english economy society

8/9/2019 English Economy Society

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Economie et société – Anglais

CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION

Anglo-American relations mainly from WWI to the present time.What does that mean? It was raised by the national for their self-interest. There’s more than arelation of crude national interest. The culture of classiness is also good points: commonlanguage, common culture trades, and ties during WWII, the countries supporting eachother in an unusual way.

Have there been such a thing as a special relationship between the US and GB, or is it just a segment of British imagination? If it actually e ists, to what e tent it has beensignificant?We ha!e a hypothesis that there’s a special relationship. "ur tas# is to appro!e$disappro!e it.The e%pression &pecial relationship:

- It was coined by the 'ritish, usually attributed to Winston (hurchill- Important point: more often used by the 'ritish than by the Americans because they

needed it more than them.- (ommon language, common cultural traits, emotional ties dating bac# to WWII

leading to some diplomatic friendship&o goes the special relationship hypothesis .

1 Theo!ies o" inte!national !elations an# special !elationship hypothesisThe ) main theories of international relations are: realism and new-realism, pluralism,structuralism.

a* +ealism and new-realism+ealism : The states a!e the most impo!tant acto!s , they are much more important thananything else. &o, the states pursue power and nothing else.Their goal is to #ominate !i$als , to inc!ease thei! po%e! and to sit to preser!e their security.In the realism scheme of things international relations are highly confrontational and throatwith danger. +ealism is dominated by real politic, power politics and pragmatism. The maingoal to maintain balance of power this is seen as the best way to a!oid conflict and achie!estability. (oncerning realism theory, there is no cultural or emotional preferences, promotionour crude interest rules supreme. We can say that alliances rest upon interest only.

ew-realism : It’s same assumption but more emphasis on non-state actors such asmultinational corporations*.What would a proponent of realism in international relations have to say about the special relationship?If there is such a thing as a special relationship between the &A and /reat 'ritain, it can berooted in national inte!est . 0rom the WWII it has been in the best interest of the &A and/reat 'ritain especially /reat 'ritain* to establish !ery close diplomatic ties with each other.(oncerning realism and new-realism, the cultural closeness, the common languages, personalinteraction or the shared memories of war ha!e nothing to do with. The special relationship is

purely a matter of national interest for countries. b* 1luralism(oncerning pluralism, the emphasis is upon comple% interdependence. &tates are not purelyindependent and self-interested entities. &tates can’t entirely separate their own interest fromthose with whom they interact. And beside states, other actors out of states* can be regardedas ma2or actors multinational corporations, religious mo!ements, national mo!ements, cyber society mo!ements3*. This seems to be especially rele!ant in the American conte%t because

pressure groups ha!e access to many entries of power e%ample with, isolationism, pro-Israellobby, and pro-Arab lobby*. (omple% picture in which foreign policy can de!iate from a

purely rational approach dominated by self-interest only.What would a proponent of pluralism in international relations have to say about the special

relation?As far as we are concerned it’s interesting because one ma#e posit that pure national interestamong the whole story on the count of multiple influences upon foreign policy . 'ut it’s acomple% that real politic rational can be e%clude or modified. It ma#es a case for a specialrelationship between the &A and /reat 'ritain resting upon more than 2ust national interestonly.


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d* The Anglo-American relations from 9= ; to 9= =The special relationship and the 'ritain decline with the &ue5 crisis in 9= ; that made thespecial relationship less rele!ant to the &A and /reat 'ritain became a less crucial ally.

e* The Anglo-American relationship in the 9=


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contin&ity so it was the opposite 0rance*. &ome of their slogans were 'ritish, for e%ample“No taxation without representation . Another e%ample is the di!ision of power, the re2ectionof absolutism 0ounding 0athers with the ideas of (ommon 1lace in /reat 'ritain*. &o the

2ustification of the American declaration of Independence was partly be founded in 'ritish political philosophy with Hohn >oc#e, and Hohn >oc#e natural philosophy is:

EWhen natural rights of the go!erned are infringed by the go!ernment, the go!erned ha!e theright and the duty to rebel against the go!ernmentG.

In addition, it can hardly be deny that the American colonists thought of themsel!es as heirs to4nglish 1arliamentary tradition we can spea# about that with Cagna (harta and the 'ill of +ights of 9


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to limit the American commercial competition and conse6uently the young republic sufferedeconomically and militarily.The American (i!il War 9


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Those pieces of legislation testified the strong isolationism tendencies in the Americansociety. Cany American citi5ens wanted to #eep a law from what some historian relator saidthe 4uropean ci!il war. In other words: not intention to be drag in 4uropean conflict.That was the situation 08+ had to grapple with and he rec#oned that it wasn’t the interest of the &A to ta#e an acti!e part in the world affairs and that isolationism would e!entually

pro!e self-defeating and can be dangerous for the county. 'ut at the same time, he had tocontend with an isolationist congress and people they wanted to stay isolationist*. &o acompromise was needed between 1resident’s opinion and (ongress’ opinion.In 9=)= when the war bro#e out he contended himself with gi!ing moral support to /reat'ritain and no loan was granted. In 9=)= /reat 'ritain was closer to 0rance than to the &Aand actually until 9=@B, the 1rime Cinister in /', who was e!ille (hamberlain, didn’te%pect much from the &A. /radually, +oose!elt managed to mo!e the &A closer andcloser to /reat 'ritain.In &eptember 9=)= there was the cash an# ca!!y ag!eement signed between /reat 'ritainand the &A. The &A sold military material to /reat 'ritain but on conditions: /' had to

pay immediately and /reat 'ritain had to transport it himself.With this American compromise position it permits /reat 'ritain to be supported but at thesame time, for the American opinion, it made sure to stop short of direct in!ol!ement in theconflict. Ceanwhile American isolationism didn’t subsidedJ two e!ents e!entually promptedthe &A to get in!ol!ed to the WWII (b. 1 c.) .

b* Hune 9=@B: 0rance surrendersIn Hune 9=@B, Na'i *e!many in$a#e# .!ance and sweetly crushed 0ranco-'ritish resistance.&o /reat 'ritain and her !ast empire were left alone to face a5i /ermany so she foundherself in desperate situation. 'ut in Cay 9=@B, Winston (hurchill became the 'ritish 1rimeCinister and he had absolutely no intention of negotiating with the a5is. At this moment,/reat 'ritain was in desperate need of American help. The special relationship with the &Awas a matter of sur!i!al.8ri!ing the &A into the WWII and recei!ing the American economic and military support

became (hurchill’s main ob2ecti!e and obsession. Therefore he probed +oose!elt to pro!ide/reat 'ritain with the help she needed and he as#ed +oose!elt that it was a matter of nationalsecurity for the &A as well as for /reat 'ritain. +oose!elt refused to enter into the conflict

in 9=@B, but he committed the &A more and more on the 'ritish side. &o from 9=@B, agreater collaboration concerning military and intelligence was de!eloped. In Hune 9=@B, the&A didn’t stay neutral anymore but they remained a non )ellige!ent nationIn &eptember 9=@B, Dest!oye!s "o! 6ases #eal was signed by /reat 'ritain and the &Awhich means that B American 8estroyers were sent to /reat 'ritain in e%change of access tosome 'ritish possessions.0rom Carch 9=@9 to 9=@ : +en# +ease . It means that it supplies her allies with great amountof war material with free of immediate charge. &o this >end >ease meant was crucial in thespecial relationship meant that by no means the beneficiary was /reat 'ritain. With a priceless support to sustain the war effort, a new lifeline was created.In o!ember 9=@B < Roose$elt %as !eelecte# "o! the thi!# time as American president.

(onse6uently it became easier for him to act regardless of popular sentiment. 'y 9=@B K 9=@9the &A had already become a central actor of the WWII, but still had not entered in theWWII the &A was the central actor concerning the support but they didn’t enter into theconflict*.

c* Hapanese attac# on 1earl 7arbor In the of 8ecember 9=@9, the Hapanese attac#ed by surprise the American na!al base in7awaii, and the &A immediately declared the war on Hapan and incidentally on /ermany*.'efore the attac# on 1earl 7arbor, the ground had been led for the special relationship but itcould now begin in earnest.

