enemies of the state the interdependence of institutional forms and the ec

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Enemies of the State

INTERDEPENDENCE OFTHE KIBBUTZ MARKETCOM MUN ITY AND THE STATE

The first kibbutz, Degania on the shores of Lake Galilee, wasestablished In 1910 by Jewish immigrants from Germany,Poland, Galitzia, and Russia. Its design reflected A. D. Gor-don's Re ligion of Labor philosophy, wh ich held that physi-cal labor was a form of art and that moral elevation through

work required the full attention of a wo rker w ho w as freefrom hierarchical supervision. Supervising others was alsotaboo, So the kibbutz emerged as the organizational manifes-tation of an ideological position that the Je w be ne ither theexplo ited nor the exp loiter (Gordon, 1938: 63). All kibbutzimare permanent settlements based on land leased from theJew ish National Fund. Traditionally they all had com m on ow nership and democratic management of financial affairs, com-munal consumption and child care, and a centralized laborallocation system that emphasized job rotation and relianceon members' labor rather than hired labor. Over time, some

of these practices have been relaxed.

On other ideological issues there were persistent splitsamong kibbutzim. The major questions had to do with theoptimal size of a kibbutz, the appropriate economic activities,how tradeoffs between Zionism and socialism should bemade, and, to a lesser extent, w ha t role Judaism should havon the kibbutz. For much of their history, kibbutzim self-divided into four federations based on their positions on thesequestions. These federations encouraged their member kib-butzim to adhere to ideological principles, facilitated assis-tance and exchange between their members (e.g., by estab-

lishing schools that were shared by member kibbutzim), andplanned the establishment of new kibbutzim. Recently, thesalience of within-population differences has faded, and fed-erations have merged.

Figure 1 displays the number of kibbutzim and the total population of the kibbutz movement over time. Two things about

Figure 1. Number and population of kibbutzim.

300 140000

Q



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Struggles of the kibbutz in the second half of the twentiethcentury. To the question W hat happened to the kibbutz im?most wo uld respond capitalism . The popular wis do m relieson the fact that Israel's capitalist economy began to thrive atabout the same time that the kibbutzim began to flounder. Asthe capitalist economy grew, the argument goes, the altema-tives to the kibbutz became more apparent and attractive

(Chafets, 1998, provided a joumalistic version of the argu-ment; recent scholarly literature includes Bloomfield-Ram-agem, 1993; Ben-Rafael, 1996; Rosolio, 1999a; Gavron, 2000Lapidot, A pplebau m, and Yehudai, 2000).

The direct explanation for the negative influence of capitalistorganizations on the kibbutzim amounts to coercive isomor-phism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983}. Simons and Ingram(1997) documented the erosion in the 1950s and 1960s ofthe principle that the kibbutz should employ only the labor ofmembers, and not hired workers. The kibbutz-levei analysis

showed that this principle was more likely to be dropped orrelaxed by kibbutzim that were indebted to capitalist banks.Simons and Ingram (1997) explained that debt was used toinfluence kibbutzim away from a principle that violated thebanks' capitalist ideology. There is evidence from a numberof contexts that capitalist organizations coerce cooperativeorganizations to change elements of their structure, threaten-ing to withhold resources that cooperatives need to survive(Mintz and Schwartz, 1985; Rothschild and Whitt, 1986;Ingram and Simons, 2000). As past evidence has shown, thisideological competition affected change within existing kib-

butzim, notably the transition to hired labor, but other revi-sions of their structure as wel l . It may have also retarded kib-butz founding by reducing the expectation of potentialfounders that they would be able to operate the organization-al form of their choice with autonomy.

Indirect arguments for the infringement of capitalism on thekibbutz are even m ore com mo n. According to these argu-ments, the opportunities of the capitalist economy luredpotential participants away from the kibbutz. Another expres-sion of this idea is that the favor toward the kibbutz in the

early years of Jewish settlement in Palestine was a functionof necessity. Due to the harshness of the political climatethese settlers faced, and the dearth of employment opportu-nities, cooperative and communal organizations were amonga small set of viable economic options (Near, 1992). Overt ime, as the capitalist economy grew in Palestine and Israel,the salience of this alternative must have increased. Its feasi-bility must have also increased, as the success of capitalistorganizations depends partly on having other capitalist organi-zations to exchange with and on supporting institutions suchas lending and stock m arkets, which them selves depend on

a critical mass of client organizations (Mizruchi and Stearns,1994). As the salience and feasibility of the capitalist alterna-



The Kibbutz and Community

Research on embeddedness introduced community intoorganizational analysis, partly as a response to the limitedinstitutional scope of transaction-cost economics (Granovet-ter, 1985). The focus of embeddedness research is on theinterpersonal trust and social cohesion that derive from inter-personal connections, which affect the form of feasible orga-

nization, generally by favoring small autonomous organiza-tions over large, comprehensive hierarchies (e.g., Uzzi, 1996}.It has also been argued that organizations may be substitutesfor community relations in the production of order, as in Put-nam's (2000) account of the displacement of the community-based cohesion of towns and neighborhoods by organizationssuch as the YMCA. The design of the kibbutz reflects anextreme form of this substitution, as it employed organiza-tional control to govern basic socia interaction, which is moretraditionally structured by community norms. This was one ofthe most controversial features of the kibbutz, and we there-

fore expect kibbutz founding to be affected by the availabilityof alternative settlement forms that employ more traditionalcommunity governance and by the community-mindednessof the potential participants of kibbutzim.

The infringement of the kibbutz model on traditional commu-nity ideals begins with the most fundamental human rela-tions, those between parents and children and between thesexes. The kibbutzim set out to employ a principle of gender-equity in work. A first step in allowing women the same eco-nomic role as men was to transfer the duties of childcare to

the communal organization. The approach to childrearing wassimilarly radical, designed to socialize young participants tothe model of organizational democracy they would be expect-ed to employ as adults. The children were organized into amicrocosm of the kibbutz, a "children's society" with signifi-cant rights of self-governance and the requisite organizationaltrappings, including committees, a general assembly, andeven "children's farms." The kibbutz also controlled anddefined other important relations, such as those betweenneighbors and friends. The word used to refer to others onthe kibbutz was a version of the Hebrew word for friend,

implying that this role was imposed on all members of theorganization.

