric Power Company

33 4411 22

Shimane, Chugoku Electric Power Company

11 22 33

2211

11 22 33 44

66

33

3

Higashidori, Tohoku Electric Power Company

Higashidori, Tokyo Electric Power Company

Tomari, Hokkaido Electric Power Company Ohma, Japan Power Development Company

Onagawa, Tohoku Electric Power Company

Namie-Odaka, Tohoku Electric Power Company

Fukushima Daiichi, Tokyo Electric Power Company

Tokai Daini, The Japan Atomic Power Company

Ikata, Shikoku Electric Power Company

Under Safety Assessment

Hamaoka, Chubu Electric Power Company

Fukushima Daini, Tokyo Electric Power Company

× ×

Application Approved


1. Measures taken after Fukushima and the present status 1-1 Activities by Safety Regulatory Authority and Utilities

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2011 2012 2013 2014

Utilities

Safety Regulatory Authority

11 March Fukushima Accident

March – August Immediate Safety Measures

July 2011 – August 2012 Assessment on the Stress Test -> 30 units submitted

July 2012 Ohi-3/4 restart

March 23 Order on Immediate Safety Measures

6 July Order on the Stress Test “Condition for the restart”

March 2012 Ohi-3/4 Report approved by NISA/ASC

September 2012 NRA Launch “New Safety Standard is a crucial condition for the restart “

July 8 New Regulation Standards endorsed

July 16- Assessment for restart

From July 8 to the present Licensing applications for restart •Ikata 3 •Ohi 3&4 •Sendai 1&2 … etc

September 10 Application approved For Sendai 1&2


Förbättra säkerhet och allmänhetens acceptans för kärnkraft i Japan 5

1. Measures taken after Fukushima and the present status 1-2 Nuclear Regulation Authority launch in September 2012

Core value • The NRA was to established to absorb and learn the lessons of the Fukushima

Daiichi nuclear accident of March 11, 2011. • The nuclear safety system and management must be rebuilt on a solid basis,

placing the highest priority on public safety and a genuine safety culture. Guiding Principles for activities : Independence and Transparency • Independent Decision Making • Effective Actions • Open and Transparent Organization • Improvement and Commitment • Emergency Response (preparedness)

: Retiring in the end of September

Successors

Professor Satoru Tanaka University of Tokyo

Professor Akira Ishiwatari Tohoku University

1. Measures taken after Fukushima and the present status 1-3 The new regulatory standard

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- Current Regulatory Standard -

- Previous Regulatory Standard-

Design Basis: to avoid core melt under the condition of a single

failure

Tolerant to natural disasters, fires

Reliable power sources and safety facilities

Tolerant to in-house flooding Tolerant to natural disasters

including volcano explosions, tornados, forest fires

Reliable power sources and safety facilities Tolerant to earthquakes/ tsunami

Tolerant to airplane crash Prepared for radioactivity release,

containment damage and core melt under simultaneous

outbreaks of malfunction

Tolerant to earthquakes/ tsunami

Source: “An overview of the draft regulatory standard”, NRA, July 3 2013

Severe Accident Management Guidelines

were self-assessed by electric utilities

Compulsory


Professor Satoru Tanaka University of Tokyo

1. Measures taken after Fukushima and the present status 1-4 Activities by Operators – case 1: Specialized Functional Facilities • Specialized Functional Facilities are required to serve functions for “shut down

the reactor”, “cooling down the fuels” and “containment of the radioactive materials” in case of airplane crash.

• The design criteria of the SFFs is to be functional against the airplane crash even though all the (existing and usually fixed) safety systems are supposed to be unavailable.

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containment vessel

emergency generators emergency

control room

reactor

Containment Spray

Alternative Reactor Injection Pump

Alternative Containment Spray Pump

Specialized Functional Facilities Building

Water Tanks

Image of the Specialized Functional Facilities Building (PWR) Source: Kansai Electric Power Company Website

<http://www.kepco.co.jp/corporate/pr/2013/pdf/0701_1j_03.pdf>


1. Measures taken after Fukushima and the present status 1-4 Activities by Operators – case 2 : Filtered Venting System (FVS) -

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Source: TEPCO http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/kk-np/info/tohoku/filtervent-j.html https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCoSqHxhc9Su-YV7dFKqqvzA

Installation of the Filter Vessel

Kashiwazaki Kariwa Unit 6/7 Role of the Filtered Venting System 1. Preventing core from melting FVS releases the heat from the core before melting by depressurizing the containment as well as the reactor vessel so as to inject sufficient water for core cooling. 2. Modifying the impact of the core melt and decrease the radioactive materials release Even though the core melts down in case of a severe accident, FVS can decrease the contamination of the soils and water in the environment by capturing more than 99.9 % of radioactive cesium particles.