II The special !elationship #&!ing 22II0rom 9=@9 to 9=@ , /reat 'ritain and the &A established an unusual close alliance.

a* Cilitary collaborationThe special relationship was military in origin, and has always ri!en on military organi5ation.The unprecedented legal cooperation in!aded by the creation in 0ebruary 9=@ on the(ombine (hief of &taff ((0*


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“ he committee" with its elaborate or*ani2ation of staff" officers of every *rade" disposes of all our resources" and" in practice uses &ritish and merican troops" ships" aircraft and

munitions 3ust as if they were the resources of a sin*le state or nation (#hurchill) 4#ombines#hief of 5taff I" 6eb. ,- 78

/reat 'ritain and the &A set up a 2oined command of their combined military forces and infront of an American audience in 9=@), Ch&!chill called the ((& E a wonderful system G and2inston to declared

“ his committee" with its elaborate or*ani2ation of staff officers of every *rade" disposes of all our resources" and" in practice uses &ritish and merican floats" ships" aircrafts and

munitions 3ust as if they were resources as a sin*le state or nation .The ((& became one of the highlights of this special relationship it should come as nosurprise that (hurchill suggested the ((& should be maintained after the WWII. It wasob!iously in /reat 'ritain’s interest since they need of American support. The close militarycorporation between the two countries helped forced practices of mutual assistance andunderstanding between them.

b* IntelligenceIt was the only field in which /reat 'ritain was a stronger partner in 9=@@. The Americansdidn’t ha!e many e%periences before the WW and li#e /reat 'ritain which was adapted atcollecting useful information. &o the American O-- O""ice o" -t!ategic -e!$ices which issince 9=@ the #I * and the 6!itish -I- -ec!et Intelligence -e!$ice L 9I: * wor#ed hand inhand. /reat 'ritain was teaching the Americans.Two agreements called '+ &A were signed in 9=@B and 9=@). They contributed $ wanted toincrease cooperation in field of intelligence, laying the ground for future cooperation. Itwould become an enduring feature of the special relationship after the WWII and of coursethroughout the (old War e!en if after the &A o!ertoo# /reat 'ritain about that.

c* uclear researchIn origin it was /reat 'ritain, but then the &A too# the lead with their ,anhattan p!o7ectculminated to the creation of the first nuclear bomb in 9=@ . In August 9=@), there was the =&e)ec ag!eement . This agreement secured /reat 'ritain’s

participation to Canhattan pro2ect. It specified that neither county can use the bomb againstthe other or without the others consent.

d* Ca#ing plans for the post-war worldIn 9=@B: the Atlantic Cha!te! which was a 2oint declaration meant to be a blueprint( empreinte ) for new world order after the WWII.In 9=@@: the 6!etton 2oo#s con"e!ence which was a blueprint for a new financial order after WWII. The 'ritish representati!e >ord Meynes was acti!ely in!ol!ed.(oncerning these points it was ob!ious that in both cases, the &A was imposing their ownagenda and the /reat 'ritain had to follow suite. And here again we can see that the &A wasa stronger partner in the special relationship.

e* 1ersonal friendshipThe personal friendship was warm-feelings both elite from the &A and from /reat 'ritain*were stic#ing together and that can build the corner stone of the special relationship

hypothesis. The first e%ample is when +oose!elt said to (hurchill“It is *reat fun to be in the same decade as you .

(hurchill it is up most to force a warm-close with the American citi5ens. It was not 2ust the1rime Cinister and the 1resident but the close personal relationship at all le!els amongmiddle ran#ing officials this close personal relationships were e%istent* during the WWII.+oose!elt, (hurchill on the (ombined (hiefs of &taff in 9=@):“ ll these men now 'now each other; they trust each other; they li'e each other" and most of them have been at wor' to*ether for a lon* time 4 hese men middle < hi*h ran'in* officials

in the army8. Winston (hurchill was o!erstating the case but he was certainly true concerning some points.And the personal friendships and mutual respect were to play a role in Anglo-Americanrelationship after the WWII. These roles are the ne%t points: a firm framewor# of diplomaticinterchange and the personal memories and shared habits facilitating mutual understanding .It should not be e%aggerated but it was what made the special relationship e%isted andspecial.

III +imitations: tensions an# m&t&al s&spicions


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The Anglo-American alliance during the WWII was e%ceptionally close and strong but wecan’t forget that the foreign policy was brought down for all countries to promoting their national interest and the WWII was no e%ception to that rule*.

a* 7idden agendasThe shifting power of parliament’s importance was appearing during the WWII, /reat 'ritainsacrificed a force of the national wealth, and empire was wea#ened especially in Asia.'y contrast, the WWII pulls the &A out of the economic inflation and 2ust started theAmerican e%tend. In addition, it enable the &A to increase its influence in the 1acific, 4astAsia, and the Ciddle 4astJ areas where she had often ta#en the second place e%ample:Australia ew ealand which mo!ed closer to the &A during the WWII* and the trend wasaccentuated by the cold war. To be sure to the o!erwriting ob2ecti!e for both countries was towin but they were also competing for world power. o one was naN!e and it fuelled mentalsuspicions and tensions:

- The &A suspected /reat 'ritain to manipulate them with the !iew to preser!e the'ritish 4mpire.

- /reat 'ritain suspected the Americans to be trying to wea#en the 'ritish 4mpire for their own strategic and commercial benefit.

The both allegation was correct.0or e%ample, The Internal 0oreign "ffice /'* 45tate =epartment >58 paper of Carch 9=@@ :It must be our purpose not to balance our power a*ainst that of merica" but to ma'e use of

merica power for purpose which we re*ard as *ood 4 8 We must use the power of the >5 to preserve the #ommonwealth and the @mpire" and" if possible" to support the pacification of @urope

b* Anglo American bones of contention

• The 'ritish empireThe &A tried to reduce its influence, and in opposite (hurchill committed to the preser!ationof the 'ritish 4mpire. 4%ample of the Atlantic cha!te! in 9=@B with the article ) “ he ri*ht of all peoples to choose the form of *overnment under which they will live . It was a blueprint for an American dominated post World War using self-determination as a

means to wea#en 4uropean colonial 4mpires. "n the opposite (hurchill interpreted article )as applying to countries in!aded by EA%is 1owersG only not for the 'ritish 4mpire*.

• TradeIn the &A it was "!ee t!a#e and in /reat 'ritain it was Impe!ial P!e"e!ences . his issuewas related to the &ritish @mpire.

• Ciddle 4ast'efore the WW it was a 'ritish sphere of influence and it was increasingly crucialstrategically as both countries were reali5ing how important oil was becoming. /reat 'ritaindominated I!an and I!a> while the &A controlled -ai A!a)ia . The &A needed more oil,/reat 'ritain willing to retain the upper hand in the region that was again a mutual suspicionsand competition.

• Attitude as regard to the so!iet unionThe main e!ent was in 9=@) with Tehe!an con"e!ence . The &A, /reat 'ritain and &&+.8uring this conference 0. +oose!elt’s priority was to collaborate more fully with the+ussians, and he was closer to &talin than to (hurchill. +oose!elt and &talin agreed on mainob2ecti!es:

- Meeping /ermany wea# - Wea#ening 4uropean colonial 4mpires.

"n the other side /reat 'ritain worried more about the danger a strong &&+ would causeafter the war. 0rom 9=@) to 9=@ , /reat 'ritain and the &A remain !ery close but it becameincreasingly difficult for the 'ritish to ma#e themsel!es heard as they had been able to do

between 9=@9 and 9=@).Concl&sion : the WWII mar#ed the birth of the special relationship, the Anglo-Americanalliance was indeed special during the war and it shouldn’t be forgotten howe!er that the

promotion of the national self-interest remained the corner stone of foreign policy for bothcountries. The &A was the stronger partner and /reat 'ritain was more and more dependentto the &A.