These practices had some success in affecting a social transi-t ion, more for the socialization of children than establishingthe equality of their mothers, but they also faced controversyand resistance. Starting with the first two children born onthe first kibbutz, mothers struggled with kibbutz-imposedallo-mothering (Baratz, 1954). This struggle was manifestedin the reintegration over time of children into the family homeand in the redefinition of women's work roles to place them

into service and chiidrearing jobs that were of lower statuson the kibbutz (Ben-Rafael, 1988). This change has beenaccompanied by a shift in the pattern of consumption, away



nemies of the State

cultural norms from the wider society, evidencing the contestbetween the kibbutz and community (Schlesinger, 1977;Hertz and Baker, 1983; Leviatan, 1985).

The above changes occurred late in the life of the kibbutz anddo not completely reconcile the difference between familyrelations and consumption on the kibbutz and in the widercommunity. The likelihood remains that the lure of alternative

consumption and familial arrangements may have sup-pressed kibbutz founding. An attractive alternative in thisregard and therefore a potential competitor for the kibbutz isthe moshav. Moshavim are like kibbutzim in that they arepermanent settlements that employ cooperative principleswith regard to work and were traditionally focused on agricul-ture and, like the kibbutzim, have more recently expandedthe scope of their economic activities. Unlike the kibbutzim,the moshavim have always employed traditional forms ofconsumption: members live in nuclear families, in their ownhom es, and spend their share of the organization s profits as

they choose. When there are more moshavim upon which tosettle, participants who prefer traditional community relationswill be more likely to choose them over the kibbutz, and kib-butz founding will be lower.

Kibbutz founding may also be affected by changes in thecommunity orientation of potential participants. A commonclaim is that Sephardic immigrants from Asia and Africa wereculturally less partial to the kibbutz than Ashkenazi immi-grants from Europe (Ben-Zadok, 1985; Cohen-Almagor, 1995).It is true that the recruitment and socialization systems of the

kibbutz federations were focused in Europe, although recruit-ment efforts did not ignore Arab countries altogether (seeTzur, 1995). It is also true that Sephardic immigrants wereprominently represented in alternative settlement types, suchas the moshavim (Lipshitz, 1998), and the developmenttowns (Spilerman and Habib, 1976). We therefore test theidea that kibbutz founding decreased as the proportion ofSephardic immigrants increased.

A third dimension of the community challenge to the kibbutz,the development town, represents the juxtaposition of analternative settlement form and the cultural values of theSephardim. Development towns are government-plannedcom m unities, created m ostly in Israel s first decade. Theyhave always been most closely associated with theSephardim {Spilerman and Habib, 1976). Social life in thedevelopment towns was defined mainly by the family, com-munity, and religious values of the Sephardim. The attitudesof the tow ns residents have always been hostile toward thekibbutzim, reflecting differences in cultural values and politi-cal and economic interests {Yiftachel and Tzefadia, 1999). Wetherefore predict that the number of development towns will

join with the number of moshavim and the proportion ofSephardic immigrants to represent the strength of communi-ty alternatives to the kibbutz s control over social and family



Jewish immigrants v\/ho favor traditional forms of comm unity gover-nance.

The Kibbutz and the State

The state figures prominently in explanations of the rise andfall of organizational populations, as a source of endorse-me nts and surety Baum and Oliver, 1992; Wh oley, Christian-

son, and Sanchez, 1992; Barnett and Carroll, 1993; Ingramand Simons, 2000), defining the rules of com petition Barron,West, and Hannan, 1994; Dobbin and Dowd, 1997; Silver-man, Nickerson, and Freeman, 1997; Wade, Swam inathan,and Saxon, 1998), as a source of isomorphic pressure {Car-roll, G oodstein, and Gyenes, 1988; Lehrm an, 1994), and as asource of environm ental change Dobrev, 1999). The them eof this work is the dependence of organizations on the state,not the interdependence between the two forms. Somerecent work has examined how organizations affect thestate, specifically how they affect specific policies and their

enforcement by lobbying and otherwise contending e.g.,Dobbin and Dowd, 2000; Schneiberg and Bartley, 2001) andby establishing precedent that affects the interpretation oflaws and the direction of policy making Haveman and Rao,1997; Stark and Bruszt, 1998; Edelman, Uggen, and Erianger,1999). These efforts form a foundation for research that con-siders the mechanisms through which organizations affectthe state, but to this point, organizational theorists have notconsidered the possibility that organizations are interdepen-dent with the state as joint contributors to the system oforder Streeck and Schmitter, 1985; Strange, 1996). This pos-

sibility has implications for our understanding of the systemof order in general and the pattern of state-organization rela-tions in particular. It must also be examined to explain theevolution of the kibbutz in a dynamic political environment.

Our argument rests on three assertions, which correspond tothree hypotheses: 1) that some organizations contribu te tosocial order and may flourish as this role expands, 2) that theopportunity for organizations to fill this role depends on thecapacity of the state, and 3) that po we rful o rder-providingorganizations may pose a threat to the state. The foundation

of these claims dates to Durkheim 1951, 1984), who arguedthat states, due to their weak connection to the population,must rely on organizations to provide order. Hechter andKanazawa 1993) made a kindred argum ent, tha t states relyon intermediating organizations to provide order becauseorganizations are closer to individuals and can therefore con-trol them more efficiently.

Although organizational theory has not yet embraced orderprovision as an explanation for the existence and growth ofcertain organizational forms, there are well-documented

examples of organizations that fulfill this role. These includefederations constituted to govern member organizations e.g., Ingram and Simons, 2000, on the Histadrut), organiza-



the system of govemance (Segev, 2001). According to Near(1992: 2), there we re three functions which the kibbutzimhad always taken on themselves—absorption [of immi-grants], settlemen t, and defen se, wh ich we re almost univer-sally seen as the priorities of Palestine's Jews. The most sig-nificant element of Jewish defense during the mandatoryperiod was the Haganah, which was the first and largest of a

number of underground armies. Largely, kibbutz membersstaffed it, and kibbutzim were the sites of its training andweapons storage. Defense and settlement were closely tiedfor the Jews of mandatory Palestine. In describing the ratio-nale for settling in a specific location, a kibbutz memberobserved that th e mere existence [of the kibbutzim] wasdetermined, sometimes as the primary consideration, basedon their abil ity to defend the 'home front' of the Jewish pop-ulation (Eilat, 2000: 157). Further illustration of the closerelationship between settlement and defense comes from aplan for a large-scale settlement scheme, devised in 1943 by

the Haganah, in which the primary considerations for settle-ment locations were strategic defense needs (Orren, 1978). 'In another form of strategic settlement, kibbutzim were locat-ed to stake Jewish claim to territory and thus affect debatesover borders (Baratz, 1954; Sherman, 1982).