Image of the Filtered Venting System Components


1. Measures taken after Fukushima and the present status 1-5 Safety assessment progress at present – Sendai got the pole position

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Unit Utility Type / 10MWe

No. of hearings*

Date of Submission

Commercial Operation

notes

Tomari 1/2 Hokkaido PWR/57.9 35 7/8/2013 6/22/1989, 4/12/1991

Tomari 3 Hokkaido PWR/91.2 272 7/8/2013 12/22/2009

Ohi 3/4 Kansai PWR/118.0 199 7/8/2013 12/18/1991, 2/2/1993 Suspected active faults -> cleared

Takahama 3/4 Kansai PWR/87.0 260 7/8/2013 1/17/1985, 6/5/1985

Ikata 3 Shikoku PWR/89.0 287 7/8/2013 12/15/1994

Sendai 1/2 Kyushu PWR/89.0 556 7/8/2013 7/4/1984, 11/28/1985 Approved

Genkai 3/4 Kyushu PWR/118.0 201 7/8/2013 3/18/1994, 7/25/1997

KK 6/7 Tokyo ABWR/135.6 67 7/12/2013 11/7/1996, 7/2/1997

Shimane 2 Chugoku BWR/82.0 47 12/25/2013 2/10/1989

Onagawa 2 Tohoku BWR/82.5 47 12/27/2013 7/28/1995

Hamaoka 4 Chubu BWR/113.7 28 2/14/2014 9/3/1993

Tokai Daini JAPC BWR/110.0 13 5/20/2014 11/28/1978

Higashidori 1 Tohoku BWR/110.0 12 6/10/2014 12/8/2005 Suspected active faults

Shika 2 Hokuriku ABWR/135.8 1 8/12/2014 3/15/2006

Source: Nuclear Regulation Authority, http://www.nsr.go.jp/activity/regulation/tekigousei/index.html (Japanese only) * As of September 10


2. Information disclosure and the public acceptance 2-1 Whom do people put reliance on? • People put a great reliance on

… • Family • Neighbors • Scientists • Self-Defense • Newspapers

• People don’t so much believe in … • Officials • Politicians • Internet • Nuclear experts

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0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

FamilyNeighbours

PoliticiansOfficials

ScientistsSelf-Defense

PoliceTV

NewpapersInternet

Nuclear Expertsquite reliable

reliable

neutral

unreliable

quite unreliable

Source: Public Survey on nuclear energy and reliance Conducted in January 2014, by NPO Public Outreach

Correct information and commentaries based on facts and scientific evidences should be highly required to newspaper editors.


2. Information disclosure and the public acceptance 2-2 Information disclosure – case : Disclosure of Yoshida Testimony (1/2) • On September 10, the testimony by late

Masao Yoshida, ex-manager of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, was disclosed.

• The testimony cleared out that the article previously reported by the Asahi Shimbun contained serious factual errors.

• The Asahi Shimbun had independently obtained a copy of the "Yoshida Testimony" at a time when the central government had not yet released the document compiled by the government's Investigation Committee on the Fukushima Accident. The first article about that testimony appeared in the morning edition on May 20, 2014.

• The article reported that “ on March 15, about 650 TEPCO workers, or 90 percent of the total number who were at the Fukushima Daiichi NPS went against the order by plant manager Masao Yoshida to wait for further instructions and withdrew to the Fukushima Daini NPS.“

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A part of “Yoshida Testimony” Source: Cabinet Secretariat,

http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/genpatsujiko/hearing_koukai/020_koukai.pdf


2. Information disclosure and the public acceptance 2-2 Information disclosure – case : Disclosure of Yoshida Testimony (2/2) • However, the disclosed “Yoshida Testimony” proved that the article was wrong.

The Asahi reporting team had focused its attention on one passage in the testimony that read, "I thought I gave an order to temporarily evacuate to a location where radiation levels were low near the Fukushima Daiichi and await further instructions, but in the end they went to the Fukushima Daini plant." The Asahi reporters combined this with other internal documents from TEPCO and concluded that the workers "went against the order of Yoshida ... and withdrew to Fukushima Daini."

• In fact, the Yoshida testimony also state, "When I really think about it, I believed that it was correct to have gone to Daini," and, "Communications were like a telephone game, and many of my instructions didn't get to the staff." The Asahi team, however, decided that these comments were "unimportant" and left them out of their reports -- which turned out to be a fatal error.

• On September 11, The Asahi Shimbun retracted the wrong article and apologized to the readers and to TEPCO.


2. Information disclosure and the public acceptance 2-3 Public acceptance – case: Interim Storage Facility in Fukushima Fukushima Governor Agrees to Interim Storage Facilities for Contaminated Waste • On September 1, Fukushima Prefectural Governor Yuhei Sato, who had

previously expressed his intention to accept the Japanese government’s plan to construct interim storage facilities in the prefecture, paid a formal visit to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at his official residence in Tokyo. Along with him for the visit were Okuma Mayor Toshitsuna Watanabe and Futaba Mayor Shiro Izawa, both whose towns are the planned sites for the facilities.

• Abe first expressed gratitude for the governor’s decision, saying that the construction of the facilities was “very important for the reconstruction not just of Fukushima, but of Japan.”

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A pile of contaminated soils – Fukushima City, January 2012

Hard, cool and logical thinking can produce solutions !


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enhancing the safety and public acceptance of nuclear ...enhancing the safety and public acceptance...

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