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CHAPTER ? @ : 1/? – 1/ 4< THE -PECIA+ RE+ATION-HIP AND THE6E*INNIN* O. THE CO+D 2AR The special relationship came into being an account of the WWII. The fight against the A%is1owers was the raison d’Dtre of the close Anglo-American relationship. In 9=@ the 6uestioncan be: What will happen now?At first the & was not !ery interested in #eeping a close relationship with /reat 'ritain

despite /reat 'ritain has enforced to #eep a special relationship ally. 'y 9=@ , as the (oldWar was about to begin, the Americans came to the reali5ation that the 'ritish could be their best ally in the fight against communism. (onse6uently it was a re!i!al of the specialrelationship. The cold war, especially during its early face, was the raison d’Dtre of the so-called special relationship.(onse6uently se!eral 6uestions arise: why did the mericans chose to distant themselves fromthe &ritish in the two years that followed the end of the WWII? And by contrast: Why did the

special relationship become a crucial element of the containment policy devised by the Aresident Barry ruman?"n other words: Why the #old War did revive the special relationship? It should be added thatthe Anglo-American rapprochement was ob!ious. The &A clearly had the upper hand, while

the 'ritish struggled more and more to #eep up with their powerful ally.What were the conse!uences of the une!ual distribution of power between the two countries?I The Allies

- The 0our Allied powers of WWII were: /reat 'ritain, The &A, the &o!iet nion&&+, +ussia* and 0rance.

- The other allied nations: Australia, 'elgium, 'oli!ia, 'ra5il, (anada, (hina, 8enmar#,/reece, Ce%ico, etherlands, ew ealand, orway, 1oland, &outh Africa andOugosla!ia

- The A%is 1owers: /ermany, Italy, Hapan. And later 7ungary, +omania and 'ugaria

II The )ellige!entAt war 8esignation of a state recogni5ed under international law as being engaged in a war.

- "f warJ of fighting- &ee#ing warJ warli#e- Inclined or eager to fight: hostile or aggressi!e- "f, pertaining to, or engaged in warfare

III 1/? – 1/?3 : the special !elationship on the %ane

a* 1ressures on the 'ritish economy/reat 'ritain 4mpire wea#ened at the end of the war and sought for the American support. In9=@ , 'ritish economy was in tatters whereas the American economy was booming. In august9=@ , the Truman administration announced the end of the >end >ease. The >end >ease was!ital to sustain the 'ritish war effort and 'ritish economy. After this decision H.C Meynes a'ritish +epresentati!e* said concerning the end of >end >ease that Eit and economic 8un#ir#GIt was a reference to the crushing defeat of the 0rench and the 'ritish at the end of the/ermans in Hune 9=@B*. 7e sent to Washington 8( to state the 'ritish case, and the conte%twas that /reat 'ritain owned ).< billion pounds, and the &A as#ed for 9; million poundsonly so the 'ritish e%pected to be rewarded of their contribution to the war and hoped their debt will be cancel but it was not the situation.'ut as 'ritish economy was on a sorry state, it was urgent to find another loan: new loan

granted by the &A with ). billion dollars to be repaid in B years at P interest rate. The'ritish thought that those conditions were harsh gi!en their economy predicament, theye%pected better terms. It caused public outcry in /reat 'ritain.The second economic bone of contention : the &A tried to a!oid and to stop the 'ritishsystem of Imperial 1references. The & attempted to ta#e ad!antage of the /reat 'ritain’swea# position to undermine 'ritish imperial protectionism /ATT system /eneral


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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade signed in 1/?3 * resulted from 6!etton 2oo#s . It didn’tdestroyed the Imperial system completely but a lot.The two main conse6uences for /reat 'ritain were:

- The pounds sterling was to be freely con!ertible into gold- Core free trade and wea#ening of the 'ritish system of imperial preferences.

Concl&sion : The Americans made some concessions but they still wea#ened /reat 'ritain’s position in the world economy. The American had been partially successful in their endea!our to wea#en the 'ritish Imperial system to their benefit.

b* The dangers of & isolationismIn 9=@ , the 'ritish badly needed the & support. Their worst fear was the American’s retreatinto protectionism. And this fear had some e!idence to suggest that the &A might withdrawfrom the world affairs as it has done after WWI. The American ob2ecti!e was the completeretreat of & troops by 9=@What actually happened from ,- / to ,- C? In 9=@ , the American military represented 1( 1million people and in mid-9=@ : 1 3 million of military people.In 9=@; the +epublican Ca2ority (ongress in the &A pushed for 6uic# demobili5ation and

protectionist measure. &o the 'ritish misgi!ings were 2ustified."ne of the main goals of 'ritish diplomacy was to draw the attention of American leaders tothe &o!iet threat, and to con!ince them of the need to remain acti!ely in!ol!ed in worldaffairs.

“Iron curtain speech *iven at 6ulton in 9issouri in ,- :" #hurchill said “If the populationof the @n*lish+spea'in* commonwealth be added to that of the >5 with all that suchcooperation implies in the air" on the sea and in science and industry" there will be no

!uiverin*" precarious balance of power to offer its temptation to ambition or adventure. Dnthe contrary" there will be an overwhelmin* assurance of security .

At this time (hurchill wasn’t the 1rime Cinister. 7e was addressing to an American audienceand he was arguing that 4urope was di!ided into two camps: The .!ee 2o!l# Q& TheComm&nist 6loc . In this 6uotation the mention was made of the fraternal association of the4nglish-spea#ing people and of the special relationship between the 'ritish (ommonwealthand 4mpire and the &A.(learly W.( was trying to cashing on the special relationship to further 'ritish interest and

what is interesting about this speech is that the president Truman has red and appro!ed thespeech before W.( deli!ered it. 7owe!er, it’s part of the public outcry in the &A. Canydiscarded (hurchill’s interpretation as wrong, conse6uently the president Truman had todistance himself from (hurchill. Although the American and the 'ritish were getting closer toeach other regarding +ussia in particular*, con!incing the &A was not an easy tas# for 'ritish leaders.

c* uclear let-down8uring the WWII the nuclear research program began in earliest in /reat 'ritain and not inthe &A but the 'ritish research program was the T&)e Alloys p!o7ect . As the &A wasli!ing behind, it as#ed /reat 'ritain to unit 'ritish and American research teams but /reat'ritain refused and because of that the &A went it alone and soon they outstripped /reat

'ritain.Two main agreements concerning the nuclear research:

- In 9=@): The =&e)ec ag!eement it was a nuclear cooperation between the twocountries under conditions fa!orable to the &A, but the &A has to consult the'ritish to use it. With this situation, some 'ritish scientists were in!ol!ed in ,anahanp!o7ect but they didn’t play a ma2or rule.

- In 9=@@:The Hy#e Pa!9 ag!eement signed by (hurchill and 0. +oose!elt and theyagreed that the nuclear cooperation would continue after WWII.

'ut when 1resident Truman came to power, he was willing to preser!e the Americanautonomy and the American congress had no desire to collaborate with /reat 'ritain onmatters in nuclear policy. (onse6uently in 9=@;, ,c,ahon Act was signed and with this actit was clear that they can’t communicate any information about nuclear research to anyforeign country and it includes the /reat 'ritain*.At this point, the nuclear cooperation between /reat 'ritain and &A was o!er and that was aslap in the face of 'ritish leaders because there was no special treatment and /reat 'ritain felt

betrayed concerning the nuclear research.


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d* 1alestineIn 9= , /reat 'ritain was awarded a mandate to go!ern 1alestine Ciddle 4ast was astrategic sphere of influence for /reat 'ritain*. &o in 9=9 , 'alfour 'ritish foreign secretary*declaration promised “a national home for the Eewish people but also to preser!e interests of Arab population. "f course, this declaration created a lot of tensions and 'ritish had to triedto wor# out on compromise but with no result*.0inally they allowed 9B BBB Hews to immigrate to 1alestine e!ery years. 'ut the Hews puthuge pressures on the 'ritish to increase the 6uota of Hews allowed to set up in 1alestine,while the Arab put huge pressure on the 'ritish to restrict Hewish immigration in 1alestine.The conse6uence is that /reat 'ritain found herself in a tric#y position but had to grapplewith it because she could not afford to lose 1alestine for strategic reasons.