As for immigration absorption, the kibbutzim actively aidedimmigrants, be it by finding them work in one of the travelingwork groups that of^ten became the seeds for new kibbutzimor by directing the immigrants to settle on an existing kibbutz(Aharoni, 1991). The kibbutzim were also a keystone of thesystem of workers' schools, hosting and staffing many ofthem. By the end of the mandate, these schools educatedhalf of Palestine's Jewish children and more than 70 percentof the children of new immigrants (Ben Chorin, 1983).

The linkage be twee n kibbutzim's service on these dimen-sions and their founding is illustrated by the kibbutzim'sresponse to the outbreak of the Arab Revolt of 1936. Thisrevolt included a general strike by Arabs, which paralyzedPalestine's government and public transportation services,and violence, including assassinations and attacks on cities,

buses, and public facilities. The Jewish response included arapid increase of militarization, including an expansion of theHaganah and modernization of its weapons (Horowitz andLissak, 1978). Demonstrating a conscious symbiosis, many ofthe new weapons were provided by the mandatory govern-ment in an effort to leverage its own defense resources(Sherman, 1997). The reaction also included a deliberateincrease in the establishment of new settlements, to rein-force previously isolated Jewish settlements and establishinitial footholds in areas that were considered to be strategi-cally important (Near, 1997; Rozenman, 1997). Throughoutthe disturbances of 1936-1939, 43 settlements, mostly kib-butzim, were founded in remote areas sparsely populated by




The Hebrew word mamlachtiyutwe translate as statism, has semantic

These arguments suggest that kibbutzim will be founded inresponse to opportunities to provide defense, settlement,and absorption in a manner analogous to the common expec-tation that an organizational form that provides a product orservice will flourish as demand for that output increases:

Hypothesis 3 (H3): Kibbutz founding wil be greater when there are

greater opportunities to provide defense, settlement, and absorp-tion,

The relationship between demand and form growth suggest-ed in hypothesis 3, however, is conditioned by competitionfrom other forms (Hannan and Freeman, 1989). Often, thestate endeavors to supply order directly and may come intocompetition with order-providing organizations, as well asmarkets and communities. The idea of substitutabilitybetween state and organizational order in specific realms isimplicit in recent analyses of order in the United States,which identify the state's reliance on indirect governance

through organizations as a response to its low capacity fordirect governance (Hamilton and Sutton, 1989; Dobbin andSutton, 1998). Competition between public and private orderappears in Greif's (1994) account of the institutions that gov-erned trade in the eleventh-century Mediterranean region,where emerging city states eventually displaced ethnic trad-ing networks.

W hile the British M andate could never be classified as astrong state, there was variance in the zeal and manpower itapplied to governing Palestine. For example, its police force

increased fivefold and its bureaucracy fourfold throughout itsyears as sovereign (not always linearly). Similarly, its attitudeto the order-provision efforts of the kibbutzim and kindredorganizations varied between encouragement and hostility,depending on its capacity to manage the society's problems(Near, 1997). An even bigger shift occurred with the transi-tion to the Israeli state in 1948. Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and other early leaders of Israel pursued a policy ofstatism that called for the centralization in the state of previ-ously dispersed mechanisms of governance (Cohen, 1987).^National objectives that had previously been pursued by thekibbutzim, and other organizations such as the Histadrut,

were seen as within the legitimate domain of the state(Horowitz and Lissak, 1978). As Ben-Gurion put it, "al nation-al initiatives will be exclusively controlled by the State's appa-ratus" (Ben Chorin, 1983: 8).

For the kibbutzim, the most salient operational impact of thispolicy was the absorption by the state of their military andeducation systems (Etzioni, 1966; Rosolio, 1999b). The inde-pendent workers' education system and the pioneering youthmovements, two critical recruitment and socialization mecha-nisms for the kibbutzim, were incorporated into the state-

controlled educational system. The Haganah and the Palmach(an elite element of the Haganah, also dominated by the kib-



state strength overall hurt the kibbutzim. Modern statesoften supply institutions that help constituent organizationsby providing surety and smoothing exchange (Ingram andSimons, 2000; Russo, 2001), and some expansions of statecapacity in Palestine and Israel must have helped kibbutzim.For exam ple, in 1933 the British Mandate appreciablyincreased the bureaucracy of the Registrar of Co-operative

Societies, which monitored the kibbutzim but also suppliedadvice and assistance to them (Hyamson, 1950: 181). There-fore, we restrict our hypothesis to the specific effect of thestate in the realms of order supply in which the kibbutzimoperated. To the extent that state capacity representedefforts to manage defense, settlement, and absorption, thesesocial needs will represent less of a stimulus to kibbutzfounding (Ben Chorin, 1983; Tzur, 1984), Thus state capacitywill moderate the impact on kibbutz founding of opportunitiesto provide order, because the more capable the state, themore likely it was to fulfill those opportunities itself.

Hypothesis 4 (H4): The state's institutional capacity will moderatethe positive effect on kibbutz founding of opportunities to providedefense, settlement, and absorption, and their effects will be small-er when the state is more capable.

Finally, we consider the possibility that organizations that pro-vide order may sometimes go beyond mere overlap with theinstitutional capacity of the state to threaten the autonomythat the state requires to manage the institutional frameworkeffectively (Rueschemeyer and Evans, 1985; Migdal, 1988;

Grinberg, 1993). Hechter and Kanazawa (1993) identified theabsence of a threat to the state's autonomy as a condition forsymbiosis between states and order-providing organizations.They didn't explain what happens if such a threat exists, butStrange (1996) did in her account of relations between theItalian state and the mafia. Her story begins with a period ofsymbiosis between the state and mafia, whe rein the statein effect delegated to the mafiosi the functions of socialintermediation and arbitration, protection of property and per-sons and the prese rvation of order (p. 115). In the 1970s,the mafia gained power relative to the state as a function of

a quantum leap in the mafia's financial resources resultingfrom the internationalization of their criminal activities. Thisshift in power caused the state to become hostile to themafia: politicians began covering up links to the mafia, andthe state attacked the mafia through the legal system.