IB The ,i##le East: A st!ategic sphe!e o" in"l&ence After the WWII Hewish immigration to 1alestine increased dramatically. Their persecution bythe a5is made it all the more difficult for /reat 'ritain to restrict Hewish immigration to1alestine. They are in fa!or of the creation of a 1alestine &tate. The Truman administrationopenly supported Hewish immigration on a larger scale he went on a record as saying that9BB BBB Hews should be allowed in 1alestine*.And this put 'ritish on an e%tremely tric#y position again. They were aware that such a mo!ea large immigration of Hews to 1alestine* could trigger off an Arab rebellion and the

American attitude was deeply resented in 'ritish diplomatic circles e.g.: in 9=@ , the foreignsecretary 4rnest 'e!in wrote to 'ritish embassy in Washington 8( :

“I feel that the mericans have been thorou*hly dishonest in handlin* this problemIn this conte%t the 'ritish accused Truman of trying to ma#e the most of the Hewish !otes in

ew Oor# &tate. They were greatly annoyed by Truman’s tendency to ma#e statements on1alestine without consulting /reat 'ritain when it was /reat 'ritain and not the &A whowas actually in charge of 1alestine. &o the 'ritish efforts to wor# out a compromise betweenthe Arabs and the ionists were dashed when Truman officially declared his support for theionists with no reason to compromise.In 9=@


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- ,a!shall Plan in ,a!ch 1/?5 . It represented R9 billion to Western 4urope. The biggest beneficiary was /reat 'ritain with R . billion. The Carshall plan sa!ed4uropean economies 0rance, Western /ermany* from meltdown.

- NATO in Ap!il 1/?/ . The &A officially committed to the defence of Western4urope and that was one of the #ey 'ritish ob2ecti!es that was attained /reat 'ritainwas afraid that the &A decided to withdraw from international affairs and from theinternational defence*.

- The &A was less and less critical and e!en sometimes supporti!e of the 'ritish4mpire e%: 0rance against Indochina, The 8utch with Indonesia and the 'ritish inCalaya*.

0or 9=@< to 9=;B, the Calawian emergency a communist insurgency*. /reat 'ritain recei!edcrucial financial support from the &A to suppress the insurgence and for /reat 'ritain it wasa desperate moment to retain her grip on Calaya because it was highly profitable. At thistime, the &A #new that if the 'ritish had to collapse in Calaya, the &A will ha!e to replacethem.It’s true that the upshot was that the Anglo-American relationship at the beginning of the (oldWar was two ways situation.A %in %in sit&ation , /reat 'ritain won because she recei!ed military and economic supportand they sustain for a while their status as a world power. &he recei!ed also protection fromthe &o!iet threat. "n the other side, the &A won because they had an ally which relie!ed

them of some of the burden to police the world. In other words, /reat 'ritain was theAmerica’s first military ally. In this process both countries benefited from close tiesestablished during the WWII.

d* Cilitary and intelligence cooperation continues'ritish military ser!ices were #nown to lobby the 'ritish go!ernment to continue and buttressclose military collaboration with the &A. And this close military collaboration at manyle!els was more and more ob!ious. About intelligence, U U-A -I*NIT 1/?3 * e%tended toall the (ommonwealth countries consolidated the remar#ably close cooperation between the&A and /reat 'ritain about intelligence pro2ect begun during the WWII.

e* The issue of 'ritish credibilityAs long as the &A regarded /reat 'ritain as a useful and necessary ally, the specialrelationship would remain. If the 'ritish power were to flag, the special relationship wouldine!itably be called into 6uestion by the &A.About the go!ernment: the post-war >abor go!ernment could ha!e chosen to turn to 4urope,

but they preferred the Transatlantic Alliance. The special relationship lay at the heart of the'ritish foreign policy under Clement Atlee8s +a)o! go$e!nment and 2inston8sconse!$ati$e go$e!nment after 9= 9.&o much so that the 'ritish spare no effort to cater to the need to their American ally and theywere afraid of losing credibility. "ne on the e%ample is the telegram from the 'ritish embassyin Washington 8( to The 0oreign "ffice Huly 9=@ *:

“Were responsible mericans to become convinced of what is unfortunately already a *rowin* impression here 4i.e. in the >58 that &ritain can be permanently written off as animportant world power capable of sharin* with the >5 the burdens of world leadership" we

should lose whatever advanta*es we now possess over other the nations in search of a system from this function. “

This 6uotation testifies to 'ritish fear of losing the confidence of the Americans and thereforelosing the special ad!antages. /reat 'ritain made a lot of sacrifices and concessions to remaina world power. The >abour /o!ernment intent on setting up a 2el"a!e -tate and that was thereason why they had been elected. They did but they had to accept limitation to it for a lac# of money as a large proportion of the 'ritish budget went to the military part.

@xample: When the >abour go!ernment was forced to scheme on some of its welfare benefitsin 9= 9, glasses and dental care were no longer free. The funds for the Morean War weree%tremely needed.Why the 'ritish go!ernment did tries hard to be the Americans’ best ally? /reat 'ritain didn’twant to relin6uish her role as a world power.This e%tract from an internal document of the 'ritish (hief of &taff 9=@=*:


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“ oday we are still a world power" shoulderin* many and heavy responsibilities. We believed the privile*ed position that we" in contrast to the other @uropean nations" en3oy with the >5 and the attention she now pays to our strate*ic and other opinions" and to our re!uirements"

is directly due to our hold on the 9iddle @ast and all that this involves. If we surrendered that hold and the responsibilities which it entails" we would automatically surrender our positionas a world power" with the inevitable strate*ic and economic conse!uences. We should 3oin

the ran's of the other @uropean powers and be treated as such by the >5.This 6uotation based testimony to the 'ritish difficulty to come to turns with the rise of theAmerican giant. The fact remains. 8oes the days of the E !a Britanica The 'ritish 4mpirehas all influence* were o!er? It was now time, to the American 2ournalist 7enry >uce in 9=@9,EThe Ame!ican Cent&!y G.

B An &ne>&al pa!tne!shipIn 9=)=, before the WWII, there were great powers: /reat 'ritain, the &A, 0rance, the&o!iet nion and /ermany. 'ut in 9=@ , at the end of the E4uropean (i!il warG there were super powers the &A and &o!iet nion. 0rom these two countries, their agendas were tosha#e the ew World "rder and /reat 'ritain could only follow suit and endea!our to adaptto the two super powers."n the &A opinion, after the WWII, the &A sought to:

- 4stablish )alance o" po%e!s in E&!ope an# Asia- (reate an en$i!onment "a$o!a)le to the American trade and in!estment-

'ring about the gradual en# o" colonial empi!es to its own benefits."n the other side the &o!iet nion wanted:- P!otect themsel$es from aggression from 4urope- +econstruct their economy- &trengthen their milita!y

(onse6uently, after the WWII, /reat 'ritain had to fit in that bipolar world and she was nolonger shaping world affairs since she had been doing for a long time.

a* 'ritish decline S American ascendency0or all their efforts 'ritish were losing ground on two points:

- 4conomy in late 9=@B’s: /reat 'ritain lost ? F o" he! eGpo!t t!a#e , 0 F o" thetonnage o" he! me!chant t!a#e and ? ( million po&n#s in in$estment a)!oa# .

#ould %reat &ritain afford to retain her empire" 'eep a bi* army and build a welfare state?

- 'ritish 4mpire gradually was falling apart with the e%ample of In#ian in#epen#encein 1/?3 . The 'ritish 4mpire was a strategic asset but also a financial liability for /reat'ritain. And in the meantime the American economy was booming.