Just when organizations will be seen as a threat to the stateis an empirical question. The threshold likely depends on thechallenge to the state's monopoly over the legitimate use ofviolence, which Weber identified as a qualifying characteristicof the state in Politics as a Vocation. This is con sistent

w ith Tilly's (1985: 173) observation that disarm ing the greatstood high on the agenda of every would-be state m aker insixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe, A Weberian



A f w readers have mistakenly assumedthai a regional analysis is equivalent tomultiplying the number of observations inour analysis by the number cf regions andthereby artificially increasing the statisticalpower of our models. While the regional-ized analysis increases the number ofunits that may experience an event, itdoes not increase the number of events.

Instead, the aggregate number of eventsis divided am ong units, and the overallrisk of an event does not increase or

heavily on institutions provided by the state Miliband, 1969),and there is evidence that the Israeli state established poli-cies that smoothed exchange between independent organiza-tions and thereby improved their life chances Ingram andSimons, 2000), The Israeli state also influenced the growth ofcommunity order, for example, by directing a disproportionateamount of the substantial external funds that were raised in

the early years of the state to moshavim and developmenttow ns as opposed to kibbutzim Tsizling, 1950; HaKibbutzHaMeuchad, 1967: 79). To the extent that the Israeli statepromoted increases in the number of corporations, moshav-im , and development towns, our analytic strategy may under-state the total influence of the state on the kibbutzim andoverstate the relative influence of market and community.

M THO S

Foundings in a population are counts of events over a dis-crete pe riod, typically a year Poisson regression is often an

appropriate method for modeling dependent variables thatare event counts King, 1988}, W ith Poisson regression asthe starting point, we considered three additional method-ological concerns to choose a modeling strategy. The firstconcern was which unit of analysis was appropriate. Organi-zational foundings are often analyzed at the level of the coun-try but are sometimes analyzed at the level of sub-countryregions e.g., Swaminathan, 1995}. For the analysis of kibbutzfoundings, there are a number of factors that favor regions asthe unit of analysis. First, the kibbutz federations sometimesmade founding decisions with consideration to what they

perceived as the optimal number of kibbutzim in a given geo-graphic region Rayman, 198 1; Katz, 1995}. So w e wo uldexpect that the influence of the number of existing kibbutzimon the founding rate would be more pronounced in smallerregions than in the country as a wh ole exploratory analysissupported this expectation}. Second, a key resource for kib-butz founding, land suitable for settlement and agriculture, isdistributed unevenly throughout the country. Modeling theavailability of land for new kibbutzim requires measures ofthe amount and type of land and of existing settlements, par-ticularly the moshavim and development towns, that may

compete for that land. The only meaningful way to do this isby operationalizing those variables in geographic regions thatare small enough to be reasonably consistent in the type ofland they represent. Third, and related, the area and type ofland available for settlement changed during the period westudied as the borders of Israel changed. This is difficult todeal with if the country is the unit of analysis, but much easi-er with smaller regions because they can be added to ordropped from the analysis depending on their feasibility forsettlement.

Given these arguments, we decided to use regions as ourunit of analysis, and our dependent variable was defined as



nemies of the State

An a lternative approach is to add a fixedeffect for each region. The fixed-effectsapproach requires fewer assumptionsthan the random-effects approach but

cannot be used if the explanatorv vari-ables include some that do not vary w i th -in regions. In our analysis, land quality

common map-grid used in maps of mandatory Palestine andIsrael. This grid divided the territory into ten-by-ten kilometersquares, which became our regions. In the early stages ofour analysis, we used a different grid because it was super-imposed on the first map we found showing all of the kib-butzim. Results of that early analysis were comparable toresults using the ten-by-ten kilometer grid, so we do notbelieve that our analysis is biased by the particular grid weused to define the regions. Our analysis included 36,800yearly observations, spread over 952 regions. Regions wereincluded in years in which they were part of Palestine, Israel,or occupied by Israel, which ranged from a minimum of 15 toa maximum of 88 years.

The second methodological concern emerges from the useof multiple regions as our unit of analysis. This approach pro-duces an unbalanced panel data structure, with repeatedannual observations of each region. A potential problem isthat observations of the same region may not be mutuallyindependent. When they are not independent, conventionalPoisson mode ls and mixed-Poisson models such as the neg-ative-binomial model) are inappropriate because they arebased on the assum ption of independence Guo, 1996). Aresponse to this problem Is to add a gamma-distributedregion-specific random effec t to the Poisson mo dels Guo,1996).® This approach, called a negative-multinomial model,makes explicit allowance for interdependent observations bymodeling unobserved influences shared by all the counts of aregion.

The third methodological concern comes from anotherassumption of the Poisson model, one of equality betweenthe conditional mean and the variance of the dependent vari-able. Often, as in our data, the variance exceeds the condi-tional mean, resulting in what is called overdispersion. Thenegative-multinomial model actually accounts for overdisper-sion. It is essen tially a nega tive-binomial m ode l a variant ofthe Poisson model that is commonly used to deal withoverdispersion) with an overdispersion parameter that variesacross regions. Hausman, Hall, and Griliches 1984) sugges t-ed a further refinement that starts wit h the negative m ultino-

mial model and makes additional assumptions about the dis-tribution of the random effect that effectively allow theoverdispersion parameter to vary across both regions andt ime. This approach, called a negative-binomial mod el w ithrandom effects, yielded a better fit to our data as indicatedby log-likelihood statistics, so we used it in the results report-ed below, although results were comparable in all respectswith the less restrictive negative-multinomial model. Themodel we estimated with the xtnbreg command in STATAwas of the form:

\ e . = exp x,,p) e,.



represents the vector of independent variables and coeffi-cients for region i in year j .

ata and Variables

We collected the data from a number of historical andarchival sources. Most useful were a large number of mapsthat identified the location and founding dates of kibbutzim,

moshavim, development towns, and other towns; the bound-aries of the Jewish population of Palestine and of the Stateof Israel; and land type and amount of annual rainfall. TheStatistical Abstract of Israel (various years) and comparablevolumes compiled under the British Mandate provided dataon population, immigration, number of corporations, andnumber of state bureaucrats.