It led many 'ritish diplomats to belie!e that the &A was replacing /reat 'ritain in se!eralareas of the world best e%ample is the Ciddle 4ast*. And they were part right in thin#ing so,the 'ritish influence was decreasing and the Americans had no intention of helping /reat'ritain become as strong as she used to be.

b* The Ciddle 4ast as a case-study4!er since the collapse of the "ttoman 4mpire after the WWI, the Ciddle 4ast has becomethe in"o!mal 6!itish Empi!e . The "ttoman 4mpire had dominated the region for se!eralcenturies and after the Ciddle 4ast was turning to a 'ritish sphere of influence which is a bigdifference from the colonies.The 'ritish reached agreement with the local elites and sent troops to the Ciddle 4ast. TheCiddle 4ast was officially not a part of the 'ritish 4mpire but actually was controlled by the'ritish. /reat 'ritain had been instrumental in the creation of such a states as Ira6, >ibya,&oudan, 3 The 'ritish troops occupied &outhern Iran, &yria, >ebanon, mandated 1alestine,(yprus and also in >ibya.The Ciddle 4ast was !ital for /reat 'ritain because it was strategically located for 'ritish

a!y and because 9BBP of oil consumed by 'ritish came from the Ciddle 4ast. That was the big difference with the &A which had, at that time, other sources of oils in the &A and in>atin America*.After 9=@ , the 'ritish were willing to #eep the Ciddle 4ast as a sphere of influence. 'ut the

problem was they were greatly wea#ened by the WWII and their rule was being challenged bylocal populations and they had to contend with American competition in this area. And it

became ob!ious that /reat 'ritain was losing a good deal of her influence in the Ciddle 4ast.


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There are two e%amples:- 1alestine: The 'ritish left in 9=@<- Iran: 7alf of all the oil used by 'ritish came from Iran than#s to the Anglo I!anian

Company . In the early 9= Bs, Iranian 1rime Cinister Cohammad Cossadegh decidedto nationali5e the Anglo-Iranian company to put an end to 'ritish monopoly on Iranianoil.

&o in 9= ), the &A and /reat 'ritain launch an operation called Ope!ation 6oot /'*4“Dperation E F (>5)8 to remo!e Cossadegh from office and this is a real situation toshow that the special relationship was in action. The American and the 'ritish secret ser!icesthe (IA and the CI;* were hand in hand to destabili5e Cossadegh go!ernment. It wassuccessful and Cossadegh’s go!ernment was replaced by a new regime more amenable towestern interest. conclusions:

- "nce more, the special relationship pro!ed to be efficient- 7owe!er, since they needed the Americans to retain the grip on Iran, the 'ritish lost

some of their interests to the benefit of the Americans. This is the end of the 'ritishmonopoly on Iranian oil because the 'ritish now had to share.

In 9= ), in /reat 'ritain there were )BP of Iranian oil, the American companies represented@BP and the 8utch and 0rench BP.

c* Ta#ing a bac# seat

The special relationship hypothesis put the emphasis upon personal interactions.>ate 9=@B’s: a 0oreign "ffice paper mentioned that the special relationship was written withthe help of some American officials. And when the American &ecretary of &tate DeanAcheson found out about it, he was furious. Acheson belie!ed in a special relationship

between the &A and /reat 'ritain, but he thought it was counterproducti!e to ma#e it public.&o in his point of !iew the countries ha!e better to #eep their secret in order to #eep their 4uropean allies especially 0rance.The other e%ample is in April 9= B:

“We should insist that &ritish reco*ni2e it is necessary for us" when we are dealin* with *enerali2ed @uropean problem" not to ma'e overt distinctions between them and other

@uropean countries. ny such over distinctions could only have the effect of seriouslyupsettin* present fear that both we and &ritish will abandon them in case of an emer*encyntil 9= B, we can say that the &A clearly emerged as the stronger partner, but in 9= 9, withthe new general election the conser!ati!e party won the general election in /reat 'ritain.2inston Ch&!chill was bac# in power as 1rime Cinister in /reat 'ritain. (hurchill de!isedthe theory of the ) (ircle address foreign policy matters:

- The 'ritish 4mpire,- The American alliance- 4urope

The special relationship in the (hurchill go!ernment was the lynchpin of his foreign policy. (hurchill set out to ma#e the most of share war memories and personal contact withthe &A but in opposition, Truman and later 4isenhower* was not interested. The e%ample iswhen (hurchill tried to tal# to 4isenhower to reestablishing the 'ritish !eto on American useof the nuclear weapons but with no result.The &A had ta#en the lead and /reat 'ritain was hardly in a position to negotiate. And itwas ne!er more e!ident than on the issue of the American nuclear weapons with:

- CcCahon act in 1/?4 which forced /reat 'ritain to de!elop her nuclear weaponalone, on their side

- /reat 'ritain was a faithful ally of the &A but she had absolutely no say about its potential use of nuclear weapon: they would be informed but not consulted about theuse of nuclear weapons.

The 'ritish were forced to adapt to & foreign policy and hope for the best means that thiswas direct conse6uence of 'ritish decline after the WWII. #ontext : At that time, theAmerican military forces used many 'ritish bases e!erywhere in the world so the bases were'ritish but the military forces were AmericanUThis was a direct conse6uence of the 'ritish decline after the WWII


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1re!iouslyJ the &A has offered to grant 4gypt a loan to finance construction of Aswan dam but this loan was cancelled due to asser’s ambi!alent position. This cancellation was adisaster for /reat 'ritain because this wea#ened /reat 'ritain strategically because they lostthe control of the canal*, economically because now they had to pay to use the canal*. 'ut of course the first and the most important disaster was that asser decided to nationali5e the&ue5 (anal.The conse6uence of this nationali5ation is the decision of the 1rime Cinister 4den who waswilling to act military in opposition to the &A: for the &A it was necessary to see# asolution by diplomatic way whereas for /reat 'ritain it was necessary to act military. In other words the 'ritish were being frustrated by their main ally so the 'ritish go!ernment decidedto set up a co!ert operation alongside 0rance and Israel to regain the control to the &ue5 5one.Why 6rance and Israel?

- 0rance: 'ecause it was also affected by this nationali5ation for the same reason.- Israel: They wanted to retaliate against 4gypt because it was fre6uently attracted by

terrorists from 4gypt"f course the American administration #new nothing about it the co!ert operation alongside0rance and Israel to regain the control of the (anal one*.(oncerning this co!ert operation: 0rance, /reat 'ritain and Israel Q& 4gypt

- Israel would attac# 4gypt and in!ade &inai- An Anglo-0rench coalition would ta#e Israel attac# as a prete%t to launch a military

operation in order to separate the two armies 4gypt and Israel*In the process, the Anglo-0rench coalition would ta#e the control of the (anal one andwould stay there clearlyJ the goal was to claim that the &ue5 (anal had to be controlled by aneutral force. In that way /reat 'ritain would be able to retain control of the (anal at thee%change of 4gypt. And the Americans again #new nothing about that.The operation started in Octo)e! 1/ 4 . A first e!erything went on as the plan. It was amilitary success but a diplomatic disaster a diplomatic disaster, especially on the American

point of !iew*. This operation pac#ed off the American outrage, the 4isenhower administration was furious for se!eral reasons:

- In 9= ;, the &&+ in!aded 7ungary and because of the &ue5 operation it made itmore difficult for the West to ta#e full ad!antage of the &o!iet ruthlessness.

- /reat 'ritain had double-crossed the &A.- The conte%t of the (old War: the &A and the &&+ had entered a competition todominate the third world countries. The (old War was a global conflictJ eachsuperpower struggled to establish spheres of influence and in such circumstances the&A feared that the Anglo-0rench in!asion of 4gypt would discredit the free worldand prompt the Arab world to go o!er to the &o!iet camp.

John .oste! D&lles American secretary of &tate from 955G. We will be loo'ed upon as forever tied to &ritish and 6rench

colonialist politics . ot only the &A refused to support their allies but they also acted to ma#e their scheme fail. Bow did the >5 act a*ainst their &ritish ally?

o They too# a stand against the /reat 'ritain and 0rance at the nited ationso The &ue5 crisis ga!e rise to a run on the pound which greatly wea#ened the

'ritish economy and forced the 'ritish go!ernment to as# for an IC0 loan.(onse6uently, the & made it clear that this loan would be granted " >O on condition that/reat 'ritain withdraws from 4gypt. The &A twisted the arm of their allies. And the &ue5crisis ended in defeat and humiliation for 'ritish and 0rance. They had to withdraw whilenone of their ob2ecti!es had been attained.+essons "!om -&e' :The &ue5 crisis carried symbolical meaning because it was a slap in the face for /reat 'ritainit dealt 'ritish prestige a terrible blow. And it had also shown that /reat 'ritain or 0rance wasno longer able to carry out a successful military operation without the American consent andsupport. After that /reat 'ritain to come to terms with military and strategic decline of courseand the conse6uence is that Anthony 4den the 1rime Cinister* resigned a few month later and was replaced by Ha!ol# ,c,illan who was conse!$ati$e * and at this point it was nolonger possible to deny the 'ritish decline and the tas# for the 'ritish leaders was to manage


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decline and ease the transition of their country from the world power to the 4uropean power.Watershed in 'ritish foreign policy.

b* >agging behind: 'ritish economic decline/reat 'ritain too# ad!antages of post-war economic boom and grew richer. At the end of theWWII /reat 'ritain was the biggest economy of 4urope but in the early 9=;Bs, /reat 'ritainhad been outstripped first by /ermany, then by 0rance. With the repeated monetary crises inthe 9=;B the 6uestion raises: De$al&ate the po&n# ste!ling or see9 the Ame!ican "inancialsystem ?0inally /reat 'ritain see#s American assistance on se!eral occasions: the first one in 9=;@with a 9 billion dollars loan, in 9=; and then in 9=;;.0rom the American side, of course they didn’t want /reat 'ritain to de!aluate the pound

because it would wea#en the dollar currency but in 9=;= /reat 'ritain had to #e$al&e thepo&n#s ste!ling )y 1?F and things didn’t get better.The conte%t of the 'ritish economy in the 9= B: low and sluggish economic growth and highinflation stagflation. (onse6uently, there were a great number of stri#es in /reat 'ritain andthis is the reason why some economist named the /reat 'ritain as the Esic# man of 4uropeG.That affected 'ritish ability to sustain a military power. As a matter of fact, the 'ritisheconomic decline was concomitant with her strategic decline.

c* >osing ground: 'ritain’s strategic decline'y the 9= Bs, it became ob!ious that /reat 'ritain was falling !ictim to was historians calledthe EImperial o!erstretchG it means a lac# of economic and military strengths to sustain globalcommitment. Ironically enough 'ritish decline didn’t go down so well in the nited &tates."ne the one hand the American had always fended off 'ritish imperialism but on the other hand they needed the 'ritish to remain imperialistic to counterbalance the world community.This is the notion of )&!#en sha!ing with the Americans. The underline message from the&A was “Will provide assistant if necessary but please donHt wal' away for your commitments overseas . The burden-sharing was the !ery basis of the special relationshipduring the (old War.In the early ;Bs : /reat 'ritain began to withdraw from se!eral bases in the Indian and 1acificoceans and left Aden and Oemen. /reat 'ritain couldn’t afford it anymore and this created anegati$e e""ect &pon the Anglo Ame!ican !elations

The Bietnam 2a! Kc 1/4 – 1/30; :Ha!ol# 2ilson 9=9;-9== *: 6!itish p!ime ministe! from 9=;@ to 9= B+yn#on 6 Johnson 9=B


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Hohnson’s administration was e%tremely furious. The &A de!oted a great deal of its energyin the Qietnam War and the 'ritish retreat from the east of &ue5 was the last thing thatAmericans needed. &o one 6uestion arose as a result: If %reat &ritain could no lon*er

perform a special role why should the >5 continue the special relationship with her? Caybe because 'ritish place was really in 4urope

II Anglo Ame!ican !elations an# E&!opean integ!ation

a* A reluctant applicant: /reat 'ritain, 4uropean integration and the &A0rom the beginning the &A played an acti!e role in 4uropean integration for two reasons:

- The &A had a !ested interest in economic reco!ery of 4urope. The point for theAmerican was to be able to unload the surplus of goods produced by their economy.

- The &A wanted to form a strong Western 'loc to thwart the communists."ne of the ob2ecti!es of the &A regarding /reat 'ritain was to con!ince her leaders tocommit their country to the process of 4uropean integration. 'ut there was a problem: /'was not #een on 2oining them, and has already pointed out that the transatlantic alliancecarried much more weight than the 4uropean connection. At first, the 'ritish were notinterested. Among the ) circles winston (hurchill*, 4urope was the last in importance.Winston saw /reat 'ritain as closed to 4urope geographically but not as part of it and he had

no intention of sacrificing 'ritish independence.In 1/ 3 , the T!eaty o" Rome mar#ed the birth of the 44( 4uropean 4conomic (ommunity*without /reat 'ritain and much to the disappointment of the Americans. 7owe!er, 'ritishmembership of the 44( more and more sense due to the loss of her world power status anddecoloni5ation. And this 'ritish situation was send by statement made by former American&ecretary of &tates>ate 9= B’s and early 9=;B’s: the former American &ecretary of &tates Dean Acheson8s in hisspeech on Decem)e! 1/40 said “%reat &ritain has lost and @mpire has not yet found a role .And to ma#e matters e!en worst to /reat 'ritain, the 44( members were faring better thanhurt. (onse6uently the 'ritish leaders came up with an idea to compete with the 44( with thecreation of the 4uropean 0ree Trade Association in 1/4 among %reat &ritain , =enmar' ,

Norway , Aortu*al and 5weden . With this 4uropean 0ree Trade Association it meant to be ari!al to the 44( but it was a failure.Ceanwhile, the American #ept urging their 'ritish ally apply for the 44( membership. 'utthere was one obstacle: /eneral de /aulle 9


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unusual: he distanced himself from the &A, he refused to establish close personalrelationship with the Ame!ican p!esi#ent Richa!# NiGon *.In 9= ), the American idea was to launch the Lea! o" E&!ope . The goal of i%on’sadministration was to induce the 4uropeans to get more in!ol!ed of their own defence. Andthe i%on administration as#ed 7eat to act as an intermediate between the &A and the other 4uropeans countries. 'ut 7eat refused to act as a middle-man between the &A and 4urope.The Oear of 4urope was resented as a to#en of American paternalism and 7eat goal was to beon the 4uropean side. This American idea of the Oear of 4urope was a complete failure andit came to nothing.0inally in 1/30 , *!eat 6!itain )ecame a mem)e! o" the EEC . In 9= ), 8e /aulle was nolonger the 0rench president.

c* 8own but not out: the special relationship li!es on8uring the period from 9=;; to 9= =, the Anglo-American relations became less and lessspecial. e!ertheless the special relationship didn’t disappeared completely. The e%ample isthe 'ritish opposition to the &A during the 7eat year and this opposition should not beo!erstated with points:

- Cilitary and secret ser!ices intelligence relationship* continue to wor# hand in hand- (ollaboration on nuclear proliferation control tal#s with pro2ects: -A+T 1 &trategic

arms >imitation Tal#s* which led to A6,T Anti-'allistic Cissile Treaty* in 9=In 9= @ the +a)o! Pa!ty bac# in power until 9= @ to 9= = with: H 2ilson from 9= @ to

9= ; and James Callaghan from 9= ; to 9= =. They both wanted to restore a closetransatlantic alliance.Why?They were disappointed by the 44( membership because 'ritish economic prospects didn’timpro!e and moreo!er many members of the >abour 1arty were hostile to the 44(

partnership. In addition there were more practical reasons.In the 9= Bs, /reat 'ritain was going through serious difficulties and needed Americanassistance. The American sponsored loan was .) billion dollars. "n the American side theleaders were ta#ing heed of 'ritish decline but no desire to brea# with /reat 'ritain."ne e%ample was with Hen!y issinge! , +ichard i%on’s foreign policy ad!isor who said“We do not suffer from such an excess of friends that we should discoura*e those who feel

that they have a special friendship to us . This remar# suggested that the special relationshipwas not dead and buried.III The Anglo Ame!ican inte!#epen#ence: the n&clea! test

The first atom bomb, in 9=@ , changed foreign relations. Weapons of mass destruction ha!eturned war into an e!en more a dangerous acti!ity than before. Therefore, it was notsurprising that a country li#e /reat 'ritain and 0rance thought to get the bomb.

a* The de!elopment of the nuclear relationshipIn 9=@;, when (ongress passed the CcCahon Act, the &A but an end to the nuclear relationship so /reat 'ritain went it alone with the first n&clea! )om) on 9= and thethe!mon&clea! )om) in 9= . /reat 'ritain entered the nuclear club. Oet /reat 'ritain stillneeded the &A to catch up with the latest technological brea#through.