Following our hypotheses, our models included densities(counts) of corporations (HI), moshavim, and developmenttowns (H2). Because moshavim and development townscompete with kibbutzim for suitable land on which to settle,we operationalized their densities at the local level as thecount in a given region.^ Corporation density is only availablein aggregate, and in any case, the arguments supportinghypothesis 1 suggest a society-wide c omp etition betw eenkibbutzim and corporations. The density variables, like alltime-changing variables in our analysis, were updated at thebeginning of each year. We also included a moving averageof the percentage of Jewish immigrants over the precedingfive years who were from Asia and Africa to test theSephardic dimension of community influence (H2).

Following the norms of ecological analysis, we also includedthe d ensity of the kibbutz popu lation. A population s ow ndensity has been argued to represent processes of legitima-tion and competition (Hannan and Freeman, 1989). Legitima-cy increases at a decreasing rate with density and increasesa population s founding rate. Comp etition increases at anincreasing rate with density and decreases the founding rate.These two processes combine to support a prediction of anon-monotonic effect of density on founding, with foundingincreasing and then decreasing with density. Kibbutz densityand its square were included in our models to capture this

non-monotonic effect. As noted, kibbutz-federation policy andexploratory analysis indicated that the effects of kibbutz den-sity were strongest at the regional level, so we measuredkibbutz density at the regional level. Following convention,we logged the first-order kibbutz density measure (Barron,West, and Hannan, 1994). In supplementary analyses, wealso included kibbutz density outside the region, which didnot improve the fit of our models.

To measure op portunities to provide defense, settlem ent,and absorption (H3), we used three variables that reflect thenear unanimity that the greatest challenges to Jewish societyin Palestine and Israel came from a rapidly growing popula-t ion, the threat of political violence, and the desire to win ter-




For the m andate period, we relied on

Haganah (1954), whic h categorized asrepresenting h eightened polit ical violenceand tension the years of the first(1920-1921) and second (1936-1939)Arab revolts, the period of World War II inthe Middle East (which began in 1940),and the years from the end of World WarII to the end of the war that began withthe UN partit ioning of Palestine in 1948.For the Israel period, we take the periodsof the Sinai War 11956), the Six-Day War(1967), the 1973 War, the Lebanon War(1982), and the first Palestinian Intifada(1989) to represent heightened politicalviolence and tension.

8Reliable statistics were not available forthe period we studied for other relevantstate participants such as soldiers andprison staff, but we would expect theseto be highly correlated with the numberof bureaucrats.

In a previous analysis of the failure ofIsraeli workers' cooperatives (Ingram andSimons. 2000), we used the Israeli-statedum my variable to represent an increasein the state's capacity to govern and didnot include a measure of the size of the

bureaucracy. In supplementary analyses(available from the authors), we reesti-mated the models from Ingram and

tension between the Jewish population and surrounding Arabpopulations.'' The third is contested region which is a codingby region based on two conditions. First, we consider itsproximity to a border contested by an Arab population. If theregion spans a contested border (for example, the borderwith Egypt before Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai Desert in1982 or the borders with Syria or the West Bank at any time)

it is coded as 3; if it is within 5 kilometers of a contested bor-der, it receives a code of 2; and if it is within 10 kilometers ofa contested border, the code is 1. If it qualifies as contestedaccording to the first condition, we consider whether it hasany non-kibbutz Jewish settlement (city, town, village, agri-cultural center, etc.); if not, the contention code is set to 0.So the contested region variable is a function of proximity toa contested border, wit h the caveat that there m ust be somekind of non-kibbutz Jewish settlement. A region that wasnear a contested border but did not attract any Jewish civil-ians, such as much of the inhospitable Sinai Desert, did not

qualify as contested—kibbutzim might settle there for theirow n p urposes, but doing so could not be interpreted as acontribution to the collective needs of the Jewish society.

We interacted these three variables with the variable stateinstitutional capacity to test H4, about competition from thestate to provide defense, settlement, and absorption. Thisvariable was operationalized using a count of the number ofstate bureaucrats and police divided by 100,000 and loggedfor scaling.^ Relying on the size of the bureaucracy as theindication of state institutional capacity reflects Weber's argu

ment that bureaucracy is the foundation of authority for themodern state (Gerth and Mills, 1946) and captures the coredeterminants of state capacity as described by Skocpol(1985), Of course Weber's and Skocpol's arguments indicatethat the po wer of bureaucracy is not merely a function of itssize. Both the British and the Israelis employed professionalbureaucracies, but differences in the institutional capacity ofeach, controlling for size, might emerge due to other sourcesof bureaucratic effectiveness, We investigated this possibilityempirically by testing for a differential impact of institutionalcapacity between the British Mandate and the State of Israel

and found no difference. Another option for measuring insti-tutional capacity is to consider specific state policies relevantto defense, settlement, and absorption (Russo, 2001). Wecouldn't employ this option because we don't know the largeset of relevant policies employed by the British Mandate andState of Israel. In our context, however, it is not clear that ref-erence to specific policies would be preferable, because forthe embattled and fledgling states we consider, the question Cou ld it be imp lem en ted? mu st be asked of any policy.Hypothesis 5, on the impact of the delegitimation campaignthat the new State of Israel launched on the kibbutzim, was

operationalized with a dichotomous variable, Israeli statewhich was coded 1 in years after the formation of the Israelistate.®



Table 1

from appropriate maps. In consultation with an Israeli agrono-mist, we assigned a value of to land types that were mostappropriate for agriculture (e.g., the coastal plain and the Yis-rael Valley); one-half was given to land of mixed quality (e.g.,the Galilee Hills): 0 represented land that was not well suitedfor agriculture (e.g., the Judean Hills) and desert. Since thisvariable was based on land area of the various types, it alsoreflects the fact that regions had less opportunity for kibbutzsettlement if they were less than 100 square kilometersbecause they spanned borders or bodies of water. The rain

fall v ri ble represents the average annual rainfall in centime-ters in the region. Controls also included the main effect ofstate institutional capacity and the de nsity of to wns in aregion to capture a potential source of land competition forkibbutzim . Table 1 presents correlations and de scriptive sta-tistics for all variables.

Descriptive Statistics

Variable

1. Kibbutz founding2. Jewish population3. Political violence4. Contested region5. State institulional capacity6. State of Israel7. Corporation d ensity8. Kibbutz density9. |Kibbutzdensity)7iO

10. Moshav density11. Town density ,12. Land quality13. Rainfall14. of Imm igrants from Asia and Africa15. Development town density

Variable

8. Kibbutz density9. (Kibbutz density)7iO

10. Moshav density11. Town density12. Land quality13. Rainfall14. of Imm igrants from Asia and Africa15. Development town density

Mean

.00820.029

.376

.30010.354

.65823.400-1.842

12 8 527.251.230

2.327.221.050

7

.17

.10

.18

.17-.07- .09

.04

.13

S . D .

.09714.04

.484

.851M 4 1

.47420.41

1.111.620

1.837.835.328

2.386.184.251

8

.61

.43

.32

.51

.43

.15

.29

1

-.05.05.05

-.03- .06- .06

.10

.04

.01

.03

.110900

-.01

9

.21

.23

.30

.22

.09

.22

2

.03

.16

.92

.89

.97

.16

.10

.17

.14- .11- .14

.17

.13

10

.43

.44

.34

.12

.44

3

.03

.12-.03

.04

.05

.02

.02

.04

.03

.03

.10

.01

11

.8

.39

.01

.28

4

.11

.11

.18

.33

.26

.29

.34

.38

.38 05.14

12

.81-.04

.23

5

1

.92

.81

.16

.10

.16

.08- .15- .19

.37

.12

13

-.05.20

6

.79

.16

.10

.17

.08-.14- .18

50.14

14

.11

RESULTS

Table 2 presents nested negative-binomial models with ran-dom e ffects. Model 1 is a base model, to which models 2and 3 add additional variables. M odel 4 adds a variable repre-

senting the year to rule out the possibility that our resultsdepend on some unobserved historical trend. Chi-squaredtests indicated that each model improves on the previous




Table 2

Negative-Binomial Mod els with Random Effects of Kibbutz

Variable

Jewish population

Jewish population x State institutional capacity

Political violence

Political violence x State institutional capacity

Contested region

Contested region x State institutional capacity

State institutional capacity

State of Israel

Corporation density

Kibbutz density

{Kibbutz densityF

Moshav density

Town density

Land quality

Rainfall

% of Immigrants from Asia and Africa

Development town density

Calendar year

Intercept

Log-likelihood

' p < , 0 5 ; - p < ,01 ,

Mo d e l

.319' *(.043)

. 5 90(.1561

,138 '(.072)

.537 '

.241)

- . 30 3 ' *

(.027).289 ' *(.081)

- , 4 1 2 -(.131)

- , 1 6 7 -(.049).030

(.089)2 . 9 6 1 -(.371).084*

(.047)- 1 . 8 8 0 -

(.423)- 1 . 0 9 4 -

.438)

-8 .408(2.18)

1289.96

: Founding, 1910-1997

1 Mode l 2

, 3 3 1 -(.041)

.306(.187)

,139'(.073)

.587 '

(.243)- 1 . 3 2 3 -

(.457)- , 2 8 3 -

(.028), 2 8 1 -(.081)

- , 4 0 3 -(.131)

- . 1 5 8 -(.049).023

(.089)2 . 9 5 7 -(.370).085*

(.047)-.541

(.625)- 1 . 0 1 0 -

(.438)

- 8 . 8 3 6(2.21)

1285.66

Model 3

1 .425 -(.300)

- . 1 0 2 -(.027)

3 .4 6 3 '(1.83)- . 3 1 6 '(.179)

2 , 0 2 7 -(.709)

- . 1 8 5 -(.069).532*

(.248)- 1 . 3 0 9 -

(.422)- . 1 9 8 -

(.031),192*(.087)

- . 4 0 1 -(.132)

- . 1 4 6 -(.051)

- .004

(.096)3 . 1 6 3 -(.396).090 '

(.051)-1 .433*

(.715)- 1 . 0 4 2 -

(.438)

-9,054(2.29)

1275,10

Model 4

1 .114(.378)

- . 0 7 8(.033)

3.414*(1,817)- . 31 0 *(.178)

2 . 0 8 9(.717)

- . 1 9 1

(.070).025

(.441}- 1 . 0 6 2 '

(.461)- . 2 0 9

(.032).180 '(.089)

- . 4 0 3(.132)

- , 1 4 5(.051)

- .006(.097)

3 . 1 9 0(.401).090 '

(.051)- .999

(.777)- 1 . 0 2 7

(.438).0478

(.035)-5.421(3463)

1274.13

In model 3, corporation density has a negative coefficient,

supporting H I , that the kibbutz suffered from com petitionfrom the capitalist system. Moshav density, the percentageof immigrants from Africa and Asia, and the density of devel-opment towns all have negative coefficients, as predicted byH2. These three variables together show that kibbutz found-ing was lower as a function of the availability of alternativesettlements that had more traditional patterns of communityrelations and as a function of the increasing proportion ofSephardic immigrants who were associated with more tradi-tional com munity values.

The Jewish population, political violence, and contestedregion variables all have positive coefficients. This indicatesthat, consistent with H3, the founding rate was higher when



tion the points in time when state institutional capacity elimi-nates kibbutzim's opportunities to provide order by taking thederivative of the kibbutz founding rate with respect to theopportunities variables (Schoonhoven, 1981). These calcula-tions indicate that Jewish population had a positive effect onkibbutz founding for the whole of the period we study, whilefor political violence and contested region, the interactions

overwhelm the main effects in the year 1967. This method ofinterpretation can be extended to consider the magnitudeand statistical significance of the opportunities variables atvarious points in history based on linear combinations of theirmain effects and interactions with state institutional capacity{Friedrich, 1982), The coefficients in table 3 show the impactof Jewish population, political violence, and contested region,conditional on the level of state institutional capacity at differ-ent times.