The e%ample is in 9= B’s, the problem was that /reat 'ritain had the bomb but they were notadapted to bombers. They didn’t ha!e bombers to carry it and only the &A can pro!ide them."nce again the 'ritish needed the Americans.In 9= ater /reat 'ritain bought new American missiles, called -9y)olt p!og!am from the&A, and it was in e%change for the &A, to an access to 'ritish bases 7oly >och and0lyindales.This decision was relegate to /reat 'ritain because they got American missiles at bargain

basement price but the down side was that the American Cissiles in 7oly >och and 0lyindalescould be used without the consent of the 'ritish go!ernment. It was the beginning of the losso" a&tonomy for /reat 'ritain. Then, in 8ecember 9=; came the Nassa& Con"e!ence .


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In early 9=;Bs the ybolt program was abandoned by the &A and that was a real disaster for /reat 'ritain because the 6uestion which rose was where will they *oin* to *et their missiles now?An additional point is that the ma2ority of the American &tate department were opposed toindependent nuclear deterrent for e%ample 0rance or /reat 'ritain*, they were afraid of nuclear proliferation. And the person who illustrated this point of !iew, the &ecretary of 8efense under Mennedy’s administration Ro)e!t ,cNama!a rooted pushed* for the creationof a ,&ltilate!al .o!ce C>0* to replace the 0rench and the 'ritish independent nuclear deterrent.The C>0 was a NATO "o!ce with nuclear weapons, the use of which would ha!e dependenton American appro!al, in other words it was necessary to get the American agreement to usethem. &o this was a way for the &A to control the use of nuclear weapon from and by the4uropeans. 'ut the creation of the C>0 was turned down by 8e /aulle and the 'ritish 1rimeCinister 7arold CcCillan but still Cc amara saw the amendment of the ybolt program asan opportunity to go away with the 'ritish nuclear deterrent. And during the assauconference, the 'ritish delegation was !ery angry on the Americans. "n the &A side, the&tate 8epartment was urging president Mennedy not to yield 'ritish pressure. 'ut the 'ritish1rime Cinister CcCillan* resorted to sentiments and begged president Mennedy to help/reat 'ritain out. And the 'ritish 1rime Cinister con!inced the American president. 7ere isan e%ample of the personal interactions as significant role in the special relationship betweenthe &A and /reat 'ritain.0inally he &A agreed to sell new American missiles Pola!is missiles * to /reat 'ritain andat a !ery cheap price. 'ut the 'ritish 1olaris missiles were to be part of AT" e!en if theyaccepted that /reat 'ritain could use them if her Esupreme national interestsG were at sta#e.The uclear relationship was firmly established between the &A and /'.In 9= = with the Jamaica Con"e!ence , the &A agreed to supply /reat 'ritain with itsT!i#ent -&)ma!ines e6uipped with the (-@ missiles under the same terms for /reat 'ritain.

b* Interdependence: 'ritish genius or 'ritish self-delusion0rom the 9= Bs, the 'ritish policy as regards to the &A was described as %a!mthinte!#epen#ence . /reat 'ritain needed to get the protection from &&+. The e%ample is a'ritish planning paper on interdependence in Hanuary 9= nited 5tates is so much the most powerful nation in the Western camp that our abilityto have our way in the world depends more than anythin* else upon our influence upon her toact in conformity with our interests .

At the same time the 'ritish were afraid of becoming a mere American satellite and the assau agreement of 9=; was an interesting case about that. We may argue that the 'ritishused the special relationship to their ad!antage but they were not strong enough to get aneffecti!e nuclear deterrent alone and /reat 'ritain made the most of the Americanconnections. Indeed, many members of the &tate 8epartment were !ery unhappy about the1resident Mennedy’s decision to pro!ide 'ritish with 1olaris missiles and they thought thatthe 1resident has been misled by the 'ritish and that they made a decision against theAmerican interest. All that is the conse6uence of the assau agreement in 9=; .

The e%ample is in April 9=; , with the memo written by Cc/eorge 'undy 1resident’s ational &ecurity Ad!isor*

EWe want the &ritish in @urope and we do not really see much point in the separate &ritishnuclear deterrent" beyond our existin* 5'ybolt commitment; we would much rather have

&ritish efforts *o into conventional weapons and have the &ritish 3oin in the rest of N D inacceptin* a sin*le >5+dominated nuclear force G.

Was %reat &ritain independent nuclear deterrent really independent?A contradiction seems to lie at the heart of 'ritish nuclear policy: the 'ritish independentnuclear deterrent depends on American acceptance to supply the missiles necessary to ma#e iteffecti!e. In theory /reat 'ritain was independent but not in reality. The e%ample to showwhat can be the real independence is the 0rench E0orce de frappeG which was completelyindependent from the &A.Concl&sion : the special relationship was wea#ened by 'ritish decline but it continues to e%istnuclear strategy for e%ample* and the ne%t period 9=


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CHAPTER 5: RONA+D REA*AN AND ,AR*ARET THATCHER IN THE 1/5 s< ANEMTRAORDINARL RE+ATION-HIP

There is a wealth of e!idence to say that the re!i!al of the special relationship occurred in the9=


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- (ontain any communist effort in the third world. ot e!erybody appro!ed that, especially in 4urope where some analyst held that it was&nnecessa!y #ange!o&s and co&nte!p!o#&cti$e . 'ut Thatcher shared +eagan’s passionatere2ection of communism and that was another mutual interest.

b* Interpersonal relations: a perfect matchThatcher and +eagan li#ed each other and that was the big difference with other 4uropeanleaders li#e 0rance*. "f course the most important point about the Anglo-American alliancewas the ) main points:

- 9 summits between 9=


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Eour ability to discuss with you problems of common interest 4 8 to discuss them freely and candidly" not necessarily always a*reein* but *ivin* and ta'in* advice as family friend"

without exitin* anxiety or envy G.There is no denying that Thatcher was drawing on special relationship rhetoric to ser!e her country’s interest. The other illustration to ser!e her country’s interest is about >ibya and the&A. In 9=ibya and the &A: the latter accusedthe former of sponsoring Arab terrorism. The &A accused >ibya to sponsor Arab terrorism.And in April 9=


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'y the time Thatcher became 1rime Cinister, /reat 'ritain had long seems to be a world power. /reat 'ritain had lost an 4mpire and her economic performances were 6uite poor./reat 'ritain was the second great nation on the world stage. Oet under Thatcher, /reat'ritain seems to ha!e more influence in international affairs than a status would ha!e wantedwhen they became 1rime Cinister. The special relationship used by the 'ritish as aninstrument to e%ert influence upon the Americans.The good e%ample is the 'ritish role in the nuclear diplomacy.In 9=5 for the supply and maintenance of its strate*ic nuclear missiles for the testin* of its warheads" &ritain is totally incapable of standin* up to that *reat power on any ma3or issue of defenseor forei*n policy. he >5 has the physical ability to still supply the rident forces withmissiles or to refuse to replace them G."n 7ealy’s !iew /reat 'ritain relied too hea!ily on the &A.

• (oncerning /renada, 8enis 7ealy instead that the reason why /reat 'ritain had beenhumiliated in /renada was to be found on the 'ritish dependence on the &A whichcould ta#e 'ritish support and ac6uaintance for granted. That’s why during his speechat the 7ouse of (ommons in "ctober 9=


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course the &A retained the upper hand. 'ut concerning the special relationship it was clear ali!e and clear on. 8uring the /ulf War the Anglo-American relations were restored to the(old War situation in other words, than#s to the /ulf War the special relationship was re!i!edas it was during the (old War. "f course there were limitations. After @ days of ground war the 'ush administration decided to en# the "ight and not to go to 6agh#a# to oust &addam7ussein. The Americans made that decision alone the 'ritish were not consulted on this

part*.c* The case of AT"

It was a buy product of the (old War created in 9=@9* and the goal was to o!gani'e the#e"ense o" E&!ope against comm&nist th!eat . 'ut at the end of the (old War 6uestionsarise:Would N D survive ? =id N D still have a purpose? WasnHt it time to terminate it? #ould the @uropeans muster a credible defense entity without the >5 ? Was @urope able to ensureits own defense alone? /reat 'ritain said no. The priority was to ma#e sure that the AT"would continue to e%isted, that Americans would remain committed in the defense of 4urope.Why American would do that?Americans remains strongly committed to AT" at the end and after the end of the (old War and Americans had a !ested interest in the e%istence of AT".