Table 3 shows that the impact of Jewish population on kib-butz founding is positive and significant throughout the peri-od we studied, with a magnitude that is substantial evenwhen state institutional capacity is at its highest, at the endof our period of analysis. Political violence represented a 138-percent increase in founding when state institutional capacitywas at its 1917 level, 44 percent higher given the Institutionalcapacity in the last year of the British Mandate {1948}, but nosignificant increase given the institutional capacity in theState of Israel's first post-war year (1950). Highly contestedregions had almost six times (463 percent) the founding rate

Table 3

Effects on Kibbutz Founding of Opp ortun ities to Provide Order onditionai on the Level of State Institution ai

apacity

Year

1917

1936

1948

1950

1967

Historic

Signif icance

First year of theBritish Mandate

Second ArabRevolt

UN Partition anddeclaration ofState of Israel

First post-war yearof State of Israel

Six-Day War

Level ofState Insti-

tu t iona l

Capacity

8.216899

9.282475

9.804496

10.03283

10.9802

11

Condit ional Coeff ic ients

Jewish

popu la-

t ion

, 5 8 6 -(.081). 4 7 7 -

(.057). 4 2 4 -

(.048)

. 4 0 1 -(.045). 3 0 4 -

(.041)

Polit ical

vio lence

.869*(.399).533»

(-249),368

(.203)

.296(.193)

-.003(.240)

Contest-

ed

region

5 1 1 -1157). 3 1 4 -

(.100). 2 1 8 -

(.082)

.176*(079)

.001(.096)

Mult ip l ier of the Founding Rate for:

Jewish

popu la t ion ,

evaluated at

7.167, its

level when

the State ofIsrael vi/as

declared in

1948

6568%

2953%

1988%

1671%

784%

Polit ical

v io lence.evaluated at

i t s max imum

of 1

138%

70%

44%

Non-significant

Non-significant

1

Contested

reg ion.evaluated at

i t s max imum

of 3

463%

257%

192%

170%

Non-significant




of non-contested regions under the lower-capacity BritishMandate of 1917, and still almost three times the rate inIsrael s first year (170 p ercent), but co ntestation s effe ct onthe founding rate fell to non-significance with the growth instate institutional capacity that happened between 1950 and1967. Although the conditional coefficients for political vio-lence and contested region are negative in years after 1967,they are never significant, so it is not the case that the kib-

butz rate is ever lower as a function of those factors.

The effects in table 3 illustrate clearly that kibbutz foundingdepended not just significantly but substantially on the opportunities to provide order to the Jews of Palestine and Israel.They also illustrate the interdependence between the benefithat those opportunities represented and the growth of statecapacity, with the founding rate becoming less and lessresponsive to the needs of the society as the state s capaci-ty, represented by the size of the bureaucracy, grew. The dif-ferences between the effects of Jewish population, political

violence, and contested region are also notable. The kibbutz-im played a significant role of absorption throughout thewhole of their history (the 1990 wave of immigrants to Israelfrom the Soviet Union was a small boon for the kibbutzim;Near, 1997). The state displaced the kibbutz completely, however, from its role of settling contested regions and respond-ing to political violence in the years between 1948 and 1967,This difference is suggestive as to which functions a statemay rely on order-providing organizations for and which itmust fulfill itself. The results lend support to the Weberiannotion that the potential for state-organization symbiosis is

influenced by the state s need to maintain a monopoly overthe use of violence.

Hypothesis 5 is supported by the negative coefficient in table2 for the State of Israel variable. Independent of the effectsof opportunities for order and state capacity, kibbutzim wereless likely to be founded after Israel was formed and its lead-ers engaged in a campaign to delegitimize the kibbutz. Themain effect of state institutional capacity is positive. Althoughwe made no prediction about this variable, the positive resulis consistent with previous arguments that the general contri

butions of the state to provide order help organizations(Ingram and Simons, 2000; Russo, 2001).

The other variables in the model yield interesting results. Kib-butz density has the non-monotonic effect on founding pre-dicted by the theory of density dependence, with foundingfirst increasing and then decreasing with density. Town densty was not significant. This provided greater confidence thatthe results we found for development-town density areattributable to the association of these settlements withSephardic immigration and are not confounded with someother influence of non-agricultural settlements on kibbutzfounding. Finally, the level of rainfall had a positive effect onthe founding rate, and kibbutzim were significantly more like-



mentary analysis (available from the authors), we tested thatpossibility by looking for differential effects of independentvariables on the founding rates of the three main kibbutz fed-erations, The differences were of degree, not kind, anddepended on the relative emphasis the federations placed onZionism and socialism. The Ichud federation was strongest inZionist ideology and had the closest political links to theIsraeli state. It was the most responsive federation to oppor-tunities to provide settlement, defense, and absorption {H3)and, consequently, the most affected by the growing capaci-ty of the state in those realms (H4). Notably, it did not sufferfrom the state s delegitimizing a ttacks, reflecting its closeralignment with the state and its leaders. The more socialistfederations (Meuhad and Artzi) were affected less dramatical-ly by opportunities to supply order and by indirect competi-tion from state capacity but suffered notably from the delegit-imizing attacks of the state (H5). These federations had moreexplicit hostilities with the state and therefore were the tar-get of its political campaign of self-protection. This adds sup-port to our argument that it was the threat posed by the kib-butzim that evoked the hostile response of the state. Theextra analysis also adds texture to the effect of capitalistcompetition. The negative impact of capitalist organizationson the federations increased from left to most-left, with theradical-Marxist Artzi federation suffering most as the capital-ist economy grew.

Additionally, we estimated our full model using an alternativeoperationalization of the growth of the capitalist economy,

demand deposits in banks, rather than the number of corpo-rations. The demand-deposit variable was negative and highlysignificant, consistent with H I , although this m odel did not fitour data as well as model 3. Finally, we tested for non-monotonic effects of moshav and corporation density, assuggested by arguments that rival populations first improvecohesion in the focal population before their competitiveimpact takes over (Swaminathan and Wade, 2001), Moshavand corporate density had monotonic effects, likely becausethe kibbutzim had more salient sources of cohesion thantheir rivalries with these populations.

DISCUSSION

The implications of the kibbutz case for theory concern theinterdependence between organizations and other institution-al forms. Thriving literatures examine the interdependenciesbetween organizations and markets and between organiza-tions and community governance. We think that the biggesttheoretical opportunity of our study is the conceptualizationof the interdependence between organizations and states.Many recent analyses indicate that the state is an importantdeterminant of organizational performance and the dynamicsof organizational populations, and some show that organiza-tional influence and example affect state policy. We compli-



nemies of the State

These concepts manifest themselves somewhat differentlyin state-organization relations than they do in relationsbetween different organizational forms. The field of interac-tion is stacked in the sta te s favor, such that it is hard toimagine conditions that would see organizations destroy thestate in a way that one organizational form sometimesdestroys another. Nevertheless, the state may face threats t

its autonomy from organizations, and these may induce it torespond with hostility, as the Israeli state responded to thekibbutzim in the 1950s. And although the state may have thepower to decide where and when it will govern itself, andwhen it will allow organizations to supply order, it is con-strained in this choice by its own capacity and influenced bythe capacity and orientation of organizations that supplyorder. The pattern of organizational influence on the statedemonstrated here is indirect, with the power and presenceof the kibbutzim influencing the state s choices on ho w togovern and which organizational forms to support, but it is

nonetheless real. We believe also that it is systematic andthat consideration of the power of organizations that supplyorder and of state capacity and autonomy will help analystsunderstand the actions of the state in other contexts.

This approach stands in contrast to the common (but not universal) treatment of the state as exogenous in organizationaltheories, a treatm ent that can be attributed to the fact thatthe field has developed with a focus on national environ-ments in which state capacity has been stable and stateautonomy rarely challenged. Without variance on thosedimensions, it is difficult to explain why the state acts as itdoes. Even so, important theory has emerged from therecognition that state capacity in the U.S. is low relative toother Western states (Hamilton and Sutton, 1989; Dobbin,1994; Dobbin and Sutton, 1998). Emergent states, morecommon in the last generation than at any other time in his-tory, provide plenty of variance of capacity and autonomy,with corresponding dynamism in their relations with order-providing organizations. And according to Strange (1996), thepower of the state is everywhere declining relative to that oforganizations such as mafias. International professional firms

cartels, and transnational corporations, as well as intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. These relationsand trends indicate that a com prehens ive mod el of state-organizational interdependence is important for explainingorganizational behavior and performance in all types of statesand will probably be more important in the future.

The potential for symbiosis, competition, and rivalry betweenstates and organizations reminds us that a strictly materialistanalysis is insu fficient to capture organizations role in theeconomy and society (Hannan and Freeman, 1989). Organizational forms of all types represent theories of power and

order, and these must be taken into account to explain rela-tionships between forms and between organizations and



12Using the Poisson regression resultsmade programming the simulation mucheasier. These results are substantivelysimilar to those reported in table 3 and,as the historical part of the simulation(1910 to 1949 in figure 3) indicates, pro-duce accurate predictions for kibbutzfounding in the aggregate.

under the assumption that the State of Israel did not employa statist strategy of bureaucracy building or engage in thecampaign to delegitimize the kibbutzim. W e conducted a sim-ulation of the grov\^h of the kibbutz population without thenegative effect of the State of Israel dummy variable, keep-ing the state institutional capacity variable at its 1948 level insubsequent years. The simulation takes all other variables attheir historical values and estimates their impact on thefounding rate using coefficients from a Poisson-regressionversion of model 3 . Figure 3 presents the mean kibbutzdensity, and the 95 percent confidence interval of that esti-mate, from 100 iterations of the simulation.

The simulation indicates that the kibbutz population wouldhave been substantially larger by 1997 were it not for statecompetition and rivalry (456 kibbutzim, compared with the267 that actually existed). Of course, if the state had beendifferent, and if the kibbutz population had been larger, otherinfluences on kibbutz founding would have been different

also. For example, had the kibbutz retained control over theeducation of immigrants, and the resulting ideological hege-mony, the resistance of the Sephardim to the kibbutz mayhave been deflated or reversed. As for the capitalist organiza-t ions, the arguments supporting hypothesis can bereversed to suggest that more kibbutzim would have reducedthe number of corporations. We have conducted other simu-lations that indicate that even a small decrease in the numberof corporations could result in a very large increase in thenumber of kibbutzim. For example, simulations using a post-1949 growth rate of the corporation population of 6 percent,

instead of the historic six-and-two-thirds, produce, on aver-age, 3,057 kibbutzim by 1997.

The point of introducing these simulations is simply to showthat in the absence of competition and rivalry from the state.

Figure 3. Simulations of kibbutz po pulation evolution.

600

5

E

a 400

300

200

100

Sinai Desert Evacuat ion




the kibbutz population might have been much larger than it now. The possibility of an altemative outcome of the kibbutz ex perim en t should serve as a caution, not just for the evauation of utopianism but also for broader comparisons ofinstitutional alternatives. Since the fall of state socialism,social scientific analysis has shifted away from the compari-son of capitalism to its alternatives and toward the compari-son of alternate forms of capitalism (e.g.. Stark and Bruszt,

1998). By showing that capitalism alone did not defeat thekibbutz, our analysis suggests that this shift may be prema-ture. In Israel, as elsewhere, the rise of capitalism rests notonly on the advantages of capitalist organization and marketbut also on a symbiosis with a very specific type of state(Miliband, 1969). Just as we think that there are realistic instutional configurations under which the kibbutz could havefared much better, we recognize the possibility that there aras yet untried combinations of institutional forces that mayproduce systems that can compete with capitalism.

The interdependence between the kibbutz and the state isthe source of the most original theoretical implications of ouanalysis. The interdependencies among market, communityand organization are fairly prominent in organizational theoryIdeas about the relationship between organizations andstates, however, are less developed. Although the state isnever absent from accounts of the rise and fall of organiza-tional populations, it is treated mostly as an exogenous forcthat bestows or withholds favor for unknown or unanalyzedreasons. In contrast, the kibbutz case shows that the role ofthe state can be at least partially explained by considering itsautonomy and capacity and the strength of the organizationapopulations with which it interacts. The effect of the kibbutzon the state was an indirect one of shaping the state'sapproach to govemance rather than directly modifying itsstructure or policies. The subtlety of this effect may explainwhy analysts have so far underemphasized the potential fororganizations to influence states. At the same time, it sug-gests that the interdependence of states and organizationsmay operate through diffuse and complex paths to funda-mentally affect both forms in a way that Is obscured by themore obvious differences in their power.

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