- It enables them to retain significant influence on 4uropean affairs. The 'ushadministration remains strongly committed to the American leadership of AT".

- 'y contrast an independent 4uropean defense entity would not ser!e the American purposes.

/reat 'ritain supported the &A and also rutted for continued American in!ol!ement in AT". 'ut with the new American president 'ill (linton from Hanuary 9==), he was about toma#e the life of 'ritish diplomats difficult.

II John ,a7o! an# 6ill Clinton: Ha!# Times6ill Clinton : Ame!ican P!esi#ent from 9==) to BB9.7e was not much interested in the special relationshipJ he was willing to turn to Asia so thatthe &A can ma#e the most of the Asian economic miracle. 0urthermore 'ill (linton and its'ritish opposite member, Hohn Ca2or, disli#ed each other. The Anglo-American relationsunder 'ill (linton and Hohn Ca2or fraught with tension especially on two points: about

L&gosla$ia and No!the!n I!elan#a* Ougosla!iaAfter the end of the (old War, Ougosla!ia disintegrated. It is a country whose population wascomposed of many #i""e!ent ethnic g!o&ps an# !eligio&s g!o&ps .

- C!oats #atholic *,- -lo$enians #atholic *,- -e!)s Drthodox #hristians *,- 6osnians ) categories: (roats, &erbs, and Cuslim 'osnians called 'osnia#*.

Tensions and ri!alry between those !arious groups happened under communist rules,Ougosla!ia held different ethnic and religious groups together. Ougosla!ia was mainly a&erbian idea. After the end of the (old War, the -e!)s were willing to #eep Ougosla!ia as anation ally . "n the other hand C!oats an# -lo$enians wanted to )!ea9 a%ay . The War

bro#e out in 9== .In 'osnia there were ) belligerents: C!oats , ethnic -e!)s and ,&slim 6osnians . The 4thnic&erbs bac# by &erbians engaged in ethnic cleansing in order to get rid of Cuslim 'osnian. Itwas an e%tremely !iolent conflict, a reminiscence of 4urope dar#est power. As !iolence inOugosla!ian conflicts intensified, a breach appeared between 4uropean countries including/reat 'ritain* and the &A. 'ut disagreement appeared to what ha!e to be done onOugosla!ia 5hould troops be committed on the *round? There were opinions:

- Oes said the E&!opeans : they pushed for a neutral military presence on the ground before an agreement can be found.

- o said the Ame!ican : they condemned the &erbs and protected 'osnian Cuslims butthey decided that no troop would be on the ground. They fa!ored air stri#es against the&erbs.

(onse6uently, AT" and the 4uropean nion appeared powerless. There were more andmore tensions between the &A and /reat 'ritain, the American diplomatic acti!ism


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increased but in o!ember 9== , with the Dayton Ag!eements it was the en# o" %a! in6osnia .

b* orthern Ireland orthern Ireland belongs to the M. It has been a religious thri!e between P!otestantsagainst Catholics . In orthern Ireland, 1rotestants are in ma2ority, (atholics are what we cancall the Esecond class citi5ensG. The 1rotestants were desperate to !emain pa!t o" the U while (atholics wanted to )!ea9 a%ay "!om the U to 2oin the +epublic of Ireland and thisled to terrorism. Terrorism was resumed in the 9= Bs under the ages of I!ish Rep&)licanA!my IRA * and the troubles in orthern Ireland had been a hot issue to tac#le by all 'ritish1rime Cinisters since the 9= Bs.It was an internal matter for the M Why and what does it have to do with the n*lo+

merican relations?&ince the 9= Bs, some Irish American politicians had thought to get in!ol!ed to the orthernIrish affairs. &ome of them were supported the independence of orthern Ireland for e%ampleTed Mennedy*. In the early 9==Bs, and estimated @@ million Irish Americans were supportedthe orthern Irish affairs. ntil 'ill (linton, orthern Ireland mo!ed to the top of theAmerican foreign policy agenda. 'ill (linton was #een to ma#e the difference. 7e got

personally in!ol!ed in peace diplomacy. &uch an attitude didn’t go done well in >ondon andthere was clearly interference in 'ritish internal affair.This is the e%ample with Pat!ic9 ,athe% &ecretary for orthern Ireland*J in 0ebruary 9==)he said EWe do not need a peace envoy G. 'ut 'ill (linton would not listen and by 9==@, /reat'ritain had accepted the Ame!ican me#iation . The American administration tried to getcloser to the I+A to ser!e as a go between.*e!!y A#ams , the leader of &inn 0ein 1olitical 1arty which represents the I+A*, applied for a !isa to the &A < times but in 0ebruary 9==@ it was accepted, /erry Adams was granted a!isa and it was public outcry in the M and ma2or go!ernment was completely furious.(onse6uently on the American mediation, in Carch 9==), there was no more restriction on&inn 0ein 0und rising in the &A. Through these actions the &A was committed to a twin-trac# approach. They started to tal# while they were trying to obtain decommissioning from9==@ to 9==;, I+A accepted a cease"i!e . In Hune 9==; the cease"i!e %as )!o9en )y the IRA .And &inn 0ein was e%cluded from tal#s as a result of this action.

"f course the orthern Ireland was a ma2or bone of contention between Hohn Ca2or and 'ill(linton in the 9==;s.III Tony 6lai! a )!i#ge )et%een Ame!ica an# E&!ope

a; Tony 'lair and 'ill (linton, the two li#e-minded leadersTony 6lai! : 6!itish Ne% +a)o! P!ime ,iniste! from 9==7e was from the E ew >abor 1artyG and it was an attempt to emulate the e%ample set by 'ill(linton in the &A. 'ill (linton had managed to become the 1resident of the &A by strayaway from the habits of 8emocratic 1arty. With the support of his group, the 8emocratic>eadership (ouncil, (linton set out to moderni5e the 8emocratic 1arty with what we calledhis Thi!# 2ay . With his Third Way Tony 'lair was willing to wal# in the foot step of (linton

whom he admired and their agenda consisted in ) parts:- .iscal !esponsi)ility- .ighting against the c&lt&!e o" #epen#ency by welfare entitlement they created

wor#fare L welfare at wor#*- To&gh on c!ime

+elying on such an agenda, Tony 'lair and 'ill (linton too# both away from the right, theycaught the political middle ground and remo!er what they called the .o!gotten ,i##leClass and they win o!er the 0orgotten Ciddle (lass. The close relationship between the twowas really clear. At first, Tony 'lair was (linton’s protFgFJ he supported him during the>ewins#i affair.

b* orthern Ireland, Moso!o and Ira6(oncerning orthern Ireland, Tony 'lair welcomed the American in!ol!ement big differencewith Hohns Ca2or*. In 9==


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'etween 9==< and 9===, Moso!o was then a part of &erbia. The &erbs restored to ethniccleansing of Moso!o Albanians with massacres of populations.Tensions between Tony 'lair and 'ill (linton: the former wanted troops on the ground whilethe latter fa!ored Air stri#es. 'ill (linton pre!ailed and &erbian troops withdrew fromMoso!o. And in spite of tensions, /reat 'ritain supported the &A. Throughout the crisis, 'ill(linton and Tony 'lair tal#ed e!ery day on the phone and got closer together. (onse6uently,Tony 'lair was accused of acting as a 'ritish poodle to the &A. In Carch 9==9, about the air stri#es, Tony 'enn said E We ta'e our orders from Washin*ton G.I!a>In 8ecember 9==

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